@bookedsolid/rea 0.34.0 → 0.35.0

package/dist/hooks/blocked-paths-bash-gate/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+/**
+ * Node-binary port of `hooks/blocked-paths-bash-gate.sh`.
+ *
+ * 0.35.0 Phase 3 port (paired tier-1 scanner-shim). This was a thin
+ * bash shim over `rea hook scan-bash --mode blocked` — the heavy
+ * lifting (the parser-backed AST walker that closes 9 bypass classes
+ * from helix-023 + discord-ops Round 13) lives in `src/hooks/bash-
+ * scanner/`.
+ *
+ * The Node-binary port preserves the same byte-for-byte verdict shape
+ * and exit-code contract but eliminates the bash-shim → node-CLI →
+ * scanner-module subprocess hop. The caller is now `rea hook blocked-
+ * paths-bash-gate`, which calls `runBlockedScan` directly.
+ *
+ * Behavioral contract — preserves the bash hook byte-for-byte:
+ *
+ *   1. HALT check → exit 2 with shared banner.
+ *   2. Read stdin via `parseHookPayload`. Empty/missing command → exit 0
+ *      (the bash gate's `[[ -z "$payload" ]] && exit 0` guard).
+ *   3. Non-Bash tool calls bypass — Claude Code's hook matcher already
+ *      filters to Bash but defense-in-depth.
+ *   4. Load policy permissively (a partial/migrating policy.yaml with
+ *      unknown keys must NOT collapse the `blocked_paths` list — same
+ *      lesson from 0.33.0 round-1 P3 + 0.34.0 round-2 P2).
+ *   5. Empty `blocked_paths` → allow (no-op). Mirrors
+ *      `runBlockedScan({ blockedPaths: [] }, cmd)` short-circuit.
+ *   6. Run `runBlockedScan` against the command.
+ *   7. Verdict `block` → exit 2 with the scanner's reason. Verdict
+ *      `allow` → exit 0.
+ *
+ * Audit-log parity: emits a `rea.hook.blocked-paths-bash-gate` entry
+ * (best-effort, never blocks the verdict on audit failure).
+ */
+import path from 'node:path';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import { parse as parseYaml } from 'yaml';
+import { checkHalt, formatHaltBanner } from '../_lib/halt-check.js';
+import { parseHookPayload, MalformedPayloadError, TypePayloadError, readStdinWithTimeout, } from '../_lib/payload.js';
+import { runBlockedScan } from '../bash-scanner/index.js';
+import { appendAuditRecord, InvocationStatus, Tier } from '../../audit/append.js';
+/**
+ * Load `blocked_paths` from `<reaRoot>/.rea/policy.yaml` permissively.
+ *
+ * Why not `loadPolicy`? The strict zod loader refuses partial / unknown
+ * keys (it's strict-mode by design). A consumer running a migrating
+ * policy.yaml or holding legacy keys would have their `blocked_paths`
+ * effectively wiped — silently. The bash gate's pre-0.35.0 yaml grep
+ * scanned for the key directly with no schema validation; we mirror
+ * that permissive posture by reading `blocked_paths` from the parsed
+ * YAML directly without validation.
+ *
+ * Returns `[]` on any failure (missing file, bad YAML, missing key,
+ * unexpected type). Empty list is the "no enforcement" no-op state.
+ */
+function loadBlockedPathsPermissive(reaRoot) {
+    const policyPath = path.join(reaRoot, '.rea', 'policy.yaml');
+    if (!fs.existsSync(policyPath))
+        return [];
+    let raw;
+    try {
+        raw = fs.readFileSync(policyPath, 'utf8');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return [];
+    }
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = parseYaml(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return [];
+    }
+    if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+        return [];
+    }
+    const obj = parsed;
+    const bp = obj['blocked_paths'];
+    if (!Array.isArray(bp))
+        return [];
+    const out = [];
+    for (const entry of bp) {
+        if (typeof entry === 'string' && entry.length > 0) {
+            out.push(entry);
+        }
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+/**
+ * Pure executor. Returns `{ exitCode, stderr, verdict }`; the CLI
+ * wrapper translates them into `process.stderr.write` + `process.exit`.
+ */
+export async function runBlockedPathsBashGate(options = {}) {
+    const reaRoot = options.reaRoot ?? process.env['CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR'] ?? process.cwd();
+    let stderr = '';
+    const writeStderr = (s) => {
+        stderr += s;
+        if (options.stderrWrite)
+            options.stderrWrite(s);
+    };
+    // 1. HALT check.
+    const halt = checkHalt(reaRoot);
+    if (halt.halted) {
+        writeStderr(formatHaltBanner(halt.reason));
+        return { exitCode: 2, stderr, verdict: { verdict: 'block', reason: 'rea HALT active' } };
+    }
+    // 2. Read + parse stdin.
+    const stdinRaw = options.stdinOverride !== undefined
+        ? options.stdinOverride
+        : await readStdinWithTimeout(5_000);
+    let toolName = '';
+    let cmd = '';
+    try {
+        const payload = parseHookPayload(stdinRaw);
+        toolName = payload.toolName;
+        cmd = payload.command;
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof MalformedPayloadError || err instanceof TypePayloadError) {
+            writeStderr(`blocked-paths-bash-gate: ${err.message} — refusing on uncertainty.\n`);
+            return { exitCode: 2, stderr, verdict: { verdict: 'block', reason: err.message } };
+        }
+        throw err;
+    }
+    // 3. Non-Bash tool calls bypass.
+    if (toolName !== '' && toolName !== 'Bash') {
+        return { exitCode: 0, stderr, verdict: null };
+    }
+    // 4. Empty command → allow.
+    if (cmd.length === 0) {
+        return { exitCode: 0, stderr, verdict: null };
+    }
+    // 5. Load policy permissively.
+    const blockedPaths = loadBlockedPathsPermissive(reaRoot);
+    // 6. Empty list → allow.
+    if (blockedPaths.length === 0) {
+        return { exitCode: 0, stderr, verdict: { verdict: 'allow' } };
+    }
+    // 7. Scan.
+    const verdict = runBlockedScan({ reaRoot, blockedPaths }, cmd);
+    // 8. Audit — best-effort, never changes verdict.
+    try {
+        await appendAuditRecord(reaRoot, {
+            tool_name: 'rea.hook.blocked-paths-bash-gate',
+            server_name: 'rea',
+            tier: Tier.Read,
+            status: verdict.verdict === 'allow' ? InvocationStatus.Allowed : InvocationStatus.Denied,
+            metadata: {
+                verdict: verdict.verdict,
+                ...(verdict.detected_form !== undefined ? { detected_form: verdict.detected_form } : {}),
+                ...(verdict.hit_pattern !== undefined ? { hit_pattern: verdict.hit_pattern } : {}),
+                command_preview: cmd.slice(0, 256),
+            },
+        });
+    }
+    catch {
+        /* best-effort */
+    }
+    if (verdict.verdict === 'block') {
+        if (typeof verdict.reason === 'string' && verdict.reason.length > 0) {
+            writeStderr(verdict.reason + '\n');
+        }
+        return { exitCode: 2, stderr, verdict };
+    }
+    return { exitCode: 0, stderr, verdict };
+}
+/**
+ * CLI entry point — `rea hook blocked-paths-bash-gate`.
+ */
+export async function runHookBlockedPathsBashGate(options = {}) {
+    const result = await runBlockedPathsBashGate({
+        ...options,
+        stderrWrite: (s) => process.stderr.write(s),
+    });
+    process.exit(result.exitCode);
+}

package/dist/hooks/blocked-paths-enforcer/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/**
+ * Node-binary port of `hooks/blocked-paths-enforcer.sh`.
+ *
+ * 0.35.0 Phase 4 port (paired Write/Edit tier). Enforces
+ * `policy.blocked_paths` against Write/Edit/MultiEdit/NotebookEdit
+ * tool calls. Sibling of `blocked-paths-bash-gate` (Bash-tier) — same
+ * policy data, different surface.
+ *
+ * Behavioral contract — preserves the bash hook byte-for-byte:
+ *
+ *   1. HALT check → exit 2 with shared banner.
+ *   2. Read stdin, extract `tool_input.file_path` (or `notebook_path`).
+ *      Missing/empty → exit 0.
+ *   3. Load policy permissively (a partial / migrating policy.yaml
+ *      must NOT collapse the blocked_paths list).
+ *   4. Empty `blocked_paths` → exit 0.
+ *   5. §5a path-traversal rejection. Refuses any path with a `..`
+ *      segment in EITHER the raw form OR the normalized form. Also
+ *      catches URL-encoded traversal (`%2E%2E/`, `..%2F`, etc.)
+ *      against the raw input.
+ *   6. §5a-bis interior `/./` segment rejection (0.29.0 helix-/./-class).
+ *      NORMALIZED form only — `normalize_path` already strips leading
+ *      `./` segments, so anything remaining is interior by construction.
+ *   7. Agent-writable allow-list short-circuit (`.rea/tasks.jsonl`,
+ *      `.rea/audit/`) — even if blocked_paths includes `.rea/` as a
+ *      prefix block, these are PM-data writeables.
+ *   8. Match the normalized path against each blocked entry:
+ *        - directory prefix (entry ends with `/`)
+ *        - glob (entry contains `*`)
+ *        - exact (lower-case, case-INSENSITIVE)
+ *      Match → exit 2 with reason.
+ *   9. §H.2 intermediate-symlink resolution. If the parent dir exists,
+ *      resolve its realpath. If the resolved target falls inside a
+ *      blocked entry, refuse.
+ *
+ * Audit-log parity: emits a `rea.hook.blocked-paths-enforcer` entry.
+ */
+import type { Buffer } from 'node:buffer';
+export interface BlockedPathsEnforcerOptions {
+    reaRoot?: string;
+    stdinOverride?: string | Buffer;
+    stderrWrite?: (s: string) => void;
+}
+export interface BlockedPathsEnforcerResult {
+    exitCode: number;
+    stderr: string;
+    /** Test seam — when the gate blocks, the matched blocked-paths entry. */
+    matched: string | null;
+}
+export declare function runBlockedPathsEnforcer(options?: BlockedPathsEnforcerOptions): Promise<BlockedPathsEnforcerResult>;
+export declare function runHookBlockedPathsEnforcer(options?: BlockedPathsEnforcerOptions): Promise<void>;

package/dist/hooks/blocked-paths-enforcer/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+/**
+ * Node-binary port of `hooks/blocked-paths-enforcer.sh`.
+ *
+ * 0.35.0 Phase 4 port (paired Write/Edit tier). Enforces
+ * `policy.blocked_paths` against Write/Edit/MultiEdit/NotebookEdit
+ * tool calls. Sibling of `blocked-paths-bash-gate` (Bash-tier) — same
+ * policy data, different surface.
+ *
+ * Behavioral contract — preserves the bash hook byte-for-byte:
+ *
+ *   1. HALT check → exit 2 with shared banner.
+ *   2. Read stdin, extract `tool_input.file_path` (or `notebook_path`).
+ *      Missing/empty → exit 0.
+ *   3. Load policy permissively (a partial / migrating policy.yaml
+ *      must NOT collapse the blocked_paths list).
+ *   4. Empty `blocked_paths` → exit 0.
+ *   5. §5a path-traversal rejection. Refuses any path with a `..`
+ *      segment in EITHER the raw form OR the normalized form. Also
+ *      catches URL-encoded traversal (`%2E%2E/`, `..%2F`, etc.)
+ *      against the raw input.
+ *   6. §5a-bis interior `/./` segment rejection (0.29.0 helix-/./-class).
+ *      NORMALIZED form only — `normalize_path` already strips leading
+ *      `./` segments, so anything remaining is interior by construction.
+ *   7. Agent-writable allow-list short-circuit (`.rea/tasks.jsonl`,
+ *      `.rea/audit/`) — even if blocked_paths includes `.rea/` as a
+ *      prefix block, these are PM-data writeables.
+ *   8. Match the normalized path against each blocked entry:
+ *        - directory prefix (entry ends with `/`)
+ *        - glob (entry contains `*`)
+ *        - exact (lower-case, case-INSENSITIVE)
+ *      Match → exit 2 with reason.
+ *   9. §H.2 intermediate-symlink resolution. If the parent dir exists,
+ *      resolve its realpath. If the resolved target falls inside a
+ *      blocked entry, refuse.
+ *
+ * Audit-log parity: emits a `rea.hook.blocked-paths-enforcer` entry.
+ */
+import path from 'node:path';
+import fs from 'node:fs';
+import { parse as parseYaml } from 'yaml';
+import { checkHalt, formatHaltBanner } from '../_lib/halt-check.js';
+import { parseWriteHookPayload, MalformedPayloadError, TypePayloadError, readStdinWithTimeout, } from '../_lib/payload.js';
+import { normalizePath, hasTraversalSegment, hasInteriorDotSegment, resolveCanonRoot, resolveParentRealpath, } from '../_lib/path-normalize.js';
+import { appendAuditRecord, InvocationStatus, Tier } from '../../audit/append.js';
+const AGENT_WRITABLE = ['.rea/tasks.jsonl', '.rea/audit/'];
+/** Match `pathLc` against a single blocked entry. Returns true on hit. */
+function matchBlockedEntry(pathLc, blockedEntry) {
+    const entryLc = blockedEntry.toLowerCase();
+    // Directory prefix.
+    if (entryLc.endsWith('/')) {
+        if (pathLc.startsWith(entryLc))
+            return true;
+        if (pathLc === entryLc.slice(0, -1))
+            return true;
+        return false;
+    }
+    // Glob (contains *).
+    if (entryLc.includes('*')) {
+        // Convert glob to regex: . → \., * → .*; anchor to whole string.
+        const escaped = entryLc.replace(/[.+^${}()|[\]\\]/g, (m) => `\\${m}`);
+        const re = '^' + escaped.replace(/\*/g, '.*') + '$';
+        try {
+            return new RegExp(re).test(pathLc);
+        }
+        catch {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+    // Exact.
+    return pathLc === entryLc;
+}
+function loadBlockedPathsPermissive(reaRoot) {
+    const policyPath = path.join(reaRoot, '.rea', 'policy.yaml');
+    if (!fs.existsSync(policyPath))
+        return [];
+    let raw;
+    try {
+        raw = fs.readFileSync(policyPath, 'utf8');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return [];
+    }
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = parseYaml(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return [];
+    }
+    if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+        return [];
+    }
+    const obj = parsed;
+    const bp = obj['blocked_paths'];
+    if (!Array.isArray(bp))
+        return [];
+    const out = [];
+    for (const entry of bp) {
+        if (typeof entry === 'string' && entry.length > 0)
+            out.push(entry);
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+export async function runBlockedPathsEnforcer(options = {}) {
+    const reaRoot = options.reaRoot ?? process.env['CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR'] ?? process.cwd();
+    let stderr = '';
+    const writeStderr = (s) => {
+        stderr += s;
+        if (options.stderrWrite)
+            options.stderrWrite(s);
+    };
+    // 1. HALT check.
+    const halt = checkHalt(reaRoot);
+    if (halt.halted) {
+        writeStderr(formatHaltBanner(halt.reason));
+        return { exitCode: 2, stderr, matched: null };
+    }
+    // 2. Read + parse stdin.
+    const stdinRaw = options.stdinOverride !== undefined
+        ? options.stdinOverride
+        : await readStdinWithTimeout(5_000);
+    let filePath = '';
+    try {
+        const payload = parseWriteHookPayload(stdinRaw);
+        filePath = payload.filePath;
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof MalformedPayloadError || err instanceof TypePayloadError) {
+            writeStderr(`blocked-paths-enforcer: ${err.message} — refusing on uncertainty.\n`);
+            return { exitCode: 2, stderr, matched: null };
+        }
+        throw err;
+    }
+    if (filePath.length === 0) {
+        return { exitCode: 0, stderr, matched: null };
+    }
+    // 3. Load policy permissively.
+    const blockedPaths = loadBlockedPathsPermissive(reaRoot);
+    if (blockedPaths.length === 0) {
+        return { exitCode: 0, stderr, matched: null };
+    }
+    // 4. Normalize.
+    const normalized = normalizePath(filePath, reaRoot);
+    const lowerNorm = normalized.toLowerCase();
+    // 5. §5a path-traversal rejection. Both raw + normalized.
+    const rawTraversal = hasTraversalSegment(filePath.replace(/\\/g, '/'));
+    const normTraversal = hasTraversalSegment(normalized);
+    // URL-encoded traversal check on raw input.
+    const urlEncodedTraversal = /%2[Ee]%2[Ee]|%2[Ee]\.|\.%2[Ee]/.test(filePath);
+    if (rawTraversal || normTraversal || urlEncodedTraversal) {
+        writeStderr('BLOCKED PATH: path traversal rejected\n');
+        writeStderr('\n');
+        writeStderr(`  File: ${filePath}\n`);
+        writeStderr("  Rule: path contains a '..' segment; rewrite to a canonical\n");
+        writeStderr('        project-relative path without traversal.\n');
+        return { exitCode: 2, stderr, matched: null };
+    }
+    // 6. §5a-bis interior `/./` segment rejection.
+    if (hasInteriorDotSegment(normalized)) {
+        writeStderr('BLOCKED PATH: interior dot-segment rejected\n');
+        writeStderr('\n');
+        writeStderr(`  File: ${filePath}\n`);
+        writeStderr("  Rule: path contains an interior '/./' segment; rewrite to a\n");
+        writeStderr('        canonical project-relative path without dot segments.\n');
+        return { exitCode: 2, stderr, matched: null };
+    }
+    // 7. Agent-writable allow-list.
+    for (const writable of AGENT_WRITABLE) {
+        if (normalized === writable)
+            return { exitCode: 0, stderr, matched: null };
+        if (writable.endsWith('/') && normalized.startsWith(writable)) {
+            return { exitCode: 0, stderr, matched: null };
+        }
+    }
+    // 8. Match against blocked_paths.
+    let matched = null;
+    for (const blocked of blockedPaths) {
+        if (matchBlockedEntry(lowerNorm, blocked)) {
+            matched = blocked;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (matched !== null) {
+        const isGlob = matched.includes('*');
+        writeStderr('BLOCKED PATH: Write denied by policy\n');
+        writeStderr('\n');
+        writeStderr(`  File: ${filePath}\n`);
+        writeStderr(`  Blocked by: ${matched}${isGlob ? ' (glob pattern)' : ''}\n`);
+        writeStderr('  Source: .rea/policy.yaml → blocked_paths\n');
+        if (matched.endsWith('/')) {
+            writeStderr('\n');
+            writeStderr('  This path is protected by policy. To modify it, a human must\n');
+            writeStderr('  either update blocked_paths in policy.yaml or edit the file directly.\n');
+        }
+        await maybeAudit(reaRoot, 'denied', matched, filePath);
+        return { exitCode: 2, stderr, matched };
+    }
+    // 9. §H.2 intermediate-symlink resolution.
+    const symMatched = checkSymlinkResolution(filePath, blockedPaths, reaRoot);
+    if (symMatched !== null) {
+        writeStderr('BLOCKED PATH: intermediate-symlink resolution blocked\n');
+        writeStderr('\n');
+        writeStderr(`  Logical:  ${filePath}\n`);
+        writeStderr(`  Resolved: ${symMatched.resolvedTarget}\n`);
+        writeStderr(`  Blocked by: ${symMatched.entry}\n`);
+        writeStderr('  Source: .rea/policy.yaml → blocked_paths\n');
+        writeStderr('\n');
+        writeStderr('  Rule: an intermediate directory of the path is a symlink\n');
+        writeStderr('        whose target falls inside a blocked policy entry.\n');
+        await maybeAudit(reaRoot, 'denied', symMatched.entry, filePath);
+        return { exitCode: 2, stderr, matched: symMatched.entry };
+    }
+    await maybeAudit(reaRoot, 'allowed', null, filePath);
+    return { exitCode: 0, stderr, matched: null };
+}
+/**
+ * Symlink-resolution check — mirrors `hooks/blocked-paths-enforcer.sh`
+ * §H.2. Returns the matched entry + resolved target form, or null.
+ */
+function checkSymlinkResolution(filePath, blockedPaths, reaRoot) {
+    // Only attempt resolution if the target exists or its parent dir
+    // exists — matches the bash `if [[ -e "$FILE_PATH" || -d ... ]]`.
+    let targetExists = false;
+    try {
+        targetExists = fs.existsSync(filePath);
+    }
+    catch {
+        /* fall through */
+    }
+    const parentDir = path.dirname(filePath);
+    let parentExists = false;
+    try {
+        parentExists = fs.statSync(parentDir).isDirectory();
+    }
+    catch {
+        /* falls through */
+    }
+    if (!targetExists && !parentExists)
+        return null;
+    if (!parentExists)
+        return null;
+    const resolvedParent = resolveParentRealpath(filePath);
+    if (resolvedParent.length === 0)
+        return null;
+    const canonRoot = resolveCanonRoot(reaRoot);
+    // Resolved parent must be inside REA_ROOT for the check to be
+    // meaningful — external paths are out of scope (the logical-path
+    // matchers handle them).
+    if (resolvedParent !== canonRoot && !resolvedParent.startsWith(canonRoot + '/')) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const relativeResolved = resolvedParent === canonRoot ? '' : resolvedParent.slice(canonRoot.length + 1);
+    const resolvedTarget = relativeResolved.length > 0
+        ? `${relativeResolved}/${path.basename(filePath)}`
+        : path.basename(filePath);
+    const resolvedTargetLc = resolvedTarget.toLowerCase();
+    for (const blocked of blockedPaths) {
+        if (matchBlockedEntry(resolvedTargetLc, blocked)) {
+            return { entry: blocked, resolvedTarget };
+        }
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+async function maybeAudit(reaRoot, status, matched, filePath) {
+    try {
+        await appendAuditRecord(reaRoot, {
+            tool_name: 'rea.hook.blocked-paths-enforcer',
+            server_name: 'rea',
+            tier: Tier.Write,
+            status: status === 'allowed' ? InvocationStatus.Allowed : InvocationStatus.Denied,
+            metadata: {
+                ...(matched !== null ? { matched } : {}),
+                file_path_preview: filePath.slice(0, 256),
+            },
+        });
+    }
+    catch {
+        /* best-effort */
+    }
+}
+export async function runHookBlockedPathsEnforcer(options = {}) {
+    const result = await runBlockedPathsEnforcer({
+        ...options,
+        stderrWrite: (s) => process.stderr.write(s),
+    });
+    process.exit(result.exitCode);
+}

package/dist/hooks/protected-paths-bash-gate/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/**
+ * Node-binary port of `hooks/protected-paths-bash-gate.sh`.
+ *
+ * 0.35.0 Phase 3 port (paired tier-1 scanner-shim). Like blocked-paths-
+ * bash-gate but uses `runProtectedScan` against the
+ * `policy.protected_writes` / `policy.protected_paths_relax` resolved
+ * set. The bash gate was already a thin shim over the parser-backed
+ * scanner; this port drops the shim → CLI → scanner subprocess hop.
+ *
+ * Behavioral contract — preserves the bash hook byte-for-byte:
+ *
+ *   1. HALT check → exit 2 with shared banner.
+ *   2. Read stdin via `parseHookPayload`. Empty/missing command → exit 0.
+ *   3. Non-Bash tool calls bypass.
+ *   4. REA_HOOK_PATCH_SESSION-class bypass: when the env var is set with
+ *      a non-empty reason, the scanner's protected-set is RELAXED for
+ *      .claude/hooks/ — the patch-session pattern. Implemented by
+ *      appending `.claude/hooks/` to the relax list when the env var is
+ *      live (this mirrors the bash gate's §6b semantics for the Bash
+ *      tier).
+ *   5. Load policy permissively (same lesson as 0.34.0 round-2 P2).
+ *   6. Run `runProtectedScan` with the resolved policy context.
+ *   7. Verdict `block` → exit 2; `allow` → exit 0.
+ *
+ * Audit-log parity: emits a `rea.hook.protected-paths-bash-gate` entry.
+ */
+import type { Buffer } from 'node:buffer';
+import { type Verdict } from '../bash-scanner/index.js';
+export interface ProtectedPathsBashGateOptions {
+    reaRoot?: string;
+    stdinOverride?: string | Buffer;
+    stderrWrite?: (s: string) => void;
+    /**
+     * Test seam — overrides `process.env.REA_HOOK_PATCH_SESSION`. The
+     * CLI wrapper omits, letting the real env var govern the bypass.
+     */
+    patchSessionOverride?: string;
+}
+export interface ProtectedPathsBashGateResult {
+    exitCode: number;
+    stderr: string;
+    /** Final verdict (test seam). Null when the gate short-circuited
+     *  before scanning (HALT, non-Bash, empty cmd). */
+    verdict: Verdict | null;
+}
+export declare function runProtectedPathsBashGate(options?: ProtectedPathsBashGateOptions): Promise<ProtectedPathsBashGateResult>;
+export declare function runHookProtectedPathsBashGate(options?: ProtectedPathsBashGateOptions): Promise<void>;