@bongos/core 1.21.175 → 1.21.177

package/scripts/gds/provision-teardown.js

@@ -1,106 +1,6 @@
+// scripts/gds/provision-teardown.js — @bongos-forwarder (task 1004848). Generated by
+// scripts/bongos/codemod-rename-scripts-gds.js; do not edit.
+// The real script is scripts/bongos/provision-teardown.js. This forwarder keeps callers that still name
+// the old path working, and warns once so they get repointed. Task 1003706 removes it.
 'use strict';
-// provision-teardown.js — reverse the provisioning runbook for one instance
-// (idempotent). Split out of provision.js (task 1002897), which sat at the size
-// ratchet; provision.js re-exports teardownInstance, so its callers are unchanged.
-//
-// What a teardown takes down: the service + backup units, the per-instance Caddy
-// snippet, the DNS record (parked at the blackhole), and the deploy key. What it
-// deliberately LEAVES (ADR 0181): the database, its dumps and the checkout (data is
-// precious), and the row's `domain` + `port` — a revive re-uses exactly that address,
-// and step 5 of the next standup UPSERTs it straight back.
-
-const path = require('node:path');
-const { CONFIG, REPO_ROOT } = require('./provision-config.js');
-const { dbName, deployKeyPath, deployKeyTitle, parseTargetRef, resolveOwnerGithubToken } = require('./provision-repo.js');
-const { pinKeyPath, pinKeyTitle, revokePinWriteKey } = require('./provision-pin-key.js');
-const { resolveProcessManager } = require('./provision-process.js');
-const { caddySnippetPath, dnsReleaseEnv } = require('./provision-net.js');
-const apexMod = require('./instance-apex.js');
-const { isReservedHostname } = require('../../modules/provisioning/provisioning.js');
-
-async function teardownInstance(inst, deps) {
-  const { db, provisioning, exec, log, apply, privileged } = deps;
-  const controlExec = deps.controlExec || exec;
-  // Tear down on the box the instance actually RAN on: a standalone ran control-plane-
-  // local (task 2074), so disable/remove its unit HERE — not on the remote co-hosting
-  // box, where it was never installed (that would allowFail-noop and leave the real
-  // control-plane unit running). Co-tenant is unchanged.
-  const boxExec = inst.hosting_shape === 'cloud-host' ? controlExec : exec;
-  const sudoP = privileged ? 'sudo ' : '';   // systemctl / rm-under-/etc escalation (task 2066)
-  log(`teardown ${inst.slug} (status=${inst.status})`);
-  if (apply) await provisioning.setInstanceStatus(db, inst.id, 'tearing_down');
-  // Stop + remove the service AND the nightly backup units (task 2213; the dir + dumps stay — precious data, like the DB below). Whoever supervises the instance owns its removal (ADR 0306) — the systemd manager keeps the reset-failed step task 1003940 added, since a removed unit's FAILED state outlives its file and `systemctl --failed` listed torn-down ghosts for weeks.
-  (deps.processManager || resolveProcessManager()).removeService(inst, { exec: boxExec, sudoP });
-  // The site snippet standup step 6 wrote: while it stays, Caddy proxies the hostname to
-  // a port nothing listens on and every visitor gets a 502 (task 1002897). Not precious.
-  boxExec(`${sudoP}rm -f ${caddySnippetPath(inst)}`, { allowFail: true });
-  boxExec(`${sudoP}systemctl reload caddy`, { allowFail: true });
-  // Left for an operator (data is precious), naming ONLY what this row created —
-  // teardown now takes 'requested'/'error'. `port` + `domain` stay held: ADR 0181.
-  if (inst.db_name) log(`  (left for the operator: dropdb ${dbName(inst)}, prune ${CONFIG.backupDir}/${dbName(inst)}-*.sql.gz)`);
-  parkAddress(inst, { controlExec, log, apply });
-  // The app's Render services are the OWNER's: forget them, never delete them (ADR 0327 §3, task 1004183).
-  await require('./provision-render.js').forgetRenderApp(inst, { db, log, apply });
-  // Revoke the instance's deploy key (ADR 0176) and remove its local halves. The
-  // checkout itself is deliberately left in place (data is precious), so the key
-  // files must NOT ride along — and a revoke skip must be LOUD: a torn-down project
-  // silently keeping durable read access to the owner's private repo is the exact
-  // shape a teardown exists to end. A missing token / API hiccup never blocks it.
-  if (inst.hosting_shape === 'cloud-host' && inst.target_ref) {
-    const repo = parseTargetRef(inst.target_ref);
-    if (repo) {
-      try {
-        const token = await resolveOwnerGithubToken(inst, deps, { tag: '[teardown]' });
-        if (token) {
-          const ghRepos = deps.githubRepos || require(path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'src/bongos/github-repos'));
-          if (apply) {
-            const keys = await ghRepos.listDeployKeys(token, { owner: repo.owner, name: repo.name, fetchImpl: deps.fetchImpl });
-            const ours = keys.find((k) => k.title === deployKeyTitle(inst));
-            if (ours) {
-              await ghRepos.deleteDeployKey(token, { owner: repo.owner, name: repo.name, keyId: ours.id, fetchImpl: deps.fetchImpl });
-              log(`  revoked the "${deployKeyTitle(inst)}" deploy key on ${repo.owner}/${repo.name}`);
-            }
-            // The hub's WRITE key (ADR 0350) — the more dangerous of the two to leave behind.
-            await revokePinWriteKey(inst, { ...deps, controlExec: boxExec, apply: true, githubRepos: ghRepos }, { token, repo, keys });
-          } else log(`  would revoke the "${deployKeyTitle(inst)}" and write deploy keys on ${repo.owner}/${repo.name} if present`);
-        } else {
-          log(`  (deploy-key revoke skipped: no usable owner credential — if ${repo.owner}/${repo.name} carries a "${deployKeyTitle(inst)}" or "${pinKeyTitle(inst)}" deploy key, remove it in the repo's settings)`);
-        }
-      } catch (e) { log(`  (deploy-key revoke skipped: ${e && e.message})`); }
-      boxExec(`rm -f ${deployKeyPath(inst)} ${deployKeyPath(inst)}.pub`, { allowFail: true });
-      // The write key's local half goes whatever happened above (lookup failed, no token).
-      boxExec(`rm -f ${pinKeyPath(inst, deps)} ${pinKeyPath(inst, deps)}.pub`, { allowFail: true });
-    }
-  }
-  if (apply) {
-    await provisioning.setInstanceStatus(db, inst.id, 'torn_down', { torn_down_at: new Date().toISOString() });
-    await provisioning.recordEvent(db, { instanceId: inst.id, ownerBuilderId: inst.owner_builder_id, event: 'torn_down', detail: 'torn down by runner', actor: 'runner' });
-  }
-  log(`  ✓ ${inst.slug} torn down`);
-  return { ok: true };
-}
-
-// Park the row's hostname at the RFC 5737 blackhole — the release a re-point already
-// uses (ADR 0200 §2: parked, not deleted, so no NXDOMAIN window gets negative-cached).
-// Runs on the CONTROL PLANE for every shape: the hook needs the Cloudflare token, which
-// never leaves it. BEST-EFFORT: a failure is logged and never strands the row. A
-// platform-reserved hostname is refused outright — standup would never have been given
-// one, and blackholing it would take the platform's own record down.
-function parkAddress(inst, { controlExec, log, apply }) {
-  if (!inst.domain) return;
-  if (isReservedHostname(inst.domain, apexMod.instanceApex())) {
-    log(`  [dns] NOT parking ${inst.domain}: a platform-reserved hostname is never blackholed by a teardown`);
-    return;
-  }
-  if (!CONFIG.dnsHook) {
-    log(`  [dns] cannot park ${inst.domain} (BOX_DNS_HOOK unset) — point its A record at 192.0.2.1 by hand`);
-    return;
-  }
-  const env = dnsReleaseEnv(inst.domain);
-  log(`  [dns] park ${inst.domain} -> ${env.BOX_IP} (blackhole, zone ${env.CLOUDFLARE_ZONE}) via ${CONFIG.dnsHook}`);
-  if (!apply) return;
-  try { controlExec(CONFIG.dnsHook, { env }); }
-  catch (e) { log(`  ⚠ could not park ${inst.domain}: ${(e && e.message) || e} — its A record still points at the platform`); }
-}
-
-module.exports = { teardownInstance };
+require('../bongos/forwarder.js').forward(module, 'provision-teardown.js');

package/scripts/gds/provision-units.js

@@ -1,469 +1,6 @@
-// scripts/gds/provision-units.js — the systemd + environment templates: the
-// instance service unit, the db-backup service and timer, and the web.env body.
-//
-// Carved out of scripts/gds/provision.js by task 1003206 (goal 1000079, the R03
-// de-monolith plan) to bring the control-plane CLI under the 1,500-line ratchet.
-// A STRUCTURAL move: bodies unchanged, provision.js requires every name back, so
-// the intent runner and its unit templates behave exactly as before.
-
+// scripts/gds/provision-units.js — @bongos-forwarder (task 1004848). Generated by
+// scripts/bongos/codemod-rename-scripts-gds.js; do not edit.
+// The real script is scripts/bongos/provision-units.js. This forwarder keeps callers that still name
+// the old path working, and warns once so they get repointed. Task 1003706 removes it.
 'use strict';
-
-const fs = require('node:fs');
-const path = require('node:path');
-const { CONFIG, REPO_ROOT } = require('./provision-config.js');
-const { CORE_PKG_DIR, appUser, dbName, instanceDbRole, instanceStateDir, instanceUser, parseTargetRef, standaloneRoot } = require('./provision-repo.js');
-const { capDirectives } = require('./provision-caps.js');
-
-function serviceUnit(inst, { etcBase = CONFIG.etcBase } = {}) {
-  const envFile = path.posix.join(etcBase, inst.slug, 'web.env');
-  const user = instanceUser(inst), stateDir = instanceStateDir(inst);
-  const standalone = inst.hosting_shape === 'cloud-host';
-  const workDir = standalone ? standaloneRoot(inst) : REPO_ROOT;
-  const execStart = standalone
-    ? `/usr/bin/node ${CORE_PKG_DIR}/src/platform-server.js`
-    : `/usr/bin/node src/platform-server.js`;
-  return `[Unit]
-Description=Cloud Bongos instance — ${inst.slug} (provisioned by provision.js, ADR 0111)
-After=network-online.target postgresql.service
-Wants=network-online.target
-Requires=postgresql.service
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-# This instance's OWN unix account, never the shared app user (task 1003369, audit B3).
-# Co-tenant is the default shape, so a shared User= let every instance read every
-# sibling's /proc/<pid>/environ — GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY, the hub client secret, every
-# OAuth cred in the EnvironmentFile below. A distinct uid is what closes that: /proc
-# environ is readable only by the process's own uid.
-User=${user}
-Group=${user}
-WorkingDirectory=${workDir}
-# Read by PID 1 as root BEFORE the privilege drop, so 0600 root-owned stays correct —
-# the instance account itself never needs read on its own secrets file.
-EnvironmentFile=${envFile}
-# HOME is the state dir, NOT /home: the server writes inside its config home on first
-# boot (secret-box.js provisions builder-secret.key there) and ProtectHome below makes
-# /home read-only. Without this the instance comes up unable to hold a secret.
-Environment=HOME=${stateDir}
-Environment=PGDATABASE=${dbName(inst)}
-Environment=PORT=${inst.port}
-ExecStart=${execStart}
-Restart=always
-RestartSec=3
-StandardOutput=journal
-StandardError=journal
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-# The same hardening the sibling backup unit already carries. ReadWritePaths is the
-# whole allow-list under ProtectSystem=strict: the state dir, plus the instance's own
-# config/ (the modules toggle writes config/modules.json at runtime). The checkout the
-# service RUNS is deliberately not writable by it. The leading dash on config/ keeps a
-# shape that has none from failing to mount rather than failing to start.
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=read-only
-PrivateTmp=true
-ReadWritePaths=${stateDir} -${workDir}/config
-# Resource caps (task 1004414; the numbers and their reasons are in provision-caps.js).
-${capDirectives().join('\n')}
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
-`;
-}
-function serviceUnitPath(inst) { return `/etc/systemd/system/${inst.slug}.service`; }
-
-// ── nightly DB backup: per-instance timer + service (task 2213) ─────────────
-// PRODUCTIZES the manual task-2210 fix: a newly-provisioned instance was born with
-// NO backups (dir absent, GDS_BACKUP_DB unset → the script fell back to the
-// nonexistent `example` default, and the repo's global gds-db-backup units
-// hardcode /home/lars/example — wrong for the consumer node_modules/@bongos/
-// core layout). These generators emit a PER-INSTANCE unit pair that fixes all three:
-//   • name  → `<slug>-db-backup.{service,timer}` so co-tenant instances on one box
-//             never collide (each dumps its OWN db; the script's retention prune is
-//             already `<db>-*.sql.gz`-scoped, so a shared backupDir is safe).
-//   • DB    → Environment=GDS_BACKUP_DB=<instance db>, set on the unit (not read from
-//             the web.env) so the dump targets the right database with no fallback.
-//   • path  → ExecStart resolves the canonical script INSIDE the instance's pinned
-//             @bongos/core (standalone) or this control-plane checkout (co-tenant),
-//             the SAME workDir/CORE_PKG_DIR split serviceUnit uses — never the old
-//             monorepo path.
-function backupUnitName(inst) { return `${inst.slug}-db-backup`; }
-function backupServicePath(inst) { return `/etc/systemd/system/${backupUnitName(inst)}.service`; }
-function backupTimerPath(inst) { return `/etc/systemd/system/${backupUnitName(inst)}.timer`; }
-// The consumer-layout-correct absolute path to db-backup-nightly.sh. Standalone runs
-// it from the instance's own pinned core; co-tenant from this checkout's
-// scripts/gds/ — mirrors serviceUnit's execStart resolution so they can't diverge.
-function backupScriptPath(inst) {
-  const rel = 'scripts/gds/db-backup-nightly.sh';
-  return inst.hosting_shape === 'cloud-host'
-    ? path.posix.join(standaloneRoot(inst), CORE_PKG_DIR, rel)
-    : path.posix.join(REPO_ROOT, rel);
-}
-function backupService(inst, { backupDir = CONFIG.backupDir } = {}) {
-  return `[Unit]
-Description=Nightly pg_dump of the ${inst.slug} GDS DB (provisioned by provision.js, task 2213)
-After=postgresql.service
-Requires=postgresql.service
-
-[Service]
-Type=oneshot
-User=${appUser()}
-# No Group=: systemd then uses the app user's primary group, whatever it is named.
-# The DB to dump + where dumps land — set on the unit (not via the instance web.env)
-# so the dump targets the right database with no fallback to a stale default (root
-# cause of the task-2210 breakage). db-backup-nightly.sh reads both as env.
-Environment=GDS_BACKUP_DB=${dbName(inst)}
-Environment=GDS_BACKUP_DIR=${backupDir}
-# Consumer-layout path: the canonical script inside this instance's pinned core.
-ExecStart=/bin/bash ${backupScriptPath(inst)}
-# Modest hardening — the script only needs read on the pg socket + write on the
-# backup dir. Mirrors the repo's gds-db-backup.service.
-NoNewPrivileges=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ReadWritePaths=${backupDir}
-ProtectHome=read-only
-PrivateTmp=true
-
-[Install]
-# Not socket-activated; the timer drives this. The timer's WantedBy is what enables.
-`;
-}
-function backupTimer(inst) {
-  return `[Unit]
-Description=Daily timer for the ${inst.slug} GDS DB pg_dump (provisioned by provision.js, task 2213)
-
-[Timer]
-# 04:00 UTC daily, mirroring the repo's gds-db-backup.timer (low-traffic window).
-OnCalendar=*-*-* 04:00:00 UTC
-# Catch up on next boot if the box was off when the timer was due.
-Persistent=true
-# Jitter so simultaneous timers don't dogpile the disk at exactly 04:00.
-RandomizedDelaySec=300
-Unit=${backupUnitName(inst)}.service
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=timers.target
-`;
-}
-
-// The pack the provisioner reads to learn an instance's env-var PREFIX floor.
-//
-// It is NOT the pack the instance loads, and that distinction is the whole of task 1003740.
-// The original co-tenant model shared ONE checkout across every instance, differentiated only by
-// env, so provisioning pinned the pack to `config/branding.neutral.json` and let identity
-// ride ENV OVERRIDES. That model is gone: under ADR 0108 each co-tenant has its own checkout
-// (`WorkingDirectory=/srv/<base>/<slug>`, running `node_modules/@bongos/core`) and its own
-// `config/branding.json` written at init.
-//
-// The pin outlived it, and src/branding.js's ENV_OVERRIDES cover domains, auth.idp and landing —
-// never `identity.productName`. So every hosted instance kept serving the NEUTRAL pack's name:
-// GET /api/bongos/instance on hermeslines-marketing, mercury and demo all answered "Cloud Bongos"
-// while each instance's own pack on disk said otherwise, and `bongos login <instance>` greeted a
-// newcomer with the platform's name at the moment they were deciding whether to trust it.
-//
-// The instance now loads its own pack by src/branding.js's DEFAULT (INSTANCE_PATH =
-// <instanceRoot>/config/branding.json), which falls back to neutral when absent — so no
-// branding-file env line is written at all. Reading the neutral pack HERE is still correct: it is
-// the prefix floor an instance inherits unless its own pack overrides envPrefix, and every live
-// co-tenant pack pins `envPrefix: "CLOUDBONGOS"` explicitly.
-// ENV_PREFIX_PACK + provisionedEnvPrefix (and the task-1004573 pack checks) live in
-// pack-env-prefix.js — provision-repo.js needs them too, and it cannot require this file
-// (this file requires it). Re-exported below so every existing caller is unchanged.
-const { ENV_PREFIX_PACK, provisionedEnvPrefix, envPrefixMismatch, normalizePackEnvPrefix } = require('./pack-env-prefix.js');
-
-// The per-instance secrets file body (the standup runbook's /etc/<inst>/web.env).
-// The OAuth client id/secret are GUIDED/manual inputs (no GitHub create-API) — the
-// runner writes placeholders the owner fills, unless provided via the intent later.
-// A domain (bring-your-own or provisioned) drives the single-host origin overrides:
-// with them set, src/branding.js resolves the instance's REAL buildersOrigin, so the
-// core's single-host router (isBuildersHost === buildersOrigin host, task 1971) serves
-// the hall on this host + OAuth uses the real callback origin — without them the pack
-// stays at neutral localhost and the hall never loads (task 1972). No domain yet
-// (bring-your-own deferred, ADR 0111 §4) ⇒ origins stay neutral until one is set.
-function webEnvBody(inst, { clientId = '', clientSecret = '', appId = null, appPem = null, federation = null, ownerLogin = null, dbPassword = null } = {}) {
-  const prefix = provisionedEnvPrefix(), { settingsEnvLines } = require(path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'modules/provisioning/provisioning')); // eslint-disable-line global-require
-  const origin = inst.domain ? `https://${inst.domain}` : '';
-  const originLines = origin
-    ? `# Single-host origins (task 1972): the hall serves on THIS host + OAuth/redirects
-# use the real address. Resolved by src/branding.js ENV_OVERRIDES under the pack's
-# ${prefix} envPrefix. A single-host instance has no dedicated builders./status.
-# subdomain, so all four point at the one host.
-${prefix}_PUBLIC_ORIGIN=${origin}
-${prefix}_BUILDERS_ORIGIN=${origin}
-${prefix}_STATUS_ORIGIN=${origin}
-${prefix}_OAUTH_ORIGIN=${origin}
-`
-    : `# No domain yet (bring-your-own-domain pending, ADR 0111 §4) — origins stay
-# neutral (localhost); add ${prefix}_{PUBLIC,BUILDERS,OAUTH}_ORIGIN once a domain
-# is set, or the hall won't load on the instance's host.
-`;
-  // The OAuth app creds are filled by ONE of two paths (task 2080): the GitHub App
-  // Manifest flow (placeManifestCreds fetches them control-plane-side + re-writes this
-  // file with clientId/clientSecret set), or the manual oauth-secret.js placement. On
-  // the first provision write they are blank placeholders the flow fills later.
-  const credComment = federation
-    ? `# Provisioned by scripts/gds/provision.js (ADR 0111). This instance FEDERATES sign-in
-# through the Cloud Bongos hub (ADR 0141 §4) — it needs no GitHub app of its own, so the
-# GitHub client id/secret below stay blank; the ${prefix}_HUB_* block drives sign-in.`
-    : clientId || clientSecret
-    ? `# Provisioned by scripts/gds/provision.js (ADR 0111). OAuth app creds placed via the
-# GitHub App Manifest flow (ADR 0133) — the owner clicked one link; no secret was pasted.`
-    : `# Provisioned by scripts/gds/provision.js (ADR 0111). Fill the OAuth app creds via the
-# one-click GitHub App Manifest flow (ADR 0133), or manually (oauth-secret.js place):`;
-  // The founding owner (firstAdmin): the GitHub login src/bongos/auth.js seats as the
-  // instance's first Archon on first sign-in (maybeSeatFirstAdmin checks
-  // <prefix>_FIRST_ADMIN before branding.firstAdmin). WITHOUT it a provisioned instance
-  // has NO owner — first sign-in is refused / lands rankless and the owner can never
-  // claim their own instance (goal 35 / criterion 165 regression, caught live 2026-07-07:
-  // demo had every origin override but no FIRST_ADMIN, so the owner could not be seated).
-  // Derived from the instance repo owner (target_ref = "<owner>/<repo>"), the SAME source
-  // instanceInitSpec uses for the scaffold's branding.firstAdmin — so this env override and
-  // the scaffolded config/branding.json agree — and, like the spec, PREFERS the signed-in
-  // builder's login when the caller resolved one (ownerLoginOf). An org-owned repo's
-  // owner is the org, which is not a sign-in identity: seating it seats nobody (task 1003240).
-  const ownerRepo = parseTargetRef(inst.target_ref);
-  const firstAdmin = ownerLogin || (ownerRepo && ownerRepo.owner) || null;
-  const firstAdminLine = firstAdmin ? `${prefix}_FIRST_ADMIN=${firstAdmin}\n` : '';
-  // Cross-site identity federation block (ADR 0141 §4, task #1002109). Present only for
-  // a HOSTED (federated) instance: flips auth.idp ON via the env override branding.js
-  // reads (idpEnabled), and carries the hub origin, this instance's per-client secret
-  // (authenticates it TO the hub, server-to-server), and the hub's PUBLIC key (verifies
-  // the CLI's hub-signed assertion offline). All written straight to this chmod-600
-  // file — never through a browser or chat (the ADR 0133 secret-placement posture).
-  const fedLines = federation
-    ? `${prefix}_AUTH_IDP=true
-${prefix}_HUB_ORIGIN=${federation.hubOrigin}
-${prefix}_HUB_CLIENT_ID=${federation.clientId}
-${prefix}_HUB_CLIENT_SECRET=${federation.clientSecret}
-${prefix}_HUB_PUBLIC_KEY=${federation.hubPublicKey}
-`
-    : '';
-  // The publish credential (task 1003049, ADR 0055): the manifest-born App's id +
-  // private key, read BARE (no prefix) by modules/lifecycle/github-push.js. The
-  // pem is env-file-flattened to a single line with literal \n (the ADR 0055
-  // rotation convention; normalizePem restores it). The installation id is NOT
-  // written — the server discovers it from the repo once the owner installs the
-  // App (the onboarding app-install step).
-  const appLines = appId && appPem
-    ? `# Publish credential (ADR 0055): the sign-in GitHub App doubles as it. The server
-# mints short-lived installation tokens once the App is INSTALLED on the repo.
-GITHUB_APP_ID=${appId}
-GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY=${String(appPem).replace(/\r?\n/g, '\\n')}
-`
-    : '';
-  // The per-instance DB credential (task 1003369, audit B3). Present only once the
-  // runner has created the role — a first dry-run and any legacy caller omit it, and the
-  // instance then falls back to the peer auth it used before, so this can never brick a
-  // box mid-migration. src/bongos/pool.js reads both names explicitly.
-  const dbLines = dbPassword
-    ? `PGUSER=${instanceDbRole(inst)}\nPGPASSWORD=${dbPassword}\n`
-    : '';
-  // The pool cap (task 1003928, ADR 0285 §3): a co-located instance shares the box's
-  // Postgres with every sibling and the control plane, so its pool may not take pg's
-  // default 10 of the server's 97. src/bongos/pool.js reads it bare.
-  const poolLine = `PGPOOL_MAX=${CONFIG.instancePoolMax}\n`;
-  // Where this project's Update button goes (task 1004608) — see hubUpgradeEnvVarsFor.
-  const hubUpgradeLines = Object.entries(hubUpgradeEnvVarsFor(inst)).map(([k, v]) => `${k}=${v}\n`).join('');
-  return `# /etc/${inst.slug}/web.env — per-instance secrets (chmod 600, OUTSIDE the repo).
-${credComment}
-${prefix}_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID=${clientId || ''}
-${prefix}_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET=${clientSecret || ''}
-${firstAdminLine}${originLines}${appLines}PORT=${inst.port}
-PGDATABASE=${dbName(inst)}
-${poolLine}${dbLines}${fedLines}${hubUpgradeLines}${settingsEnvLines(inst, prefix)}`;
-}
-function webEnvPath(inst, { etcBase = CONFIG.etcBase } = {}) {
-  return path.posix.join(etcBase, inst.slug, 'web.env');
-}
-
-// The settings env vars the runner pushes to a RUNNING instance (task 1003140):
-// the module's settingsEnvVars under the prefix the instance actually resolves —
-// the same pair webEnvBody writes at standup, so standup and push cannot drift.
-// The four origin overrides web.env carries for an addressed instance — the
-// domain-dependent half of webEnvBody, on its own so domain-attach can patch
-// exactly those lines IN PLACE (task 1003237). A single-host instance has no
-// dedicated builders./status. subdomain, so all four point at the one host.
-// Empty for a domainless instance: there is no origin to assert, and writing
-// `=` over a real one would take the hall down. PURE.
-function originEnvVarsFor(inst) {
-  if (!inst || !inst.domain) return {};
-  const prefix = provisionedEnvPrefix(), origin = `https://${inst.domain}`;
-  return {
-    [`${prefix}_PUBLIC_ORIGIN`]: origin,
-    [`${prefix}_BUILDERS_ORIGIN`]: origin,
-    [`${prefix}_STATUS_ORIGIN`]: origin,
-    [`${prefix}_OAUTH_ORIGIN`]: origin,
-  };
-}
-
-// `envBody` is the web.env being patched; only the control-plane row reads it (see
-// selfEnvPrefix). Every other shape keeps the provisioned-instance prefix, unchanged.
-function settingsEnvVarsFor(inst, envBody) {
-  const { settingsEnvVars } = require(path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'modules/provisioning/provisioning')); // eslint-disable-line global-require
-  const prefix = inst && inst.hosting_shape === 'control-plane' ? selfEnvPrefix({ envBody }) : provisionedEnvPrefix();
-  return { ...settingsEnvVars(inst, prefix), ...hubUpgradeEnvVarsFor(inst) };
-}
-
-// The env-var prefix the CONTROL PLANE's own web process resolves (task 1004334). The
-// self row is not a provisioned instance: it loads the pack src/branding.js loads, from
-// ITS instance root, so provisionedEnvPrefix() (the neutral pack's floor) is the wrong
-// question — a value written under a prefix the site does not resolve is read by
-// nothing, and the push would report success over a site that never changed.
-//
-// Precedence mirrors loadBranding: the instance pack is a <PREFIX>_BRANDING_FILE line in
-// the web.env being patched (the file the web service actually boots with) when there is
-// one, else <instanceRoot>/config/branding.json; under it sits the core's neutral pack,
-// then the fallback. The first that names an envPrefix wins. A wrong answer is not silent: the
-// leg's read-back (settingsConsumed) compares the live manifest after the restart and
-// records "still reports the OLD values".
-function selfEnvPrefix({ envBody = '', instanceRoot, readFile = (p) => fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8') } = {}) {
-  const { FALLBACK_ENV_PREFIX, LEGACY_ENV_PREFIXES } = require('../../src/instance-config');
-  const root = instanceRoot || require('./provision-repo.js').selfInstanceRoot(); // eslint-disable-line global-require
-  const names = [FALLBACK_ENV_PREFIX, ...LEGACY_ENV_PREFIXES].map((p) => `${p}_BRANDING_FILE`);
-  const override = String(envBody || '').split(/\r?\n/)
-    .map((l) => /^([A-Z]+_BRANDING_FILE)=(.*)$/.exec(l.trim()))
-    .find((m) => m && names.includes(m[1]) && m[2].trim());
-  const candidates = [
-    override ? path.resolve(root, override[2].trim()) : path.join(root, 'config', 'branding.json'),
-    path.join(REPO_ROOT, ENV_PREFIX_PACK),
-  ];
-  for (const p of candidates) {
-    try {
-      const pack = JSON.parse(readFile(p));
-      if (pack && typeof pack.envPrefix === 'string' && pack.envPrefix) return pack.envPrefix;
-    } catch { /* absent or unreadable — the next candidate answers */ }
-  }
-  return FALLBACK_ENV_PREFIX;
-}
-
-// The instance's own public manifest — the settings read-back ADR 0190 names
-// (GET /api/bongos/instance → brand.project). Sibling of provision-net's healthzCmd:
-// same loopback + timeout, a different question ("did you READ it?").
-function instanceManifestCmd(inst) {
-  return `curl -sS --max-time 5 http://127.0.0.1:${inst.port}/api/bongos/instance`;
-}
-
-// Did the restarted instance CONSUME the pushed settings? Compares each key of
-// effectiveSettings(inst) against the manifest's brand.project (camelCase — the
-// src/branding.js ENV_OVERRIDES targets). true = every key matches; false = it
-// answers with a different value; null = unknown — the manifest carries no
-// project block (a core that predates task 1003139) or did not parse. PURE.
-function settingsConsumed(stdout, inst) {
-  const { effectiveSettings } = require(path.join(REPO_ROOT, 'modules/provisioning/provisioning')); // eslint-disable-line global-require
-  let j;
-  try { j = JSON.parse(String(stdout || '').trim()); } catch { return null; }
-  const project = j && j.brand && j.brand.project;
-  if (!project || typeof project !== 'object') return null;
-  const camel = (k) => k.replace(/_([a-z])/g, (_, c) => c.toUpperCase());
-  return Object.entries(effectiveSettings(inst)).every(([k, v]) => project[camel(k)] === v);
-}
-
-// Upsert KEY=VALUE lines into an env-file body IN PLACE (task 1003140): an
-// existing `KEY=` line is replaced where it stands, a missing one is appended at
-// the end — every other line (creds, origins, the federation block, comments) is
-// untouched. This is how a setting reaches a RUNNING instance: the full-template
-// re-write webEnvBody produces would BLANK the OAuth creds placeManifestCreds
-// placed (this leg has no way to know them), so a live file is patched, never
-// regenerated. The oauth-secret.js fillOAuthEnv shape. PURE; keys are matched at
-// line start, exactly (a KEY that is a prefix of another never collides).
-function upsertEnvVars(body, vars) {
-  const esc = (k) => k.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
-  let text = String(body == null ? '' : body);
-  const missing = [];
-  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars || {})) {
-    const re = new RegExp(`^${esc(key)}=.*$`, 'm');
-    if (re.test(text)) text = text.replace(re, () => `${key}=${value}`);
-    else missing.push(`${key}=${value}`);
-  }
-  if (missing.length) {
-    if (text.length && !text.endsWith('\n')) text += '\n';
-    text += `${missing.join('\n')}\n`;
-  }
-  return text;
-}
-
-// Env names a rename retired, carried forward ON THE BOX by the settings push (task
-// 1004395). The prelaunch-gate rename (task 1003152, ADR 0182) made PRELAUNCH_PASSWORD
-// primary and kept STEALTH_PASSWORD as an alias; the alias can only be dropped (task
-// 1003830) once every live web.env carries the new name, and before this the only way
-// to add it was the owner's SSH (blocker 1000147). [from, to] pairs.
-const ENV_RENAMES = Object.freeze([['STEALTH_PASSWORD', 'PRELAUNCH_PASSWORD']]);
-
-// Which renamed names does this web.env still hold ONLY under the old name? Returns
-// { vars, carried }: `vars` is the new name → the old line's right-hand side, copied
-// verbatim (quotes and all, so systemd reads the same value), for upsertEnvVars;
-// `carried` names the pairs and is the ONLY part that may reach a log or an event —
-// the value is a secret read on the box and it never leaves it. A new name that is
-// already set wins, even when it differs. The last line of a key counts, as systemd
-// reads it. PURE.
-function renamedEnvCarry(body) {
-  const lines = String(body == null ? '' : body).split(/\r?\n/);
-  const rhs = (key) => {
-    let v = null;
-    for (const l of lines) if (l.startsWith(`${key}=`)) v = l.slice(key.length + 1);
-    return v;
-  };
-  const isSet = (v) => v !== null && !['', '""', "''"].includes(v.trim());
-  const vars = {}, carried = [];
-  for (const [from, to] of ENV_RENAMES) {
-    const oldV = rhs(from);
-    if (isSet(oldV) && !isSet(rhs(to))) { vars[to] = oldV; carried.push(`${from} -> ${to}`); }
-  }
-  return { vars, carried };
-}
-
-// ── Cross-site identity: federate a hosted instance's sign-in through the hub ───
-// (ADR 0141 §4, task #1002109). The control plane IS the hub (cloudbongos.com), so
-// registration is a direct in-process call against the hub pool — no HTTP hop.
-
-// The hub's own public origin, written into each federated instance as
-// <PREFIX>_HUB_ORIGIN (what auth.js loadIdpConfig reads). Explicit PROVISION_HUB_ORIGIN
-// wins; otherwise the control plane's OWN public origin (<PREFIX>_PUBLIC_ORIGIN, the
-// env the hub already runs under). Null → not hub-configured → shouldFederate is false.
-function federationHubOrigin() {
-  const explicit = process.env.PROVISION_HUB_ORIGIN;
-  if (explicit) return String(explicit).replace(/\/+$/, '');
-  const own = process.env[`${provisionedEnvPrefix()}_PUBLIC_ORIGIN`];
-  return own ? String(own).replace(/\/+$/, '') : null;
-}
-
-// WHERE A HOSTED PROJECT'S UPDATE BUTTON GOES (task 1004608): the hub's deploy door for
-// THIS project, written as <PREFIX>_HUB_UPGRADE_URL. The hall used to learn the hub only
-// from the sign-in federation block, which only a co-tenant gets, so every cloud-host
-// project (and any that keeps its own GitHub app) told its owner to run `bongos upgrade`
-// on a server the platform runs. The door admits the owner of both tenant shapes
-// (modules/provisioning/core-upgrade-authz.js), so both get the address. Not a secret and
-// grants nothing: the door re-checks every request. Empty for the tenant shapes when no hub
-// origin resolves (a key that came and went would leave a stale line behind); absent for
-// every other shape, which has no door on this hub.
-const HUB_UPGRADE_SHAPES = new Set(['co-tenant', 'cloud-host']);
-function hubUpgradeEnvVarsFor(inst) {
-  if (!inst || !HUB_UPGRADE_SHAPES.has(inst.hosting_shape) || !inst.slug) return {};
-  const origin = federationHubOrigin();
-  return { [`${provisionedEnvPrefix()}_HUB_UPGRADE_URL`]: origin ? `${origin}/deploy?project=${encodeURIComponent(String(inst.slug))}` : '' };
-}
-
-module.exports = {
-  federationHubOrigin,
-  hubUpgradeEnvVarsFor,
-  ENV_PREFIX_PACK,
-  envPrefixMismatch,
-  normalizePackEnvPrefix,
-  backupScriptPath,
-  backupService,
-  backupServicePath,
-  backupTimer,
-  backupTimerPath,
-  backupUnitName,
-  instanceManifestCmd,
-  originEnvVarsFor,
-  provisionedEnvPrefix,
-  selfEnvPrefix,
-  serviceUnit,
-  serviceUnitPath,
-  settingsConsumed,
-  settingsEnvVarsFor,
-  renamedEnvCarry,
-  upsertEnvVars,
-  webEnvBody,
-  webEnvPath,
-};
+require('../bongos/forwarder.js').forward(module, 'provision-units.js');