@blamejs/exceptd-skills 0.13.104 → 0.13.106

package/data/framework-control-gaps.json

@@ -38,8 +38,10 @@
       "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2023-51449",
+      "CVE-2023-6016",
       "CVE-2023-6019",
       "CVE-2023-6021",
+      "CVE-2023-6038",
       "CVE-2024-0129",
       "CVE-2024-0132",
       "CVE-2024-11392",
@@ -53,6 +55,7 @@
       "CVE-2024-24590",
       "CVE-2024-24591",
       "CVE-2024-27132",
+      "CVE-2024-2912",
       "CVE-2024-37032",
       "CVE-2024-39722",
       "CVE-2024-42478",
@@ -65,6 +68,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-1753",
       "CVE-2025-23254",
       "CVE-2025-23266",
+      "CVE-2025-27520",
       "CVE-2025-30165",
       "CVE-2025-30202",
       "CVE-2025-32434",
@@ -1267,12 +1271,15 @@
     "opened_date": "2026-01-01",
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2023-43472",
+      "CVE-2023-6016",
       "CVE-2024-12366",
       "CVE-2024-24590",
       "CVE-2024-24591",
+      "CVE-2024-2912",
       "CVE-2024-5565",
       "CVE-2025-0133",
       "CVE-2025-1094",
+      "CVE-2025-27520",
       "CVE-2025-3248",
       "CVE-2025-6965",
       "CVE-2026-30623",
@@ -2101,11 +2108,14 @@
     "opened_date": "2026-04-01",
     "evidence_cves": [
       "BUG-2026-NIGHTMARE-ECLIPSE-GREENPLASMA",
+      "CVE-2023-6016",
       "CVE-2024-12366",
       "CVE-2024-24590",
       "CVE-2024-24591",
+      "CVE-2024-2912",
       "CVE-2024-3154",
       "CVE-2024-5565",
+      "CVE-2025-27520",
       "CVE-2025-3248",
       "CVE-2025-49844",
       "CVE-2025-53773",
@@ -2249,6 +2259,7 @@
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2023-51449",
+      "CVE-2023-6038",
       "CVE-2024-0132",
       "CVE-2024-1561",
       "CVE-2024-21575",
@@ -2339,6 +2350,7 @@
       "CVE-2024-24590",
       "CVE-2024-24591",
       "CVE-2024-27132",
+      "CVE-2024-2912",
       "CVE-2024-37032",
       "CVE-2024-39722",
       "CVE-2024-50050",
@@ -2348,6 +2360,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-1550",
       "CVE-2025-1753",
       "CVE-2025-23254",
+      "CVE-2025-27520",
       "CVE-2025-30165",
       "CVE-2025-32434",
       "CVE-2025-33236",
@@ -2798,9 +2811,12 @@
     "opened_date": "2026-02-01",
     "evidence_cves": [
       "BUG-2026-NIGHTMARE-ECLIPSE-UNDEFEND",
+      "CVE-2023-6016",
       "CVE-2024-12366",
+      "CVE-2024-2912",
       "CVE-2024-5565",
       "CVE-2025-11837",
+      "CVE-2025-27520",
       "CVE-2025-3248",
       "CVE-2026-22778",
       "CVE-2026-32202",
@@ -4987,7 +5003,9 @@
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2023-3519",
       "CVE-2024-12366",
+      "CVE-2024-2912",
       "CVE-2024-5565",
+      "CVE-2025-27520",
       "CVE-2026-0300",
       "CVE-2026-42945"
     ],
@@ -5028,8 +5046,10 @@
       "CVE-2023-44467",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2023-51449",
+      "CVE-2023-6016",
       "CVE-2023-6019",
       "CVE-2023-6021",
+      "CVE-2023-6038",
       "CVE-2024-0129",
       "CVE-2024-0132",
       "CVE-2024-11392",
@@ -5045,6 +5065,7 @@
       "CVE-2024-24590",
       "CVE-2024-24591",
       "CVE-2024-27132",
+      "CVE-2024-2912",
       "CVE-2024-37032",
       "CVE-2024-39722",
       "CVE-2024-42478",
@@ -5057,6 +5078,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-1753",
       "CVE-2025-23254",
       "CVE-2025-23266",
+      "CVE-2025-27520",
       "CVE-2025-30165",
       "CVE-2025-30202",
       "CVE-2025-32434",
@@ -5133,6 +5155,7 @@
     "status": "open",
     "opened_date": "2026-05-15",
     "evidence_cves": [
+      "CVE-2023-6038",
       "CVE-2024-1709",
       "CVE-2025-3248",
       "CVE-2026-33017",
@@ -5427,6 +5450,8 @@
     "status": "open",
     "opened_date": "2026-05-15",
     "evidence_cves": [
+      "CVE-2023-6016",
+      "CVE-2023-6038",
       "CVE-2025-3248",
       "CVE-2026-33017",
       "CVE-2026-6973"
@@ -5590,6 +5615,8 @@
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2023-44467",
       "CVE-2023-51449",
+      "CVE-2023-6016",
+      "CVE-2023-6038",
       "CVE-2024-0129",
       "CVE-2024-0132",
       "CVE-2024-11392",
@@ -5605,6 +5632,7 @@
       "CVE-2024-24590",
       "CVE-2024-24591",
       "CVE-2024-27132",
+      "CVE-2024-2912",
       "CVE-2024-37032",
       "CVE-2024-39722",
       "CVE-2024-42478",
@@ -5615,6 +5643,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-1753",
       "CVE-2025-23254",
       "CVE-2025-23266",
+      "CVE-2025-27520",
       "CVE-2025-30165",
       "CVE-2025-30202",
       "CVE-2025-32434",
@@ -5686,8 +5715,10 @@
       "CVE-2023-44467",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
       "CVE-2023-51449",
+      "CVE-2023-6016",
       "CVE-2023-6019",
       "CVE-2023-6021",
+      "CVE-2023-6038",
       "CVE-2024-0129",
       "CVE-2024-0132",
       "CVE-2024-11392",
@@ -5703,6 +5734,7 @@
       "CVE-2024-24590",
       "CVE-2024-24591",
       "CVE-2024-27132",
+      "CVE-2024-2912",
       "CVE-2024-37032",
       "CVE-2024-39722",
       "CVE-2024-42478",
@@ -5715,6 +5747,7 @@
       "CVE-2025-1753",
       "CVE-2025-23254",
       "CVE-2025-23266",
+      "CVE-2025-27520",
       "CVE-2025-30165",
       "CVE-2025-30202",
       "CVE-2025-32434",
@@ -5959,6 +5992,7 @@
     "evidence_cves": [
       "CVE-2020-10148",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
+      "CVE-2023-6038",
       "CVE-2025-3248",
       "CVE-2025-55241",
       "CVE-2026-24206",
@@ -6031,11 +6065,15 @@
       "CVE-2022-1471",
       "CVE-2023-43654",
       "CVE-2023-48022",
+      "CVE-2023-6016",
       "CVE-2023-6019",
       "CVE-2023-6021",
+      "CVE-2023-6038",
       "CVE-2024-1709",
+      "CVE-2024-2912",
       "CVE-2024-4889",
       "CVE-2024-6587",
+      "CVE-2025-27520",
       "CVE-2025-3248",
       "CVE-2025-64513",
       "CVE-2025-67818",

package/data/zeroday-lessons.json

@@ -4411,6 +4411,206 @@
     "_auto_imported": false,
     "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
   },
+  "CVE-2023-6016": {
+    "name": "H2O-3 POJO Model Import Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution",
+    "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "attack_vector": {
+      "description": "H2O-3's dashboard / REST API exposes an unauthenticated POJO (Java) model-import feature that compiles and runs the imported model code, so an unauthenticated attacker imports a malicious model and gains remote code execution on the host.",
+      "privileges_required": "none (unauthenticated)",
+      "complexity": "low",
+      "ai_factor": "The abused surface is H2O-3, an open-source ML/AutoML platform. The lesson: an ML platform's control plane is a privileged surface - model import runs code, so it must authenticate and reject untrusted model artifacts; a 'trusted environment' deployment assumption is not a control."
+    },
+    "framework_coverage": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Flaw remediation does not track the ML platform's model-import feature; the vendor treats H2O-3 as trusted-environment-only, so no fix ships."
+      },
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-10": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No input validation distinguishes a trusted model from attacker code at the unauthenticated model-import endpoint."
+      },
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": {
+        "covered": false,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No framework treats an ML platform's model-import feature as a privileged code-execution surface - a model artifact is executable code."
+      }
+    },
+    "compliance_exposure_score": {
+      "percent_audit_passing_orgs_still_exposed": 82,
+      "basis": "H2O-3 is deployed for data-science productivity on trusted-network assumptions; its dashboard / REST API is frequently exposed without authentication, and the vendor ships no fix (trusted-environment-by-design).",
+      "theater_pattern": "ai_platform_trusted_environment_assumption"
+    },
+    "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-091",
+        "name": "UNTRUSTED-MODEL-ARTIFACT-LOADING",
+        "description": "Treat ML model artifacts as untrusted code: never load .keras / pickle-based models from untrusted sources, verify provenance, prefer safe formats (e.g. safetensors), and load untrusted models only in a sandboxed, network-isolated, least-privilege environment. Upgrade Keras to the fixed release (>= 3.8.0 for CVE-2025-1550; past 3.10.0 for the CVE-2025-8747 safe_mode bypass) and do not rely on safe_mode alone — it was bypassable. The distinguishing test: load an attacker-crafted .keras archive with safe_mode enabled on a sandboxed instance and confirm no code executes.",
+        "evidence": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1550",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-10",
+          "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
+  },
+  "CVE-2024-2912": {
+    "name": "BentoML Insecure Deserialization Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution",
+    "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "attack_vector": {
+      "description": "BentoML before 1.2.5 deserializes an attacker-supplied serialized object delivered to a valid serving endpoint without validation, so an unauthenticated attacker runs arbitrary code on the model server.",
+      "privileges_required": "none (unauthenticated)",
+      "complexity": "low",
+      "ai_factor": "The abused surface is BentoML, a model-serving / inference framework. The lesson: a model server must never reconstruct an untrusted serialized object from a request - the same inference-path deserialization class as the ShadowMQ / vLLM entries, here on the HTTP serving API, and it recurred in BentoML after the first fix."
+    },
+    "framework_coverage": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Flaw remediation closed one deserialization path (1.2.5) but the class recurred (serde.py, fixed 1.4.3) - the fix did not generalize to all request-deserialization sinks."
+      },
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-10": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No input validation distinguishes a safe payload from a deserialization-gadget object at the model-serving endpoint."
+      },
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": {
+        "covered": false,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No framework treats a model-serving framework's request-deserialization path as a privileged execution surface."
+      }
+    },
+    "compliance_exposure_score": {
+      "percent_audit_passing_orgs_still_exposed": 84,
+      "basis": "Model-serving frameworks are deployed for inference throughput on trusted-network assumptions; their request-deserialization paths are not treated as untrusted-input boundaries.",
+      "theater_pattern": "model_serving_deserialization_trust"
+    },
+    "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-086",
+        "name": "AI-INFERENCE-IPC-DESERIALIZATION-SAFETY",
+        "description": "AI inference engines must use a safe serializer (e.g. JSON) for IPC/socket communication, never deserialize untrusted serialized objects, authenticate socket peers, and isolate the channel on a trusted network segment. Because the insecure primitive spread by code reuse, the control must be applied across every inference engine in the estate, not one at a time. Apply the project fix (NVIDIA TensorRT-LLM), and for vLLM keep the legacy V0 engine disabled. The distinguishing test: send a crafted serialized object to the inference engine's socket from an unauthorized peer on a staging instance and confirm it is rejected, not deserialized.",
+        "evidence": "https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5648",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-10",
+          "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
+  },
+  "CVE-2025-27520": {
+    "name": "BentoML serde.py Insecure Deserialization Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution",
+    "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "attack_vector": {
+      "description": "BentoML 1.3.4 through 1.4.2 reconstructs an attacker-supplied serialized object in serde.py from a request without validation, giving any unauthenticated user remote code execution - the same insecure-deserialization class that 1.2.5 fixed, recurring on the serde.py path.",
+      "privileges_required": "none (unauthenticated)",
+      "complexity": "low",
+      "ai_factor": "The abused surface is BentoML, a model-serving / inference framework. The lesson: a model server must never reconstruct an untrusted serialized object from a request - the same inference-path deserialization class as the ShadowMQ / vLLM entries, here on the HTTP serving API, and it recurred in BentoML after the first fix."
+    },
+    "framework_coverage": {
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Flaw remediation closed one deserialization path (1.2.5) but the class recurred (serde.py, fixed 1.4.3) - the fix did not generalize to all request-deserialization sinks."
+      },
+      "NIST-800-53-SI-10": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No input validation distinguishes a safe payload from a deserialization-gadget object at the model-serving endpoint."
+      },
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": {
+        "covered": false,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No framework treats a model-serving framework's request-deserialization path as a privileged execution surface."
+      }
+    },
+    "compliance_exposure_score": {
+      "percent_audit_passing_orgs_still_exposed": 84,
+      "basis": "Model-serving frameworks are deployed for inference throughput on trusted-network assumptions; their request-deserialization paths are not treated as untrusted-input boundaries.",
+      "theater_pattern": "model_serving_deserialization_trust"
+    },
+    "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-086",
+        "name": "AI-INFERENCE-IPC-DESERIALIZATION-SAFETY",
+        "description": "AI inference engines must use a safe serializer (e.g. JSON) for IPC/socket communication, never deserialize untrusted serialized objects, authenticate socket peers, and isolate the channel on a trusted network segment. Because the insecure primitive spread by code reuse, the control must be applied across every inference engine in the estate, not one at a time. Apply the project fix (NVIDIA TensorRT-LLM), and for vLLM keep the legacy V0 engine disabled. The distinguishing test: send a crafted serialized object to the inference engine's socket from an unauthorized peer on a staging instance and confirm it is rejected, not deserialized.",
+        "evidence": "https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5648",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-SI-10",
+          "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
+  },
+  "CVE-2023-6038": {
+    "name": "H2O-3 REST API Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion (Arbitrary File Read)",
+    "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",
+    "attack_vector": {
+      "description": "H2O-3's REST API exposes a file-import path with no authorization check, so an unauthenticated remote attacker reads arbitrary files on the host with the H2O-3 process's permissions (Local File Inclusion).",
+      "privileges_required": "none (unauthenticated)",
+      "complexity": "low",
+      "ai_factor": "The abused surface is H2O-3, an open-source ML/AutoML platform. The lesson: an ML platform's control plane is a privileged surface - its REST API must authenticate every endpoint; a 'trusted environment' deployment assumption is not a control."
+    },
+    "framework_coverage": {
+      "NIST-800-53-IA-2": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "The H2O-3 REST API does not authenticate callers before serving a file-import path; 'trusted environment' is assumed, not enforced."
+      },
+      "NIST-800-53-SC-7": {
+        "covered": true,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "Boundary protection does not treat the unauthenticated ML-platform REST API as an exposed surface."
+      },
+      "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY": {
+        "covered": false,
+        "adequate": false,
+        "gap": "No framework requires authenticating every endpoint of an ML platform's control plane / REST API."
+      }
+    },
+    "compliance_exposure_score": {
+      "percent_audit_passing_orgs_still_exposed": 80,
+      "basis": "H2O-3 is deployed for data-science productivity on trusted-network assumptions; its dashboard / REST API is frequently exposed without authentication, and the vendor ships no fix (trusted-environment-by-design).",
+      "theater_pattern": "ai_platform_trusted_environment_assumption"
+    },
+    "ai_discovered_zeroday": false,
+    "ai_discovery_source": "human_researcher",
+    "ai_assist_factor": "none",
+    "new_control_requirements": [
+      {
+        "id": "NEW-CTRL-088",
+        "name": "AI-COMPUTE-CONTROL-PLANE-AUTHENTICATION",
+        "description": "An AI compute framework's job/control API must authenticate every caller; 'deploy only on a trusted network' is an assumption, not a control, and must not substitute for authentication. Enable Ray token authentication (2.52.0+), never expose the dashboard / Job Submission API to untrusted networks, front it with an authenticating proxy, and treat any internet-exposed cluster as compromised (rotate model artifacts and cloud credentials). The distinguishing test: from the public internet, attempt to reach the Ray dashboard (default 8265) and submit a job unauthenticated on a staging cluster; it must be refused.",
+        "evidence": "https://atlas.mitre.org/studies/AML.CS0023",
+        "gap_closes": [
+          "NIST-800-53-IA-2",
+          "NIST-800-53-SC-7",
+          "ALL-AI-PIPELINE-INTEGRITY"
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "_auto_imported": false,
+    "_intake_method": "manual-verified-curation"
+  },
   "CVE-2024-24591": {
     "name": "ClearML Client SDK Dataset Path Traversal Arbitrary File Write",
     "lesson_date": "2026-05-25",