@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.5.4 → 0.5.6

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.14.json

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.15.14",
-  "date": "2026-06-20",
-  "headline": "A broad security-hardening release: every request-IP trust decision is peer-gated against the immediate connection (closing an X-Forwarded-For spoofing class — one behavior change, see Migration), a wide set of authentication and signature verifiers now fail closed, pre-auth parsers are hardened against algorithmic-complexity and frame-desync attacks, and untrusted-key allowlist lookups, at-rest encryption binding, and on-disk writes are tightened framework-wide; adds streaming and exclusive atomic-write primitives, a script-context JSON serializer, and HTTP-client bandwidth throttling",
-  "summary": "This release tightens existing protections across the framework rather than adding opt-ins. The headline behavior change is how the client IP is trusted: the IP gates that make security decisions (network allowlist, rate limiter, break-glass grant pin) no longer trust a bare leftmost X-Forwarded-For value when trustProxy is set without an explicit proxy allowlist — they resolve the client IP by a peer-gated right-to-left walk anchored at the connecting socket, so a direct caller can no longer forge an allowed address. Operators who terminate behind a proxy now declare its address range in trustedProxies (see Migration). Alongside that, a large set of verifiers that could accept a malformed or unsigned credential now fail closed (SAML audience restriction, FDA electronic-signature, SD-JWT key-binding replay, DPoP, CIBA, mdoc trust anchor, COSE algorithm/curve binding, agent-snapshot plaintext under a regulated posture); pre-authentication parsers that an attacker reaches before any credential check are hardened against quadratic-time and frame-desync denial of service (CBOR, JSONPath, tar/PAX, gzip, YAML, ASN.1 DER, the scheduler's timer math); allowlist and posture lookups keyed by untrusted input can no longer reach Object.prototype; the framework's own file writes are now symlink-refusing and atomic; at-rest and egress paths bind ciphertext to its location and redact nested secrets; and several lost-update races are serialized. New surface is additive: streaming and exclusive atomic-write primitives, a serializer safe to embed in an inline <script>, and download/upload bandwidth throttling on the HTTP client.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Migration",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "X-Forwarded-For trust now requires an explicit proxy allowlist",
-          "body": "The IP gates that enforce a security decision — network allowlist, rate limiter, and the break-glass grant IP pin — previously resolved the client IP from the leftmost X-Forwarded-For value whenever trustProxy was truthy. A direct caller could set that header to any address and walk an IP allowlist or evade a rate-limit key (CWE-290 / CWE-348). These gates now fail closed: with trustProxy set but no trustedProxies, they ignore X-Forwarded-For and use the connecting socket's peer address. To keep trusting a forwarded client IP, set trustedProxies to the CIDR(s) of your front proxy/load balancer — the client IP is then resolved by a peer-gated right-to-left walk that stops at the first hop not in the allowlist. For an allowlist / rate-limit / break-glass gate the new default is stricter (it trusts less), so an operator who has not migrated sees tighter enforcement, never looser. Display-only consumers (error pages, request logs) keep the lenient resolution and carry a docstring warning. The wiki example's WIKI_TRUST_PROXY flag is replaced by WIKI_ADMIN_TRUSTED_PROXIES (a CIDR list)."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Added",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "b.atomicFile.writeStream(filepath, source, opts?) and b.atomicFile.writeExclSync(filepath, data, opts?)",
-          "body": "Two atomic-write primitives that complete the read-side fdSafeReadSync family. writeStream writes a stream to a fresh O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW temporary file with an output-byte cap, then renames into place; writeExclSync stages a synchronous write through a verify-then-rename (clearing any stale temp under O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW first) for the small sealed-state round-trips (vault seal / unseal / rotate). Both refuse to follow a symlink at the destination or temp path, so an attacker who pre-creates a link can't redirect the write. The framework's own predictable-temp and symlink-following write sites now route through them; fdSafeReadSync also gains a withStat option that returns the bound fd's stat alongside the bytes."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "b.safeJson.stringifyForScript(value, opts?)",
-          "body": "A JSON serializer safe to embed directly in an inline <script> block: it escapes <, >, and & and the U+2028 / U+2029 line separators so a value containing </script> or a JS line terminator cannot break out of the script context (DOM-XSS). The import-map helper gains scriptTag(importMap, { nonce }) built on it, and the speculation-rules inline emitter uses it."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "HTTP-client bandwidth throttling",
-          "body": "b.httpClient requests accept a bandwidth limit that interposes a throttling transform on both the download and upload paths, so a large transfer can be rate-shaped without buffering the whole body. Useful for bounding the egress a single outbound call can consume."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Incremental audit-chain verification",
-          "body": "The audit verifiers accept a from/to range so a long chain can be verified in increments rather than head-to-tail every time, report an accurate rowsVerified count, and keep the newest review when reconciling. b.vault also exposes getDefaultStore() for callers that need the process's default seal/unseal store handle."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Security",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Request-IP trust is peer-gated end to end",
-          "body": "The client-IP resolution that every IP gate depends on is extracted into one trust model (a trustedProxies-aware, peer-gated right-to-left walk) so the network allowlist, rate limiter, break-glass pin, and bot-guard audit attribution all decide identity the same way. X-Forwarded-Proto is peer-gated across the security middleware on the same model, and a WebSocket reconnect to a swapped target is re-validated against the SSRF / blocked-host guard before the connection is reused. See Migration for the one behavior change."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Authentication and signature verifiers fail closed",
-          "body": "A set of verifiers that could accept a malformed or unsigned credential now refuse it: SAML verifyResponse fails closed on a missing AudienceRestriction or unparseable Conditions; the FDA 21 CFR 11 electronic-signature verify refuses a record with no signature (recordHash alone is self-consistency, not authentication); the SD-JWT key-binding JWT requires an audience and nonce (replay binding) and an expiry when configured; DPoP cross-checks the proof's alg against its embedded JWK key type before importing it; CIBA verifies the ID token on poll and notification; the mdoc trust anchor is enforced (no fail-open); COSE binds the signature algorithm to the key curve; and agent-snapshot refuses allowPlaintext under a regulated compliance posture and gates sealing on vault initialization."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Pre-auth parsers hardened against complexity and frame-desync denial of service",
-          "body": "Parsers an attacker reaches before any credential check are bounded. CBOR rejects the quadratic-time duplicate-map-key construction (it ran O(n^2) on every COSE / CWT / EAT / mdoc verify) and rejects non-minimal integer/key encodings in canonical mode; JSONPath caps the node-list cross-product that could exhaust memory and rejects the filter expression that could overflow the parser stack; the tar reader caps a random-access entry read and resynchronizes a PAX header whose size field is non-numeric; the gzip reader caps a random-access output size; the YAML scanner replaces a backtracking pattern with a linear scan; the ASN.1 DER reader caps high-tag-number and OID sub-identifier decoding and rejects non-minimal forms; and the scheduler clamps far-future timers so a 32-bit overflow can't make a timer fire immediately or an interval tight-loop."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Allowlist and posture lookups keyed by untrusted input can't reach the prototype",
-          "body": "Lookups of the form map[untrustedKey] across the framework's allowlist and compliance-posture tables are now own-property checks, so a key like __proto__ or constructor resolves as absent instead of returning an inherited value and walking the gate (CWE-1321). The shared posture-accessor that several guards built by hand is centralized, and an inverse detector flags any re-introduced unguarded indexed lookup."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Framework file writes are symlink-refusing and atomic",
-          "body": "The predictable-temp and symlink-following write sites (cookie jar, config-drift snapshot, archive extraction, local object store, backup bundle, and the vault passphrase seal/unseal/rotate) now write through the atomic-write primitives above, so a pre-planted symlink at the destination or temp path can no longer redirect a privileged write, and a partial write can't leave a torn file. A re-introduced raw write without the exclusive/no-follow flags is flagged by a detector."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "X.509 issuer chains enforce the CA basic constraint",
-          "body": "Node's checkIssued() does not verify that the issuer certificate is actually a CA (CVE-2002-0862 class), so a leaf signed by a non-CA certificate could be accepted as an issuer. Certificate-chain walking is centralized in one helper that requires the issuer's basicConstraints cA bit and verifies the signature, and every chain consumer (TSA, BIMI, S/MIME, mdoc, content-credentials, the FIDO MDS3 anchor match) routes through it."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Header, value, and markup injection closed",
-          "body": "Mail rejects CRLF in Reply-To and in custom header keys/values (SMTP header injection); the GDPR data-export CSV writer neutralizes formula-injection prefixes; the content guards decode no-semicolon numeric HTML entities when revealing a dangerous URL scheme (so &#106;avascript: is caught); the early-hints emitter rejects CRLF in pushed link values; the HTML/SVG/BIMI comment scanners honor the WHATWG abrupt-comment-close forms (--!>, <!-->) so a mutation-XSS comment can't smuggle markup; and the CSP builder no longer emits a host source alongside 'none'."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "At-rest and egress data is bound to its context",
-          "body": "Backup restore binds each encrypted file blob to its manifest path as additional authenticated data, so a blob remapped to another entry fails the AEAD tag on restore (signed and unsigned bundles alike), and threads the signature-verification options through extraction; the data-subject-request lookup dual-reads the keyed and legacy subject hashes so a subject is still found across the hashing change (GDPR Art. 17); the log redactor collapses a secret nested as an array or object value, not only as a scalar; and the OTLP exporter redacts the span name and status message, not just attributes, before they leave the process."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Network-protocol verification hardened",
-          "body": "OCSP responses are bound to the requested certificate serial; the WebSocket reader rejects reserved opcodes and reserved bits; the DNS parser refuses a record that reads past the message buffer; the NTP client rejects a reply whose origin timestamp does not echo the request (and the SNTP cookie path was reworked to bind the exchange); DANE TLSA matching is constant-time; and MTA-STS policy fetch fails closed rather than degrading to no-policy on an ambiguous response."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Byte caps are measured in bytes, and middleware enforcement is per-instance",
-          "body": "Size limits that compared a byte budget against a string's character length (so multibyte input slipped a ~2-4x looser bound) now measure actual bytes — guard-json per-string cap, the per-tenant quota header budget, the JMAP request cap. The CSRF and fetch-metadata middleware track their gate per instance, so mounting a second, stricter instance still enforces (a shared request flag previously let the first, lenient mount disable it); the CSRF cookie is still issued once per response. The WebAssembly global is stripped from the sandbox worker so sandboxed code cannot JIT around the isolation."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Lost-update races serialized",
-          "body": "Concurrent failure recording in the login lockout and bot-challenge gates is serialized per key, so parallel failed attempts can no longer each read the same pre-write counter and stay under the lockout / challenge threshold. The inline webhook delivery is claimed before the POST so a concurrent retry pass can't double-send it, and a transient transport failure now backs off and retries instead of being dead-lettered."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Changed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "DORA major-incident reporting clock is four hours",
-          "body": "The Digital Operational Resilience Act initial-notification deadline is corrected to four hours from classification (it had used the generic 24-hour default), incident classification weighs the affected-client-base percentage, and the deadline anchors to the prior filing where one exists."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Range and conditional-request correctness",
-          "body": "Compression skips a 206 Partial Content or any Content-Range response (RFC 7233 §4.1), so it can't drop Content-Length over a now-compressed byte interval; static-file conditional handling gives If-None-Match precedence over If-Modified-Since and If-Match over If-Unmodified-Since (RFC 7232); and the object store honors the [start, end] array range contract that previously fell through to a full read."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Declared request bodies are always validated",
-          "body": "A route that declares a body schema now validates it even when no body was parsed, so an omitted required body is rejected at the router instead of reaching the handler — mirroring the always-run params and query checks."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Fixed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Object store getStream works on remote backends",
-          "body": "getStream() returned a stream wrapping an unresolved promise on every remote backend, so it never delivered bytes; it now resolves the object before streaming."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Queue and body-parser correctness",
-          "body": "The local queue's fail()/complete() paths guard on the current row status so a stale lease can't resurrect or double-process a job, and the body parser's raw() mode no longer matches every content type by default (it had answered 415 to nothing or everything depending on the wildcard)."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Sanctions screening and GraphQL SDL probing no longer under-match",
-          "body": "Sanctions screening no longer skips a candidate whose type doesn't match the query's type filter (a sanctioned entity of an unspecified type was missed) and reports a typeMatch flag; the GraphQL federation guard probes for the _service / _entities introspection fields by word boundary (an aliased field bypassed the prefix check) and over batched-array request bodies. The per-tenant query budget is a true sliding window, so a burst straddling the window boundary can't briefly double the rate."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.15.json

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.15.15",
-  "date": "2026-06-21",
-  "headline": "A focused correctness and hardening release: more authentication and signature verifiers fail closed (JWT issuer, SAML recipient binding, OAuth nonce, CIBA token binding, FIDO certification level), the WebSocket client bounds a fragmented message before it completes, DMARC resolves the From domain before the policy lookup, and the CSP builder refuses a directive-injecting source; fixes a middleware pipeline promise that never settled on a write-and-halt, and exposes the X.509 CA-bit issuer test, an IP-prefix helper, and a reverse-proxy-aware session fingerprint option",
-  "summary": "This release continues to tighten existing protections without adding opt-ins on the request path. A further set of authentication and signature verifiers now refuse malformed or unbound credentials: JWT verify rejects an array-valued issuer claim (an any-match bypass, CVE-2025-30144 class), SAML requires the mandatory Recipient on a Bearer or holder-of-key confirmation and enforces every AudienceRestriction, OAuth no longer skips the ID-token nonce check on an empty nonce, CIBA binds the returned ID token to its auth_req_id, the FIDO MDS3 certification level reflects the authenticator's current status rather than its historical maximum, and a JOSE header that decodes to a non-object is a typed error rather than an uncaught throw. The WebSocket client now bounds a fragmented incoming message by its running total instead of only at the final frame, DMARC validates the From-header domain before the policy lookup, the data-residency write gate compares the residency column case-insensitively, and the SQL builder refuses an equality against NULL and validates every IN-list element. The CSP builder refuses a source token containing whitespace or a semicolon (directive injection). A middleware pipeline that a request handler halted by writing the response without calling next() left its promise pending forever, retaining the request closure — it now settles. New surface is additive and backward compatible: the basicConstraints-enforcing X.509 issuer test is exposed publicly, the session device fingerprint can resolve the client IP through a trusted-proxy allowlist, and the /24+/64 IP-prefix masking it uses is exposed for reuse.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Added",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "b.x509Chain — the CA-bit-enforcing X.509 issuer test",
-          "body": "isCaCert(cert) and issuerValidlyIssued(issuer, subject) are now public. Node's X509Certificate.checkIssued() does not enforce the basicConstraints cA bit (CVE-2002-0862 class), so a non-CA leaf can be accepted as an issuer; these helpers require cA:TRUE and verify the signature, fail closed on any malformed input, and are the same test the framework's own chain walkers use. A consumer validating a chain outside a TLS handshake (an operator-uploaded CA bundle, a non-handshake PQ-signed certificate) can now use the hardened path instead of raw checkIssued()."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Reverse-proxy-aware session device fingerprint",
-          "body": "b.session.create / verify / rotate accept { trustedProxies } (CIDRs) or { clientIpResolver } so the built-in clientIp / clientIpPrefix fingerprint fields resolve the real client IP behind a trusted proxy, consistent with b.requestHelpers.trustedClientIp. Without the option the fingerprint still binds to the bare socket peer (unchanged default), so existing fingerprints keep matching; pass the same option to create, verify, and rotate. The /24 (IPv4) + /64 (IPv6) subnet masking is exposed as b.requestHelpers.ipPrefix for an operator using a function-form fingerprint field."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Security",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "More authentication and signature verifiers fail closed",
-          "body": "JWT verify rejects an array-valued iss claim (it had passed through a generic any-match built for the legitimately-array aud claim, so a multi-issuer array satisfied a single-issuer expectation — CVE-2025-30144 class), matching the external JWT and OIDC verifiers. SAML verifyResponse requires the Recipient attribute on a Bearer or holder-of-key SubjectConfirmation and confirms it equals the ACS URL (an absent Recipient was silently skipped), and enforces every AudienceRestriction (AND-combined per SAML core). OAuth no longer fails open and skips the ID-token nonce replay check when the supplied nonce is empty. CIBA binds the polled / notified ID token to its auth_req_id so a token minted for another request can't be accepted. The FIDO MDS3 certification level reflects the authenticator's current status, not the highest level it ever held, so a later decertification or downgrade is honored by a step-up policy. A JOSE header or payload that decodes to JSON null or a non-object now raises a typed authentication error instead of an uncaught TypeError."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "WebSocket fragmented-message reassembly is bounded before completion",
-          "body": "The client enforced maxMessageBytes only when a fragmented message's final frame arrived, so a peer could stream unbounded continuation frames and exhaust memory before the limit was ever checked. The running reassembly total is now enforced per frame, and a frame arriving after close is ignored."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "DMARC resolves the From domain before the policy lookup",
-          "body": "The From-header bare addr-spec domain extraction did not reject RFC 5322 group syntax or a trailing semicolon, so a crafted From header could yield a corrupted domain that defeated the DMARC alignment / policy lookup. The domain is now validated (length-bounded, rejecting the group and punctuation forms) before it is used."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Data-residency and SQL builder correctness",
-          "body": "The per-row data-residency write gate compares the residency column name case-insensitively, so a raw UPDATE that spells the column in a different letter case can no longer slip the cross-border transfer check. The SQL builder refuses an equality against NULL (col = NULL is always false; use IS NULL) and validates every element of an IN-list on the Postgres = ANY(?) path, matching the sqlite / MySQL path."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "CSP builder refuses a directive-injecting source",
-          "body": "A CSP source is a single non-whitespace token. build() and mergeDirectives() now reject a source containing whitespace or a semicolon — because the emitter space-joins sources and semicolon-joins directives, a value like \"https://x; script-src https://evil\" injected a live directive."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Changed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "DKIM l= is counted over the canonicalized body",
-          "body": "On verify, the l= body-length tag was applied to the raw body before canonicalization, so a legitimate relaxed/relaxed signature whose l= matched the canonicalized length was rejected with a body-hash mismatch whenever relaxed canonicalization changed the byte count within the first l= octets. The body is now canonicalized first and the canonicalized octet stream truncated to l= (RFC 6376 §3.4.5)."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "PIPL cross-border security-assessment threshold documentation corrected",
-          "body": "The b.pipl.sccFilingAssessment contract stated the CAC security assessment becomes mandatory above 100,000 cumulative PI subjects (the superseded 2022 figure). The builder enforces the current CAC Provisions on Promoting and Regulating Cross-Border Data Flows — a security assessment above 1,000,000 non-sensitive PI subjects or 10,000 sensitive, with the 100,000–1,000,000 band in the standard-contract / certification tier. The documentation now matches the enforced thresholds."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Fixed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "composePipeline settles its promise when a middleware halts",
-          "body": "A regular middleware that wrote the response and returned without calling next() — the intended way to halt the chain from an auth / rate-limit / bot block — left the promise returned by b.middleware.composePipeline pending forever, retaining its request/response closure (an unbounded leak under sustained blocked traffic). The halt path now settles the promise without advancing to the route handler; the same applies to an error handler that consumes the error without calling next()."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Quality-list header parsing is quote-aware",
-          "body": "parseQualityList mis-read a q= substring that appeared inside a quoted media-range or Accept-* parameter, mis-weighting content negotiation. It now parses the q parameter with quote-aware splitting."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.16.json

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.15.16",
-  "date": "2026-06-22",
-  "headline": "A correctness and hardening release: a broad set of credential and certificate verifiers now fail closed on a present-but-unparseable timestamp instead of silently skipping the check, outbound network clients gain an overall wall-clock timeout and a bounded framing buffer, DMARC refuses a record with no usable policy, append-only log sinks refuse a symlinked path, and the interactive-transaction and replay-store contracts refuse a backend that cannot honor them",
-  "summary": "This release closes a family of fail-open and resource-exhaustion gaps without adding opt-ins to the request path. A recurring pattern across the verifiers — a timestamp parsed with a lenient parser, then gated by isFinite() so an unparseable value disables the check — is converted to fail-closed everywhere it appears: DKIM x=/t=/l=, ARC AMS/AS t=/x=, SAML Bearer and holder-of-key NotBefore, and the FIDO MDS3 / BIMI / S/MIME certificate validity windows now refuse a malformed value rather than accepting the credential. DMARC now validates and requires a usable p= policy and never recommends delivery for a failing message with an absent or unrecognized policy. Outbound clients that exposed a single timeout but applied it only as an idle (zero-progress) timer now also enforce it as an overall wall-clock cap, so a peer that trickles bytes within the idle window can no longer hold a request open indefinitely: the encrypted HTTP client, the object-store and SQS request paths, the CloudWatch / OTLP / webhook log sinks, and the password breach check. The DNS resolver and the lower-level DNS client gain a per-query wall-clock deadline that also tears the socket down, the SMTP client and the proxy CONNECT tunnel bound their framing buffers and add an overall deadline, and the NTS key-establishment handshake bounds its accumulator. The append-only local log sink and the daemon log open with O_NOFOLLOW so a symlink planted at the path is refused rather than followed. b.externalDb.transaction and b.outbox now refuse a backend that declares it cannot provide an interactive transaction instead of silently running a non-atomic block, and the GraphQL-federation replay store adopts the framework's atomic check-and-insert contract.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Security",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Certificate and credential verifiers fail closed on an unparseable timestamp",
-          "body": "A present-but-unparseable date no longer silently disables a validity check. DKIM x= / t= (signature expiry, future-date, ordering) and l= (body-length cap), ARC AMS/AS t= / x=, SAML Bearer and holder-of-key SubjectConfirmationData NotBefore, and the FIDO MDS3, BIMI, and S/MIME certificate validity windows previously parsed the value, then guarded the comparison with isFinite() — so a value that did not parse (NaN) skipped the check and the credential was accepted. Each now refuses a present-but-unparseable value (a permerror / not-valid result) and only an absent optional field is ignored, matching the existing fail-closed handling of the SAML Conditions block."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "DMARC refuses a record with no usable policy",
-          "body": "The DMARC policy tag p= (and the subdomain sp=) were taken verbatim with no validation and p= was never required, so the disposition mapped a null or typo'd policy to the catch-all \"deliver\". A failing, unaligned message against a domain whose record omitted p= or carried an unrecognized value was therefore delivered. p= and sp= are now validated against none|quarantine|reject, p= is required for a record to carry a policy at all, an invalid record is a permerror (not a transient temperror), and the disposition is an explicit fail-closed mapping that never delivers a failing message on an absent or unrecognized policy."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Outbound clients enforce an overall wall-clock timeout, not only an idle timeout",
-          "body": "Several clients exposed a single timeout but forwarded it to the underlying request only as idleTimeoutMs (a zero-progress cap that resets on every received byte), leaving no overall bound — a peer that trickles one byte inside each idle window holds the call open indefinitely. b.httpClient.encrypted (which dropped timeoutMs entirely, and now also forwards the caller's AbortSignal), the object-store request path and Azure/GCS bucket operations, the SQS queue client, the CloudWatch / OTLP / webhook log sinks, and the password HIBP breach check now set the overall wall-clock timeout alongside the idle timeout."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "DNS lookups gain a default wall-clock deadline and tear the socket down",
-          "body": "The DNS resolver's DoH transport had no time bound of any kind and the lower-level DNS client defaulted its lookup timeout to zero (no deadline). A non-responsive or slow-trickle upstream — reachable while resolving DKIM/SPF/BIMI records for inbound mail — held the lookup pending forever. The resolver now takes a per-query timeout (default 10s) wrapping every query and CNAME hop, the DNS client defaults its lookup timeout to 10s (operators opt out with a zero timeout), and the raw DoH/DoT request paths arm a socket timeout that destroys the connection on a stall rather than leaking the descriptor."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "SMTP, proxy-CONNECT, and NTS clients bound their read buffers and add deadlines",
-          "body": "The SMTP client accumulated the server's reply without a byte cap and relied on an idle timer alone; a hostile or broken MX that never sent a line terminator could exhaust memory, and a slow trickle held the transaction open. It now caps the accumulated reply (refusing once it exceeds the response ceiling) and enforces an overall transaction deadline. The proxy CONNECT-tunnel client, which accumulated the proxy's reply unbounded with no socket timeout, now caps the header buffer and times out the connect. The NTS key-establishment handshake reader caps its record accumulator so a server streaming non-terminating records cannot exhaust memory before the handshake timer fires."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Append-only log sinks refuse a symlinked path",
-          "body": "The local log sink and the daemon log opened the active file in append mode without O_NOFOLLOW, so a symlink planted at the log path (including one re-planted in the race window after a caller's pre-check) was followed, redirecting log writes to an attacker-chosen file. Both now open with O_NOFOLLOW via the new b.atomicFile.openAppendNoFollowSync, refusing a symlinked final path component."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Transaction and replay-store contracts refuse a backend that cannot honor them",
-          "body": "b.externalDb.transaction and b.outbox.create now refuse a backend that declares it cannot provide an interactive transaction (a stateless / autocommit-per-statement adapter) instead of silently running BEGIN, the body, and COMMIT on different sessions — no isolation, no rollback — while reporting success. b.graphqlFederation.guardSdl now consults its replay nonce store through the framework's atomic checkAndInsert(nonce, expireAt) contract (the same one b.webhook and b.nonceStore use) rather than a non-atomic has()-then-remember() check that raced concurrent redeliveries; a store lacking checkAndInsert is refused at construction."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Fixed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "b.session.destroyAllForUser works for pluggable-store consumers",
-          "body": "A consumer configuring sessions through b.session.useStore without calling b.db.init() got a db/not-initialized error from destroyAllForUser — every \"log out everywhere\" / suspend / delete path rejected with a 500 after the store rows had already been deleted, because the stateless valid-from boundary write was routed only to the framework database. The boundary now prefers the framework database when one is initialized and otherwise falls back to the configured session store (provisioning its table on demand), so store-backed deployments raise the stateless boundary successfully; it still fails closed when neither a framework database nor a store is available."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Added",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "b.atomicFile.openAppendNoFollowSync — symlink-refusing append open",
-          "body": "Opens a long-lived append target (an active log file kept open across appends and reopened on rotation) with O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW: the file is created or appended normally, but a symlink at the final path component fails the open closed (ELOOP) rather than redirecting writes. The append-sink counterpart to openNoFollowSync (read) and the exclusive-create temp open."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "b.externalDb.supportsTransactions() and stateless-adapter declaration",
-          "body": "A backend adapter may declare supportsTransactions: false (a stateless / autocommit-per-statement adapter) and/or provide a batch(client, statements) hook for an atomic multi-statement path. b.externalDb.supportsTransactions() reports whether the picked backend can provide an interactive transaction, so a consumer built on the dual-write guarantee can refuse a non-atomic backend up front."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Store-free device fingerprint",
-          "body": "b.sessionDeviceBinding.fingerprint(req, opts) is now a static entry point returning the request-shape digest with no store, and b.sessionDeviceBinding.create() with neither a bindingStore nor storeInSession returns an instance whose stateless fingerprint() works while bind()/verify() throw a clear \"no store configured\". Soft device binding for self-validating tokens (a sealed cookie or JWT carrying the fingerprint) no longer needs a fabricated no-op store."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Changed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Device fingerprint IP masking is canonical",
-          "body": "b.sessionDeviceBinding masked the client IP into its prefix bucket by textual group slicing with no IPv6 normalization, so equivalent forms of one address (a ::-compressed form vs its fully-expanded form) hashed to different fingerprints and a roaming client could be logged out on a false drift. It now masks through the same canonical prefix helper b.session uses, preserving the configured prefix width (the IPv6 default stays /48, and ipPrefixBits is honored). b.requestHelpers.ipPrefix accepts { v4Bits, v6Bits } to override the /24 + /64 default for a function-form fingerprint or other reuse."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Migration",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "DNS lookups now time out by default",
-          "body": "The lower-level DNS client's lookup timeout previously defaulted to zero (no deadline); it now defaults to 10 seconds. A deployment that intentionally ran DNS lookups with no wall-clock bound must set the lookup timeout to zero explicitly to restore the old behavior. The b.network.dns.resolver default timeout is also 10 seconds and is configurable via its timeoutMs option."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "b.graphqlFederation.guardSdl nonceStore contract",
-          "body": "guardSdl's optional replay nonceStore now requires the atomic checkAndInsert(nonce, expireAt) contract (b.nonceStore.create is the reference store) and refuses the previous { has, remember } shape at construction. Operators using the old shape should pass b.nonceStore.create(...) or an adapter exposing checkAndInsert."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Interactive transactions on a stateless backend are refused",
-          "body": "If an externalDb backend adapter declares supportsTransactions: false, b.externalDb.transaction and b.outbox.create now throw rather than running a silently non-atomic block. Existing stateful adapters (Postgres / MySQL / SQLite, and any adapter that supplies beginTx/commit/rollback or omits the flag) are unaffected. A stateless / autocommit-per-statement adapter should supply interactive transaction hooks or a batch adapter."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.17.json

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.15.17",
-  "date": "2026-06-22",
-  "headline": "The job queue runs on a Postgres or MySQL cluster backend, and a set of correctness and confidentiality fixes land for encrypted-API rejections, flow-job ordering, the self-update signature verifier, and bounded file reads",
-  "summary": "The local job queue's lease path is now dialect-aware, so the queue works when its store is a Postgres or MySQL cluster backend rather than only single-node SQLite. The previous lease was a single SQLite-only statement: it double-quoted identifiers (which MySQL reads as string literals), updated a table named in its own subquery (MySQL error 1093), and used RETURNING (which MySQL rejects), so the first enqueue or lease against a cluster backend failed outright. The lease now resolves the active backend dialect and composes per-dialect SQL — a transactional SELECT ... FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED claim over the head of the queue followed by a guarded UPDATE against a literal id list, returning the claimed rows via RETURNING on Postgres and a re-select on MySQL — with backtick (MySQL) or double-quote (Postgres) identifier quoting, mirroring the framework's outbox claim. enqueue, lease, complete, fail, sweep, and dead-letter all run against the cluster backend, verified end-to-end against live MySQL and Postgres. Alongside the queue work: a request rejected on an established encrypted-API session is now returned inside the session envelope instead of leaking the rejection reason in cleartext; a flow child that declares dependencies can no longer be leased before those dependencies run during the brief window of the two-pass flow enqueue; the standalone self-update verifier classifies an ECDSA signature's encoding by its ASN.1 structure rather than its byte length and fails closed on an indeterminate shape; the self-update poller surfaces each asset's content digest; and the bounded synchronous file reader routes every failure branch through its typed error mapper.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Fixed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "The job queue's lease runs dialect-correct SQL on a Postgres or MySQL cluster backend",
-          "body": "When the queue's store is a cluster backend, the lease previously failed at the first enqueue or claim: it was composed as one SQLite-only statement that double-quoted column identifiers (a syntax error on MySQL, which treats double quotes as string literals), updated the jobs table from a subquery that named the same table (MySQL error 1093), and relied on RETURNING (which MySQL does not support). The lease now resolves the active backend dialect and builds per-dialect SQL — a transactional SELECT ... FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED over the head of the queue, then a guarded UPDATE ... WHERE status = 'pending' AND id IN (...) with a literal id list (no self-referencing subquery), reading the claimed rows back via RETURNING on Postgres and a re-select by id on MySQL — and quotes identifiers with backticks on MySQL and double quotes on Postgres. enqueue, lease, complete, fail, sweep, and the dead-letter operations now work against a cluster backend, with sealed-at-rest job payloads round-tripping correctly; single-node SQLite continues to use the original single-statement claim. The behavior is verified end-to-end against live MySQL and Postgres."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Encrypted-API rejections that would disclose session state ride the session envelope",
-          "body": "On a per-session encrypted API channel, a rejection that reveals session state — an expired or rotated session, or a request admitted past the replay gate whose ciphertext then failed authentication — returned its reason as cleartext JSON, disclosing which check failed to a network observer of an otherwise-encrypted channel. Those rejections are now encrypted inside the session envelope under the response counter the server persists for them. The generic 'rejected' refusals that carry no session-lifecycle detail (a stale or duplicate request counter) stay plaintext: they reveal nothing a 400 status does not, and encrypting them would consume a response counter the server does not persist on those paths — desyncing the session's monotonic counter and bricking it for the next genuine request. Pre-session handshake failures (a malformed bootstrap, a stale timestamp, an unknown session) also remain plaintext, since no key exists yet to encrypt under."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "A flow child with dependencies can no longer be leased before its dependencies",
-          "body": "b.queue.enqueueFlow inserts a flow's children in two passes (the second resolves dependency names to the sibling job ids assigned in the first). The first pass previously enqueued every child as immediately leaseable and relied on the second pass to park the dependency-bearing children, leaving a window in which a consumer polling between the two passes could lease a child before the jobs it depends on had run. A dependency-bearing child is now parked at enqueue time on the first pass, so it is never leaseable in that window; the second pass only rewrites its dependency names to the resolved job ids. Children with no dependencies remain immediately leaseable."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "The self-update poller carries each asset's content digest",
-          "body": "b.selfUpdate.poll() now includes the content digest for each asset and its detached signature in the result it returns, so a caller can verify a downloaded asset against the digest advertised by the release feed."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Bounded file reads always return the typed error shape",
-          "body": "The bounded synchronous file reader could surface an unmapped error on a few failure branches — a refused symlink whose target had since been removed, a short read, an integrity mismatch — rather than the typed error its callers expect. Every failure branch now passes through the reader's error mapper, so a caller always receives the documented error kind."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Changed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Bundled Public Suffix List refreshed to current upstream",
-          "body": "The vendored Mozilla Public Suffix List — which b.publicSuffix uses to derive organizational domains for DMARC (psd= / np=), BIMI, cookie-scope checks, and same-site policy — is refreshed to the latest upstream revision. Domain classification reflects recent additions and removals to the list."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Security",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "The standalone self-update verifier detects ECDSA signature encoding by structure",
-          "body": "The standalone update-signature verifier inferred whether an ECDSA signature was DER- or IEEE-P1363-encoded from its byte length — a heuristic two distinct encodings can collide on, which could lead a valid-but-misclassified signature to be parsed under the wrong scheme. It now parses the signature's ASN.1 structure to classify the encoding and fails closed on an indeterminate shape rather than guessing."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.18.json

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.15.18",
-  "date": "2026-06-22",
-  "headline": "OCSP response-freshness enforcement is restored, DPoP request-URI reconstruction peer-gates forwarded headers, and container/tool supply-chain pinning is tightened",
-  "summary": "Three hardening fixes. The stapled-OCSP evaluator parsed each response's thisUpdate / nextUpdate with Date.parse, but those fields are already numeric (unix-ms), so Date.parse returned NaN — the freshness guard then rejected every signature-valid response, fresh or stale, with a misleading \"missing thisUpdate\", and the real future-dated / past-nextUpdate window checks (RFC 6960 §4.2.2.1) were unreachable dead code. b.network.tls.ocsp.evaluate / requireGood now read the numeric fields directly: a stale or future-dated response is refused and a fresh \"good\" response is accepted, so OCSP stapling validation works again. b.middleware.dpop reconstructed the absolute request URI — the cryptographically-bound htu — trusting X-Forwarded-Proto / X-Forwarded-Host from any caller whenever trustForwardedHeaders was set, so a direct attacker could forge the scheme or authority and make a proof signed for one origin validate against another; both now resolve through the peer-gated b.requestHelpers.trustedProtocol / trustedHost (honored only from a declared trusted-proxy peer), matching csrf-protect / security-headers / cors, and the bare trustForwardedHeaders boolean is refused. The supply-chain pass pins the wiki container and ClusterFuzzLite fuzz base images to digests (Dependabot keeps them current) and the npm-publish bundle tools to exact versions.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Security",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "OCSP response-freshness enforcement restored (RFC 6960 §4.2.2.1)",
-          "body": "The stapled-OCSP evaluator computed thisUpdate / nextUpdate via Date.parse(), but the parser hands those fields back as unix-ms NUMBERS (Date.UTC(...)). Date.parse() coerces its argument to a string and a bare-integer string is not a recognized date, so the result was always NaN: the !isFinite guard then rejected every signature-valid response — fresh OR stale — with a misleading \"missing thisUpdate\", and the genuine staleness checks (future-dated thisUpdate, past nextUpdate) sat behind it as unreachable dead code, with the stale-rejection branch latently fail-open. b.network.tls.ocsp.evaluate / requireGood now read the numeric fields directly: a stale (past-nextUpdate) or future-dated response is refused, and a fresh \"good\" response is accepted — OCSP stapling validation, and its replay defense, work again."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "DPoP htu reconstruction peer-gates X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host",
-          "body": "b.middleware.dpop rebuilds the absolute request URI (scheme + authority + path) that the proof's cryptographically-bound htu claim (RFC 9449 §4.3) is verified against. When the legacy trustForwardedHeaders: true was set it derived the scheme and host from X-Forwarded-Proto / X-Forwarded-Host trusted from ANY caller, with no immediate-peer check — a direct attacker could forge X-Forwarded-Proto: https or a victim X-Forwarded-Host and make a proof signed for one origin validate against another (htu confusion). Both now resolve through the peer-gated b.requestHelpers.trustedProtocol / trustedHost, which honor the forwarded headers only when the immediate connection is a declared trusted proxy — the same fail-closed model csrf-protect (Secure cookie), security-headers (HSTS), cors (same-origin), and bot-guard (secure context) already use. A codebase-patterns detector now flags any further middleware that reads X-Forwarded-Proto / -Host directly for a scheme/authority decision."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Added",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "b.requestHelpers.requestHost and b.requestHelpers.trustedHost",
-          "body": "Peer-gated request-authority resolvers — the host companions to requestProtocol / trustedProtocol. trustedHost(opts) returns { resolve(req) => string|null, peerGated }: with trustedProxies (CIDRs) X-Forwarded-Host is honored only from a trusted-proxy peer; with hostResolver(req) the operator owns it; with neither, only the request's own Host header is used and a forged X-Forwarded-Host is ignored. requestHost(req, opts?) is the low-level resolver (default Host-only; a peer predicate gates the forwarded header). For reconstructing an absolute request URL (a DPoP htu, an origin/issuer string, a redirect base) behind a proxy without trusting a forgeable header."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Changed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Container and bundle-tool supply-chain pinning tightened",
-          "body": "The wiki container's base images (cgr.dev/chainguard/node runtime + builder stages) and the ClusterFuzzLite fuzz base (gcr.io/oss-fuzz-base/base-builder-javascript) are pinned to image digests; Dependabot's docker ecosystem keeps both current, so the pin is reproducible without freezing CVE patches. The npm-publish workflow's bundle tools (esbuild, postject) are pinned to exact versions, matching CI. The OSS-Fuzz project-submission Dockerfile is intentionally left tracking the upstream base-builder, per OSS-Fuzz convention."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Migration",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "DPoP: trustForwardedHeaders is replaced by trustedProxies",
-          "body": "b.middleware.dpop no longer honors the bare trustForwardedHeaders: true boolean — it trusted forgeable X-Forwarded-Proto / X-Forwarded-Host from any caller. Behind a reverse proxy, declare your proxy CIDRs via trustedProxies: [\"10.0.0.0/8\", …] (peer-gates both headers for the htu reconstruction), or own the reconstruction via protocolResolver(req) / hostResolver(req) / getHtu(req). A bare trustForwardedHeaders: true now throws at create() with that guidance. Apps not behind a proxy need no change — the default already derives the scheme from the TLS socket and the host from the request's Host header."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.19.json

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.15.19",
-  "date": "2026-06-22",
-  "headline": "Restores the wiki container build by keeping its base image on the continuously-patched rolling tag",
-  "summary": "A follow-up to 0.15.18. The framework code is unchanged from 0.15.18 — this patch reverts one part of that release's supply-chain pass: the example wiki container's Chainguard base images had been pinned to specific digests, but Chainguard rebuilds those images continuously to ship CVE fixes, so the frozen digest fell behind an upstream fix within hours and the container's Trivy CRITICAL/HIGH release gate rejected the build (a fixed npm/undici denial-of-service the rolling tag already carried). For a deployed, Trivy-gated image, tracking the rolling, always-patched tag is the correct posture; the wiki Dockerfile is back on it. The ClusterFuzzLite fuzz base (not deployed, not release-gated) stays digest-pinned with Dependabot keeping it current.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Fixed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Wiki container builds again on a continuously-patched base",
-          "body": "0.15.18 digest-pinned the example wiki container's Chainguard base images (runtime + builder). Because Chainguard rebuilds those images continuously to ship CVE fixes, the pinned digest went stale within hours and the container's Trivy CRITICAL/HIGH release gate rejected the build over an already-fixed npm/undici DoS (CVE-2026-12151) the rolling tag carried. The wiki Dockerfile tracks the rolling tag again, so the deployed image is always CVE-current and the build passes the release gate. To keep the Trivy-scanned image identical to the multi-arch image that is published (they are built separately), the release workflow resolves the rolling tag to a digest once at build time and feeds it to both builds via build-args — scan-equals-publish without a committed pin that goes stale. (This trades the OSSF Scorecard PinnedDependencies signal for CVE currency on a deployed, gate-scanned image — the right call here; the non-deployed ClusterFuzzLite fuzz base remains digest-pinned with Dependabot bumping it.) The framework package itself is identical to 0.15.18."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.2.json

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.15.2",
-  "date": "2026-06-12",
-  "headline": "Object keys with a space, +, &, or other reserved characters now sign correctly against S3-compatible stores and Google Cloud Storage",
-  "summary": "The SigV4 request signer (and the Google Cloud Storage V4 signer that shares it) URI-encoded the object-key path a second time when building the canonical request it signs, while the request on the wire carried the path encoded once. Amazon S3 — and every S3-compatible store such as MinIO, Cloudflare R2, Wasabi, and Backblaze B2, plus GCS — signs the canonical path encoded exactly once, so any object key containing a space, a +, an &, parentheses, or a non-ASCII character was signed over a path the server never received and the request was rejected with HTTP 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch. Keys built only from unreserved characters were unaffected, which is why the regression went unnoticed. This release makes the canonical-path encoding match the service: S3 and GCS encode the path once, while the AWS services that genuinely require a second encoding (SQS, CloudWatch Logs, SNS) keep it. Object reads, writes, deletes, listings, presigned URLs, and backup or restore through the object-store adapter now succeed for keys with reserved characters. Separately, the bucket-operations key encoder now uses the AWS reserved-character set, so a key containing !, *, ', or ( is escaped to match the bytes the store signs over.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Fixed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "SigV4 and GCS V4 sign object-key paths with the single encoding S3 and GCS expect",
-          "body": "A request to read, write, delete, list, or presign an object whose key contained a space, +, &, (, ), or a non-ASCII character failed with 403 SignatureDoesNotMatch against S3, every S3-compatible store, and Google Cloud Storage, because the canonical request double-encoded the path the wire carried once. The signer is now service-aware: S3 and GCS sign the path encoded once (matching the wire and the store's own canonicalization), while SQS, CloudWatch Logs, and SNS keep the second encoding the AWS spec requires for those services. No configuration change or migration is needed — object operations and presigned URLs for keys with reserved characters simply start working. Object keys made only of unreserved characters are byte-for-byte unchanged."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Bucket-operations key encoder escapes the AWS reserved set",
-          "body": "The bucket-level object operations encoded key path segments with a generic URI encoder that left !, *, ', and ( unescaped. Those now route through the same AWS encoder the read and write paths use, so a key containing one of those characters is escaped consistently and signs correctly."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.20.json

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.15.20",
-  "date": "2026-06-24",
-  "headline": "Vendored SBOM version fields are derived from the bundle so they cannot drift, and the Public Suffix List + @simplewebauthn/server bundles are refreshed",
-  "summary": "The vendor manifest recorded each bundled package's version in two scanner-facing places that were hand-maintained and could drift from the code actually shipped — the structured components[].version (the CycloneDX component versions) and the cpe string. Two had drifted: peculiar-pki's @peculiar/x509 component read 1.13.0 while the bundle shipped 2.0.0, and @noble/curves' cpe read 0.0.0 while the bundle shipped 2.2.0. A CVE scanner (Trivy / Grype / a CycloneDX export, or a consumer mirroring the manifest into its own SBOM) keys on those structured fields, so an advisory was matched against the wrong version — a false negative on a real fix or a false positive on a patched one. Both fields are corrected, the vendor-bundle script now derives them from the actually-installed package versions at bundle time so they cannot drift again, and a manifest gate fails the build if they ever disagree. Separately, the vendored Mozilla Public Suffix List is refreshed to the current upstream revision and @simplewebauthn/server is refreshed to 13.3.2.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Fixed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Vendored SBOM version metadata is bundle-derived, not hand-maintained",
-          "body": "lib/vendor/MANIFEST.json recorded each package's version in two places a CVE/SBOM scanner reads — the structured components[].version sub-object and the cpe string — both hand-maintained alongside the human version string, so they could (and did) drift from the bundled code. @peculiar/x509's component version read 1.13.0 while the bundle shipped 2.0.0; @noble/curves' cpe read 0.0.0 while the bundle shipped 2.2.0. Either drift makes a scanner match advisories against the wrong version. Both are corrected to the shipped versions, and the durable fix is structural: scripts/vendor-update.sh now writes both the structured component versions and the cpe version from the ACTUALLY-INSTALLED package versions captured at bundle time, so a maintainer can no longer update one field and forget the other. A smoke-time manifest gate additionally fails the build if any component or cpe version disagrees with the package version, catching a manual drift before it ships."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Changed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Vendored Public Suffix List and @simplewebauthn/server refreshed",
-          "body": "The vendored Mozilla Public Suffix List is refreshed to the current upstream revision (used by b.publicSuffix for DMARC / BIMI / cookie-scope / same-site domain classification). @simplewebauthn/server is refreshed from 13.3.1 to 13.3.2, which improves WebAuthn attestation certificate-path validation; the published-tarball diff was reviewed (no install scripts, no network/eval, a self-contained code change) before re-vendoring."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.21.json

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.15.21",
-  "date": "2026-06-24",
-  "headline": "Adds a portable compare-and-swap UPDATE, an IPv6 /64 rate-limit key, a verify-only legacy-TOTP path, request-id AsyncLocalStorage scoping, schema-agnostic backup signing, side-effect-free FSM transition resolution, and the public codepoint-threat catalog — and fixes an FSM state transition that committed without an audit record when its entry hook threw",
-  "summary": "A batch of additive primitives that close gaps operators hit composing the framework: b.sql.guardedUpdate builds the cross-instance-safe compare-and-swap UPDATE (the conditional-INSERT sibling) with b.sql.casWon reading the won/lost result; b.requestHelpers.ipKey (and a rateLimit ipKeyMode) key an IPv6 client by its routing-significant /64 so one end-site can't rotate the low 64 bits to evade a per-IP limit; b.auth.totp gains an opt-in verify-only SHA-1 path for one-final-login legacy-secret migration while generation stays SHA-512-only; b.middleware.requestId can bind the id into an AsyncLocalStorage scope that survives the awaited route chain; b.backupManifest.signBytes/verifyBytes authenticate a consumer's own canonical bytes with the framework signing key; b.fsm gains a side-effect-free instance.target() and a way to defer its transition audit when composed with an external claim; and the codepoint-threat catalog the guard family composes is exposed as b.codepointClass. A correctness fix: an FSM transition whose onEnter hook threw left the state committed but emitted no audit record — the record now always fires (stamped a failure outcome with the hook error) so a state change is never unaudited.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Added",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "b.sql.guardedUpdate + b.sql.casWon — portable compare-and-swap UPDATE",
-          "body": "b.sql.guardedUpdate(table) builds an UPDATE whose required guardWhere(col, expected) fence makes it land only when the row is still in the expected value — the cross-instance-safe way to advance a status or version on a single-statement-per-request backend (a D1-over-HTTP bridge or any autocommit-only adapter without interactive transactions), and the conditional-UPDATE sibling of b.sql.insertSelectWhere. It refuses to render without a fence (an unfenced guardedUpdate is just a plain update). b.sql.casWon(result) reads the won/lost verdict from the affected-row count, normalizing the rowCount / changes / affectedRows field-name divergence across adapters and throwing on an indeterminate result so a phantom win can't ship. Standard SQL across SQLite / Postgres / MySQL; guardWhereOp(col, op, expected) supports a non-equality fence (an optimistic-version or balance guard), and a null fence renders IS NULL."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "b.requestHelpers.ipKey + rateLimit ipKeyMode — IPv6 /64 keying",
-          "body": "b.requestHelpers.ipKey(ip, { ipv6Bits }) derives a stable rate-limit / blocklist key: an IPv4 address verbatim (one IPv4 is one host) but an IPv6 address collapsed to its routing-significant /64 prefix. A single IPv6 end-site is allocated a whole /64 (RFC 6177 / RFC 4291) and freely rotates the low 64 bits, so keying on the full 128-bit address lets one site mint unlimited fresh keys and walk a per-IP throttle or evade an exact-address block; keying on the /64 closes that while still distinguishing real end-sites. b.middleware.rateLimit gains ipKeyMode: \"prefix64\" to apply this to its default key (the audit record still logs the full client IP)."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "b.auth.totp verify-only SHA-1 path for legacy-secret migration",
-          "body": "b.auth.totp.verify(secret, code, { algorithm: \"sha1\", verifyOnly: true }) authenticates a single legacy code during a re-enrollment flow, so a consumer migrating pre-existing RFC-6238-default (SHA-1) secrets can reuse the maintained verifier — separator stripping, 64-bit counter, drift / replay semantics — instead of hand-rolling a parallel HOTP. SHA-1 is still refused on every generation path (compute / generate / uri), so new-enrollment posture stays SHA-512-only, and the flag is honored only by verify(); each such verification emits an auth.totp.legacy_sha1_verify audit signal."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "b.middleware.requestId AsyncLocalStorage scoping",
-          "body": "b.middleware.requestId({ asyncContext: true }) binds the request id into the framework's AsyncLocalStorage scope so b.log.getRequestId() (and every b.log.create-built logger) returns it inside awaited route-handler code, not just on req.requestId. Because the b.router dispatch model runs the route handler after the middleware returns, the binding uses AsyncLocalStorage.enterWith (which persists forward across the awaited chain) rather than a callback wrap that would close before the handler runs; each request runs in its own async context so the binding stays request-scoped. The underlying b.log.enterRequestId(id) is exposed for callers wiring their own middleware."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "b.backupManifest.signBytes / verifyBytes — schema-agnostic signing",
-          "body": "b.backupManifest.signBytes(canonicalBytes) and verifyBytes(canonicalBytes, signatureBlock, { expectedFingerprint }) sign and verify a consumer's own canonical bytes with the same audit-sign keypair and fingerprint pinning as the v1-manifest sign() / verifySignature(), without adopting the framework's manifest schema — so a bespoke backup-header format can authenticate itself against the framework signing key. Fingerprint pinning is bound to the key the signature actually verifies under: the pin is checked against the fingerprint recomputed from the signature block's own public key (the new b.auditSign.fingerprintOf(publicKeyPem) helper), not the block's self-asserted fingerprint field, so a block can't claim a trusted fingerprint while being signed by a different key. The same binding now also applies to the v1-manifest verifySignature(). b.auditSign.verify additionally no longer requires init() when given an explicit public key, so a downstream verifier that holds only a trusted public key can check a detached signature."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "b.fsm side-effect-free transition resolution + deferrable audit",
-          "body": "instance.target(event) resolves a transition's destination state side-effect-free — the same edge and guard check as can() but returning the to-state (or null when the edge is illegal or guard-refused) — so a consumer composing an external compare-and-swap (b.sql.guardedUpdate on an autocommit-only substrate) can build the SET status = <to> claim without calling transition(), which would mutate state and emit an audit before the cross-instance claim is known to land. transition(event, { audit: false }) suppresses the built-in emit so that composition can emit its own enriched record once the claim resolves."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "b.codepointClass — the codepoint-threat catalog on the public surface",
-          "body": "The Unicode bidi-override / C0-control / zero-width / null-byte / Unicode-Tags tables and the UTS #39 confusable-script detector that the b.guard* family composes internally are now exposed as b.codepointClass, so a consumer can build a custom unconstrained-free-text screen — detectCharThreats / assertNoCharThreats / applyCharStripPolicies / scriptFor / detectMixedScripts plus the compiled regexes — without re-rolling the regexes (where the zero-width class is mistyped and the astral Unicode-Tags block forgotten) or coupling to an internal module path. For a ready-made free-text guard, b.guardText remains the first-class entry point."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Fixed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "An FSM transition committed its state change without an audit record when the entry hook threw",
-          "body": "b.fsm commits the new state and pushes the history entry before running the destination state's onEnter hook. When that hook threw, control skipped the audit emission entirely — leaving a committed state transition with no audit record, a compliance gap for any regime that requires state changes to be auditable. The transition audit now always fires even when onEnter throws: it records the committed transition stamped with a failure outcome and the hook error, and still re-raises the error to the caller (the documented contract that an onEnter throw surfaces so the operator can roll back is unchanged)."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.15.22.json

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.15.22",
-  "date": "2026-06-24",
-  "headline": "Internal test-harness reliability only — the published library is byte-for-byte identical to 0.15.21",
-  "summary": "This release changes only the repository's own test harness and test files; nothing under the shipped tarball (index.js, bin/, lib/) is touched, so the API, behavior, and published files are identical to 0.15.21 and operators have nothing to do. The smoke worker now attributes a fire-and-forget failure — an unawaited promise or an unreleased handle (a retry timer, a shutdown wait, a watcher/reload restart) that throws AFTER a test's assertions already passed — to the exact test that caused it and retries it once, instead of the prior unattributable, intermittent failure that only surfaced on a resource-starved CI runner. Five test files that invoked their run() at module scope (re-running and, in some cases, exiting the worker before it could report a result) are corrected to run only under require.main === module, and a test-discipline check keeps the pattern from returning. An opt-in handle-leak audit (SMOKE_AUDIT_HANDLES) surfaces tests that hold a timer / socket / server / worker past completion, for a follow-up cleanup pass.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Changed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Smoke test harness attributes late-async-error failures and fixes module-level test self-execution",
-          "body": "The forked smoke worker installs unhandledRejection / uncaughtException handlers and a settle tick so a failure that fires after a test's assertions pass — a leaked handle's callback or an unawaited promise from retry / shutdown / reload logic — is reported against the test that caused it and retried once (a transient passes, a persistent one fails again and names the bug), replacing the prior intermittent, unattributable 'fork failed' that only appeared on a starved CI runner. Five test files (two integration, three layer-0, plus two wiki-suite harnesses) that called run() at module scope are corrected to execute only under require.main === module so they no longer double-run or exit the worker prematurely when required, and a codebase-patterns test-discipline detector prevents the unguarded-module-level-run shape from recurring. A SMOKE_AUDIT_HANDLES opt-in reports per-file handle leaks for a tracked cleanup. None of this is in the published package."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}