@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.5.4 → 0.5.6

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/eat.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.eat
@@ -48,6 +50,7 @@
 
 var cwt = require("./cwt");
 var bCrypto = require("./crypto");
+var pick = require("./pick");
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");
 var { defineClass } = require("./framework-error");
 
@@ -229,7 +232,7 @@ async function verify(eat, opts) {
     if (name === "dbgstat" && typeof v === "number" && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(DBGSTAT_BY_VALUE, v)) {
       v = DBGSTAT_BY_VALUE[v];
     }
-    claims[name] = v;
+    if (!pick.isPoisonedKey(name)) claims[name] = v;
   });
 
   return { claims: claims, raw: raw, alg: out.alg, protectedHeaders: out.protectedHeaders };

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/error-page.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * errors-page — router error handler with rich dev page + safe prod page.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/events.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.events

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/external-db-migrate.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * b.externalDb.migrate — versioned migrations for an externalDb backend.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/external-db.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.externalDb

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/fapi2.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.fapi2

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/fda-21cfr11.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * b.fda21cfr11 — FDA 21 CFR Part 11 audit-content + electronic-signature

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/fdx.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.fdx

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/fedcm.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.fedcm

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/file-type.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.fileType

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/file-upload.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.fileUpload
@@ -129,9 +131,12 @@
  * Design posture:
  *
  *   - **init() before any chunk**: explicit lifecycle. Init records
- *     createdAt + actor + metadata + signing key in a per-upload sidecar
- *     so subsequent acceptChunk / finalize / status calls can authenticate
- *     and audit consistently.
+ *     createdAt + actor + metadata in a per-upload sidecar; the stored owner
+ *     (actor.id || actor.userId) is enforced on every subsequent acceptChunk /
+ *     finalize / status / cancelUpload call, so one actor cannot act on another
+ *     actor's upload by its uploadId. Operator admin tooling opts into
+ *     cross-actor access via allowCrossActor (default off) plus the
+ *     "fileUpload.admin" permission scope.
  *
  *   - **Framework owns chunk lifecycle**, not final storage. Operator
  *     decides via `onFinalize` what to do with the assembled buffer
@@ -245,9 +250,16 @@ var UPLOAD_ID_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/;
 var UPLOAD_ID_MAX_LENGTH = C.BYTES.bytes(128);
 
 function _validateUploadId(id) {
+  // The char-class allows '.', so the bare path tokens "." and ".." pass the
+  // regex; joined under stagingDir they resolve to the staging dir / its PARENT
+  // (path.join(stagingDir, "..") escapes), and a later rmSync would recurse into
+  // the parent. Reject them before any filesystem op — every public method
+  // validates the id here, so this guards init / acceptChunk / finalize /
+  // status / cancelUpload alike.
   if (typeof id !== "string" ||
       id.length === 0 ||
       id.length > UPLOAD_ID_MAX_LENGTH ||
+      id === "." || id === ".." ||
       !UPLOAD_ID_RE.test(id)) {
     var ID_PREVIEW_CHARS = C.BYTES.bytes(64);
     throw _err("BAD_UPLOAD_ID",
@@ -298,6 +310,16 @@ function _validateCreateOpts(opts) {
       validateOpts.optionalObjectWithMethod(v, "check", label, FileUploadError, "BAD_OPT",
         "must be a b.permissions instance (check fn)");
     },
+    // allowCrossActor — escape hatch for operator admin tooling that must act on
+    // ANY actor's upload (ops dashboards, cleanup jobs). Default false: per-upload
+    // ownership is enforced so actor B cannot finalize / cancel / status /
+    // acceptChunk actor A's upload by guessing its uploadId. When true the
+    // ownership check is skipped; if a permissions instance is also wired the
+    // caller must additionally hold the "fileUpload.admin" scope, so cross-actor
+    // access stays gated.
+    allowCrossActor: function (v, label) {
+      validateOpts.optionalBoolean(v, label, FileUploadError, "BAD_OPT");
+    },
     // contentSafety — extension-keyed gate map for per-extension content
     // validation. Default behaviour: when undefined, the framework wires
     // b.guardAll.byExtension({ profile: "strict" }) automatically so every
@@ -376,6 +398,7 @@ function _validateCreateOpts(opts) {
  *   audit:                     b.audit,
  *   observability:             b.observability,
  *   permissions:               b.permissions,          // optional; gates init/accept/finalize/status/list/cancel
+ *   allowCrossActor:           boolean,                // default false; admin escape hatch — bypasses per-upload ownership when the caller holds the "fileUpload.admin" scope
  *   fileType:                  b.fileType,             // required when allowedFileTypes is non-empty
  *   contentSafety:             Object | null,          // ext→gate map; null = audited opt-out; undefined = b.guardAll.byExtension({ profile: "strict" })
  *   filenameSafety:            Object | null,          // gate; null = audited opt-out; undefined = b.guardFilename.gate({ profile: "strict" })
@@ -408,6 +431,7 @@ function create(opts) {
   var onChunk                 = opts.onChunk || null;
   var fileType                = opts.fileType || null;
   var permissions             = opts.permissions || null;
+  var allowCrossActor         = opts.allowCrossActor === true;
   // ---- Default-on safety wiring ----
   // contentSafety: undefined → wire b.guardAll.byExtension({ profile: "strict" })
   // contentSafety: null      → explicit opt-out, audit row emitted
@@ -540,6 +564,60 @@ function create(opts) {
     }
   }
 
+  // _checkOwnership — refuse when the calling actor does not own the upload.
+  // Owner identity is the same _actorKey derivation init() stored in
+  // meta.actorId (actor.id || actor.userId || "_anonymous"), so an anonymous
+  // upload is owned by "_anonymous" and a named actor cannot reach it (and vice
+  // versa) — fail-closed for the missing/legacy-meta case. The permission-scope
+  // check ("fileUpload.<op>") is a coarse capability ("may this actor finalize
+  // uploads AT ALL"); this is the per-resource authorization ("does this actor
+  // own THIS upload"). Both run on every lifecycle method, so one actor cannot
+  // act on another's upload by guessing its uploadId (IDOR / CWE-639).
+  //
+  // Escape hatch: allowCrossActor (create-time, default off) skips the ownership
+  // comparison for operator admin tooling; when permissions are also wired,
+  // "fileUpload.admin" is required so cross-actor access is itself gated.
+  function _checkOwnership(action, actor, meta) {
+    if (!meta) return;   // not-found is handled by the caller's own UNKNOWN_UPLOAD path
+    var callerKey = _actorKey(actor);
+    if (meta.actorId === callerKey) return;   // the owner always passes
+    // The caller is NOT the owner. Refuse unless the operator enabled
+    // cross-actor admin access at create() — and, when permissions are wired,
+    // the caller holds the "fileUpload.admin" scope (so the escape hatch is
+    // itself gated and a non-owner cannot ride allowCrossActor without it).
+    if (allowCrossActor) {
+      var adminOk = !permissions;   // scope-less single-tenant operator: allowCrossActor alone suffices
+      if (permissions) {
+        try { adminOk = permissions.check(actor, "fileUpload.admin"); }
+        catch (_e) { adminOk = false; }
+      }
+      if (adminOk) return;
+      _emitObs("fileUpload.permission_denied", 1, { action: "admin" });
+      _emitAudit("fileUpload." + action, {
+        actor:    requestHelpers.extractActorContext(actor),
+        resource: { kind: "fileUpload", id: meta.uploadId },
+        outcome:  "denied",
+        reason:   "cross-actor-admin-scope-required",
+        metadata: { uploadId: meta.uploadId, owner: meta.actorId,
+                    caller: callerKey, action: action },
+      });
+      throw _err("PERMISSION_DENIED",
+        "fileUpload." + action + ": cross-actor access requires scope 'fileUpload.admin'");
+    }
+    _emitObs("fileUpload.ownership_violation", 1, { action: action });
+    _emitAudit("fileUpload." + action, {
+      actor:    requestHelpers.extractActorContext(actor),
+      resource: { kind: "fileUpload", id: meta.uploadId },
+      outcome:  "denied",
+      reason:   "ownership-violation",
+      metadata: { uploadId: meta.uploadId, owner: meta.actorId,
+                  caller: callerKey, action: action },
+    });
+    throw _err("OWNERSHIP_VIOLATION",
+      "fileUpload." + action + ": actor does not own upload '" + meta.uploadId +
+      "' (ownership enforced; set allowCrossActor + 'fileUpload.admin' scope for admin tooling)");
+  }
+
   function _readReceivedIndices(uploadId) {
     var p = _receivedPath(uploadId);
     if (!nodeFs.existsSync(p)) return [];
@@ -692,6 +770,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       throw _err("UNKNOWN_UPLOAD",
         "fileUpload.acceptChunk: no init() seen for '" + uploadId + "'; call init() first");
     }
+    _checkOwnership("accept", actor, meta);
     if (clock() - meta.lastChunkAt > maxIdleMs) {
       // Idle-timed-out — too much time since init or last chunk.
       throw _err("UPLOAD_IDLE_EXPIRED",
@@ -984,6 +1063,7 @@ function create(opts) {
       throw _err("UNKNOWN_UPLOAD",
         "fileUpload.finalize: no init() seen for '" + uploadId + "'");
     }
+    _checkOwnership("finalize", actor, meta);
 
     _validateManifest(manifest);
 
@@ -1086,11 +1166,36 @@ function create(opts) {
     }
     if (contentSafety) {
       var safetyExt = nodePath.extname(filename).toLowerCase();
-      var safetyGate = contentSafety[safetyExt];
-      if (safetyGate && typeof safetyGate.check === "function" && bodyBuffer) {
+      // Gates to run: the filename-extension gate, plus — when the magic bytes
+      // confidently identify a DIFFERENT type — that type's gate too, so a
+      // mislabeled magic-byte file (e.g. a PDF named .png) cannot dodge the
+      // scanner for its real type by choosing the extension. Text formats with
+      // no magic bytes (HTML/SVG/CSV) are not detectable here; that residual is
+      // covered by the serving layer's Content-Type + X-Content-Type-Options:
+      // nosniff and by registering a content gate for every accepted extension.
+      var gateExts = [safetyExt];
+      // Sniff from the reassembled body, or — for a streamed upload past
+      // maxStreamReassemblyBytes (bodyBuffer null) — the first chunk already
+      // read for the MIME-sniff gate. So a streamed mislabel still routes to its
+      // real type's gate; and when that gate cannot scan the un-reassembled
+      // body, the loop below surfaces it as a streamed-over-cap skip (not a
+      // no-gate skip), so operators can alert rather than miss the bypass.
+      var sniffBytes = bodyBuffer || firstChunk;
+      if (fileType && sniffBytes) {
+        var sniffed = fileType.detect(sniffBytes);
+        if (sniffed && sniffed.extension) {
+          var sniffedExt = "." + String(sniffed.extension).toLowerCase();
+          if (sniffedExt !== safetyExt && gateExts.indexOf(sniffedExt) === -1) {
+            gateExts.push(sniffedExt);
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      // Run one gate; throws on refuse / gate-error, mutates bodyBuffer on
+      // sanitize so a later gate sees the cleaned bytes.
+      var _runContentSafetyGate = async function (gate, gateExt) {
         var safetyDecision;
         try {
-          safetyDecision = await safetyGate.check({
+          safetyDecision = await gate.check({
             bytes:    bodyBuffer,
             filename: filename,
             actor:    actor,
@@ -1108,12 +1213,12 @@ function create(opts) {
             "fileUpload.finalize: contentSafety gate threw: " + (gateErr && gateErr.message));
         }
         if (!safetyDecision.ok || safetyDecision.action === "refuse") {
-          _emitObs("fileUpload.content_safety_refused", 1, { ext: safetyExt });
+          _emitObs("fileUpload.content_safety_refused", 1, { ext: gateExt });
           _emitAudit("fileUpload.finalize_failure", {
             actor:    requestHelpers.extractActorContext(actor),
             outcome:  "failure", reason: "content-safety-refused",
             metadata: {
-              uploadId: uploadId, ext: safetyExt,
+              uploadId: uploadId, ext: gateExt,
               issues: gateContract.summarizeIssues(safetyDecision.issues),
             },
           });
@@ -1122,26 +1227,37 @@ function create(opts) {
             (safetyDecision.issues || []).map(function (i) { return i.kind; }).join(", ") + ")");
         }
         if (safetyDecision.action === "sanitize" && safetyDecision.sanitized) {
-          // Replace the body buffer with the sanitized variant.
           bodyBuffer = safetyDecision.sanitized;
-          // Clear the streaming alias if present — sanitized fits in memory.
           bodyStream = null;
         }
-      } else if (safetyGate && typeof safetyGate.check === "function" && !bodyBuffer) {
-        // A content-safety gate is configured for this extension, but the
-        // upload streamed past maxStreamReassemblyBytes and was never
-        // reassembled into a buffer the byte-level gate can inspect. The
-        // MIME-sniff and filename gates still ran; the per-extension
-        // content gate did NOT. Audit the skip (with the streamed reason)
-        // so operators can alert, lower maxStreamReassemblyBytes, or cap
+      };
+      var ranAnyGate = false;
+      var hasGateButNoBody = false;
+      for (var ge = 0; ge < gateExts.length; ge += 1) {
+        var gateForExt = contentSafety[gateExts[ge]];
+        if (gateForExt && typeof gateForExt.check === "function") {
+          if (bodyBuffer) {
+            await _runContentSafetyGate(gateForExt, gateExts[ge]);
+            ranAnyGate = true;
+          } else {
+            hasGateButNoBody = true;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+      if (!ranAnyGate && hasGateButNoBody) {
+        // A content-safety gate is configured, but the upload streamed past
+        // maxStreamReassemblyBytes and was never reassembled into a buffer the
+        // byte-level gate can inspect. The MIME-sniff and filename gates still
+        // ran; the per-extension content gate did NOT. Audit the skip so
+        // operators can alert, lower maxStreamReassemblyBytes, or cap
         // maxFileBytes to force content-gating of this type.
         _emitContentSafetySkipped(uploadId, actor, "streamed-over-reassembly-cap",
                                   safetyExt, verified.totalBytes);
-      } else {
+      } else if (!ranAnyGate) {
         // contentSafety is wired but no gate is registered for this file's
-        // extension — the byte-level scan does not run. Audit the skip so
-        // a review can tell the upload bypassed content scanning (and
-        // register a gate for the extension if it should be scanned).
+        // extension or its sniffed type — the byte-level scan does not run.
+        // Audit the skip so a review can tell the upload bypassed content
+        // scanning (and register a gate for the extension if it should be).
         _emitContentSafetySkipped(uploadId, actor, "no-gate-for-extension",
                                   safetyExt, verified.totalBytes);
       }
@@ -1209,6 +1325,7 @@ function create(opts) {
     _checkPermission("status", callerOpts.actor);
     var meta = _readMeta(uploadId);
     if (!meta) return null;
+    _checkOwnership("status", callerOpts.actor, meta);
     var indices = _readReceivedIndices(uploadId).slice().sort(function (a, b) { return a - b; });
     return {
       uploadId:           uploadId,
@@ -1251,6 +1368,7 @@ function create(opts) {
     _checkPermission("cancel", callerOpts.actor);
     var meta = _readMeta(uploadId);
     if (!meta) return { ok: false, uploadId: uploadId, reason: "not-found" };
+    _checkOwnership("cancel", callerOpts.actor, meta);
     try { nodeFs.rmSync(_uploadDir(uploadId), { recursive: true, force: true }); }
     catch (_e) { /* best-effort */ }
     _emitObs("fileUpload.cancelled", 1);

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/flag-cache.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * Flag-evaluation cache — per-targetingKey TTL'd cache wrapping a

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/flag-evaluation-context.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * Flag evaluation context — the operator-supplied object describing

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/flag-providers.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * Flag providers — backend implementations that produce flag values

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/flag-targeting.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * Flag targeting — rule-based evaluation against an operator's
@@ -178,14 +180,9 @@ function validateRules(rules, label) {
         // bound does NOT defend ReDoS (`(a+)+$` is 6 chars); screen the pattern
         // through b.guardRegex first — it refuses nested-quantifier / alternation-
         // quantifier / lookaround-quantifier shapes before compilation.
+        guardRegex().assertSafe(cond.value, clabel + ".value", FlagError, "flag/bad-condition");
         try {
-          guardRegex().sanitize(cond.value, { profile: "strict" });
-        } catch (ge) {
-          throw new FlagError("flag/bad-condition",
-            clabel + ".value: regex pattern rejected as unsafe (ReDoS shape) - " + ge.message);
-        }
-        try {
-          // allow:dynamic-regex — operator targeting pattern, ReDoS-screened via guardRegex.sanitize (strict) + length-bounded to 200 chars above
+          // allow:dynamic-regex — operator targeting pattern, ReDoS-screened via guardRegex.assertSafe + length-bounded to 200 chars above
           validatedCond._compiledRegex = new RegExp(cond.value);
         } catch (e) {
           throw new FlagError("flag/bad-condition",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/flag.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.flag

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/forms.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.forms
@@ -34,6 +36,7 @@
  */
 var C = require("./constants");
 var { generateToken, timingSafeEqual } = require("./crypto");
+var guardRegex = require("./guard-regex");
 var safeSchema = require("./safe-schema");
 var safeUrl = require("./safe-url");
 var template = require("./template");
@@ -198,6 +201,10 @@ function _renderInput(field) {
         "'.pattern must be a pre-compiled RegExp; got " +
         (typeof field.pattern) + ". Wrap the source string with `RegExp` at config time.");
     }
+    // Screen the operator-supplied pattern for catastrophic-backtracking
+    // (ReDoS) shapes at config time so a hostile-form-spec can't stage a
+    // pathological regex against the engine.
+    guardRegex.assertSafe(field.pattern, "forms: field[" + field.name + "].pattern");
     attrs.push('pattern="' + escapeAttribute(field.pattern.source) + '"');
   }
   if (field.min !== undefined)        attrs.push('min="' + escapeAttribute(field.min) + '"');
@@ -490,6 +497,10 @@ function validate(spec, body) {
             "'.pattern must be a pre-compiled RegExp; got " +
             (typeof f.pattern) + ". Wrap the source string with `RegExp` at config time.");
         }
+        // Screen the operator-supplied pattern for catastrophic-backtracking
+        // (ReDoS) shapes before the test, so a pathological regex can't be
+        // run against the submitted value.
+        guardRegex.assertSafe(f.pattern, "forms: field[" + f.name + "].pattern");
         if (!f.pattern.test(coerced)) {
           errors[f.name] = f.errorMessages && f.errorMessages.pattern
             ? f.errorMessages.pattern

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/framework-error.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 var observability = require("./observability");
 

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/framework-files.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 
 // framework-files — the single source of truth for the framework's on-disk

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/framework-schema.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.frameworkSchema

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/framework-sha1-hibp.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * framework-sha1-hibp — SHA-1 hex digest, RESTRICTED to the

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/fsm.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module     b.fsm

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/gate-contract.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.gateContract

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/gdpr-ropa.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * b.gdpr.ropa — GDPR Article 30 Records of Processing Activities.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/graphql-federation.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.graphqlFederation

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-agent-registry.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module     b.guardAgentRegistry

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-all.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.guardAll

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-archive.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.guardArchive

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-auth.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.guardAuth

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-cidr.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.guardCidr

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-csv.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.guardCsv

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-domain.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.guardDomain

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-dsn.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module     b.guardDsn

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-email.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.guardEmail

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-envelope.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module     b.guardEnvelope

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-event-bus-payload.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module     b.guardEventBusPayload

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-event-bus-topic.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module     b.guardEventBusTopic

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-filename.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.guardFilename

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-graphql.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * @module b.guardGraphql

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-html-wcag-aria.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 
 var validateOpts = require("./validate-opts");

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-html-wcag-forms.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * Form-specific accessibility validation for the WCAG 2.2 audit-only

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-html-wcag-tables.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * Table semantics validation for the WCAG 2.2 audit-only scanner.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-html-wcag-tagwalk.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * Shared tag-walker helpers for the WCAG 2.2 audit-only scanner

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-html-wcag.js

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
 "use strict";
 /**
  * WCAG 2.2 audit-only scanner for HTML.