@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.5.12 → 0.5.14

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/crypto-adversarial.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,352 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * b.crypto adversarial + malformed-input hardening across the public
+ * surface — the error/rejection half of the primitives whose happy path
+ * lives in crypto.test.js / crypto-envelope.test.js / crypto-base64url.test.js.
+ *
+ * Every decrypt / verify assertion here drives the exported consumer path
+ * (b.crypto.decrypt / b.crypto.verify / b.crypto.decryptPacked) with a
+ * tampered, truncated, wrong-key, wrong-suite, or otherwise hostile input
+ * built from real ML-KEM / ML-DSA / SLH-DSA / XChaCha20 fixtures — so the
+ * signature-PASSING adversarial shapes (implicit-rejection KEM, bit-flipped
+ * AEAD, downgraded suite header) are exercised, not merely parse failures.
+ * The security contract under test is fail-CLOSED: a decrypt / verify of a
+ * tampered input must reject (throw a typed envelope error, or return false)
+ * — never accept, never return a value, never leak a raw runtime error past
+ * the module's documented "Invalid envelope: ..." contract.
+ *
+ * Run standalone: `node test/layer-0-primitives/crypto-adversarial.test.js`
+ * Or via smoke:   `node test/smoke.js`
+ */
+
+var helpers = require("../helpers");
+var b       = helpers.b;
+var check   = helpers.check;
+
+// ---- Signature verify: an attacker-controlled signature must NEVER verify
+// true and must NEVER throw (the documented contract: false, not an
+// exception, on a malformed signature). Driven for both PQC signature
+// families the framework auto-detects.
+function testVerifyAdversarial() {
+  var pair = b.crypto.generateSigningKeyPair();            // ml-dsa-87 default
+  var msg  = "audit:row=42|action=delete";
+  var sig  = b.crypto.sign(msg, pair.privateKey);
+  check("sign→verify round-trips (ml-dsa-87)", b.crypto.verify(msg, sig, pair.publicKey) === true);
+
+  // Every tampered / malformed signature shape → false, no throw.
+  var bitflip = Buffer.from(sig); bitflip[0] ^= 0xff;
+  check("verify rejects a bit-flipped signature", b.crypto.verify(msg, bitflip, pair.publicKey) === false);
+  check("verify rejects a truncated signature",   b.crypto.verify(msg, sig.subarray(0, 100), pair.publicKey) === false);
+  check("verify rejects an oversized signature",  b.crypto.verify(msg, Buffer.concat([sig, Buffer.from([1, 2, 3])]), pair.publicKey) === false);
+  check("verify rejects an empty signature",      b.crypto.verify(msg, Buffer.alloc(0), pair.publicKey) === false);
+  check("verify rejects a garbage signature",     b.crypto.verify(msg, Buffer.from("not-a-signature-at-all"), pair.publicKey) === false);
+  check("verify rejects a hex-string signature",  b.crypto.verify(msg, sig.toString("hex"), pair.publicKey) === false);
+  check("verify rejects the right sig over tampered data", b.crypto.verify("audit:row=43|action=delete", sig, pair.publicKey) === false);
+
+  // A signature that is valid under a DIFFERENT key must not verify under this one.
+  var other = b.crypto.generateSigningKeyPair();
+  check("verify rejects a signature from a different keypair", b.crypto.verify(msg, sig, other.publicKey) === false);
+
+  // SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256f — the hash-based family. Round-trip + tamper.
+  var slh    = b.crypto.generateSigningKeyPair("slh-dsa-shake-256f");
+  var slhSig = b.crypto.sign(msg, slh.privateKey);
+  check("sign→verify round-trips (slh-dsa-shake-256f)", b.crypto.verify(msg, slhSig, slh.publicKey) === true);
+  var slhBad = Buffer.from(slhSig); slhBad[5] ^= 0xff;
+  check("verify rejects a tampered slh-dsa signature", b.crypto.verify(msg, slhBad, slh.publicKey) === false);
+  // The two families produce distinctly-sized signatures (auto-detect works
+  // off the key PEM, not a caller-passed algorithm id).
+  check("ml-dsa and slh-dsa signatures differ in length", sig.length !== slhSig.length);
+
+  // sign() with a public key PEM (operator error) surfaces the failure.
+  var signThrew = false;
+  try { b.crypto.sign(msg, pair.publicKey); } catch (_e) { signThrew = true; }
+  check("sign refuses a public key as the signing key", signThrew);
+}
+
+// ---- Envelope decrypt error matrix. Each malformed / hostile envelope
+// must reject with the module's typed "Invalid envelope: ..." contract (or
+// a Poly1305 tag failure), driven through the public b.crypto.decrypt.
+function testDecryptErrorMatrix() {
+  var keys = b.crypto.generateEncryptionKeyPair();
+  var full = Buffer.from(b.crypto.encrypt("hybrid envelope adversarial body", keys), "base64");
+
+  function decryptThrows(label, buf, keyMaterial, match) {
+    var threw = null;
+    try { b.crypto.decrypt(buf.toString("base64"), keyMaterial || keys); }
+    catch (e) { threw = e; }
+    check(label, threw && match.test(threw.message));
+  }
+
+  // Unsupported magic byte (neither 0xE1 legacy nor 0xE2 current).
+  decryptThrows("decrypt refuses an unsupported magic byte", Buffer.alloc(12), keys, /unsupported format/);
+  // Too short to hold the 4-byte suite header.
+  decryptThrows("decrypt refuses a header shorter than 4 bytes", Buffer.from([0xE2, 0x03, 0x02]), keys, /too short/);
+  // Valid header but truncated at the 2-byte KEM-ct length prefix.
+  decryptThrows("decrypt refuses truncation at the length prefix", full.subarray(0, 5), keys, /truncated/);
+  // Suite-substitution on the header: unsupported cipher / KDF / KEM id.
+  var badCipher = Buffer.from(full); badCipher[2] = 0x09;
+  decryptThrows("decrypt refuses an unsupported cipher id", badCipher, keys, /unsupported cipher/);
+  var badKdf = Buffer.from(full); badKdf[3] = 0x07;
+  decryptThrows("decrypt refuses an unsupported KDF id", badKdf, keys, /unsupported KDF/);
+  var badKem = Buffer.from(full); badKem[1] = 0x7A;
+  decryptThrows("decrypt refuses an unsupported KEM id", badKem, keys, /unsupported KEM ID/);
+
+  // Hybrid (ML-KEM-1024 + P-384) envelope opened without the EC private key.
+  decryptThrows("decrypt refuses a hybrid envelope missing the EC private key",
+    full, { privateKey: keys.privateKey }, /Hybrid KEM requires EC private key/);
+
+  // Implicit-rejection KEM: a bit-flip inside the ML-KEM ciphertext yields a
+  // DIFFERENT shared secret (FIPS 203 implicit rejection), so the derived key
+  // is wrong and the AEAD tag fails — the ciphertext is NOT accepted.
+  var tamperedKemCt = Buffer.from(full); tamperedKemCt[7] ^= 0xff;
+  decryptThrows("decrypt rejects a tampered KEM ciphertext (implicit rejection → tag failure)",
+    tamperedKemCt, keys, /tag|invalid|auth/i);
+  // Bit-flip in the trailing AEAD body → Poly1305 failure.
+  var tamperedBody = Buffer.from(full); tamperedBody[full.length - 1] ^= 0xff;
+  decryptThrows("decrypt rejects a tampered AEAD body", tamperedBody, keys, /tag|invalid|auth/i);
+
+  // Mismatched recipient — a fresh, unrelated keypair cannot open the envelope.
+  var wrong = b.crypto.generateEncryptionKeyPair();
+  decryptThrows("decrypt rejects a mismatched recipient keypair", full, wrong, /tag|invalid|auth|Decapsulation/i);
+
+  // ML-KEM-768 + X25519 envelope opened through the generic dispatcher
+  // without the required x25519 private key.
+  var p768 = b.crypto.generateMlkem768X25519KeyPair();
+  var env768 = Buffer.from(b.crypto.encryptMlkem768X25519("interop body", {
+    mlkemPublicKey:  p768.mlkemPublicKey,
+    x25519PublicKey: p768.x25519PublicKey,
+  }), "base64");
+  decryptThrows("decrypt refuses an ML-KEM-768 envelope missing x25519PrivateKey",
+    env768, { privateKey: p768.mlkemPrivateKey }, /requires x25519PrivateKey/);
+}
+
+// ---- Truncated-envelope contract (root-fix regression). A truncated
+// envelope (untrusted ciphertext) must fail with the typed
+// "Invalid envelope: ..." error at EVERY truncation length — never a raw
+// RangeError leaking noble-cipher internals past the documented contract,
+// the same class the _envU16 bounds check already closes for the length
+// prefixes. Before the fix, a truncation landing inside the 24-byte nonce
+// or the 16-byte Poly1305 tag surfaced a raw RangeError.
+function testTruncationNeverLeaksRangeError() {
+  var keys = b.crypto.generateEncryptionKeyPair();
+  var plaintext = "truncation probe payload — every offset must reject typed";
+
+  // Exercise all three KEM suites so the shared nonce/tag bounds check is
+  // proven across the hybrid, KEM-only, and ML-KEM-768 dispatch arms.
+  var p768 = b.crypto.generateMlkem768X25519KeyPair();
+  var suites = [
+    {
+      name: "hybrid ML-KEM-1024 + P-384",
+      full: Buffer.from(b.crypto.encrypt(plaintext, keys), "base64"),
+      key:  keys,
+    },
+    {
+      name: "KEM-only ML-KEM-1024",
+      full: Buffer.from(b.crypto.encrypt(plaintext, keys.publicKey), "base64"),
+      key:  { privateKey: keys.privateKey },
+    },
+    {
+      name: "ML-KEM-768 + X25519",
+      full: Buffer.from(b.crypto.encryptMlkem768X25519(plaintext, {
+        mlkemPublicKey:  p768.mlkemPublicKey,
+        x25519PublicKey: p768.x25519PublicKey,
+      }), "base64"),
+      key:  { privateKey: p768.mlkemPrivateKey, x25519PrivateKey: p768.x25519PrivateKey },
+    },
+  ];
+
+  for (var s = 0; s < suites.length; s += 1) {
+    var suite = suites[s];
+    var full = suite.full;
+    // Every truncation offset must reject either with the typed
+    // "Invalid envelope"/"Invalid packed" contract (a truncation in the header,
+    // a length-prefixed KEM ciphertext / ephemeral key, or the nonce/tag
+    // region) or with the genuine AEAD "invalid tag" authentication failure (a
+    // truncation inside the ciphertext body, where the structure is intact but
+    // Poly1305 fails) — NEVER a raw low-level crypto leak: a noble RangeError
+    // ("nonce" length) or a Node "Failed to perform decapsulation" / key-parse
+    // error from handing an under-length component to Node crypto. The agent's
+    // original test caught only RangeError, so the decapsulation leak (a
+    // truncation inside the length-prefixed KEM ciphertext, reaching
+    // nodeCrypto.decapsulate before the trailing bounds check) slipped through.
+    var leaked = null;
+    for (var n = full.length - 1; n >= 1 && leaked === null; n -= 1) {
+      try { b.crypto.decrypt(full.subarray(0, n).toString("base64"), suite.key); }
+      catch (e) {
+        var msg = (e && e.message) || String(e);
+        if (e instanceof RangeError || !/Invalid envelope|Invalid packed|invalid tag/i.test(msg)) {
+          leaked = { n: n, msg: msg };
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    check("decrypt rejects every truncation of a " + suite.name +
+      " envelope with the typed contract or a genuine AEAD tag failure " +
+      "(no raw RangeError / decapsulation error): " +
+      (leaked ? leaked.n + "→" + leaked.msg : "clean"),
+      leaked === null);
+
+    // A truncation landing inside the nonce/tag region rejects with the
+    // typed envelope error (positive lock on the contract, not just the
+    // absence of a RangeError). ctLen = plaintext bytes + 16-byte tag; land
+    // 4 bytes into the 24-byte nonce.
+    var ctLen = Buffer.byteLength(plaintext, "utf8") + 16;
+    var inNonce = full.length - ctLen - 4;
+    var nonceErr = null;
+    try { b.crypto.decrypt(full.subarray(0, inNonce).toString("base64"), suite.key); }
+    catch (e) { nonceErr = e; }
+    check("decrypt rejects a nonce-region truncation with the typed envelope error (" + suite.name + ")",
+      nonceErr && !(nonceErr instanceof RangeError) && /Invalid envelope/.test(nonceErr.message));
+  }
+}
+
+// ---- KEM-only fallback + raw mode round-trips (positive paths that reach
+// the encryptMlkemOnly / ML_KEM_1024 decrypt arm and the raw:true return).
+function testKemOnlyAndRawRoundTrips() {
+  var keys = b.crypto.generateEncryptionKeyPair();
+
+  // encrypt() with only an ML-KEM public key (string form) drops to KEM-only
+  // and still round-trips through the ML_KEM_1024 decrypt arm.
+  var sealedStr = b.crypto.encrypt("kem-only via string pubkey", keys.publicKey);
+  check("KEM-only (string pubkey) round-trips",
+    b.crypto.decrypt(sealedStr, { privateKey: keys.privateKey }) === "kem-only via string pubkey");
+
+  // encrypt() with an object carrying only publicKey (no ecPublicKey) takes
+  // the same fallback (and emits the one-shot hybrid_disabled audit).
+  var sealedObj = b.crypto.encrypt("kem-only via object", { publicKey: keys.publicKey });
+  check("KEM-only (object, no ecPublicKey) round-trips",
+    b.crypto.decrypt(sealedObj, { privateKey: keys.privateKey }) === "kem-only via object");
+
+  // decrypt accepts the private key as a bare PEM string too (the
+  // `typeof privateKeys === "string" ? privateKeys : privateKeys.privateKey`
+  // shape) for the KEM-only suite.
+  check("KEM-only decrypt accepts a bare PEM-string private key",
+    b.crypto.decrypt(sealedStr, keys.privateKey) === "kem-only via string pubkey");
+
+  // raw:true returns the decrypted Buffer rather than a utf8 string.
+  var sealedHybrid = b.crypto.encrypt("binary-carrier body", keys);
+  var rawOut = b.crypto.decrypt(sealedHybrid, keys, { raw: true });
+  check("decrypt raw:true returns a Buffer", Buffer.isBuffer(rawOut) && rawOut.toString("utf8") === "binary-carrier body");
+}
+
+// ---- Symmetric packed decrypt error matrix (b.crypto.decryptPacked).
+function testDecryptPackedErrors() {
+  var key    = b.crypto.generateBytes(32);
+  var packed = b.crypto.encryptPacked(Buffer.from("row-42 column-ssn", "utf8"), key);
+
+  // Round-trip sanity (the happy path lives elsewhere, but anchor the fixture).
+  check("encryptPacked→decryptPacked round-trips",
+    b.crypto.decryptPacked(packed, key).toString("utf8") === "row-42 column-ssn");
+
+  // Unsupported format byte.
+  var badFmt = Buffer.from(packed); badFmt[0] = 0x09;
+  var fmtThrew = null;
+  try { b.crypto.decryptPacked(badFmt, key); } catch (e) { fmtThrew = e; }
+  check("decryptPacked refuses an unsupported format byte",
+    fmtThrew && /unsupported version/.test(fmtThrew.message));
+
+  // AAD binding: a ciphertext sealed under one AAD cannot open under another.
+  var aadPacked = b.crypto.encryptPacked(Buffer.from("bound cell", "utf8"), key, Buffer.from("patients|42|ssn"));
+  var aadThrew = null;
+  try { b.crypto.decryptPacked(aadPacked, key, Buffer.from("patients|43|ssn")); } catch (e) { aadThrew = e; }
+  check("decryptPacked rejects a mismatched AAD (context binding holds)",
+    aadThrew && /tag|invalid|auth/i.test(aadThrew.message));
+
+  // Truncated packed blob (untrusted / corrupt storage cell) — must reject
+  // with the typed "Invalid packed format" contract, not a raw RangeError
+  // from the nonce/ciphertext subarray (same root as the envelope bounds
+  // check).
+  var leaked = null;
+  for (var n = packed.length - 1; n >= 1 && leaked === null; n -= 1) {
+    try { b.crypto.decryptPacked(packed.subarray(0, n), key); }
+    catch (e) { if (e instanceof RangeError) leaked = { n: n, msg: e.message }; }
+  }
+  check("decryptPacked never leaks a raw RangeError on a truncated blob", leaked === null);
+  var shortThrew = null;
+  try { b.crypto.decryptPacked(Buffer.from([0x02]), key); } catch (e) { shortThrew = e; }
+  check("decryptPacked rejects a too-short blob with the typed format error",
+    shortThrew && !(shortThrew instanceof RangeError) && /Invalid packed format/.test(shortThrew.message));
+}
+
+// ---- base64url strict canonicalization (CWE-347 / CWE-1286). The strict
+// decoder is the signature-canonicalization boundary — a length-mod-4-of-1
+// shape is impossible for any conforming encoder and must be refused, while
+// {strict:false} lets a documented lossy legacy payload through.
+function testBase64UrlCanonicalization() {
+  var lenOneThrew = null;
+  try { b.crypto.fromBase64Url("aGVsbG8AA"); } catch (e) { lenOneThrew = e; }   // 9 chars → len % 4 === 1
+  check("fromBase64Url (strict) refuses a length-mod-4-of-1 encoding",
+    lenOneThrew instanceof TypeError && /length %% 4 === 1|% 4/.test(lenOneThrew.message));
+
+  // Strict mode still accepts the canonical PADDED form (RFC 4648 §5 allows
+  // optional `=` padding) — exercises the trailing-`=` strip before the
+  // length check. "AQIDBA==" decodes to the 4 bytes [1,2,3,4].
+  var padded = b.crypto.fromBase64Url("AQIDBA==");
+  check("fromBase64Url (strict) accepts canonical padded input",
+    Buffer.isBuffer(padded) && padded.equals(Buffer.from([1, 2, 3, 4])));
+
+  // {strict:false} tolerates non-canonical input (opt-out escape hatch).
+  check("fromBase64Url {strict:false} tolerates non-canonical garbage",
+    Buffer.isBuffer(b.crypto.fromBase64Url("!!!", { strict: false })));
+  check("fromBase64Url {strict:false} still decodes a canonical value",
+    b.crypto.fromBase64Url("aGVsbG8", { strict: false }).toString("utf8") === "hello");
+}
+
+// ---- Constant-time compare entry-tier validation (b.crypto.timingSafeEqual).
+function testTimingSafeEqualEntryTier() {
+  // Length mismatch returns false immediately (length is not a secret).
+  check("timingSafeEqual returns false on length mismatch",
+    b.crypto.timingSafeEqual("abc", "abcd") === false);
+  // Non-string / non-Buffer arguments throw at the entry tier so a
+  // toString-poisoned caller cannot redirect the compare through arbitrary bytes.
+  var aThrew = null;
+  try { b.crypto.timingSafeEqual(42, "x"); } catch (e) { aThrew = e; }
+  check("timingSafeEqual refuses a non-Buffer/non-string first argument",
+    aThrew instanceof TypeError && /argument 'a'/.test(aThrew.message));
+  var bThrew = null;
+  try { b.crypto.timingSafeEqual("x", null); } catch (e) { bThrew = e; }
+  check("timingSafeEqual refuses a null second argument",
+    bThrew instanceof TypeError && /argument 'b'/.test(bThrew.message));
+}
+
+// ---- Remaining config-time throws on the hashing surface driven here for
+// completeness (namespaceHash CRLF-in-value, hashCertFingerprint oversized
+// PEM). Both are entry-tier rejections that keep hostile bytes out of
+// derived-column inputs / the ReDoS-bounded PEM parser.
+function testHashingSurfaceRejections() {
+  var crlfThrew = null;
+  try { b.crypto.namespaceHash("bj-email", "line1\r\nline2"); } catch (e) { crlfThrew = e; }
+  check("namespaceHash refuses a CR/LF string value (log-injection barrier)",
+    crlfThrew instanceof TypeError && /CR \/ LF/.test(crlfThrew.message));
+
+  var oversizedThrew = null;
+  try {
+    var big = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" + new Array(70001).join("A") + "\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
+    b.crypto.hashCertFingerprint(big);
+  } catch (e) { oversizedThrew = e; }
+  check("hashCertFingerprint refuses an oversized PEM (ReDoS bound)",
+    oversizedThrew instanceof TypeError && /exceeds 64 KiB/.test(oversizedThrew.message));
+
+  // generateToken default length is 32 bytes → 64 hex chars.
+  var tok = b.crypto.generateToken();
+  check("generateToken default is 64 hex chars (32 bytes)", typeof tok === "string" && tok.length === 64 && /^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(tok));
+}
+
+function run() {
+  testVerifyAdversarial();
+  testDecryptErrorMatrix();
+  testTruncationNeverLeaksRangeError();
+  testKemOnlyAndRawRoundTrips();
+  testDecryptPackedErrors();
+  testBase64UrlCanonicalization();
+  testTimingSafeEqualEntryTier();
+  testHashingSurfaceRejections();
+}
+
+module.exports = { run: run };
+
+if (require.main === module) {
+  try { run(); console.log("[crypto-adversarial] OK — " + helpers.getChecks() + " checks"); }
+  catch (e) { console.error(e && e.stack || e); process.exit(1); }
+}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/crypto-field-derived-hash.test.js

@@ -151,6 +151,38 @@ async function run() {
   catch (e) { cnhBadTruncFloat = /truncateBytes must be/.test(e.message); }
   check("computeNamespacedHash non-integer truncateBytes throws", cnhBadTruncFloat);
 
+  // ---- MAC-key sealed-file integrity: a plaintext (non-sealed) file
+  // planted on disk must be REFUSED, never accepted as the secret MAC
+  // key. vault.unseal() returns a value that lacks the "vault:" prefix
+  // VERBATIM (idempotent read passthrough), so without a load-bearing
+  // prefix check the reader would treat an attacker-planted plaintext
+  // base64 key as the MAC key — defeating the sealed-at-rest guarantee a
+  // disk-write-only attacker (no vault passphrase, so unable to forge a
+  // genuine seal) otherwise cannot bypass. db.js applies the same
+  // prefix check to db.key.enc; this is its sibling. ----
+  var macDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "blamejs-cf-dh-mac-"));
+  b.vault._resetForTest();
+  await b.vault.init({ mode: "plaintext", dataDir: macDir });
+  var legitMac = b.vault.getDerivedHashMacKey();
+  check("MAC key round-trips from a genuine sealed file",
+    Buffer.isBuffer(legitMac) && legitMac.length === 32);
+  // Attacker overwrites the sealed file with a KNOWN plaintext base64 key
+  // (32 bytes → passes the length check) that carries no "vault:" prefix.
+  var macFile = path.join(macDir, "vault.derived-hash-mac.sealed");
+  var knownKey = Buffer.alloc(32, 0x41);
+  fs.writeFileSync(macFile, knownKey.toString("base64"));
+  // Drop the in-process cache + re-init so the tampered file is re-read.
+  b.vault._resetForTest();
+  await b.vault.init({ mode: "plaintext", dataDir: macDir });
+  var macRefused = false;
+  var forgedMac = null;
+  try { forgedMac = b.vault.getDerivedHashMacKey(); }
+  catch (e) { macRefused = /corrupt|sealed|prefix/i.test(e.message); }
+  check("getDerivedHashMacKey refuses a plaintext (non-sealed) MAC file — " +
+    "not the attacker's known key",
+    macRefused && forgedMac === null);
+  b.vault._resetForTest();
+
   console.log("OK — crypto-field derived-hash tests");
 }