@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.5.12 → 0.5.14

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/xml-c14n-attr-normalization.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * b.xmlC14n.canonicalize — XML attribute-value normalization (canonical
+ * collision defense).
+ *
+ * RFC 3741 Exclusive c14n operates on the post-parse InfoSet, so a
+ * conforming XML processor has already applied line-ending normalization
+ * (XML 1.0 §2.11: CRLF / lone-CR -> LF) and attribute-value
+ * normalization (§3.3.3: a literal TAB / CR / LF in an attribute value
+ * -> a single SPACE) BEFORE c14n runs. Whitespace introduced through a
+ * character reference (	 / 
 / 
) is NOT normalized, and c14n
+ * escapes it back to 	 / 
 / 
 so it survives a re-parse.
+ *
+ * Pre-fix, xml-c14n's readAttrValue skipped attribute-value
+ * normalization: a literal TAB and a 	 character reference both
+ * reached _escapeAttrValue as a real TAB byte and were emitted as
+ * "&#x9;". Two DISTINCT documents (`a="x<TAB>y"` vs `a="x&#9;y"`) — whose
+ * InfoSet attribute values differ ("x y" vs "x\ty") — canonicalized to
+ * IDENTICAL bytes. That distinct-input / identical-output collision
+ * defeats the module's stated purpose (preventing XML-signature-wrapping
+ * byte collisions): a signed document could be swapped for a
+ * semantically different one whose canonical bytes still match the
+ * signature.
+ *
+ * These build the hostile whitespace bytes in the test (never as lib
+ * literals) and assert the collision is closed AND the compliant
+ * fold-vs-preserve split holds.
+ */
+
+var helpers = require("../helpers");
+var check   = helpers.check;
+var c14n    = require("../../lib/xml-c14n");
+
+function _c(xml) { return c14n.canonicalize(xml).toString("utf8"); }
+
+// A literal TAB (U+0009) inside an attribute value must fold to a SPACE;
+// a TAB delivered via a character reference must be preserved (escaped
+// back to &#x9;). The two therefore MUST NOT collide.
+function testLiteralTabVsCharRefTabDoNotCollide() {
+  var litTab = '<r a="x' + String.fromCharCode(0x09) + 'y"/>';
+  var refTab = '<r a="x&#9;y"/>';
+  var oLit = _c(litTab);
+  var oRef = _c(refTab);
+
+  check("literal-TAB and char-ref-TAB attribute values must canonicalize distinctly",
+    oLit !== oRef);
+  check("literal-TAB attribute value folds to a single SPACE",
+    oLit === '<r a="x y"></r>');
+  check("char-ref-TAB attribute value is preserved as &#x9;",
+    oRef === '<r a="x&#x9;y"></r>');
+}
+
+// Same invariant for a literal newline (U+000A) vs a &#10; reference.
+function testLiteralNewlineVsCharRefNewlineDoNotCollide() {
+  var litNl = '<r a="x' + String.fromCharCode(0x0a) + 'y"/>';
+  var refNl = '<r a="x&#10;y"/>';
+  var oLit = _c(litNl);
+  var oRef = _c(refNl);
+
+  check("literal-LF and char-ref-LF attribute values must canonicalize distinctly",
+    oLit !== oRef);
+  check("literal-LF attribute value folds to a single SPACE",
+    oLit === '<r a="x y"></r>');
+  check("char-ref-LF attribute value is preserved as &#xA;",
+    oRef === '<r a="x&#xA;y"></r>');
+}
+
+// A literal CRLF is one line ending: §2.11 collapses it to a single LF,
+// then §3.3.3 folds that to a single SPACE — one space, not two escapes.
+function testLiteralCrlfFoldsToSingleSpace() {
+  var litCrlf = '<r a="x' + String.fromCharCode(0x0d) + String.fromCharCode(0x0a) + 'y"/>';
+  check("literal-CRLF attribute value folds to a single SPACE",
+    _c(litCrlf) === '<r a="x y"></r>');
+
+  var litCr = '<r a="x' + String.fromCharCode(0x0d) + 'y"/>';
+  check("literal lone-CR attribute value folds to a single SPACE",
+    _c(litCr) === '<r a="x y"></r>');
+}
+
+// A plain literal SPACE must be left untouched (identity), and multiple
+// literal spaces are NOT collapsed for CDATA attribute values.
+function testLiteralSpacesPreserved() {
+  check("single literal SPACE is preserved",
+    _c('<r a="x y"/>') === '<r a="x y"></r>');
+  check("consecutive literal SPACEs are not collapsed",
+    _c('<r a="x  y"/>') === '<r a="x  y"></r>');
+}
+
+// The signature-wrapping shape: two documents identical except that a
+// security-significant attribute carries a literal TAB in one and the
+// &#9; reference in the other. A verifier that canonicalizes them to the
+// same bytes would accept one signature for both — the collision this
+// module exists to prevent.
+function testWrappingStyleAttributesDoNotCollide() {
+  var signed  = '<Assertion Role="admin&#9;ops">v</Assertion>';
+  var swapped = '<Assertion Role="admin' + String.fromCharCode(0x09) + 'ops">v</Assertion>';
+  check("signed vs whitespace-swapped assertion must canonicalize distinctly",
+    _c(signed) !== _c(swapped));
+}
+
+// canonicalizeElementById must inherit the same normalization on the
+// subtree it extracts.
+function testCanonicalizeByIdNormalizes() {
+  var doc = '<root><a ID="s" v="p' + String.fromCharCode(0x09) + 'q">t</a></root>';
+  var out = c14n.canonicalizeElementById(doc, "s").toString("utf8");
+  check("canonicalizeElementById folds a literal TAB attribute to a SPACE",
+    out === '<a ID="s" v="p q">t</a>');
+}
+
+// The same collision class in ELEMENT TEXT (not just attribute values): XML
+// 1.0 §2.11 folds a literal CR / CRLF in character data to a single LF, while
+// the &#xD; reference is preserved and c14n escapes the surviving CR to &#xD;.
+// Without §2.11 normalization a literal CR in text and the &#xD; reference both
+// canonicalize to &#xD; — the identical-bytes collision, in the text nodes SAML
+// signatures cover.
+function testTextLiteralCrVsCharRefCrDoNotCollide() {
+  var litCr = '<r>x' + String.fromCharCode(0x0d) + 'y</r>';
+  var refCr = '<r>x&#xD;y</r>';
+  var oLit = _c(litCr);
+  var oRef = _c(refCr);
+  check("literal-CR and char-ref-CR TEXT content must canonicalize distinctly",
+    oLit !== oRef);
+  check("literal-CR text folds to a bare LF (§2.11)",
+    oLit === '<r>x' + String.fromCharCode(0x0a) + 'y</r>');
+  check("char-ref-CR text is preserved as &#xD;",
+    oRef === '<r>x&#xD;y</r>');
+}
+
+// CDATA is character data too: a literal CR inside CDATA folds to LF (§2.11),
+// so it cannot collide with the &#xD; reference in ordinary text.
+function testCdataLiteralCrFoldsToLf() {
+  var cdataCr = '<r><![CDATA[x' + String.fromCharCode(0x0d) + 'y]]></r>';
+  check("literal-CR inside CDATA folds to a bare LF, not &#xD;",
+    _c(cdataCr) === '<r>x' + String.fromCharCode(0x0a) + 'y</r>');
+}
+
+// Wrapping shape in element text: a signed assertion whose text carries the
+// &#xD; reference vs a swapped copy carrying the literal CR must not collide.
+function testTextWrappingStyleDoNotCollide() {
+  var signed  = '<Assertion>admin&#xD;ops</Assertion>';
+  var swapped = '<Assertion>admin' + String.fromCharCode(0x0d) + 'ops</Assertion>';
+  check("signed vs CR-swapped assertion TEXT must canonicalize distinctly",
+    _c(signed) !== _c(swapped));
+}
+
+function run() {
+  testLiteralTabVsCharRefTabDoNotCollide();
+  testLiteralNewlineVsCharRefNewlineDoNotCollide();
+  testTextLiteralCrVsCharRefCrDoNotCollide();
+  testCdataLiteralCrFoldsToLf();
+  testTextWrappingStyleDoNotCollide();
+  testLiteralCrlfFoldsToSingleSpace();
+  testLiteralSpacesPreserved();
+  testWrappingStyleAttributesDoNotCollide();
+  testCanonicalizeByIdNormalizes();
+}
+
+if (require.main === module) {
+  try { run(); console.log("OK — xml-c14n-attr-normalization"); process.exit(0); }
+  catch (e) { console.error(e && e.message ? e.message : e); process.exit(1); }
+}
+module.exports = { run: run };

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/smoke.js

@@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ function _runFileForked(modulePath, displayName, timeoutMs) {
              "— likely a leaked handle on a slow runner. Last stderr: " + (stderrBuf.slice(-300) || "(none)"))
           : undefined),
         stderr: stderrBuf,
+        stdout: stdoutBuf.slice(-3000),   // surfaced on failure so a worker's own FAIL/check output isn't lost behind a bare "fork failed"
         displayName: displayName,
         retriable: processFailedAfterPass || lateError,
         leaks:  Array.isArray(parsed.leaks) ? parsed.leaks : [],
@@ -518,6 +519,7 @@ async function _runLayer(layerNum, legacyPath, layerName) {
       if (!rf) continue;                                                         // pool aborted before this file ran
       totalChecks += rf.checks;
       if (!rf.ok) {
+        if (rf.stdout) process.stdout.write("\n--- worker stdout (" + rf.displayName + ") ---\n" + rf.stdout + "\n--- end worker stdout ---\n");
         if (rf.stderr) process.stderr.write(rf.stderr);
         throw new Error(rf.displayName + ": " + (rf.error || "fork failed"));
       }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/blamejs-shop",
-  "version": "0.5.12",
+  "version": "0.5.14",
   "description": "Open-source framework built on blamejs. Vendored stack, zero npm runtime deps, PQC-first crypto, security-on by default.",
   "main": "lib/index.js",
   "scripts": {

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.16.0.json

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.16.0",
-  "date": "2026-07-03",
-  "headline": "Raises the minimum Node.js engine to 24.18.0; the status-list verifier now binds the token type against a typ-confusion replay; and CI supply-chain pinning is consolidated behind committed dev/example lockfiles, `npm ci`, and a single aggregating pin tool that closes the OpenSSF Scorecard pinned-dependency gaps",
-  "summary": "This minor raises the supported Node.js floor from 24.16.0 to 24.18.0 — operators must run Node 24.18.0 or newer (24.17.0 was a security release; 24.18.0 bundles SQLite 3.53.1 and a backup-path fix, and guarantees the native OpenSSL 3.5 SLH-DSA surface). b.auth.statusList.fromJwt now enforces RFC 8725 §3.11 by binding the JWS header typ to the \"statuslist+jwt\" that toJwt stamps, so a token minted for another purpose can't be replayed as a status list. The build's supply-chain pinning is reworked so OpenSSF Scorecard sees pinned installs everywhere it can: the dev-tool, example, and fuzz manifests now ship committed lockfiles and CI installs them with `npm ci` (Scorecard keys pinning on the `ci` verb, not on an `@version` specifier), the vendored fuzz toolchain and the oss-fuzz base image are pinned, and a new scripts/pin-all.js aggregates every pin — regenerating all lockfiles, pinning the GitHub Action SHAs, and syncing the Docker base-image digests in one `--fix`, with a `--check` gate wired into CI and the release flow so no pin can silently drift. The committed lockfiles are dev/example-only and excluded from the published tarball; the zero-npm-RUNTIME-deps rule is unchanged.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Changed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Minimum Node.js engine raised to 24.18.0",
-          "body": "engines.node is now >=24.18.0 (was >=24.16.0). Operators must run Node 24.18.0 or newer. 24.17.0 was a security release and 24.18.0 bundles SQLite 3.53.1 plus a backup-keepalive fix; the floor also guarantees the native OpenSSL 3.5 SLH-DSA sign/verify surface. CI, the release container, and the docs are updated to the new floor."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Supply-chain pinning consolidated behind committed lockfiles + `npm ci` + one aggregating pin tool",
-          "body": "The root dev-tool (esbuild, postject), examples/wiki, and fuzz (jazzer.js) manifests now ship committed package-lock.json files, and CI installs them with `npm ci` instead of `npm install pkg@version` — OpenSSF Scorecard's Pinned-Dependencies check treats only the `npm ci` verb as pinned, so this is what actually clears those alerts (an exact `@version` specifier does not). The vendored fuzz toolchain is pinned to an exact jazzer version and the oss-fuzz base image is digest-pinned (mirroring the Dependabot-tracked .clusterfuzzlite digest). A new scripts/pin-all.js aggregates every pinning segment — it regenerates all committed lockfiles, pins the GitHub Action SHAs (via check-actions-currency), and syncs the Docker base-image digests in one `--fix`; a `--check` mode runs in CI and scripts/release.js so a stale lockfile or drifted digest fails closed. The committed lockfiles are dev/example-only, excluded from the published tarball's files allowlist; the zero-npm-RUNTIME-deps rule is unchanged."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Security",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Status-list verification binds the token type (RFC 8725 §3.11 typ-confusion)",
-          "body": "b.auth.statusList.fromJwt now passes expectedTyp \"statuslist+jwt\" to the JWT verifier, matching the typ that b.auth.statusList.toJwt stamps and every sibling verifier enforces. A token minted for another purpose — even one that happens to carry a status_list.lst claim — is now refused on the type binding before the claim is read, closing the typ-confusion class where such a token could be replayed as a status list."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Added",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "scripts/pin-all.js — aggregated supply-chain pin tool",
-          "body": "One command re-pins every supply-chain segment: `--fix` regenerates the committed lockfiles (root / examples/wiki / fuzz), pins the GitHub Action SHAs, and syncs the Docker base-image digests; `--check` (wired into CI and the release flow) verifies the lockfile and digest segments — including each lockfile's package version — are in sync and fails closed on drift. Contributor tooling — it does not ship in the tarball."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Project-governance and assurance documentation; OpenSSF Best Practices silver badge",
-          "body": "Adds a ROADMAP.md (documented direction plus an explicit out-of-scope list), a Developer Certificate of Origin policy in CONTRIBUTING.md (contributions carry a Signed-off-by; releases sign off through the release tooling), and an explicit security assurance case in SECURITY.md (a top security claim decomposed into evidence-backed sub-claims, with a residual-risk statement). The project earned the OpenSSF Best Practices silver badge, linked from the README."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.16.1.json

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.16.1",
-  "date": "2026-07-03",
-  "headline": "Every source file now carries an SPDX license + copyright header; the wiki example emits its full HSTS when it runs behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy; and a good-first-issue on-ramp lands for new contributors",
-  "summary": "This patch stamps a per-file `SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0` and a copyright line onto every first-party source file, so the license of any single file is unambiguous when it is read, audited, or vendored in isolation. The project stays Apache-2.0 — this is a clarity change, not a license change, and vendored third-party files under lib/vendor/ keep their own upstream headers. The wiki example now passes its trusted-proxy CIDRs to the securityHeaders middleware: a deployment behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy (Caddy or nginx) that forwards `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` now emits the framework's strong HSTS (two-year max-age, includeSubDomains, preload) instead of suppressing it on the plain-HTTP hop from the proxy — the wiki e2e asserts both the proxied-https and the direct-http cases. CONTRIBUTING gains a good-first-issue on-ramp so new contributors have a clear, small first step.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Security",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Wiki example emits its full HSTS behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy",
-          "body": "The wiki example app now hands its trusted-proxy CIDRs to `securityHeaders`, so behind Caddy or nginx forwarding `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` it emits `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload` rather than dropping HSTS on the internal HTTP hop from the proxy. Operators modelling their own app on the example inherit the fix by declaring their proxy CIDRs via `WIKI_ADMIN_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (the production compose already defaults to the private ranges). The framework's `securityHeaders` primitive is unchanged; this closes a wiring gap in the example."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Added",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Per-file SPDX license and copyright headers",
-          "body": "Every first-party source file now begins with `// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0` and a copyright line, so the license and holder of any individual file are explicit when it is read or extracted on its own. No license change — the project remains Apache-2.0. Vendored files under `lib/vendor/` are untouched and retain their upstream license headers."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Changed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Good-first-issue on-ramp for new contributors",
-          "body": "CONTRIBUTING now points new contributors at issues labelled `good first issue` — small, self-contained tasks (a doc or wiki-example fix, a test for an uncovered branch) that are the easiest first step into the codebase."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.16.2.json

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.16.2",
-  "date": "2026-07-03",
-  "headline": "Security hardening across the mail, OAuth/SAML, ACME, keychain and router primitives — six fail-open / injection / bypass fixes and seven correctness fixes — alongside a large expansion of the automated test suite",
-  "summary": "This patch closes a batch of security and correctness defects surfaced while substantially expanding the test suite across the framework's mail-authentication, federated-identity, ACME, keychain, backup, CLI and router primitives. The security fixes: SPF evaluation no longer throws (and thus can no longer be laundered into a temperror that a permissive inbound policy accepts) on a malformed `ip4:` CIDR mask; the Authentication-Results builder now refuses CR/LF/NUL in the `version` field, closing the last header-injection gap left by the earlier mail-header sweep; `res.redirect` now rejects a horizontal TAB (which user agents strip before URL parsing, turning `/\\t/evil.example` into a protocol-relative redirect to an attacker origin); the OAuth refresh-token one-time-use replay gate now treats any truthy `seen()` result as seen (a Redis `1` / SQL `COUNT` no longer slips a stolen refresh token past a `=== true` compare) — with the same normalization applied to its sibling replay checks; SAML Single-Logout over HTTP-POST/SOAP now fails closed (throws) when a verification key is supplied without its algorithm, matching the redirect binding instead of silently skipping signature verification; and the OAuth authorization-URL / PAR builders now refuse operator `extraParams` that collide with framework-managed parameters (`redirect_uri`, `state`, `code_challenge`, …). The correctness fixes: concurrent keychain file-store writes are serialized under the existing file lock (no more lost bindings); TLS-RPT submission reads the real `statusCode` (successful reports are no longer misreported as failures); ACME account key-rollover stops double-encoding its inner JWS payload (rollover was always rejected by the CA); the response-schema validator now also validates JSON bodies sent via `res.end`; keychain `remove` validates a relative fallback path like `store`/`retrieve`; `bundleAdapterStorage` honors the ambient compliance posture like `create`; and a refused `dev --ignore` pattern now returns exit code 2 instead of rejecting the CLI promise.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Security",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "SPF `ip4:` with a malformed CIDR mask fails closed instead of throwing (fail-open)",
-          "body": "`_ipv4InCidr` lacked the finite-mask guard its IPv6 sibling has, so an `ip4:` mechanism with a non-numeric prefix (e.g. `ip4:192.0.2.0/`) reached `BigInt(32 - NaN)` and threw an uncaught `RangeError` out of `b.mail.spf.verify` / `b.mail.inbound.verify`. Upstream mail handling catches that throw as a temperror, and an inbound policy configured to accept on temperror would then admit a sender that should have been evaluated. SPF now returns a `permerror` result for a malformed mask, honoring the primitive's documented never-throw-on-message-content contract."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Authentication-Results builder refuses CR/LF/NUL in the `version` field (header injection)",
-          "body": "`b.mail.authResults.emit` validated the `authserv-id` against control characters but not the operator-supplied `version`, which is interpolated onto the `Authentication-Results:` header line — the last field left unguarded by the earlier mail-header CRLF sweep. A `version` containing CRLF could smuggle an arbitrary header. It is now refused with a typed error, like every other field on that line."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "`res.redirect` rejects horizontal TAB (open-redirect / same-origin bypass)",
-          "body": "The redirect target's control-character guard rejected CR/LF/NUL but not TAB (0x09). Node permits a TAB in a header value, but the WHATWG URL parser strips ASCII TAB/LF/CR from a URL before resolving it, so a `Location: /\\t/evil.example` collapses to the protocol-relative `//evil.example` and navigates to the attacker origin — bypassing the same-origin/allowlist heuristic. TAB is now rejected alongside CR/LF/NUL."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "OAuth refresh-token replay gate treats any truthy `seen()` result as seen (fail-open)",
-          "body": "The legacy `seen(refreshToken)` replay gate compared the callback's return with `=== true`, but the documented contract is that it returns a truthy value when the token was presented before. A store returning a truthy non-`true` value — a Redis `EXISTS`/`SISMEMBER` `1`, a SQL `COUNT` — slipped a replayed (stolen) refresh token past the one-time-use gate. Any truthy result now counts as seen; the same normalization was applied to the sibling replay checks in the module."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "SAML Single-Logout over HTTP-POST/SOAP fails closed on a key without its algorithm",
-          "body": "The POST and SOAP SLO parsers gated signature verification with an OR condition and the verify helper early-returned when the algorithm was absent, so supplying a verification key without `idpVerifyAlg` silently accepted a forged, unsigned LogoutRequest — while the HTTP-Redirect binding failed closed. All four SLO parse paths now route through one config check that throws when a key is supplied without its algorithm."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "OAuth authorization-URL / PAR builders refuse `extraParams` that collide with managed parameters",
-          "body": "`authorizationUrl` and `pushAuthorizationRequest` merged operator `extraParams` with `URLSearchParams.set`, which replaces — so an `extraParams` entry for `redirect_uri`, `state`, or `code_challenge` overwrote the framework-generated value while the call still returned the framework's `state`/PKCE verifier, diverging the returned session seed from the emitted URL. Reserved parameter keys in `extraParams` are now refused with a typed error at both builders."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Fixed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Concurrent keychain file-store writes no longer drop bindings",
-          "body": "`store` and the file-remove path performed an unlocked read-modify-write of the fallback file, so two concurrent stores could each read the pre-update document and the later write would clobber the earlier binding. Both read-modify-write sequences are now serialized under the file's existing lock."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "TLS-RPT submission reads the response `statusCode`",
-          "body": "`tlsRpt.submit` read `status` from the HTTP client response, but the client resolves `statusCode`, so a successful (2xx) report POST was reported as `{ ok: false, error: 'HTTP undefined' }`. It now reads `statusCode`, so delivered reports are distinguished from rejected ones."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "ACME account key-rollover no longer double-encodes its inner JWS payload",
-          "body": "`accountKeyRollover` passed an already-stringified payload to a signer that stringifies internally, so the inner keyChange JWS payload encoded a JSON string instead of the JSON object and every rollover was rejected by the CA (RFC 8555 §7.3.5). The payload is now passed once."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Response-schema validator also validates `res.end` JSON bodies",
-          "body": "The response validator wrapped only `res.json`, so a handler shipping an invalid body via `res.end(JSON.stringify(...))` escaped validation despite the documented contract. JSON-shaped `res.end` bodies are now validated on the same path."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "keychain `remove` validates a relative fallback path like `store`/`retrieve`",
-          "body": "`remove` checked file existence before validating the fallback path, so a relative path silently no-op'd instead of throwing the config error that `store`/`retrieve` raise. It now validates first, consistent with the other file-fallback paths."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "`bundleAdapterStorage` honors the ambient compliance posture",
-          "body": "`bundleAdapterStorage` only refused an unencrypted strategy when an explicit posture was passed, unlike `create`, which reads the ambient `b.compliance` posture and refuses `encrypt:false` under HIPAA. `bundleAdapterStorage` now falls back to the ambient posture, closing the asymmetry."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "`dev --ignore` pattern refusal returns exit code 2",
-          "body": "A `dev --ignore` pattern that exceeded the length cap or was refused by the regex guard threw out of the CLI promise instead of writing to stderr and returning exit code 2 like every other CLI validation failure. It now returns the standard non-zero exit."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.16.3.json

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
-  "version": "0.16.3",
-  "date": "2026-07-03",
-  "headline": "A batch of fail-open, injection-bypass and error-path fixes across the metrics, guard-sql, MCP, YAML-parser, content-credentials, tus-upload and buffer primitives — including a credential-leak fix on the /metrics exposition surface — alongside a further expansion of the automated test suite",
-  "summary": "This patch closes a set of security and robustness defects concentrated in the error-handling and adversarial-input paths of the observability, SQL-guard, MCP, YAML-parsing, content-credentials and resumable-upload primitives, surfaced while continuing to expand the automated test suite. The most consequential: credential-shaped metric label values were redacted only in the internal cardinality key, not in the rendered exposition, so a raw bearer token / API key / JWT placed on a label leaked verbatim to every `/metrics` scrape reader — redaction now applies to the stored labels the exposition renders. The SQL guard's fragment mode (the `whereRaw` escape hatch) refused an embedded single-quoted literal but not a PostgreSQL dollar-quoted string (`$tag$…$tag$`) or a lone top-level `;`, so operator concatenation into a dollar-quoted context bypassed the floor that forces `?`-placeholder binding. MCP tool-input validation was fail-open when a JSON Schema omitted an explicit top-level `type:\"object\"` (a valid, common shape) — `required`/`properties`/`additionalProperties` were skipped and any input accepted; and its server-initiated sampling token cap was bypassable with a string `maxTokens`. The YAML parser's flow style (`{…}` / `[…]`) accepted duplicate keys and the merge key that block style rejects — letting a later value silently override an earlier one a preceding check had already read — and mis-parsed a root-level JSON object. content-credentials returned a only shallowly-frozen manifest (nested claim fields stayed mutable before signing), and its identity-assertion hash re-check used set membership rather than multiset matching, so duplicate referenced assertions could leave a bound assertion never re-confirmed. Robustness fixes round out the batch: metrics now reject `±Infinity`; the buffer collector preserves a caller error class's code/message (they were swapped for framework error classes, so a caller branching on the error code — e.g. a resumable-upload `413` vs `400` — never matched); resumable uploads return `413` (not a `400` that leaked the internal error code) on an oversized chunk, reject a prototype-key checksum algorithm with `400` (not `500`), and parse a deferred `Upload-Length` as strictly as creation; the MCP guard refuses `/register/` (trailing slash) like `/register`, answers a missing/invalid bearer with `401` and its `WWW-Authenticate` challenge instead of `400`, honors an explicit empty accepted-version list, and accepts a loopback `http` redirect URI for native/CLI clients while still refusing non-loopback `http`.",
-  "sections": [
-    {
-      "heading": "Security",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Credential-shaped metric labels are redacted in the `/metrics` exposition, not just the cardinality key",
-          "body": "The metrics registry rewrote a credential-shaped label value to `[REDACTED-CREDENTIAL]`, but only inside the function that builds the internal Map cardinality key. The stored label object — the one the exposition renderer emits — kept the raw value, so a bearer token, API key or JWT placed on a label (e.g. an `authorization` label) was written verbatim to every `/metrics` scrape reader, contradicting the documented guarantee that the bytes never reach the scrape stream. Redaction now runs on the resolved labels themselves, so the key and the rendered output both carry the marker."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "SQL guard fragment mode refuses PostgreSQL dollar-quoted literals and any top-level semicolon",
-          "body": "In fragment mode (`whereRaw`), the embedded-string-literal floor that forces every value through a `?` placeholder detected a single-quoted literal but not a dollar-quoted one (`$tag$…$tag$` or `$$…$$`), so operator input concatenated into a dollar-quoted context passed the strict floor that the equivalent single-quoted value is refused by. The floor now recognizes dollar-quoted literals. Fragment mode also now refuses any top-level `;` — including a lone or trailing one — rather than relying on the stacked-statement scan, which only fired when a second statement followed the `;`."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "MCP tool-input validation enforces the schema without an explicit `type:\"object\"`",
-          "body": "`validateToolInput` gated the `required` / `properties` / `additionalProperties` checks on the schema declaring `type:\"object\"`. A schema that carries `properties`/`required` but omits `type` — a valid and common JSON Schema shape — was treated as untyped, so those constraints were skipped and any argument object was accepted, defeating the primitive's stated purpose (OWASP LLM07). Such a schema is now treated as an object schema and its constraints enforced."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "MCP sampling token cap rejects a non-numeric `maxTokens`",
-          "body": "`sampling.guard` applied the per-request token cap only when `maxTokens` was a number, so a hostile-tool-initiated sampling request carrying `maxTokens` as a string skipped the cap entirely — and a downstream SDK that coerces the string would then exceed the budget. A non-numeric `maxTokens` on this server-initiated surface is now refused with a typed error."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "content-credentials identity-assertion re-check uses multiset matching",
-          "body": "`verifyIdentityAssertion` re-confirmed the signed referenced-assertion hash binding with count-equality plus set membership, never consuming a matched entry. Supplying referenced assertions that hash to `[A, A]` against a signed binding of `[A, B]` passed — the counts matched and each supplied hash was present — even though the bound `hash(B)` was never re-confirmed against a real assertion (a transplant fail-open). The re-check now consumes each bound hash as it is matched, so duplicates can no longer stand in for a distinct bound assertion."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "YAML flow-style mappings refuse duplicate keys and the merge key like block style",
-          "body": "Block mappings rejected a duplicate key (`yaml/duplicate-key`) and the anchor-merge key `<<` (`yaml/merge-key-banned`), but flow mappings (`{ a: 1, a: 2 }`) enforced neither — silently keeping the last value on a repeat and accepting `<<` as an ordinary key. A value an earlier check has already read could thus be overridden through flow style. Flow mappings now apply both guards."
-        }
-      ]
-    },
-    {
-      "heading": "Fixed",
-      "items": [
-        {
-          "title": "Metrics reject non-finite values",
-          "body": "`gauge.set`, `histogram.observe` and `counter.inc` guarded their value with an `isNaN`-only check (counter only checked `< 0`), so `±Infinity` passed and produced `Infinity` / `-Infinity` in the exposition — invalid Prometheus 0.0.4 / OpenMetrics, which a scraper rejects. All three now require a finite number, matching their `must be a finite number` error text."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Buffer stream collector preserves a caller error class's code and message",
-          "body": "`safeBuffer.collectStream` constructs its size-limit error with `(message, code)`, matching its own error class — but a framework error class (the convention elsewhere) takes `(code, message)`, the opposite order, so a caller that passed its own error class received an error with `code` and `message` swapped. A caller branching on the error code then never matched — for example the resumable-upload handler mapped an oversized chunk to `400` instead of `413`. The collector now sets both fields explicitly so they are correct whichever constructor order the passed class uses."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "Resumable upload: correct status codes and strict deferred-length parse",
-          "body": "An oversized `PATCH`/creation chunk now returns `413 Payload Too Large` instead of a `400` whose body leaked the internal error code; an `Upload-Checksum` naming a prototype key (e.g. `__proto__`) returns `400 unsupported` instead of a `500` from an unguarded lookup; and a deferred-length finalization now parses `Upload-Length` with the same strict check as creation, rejecting trailing junk (`\"10abc\"`) rather than silently truncating it."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "MCP guard: trailing-slash registration refusal, 401 bearer challenge, empty accepted-version list",
-          "body": "The static-registration refusal matched `/register` exactly or by suffix, so `/register/` — which most routers normalize to the same handler — slipped through; it is now refused too. A missing or invalid bearer now returns `401 Unauthorized` with its `WWW-Authenticate` challenge (RFC 6750 §3) instead of `400`, so clients keyed on `401` re-authenticate. And an explicit empty `accepted` protocol-version list now rejects every version instead of silently widening to the default set."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "MCP accepts a loopback `http` redirect URI",
-          "body": "`redirect_uri` validation parsed the URI with the default HTTPS-only protocol set, so a loopback `http://localhost/…` redirect (RFC 8252 native-app / CLI client, permitted by RFC 9700 §4.1.1) failed as `did not parse` before the local-host allowance could run. The parse now admits `http` so the loopback allowance applies; a non-loopback `http` redirect is still refused."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "YAML: trailing content after a flow collection and root-level JSON objects",
-          "body": "`root: [1, 2] junk` silently dropped the trailing content where the quoted-scalar path rejects it; trailing content after a flow collection is now refused (`yaml/trailing-content`). A root-level flow/JSON object (`{\"a\": 1, \"b\": 2}`) was mis-scanned as a block mapping with a garbage key and returned structurally-wrong data; the leading flow bracket is now recognized before the block-mapping scan so a root JSON object parses correctly."
-        },
-        {
-          "title": "content-credentials: deep-frozen manifest and typed rejections for bad build/sign inputs",
-          "body": "`build` returned a shallowly-frozen manifest, leaving every nested claim field (`provider`/`system`/`content`) mutable before signing despite the documented pre-sign immutability guarantee; the manifest is now deep-frozen. A non-finite or out-of-Date-range `generatedAt` (`NaN` / `Infinity`) crashed with an untyped `RangeError`, and a non-Buffer `certChain` entry to `signCose` threw an untyped Node `TypeError`; both now reject with a typed `content-credentials/*` error at call time."
-        }
-      ]
-    }
-  ]
-}