@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.5.12 → 0.5.13

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/guard-graphql.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+// Copyright (c) blamejs contributors
+"use strict";
+
+var helpers = require("../helpers");
+var b       = helpers.b;
+var check   = helpers.check;
+
+var BENIGN_REQ = { query: "query GetMe { me { id name } }", operationName: "GetMe" };
+
+// Introspection leak — `__schema` in production posture. Strict refuses.
+var INTROSPECT_REQ = {
+  query: "query Inspect { __schema { types { name } } }",
+  operationName: "Inspect",
+};
+
+// Alias-amplification — 9 aliases in one selection-set exceeds strict's
+// maxAliasesPerSelection (8); the breadth-DoS class.
+var ALIAS_BOMB_REQ = {
+  query: "{ a:me { id } b:me { id } c:me { id } d:me { id } e:me { id } " +
+         "f:me { id } g:me { id } h:me { id } i:me { id } }",
+};
+
+// A complete GraphQL string literal whose backslash is itself escaped:
+// double-quote, backslash, backslash, double-quote. `'\\\\'` is a two-char
+// backslash run in JS source, so this is exactly the 4 characters `"\\"`.
+var ESC_BS_STRING = '"' + "\\\\" + '"';
+
+function expectThrows(label, fn, codeMatch) {
+  var threw = null;
+  try { fn(); } catch (e) { threw = e; }
+  check(label, !!threw && (threw.code || "") === codeMatch);
+  return threw;
+}
+
+function hasRule(rv, ruleId) {
+  return rv.issues.some(function (i) { return i.ruleId === ruleId; });
+}
+
+// Build a query whose real selection-set depth is `levels + 2`, with an early
+// GraphQL string literal ending in an escaped backslash. A scanner that
+// mis-tracks the escaped closing quote stays stuck in-string and ignores every
+// following brace, under-measuring the depth to 1.
+function deepQueryAfterEscapedString(levels) {
+  var open = "";
+  var close = "";
+  for (var i = 0; i < levels; i += 1) { open += "n" + i + " { "; close = " }" + close; }
+  return "{ f(a: " + ESC_BS_STRING + ") { " + open + "id" + close + " } }";
+}
+
+async function testGate() {
+  var gqlGate = b.guardGraphql.gate({ profile: "strict" });
+
+  // Introspection query → refuse before any schema-resolution work.
+  var introspect = await gqlGate.check({ graphqlRequest: INTROSPECT_REQ });
+  check("guardGraphql.gate introspection action=refuse", introspect.action === "refuse");
+  check("guardGraphql.gate introspection ok=false",      introspect.ok === false);
+  check("guardGraphql.gate introspection ruleId",
+    introspect.issues.some(function (i) { return i.ruleId === "graphql.introspection"; }));
+
+  // Benign named query → serve.
+  var serve = await gqlGate.check({ graphqlRequest: BENIGN_REQ });
+  check("guardGraphql.gate benign action=serve",         serve.action === "serve");
+  check("guardGraphql.gate benign ok=true",              serve.ok === true);
+
+  // Alias bomb → refuse (breadth-amplification DoS).
+  var bomb = await gqlGate.check({ graphqlRequest: ALIAS_BOMB_REQ });
+  check("guardGraphql.gate alias-bomb action=refuse",    bomb.action === "refuse");
+  check("guardGraphql.gate alias-bomb ruleId",
+    bomb.issues.some(function (i) { return i.ruleId === "graphql.alias-bomb"; }));
+
+  // No request on ctx → serve (nothing to gate).
+  var none = await gqlGate.check({});
+  check("guardGraphql.gate no-request action=serve",     none.action === "serve");
+
+  // Gate also reads ctx.gql (alias field) — deep query blinded by an escaped
+  // string must still refuse via the gate consumer path, not just validate.
+  var viaGql = await gqlGate.check({ gql: { query: deepQueryAfterEscapedString(15) } });
+  check("guardGraphql.gate ctx.gql depth-after-string refuse", viaGql.action === "refuse");
+  check("guardGraphql.gate ctx.gql depth-after-string ruleId",
+    viaGql.issues.some(function (i) { return i.ruleId === "graphql.depth-exceeded"; }));
+}
+
+function testSanitize() {
+  // Benign request passes through unchanged (bundles aren't repairable, so
+  // sanitize is pass-through-or-throw); the returned bundle re-validates clean.
+  var clean = b.guardGraphql.sanitize(BENIGN_REQ, { profile: "strict" });
+  check("guardGraphql.sanitize benign returns bundle",   clean === BENIGN_REQ);
+  check("guardGraphql.sanitize benign revalidates ok",
+    b.guardGraphql.validate(clean, { profile: "strict" }).ok === true);
+
+  // Hostile: introspection query REFUSED (thrown), never returned — the leak
+  // shape is a refuse-class outcome, not something sanitize patches up.
+  var err = expectThrows("guardGraphql.sanitize introspection throws",
+    function () { b.guardGraphql.sanitize(INTROSPECT_REQ, { profile: "strict" }); },
+    "graphql.introspection");
+  check("guardGraphql.sanitize introspection GuardGraphqlError",
+    err instanceof b.guardGraphql.GuardGraphqlError);
+
+  // Hostile: prototype-pollution gadget in a query alias (CVE-2026-32621) —
+  // critical, refused at every profile.
+  expectThrows("guardGraphql.sanitize proto-poison throws",
+    function () {
+      b.guardGraphql.sanitize({ query: "query { a:__proto__ { id } }" }, { profile: "strict" });
+    },
+    "graphql.query-prototype-poison");
+}
+
+// ---- RED: escaped-backslash string desync blinds the DoS shape walker ----
+//
+// A complete GraphQL string literal ending in an escaped backslash (`"\\"`)
+// must not blind the depth / alias walker. A scanner that reads the closing
+// quote as escaped stays stuck in-string, ignores every following brace and
+// colon, and under-measures depth to 1 / aliases to 0 — a depth-bomb or
+// alias-bomb then rides through strict validation as shape-clean (fail-open
+// DoS-measurement bypass on VALID GraphQL). These drive the shipped
+// b.guardGraphql.validate consumer path.
+function testStringEvasionDepthBomb() {
+  var req = { query: deepQueryAfterEscapedString(15) };            // real depth 17 > strict cap 8
+  var rv = b.guardGraphql.validate(req, { profile: "strict" });
+  check("depth-after-escaped-string refuses (ok=false)", rv.ok === false);
+  check("depth-after-escaped-string fires depth-exceeded",
+    hasRule(rv, "graphql.depth-exceeded"));
+
+  // The benign control: an escaped double-quote INSIDE a string must NOT be
+  // mistaken for the terminator, and braces inside the string content must stay
+  // ignored. Query text: `{ f(a: "x\"{{{{{{{{{{{{" ) { id } }` — the 12 braces
+  // live inside the string, so real depth is 2 (well under the strict cap).
+  var benign = { query: '{ f(a: "x\\"' + "{{{{{{{{{{{{" + '" ) { id } }' };
+  var rvB = b.guardGraphql.validate(benign, { profile: "strict" });
+  check("escaped quote + in-string braces stay shape-clean", rvB.ok === true);
+}
+
+function testStringEvasionAliasBomb() {
+  // 12 aliases (> strict cap 8) in a selection-set that follows an escaped
+  // string literal. Must be measured and refused.
+  var aliases = "";
+  for (var i = 0; i < 12; i += 1) {
+    aliases += String.fromCharCode(97 + i) + ":me { id } ";
+  }
+  var req = { query: "{ f(a: " + ESC_BS_STRING + ") { " + aliases + " } }" };
+  var rv = b.guardGraphql.validate(req, { profile: "strict" });
+  check("alias-after-escaped-string refuses (ok=false)", rv.ok === false);
+  check("alias-after-escaped-string fires alias-bomb",
+    hasRule(rv, "graphql.alias-bomb"));
+}
+
+// ---- RED: unbalanced-brace stack desync must not blind the alias walker ----
+//
+// A malformed query with a leading `}` must not desync the per-selection-set
+// alias stack from brace depth. A `depth`-indexed counter that lands on an
+// absent slot (`undefined + 1 === NaN`) poisons every later comparison so an
+// alias-bomb reads as clean. The walker must remain robust on adversarial /
+// syntactically-invalid input.
+function testUnbalancedBraceAliasBomb() {
+  var req = { query: "}{ a:m b:m c:m d:m e:m f:m g:m h:m i:m j:m k:m }" };  // 11 aliases > 8
+  var rv = b.guardGraphql.validate(req, { profile: "strict" });
+  check("unbalanced-brace alias walker stays measured (ok=false)", rv.ok === false);
+  check("unbalanced-brace alias-bomb still fires",
+    hasRule(rv, "graphql.alias-bomb"));
+}
+
+// ---- bad-input / query-missing defensive branches ----
+function testBadInput() {
+  var rvNull = b.guardGraphql.validate(null, { profile: "strict" });
+  check("bad-input null refuses",   rvNull.ok === false);
+  check("bad-input null ruleId",    hasRule(rvNull, "graphql.bad-input"));
+
+  var rvNum = b.guardGraphql.validate(5, { profile: "strict" });
+  check("bad-input number refuses", rvNum.ok === false);
+  check("bad-input number ruleId",  hasRule(rvNum, "graphql.bad-input"));
+
+  var rvEmpty = b.guardGraphql.validate({ query: "" }, { profile: "strict" });
+  check("query-missing empty refuses",     rvEmpty.ok === false);
+  check("query-missing empty ruleId",      hasRule(rvEmpty, "graphql.query-missing"));
+
+  var rvNonStr = b.guardGraphql.validate({ query: 123 }, { profile: "strict" });
+  check("query-missing non-string refuses", rvNonStr.ok === false);
+  check("query-missing non-string ruleId",  hasRule(rvNonStr, "graphql.query-missing"));
+}
+
+// ---- byte caps: request / query / variables ----
+function testCaps() {
+  // request-cap — total serialized bytes over strict maxBytes (32 KiB).
+  var big = {};
+  for (var i = 0; i < 5000; i += 1) { big["k" + i] = "v" + i; }
+  var rvReq = b.guardGraphql.validate({ query: "{ me { id } }", variables: big },
+    { profile: "strict" });
+  check("request-cap refuses",  rvReq.ok === false);
+  check("request-cap ruleId",   hasRule(rvReq, "graphql.request-cap"));
+
+  // query-cap — query bytes over an explicit tiny maxQueryBytes override.
+  var rvQ = b.guardGraphql.validate({ query: "{ me { id name } }" },
+    { profile: "strict", maxQueryBytes: 4 });
+  check("query-cap refuses",    rvQ.ok === false);
+  check("query-cap ruleId",     hasRule(rvQ, "graphql.query-cap"));
+
+  // variables-cap — variables bytes over an explicit tiny maxVariableBytes.
+  var rvV = b.guardGraphql.validate({ query: "{ me { id } }", variables: { a: "xxxxxxxxxx" } },
+    { profile: "strict", maxVariableBytes: 4 });
+  check("variables-cap refuses", rvV.ok === false);
+  check("variables-cap ruleId",  hasRule(rvV, "graphql.variables-cap"));
+}
+
+// ---- prototype-pollution: variable-key form (CVE-2026-32621) ----
+function testVariableProtoPoison() {
+  // JSON.parse installs `__proto__` as an OWN enumerable key (not the
+  // prototype slot), the exact deep-merge gadget shape.
+  var req = { query: "{ me { id } }", variables: JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}') };
+  var rv = b.guardGraphql.validate(req, { profile: "strict" });
+  check("variable-proto-poison refuses",  rv.ok === false);
+  check("variable-proto-poison critical",
+    rv.issues.some(function (i) {
+      return i.ruleId === "graphql.variable-prototype-poison" && i.severity === "critical";
+    }));
+
+  // sanitize surfaces the critical ruleId as the thrown error code.
+  expectThrows("variable-proto-poison sanitize throws",
+    function () { b.guardGraphql.sanitize(req, { profile: "strict" }); },
+    "graphql.variable-prototype-poison");
+}
+
+// ---- introspection policy matrix: reject (strict) / audit (balanced) ----
+function testIntrospectionPolicies() {
+  // balanced audits: warn-only, still ok=true (audit-only disposition).
+  var rvAudit = b.guardGraphql.validate({ query: '{ __type(name:"X"){ name } }' },
+    { profile: "balanced" });
+  check("introspection balanced audit ok=true", rvAudit.ok === true);
+  check("introspection balanced warn severity",
+    rvAudit.issues.some(function (i) {
+      return i.ruleId === "graphql.introspection" && i.severity === "warn";
+    }));
+
+  // permissive allows outright — no introspection issue at all.
+  var rvAllow = b.guardGraphql.validate({ query: "{ __schema { types { name } } }" },
+    { profile: "permissive" });
+  check("introspection permissive no issue", !hasRule(rvAllow, "graphql.introspection"));
+}
+
+// ---- persisted-query allowlist (require) ----
+function testPersistedQuery() {
+  var rvMissing = b.guardGraphql.validate({ query: "{ me { id } }" },
+    { profile: "strict", persistedQueryPolicy: "require" });
+  check("persisted-query missing refuses", rvMissing.ok === false);
+  check("persisted-query missing ruleId",  hasRule(rvMissing, "graphql.persisted-query-missing"));
+
+  var rvPresent = b.guardGraphql.validate(
+    { query: "{ me { id } }", extensions: { persistedQuery: { sha256Hash: "abc" } } },
+    { profile: "strict", persistedQueryPolicy: "require" });
+  check("persisted-query present ok=true", rvPresent.ok === true);
+}
+
+// ---- operation-name allowlist ----
+function testOperationAllowlist() {
+  var rvDenied = b.guardGraphql.validate(
+    { query: "{ me { id } }", operationName: "Evil" },
+    { profile: "strict", allowedOperations: ["GetMe"], operationNamePolicy: "reject" });
+  check("operation-not-allowed refuses", rvDenied.ok === false);
+  check("operation-not-allowed ruleId",  hasRule(rvDenied, "graphql.operation-not-allowed"));
+
+  var rvAllowed = b.guardGraphql.validate(
+    { query: "{ me { id } }", operationName: "GetMe" },
+    { profile: "strict", allowedOperations: ["GetMe"], operationNamePolicy: "reject" });
+  check("operation allowed ok=true", rvAllowed.ok === true);
+
+  // audit disposition: a denied op under `audit` warns but does not refuse.
+  var rvAudit = b.guardGraphql.validate(
+    { query: "{ me { id } }", operationName: "Evil" },
+    { profile: "strict", allowedOperations: ["GetMe"], operationNamePolicy: "audit" });
+  check("operation-not-allowed audit ok=true", rvAudit.ok === true);
+  check("operation-not-allowed audit warn",
+    rvAudit.issues.some(function (i) {
+      return i.ruleId === "graphql.operation-not-allowed" && i.severity === "warn";
+    }));
+}
+
+// ---- variable-shape type-confusion ----
+function testVariableTypeConfusion() {
+  var rvReject = b.guardGraphql.validate(
+    { query: "{ me { id } }", variables: { id: "5" } },
+    { profile: "strict", variableShapes: { id: "number" }, variableShapePolicy: "reject" });
+  check("variable-type-confusion refuses", rvReject.ok === false);
+  check("variable-type-confusion ruleId",  hasRule(rvReject, "graphql.variable-type-confusion"));
+
+  // Matching type → clean; an undefined declared var is skipped (no false hit).
+  var rvOk = b.guardGraphql.validate(
+    { query: "{ me { id } }", variables: { id: 5 } },
+    { profile: "strict", variableShapes: { id: "number", other: "string" },
+      variableShapePolicy: "reject" });
+  check("variable-shape matching type ok=true", rvOk.ok === true);
+}
+
+// ---- batch defense: reject / audit-over-limit / per-entry recursion ----
+function testBatch() {
+  // strict refuses any batch outright and short-circuits.
+  var rvReject = b.guardGraphql.validate(
+    [ { query: "{ me { id } }" }, { query: "{ me { id } }" } ], { profile: "strict" });
+  check("batch reject strict refuses", rvReject.ok === false);
+  check("batch reject strict ruleId",  hasRule(rvReject, "graphql.batch-size"));
+
+  // balanced audits an over-limit batch (12 > cap 10): warn-only, ok=true.
+  var batch = [];
+  for (var i = 0; i < 12; i += 1) { batch.push({ query: "{ me { id } }" }); }
+  var rvAudit = b.guardGraphql.validate(batch, { profile: "balanced" });
+  check("batch over-limit balanced ok=true", rvAudit.ok === true);
+  check("batch over-limit balanced warn",
+    rvAudit.issues.some(function (i) {
+      return i.ruleId === "graphql.batch-size" && i.severity === "warn";
+    }));
+
+  // per-entry recursion prefixes the sub-issue snippet with the batch index.
+  var rvSub = b.guardGraphql.validate(
+    [ { query: "query Inspect { __schema { types { name } } }" } ], { profile: "balanced" });
+  check("batch per-entry recursion surfaces sub-issue",
+    hasRule(rvSub, "graphql.introspection"));
+  check("batch per-entry snippet is index-prefixed",
+    rvSub.issues.some(function (i) { return /^\[batch\[0\]\]/.test(i.snippet); }));
+}
+
+async function run() {
+  await testGate();
+  testSanitize();
+  testStringEvasionDepthBomb();
+  testStringEvasionAliasBomb();
+  testUnbalancedBraceAliasBomb();
+  testBadInput();
+  testCaps();
+  testVariableProtoPoison();
+  testIntrospectionPolicies();
+  testPersistedQuery();
+  testOperationAllowlist();
+  testVariableTypeConfusion();
+  testBatch();
+}
+
+module.exports = { run: run };
+if (require.main === module) {
+  run().then(function () { console.log("OK"); })
+       .catch(function (e) { console.error(e); process.exit(1); });
+}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/guard-html.test.js

@@ -134,6 +134,24 @@ function testGuardHtmlUrlSchemes() {
   check("no-semicolon entity javascript: detected",
         rvNoSemi.issues.some(function (issue) { return issue.kind === "dangerous-url-scheme"; }));
 
+  // Whitespace/entity-hidden scheme: a browser removes tab/lf/cr from a URL and
+  // trims a leading/trailing C0-control-or-space run before resolving the scheme,
+  // so an entity tab (`java	script:` / `java	`) and an entity-encoded
+  // leading space (` javascript:`) all navigate as javascript:. A scheme
+  // extractor that strips only C0/zero-width lets these read as scheme-less.
+  var schemeWs = [
+    ["entity tab 	",      "java	script:alert(1)"],
+    ["named 	",          "java	script:alert(1)"],
+    ["entity space  ",   " javascript:alert(1)"],
+    ["entity space  ",  " javascript:alert(1)"],
+  ];
+  for (var w = 0; w < schemeWs.length; w++) {
+    var rvW = b.guardHtml.validate('<a href="' + schemeWs[w][1] + '">x</a>',
+                                   { profile: "balanced" });
+    check("whitespace/entity-hidden scheme (" + schemeWs[w][0] + ") detected",
+          rvW.issues.some(function (issue) { return issue.kind === "dangerous-url-scheme"; }));
+  }
+
   // Image-context data URL allowed under balanced when allowImageData true.
   var rvImg = b.guardHtml.validate(
     '<img src="" alt="x">',
@@ -154,6 +172,17 @@ function testGuardHtmlCssInjection() {
     'style="-moz-binding:url(x.xml)"',
     'style="background:url(javascript:alert(1))"',
     'style="@import url(evil.css)"',
+    // Entity-encoded CSS: a style attribute is character-reference-decoded before
+    // the CSS parser sees it, so `ex&#x70;ression(` reaches CSS as `expression(`.
+    // Matching the raw bytes lets these bypass -> fail-open. Match the decoded value.
+    'style="width:ex&#x70;ression(alert(1))"',
+    'style="background:url(&#x6A;avascript:alert(1))"',
+    'style="behavior&colon;url(x.htc)"',
+    // Whitespace-hidden scheme inside url(): a browser strips tab/lf/cr from a URL
+    // before resolving its scheme, so url(java<TAB>script:) navigates as
+    // javascript:. The decoded CSS value must also fold that whitespace.
+    'style="background:url(java&Tab;script:alert(1))"',
+    'style="background:url(java&#9;script:alert(1))"',
   ];
   for (var i = 0; i < payloads.length; i++) {
     var rv = b.guardHtml.validate("<div " + payloads[i] + ">x</div>",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/guard-idempotency-key.test.js

@@ -80,11 +80,39 @@ function testPermissive() {
     "idempotency-key/control-char");
 }
 
+function testProtoKeyProfileRejected() {
+  // A prototype-member name as the profile must be refused, not resolved to an
+  // inherited member ("constructor" -> Object.prototype.constructor,
+  // "__proto__" -> Object.prototype). The makeProfileResolver own-property
+  // guard rejects it; a bare `profiles[name]` bracket read would treat the
+  // inherited member as a known profile and run the gate under it (fail-open).
+  expectRefused("refuses prototype-key profile 'constructor'",
+    function () { b.guardIdempotencyKey.validate("k", { profile: "constructor" }); },
+    "idempotency-key/bad-profile");
+  expectRefused("refuses prototype-key profile '__proto__'",
+    function () { b.guardIdempotencyKey.validate("k", { profile: "__proto__" }); },
+    "idempotency-key/bad-profile");
+  // A prototype-member name as the posture must not resolve to an inherited
+  // member either. The resolver's own-property guard skips the unknown posture
+  // and falls back to the default profile, validating cleanly — a bare
+  // `postures[name]` read would return a Function and blow up on `.maxBytes`.
+  var postureThrew = null;
+  try { b.guardIdempotencyKey.validate("k", { posture: "constructor" }); }
+  catch (e) { postureThrew = e; }
+  check("prototype-key posture does not fail-open", postureThrew === null);
+  // A valid profile still resolves and validates.
+  var validThrew = null;
+  try { b.guardIdempotencyKey.validate("k", { profile: "strict" }); }
+  catch (e) { validThrew = e; }
+  check("valid profile still resolves", validThrew === null);
+}
+
 async function run() {
   testSurface();
   testValid();
   testRefuses();
   testPermissive();
+  testProtoKeyProfileRejected();
 }
 
 module.exports = { run: run };