@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.5.12 → 0.5.13

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/guard-filename.test.js

@@ -19,6 +19,21 @@
 var helpers = require("../helpers");
 var b       = helpers.b;
 var check   = helpers.check;
+var fs      = helpers.fs;
+var os      = helpers.os;
+var path    = helpers.path;
+
+// Small assertion helper for the many "this hostile shape must throw with
+// exactly this GuardFilenameError code" cases below. Not a mock — a thin
+// try/catch wrapper around the real b.guardFilename call the test drives.
+function _expectThrowCode(label, code, fn) {
+  var threw = null;
+  try { fn(); }
+  catch (e) { threw = e; }
+  check(label + " throws " + code,
+        threw && threw.code === code &&
+        threw instanceof b.guardFilename.GuardFilenameError);
+}
 
 function testGuardFilenameSurface() {
   check("guardFilename is an object",                typeof b.guardFilename === "object");
@@ -390,6 +405,390 @@ function testGuardFilenameBadProfile() {
         threw && /unknown profile/i.test(threw.message));
 }
 
+function testGuardFilenameEmptyInput() {
+  // Empty string / empty Buffer reach _detectIssues and surface an
+  // "empty" issue rather than throwing (validate never throws).
+  var rvStr = b.guardFilename.validate("", { profile: "strict" });
+  check("validate empty string → empty issue",
+        rvStr.ok === false &&
+        rvStr.issues.some(function (i) { return i.kind === "empty"; }));
+
+  var rvBuf = b.guardFilename.validate(Buffer.alloc(0), { profile: "strict" });
+  check("validate empty Buffer → empty issue",
+        rvBuf.issues.some(function (i) { return i.kind === "empty"; }));
+
+  // Non-string / non-Buffer input is rejected by the "bytes" input
+  // contract before the detector runs — a bad-input issue, not a crash.
+  var rvNum = b.guardFilename.validate(12345, { profile: "strict" });
+  check("validate non-string/Buffer → bad-input issue",
+        rvNum.ok === false &&
+        rvNum.issues.some(function (i) { return i.kind === "bad-input"; }));
+}
+
+function testGuardFilenameBenignBufferNoOverlong() {
+  // A well-formed UTF-8 Buffer must NOT raise overlong-utf8 — exercises
+  // the buffer scan completing without a non-shortest sequence.
+  var rv = b.guardFilename.validate(Buffer.from("report-2026.txt", "utf8"),
+                                    { profile: "strict" });
+  check("benign Buffer → no overlong-utf8 issue",
+        !rv.issues.some(function (i) { return i.kind === "overlong-utf8"; }));
+  check("benign ASCII Buffer → clean",
+        rv.ok === true && rv.issues.length === 0);
+}
+
+function testGuardFilenameHomoglyph() {
+  // Cyrillic small a (U+0430) mixed with ASCII letters — visual-confusable
+  // spoof. Under balanced (homoglyphPolicy:"audit") it surfaces a warn-
+  // severity homoglyph issue.
+  var cyrA = String.fromCharCode(0x0430);
+  var rv = b.guardFilename.validate("p" + cyrA + "ypal.txt", { profile: "balanced" });
+  check("balanced: homoglyph mixed with ASCII detected (audit=warn)",
+        rv.issues.some(function (i) {
+          return i.kind === "homoglyph" && i.severity === "warn";
+        }));
+
+  // Under strict (homoglyphPolicy:"reject") the same char is critical.
+  var rvStrict = b.guardFilename.validate("p" + cyrA + "ypal.txt", { profile: "strict" });
+  check("strict: homoglyph severity is critical",
+        rvStrict.issues.some(function (i) {
+          return i.kind === "homoglyph" && i.severity === "critical";
+        }));
+
+  // No ASCII letters present → homoglyph rule short-circuits (nothing to
+  // confuse against), so a pure-Cyrillic leaf raises no homoglyph issue.
+  var rvPure = b.guardFilename.validate(cyrA + String.fromCharCode(0x0431),
+                                        { profile: "balanced" });
+  check("pure non-ASCII leaf → no homoglyph issue (no ASCII to mix)",
+        !rvPure.issues.some(function (i) { return i.kind === "homoglyph"; }));
+}
+
+function testGuardFilenameSuperscriptReservedName() {
+  // Windows folds superscript digits U+00B9/00B2/00B3 to 1/2/3 when
+  // matching COM/LPT devices — "COM<sup1>" resolves to COM1. Exercises the
+  // superscript-fold branch in _isWinReserved.
+  var sup1 = String.fromCharCode(0xB9);
+  var rv = b.guardFilename.validate("COM" + sup1, { profile: "balanced" });
+  check("superscript-digit COM device spoof → reserved-name",
+        rv.issues.some(function (i) { return i.kind === "reserved-name"; }));
+}
+
+function testGuardFilenameExtAllowlistNoExtension() {
+  // A name with NO extension against an allowlist → ext-not-allowlisted
+  // (the empty-extension branch of the allowlist check).
+  var rv = b.guardFilename.validate("readme", {
+    profile:            "balanced",
+    extensionAllowlist: [".txt", ".md"],
+  });
+  check("no-extension name against allowlist → ext-not-allowlisted",
+        rv.issues.some(function (i) { return i.kind === "ext-not-allowlisted"; }));
+}
+
+function testGuardFilenameSanitizeEnforceRejections() {
+  // sanitize() default (enforce) mode — every reject/throw path below is a
+  // security-floor or profile-policy refusal the operator relies on.
+
+  _expectThrowCode("sanitize empty string", "filename.empty", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize("", { profile: "balanced" });
+  });
+
+  _expectThrowCode("sanitize overlong-UTF-8 Buffer", "filename.overlong-utf8", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize(Buffer.from([0xC0, 0xAE, 0x66]), { profile: "balanced" });
+  });
+
+  _expectThrowCode("sanitize UNC path", "filename.unc", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize("//server/share/file.txt", { profile: "balanced" });
+  });
+
+  // strict leadingTrailingPolicy:"reject" — leading whitespace refuses
+  // rather than being stripped.
+  _expectThrowCode("sanitize strict leading whitespace", "filename.leading-trailing", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize("  report.txt", { profile: "strict" });
+  });
+
+  _expectThrowCode("sanitize reserved char (reject)", "filename.reserved-char", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize("a<b.txt", { profile: "balanced" });
+  });
+
+  // balanced reservedCharPolicy:"reject" + pathSeparatorsPolicy:"reject" —
+  // the "/" is not a reserved char, so the path-separator branch refuses it.
+  _expectThrowCode("sanitize path separator (reject)", "filename.path-separator", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize("a/b.txt", { profile: "balanced" });
+  });
+
+  _expectThrowCode("sanitize reserved device name (reject)", "filename.reserved-name", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize("CON", { profile: "balanced" });
+  });
+
+  // permissive reservedNamePolicy:"audit" — disambiguates by prefixing "_"
+  // rather than throwing.
+  check("sanitize permissive reserved name → underscore-prefixed",
+        b.guardFilename.sanitize("CON", { profile: "permissive" }) === "_CON");
+
+  // NTFS ADS refusal in enforce mode. The ":" is normally caught by the
+  // reserved-char pass first, so opt that off to drive the dedicated ADS
+  // branch: reservedCharPolicy:"allow" keeps the colon, adsPolicy:"reject"
+  // refuses the stream syntax.
+  _expectThrowCode("sanitize NTFS ADS (dedicated branch)", "filename.ntfs-ads", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize("file.txt:stream", {
+      profile:            "permissive",
+      reservedCharPolicy: "allow",
+      adsPolicy:          "reject",
+    });
+  });
+
+  _expectThrowCode("sanitize over-length leaf", "filename.length", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize("x".repeat(300) + ".txt", { profile: "balanced" });
+  });
+
+  // Whitespace-only leaf strips to empty under permissive → post-strip
+  // empty refusal.
+  _expectThrowCode("sanitize strips to empty", "filename.empty", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize("   ", { profile: "permissive" });
+  });
+}
+
+function testGuardFilenameSanitizeBadInput() {
+  _expectThrowCode("sanitize non-string/Buffer input", "filename.bad-input", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize(12345, { profile: "balanced" });
+  });
+}
+
+function testGuardFilenameSanitizeStripModeFloor() {
+  // Strip-mode security floor branches not covered by the round-trip test.
+  _expectThrowCode("strip-mode overlong-UTF-8 Buffer", "filename.overlong-utf8", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize(Buffer.from([0xC0, 0xAE, 0x66]),
+                             { mode: "strip", profile: "balanced" });
+  });
+
+  _expectThrowCode("strip-mode empty string", "filename.empty", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize("", { mode: "strip", profile: "balanced" });
+  });
+
+  _expectThrowCode("strip-mode over-length leaf", "filename.length", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.sanitize("x".repeat(300), { mode: "strip", profile: "balanced" });
+  });
+}
+
+async function testGuardFilenameGateSanitizeAction() {
+  // The gate's "sanitize" action fires only when EVERY reject-policy is off
+  // and a strip-eligible high/critical issue is present. Drive it with an
+  // all-policies-non-reject config and a leading-whitespace name (a "high"
+  // leading-trailing issue that sanitize repairs to "report.txt").
+  var g = b.guardFilename.gate({
+    profile:               "permissive",
+    bidiPolicy:            "strip",
+    controlPolicy:         "strip",
+    nullBytePolicy:        "allow",
+    traversalPolicy:       "audit",
+    reservedCharPolicy:    "strip",
+    reservedNamePolicy:    "audit",
+    adsPolicy:             "audit",
+    pathSeparatorsPolicy:  "audit",
+    leadingTrailingPolicy: "strip",
+  });
+  var v = await g.check({ filename: " report.txt" });
+  check("gate: sanitize-eligible issue → action=sanitize",
+        v.ok === true && v.action === "sanitize");
+
+  // audit-only: a warn-severity-only issue (no high/critical) resolves to
+  // action=audit-only. A homoglyph under audit policy is warn-only.
+  var gAudit = b.guardFilename.gate({ profile: "permissive", homoglyphPolicy: "audit" });
+  var vAudit = await gAudit.check({ filename: "p" + String.fromCharCode(0x0430) + "y" });
+  check("gate: warn-only issue → action=audit-only",
+        vAudit.action === "audit-only");
+}
+
+function testVerifyExtractionPathStringRefusals() {
+  var root = "/var/quarantine";
+  _expectThrowCode("vep empty entryName", "filename.extraction-empty", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("", root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep non-string entryName", "filename.extraction-empty", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath(123, root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep empty extractionRoot", "filename.extraction-bad-root", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("ok.txt", "");
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep non-string extractionRoot", "filename.extraction-bad-root", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("ok.txt", 123);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep PATH_MAX overflow", "filename.extraction-path-max", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("a".repeat(4097), root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep null byte", "filename.extraction-null-byte", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("file" + String.fromCharCode(0) + ".txt", root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep absolute path", "filename.extraction-absolute", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("/etc/passwd", root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep drive-letter prefix", "filename.extraction-drive-prefix", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("C:/Windows/system32", root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep .. leading segment", "filename.extraction-traversal", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("../etc/passwd", root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep .. interior segment", "filename.extraction-traversal", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("a/../b", root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep backslash .. segment", "filename.extraction-traversal", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("a\\..\\b", root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep percent-encoded ..", "filename.extraction-traversal-encoded", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("docs/%2e%2e/x", root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep overlong-encoded ..", "filename.extraction-traversal-encoded", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("docs/%c0%ae/x", root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep reserved device segment", "filename.extraction-reserved-name", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("docs/CON/x.txt", root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep NTFS ADS segment", "filename.extraction-ntfs-ads", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("docs/file.txt:stream", root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep trailing-dot segment", "filename.extraction-leading-trailing", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("docs/secret.txt.", root);
+  });
+  _expectThrowCode("vep leading-whitespace segment", "filename.extraction-leading-trailing", function () {
+    b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath(" leading/x.txt", root);
+  });
+}
+
+function testVerifyExtractionPathOptOuts() {
+  // Non-existent root so the fs realpath block is skipped; each opt-out
+  // flips a Windows-hazard segment check off and the call succeeds.
+  var root = path.join(os.tmpdir(), "gfn-none-" + Date.now() + "-" + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2));
+  var r1 = b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("docs/CON/x.txt", root,
+                                                { reservedNamePolicy: "allow" });
+  check("vep reservedNamePolicy:allow permits CON segment",
+        typeof r1 === "string" && r1.indexOf("x.txt") !== -1);
+
+  var r2 = b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("docs/file.txt:stream", root,
+                                                { adsPolicy: "allow" });
+  check("vep adsPolicy:allow permits name:stream segment",
+        typeof r2 === "string" && r2.indexOf("stream") !== -1);
+
+  var r3 = b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("docs/secret.txt.", root,
+                                                { leadingTrailingPolicy: "allow" });
+  check("vep leadingTrailingPolicy:allow permits trailing dot",
+        typeof r3 === "string");
+}
+
+function testVerifyExtractionPathSuccess() {
+  // Non-existent root: string-containment passes, realpath block skipped,
+  // resolved path returned.
+  var noneRoot = path.join(os.tmpdir(), "gfn-none-" + Date.now() + "-" + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2));
+  var resolved = b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("docs/readme.txt", noneRoot);
+  check("vep benign entry (no root on disk) → resolved path returned",
+        typeof resolved === "string" &&
+        resolved === path.resolve(noneRoot, "docs/readme.txt"));
+
+  // Existing root on disk: exercises the realpath-agreement block — every
+  // existing ancestor must realpath inside the realpath of the root.
+  var realRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "gfn-root-"));
+  try {
+    var r = b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("sub/dir/file.txt", realRoot);
+    check("vep existing root → realpath-agreement passes, resolved returned",
+          r === path.resolve(realRoot, "sub/dir/file.txt"));
+  } finally {
+    try { fs.rmSync(realRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch (_e) { /* best-effort */ }
+  }
+}
+
+function testVerifyExtractionPathRealpathEscape() {
+  // A symlink/junction inside the root whose realpath escapes the root is
+  // the CVE-2025-4517 PATH_MAX-TOCTOU class: string containment passes
+  // (no ".." literal) but fs.realpath resolves outside. Junction on
+  // Windows (no admin needed) / symlink on POSIX.
+  var realRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "gfn-root-"));
+  var outside  = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "gfn-out-"));
+  var linkMade = false;
+  try {
+    var link = path.join(realRoot, "link");
+    try { fs.symlinkSync(outside, link, "junction"); linkMade = true; }
+    catch (_e1) {
+      try { fs.symlinkSync(outside, link, "dir"); linkMade = true; }
+      catch (_e2) { linkMade = false; }
+    }
+    if (linkMade) {
+      _expectThrowCode("vep symlink escaping root", "filename.extraction-realpath-escape", function () {
+        b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("link/evil.txt", realRoot);
+      });
+    }
+  } finally {
+    try { fs.rmSync(realRoot, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch (_e) { /* best-effort */ }
+    try { fs.rmSync(outside, { recursive: true, force: true }); } catch (_e) { /* best-effort */ }
+  }
+  check("vep realpath-escape test wired (symlink/junction created)", linkMade === true);
+}
+
+function testGuardFilenameOverlongVariants() {
+  // 3-byte overlong (0xE0 0x80-0x9F) and 4-byte overlong (0xF0 0x80-0x8F)
+  // are non-shortest forms alongside the 2-byte 0xC0/0xC1 class.
+  var three = b.guardFilename.validate(Buffer.from([0xE0, 0x80, 0xAE, 0x78]),
+                                       { profile: "strict" });
+  check("3-byte overlong UTF-8 detected",
+        three.issues.some(function (i) { return i.kind === "overlong-utf8"; }));
+
+  var four = b.guardFilename.validate(Buffer.from([0xF0, 0x80, 0x80, 0xAE]),
+                                      { profile: "strict" });
+  check("4-byte overlong UTF-8 detected",
+        four.issues.some(function (i) { return i.kind === "overlong-utf8"; }));
+}
+
+function testGuardFilenameSanitizeBufferInput() {
+  // A well-formed Buffer flows through the Buffer arm of both sanitize
+  // modes' name-extraction and round-trips to its UTF-8 text.
+  check("sanitize enforce accepts a benign Buffer",
+        b.guardFilename.sanitize(Buffer.from("okname.txt", "utf8"),
+                                 { profile: "balanced" }) === "okname.txt");
+  check("sanitize strip accepts a benign Buffer",
+        b.guardFilename.sanitize(Buffer.from("okname.txt", "utf8"),
+                                 { mode: "strip", profile: "balanced" }) === "okname.txt");
+}
+
+function testGuardFilenameStripAuditEdge() {
+  // Buffer input through strip-mode audit — the originalLength computation
+  // takes its Buffer arm.
+  var captured = [];
+  var okAudit = { safeEmit: function (ev) { captured.push(ev); } };
+  var crBuf = Buffer.from("report" + String.fromCharCode(0x0D) + ".txt", "utf8");
+  var out = b.guardFilename.sanitize(crBuf, { mode: "strip", profile: "balanced", audit: okAudit });
+  check("strip-mode audit with Buffer input emits + strips CR",
+        out === "report_.txt" && captured.length === 1 &&
+        captured[0].action === "guardfilename.sanitize.stripped");
+
+  // A throwing audit sink must NOT propagate — the sink is drop-silent so
+  // a crashing audit backend never breaks the producer.
+  var throwingAudit = { safeEmit: function () { throw new Error("audit backend down"); } };
+  var stillOut = b.guardFilename.sanitize("report" + String.fromCharCode(0x0D) + ".txt",
+                                          { mode: "strip", profile: "balanced", audit: throwingAudit });
+  check("strip-mode audit sink error is swallowed (drop-silent)",
+        stillOut === "report_.txt");
+}
+
+async function testGuardFilenameGateCtxShapes() {
+  var g = b.guardFilename.gate({ profile: "strict" });
+
+  // ctx.name (not ctx.filename) is the fallback identity key.
+  var byName = await g.check({ name: "report.txt" });
+  check("gate reads ctx.name when ctx.filename absent → serve",
+        byName.ok === true && byName.action === "serve");
+
+  // No filename at all → serve (nothing to guard).
+  var empty = await g.check({});
+  check("gate with no filename → serve",
+        empty.ok === true && empty.action === "serve");
+}
+
+function testVerifyExtractionPathDotSegment() {
+  // Current-dir "." and empty segments are skipped by the per-segment
+  // walk; a benign path carrying them still resolves cleanly.
+  var root = path.join(os.tmpdir(), "gfn-none-" + Date.now() + "-" + Math.random().toString(36).slice(2));
+  var resolved = b.guardFilename.verifyExtractionPath("a/./b.txt", root);
+  check("vep skips '.' segment and resolves",
+        resolved === path.resolve(root, "a/b.txt"));
+}
+
 async function run() {
   testGuardFilenameSurface();
   testGuardFilenameStandalonePrimitive();
@@ -416,7 +815,32 @@ async function run() {
   testGuardFilenameSanitizeStripMode();
   testGuardFilenameCompliancePosture();
   testGuardFilenameBadProfile();
+  testGuardFilenameEmptyInput();
+  testGuardFilenameBenignBufferNoOverlong();
+  testGuardFilenameHomoglyph();
+  testGuardFilenameSuperscriptReservedName();
+  testGuardFilenameExtAllowlistNoExtension();
+  testGuardFilenameSanitizeEnforceRejections();
+  testGuardFilenameSanitizeBadInput();
+  testGuardFilenameSanitizeStripModeFloor();
+  testGuardFilenameOverlongVariants();
+  testGuardFilenameSanitizeBufferInput();
+  testGuardFilenameStripAuditEdge();
+  testVerifyExtractionPathDotSegment();
+  testVerifyExtractionPathStringRefusals();
+  testVerifyExtractionPathOptOuts();
+  testVerifyExtractionPathSuccess();
+  testVerifyExtractionPathRealpathEscape();
   await testGuardFilenameGate();
+  await testGuardFilenameGateSanitizeAction();
+  await testGuardFilenameGateCtxShapes();
 }
 
 module.exports = { run: run };
+
+if (require.main === module) {
+  run().then(
+    function () { console.log("[guard-filename] OK — " + helpers.getChecks() + " checks passed"); process.exit(0); },
+    function (e) { console.error("FAIL:", e && e.stack || e); process.exit(1); }
+  );
+}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/layer-0-primitives/{guard-gate-disposition-coverage.test.js → guard-gate-disposition.test.js}

@@ -90,6 +90,6 @@ function run() {
 module.exports = { run: run };
 
 if (require.main === module) {
-  try { run(); console.log("[guard-gate-disposition-coverage] OK — " + helpers.getChecks() + " checks passed"); }
+  try { run(); console.log("[guard-gate-disposition] OK — " + helpers.getChecks() + " checks passed"); }
   catch (e) { console.error("FAIL:", e.stack || e); process.exit(1); }
 }