@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.2.12 → 0.2.13

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-markdown.js

@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   bidiPolicy:             "reject"|"strip"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   controlPolicy:          "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
  *   nullBytePolicy:         "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   ...:                    same shape as b.guardMarkdown.validate opts,
  *
  * @example
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  * @compliance hipaa, pci-dss, gdpr, soc2
  * @related    b.guardMarkdown.validate, b.guardMarkdown.sanitize, b.guardAll.gate, b.staticServe.create
  *
- * Build an async gate `(ctx) -> { ok, action, issues }` consumable
+ * Build a guard gate whose async `check(ctx)` returns `{ ok, action, issues }`, consumable
  * by `b.guardAll`, `b.staticServe`, `b.fileUpload`, and any host
  * that ingests user-supplied markdown. The gate decodes
  * `ctx.bytes` / `ctx.bodyText`, runs `validate`, and maps
@@ -617,15 +617,15 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  * @opts
  *   name:                   string,    // gate label for audit / observability
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   ...:                    same shape as b.guardMarkdown.validate opts,
  *
  * @example
  *   var g = b.guardMarkdown.gate({ profile: "strict" });
- *   var rv = await g({ bytes: Buffer.from("# hello\n", "utf8") });
+ *   var rv = await g.check({ bytes: Buffer.from("# hello\n", "utf8") });
  *   rv.action;                                         // → "serve"
  *
- *   var bad = await g({ bytes: Buffer.from("[x](javascript:1)", "utf8") });
+ *   var bad = await g.check({ bytes: Buffer.from("[x](javascript:1)", "utf8") });
  *   bad.action;                                        // → "refuse"
  */
 function gate(opts) {

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-mime.js

@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   bidiPolicy:             "reject"|"strip"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   controlPolicy:          "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
  *   nullBytePolicy:         "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   ...:                    same shape as b.guardMime.validate opts,
  *
  * @example
@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  * @compliance hipaa, pci-dss, gdpr, soc2
  * @related    b.guardMime.validate, b.guardMime.sanitize, b.guardAll.gate
  *
- * Build an async gate `(ctx) -> { ok, action, issues }` consumable
+ * Build a guard gate whose async `check(ctx)` returns `{ ok, action, issues }`, consumable
  * by `b.guardAll`, `b.staticServe`, `b.fileUpload`, and any other
  * host that integrates the guard contract. The gate reads
  * `ctx.identifier` (or `ctx.mime`), runs `validate`, and maps
@@ -477,15 +477,15 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  * @opts
  *   name:                   string,    // gate label for audit / observability
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   ...:                    same shape as b.guardMime.validate opts,
  *
  * @example
  *   var g = b.guardMime.gate({ profile: "strict" });
- *   var rv = await g({ identifier: "application/json" });
+ *   var rv = await g.check({ identifier: "application/json" });
  *   rv.action;                                         // → "serve"
  *
- *   var bad = await g({ identifier: "application/x-msdownload" });
+ *   var bad = await g.check({ identifier: "application/x-msdownload" });
  *   bad.action;                                        // → "refuse"
  */
 function gate(opts) {

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-oauth.js

@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ function _detectIssues(flow, opts) {
  * @related    b.guardOauth.sanitize, b.guardOauth.gate
  *
  * Apply the full guard-oauth threat catalog to a flow bundle.
- * Returns `{ ok, issues, refusal? }` per
+ * Returns `{ ok, issues }` per
  * `gateContract.aggregateIssues`. Detected classes include
  * `pkce-missing`, `pkce-method` (e.g. plain under require-s256),
  * `state-missing`, `redirect-uri-not-allowed`,
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ function _detectIssues(flow, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                 "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:              "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   pkcePolicy:              "require-s256"|"require-any"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   statePolicy:             "require"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   redirectUriPolicy:       "require-exact-allowlist"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   ...:        every guardOauth.validate opt is honored,
  *
  * @example
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,            // gate label for audit trails
  *   ...:        every guardOauth.validate opt is honored,
  *
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *     profile: "strict",
  *     allowedRedirectUris: ["https://app.example.com/callback"],
  *   });
- *   var rv = await oauthGate.run({
+ *   var rv = await oauthGate.check({
  *     oauthFlow: {
  *       response_type: "code",
  *       redirect_uri:  "https://attacker.example/callback",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-pdf.js

@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,
  *   ...:        any validate opt
  *

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-regex.js

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
  *   Profiles: `strict` / `balanced` / `permissive`. Compliance
  *   postures: `hipaa` / `pci-dss` / `gdpr` / `soc2`. Operators
  *   select via `{ profile: "strict" }` or
- *   `{ compliance: "hipaa" }`; postures overlay on top of the
+ *   `{ compliancePosture: "hipaa" }`; postures overlay on top of the
  *   profile baseline. Nested-quantifier rejection holds at every
  *   profile — the catastrophic class is never an operator opt-in.
  *
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ function _detectNestedExtglob(input, opts, issues) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   bidiPolicy:             "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   controlPolicy:          "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   nullBytePolicy:         "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   nestedQuantPolicy:      "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   alternationQuantPolicy: "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   boundedRepeatPolicy:    "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:                   string,    // override gate name in audit emissions
  *   nestedQuantPolicy:      "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   alternationQuantPolicy: "reject"|"audit"|"allow",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-shell.js

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
  *
  *   Profiles: `strict` / `balanced` / `permissive`. Compliance
  *   postures: `hipaa` / `pci-dss` / `gdpr` / `soc2`. Operators select
- *   via `{ profile: "strict" }` or `{ compliance: "hipaa" }`;
+ *   via `{ profile: "strict" }` or `{ compliancePosture: "hipaa" }`;
  *   postures overlay on top of the profile baseline.
  *
  *   Shell args cannot be repaired safely — `sanitize` either passes
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:           "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:        "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   bidiPolicy:        "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   controlPolicy:     "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   nullBytePolicy:    "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:           "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:        "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   posixMetaPolicy:   "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   cmdMetaPolicy:     "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   dollarSubstPolicy: "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:           "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:        "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:              string,        // override gate name in audit emissions
  *   posixMetaPolicy:   "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   cmdMetaPolicy:     "reject"|"audit"|"allow",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-svg.js

@@ -1017,9 +1017,9 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  * @status    stable
  * @related   b.guardSvg.validate, b.guardSvg.sanitize, b.fileUpload, b.staticServe
  *
- * Build a uniform gate over guard-* family contract. Returns an
- * async function whose verdict is `{ ok, action, issues?,
- * sanitized? }` where `action` is `serve` / `audit-only` /
+ * Build a uniform gate over the guard-* family contract. Returns a
+ * gate whose async `check(ctx)` produces a verdict `{ ok, action,
+ * issues?, sanitized? }` where `action` is `serve` / `audit-only` /
  * `sanitize` / `refuse`. SVGZ inputs always refuse — operators
  * ungzip and re-gate the inner SVG. External `xlink:href` on
  * `<use>` / `<feImage>` refuses under `strict` (SSRF + XSS chain).
@@ -1042,13 +1042,13 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @example
  *   var g = b.guardSvg.gate({ profile: "strict" });
- *   var verdict = await g({
+ *   var verdict = await g.check({
  *     bytes: Buffer.from('<svg><circle r="10"/></svg>', "utf8"),
  *   });
  *   verdict.action;                  // → "serve"
  *
  *   // Refuses external xlink:href under strict:
- *   var refuse = await g({
+ *   var refuse = await g.check({
  *     bytes: Buffer.from(
  *       '<svg><use xlink:href="https://evil.example/x.svg#a"/></svg>',
  *       "utf8"),

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-template.js

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
  *   Profiles: `strict` / `balanced` / `permissive`. Compliance
  *   postures: `hipaa` / `pci-dss` / `gdpr` / `soc2`. Operators
  *   select via `{ profile: "strict" }` or
- *   `{ compliance: "hipaa" }`; postures overlay on top of the
+ *   `{ compliancePosture: "hipaa" }`; postures overlay on top of the
  *   profile baseline. Jinja / ERB / Pug shape rejection holds at
  *   every profile — the SSTI class is never an operator opt-in.
  *
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                 "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:              "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   bidiPolicy:              "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   controlPolicy:           "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   nullBytePolicy:          "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                 "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:              "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   jinjaPolicy:             "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   erbPolicy:               "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   pugPolicy:               "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                 "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:              "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:                    string,    // override gate name in audit emissions
  *   jinjaPolicy:             "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   erbPolicy:               "reject"|"audit"|"allow",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-time.js

@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   bidiPolicy:             "reject"|"strip"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   controlPolicy:          "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
  *   nullBytePolicy:         "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   ...:                    same shape as b.guardTime.validate opts,
  *
  * @example
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  * @compliance hipaa, pci-dss, gdpr, soc2
  * @related    b.guardTime.validate, b.guardTime.sanitize, b.guardAll.gate
  *
- * Build an async gate `(ctx) -> { ok, action, issues }` consumable
+ * Build a guard gate whose async `check(ctx)` returns `{ ok, action, issues }`, consumable
  * by `b.guardAll`, audit pipelines, scheduling primitives, and
  * retention readers. The gate reads `ctx.identifier` (or
  * `ctx.timestamp` / `ctx.time`), runs `validate`, and maps
@@ -452,15 +452,15 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  * @opts
  *   name:                   string,    // gate label for audit / observability
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   ...:                    same shape as b.guardTime.validate opts,
  *
  * @example
  *   var g = b.guardTime.gate({ profile: "strict" });
- *   var rv = await g({ identifier: "2026-05-05T12:34:56Z" });
+ *   var rv = await g.check({ identifier: "2026-05-05T12:34:56Z" });
  *   rv.action;                                         // → "serve"
  *
- *   var bad = await g({ identifier: "2026-05-05 12:34:56" });
+ *   var bad = await g.check({ identifier: "2026-05-05 12:34:56" });
  *   bad.action;                                        // → "refuse"
  */
 function gate(opts) {

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-uuid.js

@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   bidiPolicy:             "reject"|"strip"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   controlPolicy:          "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
  *   nullBytePolicy:         "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   ...:                    same shape as b.guardUuid.validate opts,
  *
  * @example
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  * @compliance hipaa, pci-dss, gdpr, soc2
  * @related    b.guardUuid.validate, b.guardUuid.sanitize, b.guardAll.gate
  *
- * Build an async gate `(ctx) -> { ok, action, issues }` consumable
+ * Build a guard gate whose async `check(ctx)` returns `{ ok, action, issues }`, consumable
  * by `b.guardAll`, ID validators, and any host that handles
  * UUID-shaped tokens. The gate reads `ctx.identifier` (or
  * `ctx.uuid`), runs `validate`, and maps severity to action: zero
@@ -416,15 +416,15 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  * @opts
  *   name:                   string,    // gate label for audit / observability
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   ...:                    same shape as b.guardUuid.validate opts,
  *
  * @example
  *   var g = b.guardUuid.gate({ profile: "strict" });
- *   var rv = await g({ identifier: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000" });
+ *   var rv = await g.check({ identifier: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000" });
  *   rv.action;                                         // → "serve"
  *
- *   var bad = await g({ identifier: "{550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000}" });
+ *   var bad = await g.check({ identifier: "{550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000}" });
  *   bad.action;                                        // → "refuse"
  */
 function gate(opts) {

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-xml.js

@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  *
  * Inspect `input` (string of XML source) for the full guard-xml
  * threat catalog without invoking a parser. Returns
- * `{ ok, issues, severities }` where `issues` enumerates every
+ * `{ ok, issues }` where `issues` enumerates every
  * DOCTYPE declaration, `<!ENTITY>` definition (including parameter
  * entities), SYSTEM/PUBLIC external-entity reference, XInclude
  * directive, xsi:schemaLocation hint, processing instruction (after
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:               "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:            "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   doctypePolicy:         "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   entityPolicy:          "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   externalEntityPolicy:  "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   bidiPolicy:      "reject"|"strip"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   controlPolicy:   "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
  *   nullBytePolicy:  "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,    // gate identity for audit / observability
  *
  * @example

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-yaml.js

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
  *
  *   Profiles: `strict` / `balanced` / `permissive`. Compliance
  *   postures: `hipaa` / `pci-dss` / `gdpr` / `soc2`. Operators select
- *   via `{ profile: "strict" }` or `{ compliance: "hipaa" }`;
+ *   via `{ profile: "strict" }` or `{ compliancePosture: "hipaa" }`;
  *   postures overlay on top of the profile baseline.
  *
  * @card
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ function _detectDuplicateKeysYaml(text) {
  *
  * Inspect `input` (string of YAML source) for the full guard-yaml
  * threat catalog without committing to a parsed value. Returns
- * `{ ok, issues, severities }` where `issues` is the aggregated
+ * `{ ok, issues }` where `issues` is the aggregated
  * detector output — every dangerous-tag prefix, custom-tag use,
  * anchor / alias amplification, multi-document split, Norway-
  * problem implicit boolean, leading-zero octal, merge-key chain,
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ function _detectDuplicateKeysYaml(text) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:             "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:          "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   tagPolicy:           "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   aliasPolicy:         "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   multiDocPolicy:      "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   tagPolicy:    "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   aliasPolicy:  "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   maxBytes:     number, maxDepth: number, maxNodes: number,
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ function parse(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,    // gate identity for audit / observability
  *
  * @example

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/link-header.js

@@ -125,8 +125,9 @@ function _serParam(name, value) {
  * Build an HTTP <code>Link</code> header value from an array of
  * <code>{ uri, rel, params? }</code> (or a single such object). The URI
  * is angle-bracketed, <code>rel</code> (string or array) is emitted
- * first, and parameters are token-valued when they fit RFC 7230 token
- * grammar or double-quoted otherwise. Useful for emitting standard REST
+ * first, and every parameter value is double-quoted (always valid under
+ * RFC 8288, and required for space-separated multi-rel and media-type
+ * values like <code>text/html</code>). Useful for emitting standard REST
  * pagination links.
  *
  * @example

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/mail-agent.js

@@ -156,8 +156,10 @@ var COMPOSE_HINT = Object.freeze({
  * @related   b.mailStore, b.mail.agent.consumer
  *
  * Create the agent facade. Returns an object with read / write / sieve
- * / identity / mdn / export / import / consumer methods. Reads stay
- * synchronous-shaped via promises; writes audit on completion.
+ * / identity / mdn / export / import methods. Reads stay
+ * synchronous-shaped via promises; writes audit on completion. (The
+ * queue consumer is the sibling export <code>b.mail.agent.consumer</code>,
+ * not a method on this object.)
  *
  * @opts
  *   store:        b.mailStore instance,    // required

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/middleware/rate-limit.js

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  *     header:          true                    // set X-RateLimit-* response headers
  *     skipPaths:       []                      // string-prefix or regex matchers
  *     scope:           'global' | 'per-route'  (default 'global')
- *     backend:         'memory' (default) | 'cluster' | { take, reset, gc? }
+ *     backend:         'memory' (default) | 'cluster' | { take, reset }
  *     algorithm:       'token-bucket' (default) | 'fixed-window'
  *                                              // memory backend only; ignored
  *                                              // for cluster backend (which is
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ function _resolveBackend(opts) {
  *     header:          boolean,          // default true
  *     skipPaths:       Array<string|RegExp>,
  *     scope:           "global"|"per-route",
- *     backend:         "memory"|"cluster"|{ take, reset, gc },
+ *     backend:         "memory"|"cluster"|{ take, reset },
  *     algorithm:       "token-bucket"|"fixed-window",
  *     burst:           number,
  *     refillPerSecond: number,

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/tsa.js

@@ -183,7 +183,8 @@ function buildRequest(data, opts) {
     nonce = Buffer.isBuffer(opts.nonce) ? opts.nonce : nodeCrypto.randomBytes(8);  // allow:raw-byte-literal — RFC 3161 nonce: 64-bit random
     children.push(asn1.writeInteger(nonce));
   }
-  // certReq DEFAULT FALSE — only encode when true (the default we want).
+  // certReq DEFAULTS TRUE (RFC 3161 §2.4.1) — encode the boolean unless
+  // the caller explicitly opts out with certReq:false.
   var certReq = opts.certReq !== false;
   if (certReq) children.push(asn1.writeBoolean(true));
 

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@blamejs/core",
-  "version": "0.13.22",
+  "version": "0.13.24",
   "description": "The Node framework that owns its stack.",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "blamejs contributors",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.13.23.json

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
+  "version": "0.13.23",
+  "date": "2026-05-28",
+  "headline": "Documentation corrected to match actual behavior across several primitives",
+  "summary": "A set of JSDoc / doc-comment corrections where the documented contract had drifted from what the code does. No behavior changes — the implementations already behaved as now documented; only the docs were wrong. The most operator-relevant is the JWT signer doc: an expiring token signed without an explicit jti receives an auto-minted 128-bit jti (so the replay-defense path has the jti it needs), which the sign-opts doc previously denied. Also corrected: did.resolve's unsupported-method error now names did:jwk (always supported); b.cose.verify is marked stable to match its stable sign sibling and the CWT / EAT / SCITT / mdoc verifiers built on it; b.linkHeader.serialize's doc now states every parameter value is double-quoted; b.auth.saml verifyResponse's documented return shape now lists inResponseTo and issuer (both always returned); and the rate-limit custom-backend contract drops a gc member the middleware never invoked.",
+  "sections": [
+    {
+      "heading": "Fixed",
+      "items": [
+        {
+          "title": "JWT signer doc now describes the auto-minted jti on expiring tokens",
+          "body": "`b.auth.jwt.sign`'s opts doc claimed that omitting `jti` adds no jti. In fact, when a token carries an `exp` and no operator-supplied `jti`, the signer auto-mints a random 128-bit `jti` so a replay-protected token always carries the identifier `verify`'s replay store requires. The doc now describes this; pass an explicit `jti` for a deterministic value. Behavior is unchanged."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "`b.did.resolve` unsupported-method error now names did:jwk",
+          "body": "The thrown error for an unsupported DID method listed only `did:key` and `did:web`, omitting `did:jwk`, which `resolve` fully supports. The message now reads `(did:key, did:jwk, and did:web only)`."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "`b.cose.verify` marked stable",
+          "body": "`b.cose.verify` carried `@status experimental` while its `b.cose.sign` sibling is stable and the CWT / EAT / SCITT / mdoc verifiers that depend on it are stable and shipped. The verifier is the same maturity as the rest of the COSE_Sign1 round-trip; its status now reflects that."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "`b.linkHeader.serialize` doc matches its quoting behavior",
+          "body": "The doc said parameters are token-encoded when they fit RFC 7230 token grammar and double-quoted otherwise. The serializer always double-quotes every value (valid under RFC 8288, and required for space-separated multi-rel and media-type values). The doc now states that."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "`b.auth.saml` verifyResponse documented return shape lists all fields",
+          "body": "The prose and the example each omitted a different field that `verifyResponse` always returns. The documented shape now lists all of `nameId`, `nameIdFormat`, `sessionIndex`, `attributes`, `audience`, `inResponseTo`, and `issuer`."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "rate-limit custom-backend contract is `{ take, reset }`",
+          "body": "The custom-backend opts doc listed a `gc` member that the middleware never reads or invokes (the runtime contract is `take` / `reset` / `close`, and the error message already said `{ take, reset }`). The documented shape now matches; an operator-supplied `gc` was always silently ignored."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "`b.mail.agent.create` doc no longer lists consumer as a method",
+          "body": "The created agent's method list named `consumer`, which is not a method on the returned object — the queue consumer is the sibling export `b.mail.agent.consumer`. The doc now says so."
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/release-notes/v0.13.24.json

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "../scripts/release-notes-schema.json",
+  "version": "0.13.24",
+  "date": "2026-05-28",
+  "headline": "`b.guard*` docs corrected: the compliance-posture opt key, the gate API, and validate return shapes",
+  "summary": "Documentation corrections across the b.guard* family. The most consequential: the posture-selection option was documented as `compliance:` in many guards' @opts, but the working key is `compliancePosture:` — passing the documented `{ compliance: \"hipaa\" }` was silently ignored, so a compliance posture (e.g. HIPAA PII redaction) never activated. If you select a posture via the gate/validate/sanitize options, use `compliancePosture:`; `compliance:` had no effect. The guard docs now name the correct key uniformly. Also corrected: gate examples and prose that invoked the gate as a callable or via `.run` / `.inspect` (the gate is an object whose method is `.check(ctx)`), and validate() return shapes that listed `severities` / `summary` / `refusal` fields the function never returned (it returns `{ ok, issues }`).",
+  "sections": [
+    {
+      "heading": "Fixed",
+      "items": [
+        {
+          "title": "guard posture option is `compliancePosture:`, not `compliance:`",
+          "body": "Many `b.guard*` primitives documented the compliance-posture selector as `compliance: \"hipaa\"|\"pci-dss\"|\"gdpr\"|\"soc2\"` in their `@opts`, but the family resolver reads `compliancePosture:`. Passing `{ compliance: \"hipaa\" }` was accepted and silently ignored — the posture overlay (e.g. CSV `piiPolicy: \"redact\"` under HIPAA) never applied, leaving the default policy in force. The docs across the guard family now name `compliancePosture:` consistently (the key the resolver and `b.guardX.compliancePosture(name)` already used). Action: if you selected a posture with `compliance:`, switch to `compliancePosture:` — the posture was not taking effect before."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "guard gate is an object with `.check(ctx)`, not a callable",
+          "body": "Several guards' gate `@example`s and prose invoked the gate as a function (`g({...})`), via `.run(...)`, or via `.inspect(...)`, and a few described it as \"an async function\". `b.guardX.gate(opts)` returns an object whose async method is `.check(ctx)`; the examples and prose now use `.check`, so they run as written."
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "guard validate() returns `{ ok, issues }`",
+          "body": "Several guards documented `validate()` as returning `{ ok, issues, severities }`, `{ ok, issues, summary }`, or `{ ok, issues, refusal? }`. The function returns `{ ok, issues }` (each issue carries its own `severity` / `kind`); the documented extra top-level fields were never present. The docs now state the actual shape."
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/test/smoke.js

@@ -472,6 +472,31 @@ function _checkChangelogInSync() {
   await _runLayer(5, path.join(__dirname, "50-integration.js"), "Layer 5");
 
   console.log("OK — " + helpers.getChecks() + " checks passed (" + (Date.now() - smokeStart) + "ms total)");
+
+  // Deterministic exit on success. The .catch() below exits 1 on
+  // failure; the success path historically fell through and relied on
+  // the event loop draining on its own. A lingering handle (a forked-
+  // child stdio pipe, a Layer-5 integration server whose socket did not
+  // fully close, an unref-missed timer) then keeps the process alive
+  // after the suite finished, burning the CI job's timeout budget until
+  // the runner cancels it — observed on the slow macos-latest runner
+  // (OK printed, ~3.5 min idle, job-timeout cancel). Reap it here: if
+  // anything still holds the loop open, name the handle kinds so a real
+  // resource leak surfaces in the log rather than being silently masked,
+  // then exit 0.
+  var _stdio = [process.stdout, process.stderr, process.stdin];
+  var _lingering = (typeof process._getActiveHandles === "function"
+    ? process._getActiveHandles() : []).filter(function (h) { return _stdio.indexOf(h) === -1; });
+  if (_lingering.length > 0) {
+    var _kinds = {};
+    _lingering.forEach(function (h) {
+      var name = (h && h.constructor && h.constructor.name) || typeof h;
+      _kinds[name] = (_kinds[name] || 0) + 1;
+    });
+    console.error("smoke: " + _lingering.length + " handle(s) still open after pass — forcing exit. kinds: " +
+      Object.keys(_kinds).map(function (k) { return k + "x" + _kinds[k]; }).join(", "));
+  }
+  process.exit(0);
 })().catch(function (err) {
   console.error("SMOKE TEST FAILED:", err.message);
   console.error(err.stack);