@blamejs/blamejs-shop 0.2.12 → 0.2.13

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/.pinact.yaml

@@ -1,17 +1,33 @@
 # pinact configuration — refuses any tag-shaped `uses:` reference EXCEPT
-# the documented exception below.
+# the documented exceptions below.
 #
-# The single exception is the SLSA reusable workflow. SLSA's internal
-# builder-fetch step refuses non-tag `BUILDER_REF` values ("Invalid ref:
-# <40-hex>. Expected ref of the form refs/tags/vX.Y.Z"), so the call
-# MUST be tag-pinned. Mitigated by slsa-framework's upstream tag-
-# protection + immutable-release rules. Same suppression also appears
-# as a per-line `# allow:slsa-framework-action-not-sha-pinned` marker in
-# `.github/workflows/npm-publish.yml` for the codebase-patterns gate.
+# 1. The SLSA reusable workflow. SLSA's internal builder-fetch step
+#    refuses non-tag `BUILDER_REF` values ("Invalid ref: <40-hex>.
+#    Expected ref of the form refs/tags/vX.Y.Z"), so the call MUST be
+#    tag-pinned. Mitigated by slsa-framework's upstream tag-protection +
+#    immutable-release rules. Same suppression also appears as a per-line
+#    `# allow:slsa-framework-action-not-sha-pinned` marker in
+#    `.github/workflows/npm-publish.yml` for the codebase-patterns gate.
+#
+# 2. aquasecurity/trivy-action. The aquasecurity org enables a GitHub
+#    org-level IP allow-list that returns 403 to GitHub Actions runner
+#    IPs on the commits API, so `pinact run --verify`'s online tag
+#    re-resolution cannot complete from CI (it succeeds from
+#    unrestricted IPs). The action stays SHA-pinned in the workflow
+#    (auditable inline); this entry only exempts it from the online
+#    re-verification that the upstream org makes impossible from a
+#    runner.
 #
 # See npm-publish.yml comment block + memory/specs/release-v0.10.19-plan.md.
 
 version: 3
 
 ignore_actions:
+  # pinact v3 treats both `name` and `ref` as regular expressions, and
+  # both are required (a name-only entry fails config load with
+  # "initialize ignore_action: ref is required"). `ref: .*` matches the
+  # tag-pinned ref this single exception carries (currently v2.1.0).
   - name: slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_generic_slsa3.yml
+    ref: .*
+  - name: aquasecurity/trivy-action
+    ref: .*

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ upgrading across more than a few patches at a time.
 
 ## v0.13.x
 
+- v0.13.24 (2026-05-28) — **`b.guard*` docs corrected: the compliance-posture opt key, the gate API, and validate return shapes.** Documentation corrections across the b.guard* family. The most consequential: the posture-selection option was documented as `compliance:` in many guards' @opts, but the working key is `compliancePosture:` — passing the documented `{ compliance: "hipaa" }` was silently ignored, so a compliance posture (e.g. HIPAA PII redaction) never activated. If you select a posture via the gate/validate/sanitize options, use `compliancePosture:`; `compliance:` had no effect. The guard docs now name the correct key uniformly. Also corrected: gate examples and prose that invoked the gate as a callable or via `.run` / `.inspect` (the gate is an object whose method is `.check(ctx)`), and validate() return shapes that listed `severities` / `summary` / `refusal` fields the function never returned (it returns `{ ok, issues }`). **Fixed:** *guard posture option is `compliancePosture:`, not `compliance:`* — Many `b.guard*` primitives documented the compliance-posture selector as `compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2"` in their `@opts`, but the family resolver reads `compliancePosture:`. Passing `{ compliance: "hipaa" }` was accepted and silently ignored — the posture overlay (e.g. CSV `piiPolicy: "redact"` under HIPAA) never applied, leaving the default policy in force. The docs across the guard family now name `compliancePosture:` consistently (the key the resolver and `b.guardX.compliancePosture(name)` already used). Action: if you selected a posture with `compliance:`, switch to `compliancePosture:` — the posture was not taking effect before. · *guard gate is an object with `.check(ctx)`, not a callable* — Several guards' gate `@example`s and prose invoked the gate as a function (`g({...})`), via `.run(...)`, or via `.inspect(...)`, and a few described it as "an async function". `b.guardX.gate(opts)` returns an object whose async method is `.check(ctx)`; the examples and prose now use `.check`, so they run as written. · *guard validate() returns `{ ok, issues }`* — Several guards documented `validate()` as returning `{ ok, issues, severities }`, `{ ok, issues, summary }`, or `{ ok, issues, refusal? }`. The function returns `{ ok, issues }` (each issue carries its own `severity` / `kind`); the documented extra top-level fields were never present. The docs now state the actual shape.
+
+- v0.13.23 (2026-05-28) — **Documentation corrected to match actual behavior across several primitives.** A set of JSDoc / doc-comment corrections where the documented contract had drifted from what the code does. No behavior changes — the implementations already behaved as now documented; only the docs were wrong. The most operator-relevant is the JWT signer doc: an expiring token signed without an explicit jti receives an auto-minted 128-bit jti (so the replay-defense path has the jti it needs), which the sign-opts doc previously denied. Also corrected: did.resolve's unsupported-method error now names did:jwk (always supported); b.cose.verify is marked stable to match its stable sign sibling and the CWT / EAT / SCITT / mdoc verifiers built on it; b.linkHeader.serialize's doc now states every parameter value is double-quoted; b.auth.saml verifyResponse's documented return shape now lists inResponseTo and issuer (both always returned); and the rate-limit custom-backend contract drops a gc member the middleware never invoked. **Fixed:** *JWT signer doc now describes the auto-minted jti on expiring tokens* — `b.auth.jwt.sign`'s opts doc claimed that omitting `jti` adds no jti. In fact, when a token carries an `exp` and no operator-supplied `jti`, the signer auto-mints a random 128-bit `jti` so a replay-protected token always carries the identifier `verify`'s replay store requires. The doc now describes this; pass an explicit `jti` for a deterministic value. Behavior is unchanged. · *`b.did.resolve` unsupported-method error now names did:jwk* — The thrown error for an unsupported DID method listed only `did:key` and `did:web`, omitting `did:jwk`, which `resolve` fully supports. The message now reads `(did:key, did:jwk, and did:web only)`. · *`b.cose.verify` marked stable* — `b.cose.verify` carried `@status experimental` while its `b.cose.sign` sibling is stable and the CWT / EAT / SCITT / mdoc verifiers that depend on it are stable and shipped. The verifier is the same maturity as the rest of the COSE_Sign1 round-trip; its status now reflects that. · *`b.linkHeader.serialize` doc matches its quoting behavior* — The doc said parameters are token-encoded when they fit RFC 7230 token grammar and double-quoted otherwise. The serializer always double-quotes every value (valid under RFC 8288, and required for space-separated multi-rel and media-type values). The doc now states that. · *`b.auth.saml` verifyResponse documented return shape lists all fields* — The prose and the example each omitted a different field that `verifyResponse` always returns. The documented shape now lists all of `nameId`, `nameIdFormat`, `sessionIndex`, `attributes`, `audience`, `inResponseTo`, and `issuer`. · *rate-limit custom-backend contract is `{ take, reset }`* — The custom-backend opts doc listed a `gc` member that the middleware never reads or invokes (the runtime contract is `take` / `reset` / `close`, and the error message already said `{ take, reset }`). The documented shape now matches; an operator-supplied `gc` was always silently ignored. · *`b.mail.agent.create` doc no longer lists consumer as a method* — The created agent's method list named `consumer`, which is not a method on the returned object — the queue consumer is the sibling export `b.mail.agent.consumer`. The doc now says so.
+
 - v0.13.22 (2026-05-27) — **`b.archive.read.zip.fromTrustedStream` reads a ZIP from a Readable — no longer an experimental stub.** fromTrustedStream was an experimental stub whose inspect / entries / extract methods threw, forcing callers to buffer the stream themselves and use the random-access reader. It now works, with the same shape as the tar trusted-stream reader: pass b.archive.adapters.trustedStream(readable) and the bytes are collected into a size-capped buffer (1 GiB hard ceiling) and read through the same bomb-cap, path-traversal, and entry-type decode as the random-access reader — so bombPolicy, guardProfile, entryTypePolicy, and audit all apply, and inspect / entries / extract / extractEntries all return data. This is a bounded-memory reader (the archive is held in memory under the ceiling), not zero-buffer streaming; a future forward-inflate walker shared with the tar reader would lift the ceiling. **Added:** *`b.archive.read.zip.fromTrustedStream` now reads — `inspect` / `entries` / `extract` / `extractEntries`* — The ZIP trusted-stream reader is implemented (was an experimental stub that threw). Pass `b.archive.adapters.trustedStream(readable)` to read a ZIP straight from a Node Readable without buffering it yourself. The stream is collected into a size-capped buffer (1 GiB ceiling, matching `b.archive.read.tar`'s trusted-stream reader) and decoded through the same adversarial-safe path as the random-access reader, so `bombPolicy` / `guardProfile` / `entryTypePolicy` / `audit` are honored on decode. Adversarial archives remain fully bomb-capped; "trusted" refers only to the source-size bound. A non-trusted-stream adapter is refused with `archive-read/bad-adapter`.
 
 - v0.13.21 (2026-05-27) — **`b.cose.exportKey` — serialize a public key as a COSE_Key, the inverse of `b.cose.importKey`.** b.cose could import a COSE_Key (RFC 9052 §7) into a node:crypto key for verification, but had no way to produce one — so a key used with b.cose.sign could not be shipped to a verifier in COSE form without hand-building the CBOR map. b.cose.exportKey(keyObject, opts?) closes the round-trip: it serializes an EC2 (P-256 / P-384 / P-521) or OKP (Ed25519) public key as the CBOR-encoded COSE_Key map, with optional alg and kid common parameters. A private key has its public half exported; unsupported curves / key types are refused rather than emitting a COSE_Key no verifier here would accept. The bytes round-trip through b.cose.importKey, and feed the mdoc MSO / COSE_Key header / SCITT / C2PA verification-key paths. **Added:** *`b.cose.exportKey(keyObject, { alg?, kid? })` — KeyObject → COSE_Key (RFC 9052 §7)* — Serialize a `node:crypto` public key as the CBOR-encoded COSE_Key map — the inverse of `b.cose.importKey`. Supports EC2 (P-256 / P-384 / P-521) and OKP (Ed25519), the same key types `b.cose.verify` accepts; `opts.alg` (e.g. `"ES256"`) and `opts.kid` populate the COSE_Key alg (label 3) and kid (label 2) common parameters. A private key exports its public half; unsupported curves / key types throw rather than producing a COSE_Key no verifier would accept. `b.cose.importKey(b.cbor.decode(exportKey(k)))` round-trips, so a key signed with `b.cose.sign` can be shipped to a verifier as bytes — the mdoc MSO / COSE_Key header / SCITT / C2PA verification-key paths.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/api-snapshot.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 1,
-  "frameworkVersion": "0.13.22",
-  "createdAt": "2026-05-27T23:32:55.833Z",
+  "frameworkVersion": "0.13.24",
+  "createdAt": "2026-05-28T08:46:52.303Z",
   "exports": {
     "a2a": {
       "type": "object",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/archive-wrap.js

@@ -370,7 +370,7 @@ function sniffEnvelope(bytes) {
  * @signature b.archive.wrapWithPassphrase(bytes, opts)
  * @since     0.12.11
  * @status    stable
- * @related   b.archive.unwrapWithPassphrase, b.archive.wrap, b.backupCrypto
+ * @related   b.archive.unwrapWithPassphrase, b.archive.wrap
  *
  * Wrap archive bytes in a passphrase-derived envelope. The envelope
  * wire format is the framework's standard Argon2id (RFC 9106) +

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/auth/jwt.js

@@ -48,10 +48,13 @@
  *   subject:      claims.sub override
  *   expiresInSec: relative exp (claims.exp = now + expiresInSec)
  *   notBeforeSec: relative nbf (claims.nbf = now + notBeforeSec)
- *   jti:          claims.jti override (string; if missing, no jti is added —
- *                  the framework doesn't auto-mint without an operator request
- *                  since jti has uniqueness/replay-tracking semantics that
- *                  belong at the application layer)
+ *   jti:          claims.jti override (string). When omitted, a random
+ *                  128-bit jti is auto-minted if (and only if) the token
+ *                  carries an exp — so a replay-protected token always
+ *                  has the jti the verifier's replay store requires,
+ *                  closing the silent hole where a sign without jti would
+ *                  never replay-protect. Pass an explicit jti for a
+ *                  deterministic value.
  *   now:          test-time clock injection (epoch milliseconds)
  *
  * Verify opts:

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/auth/saml.js

@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ function create(opts) {
    * (Response-level OR Assertion-level signature), the assertion's
    * SubjectConfirmation Bearer constraints, and Conditions audience
    * + time bounds. Returns `{ nameId, nameIdFormat, sessionIndex,
-   * attributes, audience, inResponseTo }`.
+   * attributes, audience, inResponseTo, issuer }`.
    *
    * @opts
    *   {
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ function create(opts) {
    *     var info = sp.verifyResponse(req.body.SAMLResponse, {
    *       expectedInResponseTo: req.session.samlRequestId,
    *     });
-   *     // → { nameId, nameIdFormat, sessionIndex, attributes, audience, issuer }
+   *     // → { nameId, nameIdFormat, sessionIndex, attributes, audience, inResponseTo, issuer }
    *   });
    */
   function verifyResponse(samlResponseB64, vopts) {

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/cose.js

@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ async function sign(payload, opts) {
  * @primitive b.cose.verify
  * @signature b.cose.verify(coseSign1, opts)
  * @since     0.12.33
- * @status    experimental
+ * @status    stable
  * @related   b.cose.sign, b.cbor.decode
  *
  * Verify a COSE_Sign1 (RFC 9052) and return its payload + headers.

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/did.js

@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ function resolve(did, opts) {
     return { didDocument: docW, verificationMethods: _extractVerificationMethods(docW) };
   }
 
-  throw new DidError("did/unsupported-method", "did.resolve: unsupported DID method '" + parsed.method + "' (did:key and did:web only)");
+  throw new DidError("did/unsupported-method", "did.resolve: unsupported DID method '" + parsed.method + "' (did:key, did:jwk, and did:web only)");
 }
 
 // Import a publicKeyJwk after allowlisting its kty/crv — a DID document

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-archive.js

@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ function _detectIssues(entries, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   traversalPolicy:                "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   absolutePathPolicy:             "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   symlinkPolicy:                  "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ function validateEntries(entries, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,
  *   ...:        any validateEntries opt
  *

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-auth.js

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
  *
  *   Profiles: `strict` / `balanced` / `permissive`. Compliance postures:
  *   `hipaa` / `pci-dss` / `gdpr` / `soc2`. Operators select via
- *   `{ profile: "strict" }` or `{ compliance: "hipaa" }`; postures
+ *   `{ profile: "strict" }` or `{ compliancePosture: "hipaa" }`; postures
  *   overlay on the profile baseline.
  *
  * @card
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ function _detectIssues(bundle, opts) {
  * @compliance hipaa, pci-dss, gdpr, soc2
  * @related    b.guardAuth.sanitize, b.guardAuth.gate, b.guardJwt.validate, b.guardOauth.validate
  *
- * Inspect an auth-bundle object and return `{ ok, issues, summary }`.
+ * Inspect an auth-bundle object and return `{ ok, issues }`.
  * Each issue carries `{ kind, severity, ruleId, source, snippet }`
  * with severity in `"warn"|"high"|"critical"` and `source` tagging
  * the sub-guard that raised it (`"jwt"` / `"oauth"` / `"cookies"` /
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ function _detectIssues(bundle, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:           "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:        "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   childProfile:      "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",   // forwarded to guardJwt / guardOauth
  *   requireAtLeastOne: boolean,
  *   allowedRedirectUris: string[],   // forwarded to guardOauth
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *
  * @example
  *   var clean = b.guardAuth.sanitize({
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,    // gate identity for audit / observability
  *   childProfile: "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
  *   allowedRedirectUris: string[],

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-cidr.js

@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  * @compliance hipaa, pci-dss, gdpr, soc2
  * @related    b.guardCidr.sanitize, b.guardCidr.gate
  *
- * Inspect a CIDR notation string and return `{ ok, issues, summary }`.
+ * Inspect a CIDR notation string and return `{ ok, issues }`.
  * Each issue carries `{ kind, severity, ruleId, snippet }` with
  * severity in `"warn"|"high"|"critical"`. Detected: malformed address
  * shape, octet-out-of-range, mask-out-of-range, network-address
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   family:     "either"|"ipv4-only"|"ipv6-only",
  *   networkAlignmentPolicy: "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   reservedRangesPolicy:   "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *
  * @example
  *   var safe = b.guardCidr.sanitize("2001:DB8::/32", { profile: "permissive" });
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,    // gate identity for audit / observability
  *   family:     "either"|"ipv4-only"|"ipv6-only",
  *

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-csv.js

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
  *   Profiles: `strict` / `balanced` / `permissive` /
  *   `email-attachment`. Compliance postures: `hipaa` / `pci-dss` /
  *   `gdpr` / `soc2`. Operators select via `{ profile: "strict" }` or
- *   `{ compliance: "hipaa" }`; postures overlay on top of the
+ *   `{ compliancePosture: "hipaa" }`; postures overlay on top of the
  *   profile baseline.
  *
  *   Threat-detection regex literals are composed programmatically
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ function schema(spec) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive"|"email-attachment",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   headers:    string[]|false,    // explicit column order; false suppresses header row
  *   delimiter:  string,            // default ","
  *   lineEnding: string,            // default "\r\n"
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ function serialize(rows, opts) {
  * @related    b.guardCsv.sanitize, b.guardCsv.gate
  *
  * Inspect `input` (string or Buffer of CSV text) and return
- * `{ ok, issues, summary }`. Each issue carries `{ kind, severity,
+ * `{ ok, issues }`. Each issue carries `{ kind, severity,
  * ruleId, location, snippet }` with severity in
  * `"warn"|"high"|"critical"`. Detected: BOM mid-stream, Unicode
  * bidi override (CVE-2021-42574), C0 control char, null byte,
@@ -813,7 +813,7 @@ function serialize(rows, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive"|"email-attachment",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   bidiCharPolicy:        "reject"|"strip"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   controlCharPolicy:     "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
  *   nullByteHandling:      "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
@@ -860,7 +860,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive"|"email-attachment",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   bidiCharPolicy:    "reject"|"strip"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   controlCharPolicy: "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
  *   nullByteHandling:  "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ function detect(input) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive"|"email-attachment",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,    // gate identity for audit / observability
  *   operatorRules: [{ id: string, severity: "warn"|"high"|"critical",
  *                    detect: function, reason: string }],

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-domain.js

@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  * @compliance hipaa, pci-dss, gdpr, soc2
  * @related    b.guardDomain.sanitize, b.guardDomain.gate
  *
- * Inspect a domain-name string and return `{ ok, issues, summary }`.
+ * Inspect a domain-name string and return `{ ok, issues }`.
  * Each issue carries `{ kind, severity, ruleId, snippet }` with
  * severity in `"warn"|"high"|"critical"`. Detected: domain/label
  * length cap (RFC 1035 §2.3.4), LDH violation, IDN A-label
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   ldhPolicy:           "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   punycodePolicy:      "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   mixedScriptPolicy:   "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *
  * @example
  *   var safe = b.guardDomain.sanitize("Example.Com.", { profile: "balanced" });
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,    // gate identity for audit / observability
  *
  * @example

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-email.js

@@ -840,9 +840,10 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  * @status    stable
  * @related   b.guardEmail.validateMessage, b.guardEmail.sanitize, b.guardAll.gate
  *
- * Build a guard gate function compatible with the `b.guardAll` family
- * dispatch. The returned async gate accepts a request-shaped context,
- * runs `validateMessage` against the extracted bytes, and returns
+ * Build a guard gate compatible with the `b.guardAll` family
+ * dispatch. The returned gate's async `check(ctx)` method accepts a
+ * request-shaped context, runs `validateMessage` against the extracted
+ * bytes, and returns
  * `{ ok, action, issues? }` where `action` is `serve` (no issues),
  * `audit-only` (warn-level), or `refuse` (high / critical severity).
  *
@@ -854,11 +855,11 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  * @example
  *   var guardEmail = require("./lib/guard-email");
  *   var g = guardEmail.gate({ profile: "strict" });
- *   typeof g;               // → "function"
+ *   typeof g.check;         // → "function"
  *
  *   var msg = "From: alice@example.com\r\nTo: bob@example.com\r\n" +
  *             "Subject: hi\r\nDate: Mon, 5 May 2026 10:00:00 +0000\r\n\r\nbody\r\n";
- *   g({ body: Buffer.from(msg, "utf8") }).then(function (rv) {
+ *   g.check({ body: Buffer.from(msg, "utf8") }).then(function (rv) {
  *     rv.action;            // → "serve"
  *   });
  */

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-filename.js

@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ function _sanitize(input, opts) {
  * @related    b.guardFilename.sanitize, b.guardFilename.gate
  *
  * Inspect a filename (string or Buffer) and return
- * `{ ok, issues, summary }`. Each issue carries
+ * `{ ok, issues }`. Each issue carries
  * `{ kind, severity, ruleId, location, snippet }` with severity in
  * `"warn"|"high"|"critical"`. Detected: path-traversal raw and
  * percent-encoded, null-byte truncation, NTFS ADS, UNC path,
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ function _sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   bidiPolicy:           "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
  *   controlPolicy:        "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
  *   nullBytePolicy:       "reject",                       // always reject
@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ function _sanitizeStripMode(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   mode:       "enforce"|"strip",
  *   audit:      { safeEmit: function },     // optional sink for strip mode
  *   unicodeNormalization: "NFC"|null,
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,    // gate identity for audit / observability
  *
  * @example

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-graphql.js

@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ function _detectIssues(req, opts) {
  * @related    b.guardGraphql.sanitize, b.guardGraphql.gate
  *
  * Apply the full guard-graphql threat catalog to a request bundle
- * (or batch array). Returns `{ ok, issues, refusal? }` per
+ * (or batch array). Returns `{ ok, issues }` per
  * `gateContract.aggregateIssues`. Detected classes include
  * `query-missing`, `query-cap`, `variables-cap`, `request-cap`,
  * `batch-size`, `introspection`, `persisted-query-missing`,
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ function _detectIssues(req, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                 "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:              "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   introspectionPolicy:     "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   persistedQueryPolicy:    "require"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   operationNamePolicy:     "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   ...:        every guardGraphql.validate opt is honored,
  *
  * @example
@@ -573,13 +573,13 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,            // gate label for audit trails
  *   ...:        every guardGraphql.validate opt is honored,
  *
  * @example
  *   var gqlGate = b.guardGraphql.gate({ profile: "strict" });
- *   var rv = await gqlGate.run({
+ *   var rv = await gqlGate.check({
  *     graphqlRequest: {
  *       query: "{ a:me { id } b:me { id } c:me { id } d:me { id } " +
  *              "e:me { id } f:me { id } g:me { id } h:me { id } " +

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-html.js

@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  * Returns a guard descriptor that plugs into the framework's
  * content-safety wiring (`b.fileUpload.contentSafety` /
  * `b.staticServe.contentSafety` / `b.guardAll`). The descriptor's
- * `inspect(ctx)` resolves to one of four actions: `serve` (no
+ * `check(ctx)` resolves to one of four actions: `serve` (no
  * issues), `audit-only` (low-severity issues observed), `sanitize`
  * (sanitized buffer attached when no policy is "reject"), or
  * `refuse` (critical issue with at least one reject-policy active).
@@ -1057,7 +1057,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  *   // Refuse on tag-budget exceeded — strict profile rejects <script>.
  *   var hostileBuf = Buffer.from("<p>hi</p><script>alert(1)</script>", "utf8");
- *   var rv = await g.inspect({ bytes: hostileBuf, contentType: "text/html" });
+ *   var rv = await g.check({ bytes: hostileBuf, contentType: "text/html" });
  *   rv.ok;       // → false
  *   rv.action;   // → "refuse"
  */

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-image.js

@@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,
  *   ...:        any validate opt
  *

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-json.js

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
  *
  *   Profiles: `strict` / `balanced` / `permissive`. Compliance
  *   postures: `hipaa` / `pci-dss` / `gdpr` / `soc2`. Operators select
- *   via `{ profile: "strict" }` or `{ compliance: "hipaa" }`;
+ *   via `{ profile: "strict" }` or `{ compliancePosture: "hipaa" }`;
  *   postures overlay on top of the profile baseline.
  *
  *   Source files MUST be pure ASCII; threat-detection regexes
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ function _stripPollutionTree(value, opts, depth) {
  *
  * Inspect `input` (string of JSON source) for the full guard-json
  * threat catalog without committing to a parsed value. Returns
- * `{ ok, issues, severities }` where `issues` is the aggregated
+ * `{ ok, issues }` where `issues` is the aggregated
  * detector output — every prototype-pollution key, depth/breadth
  * cap hit, duplicate-key smuggle, JSON5-quirk match, BOM placement,
  * unicode threat, and numeric-precision-loss candidate is reported
@@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ function _stripPollutionTree(value, opts, depth) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                  "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:               "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   pollutionPolicy:          "reject"|"strip"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   duplicateKeyPolicy:       "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   nanInfinityPolicy:        "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   pollutionPolicy: "reject"|"strip"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   bomPolicy:       "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
  *   controlPolicy:   "reject"|"strip"|"allow",
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ function _policyKeyForRuleId(ruleId) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,    // gate identity for audit / observability
  *
  * @example

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-jsonpath.js

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
  *   Profiles: `strict` / `balanced` / `permissive`. Compliance
  *   postures: `hipaa` / `pci-dss` / `gdpr` / `soc2`. Operators
  *   select via `{ profile: "strict" }` or
- *   `{ compliance: "hipaa" }`; postures overlay on top of the
+ *   `{ compliancePosture: "hipaa" }`; postures overlay on top of the
  *   profile baseline. Filter / script / dynamic-hint refusal holds
  *   at every profile — the RCE class is never an operator opt-in.
  *
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   bidiPolicy:             "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   controlPolicy:          "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   nullBytePolicy:         "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   filterExprPolicy:       "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   scriptExprPolicy:       "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   dynamicHintPolicy:      "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:                "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:             "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:                   string,    // override gate name in audit emissions
  *   filterExprPolicy:       "reject"|"audit"|"allow",
  *   scriptExprPolicy:       "reject"|"audit"|"allow",

package/lib/vendor/blamejs/lib/guard-jwt.js

@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  * @related    b.guardJwt.sanitize, b.guardJwt.gate
  *
  * Apply the full guard-jwt threat catalog to a JWT compact-
- * serialization string. Returns `{ ok, issues, refusal? }` per
+ * serialization string. Returns `{ ok, issues }` per
  * `gateContract.aggregateIssues`. Detected classes include
  * `alg-none` (always critical), `kid-traversal` (always critical),
  * `alg-not-allowed`, `typ-confusion`, `crit-unknown`, `exp-past`,
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ function _detectIssues(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:              "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance:           "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   allowedAlgs:          string[],
  *   requiredClaims:       string[],
  *   knownCrit:            string[],
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ function validate(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   ...:        every guardJwt.validate opt is honored,
  *
  * @example
@@ -573,13 +573,13 @@ function sanitize(input, opts) {
  *
  * @opts
  *   profile:    "strict"|"balanced"|"permissive",
- *   compliance: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
+ *   compliancePosture: "hipaa"|"pci-dss"|"gdpr"|"soc2",
  *   name:       string,            // gate label for audit trails
  *   ...:        every guardJwt.validate opt is honored,
  *
  * @example
  *   var jwtGate = b.guardJwt.gate({ profile: "strict" });
- *   var rv = await jwtGate.run({
+ *   var rv = await jwtGate.check({
  *     identifier:
  *       "eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0." +
  *       "eyJzdWIiOiJhdHRhY2tlciJ9.",