@bevel-software/platform-core-backend 0.7.5 → 0.9.0

package/src/modules/tool-manuals/mcp-server-edit.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
+import path from 'node:path';
+import {
+  DEFAULT_BRANCH,
+  HEXIS_EXTENSION_NS,
+  PLUGINS_DIR,
+  PLUGIN_MANIFEST_FILE,
+  PLUGIN_MCP_FILE,
+  type AuthUser,
+} from '@bevel-software/platform-shared';
+import { workspaceIdForBranch, type WorkspaceService } from '../workspace/workspace.service.js';
+import { validatedVariables } from './mcp-json-discovery.js';
+import { assertSafeFetchUrl } from '../../shared/ssrf.js';
+import { containsVariableReference, findReservedVariableRef } from '../../shared/variable-refs.js';
+import type { IAccessControl } from '../access/access-control.interface.js';
+import type { IToolManualService, ToolVariable } from './tool-manuals.contract.js';
+
+/**
+ * Server-scoped editing of one MCP server — the form the tool page uses
+ * instead of dropping a writer into raw `mcp.json`.
+ *
+ * One server's truth spans TWO files (the spec's split, not ours): the
+ * portable half in `mcp.json` (transport, url, literal headers) and our half
+ * in `plugin.json`'s `extensions["software.bevel.hexis"].mcpServers[<name>]`
+ * (auth headers carrying `${VAR}` vault references, variable declarations,
+ * description, `local`). This service is the ONE writer that keeps the two in
+ * step: a save rewrites both entries and commits them together, because a
+ * server whose auth landed without its url — or the reverse — is a broken
+ * tool with no author to blame.
+ *
+ * RENAME IS DESTRUCTIVE BY DESIGN and the route says so: the `mcpServers` key
+ * is the namespace vault secrets bind to (`<name>_<VAR>`), so renaming a
+ * server orphans every configured secret and completed sign-in under the old
+ * key. The frontend counts what disconnects (it already holds per-variable
+ * status) and confirms; this service just refuses a rename onto a taken key.
+ */
+
+export type McpTransport = 'streamable-http' | 'sse' | 'stdio';
+
+export interface McpServerView {
+  name: string;
+  transport: McpTransport;
+  url?: string;
+  command?: string;
+  args?: string[];
+  cwd?: string;
+  env?: Record<string, string>;
+  /** Portable headers, stored in mcp.json. Never carry a `${VAR}`. */
+  literalHeaders: Record<string, string>;
+  /** Auth headers with vault references, stored in the extensions block. */
+  authHeaders: Record<string, string>;
+  variables: ToolVariable[];
+  description?: string;
+  local: boolean;
+  canWrite: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * PATCH semantics, field by field: `undefined` means "the client did not
+ * surface this field" and the stored value survives; a present-but-empty
+ * value (`{}`, `[]`, `''`) is an explicit clear. A full-replace contract
+ * would make every client responsible for echoing back fields it does not
+ * edit — and the one that forgot would silently destroy the literal headers
+ * in mcp.json or the variable declarations behind `${VAR}` references.
+ */
+export interface McpServerWrite {
+  newName?: string;
+  transport: McpTransport;
+  url?: string;
+  command?: string;
+  args?: string[];
+  cwd?: string;
+  env?: Record<string, string>;
+  literalHeaders?: Record<string, string>;
+  authHeaders?: Record<string, string>;
+  variables?: ToolVariable[];
+  description?: string;
+  local?: boolean;
+}
+
+export class McpServerEditError extends Error {
+  constructor(
+    message: string,
+    readonly status: number,
+  ) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'McpServerEditError';
+  }
+}
+
+/** Same shape the discovery accepts: the key is a namespace, not prose. */
+const SERVER_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]*$/;
+
+// The substitutor's own grammar (shared/variable-refs.ts) decides what is a
+// reference: `${A-B}` is not (stays a literal header), `$5` is (digit-leading
+// names are legal). The migration's header split applies the same predicate.
+const hasVarRef = containsVariableReference;
+
+function isRecord(v: unknown): v is Record<string, unknown> {
+  return typeof v === 'object' && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The same reserved-reference policy discovery enforces, applied at SAVE: a
+ * `${…API_URL}`/`${…CONNECTION_KEY}` persisted here would make discovery drop
+ * the server on its next scan — an editor that can save self-invalidating
+ * config is worse than a 422 naming the reference. The same shared grammar
+ * both sides scan with is what makes "saveable" and "discoverable" agree.
+ */
+const findReservedRef = findReservedVariableRef;
+
+interface CommitDriver {
+  runPendingCommit(
+    workspaceId: string,
+    branch: string,
+    targetPath: string,
+    user: AuthUser,
+    opts?: { systemAuthorized?: boolean },
+  ): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+export class McpServerEditService {
+  constructor(
+    private readonly workspaceService: WorkspaceService,
+    private readonly commits: CommitDriver,
+    private readonly accessControl: IAccessControl,
+    private readonly toolManuals: IToolManualService,
+    private readonly kbDirName: string,
+  ) {}
+
+  /** The merged view of one server, or null when unknown/unreadable (indistinguishable, fail closed). */
+  async getServer(userEmail: string, slug: string): Promise<McpServerView | null> {
+    const located = await this.locate(userEmail, slug);
+    if (!located) return null;
+    const { folder, name, wsId, mcpJsonPath } = located;
+    const { mcp, manifest } = await this.readFiles(folder);
+    const entry = (mcp?.mcpServers as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.[name];
+    if (!entry || typeof entry !== 'object') return null;
+    const raw = entry as Record<string, unknown>;
+    const ext = this.extensionEntry(manifest, name);
+    return {
+      name,
+      transport: (raw.type as McpTransport) ?? 'streamable-http',
+      ...(typeof raw.url === 'string' ? { url: raw.url } : {}),
+      ...(typeof raw.command === 'string' ? { command: raw.command } : {}),
+      ...(Array.isArray(raw.args) ? { args: raw.args.map(String) } : {}),
+      ...(typeof raw.cwd === 'string' ? { cwd: raw.cwd } : {}),
+      ...(raw.env && typeof raw.env === 'object' ? { env: raw.env as Record<string, string> } : {}),
+      // Shape-checked, not merely null-coalesced: both files are hand-editable
+      // knowledge-base content, and a string where an object/array belongs
+      // would flow into the form's Object.entries/`.map` as nonsense.
+      literalHeaders: isRecord(raw.headers) ? (raw.headers as Record<string, string>) : {},
+      authHeaders: isRecord(ext.headers) ? (ext.headers as Record<string, string>) : {},
+      variables: Array.isArray(ext.variables) ? (ext.variables as ToolVariable[]) : [],
+      ...(typeof ext.description === 'string' ? { description: ext.description } : {}),
+      local: ext.local === true || raw.type === 'stdio',
+      canWrite: await this.accessControl.canWrite(wsId, userEmail, mcpJsonPath),
+    };
+  }
+
+  /** Rewrite one server across both files, in one commit. Returns the (possibly new) name. */
+  async putServer(user: AuthUser, slug: string, write: McpServerWrite): Promise<{ name: string }> {
+    const located = await this.locate(user.email, slug);
+    if (!located) throw new McpServerEditError('No such tool.', 404);
+    const { folder, name, wsId, mcpJsonPath } = located;
+    if (!(await this.accessControl.canWrite(wsId, user.email, mcpJsonPath))) {
+      throw new McpServerEditError("You don't have permission to edit this plugin's servers.", 403);
+    }
+    const { mcp, manifest, mcpAbs, manifestAbs } = await this.readFiles(folder);
+    if (!mcp?.mcpServers || typeof mcp.mcpServers !== 'object') {
+      throw new McpServerEditError(`${PLUGIN_MCP_FILE} is missing or unparsable — fix the file first.`, 422);
+    }
+    const servers = mcp.mcpServers as Record<string, unknown>;
+    if (!(name in servers)) throw new McpServerEditError('No such server.', 404);
+
+    if (write.transport !== 'streamable-http' && write.transport !== 'sse' && write.transport !== 'stdio') {
+      // Persisting an unknown transport would save an entry discovery then
+      // refuses — an unusable server with no error at the moment it was made.
+      throw new McpServerEditError(`Unknown transport "${String(write.transport)}".`, 422);
+    }
+    // The EFFECTIVE value of every field, PATCH-over-stored (see
+    // McpServerWrite): `undefined` keeps what the files already say, a
+    // present value — empty included — replaces it.
+    const prior = isRecord(servers[name]) ? (servers[name] as Record<string, unknown>) : {};
+    const priorExt = this.extensionEntry(manifest, name);
+    const url = write.url ?? (typeof prior.url === 'string' ? prior.url : undefined);
+    const command = write.command ?? (typeof prior.command === 'string' ? prior.command : undefined);
+    const args = write.args ?? (Array.isArray(prior.args) ? prior.args.map(String) : undefined);
+    const env = write.env ?? (isRecord(prior.env) ? (prior.env as Record<string, string>) : undefined);
+    const cwd = write.cwd ?? (typeof prior.cwd === 'string' ? prior.cwd : undefined);
+    const literalIn =
+      write.literalHeaders ?? (isRecord(prior.headers) ? (prior.headers as Record<string, string>) : {});
+    const authIn =
+      write.authHeaders ?? (isRecord(priorExt.headers) ? (priorExt.headers as Record<string, string>) : {});
+    // RAW on the stored side, no shape fallback: coercing malformed stored
+    // declarations to [] here would let a save that never touched variables
+    // silently CLEAR them — the validator below owes that case a 422, same
+    // as any other malformed input.
+    const variablesIn = write.variables ?? priorExt.variables;
+    // Discovery's OWN validator, at save time (like the reserved-ref check
+    // below): a malformed declaration — bad name, duplicate, re-declared
+    // platform name, oauth on a shared scope or with a broken provider —
+    // persisted here would make discovery drop the whole server on its next
+    // scan. What comes back is the normalized form discovery would read, and
+    // that is what gets stored.
+    const variables = validatedVariables(variablesIn);
+    if (variables === null) {
+      throw new McpServerEditError(
+        'The `variables` declaration is malformed — each entry needs a unique, non-reserved ' +
+          'alphanumeric/underscore name, a scope of `admin` or `user`, and any `oauth` block must sit ' +
+          'on a `user`-scoped variable with valid https provider URLs and a client id.',
+        422,
+      );
+    }
+    const description =
+      write.description ?? (typeof priorExt.description === 'string' ? priorExt.description : undefined);
+    const local = write.local ?? (priorExt.local === true);
+
+    // The WHOLE writable surface, mirroring what discovery scans — effective
+    // values, not just the incoming patch: a reserved ref smuggled through a
+    // stdio arg (`--url=${X_API_URL}`), env value, cwd or description would
+    // save with a 200 and then vanish from the catalog on the next scan —
+    // the exact self-invalidating state this 422 prevents.
+    const reservedRef = findReservedRef({
+      url,
+      command,
+      args,
+      env,
+      cwd,
+      description,
+      literalHeaders: literalIn,
+      authHeaders: authIn,
+      variables,
+    });
+    if (reservedRef !== null) {
+      throw new McpServerEditError(
+        `"${reservedRef}" references a platform-seeded variable (API_URL / CONNECTION_KEY) — ` +
+          'discovery refuses servers that name them, so this cannot be saved.',
+        422,
+      );
+    }
+    const target = write.newName?.trim() || name;
+    if (!SERVER_NAME_RE.test(target)) {
+      throw new McpServerEditError(
+        'A server name is its secret namespace: lowercase alphanumeric with `_`/`-`.',
+        422,
+      );
+    }
+    if (target !== name && target in servers) {
+      throw new McpServerEditError(`A server named "${target}" already exists here.`, 409);
+    }
+
+    // Defense in depth on the portable file: a `${VAR}` in mcp.json would be
+    // transmitted literally by a conformant client AND violate the spec's
+    // no-credentials rule — reroute it to the extensions block instead of
+    // trusting the frontend's split.
+    const literal: Record<string, string> = {};
+    const auth: Record<string, string> = { ...authIn };
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(literalIn)) {
+      if (hasVarRef(v)) auth[k] = v;
+      else literal[k] = v;
+    }
+
+    let entry: Record<string, unknown>;
+    if (write.transport === 'stdio') {
+      const cmd = command?.trim();
+      if (!cmd) throw new McpServerEditError('A stdio server needs a command.', 422);
+      entry = {
+        type: 'stdio',
+        command: cmd,
+        ...(args && args.length > 0 ? { args } : {}),
+        ...(env && Object.keys(env).length > 0 ? { env } : {}),
+        ...(cwd ? { cwd } : {}),
+      };
+    } else {
+      let parsed: URL;
+      try {
+        parsed = new URL(url ?? '');
+      } catch {
+        throw new McpServerEditError('The server needs a valid http(s) URL.', 422);
+      }
+      if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') {
+        throw new McpServerEditError('The server needs a valid http(s) URL.', 422);
+      }
+      // The same SSRF gate discovery applies on read: without it here, a save
+      // succeeds and the server then silently disappears from the catalog —
+      // an edit flow that eats its own output. Local-only servers are exempt;
+      // loopback is what local means.
+      if (local !== true) {
+        try {
+          assertSafeFetchUrl(url ?? '', { label: 'Server URL' });
+        } catch (err) {
+          throw new McpServerEditError(
+            `${err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'The URL is not reachable from the workspace'} — ` +
+              'mark the server local-only if it is deliberately private.',
+            422,
+          );
+        }
+      }
+      entry = {
+        type: write.transport,
+        url,
+        ...(Object.keys(literal).length > 0 ? { headers: literal } : {}),
+      };
+    }
+
+    if (target !== name) delete servers[name];
+    servers[target] = entry;
+
+    // The extensions half: rewrite our entry, drop the old key on rename.
+    // A missing/unparsable manifest refuses the save when there is auth to
+    // store — silently dropping a credential mapping is worse than an error.
+    const extEntry = {
+      ...(Object.keys(auth).length > 0 ? { headers: auth } : {}),
+      ...(variables.length > 0 ? { variables } : {}),
+      ...(description ? { description } : {}),
+      ...(local === true && write.transport !== 'stdio' ? { local: true } : {}),
+    };
+    if (manifest === null && Object.keys(extEntry).length > 0) {
+      throw new McpServerEditError(`${PLUGIN_MANIFEST_FILE} is missing or unparsable — fix the file first.`, 422);
+    }
+    if (manifest !== null) {
+      // A wrong-TYPED extensions chain (a string, an array) would throw a
+      // TypeError below and surface as a 500. It is also not ours to silently
+      // replace: an array `extensions` may be another tool's data, malformed
+      // or not, and a save aimed at one server should not discard it.
+      const badShape = (v: unknown): boolean => v !== undefined && (typeof v !== 'object' || v === null || Array.isArray(v));
+      const ext = (manifest.extensions ??= {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
+      if (badShape(manifest.extensions)) {
+        throw new McpServerEditError(`${PLUGIN_MANIFEST_FILE} has a malformed \`extensions\` block — fix the file first.`, 422);
+      }
+      if (badShape(ext[HEXIS_EXTENSION_NS]) || badShape((ext[HEXIS_EXTENSION_NS] as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.mcpServers)) {
+        throw new McpServerEditError(`${PLUGIN_MANIFEST_FILE} has a malformed \`extensions\` block — fix the file first.`, 422);
+      }
+      const ns = (ext[HEXIS_EXTENSION_NS] ??= {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
+      const extServers = (ns.mcpServers ??= {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
+      delete extServers[name];
+      if (Object.keys(extEntry).length > 0) extServers[target] = extEntry;
+    }
+
+    // All-or-nothing for real: snapshot both files first, and on ANY failure
+    // past the first write put the originals back — the API reporting failure
+    // while the workspace keeps half the edit is the state this exists to
+    // prevent.
+    // Rollback scope is the WRITES only. A failed write restores both files
+    // (a half-written pair is the state this exists to prevent); a failed
+    // COMMIT must not — the pending-commit pipeline may already have created
+    // a local commit before the push refused, and rewriting the working tree
+    // to pre-edit bytes would leave it dirty AGAINST that commit, a state the
+    // workflow layer's own pull-rebase recovery then misreads. Commit-stage
+    // failures propagate as-is and the pipeline's recovery owns the cleanup.
+    const [mcpBefore, manifestBefore] = await Promise.all([
+      fs.readFile(mcpAbs, 'utf8').catch(() => null),
+      fs.readFile(manifestAbs, 'utf8').catch(() => null),
+    ]);
+    try {
+      await fs.writeFile(mcpAbs, `${JSON.stringify(mcp, null, 2)}\n`, 'utf8');
+      if (manifest !== null) {
+        await fs.writeFile(manifestAbs, `${JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2)}\n`, 'utf8');
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (mcpBefore !== null) await fs.writeFile(mcpAbs, mcpBefore, 'utf8').catch(() => {});
+      if (manifestBefore !== null) await fs.writeFile(manifestAbs, manifestBefore, 'utf8').catch(() => {});
+      throw err;
+    }
+    // One folder-scoped commit, ungated beyond the caller's own write access —
+    // both files or neither. The catalog cache is stale the moment it lands.
+    await this.commits.runPendingCommit(
+      workspaceIdForBranch(DEFAULT_BRANCH),
+      DEFAULT_BRANCH,
+      `${this.kbDirName}/${PLUGINS_DIR}/${folder}`,
+      user,
+    );
+    this.toolManuals.invalidate();
+    return { name: target };
+  }
+
+  /** Resolve a slug to an mcp.json-backed server the caller can READ; null otherwise. */
+  private async locate(
+    userEmail: string,
+    slug: string,
+  ): Promise<{ folder: string; name: string; wsId: string; mcpJsonPath: string } | null> {
+    const summaries = await this.toolManuals.listAccessible(userEmail);
+    const found = summaries.find((s) => s.slug === slug);
+    if (!found || found.type !== 'mcp' || !found.path.endsWith(`/${PLUGIN_MCP_FILE}`)) return null;
+    const segments = found.path.split('/');
+    const folder = segments[1];
+    if (!folder) return null;
+    return {
+      folder,
+      name: found.name,
+      wsId: workspaceIdForBranch(DEFAULT_BRANCH),
+      mcpJsonPath: found.path,
+    };
+  }
+
+  private async readFiles(folder: string): Promise<{
+    mcp: Record<string, unknown> | null;
+    manifest: Record<string, unknown> | null;
+    mcpAbs: string;
+    manifestAbs: string;
+  }> {
+    const wsId = workspaceIdForBranch(DEFAULT_BRANCH);
+    await this.workspaceService.getOrCreateForBranch(DEFAULT_BRANCH);
+    const wsDir = await this.workspaceService.getWorkspacePath(wsId);
+    const pluginDir = path.join(wsDir, this.kbDirName, PLUGINS_DIR, folder);
+    const mcpAbs = path.join(pluginDir, PLUGIN_MCP_FILE);
+    const manifestAbs = path.join(pluginDir, PLUGIN_MANIFEST_FILE);
+    return {
+      mcp: await readJson(mcpAbs),
+      manifest: await readJson(manifestAbs),
+      mcpAbs,
+      manifestAbs,
+    };
+  }
+
+  private extensionEntry(manifest: Record<string, unknown> | null, name: string): Record<string, unknown> {
+    const ns = (manifest?.extensions as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.[HEXIS_EXTENSION_NS];
+    const servers = (ns as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.mcpServers;
+    const entry = (servers as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.[name];
+    return entry && typeof entry === 'object' ? (entry as Record<string, unknown>) : {};
+  }
+}
+
+async function readJson(p: string): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null> {
+  try {
+    const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(p, 'utf-8'));
+    return typeof parsed === 'object' && parsed !== null && !Array.isArray(parsed)
+      ? (parsed as Record<string, unknown>)
+      : null;
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}

package/src/modules/tool-manuals/tool-manuals.contract.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import type { CallTemplate } from '@utcp/sdk';
 
 /**
- * Tool manuals — user-authored `*.tool` files under `Groups/` in the DEFAULT
+ * Tool manuals — user-authored `*.tool` files under `Plugins/` in the DEFAULT
  * branch KB. Each is a UTCP *manual* (a pointer to where tools come from), not a
  * flattened tool list. Access-controlled exactly like Skills (default-deny ACL
  * on the `.tool` file path). The MCP/UTCP endpoint serves every manual a user
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ export interface ToolManualSetup {
   reason?: string;
 }
 
-/** A parsed `.tool` file (normalized). */
-export interface ToolManualDescriptor {
+/** Fields common to every parsed manual — see {@link ToolManualDescriptor}. */
+export interface ToolManualDescriptorBase {
   /** URL-safe id derived from the file name (route `:slug`), unique in the catalog. */
   slug: string;
   /**
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ export interface ToolManualDescriptor {
    * catalog; namespacing doubles underscores in vault keys (`utcpNamespacedKey`).
    */
   name: string;
-  /** Repo-root-relative path of the `.tool` file (e.g. `Groups/Everyone/weather.tool`). */
+  /** Repo-root-relative path of the `.tool` file (e.g. `Plugins/Everyone/weather.tool`). */
   path: string;
   type: ToolManualType;
   /**
@@ -113,17 +113,40 @@ export interface ToolManualDescriptor {
   tools?: unknown[];
   /** Declared `${VAR}` scopes (see {@link ToolVariable}); empty when none declared. */
   variables?: ToolVariable[];
-  /**
-   * Whether this tool can run for a REMOTE consumer (Bevel's hosted MCP proxy).
-   * Absent/`true` ⇒ available remotely; `false` ⇒ LOCAL-ONLY — the remote endpoint
-   * skips it (it can't reach e.g. a `localhost` MCP server), and instead surfaces
-   * its path via the `list_local_tools` tool so a local agent can self-configure it.
-   */
-  remote?: boolean;
   /** For `type: mcp`: the admin-facing setup requirement from auto-discovery. */
   setup?: ToolManualSetup;
 }
 
+/** The spawn spec of a stdio-declared MCP server (a plugin `mcp.json` entry). */
+export interface ToolManualStdioSpec {
+  command: string;
+  args: string[];
+  env?: Record<string, string>;
+  cwd?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A parsed manual (a `.tool` file or a plugin `mcp.json` entry, normalized).
+ *
+ * `remote` — whether the tool can run for a REMOTE consumer (Bevel's hosted
+ * MCP proxy). Absent/`true` ⇒ available remotely; `false` ⇒ LOCAL-ONLY — the
+ * remote endpoint skips it (it can't reach e.g. a `localhost` MCP server),
+ * and instead surfaces its path via the `list_local_tools` tool so a local
+ * agent can self-configure it.
+ *
+ * `stdio` — for a `type: mcp` server declared with a stdio transport in a
+ * plugin's `mcp.json`: the spawn spec. A UNION, not two optional fields,
+ * because a stdio spec REQUIRES `remote: false` — the hosted proxy can never
+ * spawn a subprocess out of knowledge-base content, so stdio servers are
+ * served only to local consumers, which run them per the Agent Plugins
+ * runtime contract (PLUGIN_ROOT/PLUGIN_DATA, `./` containment) — and the
+ * type refusing `remote: true` beside a spawn spec is what keeps every
+ * producer honest about that.
+ */
+export type ToolManualDescriptor =
+  | (ToolManualDescriptorBase & { remote?: boolean; stdio?: undefined })
+  | (ToolManualDescriptorBase & { type: 'mcp'; remote: false; stdio: ToolManualStdioSpec });
+
 /** A validated UTCP manual dict (`{ utcp_version, manual_version, tools }`). */
 export type UtcpManualDict = Record<string, unknown>;
 
@@ -188,7 +211,7 @@ export interface IToolManualService {
   /**
    * Every manual in the catalog, UNFILTERED by access — the mirror of
    * `skillService.listSkills(undefined)`. For caller-INDEPENDENT counting only
-   * (the group index's "N tools", which a non-member is allowed to see as a
+   * (the plugin index's "N tools", which a non-member is allowed to see as a
    * number). Never surface a name, path or description from this to someone
    * who cannot read the file; `listAccessible` is the surface for that.
    */