@bevel-software/platform-core-backend 0.25.2 → 0.27.0

package/src/modules/embed/embed.routes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+import express from 'express';
+import type { IEmbedService } from './embed.interface.js';
+import {
+  EmbedAccessError,
+  EmbedLockedError,
+  EmbedNodeNotFoundError,
+  EmbedTokenError,
+} from './embed.errors.js';
+import { EmbedRefParseError } from './embed-link.js';
+import { rawExtensionOf, rawMimeFor } from '../workspace/file-readers/raw-mime.js';
+import '../auth/auth.middleware.js'; // Express Request augmentation
+
+/**
+ * What `/api/embed/raw` answers as `Content-Type`, by extension — the types a
+ * renderer draws from a URL. Anything else is bytes the renderer parses
+ * itself (a workbook, a deck), served as the octet stream it is.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * The embed surface: a token-minted, pseudonymous, short-lived page that
+ * renders ONE knowledge-base file with the app's own renderer, inside
+ * somebody else's frame — an MCP App's sandbox in a chat, an Atlassian issue
+ * panel. Two routers, with deliberately different auth stories:
+ *
+ *  - {@link createEmbedRoutes} (mounted at the app root, ahead of the JWT
+ *    middleware): the connector's shared-secret mint, and the TOKEN-ONLY data
+ *    routes the SPA `/embed` page calls. Also stamps the framing headers on
+ *    the two SPA routes.
+ *  - {@link createEmbedLinkRoutes} (mounted under the JWT middleware): links
+ *    the viewer's outside account to their just-authenticated Hexis user.
+ *
+ * Mounted before the production static catch-all, so the framing headers are
+ * stamped before `index.html` is served for `/embed*`.
+ *
+ * ── Why the data routes take the token and NOTHING else ───────────────────
+ *
+ * The embed page is framed by any site (see the framing headers below), which
+ * is what makes it work in every host's sandbox without an admin entry per
+ * host. The security of the embed therefore rests entirely on the token:
+ * short-lived, scoped to one file and one identity, pseudonymous. A session
+ * FALLBACK would hand that away — a hostile page could frame `/embed`, and
+ * the browser would attach the visitor's own cookie to every data request the
+ * page made, so the attacker's frame would read and write as the victim. So
+ * every route here reads `token` and never `req.userId`: a request carrying a
+ * perfectly valid session and no token is refused.
+ *
+ * ── Cross-origin callers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * The MCP App view runs the embed inside a chat host's SANDBOX — another
+ * origin, unknowable in advance (a hash subdomain under Claude's content
+ * domain, a URL-derived one under ChatGPT's) — and calls the token routes
+ * from there. Nothing here has to allow that: the server's app-wide CORS
+ * (`create-core-server.ts`, mounted ahead of this router) already reflects
+ * any origin and answers the preflight, for every route. That is safe on the
+ * token routes for the reason the token-only rule exists: CORS guards a
+ * browser's ambient credentials, these routes take none, and the token in
+ * the request is the whole credential. The routes test mounts the same CORS
+ * to pin that a cross-origin caller gets through.
+ */
+
+export function createEmbedRoutes(embedService: IEmbedService): express.Router {
+  const router = express.Router();
+
+  // ── framing ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  //
+  // The embed page: NO framing restriction at all, so any host may frame it.
+  // `X-Frame-Options` is removed rather than merely not set, so a header added
+  // globally later (by this app or by a proxy in front of it) cannot silently
+  // break every host's embed — the one route that must be frameable says so
+  // itself.
+  router.get('/embed', (_req, res, next) => {
+    res.removeHeader('X-Frame-Options');
+    // Only the framing directive goes: a policy's other directives (scripts,
+    // objects, connections) protect the page whoever frames it, and stay.
+    const csp = res.getHeader('Content-Security-Policy');
+    if (typeof csp === 'string') {
+      const kept = csp
+        .split(';')
+        .map((d) => d.trim())
+        .filter((d) => d !== '' && !/^frame-ancestors\b/i.test(d));
+      if (kept.length > 0) res.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', kept.join('; '));
+      else res.removeHeader('Content-Security-Policy');
+    }
+    next();
+  });
+  // The account-link page is the opposite: it acts under the viewer's own
+  // SESSION, so a page that could frame it could link a foreign account to
+  // whoever happened to be signed in. Refused for EVERY ancestor — the modern
+  // directive and the legacy header, since not every browser honours both.
+  router.get('/embed/link', (_req, res, next) => {
+    res.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', "frame-ancestors 'none'");
+    res.setHeader('X-Frame-Options', 'DENY');
+    next();
+  });
+
+  // ── the connector's mint (server-to-server, shared secret) ───────────────
+  router.post('/api/embed/token', async (req, res) => {
+    if (!embedService.sharedSecretConfigured()) {
+      res.status(404).json({ error: 'The shared-secret mint is not configured' });
+      return;
+    }
+    if (!embedService.verifySharedSecret(req.header('x-embed-secret') ?? undefined)) {
+      res.status(401).json({ error: 'Invalid embed secret' });
+      return;
+    }
+    const b = req.body as { accountId?: unknown; email?: unknown; reference?: unknown };
+    if (typeof b?.accountId !== 'string' || typeof b?.reference !== 'string') {
+      res.status(400).json({ error: 'accountId and reference are required' });
+      return;
+    }
+    try {
+      res.json(
+        await embedService.mintToken({
+          accountId: b.accountId,
+          email: typeof b.email === 'string' ? b.email : undefined,
+          reference: b.reference,
+        }),
+      );
+    } catch (err) {
+      sendJsonError(res, err);
+    }
+  });
+
+  // ── token-only data routes ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+  // The file to render, plus the viewer's read/write status.
+  router.get('/api/embed/load', async (req, res) => {
+    const token = queryToken(req, res);
+    if (token === null) return;
+    // Protected text and a token-bearing link URL: as with `/raw`, nothing
+    // may keep the answer past the access it was computed under.
+    res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store, private');
+    try {
+      res.json(await embedService.loadFile(token));
+    } catch (err) {
+      sendJsonError(res, err);
+    }
+  });
+
+  // The file's BYTES, for the app renderers that read bytes rather than a
+  // text buffer: an image, a PDF, a Word document — and the pictures a
+  // markdown page references, which arrive as `path`.
+  router.get('/api/embed/raw', async (req, res) => {
+    // The token is in the URL, so no shared cache may keep ANY answer from
+    // it — a refusal included, which is why this is set before the token is
+    // even looked at.
+    res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store, private');
+    const token = queryToken(req, res);
+    if (token === null) return;
+    const path = typeof req.query.path === 'string' ? req.query.path : undefined;
+    try {
+      const { bytes, path: served } = await embedService.readBytes(token, path);
+      // The type from the extension, the one table the workspace raw route
+      // serves from: under `nosniff` a browser draws an `<img>` only from an
+      // `image/*` answer, and never sniffs SVG at all, so an octet-stream
+      // picture is a broken image.
+      res.setHeader('Content-Type', rawMimeFor(served));
+      // An SVG can carry scripts; drawn through `<img>` they never run, but a
+      // tab opened on this address would run them under the app's origin.
+      if (rawExtensionOf(served) === '.svg') res.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', 'sandbox');
+      // Never a download, always bytes for a renderer to draw: an embed is a
+      // view, and `download:` is a separate verb the app's own route gates.
+      res.setHeader('Content-Disposition', 'inline');
+      res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+      res.setHeader('X-Embed-Path', encodeURIComponent(served));
+      res.end(bytes);
+    } catch (err) {
+      sendJsonError(res, err);
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Lock lifecycle: Edit → lock, timer → heartbeat, Cancel/close → cancel.
+  router.post('/api/embed/lock', tokenHandler(async (token) => embedService.acquireLock(token)));
+  router.post(
+    '/api/embed/heartbeat',
+    tokenHandler(async (token) => {
+      await embedService.heartbeat(token);
+      return null;
+    }),
+  );
+  router.post(
+    '/api/embed/cancel',
+    tokenHandler(async (token) => {
+      await embedService.cancel(token);
+      return null;
+    }),
+  );
+
+  // Save to the default branch (a writer), or propose (anybody else).
+  router.post('/api/embed/save', contentHandler(async (token, content) => {
+    await embedService.save(token, content);
+    return null;
+  }));
+  router.post('/api/embed/propose', contentHandler(async (token, content) =>
+    embedService.propose(token, content),
+  ));
+
+  return router;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Links the authenticated Hexis user to the outside account the embed token
+ * carries. JWT-protected — `req.userId` is the user we link TO, which is why
+ * the page it is called from refuses every framing ancestor.
+ */
+export function createEmbedLinkRoutes(embedService: IEmbedService): express.Router {
+  const router = express.Router();
+
+  router.post('/embed/link', async (req, res) => {
+    if (!req.userId) {
+      res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthenticated' });
+      return;
+    }
+    const b = req.body as { token?: unknown };
+    if (typeof b?.token !== 'string') {
+      res.status(400).json({ error: 'token is required' });
+      return;
+    }
+    try {
+      await embedService.linkAccount(b.token, req.userId);
+      res.status(204).end();
+    } catch (err) {
+      sendJsonError(res, err);
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Connected-apps management (list + disconnect). A person's ability to see
+  // and remove their OWN link — self-service erasure — must not depend on
+  // whether the shared-secret mint happens to be configured today.
+  router.get('/embed/links', async (req, res) => {
+    if (!req.userId) {
+      res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthenticated' });
+      return;
+    }
+    try {
+      res.json(await embedService.listLinkedAccounts(req.userId));
+    } catch (err) {
+      sendJsonError(res, err);
+    }
+  });
+
+  router.delete('/embed/links/:accountId', async (req, res) => {
+    if (!req.userId) {
+      res.status(401).json({ error: 'Unauthenticated' });
+      return;
+    }
+    try {
+      const removed = await embedService.unlinkAccount(req.userId, req.params.accountId);
+      if (!removed) {
+        // Not linked to THIS user (absent, or somebody else's) — the same 404
+        // either way, so the endpoint cannot probe other people's links.
+        res.status(404).json({ error: 'No such connected app' });
+        return;
+      }
+      res.status(204).end();
+    } catch (err) {
+      sendJsonError(res, err);
+    }
+  });
+
+  return router;
+}
+
+// ── helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * The `token` query parameter, or null after answering 401.
+ *
+ * 401, not 400: a request with no token is a request with no CREDENTIAL here,
+ * whatever else it carries. Saying "unauthorized" is what tells a session-only
+ * caller — the case the token-only rule exists for — that it was refused for
+ * who it is rather than for how it was spelled.
+ */
+function queryToken(req: express.Request, res: express.Response): string | null {
+  const token = typeof req.query.token === 'string' ? req.query.token : '';
+  if (!token) {
+    res.status(401).json({ error: TOKEN_REQUIRED });
+    return null;
+  }
+  return token;
+}
+
+/** What a tokenless request is told, on every embed data route. */
+export const TOKEN_REQUIRED =
+  'This view needs its embed token. A session is not accepted here.';
+
+/** Build a handler for a `{ token }`-body endpoint; a null result → 204. */
+function tokenHandler(run: (token: string) => Promise<unknown>): express.RequestHandler {
+  return async (req, res) => {
+    const token = (req.body as { token?: unknown })?.token;
+    if (typeof token !== 'string' || token === '') {
+      res.status(401).json({ error: TOKEN_REQUIRED });
+      return;
+    }
+    try {
+      const result = await run(token);
+      if (result === null || result === undefined) res.status(204).end();
+      else res.json(result);
+    } catch (err) {
+      sendJsonError(res, err);
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+/** Build a handler for a `{ token, content }`-body endpoint. */
+function contentHandler(
+  run: (token: string, content: string) => Promise<unknown>,
+): express.RequestHandler {
+  return async (req, res) => {
+    const b = req.body as { token?: unknown; content?: unknown };
+    if (typeof b?.token !== 'string' || b.token === '') {
+      res.status(401).json({ error: TOKEN_REQUIRED });
+      return;
+    }
+    if (typeof b?.content !== 'string') {
+      res.status(400).json({ error: 'content is required' });
+      return;
+    }
+    try {
+      const result = await run(b.token, b.content);
+      if (result === null || result === undefined) res.status(204).end();
+      else res.json(result);
+    } catch (err) {
+      sendJsonError(res, err);
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+function statusFor(err: unknown): number {
+  if (err instanceof EmbedTokenError) return 401;
+  if (err instanceof EmbedAccessError) return 403;
+  if (err instanceof EmbedNodeNotFoundError) return 404;
+  if (err instanceof EmbedLockedError) return 409;
+  if (err instanceof EmbedRefParseError) return 400;
+  // A domain error from the workflow layer (a protected-branch refusal, a
+  // duplicate request) already carries the status it deserves.
+  const status = (err as { status?: unknown })?.status;
+  if (typeof status === 'number' && status >= 400 && status < 600) return status;
+  return 500;
+}
+
+function messageFor(err: unknown): string {
+  if (
+    err instanceof EmbedTokenError ||
+    err instanceof EmbedAccessError ||
+    err instanceof EmbedNodeNotFoundError ||
+    err instanceof EmbedLockedError ||
+    err instanceof EmbedRefParseError
+  ) {
+    return err.message;
+  }
+  const status = (err as { status?: unknown })?.status;
+  if (typeof status === 'number' && status >= 400 && status < 500 && err instanceof Error) {
+    return err.message;
+  }
+  return 'Something went wrong.';
+}
+
+function sendJsonError(res: express.Response, err: unknown): void {
+  const status = statusFor(err);
+  if (status === 500) console.error('[embed] unexpected error:', err);
+  res.status(status).json({ error: messageFor(err) });
+}