@aztec-labs/p2p 6.0.0-nightly.20260829

package/dest/msg_validators/tx_validator/data_validator.js

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+import { MAX_FR_CALLDATA_TO_ALL_ENQUEUED_CALLS } from '@aztec-labs/constants';
+import { createLogger } from '@aztec-labs/foundation/log';
+import { ContractClassPublishedEvent } from '@aztec-labs/protocol-contracts/class-registry';
+import { computeContractClassId } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/contract';
+import { computeCalldataHash } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/hash';
+import { TX_ERROR_CALLDATA_COUNT_MISMATCH, TX_ERROR_CALLDATA_COUNT_TOO_LARGE, TX_ERROR_CONTRACT_CLASS_LOGS, TX_ERROR_CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_COUNT, TX_ERROR_CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_LENGTH, TX_ERROR_CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SORTING, TX_ERROR_INCORRECT_CALLDATA, TX_ERROR_INCORRECT_CONTRACT_CLASS_ID, TX_ERROR_INCORRECT_HASH, TX_ERROR_MALFORMED_CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG, Tx } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/tx';
+export class DataTxValidator {
+    identifier = Symbol('DataTxValidator');
+    #log;
+    constructor(bindings){
+        this.#log = createLogger('p2p:tx_validator:tx_data', bindings);
+    }
+    async validateTx(tx) {
+        const reason = await this.#hasCorrectHash(tx) ?? await this.#hasCorrectCalldata(tx) ?? await this.#hasCorrectContractClassLogs(tx) ?? await this.#hasCorrectContractClassIds(tx);
+        return reason ? {
+            result: 'invalid',
+            reason: [
+                reason
+            ]
+        } : {
+            result: 'valid'
+        };
+    }
+    async #hasCorrectHash(tx) {
+        const expected = await Tx.computeTxHash(tx);
+        if (!tx.getTxHash().equals(expected)) {
+            const reason = TX_ERROR_INCORRECT_HASH;
+            this.#log.verbose(`Rejecting tx ${tx.getTxHash().toString()}. Reason: ${reason}. Expected hash ${expected.toString()}. Got ${tx.getTxHash().toString()}.`);
+            return reason;
+        }
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    async #hasCorrectCalldata(tx) {
+        if (tx.publicFunctionCalldata.length !== tx.numberOfPublicCalls()) {
+            const reason = TX_ERROR_CALLDATA_COUNT_MISMATCH;
+            this.#log.verbose(`Rejecting tx ${tx.getTxHash().toString()}. Reason: ${reason}. Expected ${tx.numberOfPublicCalls()}. Got ${tx.publicFunctionCalldata.length}.`);
+            return reason;
+        }
+        if (tx.getTotalPublicCalldataCount() > MAX_FR_CALLDATA_TO_ALL_ENQUEUED_CALLS) {
+            const reason = TX_ERROR_CALLDATA_COUNT_TOO_LARGE;
+            this.#log.verbose(`Rejecting tx ${tx.getTxHash().toString()}. Reason: ${reason}. Expected no greater than ${MAX_FR_CALLDATA_TO_ALL_ENQUEUED_CALLS} fields. Got ${tx.getTotalPublicCalldataCount()}.`);
+            return reason;
+        }
+        const callRequests = tx.getPublicCallRequestsWithCalldata();
+        for(let i = 0; i < callRequests.length; i++){
+            const { request, calldata } = callRequests[i];
+            const hash = await computeCalldataHash(calldata);
+            if (!hash.equals(request.calldataHash)) {
+                const reason = TX_ERROR_INCORRECT_CALLDATA;
+                this.#log.verbose(`Rejecting tx ${tx.getTxHash().toString()}. Reason: ${reason}. Call request index: ${i}.`);
+                return reason;
+            }
+        }
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    async #hasCorrectContractClassLogs(tx) {
+        const contractClassLogsHashes = tx.data.getNonEmptyContractClassLogsHashes();
+        if (contractClassLogsHashes.length !== tx.contractClassLogFields.length) {
+            this.#log.verbose(`Rejecting tx ${tx.getTxHash().toString()} because of mismatched number of contract class logs. Expected ${contractClassLogsHashes.length}. Got ${tx.contractClassLogFields.length}.`);
+            return TX_ERROR_CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_COUNT;
+        }
+        const expectedHashes = await Promise.all(tx.contractClassLogFields.map((l)=>l.hash()));
+        for (const [i, logHash] of contractClassLogsHashes.entries()){
+            const hash = expectedHashes[i];
+            if (!logHash.value.equals(hash)) {
+                if (expectedHashes.some((h)=>logHash.value.equals(h))) {
+                    const matchingLogIndex = expectedHashes.findIndex((l)=>logHash.value.equals(l));
+                    this.#log.verbose(`Rejecting tx ${tx.getTxHash().toString()} because of mismatched contract class logs indices. Expected ${i} from the kernel's log hashes. Got ${matchingLogIndex} in the tx.`);
+                    return TX_ERROR_CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_SORTING;
+                } else {
+                    this.#log.verbose(`Rejecting tx ${tx.getTxHash().toString()} because of mismatched contract class logs. Expected hash ${logHash.value} from the kernels. Got ${hash} in the tx.`);
+                    return TX_ERROR_CONTRACT_CLASS_LOGS;
+                }
+            }
+            const expectedMinLength = 1 + tx.contractClassLogFields[i].fields.findLastIndex((f)=>!f.isZero());
+            if (logHash.logHash.length < expectedMinLength) {
+                this.#log.verbose(`Rejecting tx ${tx.getTxHash().toString()} because of incorrect contract class log length. Expected the length to be at least ${expectedMinLength}. Got ${logHash.logHash.length}.`);
+                return TX_ERROR_CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG_LENGTH;
+            }
+        }
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    async #hasCorrectContractClassIds(tx) {
+        const contractClassLogs = tx.getContractClassLogs();
+        for (const log of contractClassLogs){
+            if (!ContractClassPublishedEvent.isContractClassPublishedEvent(log)) {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let event;
+            try {
+                event = ContractClassPublishedEvent.fromLog(log);
+            } catch (e) {
+                this.#log.warn(`Rejecting tx ${tx.getTxHash()}: failed to parse contract class event: ${e}`);
+                return TX_ERROR_MALFORMED_CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG;
+            }
+            try {
+                const { publicBytecodeCommitment } = await event.toContractClassPublicWithBytecodeCommitment();
+                const computedClassId = await computeContractClassId({
+                    artifactHash: event.artifactHash,
+                    privateFunctionsRoot: event.privateFunctionsRoot,
+                    publicBytecodeCommitment
+                });
+                if (!computedClassId.equals(event.contractClassId)) {
+                    this.#log.warn(`Rejecting tx ${tx.getTxHash()}: contract class id mismatch. Claimed ${event.contractClassId}, computed ${computedClassId}`);
+                    return TX_ERROR_INCORRECT_CONTRACT_CLASS_ID;
+                }
+            } catch (e) {
+                this.#log.warn(`Rejecting tx ${tx.getTxHash()}: failed to compute contract class id: ${e}`);
+                return TX_ERROR_MALFORMED_CONTRACT_CLASS_LOG;
+            }
+        }
+        return undefined;
+    }
+}

package/dest/msg_validators/tx_validator/double_spend_validator.d.ts

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+import type { Fr } from '@aztec-labs/foundation/curves/bn254';
+import { type LoggerBindings } from '@aztec-labs/foundation/log';
+import { type TxValidationResult, type TxValidator } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/tx';
+export interface NullifierSource {
+    nullifiersExist: (nullifiers: Buffer[]) => Promise<boolean[]>;
+}
+/** Structural interface for double-spend validation. */
+export interface HasNullifierData {
+    txHash: {
+        toString(): string;
+    };
+    data: {
+        getNonEmptyNullifiers(): Fr[];
+    };
+}
+export declare class DoubleSpendTxValidator<T extends HasNullifierData> implements TxValidator<T> {
+    #private;
+    constructor(nullifierSource: NullifierSource, bindings?: LoggerBindings);
+    validateTx(tx: T): Promise<TxValidationResult>;
+}
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package/dest/msg_validators/tx_validator/double_spend_validator.d.ts.map

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package/dest/msg_validators/tx_validator/double_spend_validator.js

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+import { createLogger } from '@aztec-labs/foundation/log';
+import { TX_ERROR_DUPLICATE_NULLIFIER_IN_TX, TX_ERROR_EXISTING_NULLIFIER } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/tx';
+export class DoubleSpendTxValidator {
+    #log;
+    #nullifierSource;
+    constructor(nullifierSource, bindings){
+        this.#nullifierSource = nullifierSource;
+        this.#log = createLogger('p2p:tx_validator:tx_double_spend', bindings);
+    }
+    async validateTx(tx) {
+        const nullifiers = tx.data.getNonEmptyNullifiers();
+        // Ditch this tx if it has repeated nullifiers
+        const uniqueNullifiers = new Set(nullifiers.map((n)=>n.toBigInt()));
+        if (uniqueNullifiers.size !== nullifiers.length) {
+            this.#log.verbose(`Rejecting tx ${tx.txHash} for emitting duplicate nullifiers`);
+            return {
+                result: 'invalid',
+                reason: [
+                    TX_ERROR_DUPLICATE_NULLIFIER_IN_TX
+                ]
+            };
+        }
+        if ((await this.#nullifierSource.nullifiersExist(nullifiers.map((n)=>n.toBuffer()))).some(Boolean)) {
+            this.#log.verbose(`Rejecting tx ${tx.txHash} for repeating a nullifier`);
+            return {
+                result: 'invalid',
+                reason: [
+                    TX_ERROR_EXISTING_NULLIFIER
+                ]
+            };
+        }
+        return {
+            result: 'valid'
+        };
+    }
+}

package/dest/msg_validators/tx_validator/factory.d.ts

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+/**
+ * Transaction validator factories for each tx entry point.
+ *
+ * Unsolicited transactions (gossip and RPC) are fully validated before acceptance.
+ * Transactions received via req/resp or block proposals are only checked for
+ * well-formedness because we must include them for block re-execution — they may
+ * ultimately be invalid, which is caught during block building and reported as
+ * part of block validation/attestation. See the README in this directory for the
+ * full validation strategy.
+ *
+ * 1. **Gossip** — full validation in two stages with a pool pre-check in between.
+ *    Stage 1 (fast): metadata, data, timestamps, double-spend, gas, phases, block header.
+ *    Pool pre-check: `canAddPendingTx` — skips proof verification if pool would reject.
+ *    Stage 2 (slow): proof verification.
+ *    Orchestrated by `handleGossipedTx` in `libp2p_service.ts`.
+ *
+ * 2. **JSON-RPC** — full validation including all state-dependent checks.
+ *    Proof verification and fee enforcement are configurable for testing purposes.
+ *
+ * 3. **Req/resp & block proposals** — well-formedness checks only (metadata, size,
+ *    data, proof). Stored for re-execution; validity against state is not checked here.
+ *
+ * 4. **Block building** — re-validates against current state immediately before
+ *    sequencing. Catches invalid txs that entered via req/resp or block proposals.
+ *    Proof and data checks are skipped since they were verified on entry.
+ *
+ * 5. **Pending pool migration** — when unmined txs (e.g. from req/resp or block
+ *    proposals) are migrated to the pending pool, the pool runs the state-dependent
+ *    checks they missed: double-spend, block header, gas limits, and timestamps.
+ *    This runs on every tx potentially entering the pending pool.
+ */
+import { BlockNumber } from '@aztec-labs/foundation/branded-types';
+import { Fr } from '@aztec-labs/foundation/curves/bn254';
+import type { LoggerBindings } from '@aztec-labs/foundation/log';
+import type { ContractDataSource } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/contract';
+import type { GasFees } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/gas';
+import type { AllowedElement, ClientProtocolCircuitVerifier, MerkleTreeReadOperations, PublicProcessorValidator, WorldStateSynchronizer } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/interfaces/server';
+import { PeerErrorSeverity } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/p2p';
+import type { GlobalVariables, Tx, TxValidationResult, TxValidator } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/tx';
+import type { UInt64 } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/types';
+import type { TxMetaData } from '../../mem_pools/tx_pool_v2/tx_metadata.js';
+import { TxValidationCache } from './tx_validation_cache.js';
+/**
+ * A validator paired with a peer penalty severity.
+ * Used for gossip validation where each validator's failure triggers a peer penalization
+ * with the associated severity level.
+ */
+export interface TransactionValidator {
+    validator: {
+        validateTx(tx: Tx): Promise<TxValidationResult>;
+    };
+    severity: PeerErrorSeverity;
+}
+/**
+ * First stage of gossip validation — fast checks run before the pool pre-check.
+ *
+ * If any validator fails, the peer is penalized and the tx is rejected immediately,
+ * without consulting the pool or running proof verification.
+ *
+ * The `doubleSpendValidator` failure is special-cased by the caller (`handleGossipedTx`)
+ * to determine severity based on how recently the nullifier appeared. The caller reports the
+ * first failing entry among equally severe ones.
+ */
+export declare function createFirstStageTxValidationsForGossipedTransactions(timestamp: UInt64, blockNumber: BlockNumber, worldStateSynchronizer: WorldStateSynchronizer, gasFees: GasFees, l1ChainId: number, rollupVersion: number, protocolContractsHash: Fr, contractDataSource: ContractDataSource, txsPermitted: boolean, allowedInSetup?: AllowedElement[], bindings?: LoggerBindings, gasLimitOpts?: {
+    maxTxL2Gas?: number;
+    maxTxDAGas?: number;
+}): Record<string, TransactionValidator>;
+/**
+ * Second stage of gossip validation — expensive proof verification.
+ *
+ * Only runs after the first stage passes AND `canAddPendingTx` confirms the pool would
+ * accept the tx. This avoids wasting CPU on proof verification for txs the pool would reject
+ * (e.g., duplicates, insufficient balance, pool full).
+ */
+export declare function createSecondStageTxValidationsForGossipedTransactions(proofVerifier: ClientProtocolCircuitVerifier, bindings?: LoggerBindings): Record<string, TransactionValidator>;
+/**
+ * Validators for txs received via req/resp or filestores.
+ * Checks well-formedness only — we must accept these for re-execution even if they
+ * are invalid against current state. State-dependent checks happen when the tx
+ * enters the pending pool or during block building.
+ */
+export declare function createTxValidatorForOnDemandReceivedTxs(verifier: ClientProtocolCircuitVerifier, { l1ChainId, rollupVersion }: {
+    l1ChainId: number;
+    rollupVersion: number;
+}, bindings?: LoggerBindings, cache?: TxValidationCache): TxValidator;
+/**
+ * Validators for txs received in block proposals.
+ * Same as req/resp — well-formedness only. We must store these for block
+ * re-execution; their validity against state is checked during block building.
+ */
+export declare function createTxValidatorForBlockProposalReceivedTxs(verifier: ClientProtocolCircuitVerifier, { l1ChainId, rollupVersion }: {
+    l1ChainId: number;
+    rollupVersion: number;
+}, bindings?: LoggerBindings, cache?: TxValidationCache): TxValidator;
+/**
+ * Validators for unsolicited txs received over JSON-RPC (from a local wallet/PXE).
+ * Full validation — all state-dependent checks are run. Proof verification is optional
+ * (can be skipped for testing purposes). Fee enforcement is also optional (skipped for testing/dev).
+ * Called from `AztecNodeService.isValidTx()`.
+ */
+export declare function createTxValidatorForAcceptingTxsOverRPC(db: MerkleTreeReadOperations, contractDataSource: ContractDataSource, verifier: ClientProtocolCircuitVerifier | undefined, { l1ChainId, rollupVersion, setupAllowList, gasFees, skipFeeEnforcement, isSimulation, timestamp, blockNumber, txsPermitted, maxTxL2Gas, maxTxDAGas }: {
+    l1ChainId: number;
+    rollupVersion: number;
+    setupAllowList: AllowedElement[];
+    gasFees: GasFees;
+    skipFeeEnforcement?: boolean;
+    isSimulation?: boolean;
+    timestamp: UInt64;
+    blockNumber: BlockNumber;
+    txsPermitted: boolean;
+    maxTxL2Gas?: number;
+    maxTxDAGas?: number;
+}, bindings?: LoggerBindings): TxValidator<Tx>;
+/**
+ * Validators for txs about to be included in a block by the sequencer.
+ * Re-validates against current state. This is where invalid txs that entered via
+ * req/resp or block proposals are caught — their invalidity is reported as part
+ * of block validation/attestation. Proof and data checks are omitted since they
+ * were already verified on entry.
+ * Called from `CheckpointBuilder.makeBlockBuilderDeps()`.
+ */
+export declare function createTxValidatorForBlockBuilding(db: MerkleTreeReadOperations, contractDataSource: ContractDataSource, globalVariables: GlobalVariables, setupAllowList: AllowedElement[], bindings?: LoggerBindings): PublicProcessorValidator;
+/**
+ * Validators for txs migrating to the pending pool.
+ *
+ * Txs that arrived via req/resp or block proposals only had well-formedness checks
+ * on receipt. When they fail to be mined and are migrated to the pending pool, we
+ * run the state-dependent checks they missed: double-spend, block header, gas limits,
+ * and timestamp expiry. This is run on EVERY tx potentially entering the pending pool
+ * — called inside `TxPoolV2Impl` during `addPendingTxs`, `prepareForSlot` (unprotect),
+ * `handlePrunedBlocks` (unmine), and startup hydration.
+ *
+ * Operates on `TxMetaData` rather than full `Tx` since metadata is pre-built by the pool.
+ * Injected into `TxPoolV2` as the `createTxValidator` factory in `TxPoolV2Dependencies`.
+ */
+export declare function createTxValidatorForTransactionsEnteringPendingTxPool(worldStateSynchronizer: WorldStateSynchronizer, timestamp: bigint, blockNumber: BlockNumber, gasLimitOpts: {
+    maxTxL2Gas?: number;
+    maxTxDAGas?: number;
+}, gasFees: GasFees, bindings?: LoggerBindings): Promise<TxValidator<TxMetaData>>;
+/**
+ * Creates a function that checks whether a tx's setup-phase calls are on the allow list.
+ *
+ * Uses the `PhasesTxValidator` on the full Tx. The result is stored as a boolean
+ * flag in `TxMetaData.allowedSetupCalls` at receipt time, so the pending pool
+ * migration validator can check it without needing the full Tx or its dependencies.
+ */
+export declare function createCheckAllowedSetupCalls(contractDataSource: ContractDataSource, setupAllowList: AllowedElement[], getTimestamp: () => UInt64): (tx: Tx) => Promise<boolean>;
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package/dest/msg_validators/tx_validator/factory.js

@@ -0,0 +1,302 @@
+/**
+ * Transaction validator factories for each tx entry point.
+ *
+ * Unsolicited transactions (gossip and RPC) are fully validated before acceptance.
+ * Transactions received via req/resp or block proposals are only checked for
+ * well-formedness because we must include them for block re-execution — they may
+ * ultimately be invalid, which is caught during block building and reported as
+ * part of block validation/attestation. See the README in this directory for the
+ * full validation strategy.
+ *
+ * 1. **Gossip** — full validation in two stages with a pool pre-check in between.
+ *    Stage 1 (fast): metadata, data, timestamps, double-spend, gas, phases, block header.
+ *    Pool pre-check: `canAddPendingTx` — skips proof verification if pool would reject.
+ *    Stage 2 (slow): proof verification.
+ *    Orchestrated by `handleGossipedTx` in `libp2p_service.ts`.
+ *
+ * 2. **JSON-RPC** — full validation including all state-dependent checks.
+ *    Proof verification and fee enforcement are configurable for testing purposes.
+ *
+ * 3. **Req/resp & block proposals** — well-formedness checks only (metadata, size,
+ *    data, proof). Stored for re-execution; validity against state is not checked here.
+ *
+ * 4. **Block building** — re-validates against current state immediately before
+ *    sequencing. Catches invalid txs that entered via req/resp or block proposals.
+ *    Proof and data checks are skipped since they were verified on entry.
+ *
+ * 5. **Pending pool migration** — when unmined txs (e.g. from req/resp or block
+ *    proposals) are migrated to the pending pool, the pool runs the state-dependent
+ *    checks they missed: double-spend, block header, gas limits, and timestamps.
+ *    This runs on every tx potentially entering the pending pool.
+ */ import { Fr } from '@aztec-labs/foundation/curves/bn254';
+import { getVKTreeRoot } from '@aztec-labs/noir-protocol-circuits-types/vk-tree';
+import { ProtocolContractAddress, protocolContractsHash } from '@aztec-labs/protocol-contracts';
+import { PeerErrorSeverity } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/p2p';
+import { DatabasePublicStateSource, MerkleTreeId } from '@aztec-labs/stdlib/trees';
+import { AggregateTxValidator } from './aggregate_tx_validator.js';
+import { ArchiveCache } from './archive_cache.js';
+import { BlockHeaderTxValidator } from './block_header_validator.js';
+import { CachedTxValidator } from './cached_tx_validator.js';
+import { ContractInstanceTxValidator } from './contract_instance_validator.js';
+import { DataTxValidator } from './data_validator.js';
+import { DoubleSpendTxValidator } from './double_spend_validator.js';
+import { MaxGasLimitsValidator, MinGasLimitsValidator } from './gas_limits_validator.js';
+import { GasTxValidator, MaxFeePerGasValidator } from './gas_validator.js';
+import { MetadataTxValidator } from './metadata_validator.js';
+import { NullifierCache } from './nullifier_cache.js';
+import { AllowedSetupCallsMetaValidator, PhasesTxValidator } from './phases_validator.js';
+import { SizeTxValidator } from './size_validator.js';
+import { TimestampTxValidator } from './timestamp_validator.js';
+import { TxPermittedValidator } from './tx_permitted_validator.js';
+import { TxProofValidator } from './tx_proof_validator.js';
+/**
+ * First stage of gossip validation — fast checks run before the pool pre-check.
+ *
+ * If any validator fails, the peer is penalized and the tx is rejected immediately,
+ * without consulting the pool or running proof verification.
+ *
+ * The `doubleSpendValidator` failure is special-cased by the caller (`handleGossipedTx`)
+ * to determine severity based on how recently the nullifier appeared. The caller reports the
+ * first failing entry among equally severe ones.
+ */ export function createFirstStageTxValidationsForGossipedTransactions(timestamp, blockNumber, worldStateSynchronizer, gasFees, l1ChainId, rollupVersion, protocolContractsHash, contractDataSource, txsPermitted, allowedInSetup = [], bindings, gasLimitOpts) {
+    const merkleTree = worldStateSynchronizer.getCommitted();
+    return {
+        timestampValidator: {
+            validator: new TimestampTxValidator({
+                timestamp,
+                blockNumber
+            }, bindings),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.HighToleranceError
+        },
+        txsPermittedValidator: {
+            validator: new TxPermittedValidator(txsPermitted, bindings),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError
+        },
+        txSizeValidator: {
+            validator: new SizeTxValidator(bindings),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError
+        },
+        metadataValidator: {
+            validator: new MetadataTxValidator({
+                l1ChainId: new Fr(l1ChainId),
+                rollupVersion: new Fr(rollupVersion),
+                protocolContractsHash,
+                vkTreeRoot: getVKTreeRoot()
+            }, bindings),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError
+        },
+        phasesValidator: {
+            validator: new PhasesTxValidator(contractDataSource, allowedInSetup, timestamp, bindings),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError
+        },
+        blockHeaderValidator: {
+            validator: new BlockHeaderTxValidator(new ArchiveCache(merkleTree), bindings),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.HighToleranceError
+        },
+        doubleSpendValidator: {
+            validator: new DoubleSpendTxValidator({
+                nullifiersExist: async (nullifiers)=>{
+                    const merkleTree = worldStateSynchronizer.getCommitted();
+                    const indices = await merkleTree.findLeafIndices(MerkleTreeId.NULLIFIER_TREE, nullifiers);
+                    return indices.map((index)=>index !== undefined);
+                }
+            }, bindings),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError
+        },
+        minGasLimitsValidator: {
+            validator: new MinGasLimitsValidator(bindings),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError
+        },
+        maxGasLimitsValidator: {
+            validator: new MaxGasLimitsValidator({
+                ...gasLimitOpts,
+                bindings
+            }),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError
+        },
+        gasValidator: {
+            validator: new GasTxValidator(new DatabasePublicStateSource(merkleTree), ProtocolContractAddress.FeeJuice, gasFees, bindings),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError
+        },
+        dataValidator: {
+            validator: new DataTxValidator(bindings),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError
+        },
+        contractInstanceValidator: {
+            validator: new ContractInstanceTxValidator(bindings),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.MidToleranceError
+        }
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Second stage of gossip validation — expensive proof verification.
+ *
+ * Only runs after the first stage passes AND `canAddPendingTx` confirms the pool would
+ * accept the tx. This avoids wasting CPU on proof verification for txs the pool would reject
+ * (e.g., duplicates, insufficient balance, pool full).
+ */ export function createSecondStageTxValidationsForGossipedTransactions(proofVerifier, bindings) {
+    return {
+        proofValidator: {
+            validator: new TxProofValidator(proofVerifier, bindings),
+            severity: PeerErrorSeverity.LowToleranceError
+        }
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Well-formedness checks only: metadata, size, data, and proof.
+ * Used for req/resp and block proposal txs. These txs must be accepted for block
+ * re-execution even though they may be invalid against current state — that is
+ * caught later by the block building validator.
+ */ function createTxValidatorForMinimumTxIntegrityChecks(verifier, { l1ChainId, rollupVersion }, bindings, cache) {
+    const aggregate = new AggregateTxValidator(new SizeTxValidator(bindings), new MetadataTxValidator({
+        l1ChainId: new Fr(l1ChainId),
+        rollupVersion: new Fr(rollupVersion),
+        protocolContractsHash,
+        vkTreeRoot: getVKTreeRoot()
+    }, bindings), CachedTxValidator.new(new DataTxValidator(bindings), cache), new ContractInstanceTxValidator(bindings), CachedTxValidator.new(new TxProofValidator(verifier, bindings), cache));
+    // This validator is not state-dependent so we can cache it.
+    const identifier = Symbol('TxValidatorForMinimumTxIntegrityChecks');
+    return CachedTxValidator.newWithIdentifier(aggregate, identifier, cache);
+}
+/**
+ * Validators for txs received via req/resp or filestores.
+ * Checks well-formedness only — we must accept these for re-execution even if they
+ * are invalid against current state. State-dependent checks happen when the tx
+ * enters the pending pool or during block building.
+ */ export function createTxValidatorForOnDemandReceivedTxs(verifier, { l1ChainId, rollupVersion }, bindings, cache) {
+    return createTxValidatorForMinimumTxIntegrityChecks(verifier, {
+        l1ChainId,
+        rollupVersion
+    }, bindings, cache);
+}
+/**
+ * Validators for txs received in block proposals.
+ * Same as req/resp — well-formedness only. We must store these for block
+ * re-execution; their validity against state is checked during block building.
+ */ export function createTxValidatorForBlockProposalReceivedTxs(verifier, { l1ChainId, rollupVersion }, bindings, cache) {
+    return createTxValidatorForMinimumTxIntegrityChecks(verifier, {
+        l1ChainId,
+        rollupVersion
+    }, bindings, cache);
+}
+/**
+ * Validators for unsolicited txs received over JSON-RPC (from a local wallet/PXE).
+ * Full validation — all state-dependent checks are run. Proof verification is optional
+ * (can be skipped for testing purposes). Fee enforcement is also optional (skipped for testing/dev).
+ * Called from `AztecNodeService.isValidTx()`.
+ */ export function createTxValidatorForAcceptingTxsOverRPC(db, contractDataSource, verifier, { l1ChainId, rollupVersion, setupAllowList, gasFees, skipFeeEnforcement, isSimulation, timestamp, blockNumber, txsPermitted, maxTxL2Gas, maxTxDAGas }, bindings) {
+    const validators = [
+        new TxPermittedValidator(txsPermitted, bindings),
+        new TimestampTxValidator({
+            timestamp,
+            blockNumber
+        }, bindings),
+        new SizeTxValidator(bindings),
+        new MetadataTxValidator({
+            l1ChainId: new Fr(l1ChainId),
+            rollupVersion: new Fr(rollupVersion),
+            protocolContractsHash,
+            vkTreeRoot: getVKTreeRoot()
+        }, bindings),
+        // Declared gas-limit admission is not fee enforcement, so it runs even when fees are skipped. The floor
+        // has no exemption: a tx declaring less than the fixed overheads can never be mined, so rejecting it
+        // during simulation is the earliest useful feedback rather than a surprise on sendTx.
+        new MinGasLimitsValidator(bindings),
+        // Only the ceiling is exempted during simulation: gas estimation submits intentionally-inflated
+        // `forEstimation` limits (above the per-tx max) and the wallet clamps the real tx to the admission limit
+        // afterward, so enforcing the ceiling on the estimation tx would reject a valid estimation.
+        ...!isSimulation ? [
+            new MaxGasLimitsValidator({
+                maxTxL2Gas,
+                maxTxDAGas,
+                bindings
+            })
+        ] : [],
+        new PhasesTxValidator(contractDataSource, setupAllowList, timestamp, bindings),
+        new BlockHeaderTxValidator(new ArchiveCache(db), bindings),
+        new DoubleSpendTxValidator(new NullifierCache(db), bindings),
+        ...!skipFeeEnforcement ? [
+            new GasTxValidator(new DatabasePublicStateSource(db), ProtocolContractAddress.FeeJuice, gasFees, bindings)
+        ] : [],
+        new DataTxValidator(bindings),
+        new ContractInstanceTxValidator(bindings),
+        ...verifier ? [
+            new TxProofValidator(verifier, bindings)
+        ] : []
+    ];
+    return new AggregateTxValidator(...validators);
+}
+/**
+ * Validators for txs about to be included in a block by the sequencer.
+ * Re-validates against current state. This is where invalid txs that entered via
+ * req/resp or block proposals are caught — their invalidity is reported as part
+ * of block validation/attestation. Proof and data checks are omitted since they
+ * were already verified on entry.
+ * Called from `CheckpointBuilder.makeBlockBuilderDeps()`.
+ */ export function createTxValidatorForBlockBuilding(db, contractDataSource, globalVariables, setupAllowList, bindings) {
+    const nullifierCache = new NullifierCache(db);
+    const archiveCache = new ArchiveCache(db);
+    const publicStateSource = new DatabasePublicStateSource(db);
+    return {
+        preprocessValidator: createTxValidatorForValidatingAgainstCurrentState(nullifierCache, archiveCache, publicStateSource, contractDataSource, globalVariables, setupAllowList, bindings),
+        nullifierCache
+    };
+}
+function createTxValidatorForValidatingAgainstCurrentState(nullifierSource, archiveSource, publicStateSource, contractDataSource, globalVariables, setupAllowList, bindings) {
+    // We don't include the TxProofValidator nor the DataTxValidator here because they are already checked by the time we get to block building.
+    return new AggregateTxValidator(new TimestampTxValidator({
+        timestamp: globalVariables.timestamp,
+        blockNumber: globalVariables.blockNumber
+    }, bindings), new MinGasLimitsValidator(bindings), // No limit opts: enforce only the per-tx protocol ceiling. Network admission limits are relay policy and
+    // must not invalidate a proposed block.
+    new MaxGasLimitsValidator({
+        bindings
+    }), new PhasesTxValidator(contractDataSource, setupAllowList, globalVariables.timestamp, bindings), new BlockHeaderTxValidator(archiveSource, bindings), new DoubleSpendTxValidator(nullifierSource, bindings), new GasTxValidator(publicStateSource, ProtocolContractAddress.FeeJuice, globalVariables.gasFees, bindings));
+}
+/**
+ * Validators for txs migrating to the pending pool.
+ *
+ * Txs that arrived via req/resp or block proposals only had well-formedness checks
+ * on receipt. When they fail to be mined and are migrated to the pending pool, we
+ * run the state-dependent checks they missed: double-spend, block header, gas limits,
+ * and timestamp expiry. This is run on EVERY tx potentially entering the pending pool
+ * — called inside `TxPoolV2Impl` during `addPendingTxs`, `prepareForSlot` (unprotect),
+ * `handlePrunedBlocks` (unmine), and startup hydration.
+ *
+ * Operates on `TxMetaData` rather than full `Tx` since metadata is pre-built by the pool.
+ * Injected into `TxPoolV2` as the `createTxValidator` factory in `TxPoolV2Dependencies`.
+ */ export async function createTxValidatorForTransactionsEnteringPendingTxPool(worldStateSynchronizer, timestamp, blockNumber, gasLimitOpts, gasFees, bindings) {
+    await worldStateSynchronizer.syncImmediate();
+    const merkleTree = worldStateSynchronizer.getCommitted();
+    const nullifierSource = {
+        nullifiersExist: async (nullifiers)=>{
+            const indices = await merkleTree.findLeafIndices(MerkleTreeId.NULLIFIER_TREE, nullifiers);
+            return indices.map((index)=>index !== undefined);
+        }
+    };
+    const archiveSource = {
+        getArchiveIndices: (archives)=>{
+            return merkleTree.findLeafIndices(MerkleTreeId.ARCHIVE, archives);
+        }
+    };
+    return new AggregateTxValidator(new AllowedSetupCallsMetaValidator(bindings), new TimestampTxValidator({
+        timestamp,
+        blockNumber
+    }, bindings), new MinGasLimitsValidator(bindings), new MaxGasLimitsValidator({
+        ...gasLimitOpts,
+        bindings
+    }), new MaxFeePerGasValidator(gasFees, bindings), new BlockHeaderTxValidator(archiveSource, bindings), new DoubleSpendTxValidator(nullifierSource, bindings));
+}
+/**
+ * Creates a function that checks whether a tx's setup-phase calls are on the allow list.
+ *
+ * Uses the `PhasesTxValidator` on the full Tx. The result is stored as a boolean
+ * flag in `TxMetaData.allowedSetupCalls` at receipt time, so the pending pool
+ * migration validator can check it without needing the full Tx or its dependencies.
+ */ export function createCheckAllowedSetupCalls(contractDataSource, setupAllowList, getTimestamp) {
+    return async (tx)=>{
+        const validator = new PhasesTxValidator(contractDataSource, setupAllowList, getTimestamp());
+        const result = await validator.validateTx(tx);
+        return result.result === 'valid';
+    };
+}