@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 5.4.2 → 5.6.0

package/dist/adapters/mcp.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/version.ts","../../src/http.ts","../../src/trust-levels.ts","../../src/well-known.ts","../../src/verify.ts","../../src/metadata-capture.ts","../../src/adapters/approval-gate.ts","../../src/adapters/stepup-poll.ts","../../src/verified-hop.ts","../../src/transport/mcp-server.ts","../../src/adapters/mcp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Single source-of-truth for the SDK's\n * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future\n * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.\n *\n * Why a constant rather than `import pkg from '../package.json'`:\n * - `tsconfig.json` sets `rootDir: ./src`; importing the sibling\n *   package.json fails the build with \"outside rootDir\".\n * - Build-time string replacement (tsup `define`, esbuild banner, etc.)\n *   adds toolchain coupling for a trivial gain.\n * - Embedded readonly constant works in every environment (Node, browser,\n *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.\n *\n * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against\n * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. A manual bump\n * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them\n * lockstep.\n */\nexport const SDK_VERSION = '5.4.1';\n","/**\n * Shared outbound-HTTP wrapper — every request the SDK makes to the\n * AstraSync backend (or anywhere else) goes through `sdkFetch` so it\n * carries an identifying User-Agent.\n *\n * Why: Node's global fetch defaults to `user-agent: node`, which is\n * indistinguishable from every other Node client on the wire. Visit\n * Intelligence observed our own SDK/beacon traffic as anonymous \"node\"\n * visits. Self-identification is the platform's own medicine.\n *\n * Browser note: some browsers filter the User-Agent request header\n * silently (never throwing), so this is a no-op there — which is correct:\n * in a browser the page's real UA is the honest identity.\n */\n\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\n\nexport const SDK_USER_AGENT = `astrasync-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;\n\n/**\n * Add the SDK User-Agent without changing the SHAPE of the caller's headers\n * (plain records stay plain records) — interceptors, adapters, and tests\n * read `init.headers` as a record, and `Headers` would also lowercase names.\n */\nfunction withUserAgent(initHeaders: HeadersInit | undefined): HeadersInit {\n  if (!initHeaders) return { 'user-agent': SDK_USER_AGENT };\n  if (initHeaders instanceof Headers) {\n    const copy = new Headers(initHeaders);\n    if (!copy.has('user-agent')) copy.set('user-agent', SDK_USER_AGENT);\n    return copy;\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(initHeaders)) {\n    const has = initHeaders.some(([name]) => name.toLowerCase() === 'user-agent');\n    return has ? initHeaders : [...initHeaders, ['user-agent', SDK_USER_AGENT]];\n  }\n  const has = Object.keys(initHeaders).some((name) => name.toLowerCase() === 'user-agent');\n  return has ? initHeaders : { 'user-agent': SDK_USER_AGENT, ...initHeaders };\n}\n\nexport const sdkFetch: typeof fetch = (input, init) =>\n  fetch(input, { ...init, headers: withUserAgent(init?.headers) });\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway — Trust Level helpers.\n *\n * SDK 5.0.0: the `accessLevel` band (`none`/`restricted`/`read-only`/`standard`/\n * `full`/`internal`) was removed entirely — it never gated the access decision\n * (the server does, from a verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS match + trust\n * score). What remains here is the coarse trust-level badge derived from the\n * numeric trust score, used only for display.\n */\n\nimport type { TrustLevel } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Trust level score ranges\n */\nexport const TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES: Record<TrustLevel, { min: number; max: number }> = {\n  BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },\n  SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },\n  GOLD: { min: 60, max: 79 },\n  PLATINUM: { min: 80, max: 100 },\n};\n\n/**\n * Determine trust level from score\n */\nexport function getTrustLevel(score: number): TrustLevel {\n  if (score >= 80) return 'PLATINUM';\n  if (score >= 60) return 'GOLD';\n  if (score >= 40) return 'SILVER';\n  return 'BRONZE';\n}\n","import { sdkFetch } from './http';\n/**\n * SDK-side discovery of canonical platform URLs via `/.well-known/agentic-commerce`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget pre-fetch at middleware creation; first verify() awaits\n * the in-flight promise if it hasn't resolved. 60-minute TTL with\n * stale-while-revalidate background refresh.\n */\n\nexport interface WellKnownAgenticCommerce {\n  registrationUrl: string;\n  documentationUrl: string;\n  verifyAccessUrl: string;\n  /** 5.1.0: hosted AstraSync MCP bridge endpoint (absent on self-hosted backends). */\n  mcpEndpoint?: string;\n  /** 5.1.0: bridge connector-discovery doc (absent on self-hosted backends). */\n  mcpDiscoveryUrl?: string;\n}\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  data: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n  fetchedAt: number;\n}\n\nconst CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 60 minutes\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();\nconst inflight = new Map<string, Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce>>();\n\nfunction wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl: string): string {\n  // apiBaseUrl is typically 'https://astrasync.ai/api' — strip the /api suffix\n  // to get the platform root, then append /.well-known/agentic-commerce.\n  const base = apiBaseUrl.replace(/\\/api\\/?$/, '');\n  return `${base}/.well-known/agentic-commerce`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const url = wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl);\n  const response = await sdkFetch(url, {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },\n    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),\n  });\n  if (!response.ok) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `AstraSync platform must expose /.well-known/agentic-commerce; ` +\n        `got ${response.status} from ${url}. SDK cannot initialise without it.`\n    );\n  }\n  const data = (await response.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (!data.registrationUrl || !data.documentationUrl || !data.verifyAccessUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `/.well-known/agentic-commerce response missing required fields ` +\n        `(registrationUrl, documentationUrl, verifyAccessUrl).`\n    );\n  }\n  return data as unknown as WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n}\n\n/**\n * Start a background fetch. Returns the promise for callers that need\n * to await it (first verify() call).\n */\nexport function prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const existing = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (existing) return existing;\n\n  const promise = fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl)\n    .then((data) => {\n      cache.set(apiBaseUrl, { data, fetchedAt: Date.now() });\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      return data;\n    })\n    .catch((err) => {\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      throw err;\n    });\n\n  inflight.set(apiBaseUrl, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get cached well-known URLs. If stale, triggers a background refresh\n * and returns stale data (stale-while-revalidate). If no cache exists,\n * awaits the in-flight fetch or starts a new one.\n */\nexport async function getWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const entry = cache.get(apiBaseUrl);\n\n  if (entry) {\n    if (Date.now() - entry.fetchedAt > CACHE_TTL_MS) {\n      // Stale — trigger background refresh, return stale data\n      prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl).catch(() => {\n        // Background refresh failed — stale data remains until next request\n      });\n    }\n    return entry.data;\n  }\n\n  // No cache — must await\n  const pending = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  return prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl);\n}\n\n/**\n * Synchronous cache read — returns cached URLs or undefined.\n * Never triggers a fetch. Used by verify() to avoid extra HTTP calls\n * in the hot path; adapters are responsible for prefetching.\n */\nexport function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): WellKnownAgenticCommerce | undefined {\n  return cache.get(apiBaseUrl)?.data;\n}\n\n/** Reset cache — for testing only. */\nexport function _resetWellKnownCache(): void {\n  cache.clear();\n  inflight.clear();\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Core Verification Logic\n *\n * This module handles the core verification logic, calling the AstraSync API\n * and processing the response into a standardized VerificationResult.\n */\n\nimport { sdkFetch } from './http';\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationRequest,\n  VerificationResult,\n  VerifiedAgent,\n  VerifiedDeveloper,\n  VerifiedOrganization,\n  GuidanceInfo,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  TokenGuidance,\n  RuntimeChallengeResult,\n  StepUpApprovalInfo,\n  SettlementOutcomeInfo,\n  SettlementArtifact,\n  AttemptReport,\n} from './types';\nimport { getTrustLevel } from './trust-levels';\nimport type { ObservedMetadata } from './metadata-capture';\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\nimport { getCachedWellKnownUrls, type WellKnownAgenticCommerce } from './well-known';\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values\n *\n * apiBaseUrl matches the OpenAPI authoritative server (https://astrasync.ai/api\n * for prod, https://staging.astrasync.ai/api for staging). Always include the\n * /api path prefix when overriding — registration / docs URLs are derived by\n * stripping it.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CONFIG: Partial<GatewayConfig> = {\n  apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n  // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.\n  // cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult applies the 60s\n  // default; the caller's explicit value is honoured for cacheable results.\n  // Denials and step-up escalations are NEVER cached (3.6.0) regardless of\n  // cacheTtl. Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.\n  debug: false,\n};\n\n/**\n * Init self-test state. Fires once per process on first verify() call to warn\n * if apiBaseUrl is pointing at the wrong host (e.g. a marketing site that\n * 200s with text/html instead of the API).\n */\nlet initCheckPerformed = false;\n\n/** Test-only: re-arm the one-time init self-check. */\nexport function _resetInitCheck(): void {\n  initCheckPerformed = false;\n}\n\n/** One-shot guard for v2.3.0 deprecation warning. */\nlet deprecationWarningShown = false;\n\nasync function performInitCheck(\n  apiBaseUrl: string,\n  debug?: boolean,\n  strictInit?: boolean,\n  apiKey?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  initCheckPerformed = true;\n  try {\n    const probeUrl = `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`;\n    // HEAD mirrors GET semantics (running the full request pipeline without a\n    // body) so the response carries the same content-type the marketing 404\n    // would return. OPTIONS often gets short-circuited by CORS-preflight\n    // handlers and returns no content-type, defeating the check.\n    const response = await sdkFetch(probeUrl, { method: 'HEAD' });\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n    if (contentType.startsWith('text/html')) {\n      const message =\n        `[VerificationGateway] apiBaseUrl '${apiBaseUrl}' returned HTML (content-type: ${contentType}). ` +\n        `This usually means apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing site instead of the API. ` +\n        `Expected: 'https://astrasync.ai/api' (prod) or 'https://staging.astrasync.ai/api' (staging).`;\n      // Audit F-A6-33: when strictInit is set, throw on misconfig instead\n      // of warning + continuing. Recurring footgun per\n      // `[[feedback_astrasync_api_url_canonical]]` — silent warn lets\n      // misconfigured prod deploys ship with all verify-access calls\n      // silently failing.\n      if (strictInit) {\n        throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n      }\n      console.warn(`${message} Set disableInitChecks: true on GatewayConfig to silence.`);\n    } else if (debug) {\n      console.log(\n        `[VerificationGateway] init check passed for ${apiBaseUrl} (content-type: ${contentType})`\n      );\n    }\n\n    // 4.0.0: key liveness probe. A dead API key otherwise surfaces only\n    // per-request as inbound agents get turned away — the operator should\n    // learn at deploy time. 404 = older backend without self-check: silent.\n    if (apiKey) {\n      const selfCheck = await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/self-check`, {\n        headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}` },\n      });\n      if (selfCheck.status === 401) {\n        const body = (await selfCheck.json().catch(() => ({}))) as {\n          code?: string;\n          message?: string;\n          remediation?: { manageUrl?: string };\n        };\n        const message =\n          `[VerificationGateway] the configured AstraSync API key was REJECTED at startup ` +\n          `(${body.code ?? 'api_key_invalid'}: ${body.message ?? 'invalid key'}). Every inbound agent ` +\n          `will be turned away until the key is rotated` +\n          (body.remediation?.manageUrl ? ` at ${body.remediation.manageUrl}` : '') +\n          `.`;\n        if (strictInit) {\n          throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n        }\n        console.error(message);\n      } else if (selfCheck.ok) {\n        const body = (await selfCheck.json().catch(() => ({}))) as {\n          daysToExpiry?: number | null;\n        };\n        if (typeof body.daysToExpiry === 'number' && body.daysToExpiry <= 7) {\n          console.warn(\n            `[VerificationGateway] the configured AstraSync API key expires in ${body.daysToExpiry} day(s) — ` +\n              `rotate it at Settings → Developer Tools before integrations start failing.`\n          );\n        } else if (debug) {\n          console.log('[VerificationGateway] API key self-check passed');\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (strictInit) {\n      // strict mode propagates init failures so callers get a clear,\n      // synchronous \"your config is broken\" signal at startup.\n      throw err;\n    }\n    if (debug) {\n      console.log(`[VerificationGateway] init check failed (non-blocking): ${String(err)}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple in-memory cache for verification results\n */\nconst verificationCache = new Map<string, { result: VerificationResult; expiresAt: number }>();\n\n/**\n * Generate cache key from the full request shape.\n *\n * Historically the key was credentials-only (`astraId-apiKey-jwt`),\n * which silently returned the cached result of a prior call even when the\n * subsequent call's purpose/action/counterparty/etc. differed. That was a\n * security gap — a warm cache could serve an allow verdict for a purpose the\n * agent hadn't actually been authorised for. Key now includes every field\n * that affects the backend verdict.\n *\n * MAINTAIN: when adding a field to VerificationRequest that affects the\n * backend verdict, add it to this key. Fields that don't affect verdict\n * (e.g. requestId, timestamps, sdkVersion) don't belong here — including\n * them would needlessly thrash the cache for repeated identical requests.\n *\n * 3.12.0 (Trust Record): `attemptId` and `considerationSet` are\n * deliberately EXCLUDED — like `callerMetadata.observedMetadata` they are\n * observational pass-through that never affects the verdict, and keying on\n * a per-attempt id would defeat verdict caching entirely. Cache hits get\n * their attemptId rewritten in verify() instead (never leak a prior\n * attempt's id from a cached result).\n */\nfunction getCacheKey(request: VerificationRequest, counterpartyId?: string): string {\n  const c = request.credentials;\n  return [\n    c.astraId || '',\n    c.apiKey || '',\n    c.jwt || '',\n    request.purpose || '',\n    request.action || '',\n    request.resourceType || '',\n    request.resource || '',\n    request.jurisdiction || '',\n    request.transactionValue ?? '',\n    request.currency || '',\n    // SECURITY (cross-merchant cache leak): the merchant identity is sent via\n    // `config.counterpartyId`, NOT on the request, so it was previously absent\n    // from the key — two verifies for the SAME agent/purpose/action/value but\n    // DIFFERENT merchants collided, and a grant at a permissive merchant (low\n    // trust floor) was served for a stricter one. Same bug class as the\n    // duration omission (F-A1-07). counterpartyId affects the backend verdict\n    // (trust floor / per-route policy), so it MUST key the cache.\n    counterpartyId || '',\n    request.counterpartyUrl || '',\n    request.counterpartyType || '',\n    request.isSubAgentRequest ? '1' : '0',\n    request.parentAgentId || '',\n    request.subAgentDepth ?? '',\n    // Audit F-A1-07: previously-missing dimensions that DO affect the\n    // backend verdict. Without these, two requests with different\n    // durations (e.g. 60s vs 86400s) collided on the same cache key and\n    // the shorter-duration allow served the longer-duration request.\n    request.durationRequired ?? '',\n    request.invocationProtocol || '',\n    request.enableRuntimeChallenge ? '1' : '0',\n    // callerMetadata fields contribute to risk model; include the ones\n    // backend reads. sourceIp/userAgent/forwardedFor change per-request\n    // so their inclusion effectively forces a re-check for any varying\n    // client (the right behavior — IP-driven anomaly scoring shouldn't\n    // be cached across IPs).\n    request.callerMetadata?.sourceIp || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.userAgent || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.forwardedFor || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || '',\n    // UAT2 Bug B (5.4.1): the commerce phase and cart identity DO affect the\n    // backend verdict — the confirm leg is the ONLY leg that may execute\n    // first-party settlement. Without these, a confirm within the cache TTL of\n    // its start_checkout quote was served the cached quote-leg grant (no\n    // settlementOutcome) and never reached the backend. Same F-A1-07 bug class.\n    request.commercePhase || '',\n    request.checkoutSessionId || '',\n  ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if cached result is still valid\n */\nfunction getCachedResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): VerificationResult | null {\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  const cached = verificationCache.get(key);\n\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {\n    return cached.result;\n  }\n\n  if (cached) {\n    verificationCache.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache a verification result.\n *\n * 3.6.0: uniform 60s default. The earlier step-up TTL split (300s for\n * step-up verdicts) is gone — step-up verdicts are no longer cached AT ALL\n * (see the write predicate in verify()): a cached step_up_required result\n * carries a pollUrl that goes stale (consumed/expired) and, worse, keeps\n * denying retries that the owner has already approved. When `configuredTtl`\n * is set (truthy positive number), it's honoured for cacheable results.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\n\nfunction cacheResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  result: VerificationResult,\n  configuredTtl: number | undefined,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): void {\n  const ttlSeconds = configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0 ? configuredTtl : DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  verificationCache.set(key, {\n    result,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1000,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear the verification cache\n */\nexport function clearCache(): void {\n  verificationCache.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract agent credentials from various sources\n */\nexport function extractCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  query?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n): AgentCredentials {\n  const credentials: AgentCredentials = {};\n\n  // Audit F-A1-12: ASTRA-ID shape validation. Accept only the canonical\n  // pattern (ASTRA-/ASTRAE- prefix + 1-64 url-safe chars) to prevent CRLF\n  // header injection or downstream interpolation surprises. Reject otherwise.\n  const ASTRA_ID_PATTERN = /^ASTRAE?-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;\n\n  // Check for ASTRA-ID in headers (case-insensitive). Accepts the historical\n  // X-Astra-Id name plus the X-Astra-AgentId / x-astra-agent-id alias the\n  // partner asked for in #9a — both surface the same field.\n  const astraIdHeader =\n    headers['x-astra-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-ID'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agentid'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-AgentId'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agent-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Agent-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-AGENT-ID'];\n  if (astraIdHeader) {\n    // Audit F-A1-11: guard array-confusion. If multiple X-Astra-Id headers\n    // were sent (Express collapses to comma-joined string on most paths),\n    // take only the first canonical-shaped one.\n    const raw = Array.isArray(astraIdHeader)\n      ? astraIdHeader[0]\n      : typeof astraIdHeader === 'string'\n        ? astraIdHeader\n        : undefined;\n    if (typeof raw === 'string' && ASTRA_ID_PATTERN.test(raw)) {\n      credentials.astraId = raw;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check for API key in headers\n  const apiKeyHeader = headers['x-api-key'] || headers['X-Api-Key'] || headers['X-API-KEY'];\n  if (apiKeyHeader) {\n    credentials.apiKey = Array.isArray(apiKeyHeader) ? apiKeyHeader[0] : apiKeyHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check Authorization header for Bearer token.\n  // Audit F-A1-11: defensive type guard — Array.isArray gives a non-string,\n  // and Express path quirks can produce undefined despite the truthy check.\n  const authHeader = headers['authorization'] || headers['Authorization'];\n  if (authHeader) {\n    const authValue = Array.isArray(authHeader) ? authHeader[0] : authHeader;\n    if (typeof authValue === 'string') {\n      credentials.authorizationHeader = authValue;\n      if (authValue.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n        credentials.jwt = authValue.slice(7);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check query parameters as fallback\n  if (query) {\n    if (query.astraId && !credentials.astraId) {\n      credentials.astraId = query.astraId;\n    }\n    if (query.apiKey && !credentials.apiKey) {\n      credentials.apiKey = query.apiKey;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if credentials are present\n */\nexport function hasCredentials(credentials: AgentCredentials): boolean {\n  return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);\n}\n\n/**\n * Source of a synthesised guidance response. The sources are split — the\n * `'no_credentials'` shape is the original (caller has no AstraSync\n * credentials, suggest registration). The `'api_error'` shape is for when\n * the verify-access HTTP call itself failed (5xx, network, etc.) — DON'T\n * tell a verified-but-currently-blocked partner to \"register your agent\".\n *\n * 4.0.0 adds `'merchant_misconfig'`: the backend rejected THIS INTEGRATION'S\n * own API key (401 api_key_revoked/expired/invalid). Neither the agent's\n * fault nor a platform outage — retrying won't help, and the inbound agent\n * deserves to know the site operator's integration is broken (the\n * gadget-emporium failure mode: a rotated key silently 401ing every\n * credentialed agent for days).\n */\ntype GuidanceSource = 'no_credentials' | 'api_error' | 'merchant_misconfig';\n\n/**\n * MCP-connector steering (5.1.0). Present only when the backend's well-known\n * doc advertises a hosted bridge. The copy must directly counter the observed\n * model refusal (\"go register manually on the dashboard\"): registration via\n * the connector is the agent's own next action, with the human approval built\n * into the flow.\n */\nfunction mcpGuidance(urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce): GuidanceInfo['mcp'] {\n  if (!urls?.mcpEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    endpoint: urls.mcpEndpoint,\n    discoveryUrl: urls.mcpDiscoveryUrl,\n    message:\n      'If you are operating inside an MCP-capable host (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, or any MCP client), ' +\n      'add the AstraSync MCP connector instead of integrating these URLs by hand: registration through ' +\n      'the connector is KEYLESS and HUMAN-APPROVED — your human approves in an in-chat card, and you ' +\n      'never see, hold, or transmit an API key, password, or private key.',\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Create guidance response for unverified agents or for API-error fallback.\n *\n * The source is split so the `register your agent` template\n * doesn't fire on transient backend failures. Also threads `correlationId`\n * through so adapter `onDenied` handlers can surface it on the merchant's\n * response body for log correlation.\n */\nfunction createGuidanceResponse(\n  _config: GatewayConfig,\n  reason?: string,\n  options: {\n    source?: GuidanceSource;\n    correlationId?: string;\n    /** 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server-echoed attempt handle, threaded like correlationId. */\n    attemptId?: string;\n    urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n    /** 4.0.0: backend-provided remediation URLs for the merchant (misconfig source). */\n    remediation?: { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string };\n  } = {}\n): VerificationResult {\n  const source = options.source ?? 'no_credentials';\n  const isApiError = source === 'api_error';\n  const isMisconfig = source === 'merchant_misconfig';\n  const urls = options.urls;\n\n  const guidance: GuidanceInfo = isMisconfig\n    ? {\n        message:\n          \"This site's AstraSync integration is misconfigured (its API key was revoked, expired, or rotated). \" +\n          'Your identity and the AstraSync platform are fine — contact the site operator. Retrying will not help.',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: options.remediation?.docsUrl ?? urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        steps: [\n          'Report the failure to the site operator — their AstraSync API key needs rotating',\n          'Do not retry: the failure is deterministic until the operator updates their key',\n        ],\n      }\n    : isApiError\n      ? {\n          message:\n            'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry with exponential backoff; if the issue persists, contact support with the correlationId.',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n          steps: [\n            'Retry the request with exponential backoff',\n            'If failures persist, share the correlationId with support',\n          ],\n        }\n      : {\n          message:\n            'This service verifies AI agents before granting access. Please register your agent with AstraSync.',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n          steps: [\n            // MCP steering leads when the hosted bridge is advertised — the\n            // connector is the agent-actionable path (keyless, human-approved).\n            ...(urls?.mcpEndpoint\n              ? [\n                  `Fastest path (inside an MCP host): add the AstraSync MCP connector at ${urls.mcpEndpoint} — keyless, human-approved registration`,\n                ]\n              : []),\n            'Register for an AstraSync account',\n            'Create and register your agent',\n            'Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers',\n            'Retry your request',\n          ],\n          ...(mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }),\n        };\n\n  return {\n    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or\n    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);\n    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).\n    identityVerified: false,\n    policyAllowed: false,\n    guidance,\n    denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ['No valid agent credentials provided'],\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so\n    // partners (and their custom onDenied handlers) can branch on\n    // dimension. Without this, the synthesised stub was indistinguishable\n    // from a real policy deny.\n    failures: isMisconfig\n      ? [\n          {\n            dimension: 'verify_access.merchant_misconfigured',\n            message: reason ?? 'The integration API key was rejected by AstraSync',\n            guidance: guidance.message,\n          },\n        ]\n      : isApiError\n        ? [\n            {\n              dimension: 'verify_access.api_error',\n              message: reason ?? 'Verification temporarily unavailable',\n              guidance: guidance.message,\n            },\n          ]\n        : undefined,\n    // 4.0.0: typed marker so adapters render the misconfig envelope (503 +\n    // MERCHANT_VERIFICATION_MISCONFIGURED) without string-matching.\n    ...(isMisconfig && { misconfigured: true }),\n    // 4.6.0: a transient api_error is retryable — mark it so consumers surface\n    // \"temporarily unavailable, retry\" (recommendation 'error') instead of\n    // coercing the absent recommendation to a policy 'deny'. Misconfig is\n    // deterministic and intentionally NOT marked retryable.\n    ...(isApiError && { retryable: true }),\n    correlationId: options.correlationId,\n    attemptId: options.attemptId,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Call the AstraSync verify-access API\n */\nasync function callVerifyAccessAPI(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  access?: {\n    allowed: boolean;\n    reason?: string;\n    /**\n     * Aggregated denial failures (v2.9.8+). Empty / absent when allowed.\n     * Each entry is `{ dimension, message, guidance? }` — see\n     * `AccessFailure` for the contract.\n     */\n    failures?: Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }>;\n    requiresStepUp?: boolean;\n    requiresApproval?: boolean;\n    appliedPolicy?: {\n      boundaryName: string;\n      policyVersion: string;\n    };\n    counterparty?: {\n      id: string;\n      name: string;\n      trustScoreRequirement: number;\n    };\n  };\n  agent?: {\n    kyaAgentId: string;\n    astraId: string;\n    name: string;\n    trustScore: number;\n    trustLevel: string;\n    agentStatus: string;\n    blockchainStatus: string;\n  };\n  developer?: {\n    kyaOwnerId: string;\n    fullName: string;\n    email: string;\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  organization?: {\n    name: string;\n    verified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Structured explanation of the verification decision. Tells the merchant\n   * WHY (id verified? challenge passed? request within PDLSS? trust score?)\n   * without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or other-tenant counterparty\n   * membership. Empty `attestations` unless the endpoint's access policy\n   * declared `required_attestations`.\n   */\n  verificationContext?: {\n    idVerified: boolean;\n    runtimeChallenge: {\n      status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';\n      checkedAt: string | null;\n    };\n    pdlssCheck: {\n      result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';\n      purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';\n      scope: 'approved' | 'denied';\n    };\n    dynamicTrustScore: number;\n    attestations: Array<{\n      type: string;\n      status: 'passed' | 'failed';\n      /** LMAX-POC C1: underlying check timestamp for merchant freshness gates. */\n      checkedAt: string;\n      validUntil?: string;\n      proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';\n      proof: string;\n    }>;\n  };\n  error?: string;\n  /**\n   * 4.0.0: the backend 401'd this integration's OWN API key (revoked /\n   * expired / invalid) — deterministic merchant-side misconfig, not a\n   * transient failure. `misconfigCode` carries the backend's api_key_* code\n   * and `remediation` its operator-facing URLs when present.\n   */\n  misconfig?: boolean;\n  misconfigCode?: string;\n  remediation?: { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string };\n  /**\n   * When the verify-access server response carries a\n   * correlationId on an error envelope, propagate it so the SDK can thread\n   * it through createGuidanceResponse → adapter onDenied → merchant body.\n   */\n  correlationId?: string;\n  /**\n   * 3.12.0 (Trust Record): the server echoes the attempt-chain\n   * handle top-level on every response branch (error envelopes included).\n   */\n  attemptId?: string;\n}> {\n  const { credentials, ...requestData } = request;\n\n  // Build the request body. agentId is omitted when not provided so the\n  // server treats it as an anonymous canonical-flow call (Branch A/B/C).\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n    ...(credentials.astraId && { agentId: credentials.astraId }),\n    ...(requestData.purpose && { purpose: requestData.purpose }),\n  };\n\n  // Add optional fields\n  if (requestData.action) body.action = requestData.action;\n  if (requestData.resourceType) body.resourceType = requestData.resourceType;\n  if (requestData.resource) body.resource = requestData.resource;\n  if (requestData.jurisdiction) body.jurisdiction = requestData.jurisdiction;\n  if (requestData.transactionValue) body.transactionValue = requestData.transactionValue;\n  if (requestData.currency) body.currency = requestData.currency;\n  if (requestData.isSubAgentRequest) body.isSubAgentRequest = requestData.isSubAgentRequest;\n  if (requestData.parentAgentId) body.parentAgentId = requestData.parentAgentId;\n  if (requestData.subAgentDepth !== undefined) body.subAgentDepth = requestData.subAgentDepth;\n  // Handshake Protocol v10 additions\n  if (requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge)\n    body.enableRuntimeChallenge = requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge;\n  if (requestData.createSession) body.createSession = requestData.createSession;\n  if (requestData.durationRequired) body.durationRequired = requestData.durationRequired;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyType) body.counterpartyType = requestData.counterpartyType;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyUrl) body.counterpartyUrl = requestData.counterpartyUrl;\n  if (config.counterpartyId) body.counterpartyId = config.counterpartyId;\n  if (requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions)\n    body.runtimeChallengeOptions = requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions;\n  // Round-12 (F19): transport-vs-intent separation. MCP middleware sets\n  // this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers leave it unset.\n  if (requestData.invocationProtocol) body.invocationProtocol = requestData.invocationProtocol;\n  // 5.3.0 (astra-pay): checkout-leg discriminator — first-party settlement\n  // fires only on 'confirm'; absent keeps pre-phase server behavior.\n  if (requestData.commercePhase) body.commercePhase = requestData.commercePhase;\n  // Per-cart idempotency key (checkout session id) forwarded on the confirm\n  // leg so concurrent confirms for one cart charge at most once.\n  if (requestData.checkoutSessionId) body.checkoutSessionId = requestData.checkoutSessionId;\n  // Order-plane cart lines (receipts + fulfillment email) — informational.\n  if (requestData.checkoutItems) body.checkoutItems = requestData.checkoutItems;\n  // 3.9.0 (§33.5 #1): raw commerce artifacts forwarded verbatim — the\n  // backend's Step 0.5 pipeline does the cryptographic verification\n  // server-side (adapters forward, never verify locally).\n  if (requestData.commerceArtifacts) body.commerceArtifacts = requestData.commerceArtifacts;\n  // 3.12.0 (Trust Record, §33.5 #3): attempt-chain handle + consideration set,\n  // forwarded skip-when-undefined (observedMetadata precedent) — pure\n  // observational pass-through; the server echoes attemptId on every branch.\n  if (requestData.attemptId) body.attemptId = requestData.attemptId;\n  if (requestData.considerationSet) body.considerationSet = requestData.considerationSet;\n\n  // Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): emit the SDK package version on every\n  // verify-access body so the backend can auto-populate `kya_counterparty.\n  // sdk_version` for the calling endpoint. Body field (not User-Agent\n  // header) is the canonical channel — works in Node, browser, behind\n  // Cloudflare, and across SDK bundlers without environment-specific\n  // header gymnastics. Backend's `validation.ts:verifyAccessSchema`\n  // accepts the semver regex; the auto-pop logic is forward-only.\n  body.sdkVersion = SDK_VERSION;\n\n  // Forward caller metadata when present. Merges the legacy top-level\n  // clientIp/userAgent into the nested block for backward compatibility.\n  if (requestData.callerMetadata || requestData.clientIp || requestData.userAgent) {\n    const meta = {\n      ...(requestData.clientIp && { sourceIp: requestData.clientIp }),\n      ...(requestData.userAgent && { userAgent: requestData.userAgent }),\n      ...requestData.callerMetadata,\n    };\n    if (Object.keys(meta).length > 0) body.callerMetadata = meta;\n  }\n\n  // Build headers\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    ...config.customHeaders,\n  };\n\n  // verify-access requires authentication. Use ONLY the merchant's\n  // configured apiKey for outbound auth. Previously the caller's inbound\n  // Authorization header took priority, which pivoted the verify-access\n  // call to the caller's identity — letting an attacker who supplied\n  // their own Authorization header trigger verify-access calls under\n  // THEIR account and observe the resulting verdicts for arbitrary\n  // lookups they triggered via the merchant. Audit F-A1-10.\n  //\n  // The caller-supplied JWT (if any) is already extracted to\n  // credentials.jwt and travels in the verify-access request body so\n  // backend can evaluate it as the agent's identity claim — separate from\n  // the merchant-attribution auth on the outbound HTTPS call.\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    // Legacy header kept for compatibility with any middleware that reads it directly.\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    // 4.0.0: hard timeout — without one, a backend that accepts the\n    // connection but never answers hangs the merchant's middleware and every\n    // inbound agent request behind it (observed live on a partner property).\n    // Timeouts land on the catch path below → api_error (fail-closed),\n    // NOT misconfig. The edge adapter races its own tighter withBudget.\n    const response = await sdkFetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: JSON.stringify(body),\n      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(config.verifyTimeoutMs ?? 10_000),\n    });\n\n    const data = await response.json();\n\n    // v2.3.8 (defect #29): treat 410 Gone as a deterministic deactivated-endpoint\n    // signal. Older SDKs may treat any non-2xx as transient and retry; v2.3.8+\n    // surfaces it as a structured denial with `reason: 'endpoint_deactivated'`\n    // so callers can distinguish \"endpoint gone\" from \"endpoint denied this\".\n    if (response.status === 410) {\n      return {\n        success: true,\n        // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): keep the server-echoed attempt handle even on\n        // the synthesised 410 deny shape (echoed on every branch).\n        attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n        access: {\n          allowed: false,\n          reason: 'endpoint_deactivated',\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'endpoint.deactivated',\n              message:\n                typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'Endpoint has been deactivated',\n              guidance:\n                typeof data?.guidance === 'string'\n                  ? data.guidance\n                  : 'Reactivate via POST /api/endpoints/{id}/reactivate, or update the URL on the calling agent.',\n            },\n          ],\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      // 4.0.0: a 401 from verify-access can ONLY mean the backend rejected\n      // THIS INTEGRATION'S own API key — agent denials come back as 200 with\n      // access.allowed=false. Surface it as merchant-misconfig, not a\n      // transient api_error: it is deterministic until the operator rotates\n      // the key, and the \"retry with backoff\" template actively misleads.\n      // Backends ≥ this round also send code: api_key_* + remediation URLs.\n      if (response.status === 401) {\n        return {\n          success: false,\n          error: data.message || data.error || 'Integration API key rejected',\n          misconfig: true,\n          misconfigCode: typeof data?.code === 'string' ? data.code : undefined,\n          remediation:\n            data?.remediation && typeof data.remediation === 'object'\n              ? (data.remediation as { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string })\n              : undefined,\n          correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n          attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n        };\n      }\n      // Round-10 (#47, O5): propagate correlationId on the error path too if\n      // the server happened to include one (some 5xx error envelopes carry\n      // it). Lets the SDK pass it through to the adapter onDenied handler.\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: data.message || data.error || `API returned ${response.status}`,\n        correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n        attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return data;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: `Failed to call verify-access API: ${message}`,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for a single verify() call (as opposed to GatewayConfig, which is\n * per-gateway). Mirrors the Java SDK's `verify(request, bypassCache)`.\n */\nexport interface VerifyOptions {\n  /**\n   * Skip the cache READ for this call so the request is guaranteed to reach\n   * the backend (the result is still written to the cache if cacheable).\n   * Used by the step-up hold-and-poll retry: the re-verify after an approval\n   * must hit the server to redeem the single-use approval.\n   */\n  bypassCache?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Main verification function\n */\nexport async function verify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n  // v2.5.0: read well-known URLs from cache (prefetched by adapter at middleware creation).\n  // Synchronous — never triggers a fetch. If cache is empty, guidance URLs are empty strings.\n  const urls = mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl\n    ? getCachedWellKnownUrls(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl)\n    : undefined;\n\n  // One-time init self-test — fire-and-forget by default, never blocks verify().\n  // Audit F-A6-33: when GatewayConfig.strictInit is set, the init promise is\n  // awaited and any failure throws synchronously so callers learn about\n  // misconfigured apiBaseUrl on the first verify() call rather than silently\n  // running with broken auth.\n  if (!initCheckPerformed && !mergedConfig.disableInitChecks && mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl) {\n    if (mergedConfig.strictInit) {\n      await performInitCheck(\n        mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl,\n        mergedConfig.debug,\n        true,\n        mergedConfig.apiKey\n      );\n    } else {\n      void performInitCheck(\n        mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl,\n        mergedConfig.debug,\n        false,\n        mergedConfig.apiKey\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Deprecation warning for v2.3.0 removed config fields. Fires once per process.\n  if (\n    !deprecationWarningShown &&\n    (config.minTrustScore !== undefined || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== undefined)\n  ) {\n    deprecationWarningShown = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 ' +\n        'and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access decisions ' +\n        '(verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score). To gate access ' +\n        \"to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side.\"\n    );\n  }\n\n  // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits here. We forward the\n  // request to the server with no agentId; the server applies the endpoint's\n  // unverifiedAgentPolicy and returns advisory. createGuidanceResponse remains\n  // as the offline fallback if the API itself fails (handled below).\n\n  // Check cache first. Caching on unless caller explicitly sets cacheTtl: 0\n  // to disable. Undefined falls through to the 60s default at cacheResult\n  // write time. options.bypassCache skips the read only (hold-and-poll retry\n  // must reach the backend to redeem its approval).\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && !options?.bypassCache) {\n    const cached = getCachedResult(request, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n        console.log('[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result');\n      }\n      // 3.12.0 (Trust Record, §33.5 #3): attemptId is excluded from the cache\n      // key, so the stored result may carry a PRIOR attempt's id. Overwrite it\n      // with this request's own attemptId — or drop it when this request has\n      // none — a cached verdict must never leak another attempt's handle.\n      // Shallow clone: never mutate the stored entry (a concurrent holder of\n      // the same cached object may still be reading it).\n      const hit: VerificationResult = { ...cached };\n      if (request.attemptId) {\n        hit.attemptId = request.attemptId;\n      } else {\n        delete hit.attemptId;\n      }\n      return hit;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Inject counterparty info from config if not already set in request\n  const enrichedRequest = { ...request };\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl && mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl = mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl;\n  }\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyType && mergedConfig.counterpartyType) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyType = mergedConfig.counterpartyType;\n  }\n\n  // Call the API\n  if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n    console.log('[VerificationGateway] Calling verify-access API');\n  }\n\n  const apiResponse = await callVerifyAccessAPI(mergedConfig, enrichedRequest);\n\n  // 3.6.0: the server emits a top-level denialReasons array on every deny\n  // path (same strings as the failure messages). Non-empty → authoritative;\n  // absent/empty → fall back to the client-side reconstructions below.\n  const rawServerDenialReasons = (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).denialReasons;\n  const serverDenialReasons =\n    Array.isArray(rawServerDenialReasons) && rawServerDenialReasons.length > 0\n      ? (rawServerDenialReasons as string[])\n      : undefined;\n\n  // Handle API errors\n  if (!apiResponse.success) {\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): distinguish API errors from missing-credentials.\n    // The previous default tagged any failure with the \"register your\n    // agent\" template, which is misleading to a verified partner whose\n    // verify-access call hit a 500. The `api_error` source surfaces a\n    // typed `verify_access.api_error` failure entry instead.\n    // 4.0.0: a rejected merchant key gets its own source — deterministic\n    // misconfig must not wear the \"temporarily unavailable, retry\" template.\n    return createGuidanceResponse(mergedConfig, apiResponse.error, {\n      source: apiResponse.misconfig ? 'merchant_misconfig' : 'api_error',\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as { correlationId?: string }).correlationId,\n      attemptId: (apiResponse as { attemptId?: string }).attemptId,\n      remediation: apiResponse.remediation,\n      urls,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Check access result\n  if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {\n    // v2.9.8 (defect M1): aggregated failures across every gate that\n    // denied. Surface them on the result so the integrator can see every\n    // blocker in one go instead of the previous fail-fast cascade.\n    const aggregatedFailures = (apiResponse.access as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)\n      ?.failures as Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }> | undefined;\n    // Round-18 G4: backend denied access (PDLSS or other gate); identity status\n    // depends on whether the backend resolved the caller. Read from\n    // verificationContext.idVerified; default false if absent (anonymous or\n    // identity-fail paths land here too). policyAllowed is false by definition\n    // in this branch (apiResponse.access.allowed === false).\n    const idVerifiedFromBackend =\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true;\n    const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,\n      policyAllowed: false,\n      // 3.6.0: the server now emits top-level denialReasons on every deny\n      // path — prefer it verbatim; the failure-message reconstruction remains\n      // as the fallback for older backends.\n      denialReasons:\n        serverDenialReasons ??\n        (aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0\n          ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message)\n          : apiResponse.access?.reason\n            ? [apiResponse.access.reason]\n            : ['Access denied']),\n      failures: aggregatedFailures,\n      requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n      requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n      guidance: {\n        message: apiResponse.access?.reason || 'Access denied by PDLSS policy',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        // 5.1.0: anonymous callers land on this branch — steer MCP-hosted\n        // agents to the connector (this is what the edge deny body surfaces).\n        ...(mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }),\n      },\n      verifiedAt: new Date(),\n      // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too\n      sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n      // Anonymous traffic has no session → correlationId is the per-attempt\n      // linking key (the sessionId-equivalent for anonymous callers).\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n      // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server echoes the attempt-chain handle on\n      // every branch — denials included (the funnel outlives one deny).\n      attemptId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).attemptId as string | undefined,\n      recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n        .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n      recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n        | string[]\n        | undefined,\n      stepUpApproval: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).stepUpApproval as\n        | StepUpApprovalInfo\n        | undefined,\n      settlement: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlement as\n        | SettlementArtifact\n        | undefined,\n      settlementOutcome: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementOutcome as\n        | SettlementOutcomeInfo\n        | undefined,\n    };\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  // Build successful result\n  const agent: VerifiedAgent | undefined = apiResponse.agent\n    ? {\n        astraId: apiResponse.agent.astraId,\n        name: apiResponse.agent.name,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,\n        trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),\n        blockchainVerified: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === 'verified',\n        status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus as VerifiedAgent['status'],\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const developer: VerifiedDeveloper | undefined = apiResponse.developer\n    ? {\n        astradId: apiResponse.developer.kyaOwnerId,\n        name: apiResponse.developer.fullName,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.developer.trustScore || 0,\n        verified: apiResponse.developer.identityVerified,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const organization: VerifiedOrganization | undefined = apiResponse.organization\n    ? {\n        name: apiResponse.organization.name,\n        verified: apiResponse.organization.verified,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  // Verification context — structured \"why\" the merchant gets in v2.2.4+.\n  // Carries appliedPolicy (no UUIDs), pdlssCheck summary, dynamic trust score,\n  // and policy-driven attestations. Replaces the old over-sharing `pdlss` block.\n  const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;\n\n  const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n    // 4.5.0 (probe F1): read idVerified from verificationContext with the\n    // SAME absent⇒false default as the deny branch. The previous `!== false`\n    // default manufactured `identityVerified: true` for anonymous\n    // allow_full/allow_partial/audit responses (which allow access but omit\n    // verificationContext entirely) — the \"anonymous caller labelled\n    // verified\" defect. Every authenticated success response has carried\n    // `verificationContext.idVerified: true` since v2.2.4, so a truth claim\n    // this load-bearing must never be defaulted on.\n    identityVerified:\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true,\n    policyAllowed: true,\n    agent,\n    developer,\n    organization,\n    appliedPolicy: apiResponse.access?.appliedPolicy,\n    verificationContext,\n    requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n    requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n    cacheTtl: mergedConfig.cacheTtl,\n    // Handshake Protocol v10 enhanced fields (present when backend returns them)\n    sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n    // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous responses surface correlationId\n    // (no session row exists for unverified callers).\n    correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n    // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server-echoed attempt-chain handle.\n    attemptId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).attemptId as string | undefined,\n    runtimeChallenge: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).runtimeChallenge as\n      | RuntimeChallengeResult\n      | undefined,\n    tokenGuidance: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).tokenGuidance as\n      | TokenGuidance\n      | undefined,\n    recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n    recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n      | string[]\n      | undefined,\n    warningHeader: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).warningHeader as\n      | { name: string; value: string }\n      | undefined,\n    stepUpApproval: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).stepUpApproval as\n      | StepUpApprovalInfo\n      | undefined,\n    settlement: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlement as\n      | SettlementArtifact\n      | undefined,\n    settlementOutcome: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementOutcome as\n      | SettlementOutcomeInfo\n      | undefined,\n  };\n\n  // Enforce AstraSync recommendation\n  if (result.recommendation === 'deny') {\n    // Round-18 G4: recommendation-driven deny lands on the success-path\n    // construction (identity was resolved). Flip policy only — identity stays\n    // verified — so adapters return 403 (re-auth won't help; the policy\n    // decision is the blocker).\n    result.policyAllowed = false;\n    // 3.6.0: server-sent top-level denialReasons wins; recommendationReasons\n    // reconstruction is the fallback for older backends.\n    result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ??\n      result.recommendationReasons ?? ['Access denied by AstraSync recommendation'];\n    result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge\n      ? {\n          message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || 'runtime challenge failed'}`,\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        }\n      : {\n          message: result.recommendationReasons?.[0] || 'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        };\n  } else if (result.recommendation === 'step_up_required') {\n    // The escalation signal rides on `requiresStepUp` / `stepUpApproval`, not\n    // on any masquerade of the (now-removed) access band.\n    result.requiresStepUp = true;\n    result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ??\n      result.recommendationReasons ?? ['Step-up verification required'];\n  }\n\n  // Cache the result. Never cache denials (agent may fix challenge endpoint\n  // and retry) NOR step-up escalations (3.6.0 — the same bug the Java SDK\n  // had: a cached step_up_required verdict keeps denying retries the owner\n  // has already approved, and its pollUrl goes stale once consumed/expired).\n  // Escalations stay uncached even when the caller pins an explicit cacheTtl.\n  const escalates =\n    result.requiresStepUp === true ||\n    result.requiresApproval === true ||\n    result.recommendation === 'step_up_required';\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== 'deny' && !escalates) {\n    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a counterparty's grant/deny decision for a verification session.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function recordDecision(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  sessionId: string,\n  decision: 'granted' | 'denied',\n  reason?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/${sessionId}/decision`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({ decision, reason }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report post-hoc consideration/outcome data for an attempt chain (Trust\n * Record). Use when the signal never reached verify-access: a\n * catalog served from a local cache, a transport-side deny (sku not found,\n * over budget), or a terminal outcome (settled / blocked on step-up).\n * Authenticated with the same credentials as verify(); the backend responds\n * 202 and folds the data into the attempt chain keyed by `attemptId`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed, never throws.\n */\nexport async function reportAttempt(config: GatewayConfig, report: AttemptReport): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  // counterpartyId resolution mirrors reportUnregisteredAttempt: an explicit\n  // report value wins; otherwise attribute to the configured endpoint.\n  const body = {\n    ...report,\n    ...(!report.counterpartyId &&\n      config.counterpartyId && { counterpartyId: config.counterpartyId }),\n  };\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/attempt-report`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify(body),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch the per-route policy for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * v2.9.7 moved policy authority into the dashboard — the SDK no longer\n * accepts `routes` from merchant-side source code, it fetches them from\n * here on init (and refreshes periodically).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the request fails for any reason — the caller decides\n * how to fall back (the middleware allows-all when no policy is loaded so\n * a misconfigured init doesn't take down the merchant's API).\n */\nexport async function fetchRoutes(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<RouteAccessConfigShape[] | null> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  try {\n    const response = await sdkFetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/routes`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers }\n    );\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { routes?: RouteAccessConfigShape[] } };\n    return body.data?.routes ?? [];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of an EndpointRoute as the SDK consumes it. Mirrors the\n * server's `EndpointRoute` type and the SDK's `RouteAccessConfig` — same\n * JSON moves between server and SDK unchanged.\n */\nexport interface RouteAccessConfigShape {\n  pattern: string;\n  method: string;\n  /** Pass through unenforced (observe). Replaces `minAccessLevel: 'none'`. */\n  observe?: boolean;\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  requiredPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  maxDuration?: number;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  requirePurpose?: boolean;\n  /** Send-mapping — see RouteAccessConfig in types.ts. */\n  purpose?: string;\n  action?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an agent AND automatically record the grant/deny decision.\n *\n * This is the recommended entry point for counterparties that call verify()\n * directly (e.g. MCP servers) rather than using createMiddleware().\n * It adds createSession: true, then fire-and-forgets the decision.\n */\nexport async function verifyAndRecord(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n  const result = await verify(mergedConfig, { ...request, createSession: true }, options);\n  const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n  if (sessionId) {\n    // Round-18 G4: a session is \"granted\" only if identity verified AND\n    // policy allowed; either failing is a deny.\n    if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n    } else {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n    }\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report an unregistered agent attempt (no AstraSync credentials).\n * Called by SDK adapters when an agent is redirected to /docs/agent-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    /**\n     * 3.6.0: optional — the backend attributes by counterpartyId first (sent\n     * from config below) and requires at least ONE of counterpartyId/URL.\n     * A null/undefined URL is omitted from the body, not sent as null.\n     */\n    counterpartyUrl?: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    sourceIp?: string;\n    userAgent?: string;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n    /**\n     * 3.9.0 — edge-adapter evidence fields, persisted into the\n     * event's eventData by the backend: `protocol` = detected transport/\n     * credential protocol; `evidence` = light crypto-free detection detail.\n     */\n    protocol?: string;\n    evidence?: Record<string, unknown>;\n    /**\n     * Maximal metadata capture — the full sanitised metadata for an\n     * unregistered caller (every signal legitimately visible on the wire).\n     * Persisted into eventData; feeds platform attribution and (via\n     * correlationId) registration auto-fill. Fire-and-forget, so free.\n     */\n    observedMetadata?: ObservedMetadata;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  const { counterpartyUrl, ...rest } = data;\n  const body = {\n    ...rest,\n    ...(counterpartyUrl && { counterpartyUrl }),\n    ...(config.counterpartyId && { counterpartyId: config.counterpartyId }),\n  };\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/unregistered-attempt`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(body),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check failure.\n * Called by SDK adapters when the agent's requested PDLSS exceeds\n * counterparty-defined maximums BEFORE calling verify-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    agentId: string;\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    failures: Array<{\n      field: string;\n      requested: string | number;\n      limit: string | number | string[];\n      message: string;\n    }>;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/counterparty-pre-check-failure`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n *\n * The return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s split — partners\n * writing custom handlers around `quickVerify` get the same identity/policy\n * distinction as those calling `verify()` directly. Map to HTTP status the\n * same way: `!identityVerified` → 401; `identityVerified && !policyAllowed`\n * → 403.\n */\nexport async function quickVerify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  credentials: AgentCredentials\n): Promise<{\n  identityVerified: boolean;\n  policyAllowed: boolean;\n  reason?: string;\n}> {\n  const result = await verify(config, {\n    credentials,\n    purpose: 'verification',\n  });\n\n  return {\n    identityVerified: result.identityVerified,\n    policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,\n    reason: result.denialReasons?.[0],\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Maximal metadata capture — the shared, edge-safe sanitiser.\n *\n * AstraSync's thesis is total metadata capture: every header and connection\n * signal an inbound agent presents is a signal we want to keep. This module is\n * the ONE place that decides what is safe to store verbatim, what is a secret\n * to drop, and what credential headers reduce to a safe *format prefix* (a\n * platform signal, never the secret itself).\n *\n * It runs in three places that must agree byte-for-byte:\n *   - the edge adapter (`@astrasyncai/adapter-lambda`) — the richest capture\n *     point (full CloudFront header arrays),\n *   - the SDK adapters (express / nextjs) — for SDK-only merchants with no edge,\n *   - (indirectly) the backend, which stores whatever the above forward.\n *\n * Pure — no Node built-ins, no I/O — so it is safe in Lambda@Edge, the browser\n * build, and Deno. Capture is cheap: at the edge and SDK it is local string\n * work, and the backend stores it on a fire-and-forget event insert, so it adds\n * ZERO verify-access decision latency. Detection (which few signals imply which\n * vendor) is a separate, curated concern — see `platform-signatures.ts`.\n */\n\n/**\n * Version of the capture semantics (what is kept, dropped, reduced, or\n * derived — and under which key names).\n *\n * Capture semantics are FROZEN within a package major version: a given\n * `schemaVersion` always means the same field vocabulary and the same\n * keep/drop/reduce rules. The number bumps only on a SEMANTIC change to\n * capture (a renamed key, a changed reduction rule) — never for additive\n * signals, and never merely because the package version moved. To tell\n * builds apart, use the `sdkVersion` already present on the verify body;\n * `schemaVersion` answers the different question \"how do I interpret this\n * stored metadata?\".\n */\nexport const CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;\n\n/**\n * The captured, sanitised view of an inbound agent's request metadata. Attached\n * to verify-access / beacon payloads as `callerMetadata.observedMetadata`.\n */\nexport interface ObservedMetadata {\n  /** Header name → value, secrets removed, verbatim otherwise. */\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Safe key-format prefix of a credential header (e.g. `sk-ant-api03`,\n   * `sk-proj`, `AIza`) — a platform signal, NEVER the secret. Absent if no\n   * credential header was present or none matched a known format.\n   */\n  apiKeyFormat?: string;\n  /**\n   * The subset of `headers` that are known platform-signal headers\n   * (`openai-organization`, `x-goog-user-project`, `anthropic-version`, …),\n   * pulled out for convenient detection + display. Values are the same\n   * sanitised strings as in `headers`.\n   */\n  platformHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Connection-layer signals (IP, ASN, country, TLS version, HTTP version,\n   * device class, TLS fingerprint). Edge adapters populate this from the\n   * platform's native connection surface — the authoritative source. SDK\n   * adapters populate it as a fallback via {@link deriveConnectionFromHeaders}\n   * when a CDN in front of the merchant injected the equivalent headers;\n   * absent when neither source had anything.\n   */\n  connection?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Number of cookie pairs the caller sent. The `cookie` header VALUE is a\n   * secret and is always dropped; the COUNT is a client-shape signal\n   * (browsers carry cookies, most automation carries none) that would\n   * otherwise be unobservable downstream. Absent when no cookie header\n   * arrived.\n   */\n  cookieCount?: number;\n  /**\n   * Query-string parameter NAMES (deduped, lowercased) — values are NEVER\n   * captured (they routinely carry OAuth codes, tokens, and PII, and no\n   * deny-list is complete). Names alone fingerprint client shape. Populated\n   * by the edge path, which sees the raw query string.\n   */\n  queryKeys?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Version of the capture semantics this object was produced under — see\n   * {@link CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION}. Optional for backward compatibility with\n   * metadata captured before the field existed.\n   */\n  schemaVersion?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of sanitising a raw header map. `headers` is always present (possibly\n * empty); `apiKeyFormat` / `platformHeaders` only when a signal was found.\n */\nexport interface SanitizeHeadersResult {\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  apiKeyFormat?: string;\n  platformHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Cookie-pair count; the cookie value itself is always dropped. */\n  cookieCount?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Header names dropped entirely — genuine secrets or our own credentials that\n * describe the request's transport, not the agent. Matched case-insensitively\n * on the exact header name.\n */\nconst SECRET_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([\n  'cookie',\n  'set-cookie',\n  'x-csrf-token',\n  'proxy-authorization',\n  'x-astrasync-signature',\n  'x-astrasync-secret',\n  'x-hub-signature',\n  'x-hub-signature-256',\n  // Short-lived verify dedupe token — must never persist in stored metadata.\n  'x-astra-verified-hop',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Header-name prefixes dropped entirely — our own credential / signing surface\n * (`x-astrasync-*`, `kya-*`) must never round-trip into stored metadata.\n */\nconst SECRET_HEADER_PREFIXES = ['x-astrasync-', 'kya-', 'kya_'];\n\n/**\n * Credential headers whose VALUE is a secret but whose FORMAT is a signal. We\n * keep the leading format prefix (up to the random tail) and drop the rest.\n */\nconst CREDENTIAL_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([\n  'authorization',\n  'x-api-key',\n  'x-goog-api-key',\n  'api-key',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Header names that carry a raw signature value (drop the value; the presence\n * is not worth a bloat risk). Matched as a suffix so `x-*-signature` variants\n * are covered without an exhaustive list.\n */\nfunction isSignatureHeader(name: string): boolean {\n  return name === 'signature' || name.endsWith('-signature') || name.endsWith('-signature-256');\n}\n\n/**\n * Known platform-signal headers — pulled into `platformHeaders` for convenient\n * detection + display. Exact names plus a few prefixes (`x-goog-`,\n * `x-stainless-` — the OpenAI/Anthropic SDK client fingerprint headers).\n */\nconst PLATFORM_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([\n  'openai-organization',\n  'openai-project',\n  'openai-version',\n  'openai-processing-ms',\n  'anthropic-version',\n  'anthropic-beta',\n  'x-goog-user-project',\n  'x-goog-api-client',\n  'user-agent',\n  'x-agent-card-url',\n  'x-agent-provider',\n]);\n// `sec-ch-*` client hints are platform signals: Chromium forks (agentic\n// browsers included) often carry their real brand in `sec-ch-ua` even when\n// the UA string mimics stock Chrome.\nconst PLATFORM_HEADER_PREFIXES = [\n  'x-goog-',\n  'x-stainless-',\n  'x-anthropic-',\n  'x-openai-',\n  'sec-ch-',\n];\n\n/**\n * Known API-key format prefixes, longest-first so `sk-ant-api03` wins over\n * `sk-ant` and `sk-`. Each is the SAFE, non-secret leading token of a\n * credential; the random tail is never captured.\n */\nconst KEY_FORMAT_PREFIXES = [\n  'sk-ant-api03',\n  'sk-ant-api',\n  'sk-ant',\n  'sk-proj',\n  'sk-svcacct',\n  'sk-or-v1',\n  'sk-or',\n  'sk-lf',\n  'sk-',\n  'gsk_',\n  'aiza',\n  'ya29',\n  'ghp_',\n  'gho_',\n  'github_pat_',\n  'xai-',\n  'pplx-',\n  'r8_',\n  'hf_',\n  'astra-',\n  'astrae-',\n];\n\n/** Size caps — the only guard against jsonb bloat from a hostile POST. */\nexport const MAX_HEADERS = 64;\nexport const MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES = 1024;\nexport const MAX_TOTAL_BYTES = 16 * 1024;\n\nfunction byteLength(s: string): number {\n  // Edge-safe (no Buffer): count UTF-8 bytes without allocating a Buffer.\n  let bytes = 0;\n  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {\n    const code = s.charCodeAt(i);\n    if (code < 0x80) bytes += 1;\n    else if (code < 0x800) bytes += 2;\n    else if (code >= 0xd800 && code <= 0xdbff) {\n      bytes += 4;\n      i++; // surrogate pair\n    } else bytes += 3;\n  }\n  return bytes;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract the safe key-format prefix from a credential header value. Strips a\n * leading `Bearer ` / `Basic ` scheme, then returns the longest known prefix\n * that the (lowercased) value starts with. Returns undefined for opaque values\n * (e.g. a bare UUID token) so we never guess a format we don't recognise.\n */\nexport function extractApiKeyFormat(rawValue: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!rawValue) return undefined;\n  let value = rawValue.trim();\n  const spaceIdx = value.indexOf(' ');\n  if (spaceIdx > 0) {\n    const scheme = value.slice(0, spaceIdx).toLowerCase();\n    if (scheme === 'bearer' || scheme === 'basic' || scheme === 'token') {\n      value = value.slice(spaceIdx + 1).trim();\n    }\n  }\n  const lower = value.toLowerCase();\n  for (const prefix of KEY_FORMAT_PREFIXES) {\n    if (lower.startsWith(prefix)) {\n      // Return the prefix as-declared in the list (canonical casing).\n      return prefix;\n    }\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction isSecretHeader(name: string): boolean {\n  if (SECRET_HEADER_NAMES.has(name)) return true;\n  if (SECRET_HEADER_PREFIXES.some((p) => name.startsWith(p))) return true;\n  if (isSignatureHeader(name)) return true;\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction isPlatformHeader(name: string): boolean {\n  if (PLATFORM_HEADER_NAMES.has(name)) return true;\n  return PLATFORM_HEADER_PREFIXES.some((p) => name.startsWith(p));\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitise a raw header map for storage. Deny-lists genuine secrets, reduces\n * credential headers to a safe format prefix, keeps everything else verbatim,\n * and enforces the size caps that bound jsonb growth.\n *\n * Accepts any string→(string|string[]|undefined) map (Node's `req.headers`,\n * CloudFront's flattened headers, a plain object). Multi-value headers are\n * joined with `, ` per RFC 7230.\n */\nexport function sanitizeHeaders(\n  raw: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> | undefined | null\n): SanitizeHeadersResult {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {};\n  const platformHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};\n  let apiKeyFormat: string | undefined;\n  let cookieCount: number | undefined;\n  let totalBytes = 0;\n  let count = 0;\n\n  if (!raw) return { headers };\n\n  for (const rawName of Object.keys(raw)) {\n    if (count >= MAX_HEADERS) break;\n    const name = rawName.toLowerCase();\n    const rawValue = raw[rawName];\n    if (rawValue === undefined) continue;\n    const joined = Array.isArray(rawValue) ? rawValue.join(', ') : String(rawValue);\n\n    // Credential headers: capture the format prefix, drop the secret.\n    if (CREDENTIAL_HEADER_NAMES.has(name)) {\n      const fmt = extractApiKeyFormat(joined);\n      if (fmt && !apiKeyFormat) apiKeyFormat = fmt;\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    // Cookie: the value is a secret (dropped below), but the PAIR COUNT is a\n    // client-shape signal worth keeping.\n    if (name === 'cookie') {\n      cookieCount = joined.split(';').filter((s) => s.trim().length > 0).length;\n    }\n\n    // Genuine secrets: drop entirely.\n    if (isSecretHeader(name)) continue;\n\n    // Everything else describing the agent: keep, bounded.\n    let value = joined;\n    if (byteLength(value) > MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES) {\n      value = value.slice(0, MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES);\n    }\n    const entryBytes = byteLength(name) + byteLength(value);\n    if (totalBytes + entryBytes > MAX_TOTAL_BYTES) continue;\n    totalBytes += entryBytes;\n    count++;\n    headers[name] = value;\n    if (isPlatformHeader(name)) platformHeaders[name] = value;\n  }\n\n  const result: SanitizeHeadersResult = { headers };\n  if (apiKeyFormat) result.apiKeyFormat = apiKeyFormat;\n  if (Object.keys(platformHeaders).length > 0) result.platformHeaders = platformHeaders;\n  if (cookieCount !== undefined) result.cookieCount = cookieCount;\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Pull the known platform-signal headers out of an ALREADY-sanitised header\n * map. `sanitizeHeaders` already computes this as a by-product; this standalone\n * form is exported for call-sites (edge, tests) that hold a sanitised map and\n * want only the platform subset. Never re-run over raw (unsanitised) headers.\n */\nexport function extractPlatformHeaders(\n  sanitized: Record<string, string> | undefined | null\n): Record<string, string> {\n  const out: Record<string, string> = {};\n  if (!sanitized) return out;\n  for (const name of Object.keys(sanitized)) {\n    if (isPlatformHeader(name.toLowerCase())) out[name.toLowerCase()] = sanitized[name];\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/**\n * Precedence-ordered CDN header sources for each derived `connection` key.\n * First present header wins; the special `x-forwarded-for` source takes the\n * LEFTMOST (client) entry of the comma-separated chain.\n */\nconst CONNECTION_HEADER_SOURCES: ReadonlyArray<readonly [key: string, headers: readonly string[]]> =\n  [\n    ['ip', ['cf-connecting-ip', 'fastly-client-ip', 'true-client-ip', 'x-real-ip']],\n    [\n      'country',\n      ['cf-ipcountry', 'x-vercel-ip-country', 'cloudfront-viewer-country', 'fastly-geo-country'],\n    ],\n    ['region', ['x-vercel-ip-country-region', 'cloudfront-viewer-country-region']],\n    ['countryRegionName', ['cloudfront-viewer-country-region-name']],\n    ['city', ['x-vercel-ip-city', 'cloudfront-viewer-city']],\n    ['latitude', ['x-vercel-ip-latitude', 'cloudfront-viewer-latitude']],\n    ['longitude', ['x-vercel-ip-longitude', 'cloudfront-viewer-longitude']],\n    ['postalCode', ['x-vercel-ip-postal-code', 'cloudfront-viewer-postal-code']],\n    ['asn', ['cloudfront-viewer-asn']],\n    ['tlsVersion', ['cloudfront-viewer-tls']],\n    ['httpVersion', ['cloudfront-viewer-http-version']],\n    ['timeZone', ['x-vercel-ip-timezone', 'cloudfront-viewer-time-zone']],\n    ['metroCode', ['cloudfront-viewer-metro-code']],\n    // TLS fingerprints can only be computed where TLS terminates. When a CDN\n    // terminates TLS in front of the merchant, its fingerprint headers ARE the\n    // connection-layer truth — normalising them here is the permanent design.\n    // CloudFront delivers JA3/JA4 only via an origin request policy and only\n    // for HTTPS viewer connections.\n    ['tlsFingerprint', ['cf-ja3-hash', 'cloudfront-viewer-ja3-fingerprint']],\n    ['ja4', ['cf-ja4', 'cloudfront-viewer-ja4-fingerprint']],\n    // Header-structure fingerprint: browser/SDK-distinctive header ordering.\n    ['headerOrder', ['cloudfront-viewer-header-order']],\n    ['headerCount', ['cloudfront-viewer-header-count']],\n  ];\n\n/**\n * Backend bound: observedMetadata.connection values longer than this fail\n * the platform's zod parse outright (boundedStringRecord(32, 256)), so every\n * emitter truncates — headerOrder routinely exceeds it.\n */\nexport const MAX_CONNECTION_VALUE_CHARS = 256;\n\n/**\n * Derive the connection-layer block from CDN-injected request headers.\n *\n * When a merchant's SDK-gated origin sits behind a CDN (Cloudflare, Fastly,\n * Vercel, CloudFront), the CDN has already seen the connection layer and\n * injected it as headers. This promotes those headers to the same\n * `connection` keys the edge adapters populate natively, so SDK-only\n * deployments still get IP / geo / TLS attribution. Precedence per key:\n *\n * - `ip`: `cf-connecting-ip` > `fastly-client-ip` > `true-client-ip` >\n *   `x-real-ip` > `cloudfront-viewer-address` (port stripped) > leftmost\n *   `x-forwarded-for`\n * - `country`: `cf-ipcountry` > `x-vercel-ip-country` >\n *   `cloudfront-viewer-country` > `fastly-geo-country`\n * - `region` / `city` / `timeZone`: Vercel then CloudFront viewer headers\n * - `countryRegionName` / `asn` / `tlsVersion` / `httpVersion` /\n *   `metroCode` / `headerOrder` / `headerCount`: `cloudfront-viewer-*`\n * - `tlsFingerprint`: `cf-ja3-hash` > `cloudfront-viewer-ja3-fingerprint`\n * - `ja4`: `cf-ja4` > `cloudfront-viewer-ja4-fingerprint`\n *\n * All keys are additive under `schemaVersion` 1 (the frozen-capture doctrine\n * bumps only for changed semantics, never for additive signals). Values are\n * truncated to MAX_CONNECTION_VALUE_CHARS — the platform's hard bound.\n *\n * Edge adapters keep their richer native collectors — native platform\n * signals are authoritative; this header derivation is the SDK-level\n * fallback. Header names are matched case-insensitively. Returns undefined\n * when no source header is present, so the `connection` key is simply\n * omitted (matching edge behaviour).\n */\nexport function deriveConnectionFromHeaders(\n  headers: Record<string, string> | undefined | null\n): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n  if (!headers) return undefined;\n  const lower: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const name of Object.keys(headers)) {\n    const value = headers[name];\n    if (typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0) lower[name.toLowerCase()] = value;\n  }\n\n  const connection: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [key, sources] of CONNECTION_HEADER_SOURCES) {\n    for (const source of sources) {\n      const value = lower[source]?.trim();\n      if (value) {\n        connection[key] = value.slice(0, MAX_CONNECTION_VALUE_CHARS);\n        break;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  // ip fallback 1: cloudfront-viewer-address arrives as ip:port — strip the\n  // trailing port only (IPv6-safe), unlike the dedicated client-ip headers.\n  // The port itself is kept as its own key: ephemeral-port patterns signal\n  // NAT/proxy connection reuse.\n  {\n    const addr = lower['cloudfront-viewer-address']?.trim();\n    const portMatch = addr?.match(/:(\\d+)$/);\n    if (portMatch) connection.sourcePort = portMatch[1];\n    if (!connection.ip && addr) connection.ip = addr.replace(/:\\d+$/, '');\n  }\n  // ip fallback 2: leftmost (client) hop of the x-forwarded-for chain.\n  if (!connection.ip) {\n    const xff = lower['x-forwarded-for'];\n    const client = xff?.split(',')[0]?.trim();\n    if (client) connection.ip = client;\n  }\n  // tlsCipher: CloudFront folds the cipher into the viewer-tls string\n  // (`TLSv1.3:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:fullHandshake`). `tlsVersion` stays\n  // verbatim (reducing it would be a semantic change → schema v2); the\n  // cipher is pulled out additively so it is queryable on its own.\n  if (!connection.tlsCipher) {\n    const cipher = connection.tlsVersion?.split(':')[1];\n    if (cipher) connection.tlsCipher = cipher;\n  }\n\n  return Object.keys(connection).length > 0 ? connection : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * The FULL metadata capture for one request at an SDK adapter (express /\n * nextjs / mcp): sanitised headers, the safe credential format prefix, the\n * platform-signal subset, the CDN-derived connection block, and the capture\n * schema version. This is the ONE builder all SDK adapters share, so their\n * verify-access bodies agree byte-for-byte.\n *\n * Connection derivation runs over the RAW header map (pre-cap) — the size\n * caps guard storage growth and must never hide a geo/IP header that\n * happened to arrive late in an oversized map.\n */\nexport function buildSdkObservedMetadata(\n  rawHeaders: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> | undefined | null\n): ObservedMetadata {\n  const { headers, apiKeyFormat, platformHeaders, cookieCount } = sanitizeHeaders(rawHeaders);\n  const flat: Record<string, string> = {};\n  if (rawHeaders) {\n    for (const name of Object.keys(rawHeaders)) {\n      const value = rawHeaders[name];\n      if (value === undefined) continue;\n      flat[name.toLowerCase()] = Array.isArray(value) ? value.join(', ') : String(value);\n    }\n  }\n  const connection = deriveConnectionFromHeaders(flat);\n  return {\n    headers,\n    ...(apiKeyFormat && { apiKeyFormat }),\n    ...(platformHeaders && { platformHeaders }),\n    ...(connection && { connection }),\n    ...(cookieCount !== undefined && { cookieCount }),\n    schemaVersion: CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Direct-path step-up approval gate (post-3.1.0 F2 follow-up).\n *\n * The verify-access spending-Limit ladder returns an \"allowed-but-escalate\"\n * outcome for a transaction value in the human-in-the-loop band\n * `[autonomousThreshold, hardLimit)`: `policyAllowed: true` (it is NOT a deny)\n * plus `requiresStepUp` / `requiresApproval`. The bridge blocks these; the\n * direct-path adapters historically gated on `identityVerified && policyAllowed`\n * alone and would therefore ADMIT (and let the merchant settle) the very\n * purchase the bridge blocks - a cross-path bypass.\n *\n * The backend now creates a pending step-up approval record and returns a\n * `stepUpApproval` object with `{ approvalId, pollUrl, expiresAt }` in the\n * verify-access response. The owner can approve/deny from the dashboard\n * (Activity → Pending Verifications). Future channels: mobile push, browser\n * extension.\n *\n * Direct-path adapters (Express/MCP/Next.js) fail closed BY DEFAULT. The\n * `stepUpApproval` info is included in the deny response so integrations can\n * surface it (\"your agent owner needs to approve this\") or poll it themselves.\n * 3.6.0 adds an opt-in hold-and-poll (`stepUpMaxWaitMs` on GatewayConfig, see\n * ./stepup-poll.ts): the adapter holds the request, polls the approval, and on\n * 'approved' re-verifies once (cache-bypassed) so the backend redeems the\n * single-use approval — the MFA model the Java SDK ships default-on. Opt-in\n * here because a minor release must not silently convert instant 403s into\n * multi-minute holds (client timeouts, connection pools, edge wall-clocks).\n *\n * Detection keys on the granular Limit flags (`requiresStepUp` /\n * `requiresApproval`, set from the verify-access `access` block) rather than\n * the `recommendation` umbrella - both because those flags ARE what drive a\n * `step_up_required` recommendation server-side, and because it keeps the\n * unverified-agent-policy `audit` outcome (a deliberate allow-and-log) from\n * being caught here.\n */\nimport type { VerificationResult, StepUpApprovalInfo } from '../types';\n\nconst APPROVAL_REASON =\n  'Transaction is above the autonomous limit and requires human approval. The agent owner can approve or deny this transaction in the AstraSync dashboard.';\n\n/** True when the outcome needs human step-up/approval. */\nexport function requiresHumanApproval(result: VerificationResult): boolean {\n  return result.requiresStepUp === true || result.requiresApproval === true;\n}\n\n/**\n * Annotate a result in place with the structured approval-required failure +\n * denial reason, so the adapters' existing deny renderers surface it like any\n * other failure. Mirrors the bridge's `commerce.intent.approval_required`.\n */\nexport function annotateApprovalRequired(result: VerificationResult): void {\n  result.failures = [\n    ...(result.failures ?? []),\n    { dimension: 'commerce.intent.approval_required', message: APPROVAL_REASON },\n  ];\n  result.denialReasons = [APPROVAL_REASON, ...(result.denialReasons ?? [])];\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract step-up approval polling info from the verification result, if\n * present. Returns undefined when no approval was created (e.g. transaction\n * below the autonomous threshold, or the backend couldn't create one).\n */\nexport function getApprovalPollingInfo(result: VerificationResult): StepUpApprovalInfo | undefined {\n  return result.stepUpApproval;\n}\n","/**\n * Step-up hold-and-poll (3.6.0) — the synchronous half of the MFA-style gate,\n * mirroring the Java SDK's `awaitStepUpApproval` / `pollStepUpStatus`.\n *\n * A verify() that comes back step_up_required carries a `stepUpApproval`\n * handle: `{ approvalId, pollUrl, expiresAt }`. The adapter HOLDS the original\n * request, polls the approval status, and on 'approved' re-verifies the same\n * request once (cache-bypassed) so the backend redeems the single-use approval\n * and returns a grant. Any other terminal outcome falls into the adapter's\n * normal fail-closed deny path.\n *\n * The poll endpoint is deliberately unauthenticated (it sits above the\n * backend router's `authenticate` middleware): the unguessable UUIDv4\n * approvalId is the capability token, and the route is rate-limited\n * (60/min/IP). No Authorization header is sent.\n */\n\nimport { sdkFetch } from '../http';\nimport { GatewayConfig, StepUpApprovalInfo, StepUpApprovalStatus, StepUpOutcome } from '../types';\n\nconst DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 3000;\nconst MIN_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 250;\nconst FALLBACK_MAX_WAIT_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;\nconst EXPIRY_GRACE_MS = 5000;\nconst POLL_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;\n\n/** Resolve the absolute poll URL. pollUrl is server-relative\n * (`/api/step-up-approvals/poll/:id`), so join it to apiBaseUrl minus its\n * `/api` suffix (the origin) — same idiom as well-known.ts. Absolute URLs\n * pass through untouched. */\nfunction resolvePollUrl(config: GatewayConfig, pollUrl: string): string {\n  if (pollUrl.startsWith('http')) return pollUrl;\n  const origin = (config.apiBaseUrl ?? '').replace(/\\/api\\/?$/, '');\n  return origin + pollUrl;\n}\n\n/**\n * One GET of the approval's poll endpoint. Returns the status string, or\n * null on any error / non-2xx / unparsable body — the hold loop treats null\n * as transient and just polls again.\n */\nexport async function pollStepUpStatus(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  approval: StepUpApprovalInfo\n): Promise<StepUpApprovalStatus | null> {\n  if (!approval.pollUrl) return null;\n  try {\n    const res = await sdkFetch(resolvePollUrl(config, approval.pollUrl), {\n      method: 'GET',\n      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(POLL_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS),\n    });\n    if (!res.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n    // Envelope shape: { success, data: { status, resolvedAt } } — a flat\n    // `status` read hangs every hold (live-UAT catch). Envelope-first with a\n    // flat fallback for forward compatibility, exactly like the Java SDK.\n    const data = body?.data;\n    const status =\n      data && typeof data === 'object' ? (data as Record<string, unknown>).status : body?.status;\n    return typeof status === 'string' ? (status as StepUpApprovalStatus) : null;\n  } catch {\n    return null; // transient poll failure — the loop just polls again\n  }\n}\n\nfunction resolveDeadline(config: GatewayConfig, approval: StepUpApprovalInfo): number {\n  const now = Date.now();\n  const maxWait = config.stepUpMaxWaitMs ?? 0;\n  if (maxWait > 0) return now + maxWait;\n  // stepUpMaxWaitMs === 0: hold until the approval itself expires (+ a small\n  // grace so an approval landing at the buzzer still resolves on the next\n  // poll). Missing/unparsable expiresAt → fixed 5-min fallback (Java parity).\n  if (approval.expiresAt) {\n    const expiry = Date.parse(approval.expiresAt);\n    if (!Number.isNaN(expiry)) return Math.max(now, expiry) + EXPIRY_GRACE_MS;\n  }\n  return now + FALLBACK_MAX_WAIT_MS;\n}\n\nfunction sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {\n  return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));\n}\n\n/**\n * Block until a pending step-up approval reaches a terminal state or the wait\n * budget runs out. Returns the terminal status, or 'timeout'.\n *\n * Unknown non-pending statuses (a future backend state) still terminate the\n * hold — they are returned as-is and land in the deny path, which is the safe\n * reading of \"not approved\".\n */\nexport async function awaitStepUpApproval(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  approval: StepUpApprovalInfo\n): Promise<StepUpOutcome> {\n  const deadline = resolveDeadline(config, approval);\n  const pollInterval = Math.max(\n    MIN_POLL_INTERVAL_MS,\n    config.stepUpPollIntervalMs ?? DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS\n  );\n\n  while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n    const status = await pollStepUpStatus(config, approval);\n    if (status && status !== 'pending') {\n      return status as StepUpOutcome;\n    }\n    const remaining = deadline - Date.now();\n    if (remaining <= 0) break;\n    await sleep(Math.min(pollInterval, remaining));\n  }\n  return 'timeout';\n}\n","/**\n * X-Astra-Verified-Hop — cross-hop verify-access dedupe marker.\n *\n * Header carrying upstream verify-access proof so an inner-hop endpoint can\n * dedupe (skip verify-access when the same ASTRA-id was already verified a\n * few ms earlier). Emitted by the MCP adapter toward tool fetches and by the\n * edge gateway toward the origin at authenticate/authorize depth. Value\n * format:\n *\n *   {astraId};{sessionId};{checkedAt-ms}\n *\n * Receivers MUST validate that `checkedAt` is recent (≤ 60s window\n * recommended) and that `astraId` matches the agent identity claimed on the\n * inner hop. The header alone is NOT proof-of-identity — it's an UNSIGNED\n * dedupe advisory: trust it (`trustVerifiedHop`) only where every network\n * path to the inner hop crosses a stripping gateway or an equivalent trusted\n * boundary, exactly like the unsigned X-AstraSync-* attestation headers.\n * Pair with the existing X-Astra-Id auth.\n */\n\nexport const MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER = 'X-Astra-Verified-Hop';\n\n/** Default acceptable age (ms) for an X-Astra-Verified-Hop header. */\nexport const MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS = 60_000;\n\nexport interface VerifiedHopMarker {\n  astraId: string;\n  sessionId?: string;\n  checkedAt: number; // epoch ms\n}\n\nexport function serializeVerifiedHop(marker: VerifiedHopMarker): string {\n  return `${marker.astraId};${marker.sessionId ?? ''};${marker.checkedAt}`;\n}\n\nexport function parseVerifiedHop(value: string | undefined | null): VerifiedHopMarker | null {\n  if (!value) return null;\n  const parts = value.split(';');\n  if (parts.length !== 3) return null;\n  const [astraId, sessionId, checkedAtRaw] = parts;\n  if (!astraId) return null;\n  const checkedAt = Number(checkedAtRaw);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(checkedAt) || checkedAt <= 0) return null;\n  return {\n    astraId,\n    ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}),\n    checkedAt,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `marker.astraId` matches the inner-hop's claimed\n * ASTRA-id AND the marker is recent enough. Inner-hop middleware uses this\n * to skip a duplicate verify-access call.\n */\nexport function isVerifiedHopValidFor(\n  marker: VerifiedHopMarker | null,\n  expectedAstraId: string,\n  opts: { maxAgeMs?: number; now?: number } = {}\n): boolean {\n  if (!marker) return false;\n  if (marker.astraId !== expectedAstraId) return false;\n  const maxAge = opts.maxAgeMs ?? MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS;\n  const now = opts.now ?? Date.now();\n  return now - marker.checkedAt <= maxAge && now >= marker.checkedAt;\n}\n","/**\n * MCP server-side helpers — companion to `transport/mcp.ts` (which handles the\n * agent-side `_meta.astrasync` block).\n *\n * Surfaces a body-aware policy hook the existing `createMiddleware` couldn't\n * provide — MCP traffic is JSON-RPC over a single endpoint (`/mcp`), so the\n * default route-pattern gating is too coarse: every request looks the same\n * URL-wise, but `initialize` is low-risk handshake while `tools/call` of a\n * payment tool is high-risk. Cohort-3 beta merchants flagged this 🟡 in the\n * v2.9.5 round.\n *\n * What lives here:\n *   - `parseMcpJsonRpc(body)`    — peels JSON-RPC method + tool name + agent\n *                                   id without committing to a particular MCP\n *                                   server framework.\n *   - `mcpToPdlss(parsed)`       — canonical mapping JSON-RPC method → PDLSS\n *                                   purpose / action / resource. Doc-stable\n *                                   so audits can correlate.\n *   - `mcpDefaultEnforced(parsed)` — whether a method is enforced by default\n *                                   so a single MCP middleware can split\n *                                   `initialize` / `tools/list` (pass-through)\n *                                   from `tools/call` (enforced).\n *   - `MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER`   — header convention for the dedupe pattern\n *                                   when an MCP tool calls an inner REST hop.\n *   - `serialize/parseVerifiedHop` helpers.\n *\n * The Express MCP adapter is in `adapters/mcp.ts` and consumes these.\n */\n\n// X-Astra-Verified-Hop helpers live in ../verified-hop (shared with the\n// edge gateway's origin-bound emission); re-exported here so existing\n// transport-level imports keep working unchanged.\nexport {\n  MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n  MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS,\n  serializeVerifiedHop,\n  parseVerifiedHop,\n  isVerifiedHopValidFor,\n} from '../verified-hop';\nexport type { VerifiedHopMarker } from '../verified-hop';\n\n/**\n * Output of `parseMcpJsonRpc`. Self-describing so the middleware doesn't have\n * to re-introspect the body to figure out gating.\n */\nexport interface ParsedMcpRequest {\n  /** JSON-RPC method (e.g. `tools/call`, `initialize`, `tools/list`). */\n  method: string;\n  /** Set when method === 'tools/call'; the tool name from `params.name`. */\n  toolName?: string;\n  /** Initialize-specific protocolVersion handshake info, when present. */\n  protocolVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Agent id read from the body, in priority order:\n   *   1. `params._meta.astrasync.agentId` (the canonical SDK location, see\n   *      `transport/mcp.ts → setMcpMeta`)\n   *   2. `params.arguments.agent_id` (legacy / hand-written tool callers)\n   * Header-supplied id (X-Astra-Id) is read separately by the adapter and\n   * compared to this for the mismatch check.\n   */\n  agentIdFromBody?: string;\n  /**\n   * Purpose extracted from the MCP body\n   * with the symmetric precedence chain. Sourced from `_meta.astrasync.purpose`\n   * (canonical SDK location) OR `params.arguments.purpose` (legacy /\n   * conventional callers). The discriminator is on `purposeSourceFromBody`.\n   * Adapter combines this with the `X-Astra-Purpose` header (header wins)\n   * before mapping; final fallback at `mcpToPdlss` is `undefined`.\n   */\n  purposeFromBody?: string;\n  /** Which body location resolved `purposeFromBody`. */\n  purposeSourceFromBody?: 'meta' | 'tool_argument';\n  /**\n   * Action extracted from the MCP body with the same\n   * symmetric chain as purpose. Sourced from `_meta.astrasync.action`\n   * (canonical) OR `params.arguments.action` (legacy). Adapter combines\n   * with the `X-Astra-Action` header (header wins) before mapping; final\n   * fallback at `mcpToPdlss` is the transport-layer default\n   * (`tools/call:<toolname>` or just `<method>`).\n   */\n  actionFromBody?: string;\n  /** Which body location resolved `actionFromBody`. */\n  actionSourceFromBody?: 'meta' | 'tool_argument';\n  /** True for handshake methods that must succeed before any tool call. */\n  isInitialize: boolean;\n  /** True for `tools/call`. */\n  isToolCall: boolean;\n  /** True for low-risk introspection (`tools/list`, `prompts/list`, etc.). */\n  isIntrospection: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Peel the JSON-RPC envelope. Returns `null` if the body isn't a JSON-RPC\n * request (callers can short-circuit with a 400 or treat as untyped traffic).\n *\n * Accepts both single-request and notification shapes. Batch requests are\n * NOT supported here — the verify-access contract is single-agent-per-call;\n * a batch body should be split before policy gating.\n */\nexport function parseMcpJsonRpc(body: unknown): ParsedMcpRequest | null {\n  if (!body || typeof body !== 'object' || Array.isArray(body)) return null;\n  const obj = body as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (obj.jsonrpc !== '2.0' && obj.jsonrpc !== '1.0') return null;\n  const method = typeof obj.method === 'string' ? obj.method : null;\n  if (!method) return null;\n  const params = obj.params as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n\n  // Tool-name lookup. MCP `tools/call` puts the tool under `params.name`.\n  let toolName: string | undefined;\n  if (method === 'tools/call' && params && typeof params.name === 'string') {\n    toolName = params.name;\n  }\n\n  // protocolVersion only on the initialize request.\n  let protocolVersion: string | undefined;\n  if (method === 'initialize' && params && typeof params.protocolVersion === 'string') {\n    protocolVersion = params.protocolVersion;\n  }\n\n  const meta = params?._meta as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n  const astrasyncMeta = meta?.astrasync as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n  const args = params?.arguments as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n\n  // Agent-id lookup with documented precedence: _meta.astrasync.agentId\n  // wins over params.arguments.agent_id. (The argument-shape uses\n  // `agent_id` snake_case for legacy conventional callers; meta is the\n  // canonical SDK location.)\n  let agentIdFromBody: string | undefined;\n  if (astrasyncMeta && typeof astrasyncMeta.agentId === 'string') {\n    agentIdFromBody = astrasyncMeta.agentId;\n  } else if (args && typeof args.agent_id === 'string') {\n    agentIdFromBody = args.agent_id;\n  }\n\n  // Round-13 (R13-1, R13-2) — symmetric body-extraction for purpose +\n  // action. Per `feedback_symmetric_fallbacks_for_symmetric_concepts.md`:\n  // these two concepts are paired in the MCP middleware, so their\n  // fallback chains MUST mirror each other exactly. Drift between them\n  // generates the same support-ticket class repeatedly (\"I set X in\n  // arguments and it didn't take\" — happened for purpose in round-12\n  // post-F19, and was about to happen for action in round-13).\n  //\n  // Body precedence (applies to both): _meta.astrasync.<key> wins over\n  // params.arguments.<key>. The discriminator is exported alongside the\n  // value so the adapter can fold it into purposeSource / actionSource\n  // for debug logging and adoption tracking.\n  const purposeBodyResult = extractFromMcpBody(astrasyncMeta, args, 'purpose');\n  const actionBodyResult = extractFromMcpBody(astrasyncMeta, args, 'action');\n\n  const isInitialize = method === 'initialize';\n  const isToolCall = method === 'tools/call';\n  const isIntrospection =\n    method === 'tools/list' ||\n    method === 'prompts/list' ||\n    method === 'resources/list' ||\n    method === 'ping' ||\n    method === 'notifications/initialized';\n\n  return {\n    method,\n    ...(toolName ? { toolName } : {}),\n    ...(protocolVersion ? { protocolVersion } : {}),\n    ...(agentIdFromBody ? { agentIdFromBody } : {}),\n    ...(purposeBodyResult.value ? { purposeFromBody: purposeBodyResult.value } : {}),\n    ...(purposeBodyResult.source ? { purposeSourceFromBody: purposeBodyResult.source } : {}),\n    ...(actionBodyResult.value ? { actionFromBody: actionBodyResult.value } : {}),\n    ...(actionBodyResult.source ? { actionSourceFromBody: actionBodyResult.source } : {}),\n    isInitialize,\n    isToolCall,\n    isIntrospection,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared body-extraction helper for the symmetric purpose + action\n * fallback chain. Returns the resolved value AND\n * the source discriminator so adapters can fold it into per-call debug\n * logs (`purpose_source` / `action_source`).\n *\n * Precedence:\n *   1. `params._meta.astrasync.<key>` — canonical SDK location, source: 'meta'\n *   2. `params.arguments.<key>`        — legacy / conventional, source: 'tool_argument'\n *   3. neither present                 — value: undefined, source: undefined\n *\n * The HTTP-header tier (`X-Astra-<concept>`) is the adapter's job; this\n * helper only handles body sources. Adapters combine the two: header\n * wins over body. See `mcpToPdlss` for the final precedence assembly.\n */\nfunction extractFromMcpBody(\n  astrasyncMeta: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,\n  args: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,\n  key: 'purpose' | 'action'\n): { value: string | undefined; source: 'meta' | 'tool_argument' | undefined } {\n  if (astrasyncMeta && typeof astrasyncMeta[key] === 'string') {\n    return { value: astrasyncMeta[key] as string, source: 'meta' };\n  }\n  if (args && typeof args[key] === 'string') {\n    return { value: args[key] as string, source: 'tool_argument' };\n  }\n  return { value: undefined, source: undefined };\n}\n\n/**\n * PDLSS mapping for an MCP request. The platform's PDLSS taxonomy is\n * `purpose / action / resource`; for MCP traffic the audit-useful dimensions\n * are the JSON-RPC method and (for `tools/call`) the tool name.\n *\n * v2.5.0 rules:\n *   - `resource` defaults to the HTTP request path (e.g. `/mcp`). Per-tool\n *     overrides via `toolGates` config let merchants map tools to specific\n *     backend resources (e.g. `/api/catalog`).\n *   - `purpose` defaults to `undefined` (backend evaluator applies\n *     skip-when-undefined). Per-tool overrides via `toolGates` config let\n *     merchants declare the semantic purpose each tool fulfils.\n *   - `action` comes only from declarations (toolGate config, header, or\n *     body). For `tools/call` with none declared it is `undefined` —\n *     evaluation is purpose-only, because a raw tool name is a transport\n *     token, not a PDLSS action, and sending it as one guarantees an\n *     action-policy mismatch. For other JSON-RPC methods the method string\n *     is used.\n */\nexport interface McpPdlssMapping {\n  purpose: string | undefined;\n  /**\n   * `undefined` when a `tools/call` request declared no action anywhere —\n   * the verify-access call then evaluates purpose-only. Tool names never\n   * travel as PDLSS actions.\n   */\n  action: string | undefined;\n  resource: string;\n  purposeSource: 'header' | 'meta' | 'tool_argument' | 'tool_gate' | undefined;\n  actionSource: 'header' | 'meta' | 'tool_argument' | 'tool_gate' | 'transport_layer' | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * v2.5.0 — PDLSS field derivation for MCP requests.\n *\n * Purpose precedence:\n *   - If `toolGate.purpose` is provided, it is authoritative (header/body ignored).\n *   - Otherwise: header → body `_meta` → body `arguments` → `undefined`.\n *\n * Resource precedence:\n *   - `toolGate.resource` if provided, else `requestPath`.\n *\n * Action precedence (3.1.0 — toolGate override added for\n * symmetry with purpose; 4.1.0 — the bare-tool-name fallback for\n * `tools/call` was removed):\n *   - `toolGate.action` authoritative → header → body `_meta` → body\n *     `arguments` → then: `undefined` for `tools/call` (purpose-only\n *     evaluation — tool names are transport tokens, never PDLSS actions),\n *     or the JSON-RPC method string for other methods (transport_layer).\n *\n * @param requestPath  The HTTP request path (e.g. '/mcp'). Required.\n * @param toolGate     Resolved per-tool config from `toolGates`, if present.\n */\nexport function mcpToPdlss(\n  parsed: ParsedMcpRequest,\n  requestPath: string,\n  headerPurpose?: string,\n  headerAction?: string,\n  toolGate?: { purpose?: string; action?: string; resource?: string }\n): McpPdlssMapping {\n  const resource = toolGate?.resource ?? requestPath;\n\n  let purpose: string | undefined;\n  let purposeSource: McpPdlssMapping['purposeSource'];\n  if (toolGate?.purpose !== undefined) {\n    purpose = toolGate.purpose;\n    purposeSource = 'tool_gate';\n  } else if (headerPurpose) {\n    purpose = headerPurpose;\n    purposeSource = 'header';\n  } else if (parsed.purposeFromBody && parsed.purposeSourceFromBody) {\n    purpose = parsed.purposeFromBody;\n    purposeSource = parsed.purposeSourceFromBody;\n  } else {\n    purpose = undefined;\n    purposeSource = undefined;\n  }\n\n  let action: string | undefined;\n  let actionSource: McpPdlssMapping['actionSource'];\n  if (toolGate?.action !== undefined) {\n    action = toolGate.action;\n    actionSource = 'tool_gate';\n  } else if (headerAction) {\n    action = headerAction;\n    actionSource = 'header';\n  } else if (parsed.actionFromBody && parsed.actionSourceFromBody) {\n    action = parsed.actionFromBody;\n    actionSource = parsed.actionSourceFromBody;\n  } else if (parsed.method === 'tools/call') {\n    // 4.1.0 fix: previously the bare tool name travelled as the PDLSS\n    // action here, which guaranteed an action-policy deny for merchants\n    // using the bare-string toolGate shorthand (tool names are transport\n    // tokens, not policy vocabulary). With nothing configured or declared,\n    // leave the action undeclared so evaluation is purpose-only.\n    action = undefined;\n    actionSource = undefined;\n  } else {\n    action = parsed.toolName ? `${parsed.method}:${parsed.toolName}` : parsed.method;\n    actionSource = 'transport_layer';\n  }\n\n  return { purpose, action, resource, purposeSource, actionSource };\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether a method is enforced (calls verify-access + gates on the server\n * decision) by default. The MCP middleware uses this to split low-risk\n * handshake / introspection traffic (pass-through) from high-risk tool\n * execution (enforced). Per-tool / per-method overrides win over this default.\n *\n *   - `initialize` / `notifications/initialized`        → false (handshake must work for unregistered probes)\n *   - `tools/list` / `prompts/list` / `resources/list`  → false (introspection is public-surface)\n *   - `ping`                                            → false\n *   - `resources/read`                                  → true\n *   - `tools/call`                                      → true  (default — overridable per-tool)\n *   - everything else                                   → true  (least-privilege fallback)\n */\nexport function mcpDefaultEnforced(parsed: ParsedMcpRequest): boolean {\n  if (parsed.isInitialize || parsed.method === 'notifications/initialized') return false;\n  if (parsed.isIntrospection) return false;\n  return true;\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway — MCP middleware\n *\n * Express-shaped middleware tailored to the JSON-RPC body of an MCP\n * (Model Context Protocol) endpoint. Closes the cohort-3 gaps the default\n * `createMiddleware` couldn't:\n *\n *   (a) **Body-aware gating**.  All MCP traffic targets the same `/mcp` URL.\n *       The default route-pattern matcher can't tell `initialize` (low risk)\n *       from `tools/call start_checkout` (high risk). This middleware peels\n *       the JSON-RPC body and applies a per-method risk tier.\n *\n *   (b) **PDLSS mapping**.  Derives purpose, action, and resource from\n *       `toolGates` config and request context. See `transport/mcp-server.ts`\n *       `mcpToPdlss()` for the exact mapping.\n *\n *   (c) **Inner-hop dedupe**.  Outbound responses set\n *       `X-Astra-Verified-Hop` so a downstream REST endpoint that the tool\n *       calls can skip a duplicate verify-access. The receiving REST\n *       middleware checks `parseVerifiedHop` and skips when valid.\n *\n *   (d) **Header-vs-body identity precedence**.  Reads ASTRA-id from\n *       `X-Astra-Id` first, body second. If both are present and disagree,\n *       returns a structured 400 by default (configurable). Pre-fix,\n *       integrators had to re-discover this on their own.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```typescript\n * import express from 'express';\n * import { createMcpMiddleware } from '@astrasyncai/verification-gateway/mcp';\n *\n * const app = express();\n * app.use(express.json());\n *\n * app.post(\n *   '/mcp',\n *   createMcpMiddleware({\n *     apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n *     apiKey: process.env.ASTRASYNC_API_KEY,\n *     // Per-tool gates — `tools/call` is enforced by default; introspection /\n *     // handshake pass through. A gated tool needs a PDLSS purpose (and ideally\n *     // an action). Set a tool/method to `'observe'` to pass it through\n *     // unenforced (still evaluated when `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed`).\n *     toolGates: {\n *       browse_catalog: { purpose: 'shopping', action: 'shopping.search' },\n *       start_checkout: { purpose: 'shopping', action: 'shopping.purchase' },\n *       health_check: 'observe',\n *     },\n *   }),\n *   yourMcpServerHandler,\n * );\n * ```\n */\n\nimport type { Request, Response, NextFunction, RequestHandler } from 'express';\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  VerificationResult,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  VerificationRequest,\n} from '../types';\nimport { verify, extractCredentials, recordDecision } from '../verify';\nimport { buildSdkObservedMetadata } from '../metadata-capture';\nimport { requiresHumanApproval, annotateApprovalRequired } from './approval-gate';\nimport { awaitStepUpApproval } from './stepup-poll';\nimport { prefetchWellKnown, getWellKnownUrls } from '../well-known';\nimport {\n  parseMcpJsonRpc,\n  mcpToPdlss,\n  mcpDefaultEnforced,\n  serializeVerifiedHop,\n  parseVerifiedHop,\n  isVerifiedHopValidFor,\n  MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n  type ParsedMcpRequest,\n} from '../transport/mcp-server';\n\ndeclare global {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-namespace\n  namespace Express {\n    interface Request {\n      mcpRequest?: ParsedMcpRequest;\n      // Declared here as well as in express.ts (identical type — the merged\n      // interfaces are compatible) so this module typechecks standalone: the\n      // grouped DTS build compiles each entry group as its own program, and\n      // mcp.ts must not depend on express.ts being in the same one.\n      agentVerification?: VerificationResult;\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Extended per-tool gate with optional PDLSS purpose + action + resource\n * overrides.\n *\n * When `purpose` is set, it is authoritative for that tool — the agent's\n * `X-Astra-Purpose` header is ignored. This lets the merchant declare what\n * semantic purpose each tool fulfils rather than trusting agent self-declaration.\n *\n * When `action` is set (symmetric with `purpose`), it is\n * authoritative over `X-Astra-Action` / body declarations, letting the\n * merchant pin a dotted-verb action (e.g. `shopping.search`) for a tool\n * whose callers would otherwise leave the action undeclared (purpose-only\n * evaluation — raw tool names never travel as PDLSS actions).\n *\n * When `resource` is set, it overrides the default (`req.path`) for that\n * tool's verify-access call — e.g. mapping `list_products` to `/api/catalog`.\n */\nexport interface ToolGateConfig {\n  purpose?: string;\n  action?: string;\n  resource?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A tool/method gate is either a {@link ToolGateConfig} (enforced — calls\n * verify-access and gates on the server decision, using the declared PDLSS\n * purpose/action) or the literal `'observe'` (passed through unenforced;\n * still evaluated when `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed` is set). SDK 5.0.0\n * removed the access-level band, so a gate no longer carries a tier — its\n * only decision is enforce vs observe.\n */\nexport type ToolGate = ToolGateConfig | 'observe';\n\nexport interface McpMiddlewareOptions extends GatewayConfig {\n  /**\n   * Per-tool gating for `tools/call` invocations. Tools not listed are\n   * enforced by default (`tools/call` calls verify-access and gates on the\n   * server decision).\n   *\n   * A gated tool declares its PDLSS `purpose` (required: the backend rejects\n   * gated calls with no resolvable purpose) and ideally a dotted-verb\n   * `action`:\n   * ```typescript\n   * toolGates: {\n   *   list_products:  { purpose: 'shopping',\n   *                     action: 'shopping.search',\n   *                     resource: '/api/catalog' },\n   *   start_checkout: { purpose: 'shopping',\n   *                     action: 'shopping.purchase',\n   *                     resource: '/api/checkout/*' },\n   *   health_check:   'observe',   // pass through unenforced\n   * }\n   * ```\n   *\n   * Set a tool to `'observe'` to pass it through without enforcement (it is\n   * still evaluated for the audit trail when `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed`\n   * is set). A gated object form with no resolvable purpose fails fast with a\n   * `PDLSS_PURPOSE_REQUIRED` 400 (the SDK never sends the raw tool name as\n   * the PDLSS action).\n   *\n   * The action axis for non-tools/call MCP methods (`tools/list`,\n   * `resources/list`, `prompts/list`, etc.) is the literal JSON-RPC method\n   * name (e.g. `'tools/list'`). Merchants gating MCP traffic by action should\n   * declare per-tool gates in `toolGates`, not endpoint-level `allowedActions`\n   * — the latter applies to REST-style action values, not MCP method strings.\n   */\n  toolGates?: Record<string, ToolGate>;\n  /**\n   * Per-method override. By default introspection / handshake methods\n   * (`tools/list`, `initialize`, `ping`, …) pass through and `tools/call` is\n   * enforced; declare a method here to enforce it (object form, with a PDLSS\n   * purpose) or set it to `'observe'` to pass it through. Matches by exact\n   * JSON-RPC method string.\n   */\n  methodGates?: Record<string, ToolGate>;\n  /**\n   * What to do when the agent id supplied in the X-Astra-Id header\n   * disagrees with the agent id in the JSON-RPC body\n   * (`params._meta.astrasync.agentId` or `params.arguments.agent_id`).\n   *\n   *   - `'reject'` (default) — return 400 `AGENT_ID_MISMATCH`. Safest.\n   *   - `'prefer-header'` — log + verify against the header value. Keeps\n   *     bodies that were authored before X-Astra-Id was the canonical\n   *     identity slot working.\n   *   - `'prefer-body'` — log + verify against the body value. Useful in\n   *     reverse-proxy setups that strip auth headers.\n   */\n  onAgentIdMismatch?: 'reject' | 'prefer-header' | 'prefer-body';\n  /** Skip verification + dedupe entirely. For testing. */\n  skip?: boolean;\n  /** Custom denied handler. Defaults to a structured JSON-RPC error response. */\n  onDenied?: (result: VerificationResult, req: Request, res: Response) => void;\n  /**\n   * If `true`, trust an inbound `X-Astra-Verified-Hop` header to skip\n   * verify-access when it carries a recent marker for the resolved agent.\n   *\n   * **DEFAULT FLIPPED TO `false` in SDK 2.4.13.** The marker\n   * is plaintext semicolon-delimited with no HMAC, so any client that sets\n   * the header (with the right format + fresh timestamp + matching ASTRA-id)\n   * skipped verify-access entirely. The per-process verify-access result\n   * cache already dedupes legitimate repeat calls — this optimization\n   * provided no additional savings, only a bypass surface.\n   *\n   * Set this to `true` ONLY if you control every upstream MCP hop that sets\n   * the header AND you trust the network path between hops (mTLS, internal\n   * VPC, etc.). For most installs, leave at the safe default.\n   *\n   * A future SDK release will either remove this option entirely OR add\n   * HMAC signing to the marker.\n   */\n  trustVerifiedHop?: boolean;\n  /** Window for accepting an upstream verified-hop marker. Default 60_000ms. */\n  verifiedHopMaxAgeMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Automatically record grant/deny decisions for every MCP call. Default\n   * `true` — matches the express adapter.\n   */\n  recordDecisions?: boolean;\n  /** Forward runtime challenge (default `true`). */\n  enableRuntimeChallenge?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Posture when the MCP middleware itself throws an internal error.\n   * Default `'open'` for backward compatibility in SDK 2.4.13. Shadow logs\n   * record what WOULD be denied with `failOnError: 'closed'` so merchants\n   * can grep correlationId for impact analysis during the observation\n   * window. Default flips to `'closed'` in a follow-up release.\n   */\n  failOnError?: 'open' | 'closed';\n}\n\n/**\n * Default MCP denied handler.\n *\n * Mirrors the express adapter — surfaces `failures[]`\n * and `correlationId` on the response so partners can render rich UX and\n * tie a denial to a log line. Also stamps `X-Astra-Gateway-Mode: enforced`\n * so the header reliably distinguishes gate-evaluated denials\n * from gate-skipped pass-throughs.\n */\n/**\n * Shared single-value HTTP header reader. Same shape used for\n * both `X-Astra-Purpose` and `X-Astra-Action` extraction (symmetric\n * fallback chain — see `mcpToPdlss` for the full precedence rule).\n * Returns the first value if the header repeats (Express turns repeated\n * headers into an array); returns undefined when the header is absent.\n */\nfunction readSingleHeader(value: string | string[] | undefined): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return value;\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value[0];\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction dedupeFailures(result: VerificationResult): void {\n  if (result.failures && result.failures.length > 1) {\n    const seen = new Set<string>();\n    result.failures = result.failures.filter((f) => {\n      const key = `${f.dimension}|${f.message}|${(f as { guidance?: string }).guidance ?? ''}`;\n      if (seen.has(key)) return false;\n      seen.add(key);\n      return true;\n    });\n  }\n  if (result.denialReasons && result.denialReasons.length > 1) {\n    result.denialReasons = [...new Set(result.denialReasons)];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction defaultMcpDenied(result: VerificationResult, req: Request, res: Response): void {\n  // JSON-RPC error envelope so MCP-aware clients render it correctly.\n  const id = (req.body as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.id ?? null;\n\n  // 4.0.0 BREAKING: the integration's OWN key was rejected — not the agent's\n  // fault, not transient. 503 + a dedicated JSON-RPC code so MCP clients can\n  // tell \"this server's verification layer is broken\" from their own denial.\n  if (result.misconfigured) {\n    res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n    res.status(503).json({\n      jsonrpc: '2.0',\n      id,\n      error: {\n        // -32002 → merchant verification misconfigured (see -32000/-32001 below)\n        code: -32002,\n        message:\n          result.denialReasons?.[0] ?? \"This server's AstraSync integration is misconfigured\",\n        data: {\n          guidance: result.guidance,\n          failures: result.failures,\n          correlationId: result.correlationId,\n        },\n      },\n    });\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Round-18 G4: see express.defaultOnDenied for full rationale on the\n  // identity-vs-policy split → 401/403 mapping. Same logic here so MCP\n  // clients get HTTP status semantics aligned with REST adapters.\n  const status = !result.identityVerified ? 401 : 403;\n\n  res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n\n  res.status(status).json({\n    jsonrpc: '2.0',\n    id,\n    error: {\n      // JSON-RPC error codes:\n      //   -32000 → unauthorized (no identity resolved)\n      //   -32001 → insufficient access (identity OK, policy denied)\n      //   -32002 → merchant verification misconfigured (handled above)\n      code: !result.identityVerified ? -32000 : -32001,\n      message: result.denialReasons?.[0] ?? 'Access denied',\n      data: {\n        guidance: result.guidance,\n        // Round-10: aggregated per-dimension detail + correlation handle.\n        failures: result.failures,\n        correlationId: result.correlationId,\n        stepUpApproval: result.stepUpApproval,\n        // 3.6.0: terminal outcome of an opt-in hold-and-poll wait (denied /\n        // expired / consumed / timeout). Absent when the feature is off.\n        ...(result.stepUpOutcome && { stepUpOutcome: result.stepUpOutcome }),\n      },\n    },\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve whether a parsed MCP request is enforced, and the gate config to\n * apply. SDK 5.0.0 removed the access-level band — a gate's only decision is\n * enforce vs observe.\n *\n * Precedence:\n *   1. Non-tools/call without `methodGates` entry → pass through\n *      (`discovery_default`). Discovery is open — agents must list tools\n *      before invoking them.\n *   2. `methodGates[method]` — per-method override (`'observe'` or a config)\n *   3. `toolGates[toolName]` — per-tool override (tools/call only)\n *   4. `mcpDefaultEnforced` — built-in default (tools/call → enforced)\n *\n * The `source` field is logged for forensics / activity-feed attribution.\n */\nfunction resolveGate(\n  parsed: ParsedMcpRequest,\n  opts: {\n    toolGates?: Record<string, ToolGate>;\n    methodGates?: Record<string, ToolGate>;\n  }\n): {\n  enforce: boolean;\n  config?: ToolGateConfig;\n  source: 'toolGate' | 'methodGate' | 'tier' | 'discovery_default';\n} {\n  if (!parsed.toolName) {\n    const methodGate = opts.methodGates?.[parsed.method];\n    if (methodGate !== undefined) {\n      return methodGate === 'observe'\n        ? { enforce: false, source: 'methodGate' }\n        : { enforce: true, config: methodGate, source: 'methodGate' };\n    }\n    // Non-tools/call methods (handshake / introspection) pass through unless a\n    // methodGate opts them in — preserves open discovery for unregistered probes.\n    return { enforce: false, source: 'discovery_default' };\n  }\n  const toolGate = opts.toolGates?.[parsed.toolName];\n  if (toolGate !== undefined) {\n    return toolGate === 'observe'\n      ? { enforce: false, source: 'toolGate' }\n      : { enforce: true, config: toolGate, source: 'toolGate' };\n  }\n  // tools/call with no explicit gate → enforced by default.\n  return { enforce: mcpDefaultEnforced(parsed), source: 'tier' };\n}\n\n/**\n * Create the MCP middleware. Attach AFTER `express.json()` — the body must\n * already be a parsed object.\n */\nexport function createMcpMiddleware(options: McpMiddlewareOptions): RequestHandler {\n  const {\n    toolGates,\n    methodGates,\n    onAgentIdMismatch = 'reject',\n    skip = false,\n    onDenied = defaultMcpDenied,\n    trustVerifiedHop = false,\n    verifiedHopMaxAgeMs,\n    recordDecisions,\n    enableRuntimeChallenge = true,\n    failOnError = 'open',\n    ...config\n  } = options;\n\n  // v2.5.0: fire-and-forget pre-fetch of well-known URLs\n  if (config.apiBaseUrl) {\n    prefetchWellKnown(config.apiBaseUrl).catch(() => {});\n  }\n\n  return async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): Promise<void> => {\n    try {\n      if (skip) return next();\n\n      const parsed = parseMcpJsonRpc(req.body);\n      if (!parsed) {\n        // Not a JSON-RPC body. Either the route is misconfigured or the\n        // client sent a non-MCP payload. We don't 400 here — let the actual\n        // MCP server handler render its own error so the middleware doesn't\n        // pre-empt valid framework error shapes.\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          // Round-10 (#49, O10): `unenforced` describes the GATE state, not\n          // the downstream response. Renamed from the ambiguous\n          // `pass-through` (which partners read as \"request succeeded\").\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'unenforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'non-jsonrpc-body');\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n      req.mcpRequest = parsed;\n\n      // ── Identity reconciliation (defect d) ─────────────────────────────\n      // Header value is the SDK-canonical slot; body slot exists for legacy\n      // hand-written tool callers and the MCP `_meta.astrasync.agentId`\n      // convention.\n      const headerRaw = req.headers['x-astra-id'] ?? req.headers['x-astra-agentid'];\n      const headerAstraId =\n        typeof headerRaw === 'string'\n          ? headerRaw\n          : Array.isArray(headerRaw)\n            ? headerRaw[0]\n            : undefined;\n      const bodyAstraId = parsed.agentIdFromBody;\n\n      let effectiveAstraId: string | undefined;\n      if (headerAstraId && bodyAstraId && headerAstraId !== bodyAstraId) {\n        if (onAgentIdMismatch === 'reject') {\n          const id = (req.body as Record<string, unknown>)?.id ?? null;\n          res.status(400).json({\n            jsonrpc: '2.0',\n            id,\n            error: {\n              code: -32602,\n              message: 'AGENT_ID_MISMATCH',\n              data: {\n                detail:\n                  'The agent id in the X-Astra-Id header disagrees with params._meta.astrasync.agentId / params.arguments.agent_id. Reconcile before calling the tool — see https://astrasync.ai/docs/mcp-integration#identity-reconciliation.',\n                headerAstraId,\n                bodyAstraId,\n              },\n            },\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n        effectiveAstraId = onAgentIdMismatch === 'prefer-header' ? headerAstraId : bodyAstraId;\n      } else {\n        effectiveAstraId = headerAstraId ?? bodyAstraId;\n      }\n\n      // ── Inner-hop dedupe (defect c) ────────────────────────────────────\n      // If a trusted upstream MCP hop already verified this exact ASTRA-id\n      // a few ms ago, we accept the marker and skip a redundant verify-access\n      // call. Only valid when the header is fresh AND matches the agent id\n      // we resolved above.\n      if (trustVerifiedHop && effectiveAstraId) {\n        const hopRaw = req.headers[MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER.toLowerCase()];\n        const hopValue =\n          typeof hopRaw === 'string' ? hopRaw : Array.isArray(hopRaw) ? hopRaw[0] : undefined;\n        const marker = parseVerifiedHop(hopValue);\n        if (\n          isVerifiedHopValidFor(marker, effectiveAstraId, {\n            ...(verifiedHopMaxAgeMs !== undefined ? { maxAgeMs: verifiedHopMaxAgeMs } : {}),\n          })\n        ) {\n          // Skip verify-access — pass straight through. Don't re-emit the\n          // header since the MCP framework will issue the response (the\n          // outer hop already tagged it for any further inner hops).\n          return next();\n        }\n      }\n\n      // ── Resolve gating ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n      const gateDecision = resolveGate(parsed, {\n        toolGates,\n        methodGates,\n      });\n\n      // ── Build verify-access request ────────────────────────────────────\n      // Round-13 (R13-5) — credentials extraction hoisted above the\n      // mcp-tier-none short-circuit (mirrors round-12 F9 express adapter\n      // restructure). The `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed` flag lets the\n      // caller turn unenforced tier-none calls into evaluated-not-enforced\n      // calls when credentials are present, so the agent verification\n      // result populates `req.agentVerification` for tier-aware handler\n      // rendering (e.g. anonymous vs verified MCP tool listings).\n      const credentials = extractCredentials(\n        req.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n        req.query as Record<string, string | undefined>\n      );\n      // Override the SDK's default credential extraction with the resolved\n      // ASTRA-id so the verify-access call sees the post-precedence value\n      // (defect d). When neither header nor body supplied an id, the SDK's\n      // anonymous-canonical-flow handles it.\n      if (effectiveAstraId) credentials.astraId = effectiveAstraId;\n\n      // Pass-through short-circuit. Default behaviour: skip verify-access for\n      // observe / handshake / introspection (must work for unregistered\n      // probes). With `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed: true` AND credentials\n      // present, fall through to verify-access for the audit trail; the\n      // post-verify gate-skipping branch below handles the rendering side.\n      // Round-12 F9 parity (closes the round-12 deferral).\n      const shouldEnforce = gateDecision.enforce;\n      if (!shouldEnforce && (!config.evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed || !credentials.astraId)) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          // Round-10 (#49, O10): `unenforced` describes the GATE state, not\n          // the downstream response.\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'unenforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'mcp-observe');\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // Per-tool gate config (purpose + action + resource overrides).\n      const gate = gateDecision.config;\n\n      const headerPurpose = readSingleHeader(req.headers['x-astra-purpose']);\n      const headerAction = readSingleHeader(req.headers['x-astra-action']);\n      const pdlss = mcpToPdlss(\n        parsed,\n        req.path,\n        headerPurpose,\n        headerAction,\n        gate ? { purpose: gate.purpose, action: gate.action, resource: gate.resource } : undefined\n      );\n\n      // Telemetry: debug log per resolution. Adoption tracking, support\n      // triage, and the `default_*` / `transport_layer` decay signals\n      // all read this. Both purpose and action emit their source so we\n      // can spot which integration path each partner is using.\n      if (config.debug) {\n        // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n        console.debug('[mcp-middleware] pdlss resolved', {\n          purpose_source: pdlss.purposeSource,\n          resolved_purpose: pdlss.purpose,\n          action_source: pdlss.actionSource,\n          resolved_action: pdlss.action,\n        });\n      }\n\n      // 3.2.0 — clear \"purpose required\" error. We only reach here on the\n      // ENFORCED path (the `!shouldEnforce` early-return is above). A gated\n      // tool call with no resolvable PDLSS purpose (none on the toolGate, no\n      // X-Astra-Purpose header, none in the body) would otherwise hit\n      // verify-access's generic \"Invalid request data\" → surface to the agent\n      // as an opaque `verify_access.api_error`. Fail fast with an actionable\n      // message instead (purpose is required post-vocabulary-unification).\n      if (!pdlss.purpose) {\n        const id = (req.body as Record<string, unknown>)?.id ?? null;\n        res.status(400).json({\n          jsonrpc: '2.0',\n          id,\n          error: {\n            code: -32602,\n            message: 'PDLSS_PURPOSE_REQUIRED',\n            data: {\n              dimension: 'pdlss.purpose',\n              detail:\n                'This tool is access-gated but the call declared no PDLSS purpose. Supply a bare-category purpose via the X-Astra-Purpose header or params._meta.astrasync.purpose, or have the merchant set the tool’s purpose in its toolGate config.',\n              resolvedAction: pdlss.action,\n            },\n          },\n        });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const counterpartyUrl =\n        config.counterpartyUrl || `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}${req.path}`;\n      const shouldRecordDecisions = recordDecisions !== false;\n\n      const verificationRequest: VerificationRequest = {\n        credentials,\n        purpose: pdlss.purpose,\n        action: pdlss.action,\n        resource: pdlss.resource,\n        // Round-12 (F19): mark transport protocol separately from intent.\n        // The MCP middleware always sets this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers\n        // leave it unset (server-side default is 'rest').\n        invocationProtocol: 'mcp',\n        createSession: shouldRecordDecisions,\n        counterpartyUrl,\n        counterpartyType: config.counterpartyType || 'mcp_server',\n        enableRuntimeChallenge,\n        callerMetadata: {\n          sourceIp: req.ip,\n          userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] as string | undefined,\n          host: req.headers.host as string | undefined,\n          // Capture EVERY inbound header (parity with the express adapter —\n          // MCP-only merchants have no edge to do it upstream) plus the\n          // CDN-derived connection block. Local string work, secrets\n          // stripped; out of the verify cache key so it doesn't defeat\n          // caching.\n          observedMetadata: buildSdkObservedMetadata(req.headers),\n        },\n      };\n      let result = await verify(config, verificationRequest);\n\n      req.agentVerification = result;\n      let sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n      // 3.6.0 hold-and-poll (opt-in via stepUpMaxWaitMs) — see express.ts for\n      // the full rationale. On 'approved' the same request is re-verified\n      // once, cache-bypassed, so the backend redeems the single-use approval.\n      if (\n        config.stepUpMaxWaitMs !== undefined &&\n        result.policyAllowed &&\n        requiresHumanApproval(result) &&\n        result.stepUpApproval?.pollUrl\n      ) {\n        const outcome = await awaitStepUpApproval(config, result.stepUpApproval);\n        res.setHeader('X-Astra-Step-Up', outcome);\n        if (outcome === 'approved') {\n          result = await verify(config, verificationRequest, { bypassCache: true });\n          req.agentVerification = result;\n          sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n        } else {\n          result.stepUpOutcome = outcome;\n        }\n      }\n\n      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denied verifications short-circuit BEFORE the\n      // gate-level comparison. See express.ts for the full rationale —\n      // mirroring it here so the MCP path inherits the same belt-and-braces\n      // protection against access-level/help-payload conflation.\n      // 4.5.0: gate on the SERVER decision only (`policyAllowed`) — anonymous\n      // callers allowed by an audit/allow endpoint policy are honestly\n      // identity-unverified; see express.ts.\n      if (!result.policyAllowed) {\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n        }\n        dedupeFailures(result);\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // F2 direct-path fail-closed: a step-up / requires-approval outcome\n      // (policyAllowed:true, allowed-but-escalate) cannot be completed\n      // autonomously — deny and surface stepUpApproval polling info.\n      if (requiresHumanApproval(result)) {\n        annotateApprovalRequired(result);\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n        }\n        dedupeFailures(result);\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Round-13 (R13-5): evaluation-without-enforcement parity with the\n      // express F9 adapter. When the route is `none` but we ran\n      // verify-access because `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed: true` AND\n      // credentials were present, skip the gates and call next() — the\n      // result is on `req.agentVerification` for the MCP handler to\n      // render tier-aware responses (e.g. anonymous vs verified\n      // tool-listing on the same `/mcp` endpoint).\n      if (!shouldEnforce) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'evaluated-not-enforced');\n        }\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // The access decision is the server's (identityVerified / policyAllowed,\n      // denied above) — resting on a verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS\n      // match + trust score. The per-tool gate only decides WHETHER a tool is\n      // enforced at all (`shouldEnforce`, above); there is no client-side tier\n      // veto (the access-level band was removed in SDK 5.0.0).\n\n      // ── Tag the outbound response with X-Astra-Verified-Hop ────────────\n      // Inner-hop REST endpoints called by this tool can read the header\n      // and skip a duplicate verify-access. We set it on the response so\n      // downstream proxies see it; tools that perform fetch() to an inner\n      // hop should also forward it themselves (the MCP server framework\n      // controls outbound calls — out of scope here).\n      if (effectiveAstraId) {\n        res.setHeader(\n          MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n          serializeVerifiedHop({\n            astraId: effectiveAstraId,\n            ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}),\n            checkedAt: Date.now(),\n          })\n        );\n      }\n\n      if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n        recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n      }\n      // v2.3.8 (defect #26): relay X-Astra-Unverified-Warning when the\n      // server returned an audit-mode advisory.\n      const enhancedResult = result as EnhancedVerificationResult;\n      if (enhancedResult.warningHeader) {\n        res.setHeader(enhancedResult.warningHeader.name, enhancedResult.warningHeader.value);\n      }\n      next();\n    } catch (error) {\n      // Audit F-A1-06: shadow-mode logging for fail-closed default migration.\n      // Mirror of the express adapter pattern. Default 'open' for backward\n      // compat in SDK 2.4.13; shadow logs let merchants grep correlationId\n      // for impact analysis before the default flips in a follow-up release.\n      const errorClass = error instanceof Error ? error.constructor.name : typeof error;\n      const correlationId =\n        (req.headers['x-request-id'] as string | undefined) ||\n        (req.headers['x-correlation-id'] as string | undefined) ||\n        `gen-${Date.now().toString(36)}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;\n      // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n      console.error('[VerificationGateway/MCP] Middleware error:', error);\n      // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n      console.warn(\n        `[SHADOW] would-have-denied: errorClass=${errorClass} route=${req.method}:${req.path} merchantId=${config.counterpartyId ?? 'unknown'} correlationId=${correlationId}`\n      );\n\n      if (failOnError === 'closed') {\n        const result: VerificationResult = {\n          identityVerified: false,\n          policyAllowed: false,\n          denialReasons: [`MCP middleware internal error: ${errorClass}`],\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'middleware.internal_error',\n              message: `Middleware threw ${errorClass} — failing closed`,\n            },\n          ],\n          verifiedAt: new Date(),\n          correlationId,\n        };\n        const catchUrls = config.apiBaseUrl\n          ? await getWellKnownUrls(config.apiBaseUrl).catch(() => undefined)\n          : undefined;\n        if (catchUrls) {\n          result.guidance = {\n            message: `Middleware threw ${errorClass} — failing closed`,\n            registrationUrl: catchUrls.registrationUrl,\n            documentationUrl: catchUrls.documentationUrl,\n          };\n        }\n        dedupeFailures(result);\n        return onDenied(result, req, res);\n      }\n\n      next();\n    }\n  };\n}\n\n// Re-export the helpers so consumers can mix-and-match (e.g. read the\n// verified-hop header themselves on a custom inner-hop handler).\nexport {\n  parseMcpJsonRpc,\n  mcpToPdlss,\n  mcpDefaultEnforced,\n  serializeVerifiedHop,\n  parseVerifiedHop,\n  isVerifiedHopValidFor,\n  MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n};\nexport type { ParsedMcpRequest } from '../transport/mcp-server';\n"],"mappings":";AAkBO,IAAM,cAAc;;;ACDpB,IAAM,iBAAiB,iBAAiB,WAAW;AAO1D,SAAS,cAAc,aAAmD;AACxE,MAAI,CAAC,YAAa,QAAO,EAAE,cAAc,eAAe;AACxD,MAAI,uBAAuB,SAAS;AAClC,UAAM,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW;AACpC,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,YAAY,EAAG,MAAK,IAAI,cAAc,cAAc;AAClE,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;AAC9B,UAAMA,OAAM,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,YAAY;AAC5E,WAAOA,OAAM,cAAc,CAAC,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC,cAAc,cAAc,CAAC;AAAA,EAC5E;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,YAAY;AACvF,SAAO,MAAM,cAAc,EAAE,cAAc,gBAAgB,GAAG,YAAY;AAC5E;AAEO,IAAM,WAAyB,CAAC,OAAO,SAC5C,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,SAAS,cAAc,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;;;ACf1D,SAAS,cAAc,OAA2B;AACvD,MAAI,SAAS,GAAI,QAAO;AACxB,MAAI,SAAS,GAAI,QAAO;AACxB,MAAI,SAAS,GAAI,QAAO;AACxB,SAAO;AACT;;;ACNA,IAAM,eAAe,KAAK,KAAK;AAE/B,IAAM,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAwB;AAC1C,IAAM,WAAW,oBAAI,IAA+C;AAEpE,SAAS,aAAa,YAA4B;AAGhD,QAAM,OAAO,WAAW,QAAQ,aAAa,EAAE;AAC/C,SAAO,GAAG,IAAI;AAChB;AAEA,eAAe,eAAe,YAAuD;AACnF,QAAM,MAAM,aAAa,UAAU;AACnC,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAAA,IACnC,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAAA,IACtC,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,GAAI;AAAA,EAClC,CAAC;AACD,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI;AAChB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,qEACS,SAAS,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,OAAQ,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAClC,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK,mBAAmB,CAAC,KAAK,oBAAoB,CAAC,KAAK,iBAAiB;AAC5E,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAMO,SAAS,kBAAkB,YAAuD;AACvF,QAAM,WAAW,SAAS,IAAI,UAAU;AACxC,MAAI,SAAU,QAAO;AAErB,QAAM,UAAU,eAAe,UAAU,EACtC,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS;AACd,UAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;AACrD,aAAS,OAAO,UAAU;AAC1B,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,CAAC,EACA,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ;AACd,aAAS,OAAO,UAAU;AAC1B,UAAM;AAAA,EACR,CAAC;AAEH,WAAS,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO;AAChC,SAAO;AACT;AAOA,eAAsB,iBAAiB,YAAuD;AAC5F,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU;AAElC,MAAI,OAAO;AACT,QAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,YAAY,cAAc;AAE/C,wBAAkB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,MAE1C,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AACA,WAAO,MAAM;AAAA,EACf;AAGA,QAAM,UAAU,SAAS,IAAI,UAAU;AACvC,MAAI,QAAS,QAAO;AAEpB,SAAO,kBAAkB,UAAU;AACrC;AAOO,SAAS,uBAAuB,YAA0D;AAC/F,SAAO,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU,GAAG;AAChC;;;AC5EA,IAAM,iBAAyC;AAAA,EAC7C,YAAY;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMZ,OAAO;AACT;AAOA,IAAI,qBAAqB;AAQzB,IAAI,0BAA0B;AAE9B,eAAe,iBACb,YACA,OACA,YACA,QACe;AACf,uBAAqB;AACrB,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,WAAW,GAAG,UAAU;AAK9B,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,SAAS,UAAU,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC;AAC5D,UAAM,cAAc,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,cAAc,KAAK;AAC5D,QAAI,YAAY,WAAW,WAAW,GAAG;AACvC,YAAM,UACJ,qCAAqC,UAAU,kCAAkC,WAAW;AAQ9F,UAAI,YAAY;AACd,cAAM,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,MAChD;AACA,cAAQ,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,2DAA2D;AAAA,IACpF,WAAW,OAAO;AAChB,cAAQ;AAAA,QACN,+CAA+C,UAAU,mBAAmB,WAAW;AAAA,MACzF;AAAA,IACF;AAKA,QAAI,QAAQ;AACV,YAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,UAAU,oCAAoC;AAAA,QAChF,SAAS,EAAE,eAAe,UAAU,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,MAC/C,CAAC;AACD,UAAI,UAAU,WAAW,KAAK;AAC5B,cAAM,OAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE;AAKrD,cAAM,UACJ,mFACI,KAAK,QAAQ,iBAAiB,KAAK,KAAK,WAAW,aAAa,yEAEnE,KAAK,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,SAAS,KAAK,MACrE;AACF,YAAI,YAAY;AACd,gBAAM,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,QAChD;AACA,gBAAQ,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MACvB,WAAW,UAAU,IAAI;AACvB,cAAM,OAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE;AAGrD,YAAI,OAAO,KAAK,iBAAiB,YAAY,KAAK,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACnE,kBAAQ;AAAA,YACN,qEAAqE,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,UAExF;AAAA,QACF,WAAW,OAAO;AAChB,kBAAQ,IAAI,iDAAiD;AAAA,QAC/D;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,QAAI,YAAY;AAGd,YAAM;AAAA,IACR;AACA,QAAI,OAAO;AACT,cAAQ,IAAI,2DAA2D,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,IACtF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAKA,IAAM,oBAAoB,oBAAI,IAA+D;AAwB7F,SAAS,YAAY,SAA8B,gBAAiC;AAClF,QAAM,IAAI,QAAQ;AAClB,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,EAAE,WAAW;AAAA,IACb,EAAE,UAAU;AAAA,IACZ,EAAE,OAAO;AAAA,IACT,QAAQ,WAAW;AAAA,IACnB,QAAQ,UAAU;AAAA,IAClB,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACxB,QAAQ,YAAY;AAAA,IACpB,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACxB,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC5B,QAAQ,YAAY;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAQpB,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAClB,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAAA,IAC3B,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC5B,QAAQ,oBAAoB,MAAM;AAAA,IAClC,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACzB,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAKzB,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC5B,QAAQ,sBAAsB;AAAA,IAC9B,QAAQ,yBAAyB,MAAM;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAMvC,QAAQ,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAAA,IACpC,QAAQ,gBAAgB,aAAa;AAAA,IACrC,QAAQ,gBAAgB,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACxC,QAAQ,gBAAgB,gBAAgB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAMxC,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACzB,QAAQ,qBAAqB;AAAA,EAC/B,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG;AACZ;AAKA,SAAS,gBACP,SACA,gBAC2B;AAC3B,QAAM,MAAM,YAAY,SAAS,cAAc;AAC/C,QAAM,SAAS,kBAAkB,IAAI,GAAG;AAExC,MAAI,UAAU,OAAO,YAAY,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AAC3C,WAAO,OAAO;AAAA,EAChB;AAEA,MAAI,QAAQ;AACV,sBAAkB,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,EAC9B;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAYA,IAAM,4BAA4B;AAElC,SAAS,YACP,SACA,QACA,eACA,gBACM;AACN,QAAM,aAAa,iBAAiB,gBAAgB,IAAI,gBAAgB;AACxE,QAAM,MAAM,YAAY,SAAS,cAAc;AAC/C,oBAAkB,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA,IACzB;AAAA,IACA,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,aAAa;AAAA,EACvC,CAAC;AACH;AAYO,SAAS,mBACd,SACA,OACkB;AAClB,QAAM,cAAgC,CAAC;AAKvC,QAAM,mBAAmB;AAKzB,QAAM,gBACJ,QAAQ,YAAY,KACpB,QAAQ,YAAY,KACpB,QAAQ,YAAY,KACpB,QAAQ,iBAAiB,KACzB,QAAQ,iBAAiB,KACzB,QAAQ,kBAAkB,KAC1B,QAAQ,kBAAkB,KAC1B,QAAQ,kBAAkB;AAC5B,MAAI,eAAe;AAIjB,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,aAAa,IACnC,cAAc,CAAC,IACf,OAAO,kBAAkB,WACvB,gBACA;AACN,QAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,iBAAiB,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG;AACzD,kBAAY,UAAU;AAAA,IACxB;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,QAAM,eAAe,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,WAAW;AACxF,MAAI,cAAc;AAChB,gBAAY,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,aAAa,CAAC,IAAI;AAAA,EACvE;AAKA,QAAM,aAAa,QAAQ,eAAe,KAAK,QAAQ,eAAe;AACtE,MAAI,YAAY;AACd,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI;AAC9D,QAAI,OAAO,cAAc,UAAU;AACjC,kBAAY,sBAAsB;AAClC,UAAI,UAAU,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACnC,oBAAY,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,MACrC;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,OAAO;AACT,QAAI,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC,YAAY,SAAS;AACzC,kBAAY,UAAU,MAAM;AAAA,IAC9B;AACA,QAAI,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC,YAAY,QAAQ;AACvC,kBAAY,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,IAC7B;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAgCA,SAAS,YAAY,MAAsD;AACzE,MAAI,CAAC,MAAM,YAAa,QAAO;AAC/B,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IACf,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,IACnB,SACE;AAAA,EAIJ;AACF;AAUA,SAAS,uBACP,SACA,QACA,UAQI,CAAC,GACe;AACpB,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU;AACjC,QAAM,aAAa,WAAW;AAC9B,QAAM,cAAc,WAAW;AAC/B,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;AAErB,QAAM,WAAyB,cAC3B;AAAA,IACE,SACE;AAAA,IAEF,iBAAiB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,IAC1C,kBAAkB,QAAQ,aAAa,WAAW,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC5E,OAAO;AAAA,MACL;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,IACA,aACE;AAAA,IACE,SACE;AAAA,IACF,iBAAiB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,IAC1C,kBAAkB,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC5C,OAAO;AAAA,MACL;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,IACA;AAAA,IACE,SACE;AAAA,IACF,iBAAiB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,IAC1C,kBAAkB,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC5C,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAGL,GAAI,MAAM,cACN;AAAA,QACE,yEAAyE,KAAK,WAAW;AAAA,MAC3F,IACA,CAAC;AAAA,MACL;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,IACA,GAAI,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,EACpD;AAEN,SAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAIL,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAClB,eAAe;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,IACA,eAAe,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,qCAAqC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAKzE,UAAU,cACN;AAAA,MACE;AAAA,QACE,WAAW;AAAA,QACX,SAAS,UAAU;AAAA,QACnB,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,MACrB;AAAA,IACF,IACA,aACE;AAAA,MACE;AAAA,QACE,WAAW;AAAA,QACX,SAAS,UAAU;AAAA,QACnB,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,MACrB;AAAA,IACF,IACA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAGN,GAAI,eAAe,EAAE,eAAe,KAAK;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAKzC,GAAI,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,IACpC,eAAe,QAAQ;AAAA,IACvB,WAAW,QAAQ;AAAA,IACnB,YAAY,oBAAI,KAAK;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAKA,eAAe,oBACb,QACA,SA+FC;AACD,QAAM,EAAE,aAAa,GAAG,YAAY,IAAI;AAIxC,QAAM,OAAgC;AAAA,IACpC,GAAI,YAAY,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC1D,GAAI,YAAY,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC5D;AAGA,MAAI,YAAY,OAAQ,MAAK,SAAS,YAAY;AAClD,MAAI,YAAY,aAAc,MAAK,eAAe,YAAY;AAC9D,MAAI,YAAY,SAAU,MAAK,WAAW,YAAY;AACtD,MAAI,YAAY,aAAc,MAAK,eAAe,YAAY;AAC9D,MAAI,YAAY,iBAAkB,MAAK,mBAAmB,YAAY;AACtE,MAAI,YAAY,SAAU,MAAK,WAAW,YAAY;AACtD,MAAI,YAAY,kBAAmB,MAAK,oBAAoB,YAAY;AACxE,MAAI,YAAY,cAAe,MAAK,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAChE,MAAI,YAAY,kBAAkB,OAAW,MAAK,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAE9E,MAAI,YAAY;AACd,SAAK,yBAAyB,YAAY;AAC5C,MAAI,YAAY,cAAe,MAAK,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAChE,MAAI,YAAY,iBAAkB,MAAK,mBAAmB,YAAY;AACtE,MAAI,YAAY,iBAAkB,MAAK,mBAAmB,YAAY;AACtE,MAAI,YAAY,gBAAiB,MAAK,kBAAkB,YAAY;AACpE,MAAI,OAAO,eAAgB,MAAK,iBAAiB,OAAO;AACxD,MAAI,YAAY;AACd,SAAK,0BAA0B,YAAY;AAG7C,MAAI,YAAY,mBAAoB,MAAK,qBAAqB,YAAY;AAG1E,MAAI,YAAY,cAAe,MAAK,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAGhE,MAAI,YAAY,kBAAmB,MAAK,oBAAoB,YAAY;AAExE,MAAI,YAAY,cAAe,MAAK,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAIhE,MAAI,YAAY,kBAAmB,MAAK,oBAAoB,YAAY;AAIxE,MAAI,YAAY,UAAW,MAAK,YAAY,YAAY;AACxD,MAAI,YAAY,iBAAkB,MAAK,mBAAmB,YAAY;AAStE,OAAK,aAAa;AAIlB,MAAI,YAAY,kBAAkB,YAAY,YAAY,YAAY,WAAW;AAC/E,UAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MACX,GAAI,YAAY,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,SAAS;AAAA,MAC7D,GAAI,YAAY,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,MAChE,GAAG,YAAY;AAAA,IACjB;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAG,MAAK,iBAAiB;AAAA,EAC1D;AAGA,QAAM,UAAkC;AAAA,IACtC,gBAAgB;AAAA,IAChB,GAAG,OAAO;AAAA,EACZ;AAcA,MAAI,OAAO,QAAQ;AACjB,YAAQ,eAAe,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM;AAElD,YAAQ,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,EAChC;AAEA,MAAI;AAMF,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,UAAU,yBAAyB;AAAA,MAC3E,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,MACzB,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,OAAO,mBAAmB,GAAM;AAAA,IAC9D,CAAC;AAED,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAMjC,QAAI,SAAS,WAAW,KAAK;AAC3B,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAS;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,QAGT,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM,cAAc,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,QAClE,QAAQ;AAAA,UACN,SAAS;AAAA,UACT,QAAQ;AAAA,UACR,UAAU;AAAA,YACR;AAAA,cACE,WAAW;AAAA,cACX,SACE,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,WAAW,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,cACrD,UACE,OAAO,MAAM,aAAa,WACtB,KAAK,WACL;AAAA,YACR;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,QAAI,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI;AAOhB,UAAI,SAAS,WAAW,KAAK;AAC3B,eAAO;AAAA,UACL,SAAS;AAAA,UACT,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,UACrC,WAAW;AAAA,UACX,eAAe,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,WAAW,KAAK,OAAO;AAAA,UAC5D,aACE,MAAM,eAAe,OAAO,KAAK,gBAAgB,WAC5C,KAAK,cACN;AAAA,UACN,eAAe,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,WAAW,KAAK,gBAAgB;AAAA,UAC9E,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM,cAAc,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,QACpE;AAAA,MACF;AAIA,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS,gBAAgB,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,QACpE,eAAe,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,WAAW,KAAK,gBAAgB;AAAA,QAC9E,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM,cAAc,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,MACpE;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,SAAS,OAAO;AACd,UAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU;AACzD,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,SAAS;AAAA,MACT,OAAO,qCAAqC,OAAO;AAAA,IACrD;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAmBA,eAAsB,OACpB,QACA,SACA,SAC6B;AAC7B,QAAM,eAAe,EAAE,GAAG,gBAAgB,GAAG,OAAO;AAIpD,QAAM,OAAO,aAAa,aACtB,uBAAuB,aAAa,UAAU,IAC9C;AAOJ,MAAI,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,aAAa,qBAAqB,aAAa,YAAY;AACrF,QAAI,aAAa,YAAY;AAC3B,YAAM;AAAA,QACJ,aAAa;AAAA,QACb,aAAa;AAAA,QACb;AAAA,QACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF,OAAO;AACL,WAAK;AAAA,QACH,aAAa;AAAA,QACb,aAAa;AAAA,QACb;AAAA,QACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MACE,CAAC,4BACA,OAAO,kBAAkB,UAAa,OAAO,yBAAyB,SACvE;AACA,8BAA0B;AAC1B,YAAQ;AAAA,MACN;AAAA,IAIF;AAAA,EACF;AAWA,MAAI,aAAa,aAAa,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS,aAAa;AACxD,UAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB,SAAS,aAAa,cAAc;AACnE,QAAI,QAAQ;AACV,UAAI,aAAa,OAAO;AACtB,gBAAQ,IAAI,+CAA+C;AAAA,MAC7D;AAOA,YAAM,MAA0B,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO;AAC5C,UAAI,QAAQ,WAAW;AACrB,YAAI,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,MAC1B,OAAO;AACL,eAAO,IAAI;AAAA,MACb;AACA,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,QAAM,kBAAkB,EAAE,GAAG,QAAQ;AACrC,MAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,mBAAmB,aAAa,iBAAiB;AACpE,oBAAgB,kBAAkB,aAAa;AAAA,EACjD;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,oBAAoB,aAAa,kBAAkB;AACtE,oBAAgB,mBAAmB,aAAa;AAAA,EAClD;AAGA,MAAI,aAAa,OAAO;AACtB,YAAQ,IAAI,iDAAiD;AAAA,EAC/D;AAEA,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,oBAAoB,cAAc,eAAe;AAK3E,QAAM,yBAA0B,YAAwC;AACxE,QAAM,sBACJ,MAAM,QAAQ,sBAAsB,KAAK,uBAAuB,SAAS,IACpE,yBACD;AAGN,MAAI,CAAC,YAAY,SAAS;AAQxB,WAAO,uBAAuB,cAAc,YAAY,OAAO;AAAA,MAC7D,QAAQ,YAAY,YAAY,uBAAuB;AAAA,MACvD,eAAgB,YAA2C;AAAA,MAC3D,WAAY,YAAuC;AAAA,MACnD,aAAa,YAAY;AAAA,MACzB;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AAGA,MAAI,CAAC,YAAY,QAAQ,SAAS;AAIhC,UAAM,qBAAsB,YAAY,QACpC;AAMJ,UAAM,wBACH,YAAY,qBAA8D,eAC3E;AACF,UAAMC,UAAqC;AAAA,MACzC,kBAAkB;AAAA,MAClB,eAAe;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAIf,eACE,wBACC,sBAAsB,mBAAmB,SAAS,IAC/C,mBAAmB,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,IACvC,YAAY,QAAQ,SAClB,CAAC,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM,IAC1B,CAAC,eAAe;AAAA,MACxB,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,gBAAgB,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,MACpC,kBAAkB,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,MACtC,UAAU;AAAA,QACR,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ,UAAU;AAAA,QACvC,iBAAiB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,QAC1C,kBAAkB,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,QAG5C,GAAI,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,MACpD;AAAA,MACA,YAAY,oBAAI,KAAK;AAAA;AAAA,MAErB,WAAY,YAAwC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAGpD,eAAgB,YAAwC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAGxD,WAAY,YAAwC;AAAA,MACpD,gBAAiB,YACd;AAAA,MACH,uBAAwB,YAAwC;AAAA,MAGhE,gBAAiB,YAAwC;AAAA,MAGzD,YAAa,YAAwC;AAAA,MAGrD,mBAAoB,YAAwC;AAAA,IAG9D;AAEA,WAAOA;AAAA,EACT;AAGA,QAAM,QAAmC,YAAY,QACjD;AAAA,IACE,SAAS,YAAY,MAAM;AAAA,IAC3B,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM;AAAA,IACxB,YAAY,YAAY,MAAM;AAAA,IAC9B,YAAY,cAAc,YAAY,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,IACtD,oBAAoB,YAAY,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAAA,IAC3D,QAAQ,YAAY,MAAM;AAAA,EAC5B,IACA;AAEJ,QAAM,YAA2C,YAAY,YACzD;AAAA,IACE,UAAU,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,IAChC,MAAM,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,IAC5B,YAAY,YAAY,UAAU,cAAc;AAAA,IAChD,UAAU,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,EAClC,IACA;AAEJ,QAAM,eAAiD,YAAY,eAC/D;AAAA,IACE,MAAM,YAAY,aAAa;AAAA,IAC/B,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa;AAAA,IACnC,YAAY,YAAY,aAAa;AAAA,EACvC,IACA;AAKJ,QAAM,sBAAsB,YAAY;AAExC,QAAM,SAAqC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IASzC,kBACG,YAAY,qBAA8D,eAC3E;AAAA,IACF,eAAe;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,eAAe,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,IACnC;AAAA,IACA,gBAAgB,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,IACpC,kBAAkB,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,IACtC,YAAY,oBAAI,KAAK;AAAA,IACrB,UAAU,aAAa;AAAA;AAAA,IAEvB,WAAY,YAAwC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAGpD,eAAgB,YAAwC;AAAA;AAAA,IAExD,WAAY,YAAwC;AAAA,IACpD,kBAAmB,YAAwC;AAAA,IAG3D,eAAgB,YAAwC;AAAA,IAGxD,gBAAiB,YACd;AAAA,IACH,uBAAwB,YAAwC;AAAA,IAGhE,eAAgB,YAAwC;AAAA,IAGxD,gBAAiB,YAAwC;AAAA,IAGzD,YAAa,YAAwC;AAAA,IAGrD,mBAAoB,YAAwC;AAAA,EAG9D;AAGA,MAAI,OAAO,mBAAmB,QAAQ;AAKpC,WAAO,gBAAgB;AAGvB,WAAO,gBAAgB,uBACrB,OAAO,yBAAyB,CAAC,2CAA2C;AAC9E,WAAO,WAAW,OAAO,mBACrB;AAAA,MACE,SAAS,wBAAwB,OAAO,iBAAiB,UAAU,0BAA0B;AAAA,MAC7F,iBAAiB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,MAC1C,kBAAkB,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC9C,IACA;AAAA,MACE,SAAS,OAAO,wBAAwB,CAAC,KAAK;AAAA,MAC9C,iBAAiB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,MAC1C,kBAAkB,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC9C;AAAA,EACN,WAAW,OAAO,mBAAmB,oBAAoB;AAGvD,WAAO,iBAAiB;AACxB,WAAO,gBAAgB,uBACrB,OAAO,yBAAyB,CAAC,+BAA+B;AAAA,EACpE;AAOA,QAAM,YACJ,OAAO,mBAAmB,QAC1B,OAAO,qBAAqB,QAC5B,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAC5B,MAAI,aAAa,aAAa,KAAK,OAAO,mBAAmB,UAAU,CAAC,WAAW;AACjF,gBAAY,SAAS,QAAQ,aAAa,UAAU,aAAa,cAAc;AAAA,EACjF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAMA,eAAsB,eACpB,QACA,WACA,UACA,QACe;AACf,QAAM,UAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,mBAAmB;AAC7E,MAAI,OAAO,QAAQ;AACjB,YAAQ,eAAe,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM;AAClD,YAAQ,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,EAChC;AAEA,QAAM,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,UAAU,yBAAyB,SAAS,aAAa;AAAA,IAChF,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,UAAU,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EAC3C,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,EAEf,CAAC;AACH;;;AC/lCO,IAAM,yBAAyB;AAuEtC,IAAM,sBAAsB,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EAClC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AACF,CAAC;AAMD,IAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC,gBAAgB,QAAQ,MAAM;AAM9D,IAAM,0BAA0B,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EACtC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AAOD,SAAS,kBAAkB,MAAuB;AAChD,SAAO,SAAS,eAAe,KAAK,SAAS,YAAY,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAC9F;AAOA,IAAM,wBAAwB,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EACpC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AAID,IAAM,2BAA2B;AAAA,EAC/B;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAOA,IAAM,sBAAsB;AAAA,EAC1B;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAGO,IAAM,cAAc;AACpB,IAAM,yBAAyB;AAC/B,IAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK;AAEpC,SAAS,WAAW,GAAmB;AAErC,MAAI,QAAQ;AACZ,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;AAC3B,QAAI,OAAO,IAAM,UAAS;AAAA,aACjB,OAAO,KAAO,UAAS;AAAA,aACvB,QAAQ,SAAU,QAAQ,OAAQ;AACzC,eAAS;AACT;AAAA,IACF,MAAO,UAAS;AAAA,EAClB;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAQO,SAAS,oBAAoB,UAAsC;AACxE,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAK;AAC1B,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;AAClC,MAAI,WAAW,GAAG;AAChB,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ,EAAE,YAAY;AACpD,QAAI,WAAW,YAAY,WAAW,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS;AACnE,cAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK;AAAA,IACzC;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,YAAY;AAChC,aAAW,UAAU,qBAAqB;AACxC,QAAI,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,GAAG;AAE5B,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,MAAuB;AAC7C,MAAI,oBAAoB,IAAI,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AAC1C,MAAI,uBAAuB,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AACnE,MAAI,kBAAkB,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AACpC,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,iBAAiB,MAAuB;AAC/C,MAAI,sBAAsB,IAAI,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AAC5C,SAAO,yBAAyB,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;AAChE;AAWO,SAAS,gBACd,KACuB;AACvB,QAAM,UAAkC,CAAC;AACzC,QAAM,kBAA0C,CAAC;AACjD,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,aAAa;AACjB,MAAI,QAAQ;AAEZ,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,QAAQ;AAE3B,aAAW,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG;AACtC,QAAI,SAAS,YAAa;AAC1B,UAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY;AACjC,UAAM,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO;AAC5B,QAAI,aAAa,OAAW;AAC5B,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ;AAG9E,QAAI,wBAAwB,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG;AACrC,YAAM,MAAM,oBAAoB,MAAM;AACtC,UAAI,OAAO,CAAC,aAAc,gBAAe;AACzC;AAAA,IACF;AAIA,QAAI,SAAS,UAAU;AACrB,oBAAc,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,IACrE;AAGA,QAAI,eAAe,IAAI,EAAG;AAG1B,QAAI,QAAQ;AACZ,QAAI,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,wBAAwB;AAC9C,cAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,sBAAsB;AAAA,IAC/C;AACA,UAAM,aAAa,WAAW,IAAI,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK;AACtD,QAAI,aAAa,aAAa,gBAAiB;AAC/C,kBAAc;AACd;AACA,YAAQ,IAAI,IAAI;AAChB,QAAI,iBAAiB,IAAI,EAAG,iBAAgB,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EACtD;AAEA,QAAM,SAAgC,EAAE,QAAQ;AAChD,MAAI,aAAc,QAAO,eAAe;AACxC,MAAI,OAAO,KAAK,eAAe,EAAE,SAAS,EAAG,QAAO,kBAAkB;AACtE,MAAI,gBAAgB,OAAW,QAAO,cAAc;AACpD,SAAO;AACT;AAwBA,IAAM,4BACJ;AAAA,EACE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,oBAAoB,kBAAkB,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,EAC9E;AAAA,IACE;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,gBAAgB,uBAAuB,6BAA6B,oBAAoB;AAAA,EAC3F;AAAA,EACA,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,8BAA8B,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAAA,EAC7E,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/D,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,oBAAoB,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAAA,EACvD,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,wBAAwB,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAAA,EACnE,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,yBAAyB,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAAA,EACtE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,2BAA2B,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAAA,EAC3E,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAAA,EACjC,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAAA,EACxC,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAAA,EAClD,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,wBAAwB,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAAA,EACpE,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAM9C,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,eAAe,mCAAmC,CAAC;AAAA,EACvE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,mCAAmC,CAAC;AAAA;AAAA,EAEvD,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAAA,EAClD,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC;AACpD;AAOK,IAAM,6BAA6B;AAgCnC,SAAS,4BACd,SACoC;AACpC,MAAI,CAAC,QAAS,QAAO;AACrB,QAAM,QAAgC,CAAC;AACvC,aAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG;AACvC,UAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC1B,QAAI,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,EAAG,OAAM,KAAK,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI;AAAA,EACjF;AAEA,QAAM,aAAqC,CAAC;AAC5C,aAAW,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,2BAA2B;AACtD,eAAW,UAAU,SAAS;AAC5B,YAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK;AAClC,UAAI,OAAO;AACT,mBAAW,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,0BAA0B;AAC3D;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAKA;AACE,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B,GAAG,KAAK;AACtD,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,MAAM,SAAS;AACvC,QAAI,UAAW,YAAW,aAAa,UAAU,CAAC;AAClD,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW,MAAM,KAAM,YAAW,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,EACtE;AAEA,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI;AAClB,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB;AACnC,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK;AACxC,QAAI,OAAQ,YAAW,KAAK;AAAA,EAC9B;AAKA,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW;AACzB,UAAM,SAAS,WAAW,YAAY,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAClD,QAAI,OAAQ,YAAW,YAAY;AAAA,EACrC;AAEA,SAAO,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,aAAa;AAC3D;AAaO,SAAS,yBACd,YACkB;AAClB,QAAM,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,iBAAiB,YAAY,IAAI,gBAAgB,UAAU;AAC1F,QAAM,OAA+B,CAAC;AACtC,MAAI,YAAY;AACd,eAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,GAAG;AAC1C,YAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,IAAI;AAC7B,UAAI,UAAU,OAAW;AACzB,WAAK,KAAK,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACnF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,aAAa,4BAA4B,IAAI;AACnD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,GAAI,gBAAgB,EAAE,aAAa;AAAA,IACnC,GAAI,mBAAmB,EAAE,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACzC,GAAI,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW;AAAA,IAC/B,GAAI,gBAAgB,UAAa,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAC/C,eAAe;AAAA,EACjB;AACF;;;AC1cA,IAAM,kBACJ;AAGK,SAAS,sBAAsB,QAAqC;AACzE,SAAO,OAAO,mBAAmB,QAAQ,OAAO,qBAAqB;AACvE;AAOO,SAAS,yBAAyB,QAAkC;AACzE,SAAO,WAAW;AAAA,IAChB,GAAI,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC;AAAA,IACxB,EAAE,WAAW,qCAAqC,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC7E;AACA,SAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,iBAAiB,GAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAE;AAC1E;;;ACnCA,IAAM,2BAA2B;AACjC,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAC7B,IAAM,uBAAuB,IAAI,KAAK;AACtC,IAAM,kBAAkB;AACxB,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAMhC,SAAS,eAAe,QAAuB,SAAyB;AACtE,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACvC,QAAM,UAAU,OAAO,cAAc,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,EAAE;AAChE,SAAO,SAAS;AAClB;AAOA,eAAsB,iBACpB,QACA,UACsC;AACtC,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,QAAS,QAAO;AAC9B,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,SAAS,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,MACnE,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,uBAAuB;AAAA,IACrD,CAAC;AACD,QAAI,CAAC,IAAI,GAAI,QAAO;AACpB,UAAM,OAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK;AAI7B,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM;AACnB,UAAM,SACJ,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS,WAAY,KAAiC,SAAS,MAAM;AACtF,WAAO,OAAO,WAAW,WAAY,SAAkC;AAAA,EACzE,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,gBAAgB,QAAuB,UAAsC;AACpF,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACrB,QAAM,UAAU,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAC1C,MAAI,UAAU,EAAG,QAAO,MAAM;AAI9B,MAAI,SAAS,WAAW;AACtB,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS;AAC5C,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,MAAM,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,EAC5D;AACA,SAAO,MAAM;AACf;AAEA,SAAS,MAAM,IAA2B;AACxC,SAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,YAAY,WAAW,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;AACzD;AAUA,eAAsB,oBACpB,QACA,UACwB;AACxB,QAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB,QAAQ,QAAQ;AACjD,QAAM,eAAe,KAAK;AAAA,IACxB;AAAA,IACA,OAAO,wBAAwB;AAAA,EACjC;AAEA,SAAO,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,UAAU;AAC5B,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,iBAAiB,QAAQ,QAAQ;AACtD,QAAI,UAAU,WAAW,WAAW;AAClC,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,UAAM,YAAY,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AACtC,QAAI,aAAa,EAAG;AACpB,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,cAAc,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/C;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AC3FO,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAGhC,IAAM,8BAA8B;AAQpC,SAAS,qBAAqB,QAAmC;AACtE,SAAO,GAAG,OAAO,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,aAAa,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS;AACxE;AAEO,SAAS,iBAAiB,OAA4D;AAC3F,MAAI,CAAC,MAAO,QAAO;AACnB,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7B,MAAI,MAAM,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;AAC/B,QAAM,CAAC,SAAS,WAAW,YAAY,IAAI;AAC3C,MAAI,CAAC,QAAS,QAAO;AACrB,QAAM,YAAY,OAAO,YAAY;AACrC,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS,KAAK,aAAa,EAAG,QAAO;AAC1D,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,GAAI,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAOO,SAAS,sBACd,QACA,iBACA,OAA4C,CAAC,GACpC;AACT,MAAI,CAAC,OAAQ,QAAO;AACpB,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,gBAAiB,QAAO;AAC/C,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,YAAY;AAChC,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI;AACjC,SAAO,MAAM,OAAO,aAAa,UAAU,OAAO,OAAO;AAC3D;;;ACkCO,SAAS,gBAAgB,MAAwC;AACtE,MAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AACrE,QAAM,MAAM;AACZ,MAAI,IAAI,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI,YAAY,MAAO,QAAO;AAC3D,QAAM,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,WAAW,IAAI,SAAS;AAC7D,MAAI,CAAC,OAAQ,QAAO;AACpB,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI;AAGnB,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,WAAW,gBAAgB,UAAU,OAAO,OAAO,SAAS,UAAU;AACxE,eAAW,OAAO;AAAA,EACpB;AAGA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,WAAW,gBAAgB,UAAU,OAAO,OAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU;AACnF,sBAAkB,OAAO;AAAA,EAC3B;AAEA,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;AACrB,QAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAC5B,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;AAMrB,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,iBAAiB,OAAO,cAAc,YAAY,UAAU;AAC9D,sBAAkB,cAAc;AAAA,EAClC,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,aAAa,UAAU;AACpD,sBAAkB,KAAK;AAAA,EACzB;AAcA,QAAM,oBAAoB,mBAAmB,eAAe,MAAM,SAAS;AAC3E,QAAM,mBAAmB,mBAAmB,eAAe,MAAM,QAAQ;AAEzE,QAAM,eAAe,WAAW;AAChC,QAAM,aAAa,WAAW;AAC9B,QAAM,kBACJ,WAAW,gBACX,WAAW,kBACX,WAAW,oBACX,WAAW,UACX,WAAW;AAEb,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,GAAI,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/B,GAAI,kBAAkB,EAAE,gBAAgB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC7C,GAAI,kBAAkB,EAAE,gBAAgB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC7C,GAAI,kBAAkB,QAAQ,EAAE,iBAAiB,kBAAkB,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC9E,GAAI,kBAAkB,SAAS,EAAE,uBAAuB,kBAAkB,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACtF,GAAI,iBAAiB,QAAQ,EAAE,gBAAgB,iBAAiB,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC3E,GAAI,iBAAiB,SAAS,EAAE,sBAAsB,iBAAiB,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnF;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAiBA,SAAS,mBACP,eACA,MACA,KAC6E;AAC7E,MAAI,iBAAiB,OAAO,cAAc,GAAG,MAAM,UAAU;AAC3D,WAAO,EAAE,OAAO,cAAc,GAAG,GAAa,QAAQ,OAAO;AAAA,EAC/D;AACA,MAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,UAAU;AACzC,WAAO,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,GAAa,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC/D;AACA,SAAO,EAAE,OAAO,QAAW,QAAQ,OAAU;AAC/C;AAuDO,SAAS,WACd,QACA,aACA,eACA,cACA,UACiB;AACjB,QAAM,WAAW,UAAU,YAAY;AAEvC,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,UAAU,YAAY,QAAW;AACnC,cAAU,SAAS;AACnB,oBAAgB;AAAA,EAClB,WAAW,eAAe;AACxB,cAAU;AACV,oBAAgB;AAAA,EAClB,WAAW,OAAO,mBAAmB,OAAO,uBAAuB;AACjE,cAAU,OAAO;AACjB,oBAAgB,OAAO;AAAA,EACzB,OAAO;AACL,cAAU;AACV,oBAAgB;AAAA,EAClB;AAEA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,UAAU,WAAW,QAAW;AAClC,aAAS,SAAS;AAClB,mBAAe;AAAA,EACjB,WAAW,cAAc;AACvB,aAAS;AACT,mBAAe;AAAA,EACjB,WAAW,OAAO,kBAAkB,OAAO,sBAAsB;AAC/D,aAAS,OAAO;AAChB,mBAAe,OAAO;AAAA,EACxB,WAAW,OAAO,WAAW,cAAc;AAMzC,aAAS;AACT,mBAAe;AAAA,EACjB,OAAO;AACL,aAAS,OAAO,WAAW,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;AAC1E,mBAAe;AAAA,EACjB;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU,eAAe,aAAa;AAClE;AAeO,SAAS,mBAAmB,QAAmC;AACpE,MAAI,OAAO,gBAAgB,OAAO,WAAW,4BAA6B,QAAO;AACjF,MAAI,OAAO,gBAAiB,QAAO;AACnC,SAAO;AACT;;;ACtFA,SAAS,iBAAiB,OAA0D;AAClF,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AACtC,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG,QAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AACxC,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,QAAkC;AACxD,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACjD,UAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAY;AAC7B,WAAO,WAAW,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM;AAC9C,YAAM,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,IAAK,EAA4B,YAAY,EAAE;AACtF,UAAI,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO;AAC1B,WAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AACZ,aAAO;AAAA,IACT,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,OAAO,cAAc,SAAS,GAAG;AAC3D,WAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,aAAa,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1D;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,iBAAiB,QAA4B,KAAc,KAAqB;AAEvF,QAAM,KAAM,IAAI,MAA8C,MAAM;AAKpE,MAAI,OAAO,eAAe;AACxB,QAAI,UAAU,wBAAwB,UAAU;AAChD,QAAI,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK;AAAA,MACnB,SAAS;AAAA,MACT;AAAA,MACA,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA,QAEL,MAAM;AAAA,QACN,SACE,OAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK;AAAA,QAC/B,MAAM;AAAA,UACJ,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,UACjB,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,UACjB,eAAe,OAAO;AAAA,QACxB;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AACD;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,SAAS,CAAC,OAAO,mBAAmB,MAAM;AAEhD,MAAI,UAAU,wBAAwB,UAAU;AAEhD,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK;AAAA,IACtB,SAAS;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,IACA,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAKL,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,mBAAmB,QAAS;AAAA,MAC1C,SAAS,OAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK;AAAA,MACtC,MAAM;AAAA,QACJ,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA,QAEjB,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,QACjB,eAAe,OAAO;AAAA,QACtB,gBAAgB,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,QAGvB,GAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,EAAE,eAAe,OAAO,cAAc;AAAA,MACpE;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AACH;AAiBA,SAAS,YACP,QACA,MAQA;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU;AACpB,UAAM,aAAa,KAAK,cAAc,OAAO,MAAM;AACnD,QAAI,eAAe,QAAW;AAC5B,aAAO,eAAe,YAClB,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,aAAa,IACvC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,aAAa;AAAA,IAChE;AAGA,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACvD;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY,OAAO,QAAQ;AACjD,MAAI,aAAa,QAAW;AAC1B,WAAO,aAAa,YAChB,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,IACrC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,QAAQ,WAAW;AAAA,EAC5D;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS,mBAAmB,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ,OAAO;AAC/D;AAMO,SAAS,oBAAoB,SAA+C;AACjF,QAAM;AAAA,IACJ;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,oBAAoB;AAAA,IACpB,OAAO;AAAA,IACP,WAAW;AAAA,IACX,mBAAmB;AAAA,IACnB;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,yBAAyB;AAAA,IACzB,cAAc;AAAA,IACd,GAAG;AAAA,EACL,IAAI;AAGJ,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY;AACrB,sBAAkB,OAAO,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,IAAC,CAAC;AAAA,EACrD;AAEA,SAAO,OAAO,KAAc,KAAe,SAAsC;AAC/E,QAAI;AACF,UAAI,KAAM,QAAO,KAAK;AAEtB,YAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB,IAAI,IAAI;AACvC,UAAI,CAAC,QAAQ;AAKX,YAAI,OAAO,sBAAsB;AAI/B,cAAI,UAAU,wBAAwB,YAAY;AAClD,cAAI,UAAU,0BAA0B,kBAAkB;AAAA,QAC5D;AACA,eAAO,KAAK;AAAA,MACd;AACA,UAAI,aAAa;AAMjB,YAAM,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,KAAK,IAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAC5E,YAAM,gBACJ,OAAO,cAAc,WACjB,YACA,MAAM,QAAQ,SAAS,IACrB,UAAU,CAAC,IACX;AACR,YAAM,cAAc,OAAO;AAE3B,UAAI;AACJ,UAAI,iBAAiB,eAAe,kBAAkB,aAAa;AACjE,YAAI,sBAAsB,UAAU;AAClC,gBAAM,KAAM,IAAI,MAAkC,MAAM;AACxD,cAAI,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK;AAAA,YACnB,SAAS;AAAA,YACT;AAAA,YACA,OAAO;AAAA,cACL,MAAM;AAAA,cACN,SAAS;AAAA,cACT,MAAM;AAAA,gBACJ,QACE;AAAA,gBACF;AAAA,gBACA;AAAA,cACF;AAAA,YACF;AAAA,UACF,CAAC;AACD;AAAA,QACF;AACA,2BAAmB,sBAAsB,kBAAkB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAC7E,OAAO;AACL,2BAAmB,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACtC;AAOA,UAAI,oBAAoB,kBAAkB;AACxC,cAAM,SAAS,IAAI,QAAQ,wBAAwB,YAAY,CAAC;AAChE,cAAM,WACJ,OAAO,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI;AAC5E,cAAM,SAAS,iBAAiB,QAAQ;AACxC,YACE,sBAAsB,QAAQ,kBAAkB;AAAA,UAC9C,GAAI,wBAAwB,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,oBAAoB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,QAC/E,CAAC,GACD;AAIA,iBAAO,KAAK;AAAA,QACd;AAAA,MACF;AAGA,YAAM,eAAe,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,QACvC;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF,CAAC;AAUD,YAAM,cAAc;AAAA,QAClB,IAAI;AAAA,QACJ,IAAI;AAAA,MACN;AAKA,UAAI,iBAAkB,aAAY,UAAU;AAQ5C,YAAM,gBAAgB,aAAa;AACnC,UAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,OAAO,gCAAgC,CAAC,YAAY,UAAU;AACpF,YAAI,OAAO,sBAAsB;AAG/B,cAAI,UAAU,wBAAwB,YAAY;AAClD,cAAI,UAAU,0BAA0B,aAAa;AAAA,QACvD;AACA,eAAO,KAAK;AAAA,MACd;AAGA,YAAM,OAAO,aAAa;AAE1B,YAAM,gBAAgB,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB,CAAC;AACrE,YAAM,eAAe,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ,gBAAgB,CAAC;AACnE,YAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,QACZ;AAAA,QACA,IAAI;AAAA,QACJ;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,MACnF;AAMA,UAAI,OAAO,OAAO;AAEhB,gBAAQ,MAAM,mCAAmC;AAAA,UAC/C,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAAA,UACtB,kBAAkB,MAAM;AAAA,UACxB,eAAe,MAAM;AAAA,UACrB,iBAAiB,MAAM;AAAA,QACzB,CAAC;AAAA,MACH;AASA,UAAI,CAAC,MAAM,SAAS;AAClB,cAAM,KAAM,IAAI,MAAkC,MAAM;AACxD,YAAI,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK;AAAA,UACnB,SAAS;AAAA,UACT;AAAA,UACA,OAAO;AAAA,YACL,MAAM;AAAA,YACN,SAAS;AAAA,YACT,MAAM;AAAA,cACJ,WAAW;AAAA,cACX,QACE;AAAA,cACF,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAAA,YACxB;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF,CAAC;AACD;AAAA,MACF;AAEA,YAAM,kBACJ,OAAO,mBAAmB,GAAG,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI;AAC3E,YAAM,wBAAwB,oBAAoB;AAElD,YAAM,sBAA2C;AAAA,QAC/C;AAAA,QACA,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,QACf,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,QACd,UAAU,MAAM;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,QAIhB,oBAAoB;AAAA,QACpB,eAAe;AAAA,QACf;AAAA,QACA,kBAAkB,OAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,QAC7C;AAAA,QACA,gBAAgB;AAAA,UACd,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,UACd,WAAW,IAAI,QAAQ,YAAY;AAAA,UACnC,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,UAMlB,kBAAkB,yBAAyB,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,QACxD;AAAA,MACF;AACA,UAAI,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAErD,UAAI,oBAAoB;AACxB,UAAI,YAAa,OAAsC;AAKvD,UACE,OAAO,oBAAoB,UAC3B,OAAO,iBACP,sBAAsB,MAAM,KAC5B,OAAO,gBAAgB,SACvB;AACA,cAAM,UAAU,MAAM,oBAAoB,QAAQ,OAAO,cAAc;AACvE,YAAI,UAAU,mBAAmB,OAAO;AACxC,YAAI,YAAY,YAAY;AAC1B,mBAAS,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,KAAK,CAAC;AACxE,cAAI,oBAAoB;AACxB,sBAAa,OAAsC;AAAA,QACrD,OAAO;AACL,iBAAO,gBAAgB;AAAA,QACzB;AAAA,MACF;AASA,UAAI,CAAC,OAAO,eAAe;AACzB,YAAI,yBAAyB,WAAW;AACtC,yBAAe,QAAQ,WAAW,UAAU,OAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,UAAC,CAAC;AAAA,QACvF;AACA,uBAAe,MAAM;AACrB,iBAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AACzB;AAAA,MACF;AAKA,UAAI,sBAAsB,MAAM,GAAG;AACjC,iCAAyB,MAAM;AAC/B,YAAI,yBAAyB,WAAW;AACtC,yBAAe,QAAQ,WAAW,UAAU,OAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,UAAC,CAAC;AAAA,QACvF;AACA,uBAAe,MAAM;AACrB,iBAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AACzB;AAAA,MACF;AASA,UAAI,CAAC,eAAe;AAClB,YAAI,OAAO,sBAAsB;AAC/B,cAAI,UAAU,wBAAwB,UAAU;AAChD,cAAI,UAAU,0BAA0B,wBAAwB;AAAA,QAClE;AACA,YAAI,yBAAyB,WAAW;AACtC,yBAAe,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,UAAC,CAAC;AAAA,QAC7D;AACA,eAAO,KAAK;AAAA,MACd;AAcA,UAAI,kBAAkB;AACpB,YAAI;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,UACA,qBAAqB;AAAA,YACnB,SAAS;AAAA,YACT,GAAI,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,YACjC,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,UACtB,CAAC;AAAA,QACH;AAAA,MACF;AAEA,UAAI,yBAAyB,WAAW;AACtC,uBAAe,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,QAAC,CAAC;AAAA,MAC7D;AAGA,YAAM,iBAAiB;AACvB,UAAI,eAAe,eAAe;AAChC,YAAI,UAAU,eAAe,cAAc,MAAM,eAAe,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,MACrF;AACA,WAAK;AAAA,IACP,SAAS,OAAO;AAKd,YAAM,aAAa,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO;AAC5E,YAAM,gBACH,IAAI,QAAQ,cAAc,KAC1B,IAAI,QAAQ,kBAAkB,KAC/B,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AAE1E,cAAQ,MAAM,+CAA+C,KAAK;AAElE,cAAQ;AAAA,QACN,0CAA0C,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,eAAe,OAAO,kBAAkB,SAAS,kBAAkB,aAAa;AAAA,MACtK;AAEA,UAAI,gBAAgB,UAAU;AAC5B,cAAM,SAA6B;AAAA,UACjC,kBAAkB;AAAA,UAClB,eAAe;AAAA,UACf,eAAe,CAAC,kCAAkC,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,UAC9D,UAAU;AAAA,YACR;AAAA,cACE,WAAW;AAAA,cACX,SAAS,oBAAoB,UAAU;AAAA,YACzC;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,UACA,YAAY,oBAAI,KAAK;AAAA,UACrB;AAAA,QACF;AACA,cAAM,YAAY,OAAO,aACrB,MAAM,iBAAiB,OAAO,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAS,IAC/D;AACJ,YAAI,WAAW;AACb,iBAAO,WAAW;AAAA,YAChB,SAAS,oBAAoB,UAAU;AAAA,YACvC,iBAAiB,UAAU;AAAA,YAC3B,kBAAkB,UAAU;AAAA,UAC9B;AAAA,QACF;AACA,uBAAe,MAAM;AACrB,eAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,MAClC;AAEA,WAAK;AAAA,IACP;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":["has","result"]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/version.ts","../../src/http.ts","../../src/trust-levels.ts","../../src/well-known.ts","../../src/verify.ts","../../src/metadata-capture.ts","../../src/adapters/approval-gate.ts","../../src/adapters/stepup-poll.ts","../../src/verified-hop.ts","../../src/transport/mcp-server.ts","../../src/adapters/mcp.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Single source-of-truth for the SDK's\n * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future\n * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.\n *\n * Why a constant rather than `import pkg from '../package.json'`:\n * - `tsconfig.json` sets `rootDir: ./src`; importing the sibling\n *   package.json fails the build with \"outside rootDir\".\n * - Build-time string replacement (tsup `define`, esbuild banner, etc.)\n *   adds toolchain coupling for a trivial gain.\n * - Embedded readonly constant works in every environment (Node, browser,\n *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.\n *\n * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against\n * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. A manual bump\n * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them\n * lockstep.\n */\nexport const SDK_VERSION = '5.6.0';\n","/**\n * Shared outbound-HTTP wrapper — every request the SDK makes to the\n * AstraSync backend (or anywhere else) goes through `sdkFetch` so it\n * carries an identifying User-Agent.\n *\n * Why: Node's global fetch defaults to `user-agent: node`, which is\n * indistinguishable from every other Node client on the wire. Visit\n * Intelligence observed our own SDK/beacon traffic as anonymous \"node\"\n * visits. Self-identification is the platform's own medicine.\n *\n * Browser note: some browsers filter the User-Agent request header\n * silently (never throwing), so this is a no-op there — which is correct:\n * in a browser the page's real UA is the honest identity.\n */\n\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\n\nexport const SDK_USER_AGENT = `astrasync-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;\n\n/**\n * Add the SDK User-Agent without changing the SHAPE of the caller's headers\n * (plain records stay plain records) — interceptors, adapters, and tests\n * read `init.headers` as a record, and `Headers` would also lowercase names.\n */\nfunction withUserAgent(initHeaders: HeadersInit | undefined): HeadersInit {\n  if (!initHeaders) return { 'user-agent': SDK_USER_AGENT };\n  if (initHeaders instanceof Headers) {\n    const copy = new Headers(initHeaders);\n    if (!copy.has('user-agent')) copy.set('user-agent', SDK_USER_AGENT);\n    return copy;\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(initHeaders)) {\n    const has = initHeaders.some(([name]) => name.toLowerCase() === 'user-agent');\n    return has ? initHeaders : [...initHeaders, ['user-agent', SDK_USER_AGENT]];\n  }\n  const has = Object.keys(initHeaders).some((name) => name.toLowerCase() === 'user-agent');\n  return has ? initHeaders : { 'user-agent': SDK_USER_AGENT, ...initHeaders };\n}\n\nexport const sdkFetch: typeof fetch = (input, init) =>\n  fetch(input, { ...init, headers: withUserAgent(init?.headers) });\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway — Trust Level helpers.\n *\n * SDK 5.0.0: the `accessLevel` band (`none`/`restricted`/`read-only`/`standard`/\n * `full`/`internal`) was removed entirely — it never gated the access decision\n * (the server does, from a verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS match + trust\n * score). What remains here is the coarse trust-level badge derived from the\n * numeric trust score, used only for display.\n */\n\nimport type { TrustLevel } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Trust level score ranges\n */\nexport const TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES: Record<TrustLevel, { min: number; max: number }> = {\n  BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },\n  SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },\n  GOLD: { min: 60, max: 79 },\n  PLATINUM: { min: 80, max: 100 },\n};\n\n/**\n * Determine trust level from score\n */\nexport function getTrustLevel(score: number): TrustLevel {\n  if (score >= 80) return 'PLATINUM';\n  if (score >= 60) return 'GOLD';\n  if (score >= 40) return 'SILVER';\n  return 'BRONZE';\n}\n","import { sdkFetch } from './http';\n/**\n * SDK-side discovery of canonical platform URLs via `/.well-known/agentic-commerce`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget pre-fetch at middleware creation; first verify() awaits\n * the in-flight promise if it hasn't resolved. 60-minute TTL with\n * stale-while-revalidate background refresh.\n */\n\nexport interface WellKnownAgenticCommerce {\n  registrationUrl: string;\n  documentationUrl: string;\n  verifyAccessUrl: string;\n  /** 5.1.0: hosted AstraSync MCP bridge endpoint (absent on self-hosted backends). */\n  mcpEndpoint?: string;\n  /** 5.1.0: bridge connector-discovery doc (absent on self-hosted backends). */\n  mcpDiscoveryUrl?: string;\n}\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  data: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n  fetchedAt: number;\n}\n\nconst CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 60 minutes\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();\nconst inflight = new Map<string, Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce>>();\n\nfunction wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl: string): string {\n  // apiBaseUrl is typically 'https://astrasync.ai/api' — strip the /api suffix\n  // to get the platform root, then append /.well-known/agentic-commerce.\n  const base = apiBaseUrl.replace(/\\/api\\/?$/, '');\n  return `${base}/.well-known/agentic-commerce`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const url = wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl);\n  const response = await sdkFetch(url, {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },\n    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),\n  });\n  if (!response.ok) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `AstraSync platform must expose /.well-known/agentic-commerce; ` +\n        `got ${response.status} from ${url}. SDK cannot initialise without it.`\n    );\n  }\n  const data = (await response.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (!data.registrationUrl || !data.documentationUrl || !data.verifyAccessUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `/.well-known/agentic-commerce response missing required fields ` +\n        `(registrationUrl, documentationUrl, verifyAccessUrl).`\n    );\n  }\n  return data as unknown as WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n}\n\n/**\n * Start a background fetch. Returns the promise for callers that need\n * to await it (first verify() call).\n */\nexport function prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const existing = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (existing) return existing;\n\n  const promise = fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl)\n    .then((data) => {\n      cache.set(apiBaseUrl, { data, fetchedAt: Date.now() });\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      return data;\n    })\n    .catch((err) => {\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      throw err;\n    });\n\n  inflight.set(apiBaseUrl, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get cached well-known URLs. If stale, triggers a background refresh\n * and returns stale data (stale-while-revalidate). If no cache exists,\n * awaits the in-flight fetch or starts a new one.\n */\nexport async function getWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const entry = cache.get(apiBaseUrl);\n\n  if (entry) {\n    if (Date.now() - entry.fetchedAt > CACHE_TTL_MS) {\n      // Stale — trigger background refresh, return stale data\n      prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl).catch(() => {\n        // Background refresh failed — stale data remains until next request\n      });\n    }\n    return entry.data;\n  }\n\n  // No cache — must await\n  const pending = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  return prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl);\n}\n\n/**\n * Synchronous cache read — returns cached URLs or undefined.\n * Never triggers a fetch. Used by verify() to avoid extra HTTP calls\n * in the hot path; adapters are responsible for prefetching.\n */\nexport function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): WellKnownAgenticCommerce | undefined {\n  return cache.get(apiBaseUrl)?.data;\n}\n\n/** Reset cache — for testing only. */\nexport function _resetWellKnownCache(): void {\n  cache.clear();\n  inflight.clear();\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Core Verification Logic\n *\n * This module handles the core verification logic, calling the AstraSync API\n * and processing the response into a standardized VerificationResult.\n */\n\nimport { sdkFetch } from './http';\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationRequest,\n  VerificationResult,\n  VerifiedAgent,\n  VerifiedDeveloper,\n  VerifiedOrganization,\n  GuidanceInfo,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  TokenGuidance,\n  RuntimeChallengeResult,\n  StepUpApprovalInfo,\n  SettlementOutcomeInfo,\n  MerchantSettlementToken,\n  FulfilmentInfo,\n  SettlementArtifact,\n  AttemptReport,\n} from './types';\nimport { getTrustLevel } from './trust-levels';\nimport type { ObservedMetadata } from './metadata-capture';\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\nimport { getCachedWellKnownUrls, type WellKnownAgenticCommerce } from './well-known';\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values\n *\n * apiBaseUrl matches the OpenAPI authoritative server (https://astrasync.ai/api\n * for prod, https://staging.astrasync.ai/api for staging). Always include the\n * /api path prefix when overriding — registration / docs URLs are derived by\n * stripping it.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CONFIG: Partial<GatewayConfig> = {\n  apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n  // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.\n  // cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult applies the 60s\n  // default; the caller's explicit value is honoured for cacheable results.\n  // Denials and step-up escalations are NEVER cached (3.6.0) regardless of\n  // cacheTtl. Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.\n  debug: false,\n};\n\n/**\n * Init self-test state. Fires once per process on first verify() call to warn\n * if apiBaseUrl is pointing at the wrong host (e.g. a marketing site that\n * 200s with text/html instead of the API).\n */\nlet initCheckPerformed = false;\n\n/** Test-only: re-arm the one-time init self-check. */\nexport function _resetInitCheck(): void {\n  initCheckPerformed = false;\n}\n\n/** One-shot guard for v2.3.0 deprecation warning. */\nlet deprecationWarningShown = false;\n\nasync function performInitCheck(\n  apiBaseUrl: string,\n  debug?: boolean,\n  strictInit?: boolean,\n  apiKey?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  initCheckPerformed = true;\n  try {\n    const probeUrl = `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`;\n    // HEAD mirrors GET semantics (running the full request pipeline without a\n    // body) so the response carries the same content-type the marketing 404\n    // would return. OPTIONS often gets short-circuited by CORS-preflight\n    // handlers and returns no content-type, defeating the check.\n    const response = await sdkFetch(probeUrl, { method: 'HEAD' });\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n    if (contentType.startsWith('text/html')) {\n      const message =\n        `[VerificationGateway] apiBaseUrl '${apiBaseUrl}' returned HTML (content-type: ${contentType}). ` +\n        `This usually means apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing site instead of the API. ` +\n        `Expected: 'https://astrasync.ai/api' (prod) or 'https://staging.astrasync.ai/api' (staging).`;\n      // Audit F-A6-33: when strictInit is set, throw on misconfig instead\n      // of warning + continuing. Recurring footgun per\n      // `[[feedback_astrasync_api_url_canonical]]` — silent warn lets\n      // misconfigured prod deploys ship with all verify-access calls\n      // silently failing.\n      if (strictInit) {\n        throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n      }\n      console.warn(`${message} Set disableInitChecks: true on GatewayConfig to silence.`);\n    } else if (debug) {\n      console.log(\n        `[VerificationGateway] init check passed for ${apiBaseUrl} (content-type: ${contentType})`\n      );\n    }\n\n    // 4.0.0: key liveness probe. A dead API key otherwise surfaces only\n    // per-request as inbound agents get turned away — the operator should\n    // learn at deploy time. 404 = older backend without self-check: silent.\n    if (apiKey) {\n      const selfCheck = await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/self-check`, {\n        headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}` },\n      });\n      if (selfCheck.status === 401) {\n        const body = (await selfCheck.json().catch(() => ({}))) as {\n          code?: string;\n          message?: string;\n          remediation?: { manageUrl?: string };\n        };\n        const message =\n          `[VerificationGateway] the configured AstraSync API key was REJECTED at startup ` +\n          `(${body.code ?? 'api_key_invalid'}: ${body.message ?? 'invalid key'}). Every inbound agent ` +\n          `will be turned away until the key is rotated` +\n          (body.remediation?.manageUrl ? ` at ${body.remediation.manageUrl}` : '') +\n          `.`;\n        if (strictInit) {\n          throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n        }\n        console.error(message);\n      } else if (selfCheck.ok) {\n        const body = (await selfCheck.json().catch(() => ({}))) as {\n          daysToExpiry?: number | null;\n        };\n        if (typeof body.daysToExpiry === 'number' && body.daysToExpiry <= 7) {\n          console.warn(\n            `[VerificationGateway] the configured AstraSync API key expires in ${body.daysToExpiry} day(s) — ` +\n              `rotate it at Settings → Developer Tools before integrations start failing.`\n          );\n        } else if (debug) {\n          console.log('[VerificationGateway] API key self-check passed');\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (strictInit) {\n      // strict mode propagates init failures so callers get a clear,\n      // synchronous \"your config is broken\" signal at startup.\n      throw err;\n    }\n    if (debug) {\n      console.log(`[VerificationGateway] init check failed (non-blocking): ${String(err)}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple in-memory cache for verification results\n */\nconst verificationCache = new Map<string, { result: VerificationResult; expiresAt: number }>();\n\n/**\n * Generate cache key from the full request shape.\n *\n * Historically the key was credentials-only (`astraId-apiKey-jwt`),\n * which silently returned the cached result of a prior call even when the\n * subsequent call's purpose/action/counterparty/etc. differed. That was a\n * security gap — a warm cache could serve an allow verdict for a purpose the\n * agent hadn't actually been authorised for. Key now includes every field\n * that affects the backend verdict.\n *\n * MAINTAIN: when adding a field to VerificationRequest that affects the\n * backend verdict, add it to this key. Fields that don't affect verdict\n * (e.g. requestId, timestamps, sdkVersion) don't belong here — including\n * them would needlessly thrash the cache for repeated identical requests.\n *\n * 3.12.0 (Trust Record): `attemptId` and `considerationSet` are\n * deliberately EXCLUDED — like `callerMetadata.observedMetadata` they are\n * observational pass-through that never affects the verdict, and keying on\n * a per-attempt id would defeat verdict caching entirely. Cache hits get\n * their attemptId rewritten in verify() instead (never leak a prior\n * attempt's id from a cached result).\n */\nfunction getCacheKey(request: VerificationRequest, counterpartyId?: string): string {\n  const c = request.credentials;\n  return [\n    c.astraId || '',\n    c.apiKey || '',\n    c.jwt || '',\n    request.purpose || '',\n    request.action || '',\n    request.resourceType || '',\n    request.resource || '',\n    request.jurisdiction || '',\n    request.transactionValue ?? '',\n    request.currency || '',\n    // SECURITY (cross-merchant cache leak): the merchant identity is sent via\n    // `config.counterpartyId`, NOT on the request, so it was previously absent\n    // from the key — two verifies for the SAME agent/purpose/action/value but\n    // DIFFERENT merchants collided, and a grant at a permissive merchant (low\n    // trust floor) was served for a stricter one. Same bug class as the\n    // duration omission (F-A1-07). counterpartyId affects the backend verdict\n    // (trust floor / per-route policy), so it MUST key the cache.\n    counterpartyId || '',\n    request.counterpartyUrl || '',\n    request.counterpartyType || '',\n    request.isSubAgentRequest ? '1' : '0',\n    request.parentAgentId || '',\n    request.subAgentDepth ?? '',\n    // Audit F-A1-07: previously-missing dimensions that DO affect the\n    // backend verdict. Without these, two requests with different\n    // durations (e.g. 60s vs 86400s) collided on the same cache key and\n    // the shorter-duration allow served the longer-duration request.\n    request.durationRequired ?? '',\n    request.invocationProtocol || '',\n    request.enableRuntimeChallenge ? '1' : '0',\n    // callerMetadata fields contribute to risk model; include the ones\n    // backend reads. sourceIp/userAgent/forwardedFor change per-request\n    // so their inclusion effectively forces a re-check for any varying\n    // client (the right behavior — IP-driven anomaly scoring shouldn't\n    // be cached across IPs).\n    request.callerMetadata?.sourceIp || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.userAgent || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.forwardedFor || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || '',\n    // UAT2 Bug B (5.4.1): the commerce phase and cart identity DO affect the\n    // backend verdict — the confirm leg is the ONLY leg that may execute\n    // first-party settlement. Without these, a confirm within the cache TTL of\n    // its start_checkout quote was served the cached quote-leg grant (no\n    // settlementOutcome) and never reached the backend. Same F-A1-07 bug class.\n    request.commercePhase || '',\n    request.checkoutSessionId || '',\n  ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if cached result is still valid\n */\nfunction getCachedResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): VerificationResult | null {\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  const cached = verificationCache.get(key);\n\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {\n    return cached.result;\n  }\n\n  if (cached) {\n    verificationCache.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache a verification result.\n *\n * 3.6.0: uniform 60s default. The earlier step-up TTL split (300s for\n * step-up verdicts) is gone — step-up verdicts are no longer cached AT ALL\n * (see the write predicate in verify()): a cached step_up_required result\n * carries a pollUrl that goes stale (consumed/expired) and, worse, keeps\n * denying retries that the owner has already approved. When `configuredTtl`\n * is set (truthy positive number), it's honoured for cacheable results.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\n\nfunction cacheResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  result: VerificationResult,\n  configuredTtl: number | undefined,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): void {\n  const ttlSeconds = configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0 ? configuredTtl : DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  verificationCache.set(key, {\n    result,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1000,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear the verification cache\n */\nexport function clearCache(): void {\n  verificationCache.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract agent credentials from various sources\n */\nexport function extractCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  query?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n): AgentCredentials {\n  const credentials: AgentCredentials = {};\n\n  // Audit F-A1-12: ASTRA-ID shape validation. Accept only the canonical\n  // pattern (ASTRA-/ASTRAE- prefix + 1-64 url-safe chars) to prevent CRLF\n  // header injection or downstream interpolation surprises. Reject otherwise.\n  const ASTRA_ID_PATTERN = /^ASTRAE?-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;\n\n  // Check for ASTRA-ID in headers (case-insensitive). Accepts the historical\n  // X-Astra-Id name plus the X-Astra-AgentId / x-astra-agent-id alias the\n  // partner asked for in #9a — both surface the same field.\n  const astraIdHeader =\n    headers['x-astra-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-ID'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agentid'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-AgentId'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agent-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Agent-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-AGENT-ID'];\n  if (astraIdHeader) {\n    // Audit F-A1-11: guard array-confusion. If multiple X-Astra-Id headers\n    // were sent (Express collapses to comma-joined string on most paths),\n    // take only the first canonical-shaped one.\n    const raw = Array.isArray(astraIdHeader)\n      ? astraIdHeader[0]\n      : typeof astraIdHeader === 'string'\n        ? astraIdHeader\n        : undefined;\n    if (typeof raw === 'string' && ASTRA_ID_PATTERN.test(raw)) {\n      credentials.astraId = raw;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check for API key in headers\n  const apiKeyHeader = headers['x-api-key'] || headers['X-Api-Key'] || headers['X-API-KEY'];\n  if (apiKeyHeader) {\n    credentials.apiKey = Array.isArray(apiKeyHeader) ? apiKeyHeader[0] : apiKeyHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check Authorization header for Bearer token.\n  // Audit F-A1-11: defensive type guard — Array.isArray gives a non-string,\n  // and Express path quirks can produce undefined despite the truthy check.\n  const authHeader = headers['authorization'] || headers['Authorization'];\n  if (authHeader) {\n    const authValue = Array.isArray(authHeader) ? authHeader[0] : authHeader;\n    if (typeof authValue === 'string') {\n      credentials.authorizationHeader = authValue;\n      if (authValue.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n        credentials.jwt = authValue.slice(7);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check query parameters as fallback\n  if (query) {\n    if (query.astraId && !credentials.astraId) {\n      credentials.astraId = query.astraId;\n    }\n    if (query.apiKey && !credentials.apiKey) {\n      credentials.apiKey = query.apiKey;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if credentials are present\n */\nexport function hasCredentials(credentials: AgentCredentials): boolean {\n  return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);\n}\n\n/**\n * Source of a synthesised guidance response. The sources are split — the\n * `'no_credentials'` shape is the original (caller has no AstraSync\n * credentials, suggest registration). The `'api_error'` shape is for when\n * the verify-access HTTP call itself failed (5xx, network, etc.) — DON'T\n * tell a verified-but-currently-blocked partner to \"register your agent\".\n *\n * 4.0.0 adds `'merchant_misconfig'`: the backend rejected THIS INTEGRATION'S\n * own API key (401 api_key_revoked/expired/invalid). Neither the agent's\n * fault nor a platform outage — retrying won't help, and the inbound agent\n * deserves to know the site operator's integration is broken (the\n * gadget-emporium failure mode: a rotated key silently 401ing every\n * credentialed agent for days).\n */\ntype GuidanceSource = 'no_credentials' | 'api_error' | 'merchant_misconfig';\n\n/**\n * MCP-connector steering (5.1.0). Present only when the backend's well-known\n * doc advertises a hosted bridge. The copy must directly counter the observed\n * model refusal (\"go register manually on the dashboard\"): registration via\n * the connector is the agent's own next action, with the human approval built\n * into the flow.\n */\nfunction mcpGuidance(urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce): GuidanceInfo['mcp'] {\n  if (!urls?.mcpEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    endpoint: urls.mcpEndpoint,\n    discoveryUrl: urls.mcpDiscoveryUrl,\n    message:\n      'If you are operating inside an MCP-capable host (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, or any MCP client), ' +\n      'add the AstraSync MCP connector instead of integrating these URLs by hand: registration through ' +\n      'the connector is KEYLESS and HUMAN-APPROVED — your human approves in an in-chat card, and you ' +\n      'never see, hold, or transmit an API key, password, or private key.',\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Create guidance response for unverified agents or for API-error fallback.\n *\n * The source is split so the `register your agent` template\n * doesn't fire on transient backend failures. Also threads `correlationId`\n * through so adapter `onDenied` handlers can surface it on the merchant's\n * response body for log correlation.\n */\nfunction createGuidanceResponse(\n  _config: GatewayConfig,\n  reason?: string,\n  options: {\n    source?: GuidanceSource;\n    correlationId?: string;\n    /** 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server-echoed attempt handle, threaded like correlationId. */\n    attemptId?: string;\n    urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n    /** 4.0.0: backend-provided remediation URLs for the merchant (misconfig source). */\n    remediation?: { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string };\n  } = {}\n): VerificationResult {\n  const source = options.source ?? 'no_credentials';\n  const isApiError = source === 'api_error';\n  const isMisconfig = source === 'merchant_misconfig';\n  const urls = options.urls;\n\n  const guidance: GuidanceInfo = isMisconfig\n    ? {\n        message:\n          \"This site's AstraSync integration is misconfigured (its API key was revoked, expired, or rotated). \" +\n          'Your identity and the AstraSync platform are fine — contact the site operator. Retrying will not help.',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: options.remediation?.docsUrl ?? urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        steps: [\n          'Report the failure to the site operator — their AstraSync API key needs rotating',\n          'Do not retry: the failure is deterministic until the operator updates their key',\n        ],\n      }\n    : isApiError\n      ? {\n          message:\n            'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry with exponential backoff; if the issue persists, contact support with the correlationId.',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n          steps: [\n            'Retry the request with exponential backoff',\n            'If failures persist, share the correlationId with support',\n          ],\n        }\n      : {\n          message:\n            'This service verifies AI agents before granting access. Please register your agent with AstraSync.',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n          steps: [\n            // MCP steering leads when the hosted bridge is advertised — the\n            // connector is the agent-actionable path (keyless, human-approved).\n            ...(urls?.mcpEndpoint\n              ? [\n                  `Fastest path (inside an MCP host): add the AstraSync MCP connector at ${urls.mcpEndpoint} — keyless, human-approved registration`,\n                ]\n              : []),\n            'Register for an AstraSync account',\n            'Create and register your agent',\n            'Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers',\n            'Retry your request',\n          ],\n          ...(mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }),\n        };\n\n  return {\n    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or\n    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);\n    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).\n    identityVerified: false,\n    policyAllowed: false,\n    guidance,\n    denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ['No valid agent credentials provided'],\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so\n    // partners (and their custom onDenied handlers) can branch on\n    // dimension. Without this, the synthesised stub was indistinguishable\n    // from a real policy deny.\n    failures: isMisconfig\n      ? [\n          {\n            dimension: 'verify_access.merchant_misconfigured',\n            message: reason ?? 'The integration API key was rejected by AstraSync',\n            guidance: guidance.message,\n          },\n        ]\n      : isApiError\n        ? [\n            {\n              dimension: 'verify_access.api_error',\n              message: reason ?? 'Verification temporarily unavailable',\n              guidance: guidance.message,\n            },\n          ]\n        : undefined,\n    // 4.0.0: typed marker so adapters render the misconfig envelope (503 +\n    // MERCHANT_VERIFICATION_MISCONFIGURED) without string-matching.\n    ...(isMisconfig && { misconfigured: true }),\n    // 4.6.0: a transient api_error is retryable — mark it so consumers surface\n    // \"temporarily unavailable, retry\" (recommendation 'error') instead of\n    // coercing the absent recommendation to a policy 'deny'. Misconfig is\n    // deterministic and intentionally NOT marked retryable.\n    ...(isApiError && { retryable: true }),\n    correlationId: options.correlationId,\n    attemptId: options.attemptId,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Call the AstraSync verify-access API\n */\nasync function callVerifyAccessAPI(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  access?: {\n    allowed: boolean;\n    reason?: string;\n    /**\n     * Aggregated denial failures (v2.9.8+). Empty / absent when allowed.\n     * Each entry is `{ dimension, message, guidance? }` — see\n     * `AccessFailure` for the contract.\n     */\n    failures?: Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }>;\n    requiresStepUp?: boolean;\n    requiresApproval?: boolean;\n    appliedPolicy?: {\n      boundaryName: string;\n      policyVersion: string;\n    };\n    counterparty?: {\n      id: string;\n      name: string;\n      trustScoreRequirement: number;\n    };\n  };\n  agent?: {\n    kyaAgentId: string;\n    astraId: string;\n    name: string;\n    trustScore: number;\n    trustLevel: string;\n    agentStatus: string;\n    blockchainStatus: string;\n  };\n  developer?: {\n    kyaOwnerId: string;\n    fullName: string;\n    email: string;\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  organization?: {\n    name: string;\n    verified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Structured explanation of the verification decision. Tells the merchant\n   * WHY (id verified? challenge passed? request within PDLSS? trust score?)\n   * without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or other-tenant counterparty\n   * membership. Empty `attestations` unless the endpoint's access policy\n   * declared `required_attestations`.\n   */\n  verificationContext?: {\n    idVerified: boolean;\n    runtimeChallenge: {\n      status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';\n      checkedAt: string | null;\n    };\n    pdlssCheck: {\n      result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';\n      purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';\n      scope: 'approved' | 'denied';\n    };\n    dynamicTrustScore: number;\n    attestations: Array<{\n      type: string;\n      status: 'passed' | 'failed';\n      /** LMAX-POC C1: underlying check timestamp for merchant freshness gates. */\n      checkedAt: string;\n      validUntil?: string;\n      proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';\n      proof: string;\n    }>;\n  };\n  error?: string;\n  /**\n   * 4.0.0: the backend 401'd this integration's OWN API key (revoked /\n   * expired / invalid) — deterministic merchant-side misconfig, not a\n   * transient failure. `misconfigCode` carries the backend's api_key_* code\n   * and `remediation` its operator-facing URLs when present.\n   */\n  misconfig?: boolean;\n  misconfigCode?: string;\n  remediation?: { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string };\n  /**\n   * When the verify-access server response carries a\n   * correlationId on an error envelope, propagate it so the SDK can thread\n   * it through createGuidanceResponse → adapter onDenied → merchant body.\n   */\n  correlationId?: string;\n  /**\n   * 3.12.0 (Trust Record): the server echoes the attempt-chain\n   * handle top-level on every response branch (error envelopes included).\n   */\n  attemptId?: string;\n}> {\n  const { credentials, ...requestData } = request;\n\n  // Build the request body. agentId is omitted when not provided so the\n  // server treats it as an anonymous canonical-flow call (Branch A/B/C).\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n    ...(credentials.astraId && { agentId: credentials.astraId }),\n    ...(requestData.purpose && { purpose: requestData.purpose }),\n  };\n\n  // Add optional fields\n  if (requestData.action) body.action = requestData.action;\n  if (requestData.resourceType) body.resourceType = requestData.resourceType;\n  if (requestData.resource) body.resource = requestData.resource;\n  if (requestData.jurisdiction) body.jurisdiction = requestData.jurisdiction;\n  if (requestData.transactionValue) body.transactionValue = requestData.transactionValue;\n  if (requestData.currency) body.currency = requestData.currency;\n  if (requestData.isSubAgentRequest) body.isSubAgentRequest = requestData.isSubAgentRequest;\n  if (requestData.parentAgentId) body.parentAgentId = requestData.parentAgentId;\n  if (requestData.subAgentDepth !== undefined) body.subAgentDepth = requestData.subAgentDepth;\n  // Handshake Protocol v10 additions\n  if (requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge)\n    body.enableRuntimeChallenge = requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge;\n  if (requestData.createSession) body.createSession = requestData.createSession;\n  if (requestData.durationRequired) body.durationRequired = requestData.durationRequired;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyType) body.counterpartyType = requestData.counterpartyType;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyUrl) body.counterpartyUrl = requestData.counterpartyUrl;\n  if (config.counterpartyId) body.counterpartyId = config.counterpartyId;\n  if (requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions)\n    body.runtimeChallengeOptions = requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions;\n  // Round-12 (F19): transport-vs-intent separation. MCP middleware sets\n  // this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers leave it unset.\n  if (requestData.invocationProtocol) body.invocationProtocol = requestData.invocationProtocol;\n  // 5.3.0 (astra-pay): checkout-leg discriminator — first-party settlement\n  // fires only on 'confirm'; absent keeps pre-phase server behavior.\n  if (requestData.commercePhase) body.commercePhase = requestData.commercePhase;\n  // Per-cart idempotency key (checkout session id) forwarded on the confirm\n  // leg so concurrent confirms for one cart charge at most once.\n  if (requestData.checkoutSessionId) body.checkoutSessionId = requestData.checkoutSessionId;\n  // Order-plane cart lines (receipts + fulfillment email) — informational.\n  if (requestData.checkoutItems) body.checkoutItems = requestData.checkoutItems;\n  // 5.6.0 (astra-pay): transit-only fulfilment contact — echoed back in\n  // result.fulfilment for first-party confirms, never persisted server-side.\n  if (requestData.buyerEmail) body.buyerEmail = requestData.buyerEmail;\n  // 3.9.0 (§33.5 #1): raw commerce artifacts forwarded verbatim — the\n  // backend's Step 0.5 pipeline does the cryptographic verification\n  // server-side (adapters forward, never verify locally).\n  if (requestData.commerceArtifacts) body.commerceArtifacts = requestData.commerceArtifacts;\n  // 3.12.0 (Trust Record, §33.5 #3): attempt-chain handle + consideration set,\n  // forwarded skip-when-undefined (observedMetadata precedent) — pure\n  // observational pass-through; the server echoes attemptId on every branch.\n  if (requestData.attemptId) body.attemptId = requestData.attemptId;\n  if (requestData.considerationSet) body.considerationSet = requestData.considerationSet;\n\n  // Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): emit the SDK package version on every\n  // verify-access body so the backend can auto-populate `kya_counterparty.\n  // sdk_version` for the calling endpoint. Body field (not User-Agent\n  // header) is the canonical channel — works in Node, browser, behind\n  // Cloudflare, and across SDK bundlers without environment-specific\n  // header gymnastics. Backend's `validation.ts:verifyAccessSchema`\n  // accepts the semver regex; the auto-pop logic is forward-only.\n  body.sdkVersion = SDK_VERSION;\n\n  // Forward caller metadata when present. Merges the legacy top-level\n  // clientIp/userAgent into the nested block for backward compatibility.\n  if (requestData.callerMetadata || requestData.clientIp || requestData.userAgent) {\n    const meta = {\n      ...(requestData.clientIp && { sourceIp: requestData.clientIp }),\n      ...(requestData.userAgent && { userAgent: requestData.userAgent }),\n      ...requestData.callerMetadata,\n    };\n    if (Object.keys(meta).length > 0) body.callerMetadata = meta;\n  }\n\n  // Build headers\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    ...config.customHeaders,\n  };\n\n  // verify-access requires authentication. Use ONLY the merchant's\n  // configured apiKey for outbound auth. Previously the caller's inbound\n  // Authorization header took priority, which pivoted the verify-access\n  // call to the caller's identity — letting an attacker who supplied\n  // their own Authorization header trigger verify-access calls under\n  // THEIR account and observe the resulting verdicts for arbitrary\n  // lookups they triggered via the merchant. Audit F-A1-10.\n  //\n  // The caller-supplied JWT (if any) is already extracted to\n  // credentials.jwt and travels in the verify-access request body so\n  // backend can evaluate it as the agent's identity claim — separate from\n  // the merchant-attribution auth on the outbound HTTPS call.\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    // Legacy header kept for compatibility with any middleware that reads it directly.\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    // 4.0.0: hard timeout — without one, a backend that accepts the\n    // connection but never answers hangs the merchant's middleware and every\n    // inbound agent request behind it (observed live on a partner property).\n    // Timeouts land on the catch path below → api_error (fail-closed),\n    // NOT misconfig. The edge adapter races its own tighter withBudget.\n    const response = await sdkFetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: JSON.stringify(body),\n      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(config.verifyTimeoutMs ?? 10_000),\n    });\n\n    const data = await response.json();\n\n    // v2.3.8 (defect #29): treat 410 Gone as a deterministic deactivated-endpoint\n    // signal. Older SDKs may treat any non-2xx as transient and retry; v2.3.8+\n    // surfaces it as a structured denial with `reason: 'endpoint_deactivated'`\n    // so callers can distinguish \"endpoint gone\" from \"endpoint denied this\".\n    if (response.status === 410) {\n      return {\n        success: true,\n        // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): keep the server-echoed attempt handle even on\n        // the synthesised 410 deny shape (echoed on every branch).\n        attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n        access: {\n          allowed: false,\n          reason: 'endpoint_deactivated',\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'endpoint.deactivated',\n              message:\n                typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'Endpoint has been deactivated',\n              guidance:\n                typeof data?.guidance === 'string'\n                  ? data.guidance\n                  : 'Reactivate via POST /api/endpoints/{id}/reactivate, or update the URL on the calling agent.',\n            },\n          ],\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      // 4.0.0: a 401 from verify-access can ONLY mean the backend rejected\n      // THIS INTEGRATION'S own API key — agent denials come back as 200 with\n      // access.allowed=false. Surface it as merchant-misconfig, not a\n      // transient api_error: it is deterministic until the operator rotates\n      // the key, and the \"retry with backoff\" template actively misleads.\n      // Backends ≥ this round also send code: api_key_* + remediation URLs.\n      if (response.status === 401) {\n        return {\n          success: false,\n          error: data.message || data.error || 'Integration API key rejected',\n          misconfig: true,\n          misconfigCode: typeof data?.code === 'string' ? data.code : undefined,\n          remediation:\n            data?.remediation && typeof data.remediation === 'object'\n              ? (data.remediation as { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string })\n              : undefined,\n          correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n          attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n        };\n      }\n      // Round-10 (#47, O5): propagate correlationId on the error path too if\n      // the server happened to include one (some 5xx error envelopes carry\n      // it). Lets the SDK pass it through to the adapter onDenied handler.\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: data.message || data.error || `API returned ${response.status}`,\n        correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n        attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return data;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: `Failed to call verify-access API: ${message}`,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for a single verify() call (as opposed to GatewayConfig, which is\n * per-gateway). Mirrors the Java SDK's `verify(request, bypassCache)`.\n */\nexport interface VerifyOptions {\n  /**\n   * Skip the cache READ for this call so the request is guaranteed to reach\n   * the backend (the result is still written to the cache if cacheable).\n   * Used by the step-up hold-and-poll retry: the re-verify after an approval\n   * must hit the server to redeem the single-use approval.\n   */\n  bypassCache?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Main verification function\n */\nexport async function verify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n  // v2.5.0: read well-known URLs from cache (prefetched by adapter at middleware creation).\n  // Synchronous — never triggers a fetch. If cache is empty, guidance URLs are empty strings.\n  const urls = mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl\n    ? getCachedWellKnownUrls(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl)\n    : undefined;\n\n  // One-time init self-test — fire-and-forget by default, never blocks verify().\n  // Audit F-A6-33: when GatewayConfig.strictInit is set, the init promise is\n  // awaited and any failure throws synchronously so callers learn about\n  // misconfigured apiBaseUrl on the first verify() call rather than silently\n  // running with broken auth.\n  if (!initCheckPerformed && !mergedConfig.disableInitChecks && mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl) {\n    if (mergedConfig.strictInit) {\n      await performInitCheck(\n        mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl,\n        mergedConfig.debug,\n        true,\n        mergedConfig.apiKey\n      );\n    } else {\n      void performInitCheck(\n        mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl,\n        mergedConfig.debug,\n        false,\n        mergedConfig.apiKey\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Deprecation warning for v2.3.0 removed config fields. Fires once per process.\n  if (\n    !deprecationWarningShown &&\n    (config.minTrustScore !== undefined || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== undefined)\n  ) {\n    deprecationWarningShown = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 ' +\n        'and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access decisions ' +\n        '(verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score). To gate access ' +\n        \"to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side.\"\n    );\n  }\n\n  // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits here. We forward the\n  // request to the server with no agentId; the server applies the endpoint's\n  // unverifiedAgentPolicy and returns advisory. createGuidanceResponse remains\n  // as the offline fallback if the API itself fails (handled below).\n\n  // Check cache first. Caching on unless caller explicitly sets cacheTtl: 0\n  // to disable. Undefined falls through to the 60s default at cacheResult\n  // write time. options.bypassCache skips the read only (hold-and-poll retry\n  // must reach the backend to redeem its approval).\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && !options?.bypassCache) {\n    const cached = getCachedResult(request, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n        console.log('[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result');\n      }\n      // 3.12.0 (Trust Record, §33.5 #3): attemptId is excluded from the cache\n      // key, so the stored result may carry a PRIOR attempt's id. Overwrite it\n      // with this request's own attemptId — or drop it when this request has\n      // none — a cached verdict must never leak another attempt's handle.\n      // Shallow clone: never mutate the stored entry (a concurrent holder of\n      // the same cached object may still be reading it).\n      const hit: VerificationResult = { ...cached };\n      if (request.attemptId) {\n        hit.attemptId = request.attemptId;\n      } else {\n        delete hit.attemptId;\n      }\n      return hit;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Inject counterparty info from config if not already set in request\n  const enrichedRequest = { ...request };\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl && mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl = mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl;\n  }\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyType && mergedConfig.counterpartyType) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyType = mergedConfig.counterpartyType;\n  }\n\n  // Call the API\n  if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n    console.log('[VerificationGateway] Calling verify-access API');\n  }\n\n  const apiResponse = await callVerifyAccessAPI(mergedConfig, enrichedRequest);\n\n  // 3.6.0: the server emits a top-level denialReasons array on every deny\n  // path (same strings as the failure messages). Non-empty → authoritative;\n  // absent/empty → fall back to the client-side reconstructions below.\n  const rawServerDenialReasons = (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).denialReasons;\n  const serverDenialReasons =\n    Array.isArray(rawServerDenialReasons) && rawServerDenialReasons.length > 0\n      ? (rawServerDenialReasons as string[])\n      : undefined;\n\n  // Handle API errors\n  if (!apiResponse.success) {\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): distinguish API errors from missing-credentials.\n    // The previous default tagged any failure with the \"register your\n    // agent\" template, which is misleading to a verified partner whose\n    // verify-access call hit a 500. The `api_error` source surfaces a\n    // typed `verify_access.api_error` failure entry instead.\n    // 4.0.0: a rejected merchant key gets its own source — deterministic\n    // misconfig must not wear the \"temporarily unavailable, retry\" template.\n    return createGuidanceResponse(mergedConfig, apiResponse.error, {\n      source: apiResponse.misconfig ? 'merchant_misconfig' : 'api_error',\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as { correlationId?: string }).correlationId,\n      attemptId: (apiResponse as { attemptId?: string }).attemptId,\n      remediation: apiResponse.remediation,\n      urls,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Check access result\n  if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {\n    // v2.9.8 (defect M1): aggregated failures across every gate that\n    // denied. Surface them on the result so the integrator can see every\n    // blocker in one go instead of the previous fail-fast cascade.\n    const aggregatedFailures = (apiResponse.access as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)\n      ?.failures as Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }> | undefined;\n    // Round-18 G4: backend denied access (PDLSS or other gate); identity status\n    // depends on whether the backend resolved the caller. Read from\n    // verificationContext.idVerified; default false if absent (anonymous or\n    // identity-fail paths land here too). policyAllowed is false by definition\n    // in this branch (apiResponse.access.allowed === false).\n    const idVerifiedFromBackend =\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true;\n    const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,\n      policyAllowed: false,\n      // 3.6.0: the server now emits top-level denialReasons on every deny\n      // path — prefer it verbatim; the failure-message reconstruction remains\n      // as the fallback for older backends.\n      denialReasons:\n        serverDenialReasons ??\n        (aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0\n          ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message)\n          : apiResponse.access?.reason\n            ? [apiResponse.access.reason]\n            : ['Access denied']),\n      failures: aggregatedFailures,\n      requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n      requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n      guidance: {\n        message: apiResponse.access?.reason || 'Access denied by PDLSS policy',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        // 5.1.0: anonymous callers land on this branch — steer MCP-hosted\n        // agents to the connector (this is what the edge deny body surfaces).\n        ...(mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }),\n      },\n      verifiedAt: new Date(),\n      // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too\n      sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n      // Anonymous traffic has no session → correlationId is the per-attempt\n      // linking key (the sessionId-equivalent for anonymous callers).\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n      // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server echoes the attempt-chain handle on\n      // every branch — denials included (the funnel outlives one deny).\n      attemptId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).attemptId as string | undefined,\n      recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n        .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n      recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n        | string[]\n        | undefined,\n      stepUpApproval: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).stepUpApproval as\n        | StepUpApprovalInfo\n        | undefined,\n      settlement: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlement as\n        | SettlementArtifact\n        | undefined,\n      settlementOutcome: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementOutcome as\n        | SettlementOutcomeInfo\n        | undefined,\n      // 5.5.0 self-settlement: merchant-only material — passes through to the\n      // MERCHANT caller only (bridge callers strip it before the agent plane).\n      settlementToken: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementToken as\n        | MerchantSettlementToken\n        | undefined,\n      // 5.6.0: fulfilment contact — merchant-only lane, same strip rule.\n      fulfilment: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).fulfilment as FulfilmentInfo | undefined,\n    };\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  // Build successful result\n  const agent: VerifiedAgent | undefined = apiResponse.agent\n    ? {\n        astraId: apiResponse.agent.astraId,\n        name: apiResponse.agent.name,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,\n        trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),\n        blockchainVerified: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === 'verified',\n        status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus as VerifiedAgent['status'],\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const developer: VerifiedDeveloper | undefined = apiResponse.developer\n    ? {\n        astradId: apiResponse.developer.kyaOwnerId,\n        name: apiResponse.developer.fullName,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.developer.trustScore || 0,\n        verified: apiResponse.developer.identityVerified,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const organization: VerifiedOrganization | undefined = apiResponse.organization\n    ? {\n        name: apiResponse.organization.name,\n        verified: apiResponse.organization.verified,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  // Verification context — structured \"why\" the merchant gets in v2.2.4+.\n  // Carries appliedPolicy (no UUIDs), pdlssCheck summary, dynamic trust score,\n  // and policy-driven attestations. Replaces the old over-sharing `pdlss` block.\n  const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;\n\n  const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n    // 4.5.0 (probe F1): read idVerified from verificationContext with the\n    // SAME absent⇒false default as the deny branch. The previous `!== false`\n    // default manufactured `identityVerified: true` for anonymous\n    // allow_full/allow_partial/audit responses (which allow access but omit\n    // verificationContext entirely) — the \"anonymous caller labelled\n    // verified\" defect. Every authenticated success response has carried\n    // `verificationContext.idVerified: true` since v2.2.4, so a truth claim\n    // this load-bearing must never be defaulted on.\n    identityVerified:\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true,\n    policyAllowed: true,\n    agent,\n    developer,\n    organization,\n    appliedPolicy: apiResponse.access?.appliedPolicy,\n    verificationContext,\n    requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n    requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n    cacheTtl: mergedConfig.cacheTtl,\n    // Handshake Protocol v10 enhanced fields (present when backend returns them)\n    sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n    // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous responses surface correlationId\n    // (no session row exists for unverified callers).\n    correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n    // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server-echoed attempt-chain handle.\n    attemptId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).attemptId as string | undefined,\n    runtimeChallenge: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).runtimeChallenge as\n      | RuntimeChallengeResult\n      | undefined,\n    tokenGuidance: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).tokenGuidance as\n      | TokenGuidance\n      | undefined,\n    recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n    recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n      | string[]\n      | undefined,\n    warningHeader: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).warningHeader as\n      | { name: string; value: string }\n      | undefined,\n    stepUpApproval: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).stepUpApproval as\n      | StepUpApprovalInfo\n      | undefined,\n    settlement: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlement as\n      | SettlementArtifact\n      | undefined,\n    settlementOutcome: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementOutcome as\n      | SettlementOutcomeInfo\n      | undefined,\n    settlementToken: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementToken as\n      | MerchantSettlementToken\n      | undefined,\n    // 5.6.0: fulfilment contact — merchant-only lane, same strip rule.\n    fulfilment: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).fulfilment as FulfilmentInfo | undefined,\n  };\n\n  // Enforce AstraSync recommendation\n  if (result.recommendation === 'deny') {\n    // Round-18 G4: recommendation-driven deny lands on the success-path\n    // construction (identity was resolved). Flip policy only — identity stays\n    // verified — so adapters return 403 (re-auth won't help; the policy\n    // decision is the blocker).\n    result.policyAllowed = false;\n    // 3.6.0: server-sent top-level denialReasons wins; recommendationReasons\n    // reconstruction is the fallback for older backends.\n    result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ??\n      result.recommendationReasons ?? ['Access denied by AstraSync recommendation'];\n    result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge\n      ? {\n          message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || 'runtime challenge failed'}`,\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        }\n      : {\n          message: result.recommendationReasons?.[0] || 'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        };\n  } else if (result.recommendation === 'step_up_required') {\n    // The escalation signal rides on `requiresStepUp` / `stepUpApproval`, not\n    // on any masquerade of the (now-removed) access band.\n    result.requiresStepUp = true;\n    result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ??\n      result.recommendationReasons ?? ['Step-up verification required'];\n  }\n\n  // Cache the result. Never cache denials (agent may fix challenge endpoint\n  // and retry) NOR step-up escalations (3.6.0 — the same bug the Java SDK\n  // had: a cached step_up_required verdict keeps denying retries the owner\n  // has already approved, and its pollUrl goes stale once consumed/expired).\n  // Escalations stay uncached even when the caller pins an explicit cacheTtl.\n  const escalates =\n    result.requiresStepUp === true ||\n    result.requiresApproval === true ||\n    result.recommendation === 'step_up_required';\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== 'deny' && !escalates) {\n    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a counterparty's grant/deny decision for a verification session.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function recordDecision(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  sessionId: string,\n  decision: 'granted' | 'denied',\n  reason?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/${sessionId}/decision`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({ decision, reason }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report post-hoc consideration/outcome data for an attempt chain (Trust\n * Record). Use when the signal never reached verify-access: a\n * catalog served from a local cache, a transport-side deny (sku not found,\n * over budget), or a terminal outcome (settled / blocked on step-up).\n * Authenticated with the same credentials as verify(); the backend responds\n * 202 and folds the data into the attempt chain keyed by `attemptId`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed, never throws.\n */\nexport async function reportAttempt(config: GatewayConfig, report: AttemptReport): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  // counterpartyId resolution mirrors reportUnregisteredAttempt: an explicit\n  // report value wins; otherwise attribute to the configured endpoint.\n  const body = {\n    ...report,\n    ...(!report.counterpartyId &&\n      config.counterpartyId && { counterpartyId: config.counterpartyId }),\n  };\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/attempt-report`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify(body),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch the per-route policy for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * v2.9.7 moved policy authority into the dashboard — the SDK no longer\n * accepts `routes` from merchant-side source code, it fetches them from\n * here on init (and refreshes periodically).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the request fails for any reason — the caller decides\n * how to fall back (the middleware allows-all when no policy is loaded so\n * a misconfigured init doesn't take down the merchant's API).\n */\nexport async function fetchRoutes(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<RouteAccessConfigShape[] | null> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  try {\n    const response = await sdkFetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/routes`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers }\n    );\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { routes?: RouteAccessConfigShape[] } };\n    return body.data?.routes ?? [];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of an EndpointRoute as the SDK consumes it. Mirrors the\n * server's `EndpointRoute` type and the SDK's `RouteAccessConfig` — same\n * JSON moves between server and SDK unchanged.\n */\nexport interface RouteAccessConfigShape {\n  pattern: string;\n  method: string;\n  /** Pass through unenforced (observe). Replaces `minAccessLevel: 'none'`. */\n  observe?: boolean;\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  requiredPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  maxDuration?: number;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  requirePurpose?: boolean;\n  /** Send-mapping — see RouteAccessConfig in types.ts. */\n  purpose?: string;\n  action?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an agent AND automatically record the grant/deny decision.\n *\n * This is the recommended entry point for counterparties that call verify()\n * directly (e.g. MCP servers) rather than using createMiddleware().\n * It adds createSession: true, then fire-and-forgets the decision.\n */\nexport async function verifyAndRecord(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n  const result = await verify(mergedConfig, { ...request, createSession: true }, options);\n  const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n  if (sessionId) {\n    // Round-18 G4: a session is \"granted\" only if identity verified AND\n    // policy allowed; either failing is a deny.\n    if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n    } else {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n    }\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report an unregistered agent attempt (no AstraSync credentials).\n * Called by SDK adapters when an agent is redirected to /docs/agent-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    /**\n     * 3.6.0: optional — the backend attributes by counterpartyId first (sent\n     * from config below) and requires at least ONE of counterpartyId/URL.\n     * A null/undefined URL is omitted from the body, not sent as null.\n     */\n    counterpartyUrl?: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    sourceIp?: string;\n    userAgent?: string;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n    /**\n     * 3.9.0 — edge-adapter evidence fields, persisted into the\n     * event's eventData by the backend: `protocol` = detected transport/\n     * credential protocol; `evidence` = light crypto-free detection detail.\n     */\n    protocol?: string;\n    evidence?: Record<string, unknown>;\n    /**\n     * Maximal metadata capture — the full sanitised metadata for an\n     * unregistered caller (every signal legitimately visible on the wire).\n     * Persisted into eventData; feeds platform attribution and (via\n     * correlationId) registration auto-fill. Fire-and-forget, so free.\n     */\n    observedMetadata?: ObservedMetadata;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  const { counterpartyUrl, ...rest } = data;\n  const body = {\n    ...rest,\n    ...(counterpartyUrl && { counterpartyUrl }),\n    ...(config.counterpartyId && { counterpartyId: config.counterpartyId }),\n  };\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/unregistered-attempt`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(body),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check failure.\n * Called by SDK adapters when the agent's requested PDLSS exceeds\n * counterparty-defined maximums BEFORE calling verify-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    agentId: string;\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    failures: Array<{\n      field: string;\n      requested: string | number;\n      limit: string | number | string[];\n      message: string;\n    }>;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/counterparty-pre-check-failure`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n *\n * The return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s split — partners\n * writing custom handlers around `quickVerify` get the same identity/policy\n * distinction as those calling `verify()` directly. Map to HTTP status the\n * same way: `!identityVerified` → 401; `identityVerified && !policyAllowed`\n * → 403.\n */\nexport async function quickVerify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  credentials: AgentCredentials\n): Promise<{\n  identityVerified: boolean;\n  policyAllowed: boolean;\n  reason?: string;\n}> {\n  const result = await verify(config, {\n    credentials,\n    purpose: 'verification',\n  });\n\n  return {\n    identityVerified: result.identityVerified,\n    policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,\n    reason: result.denialReasons?.[0],\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Maximal metadata capture — the shared, edge-safe sanitiser.\n *\n * AstraSync's thesis is total metadata capture: every header and connection\n * signal an inbound agent presents is a signal we want to keep. This module is\n * the ONE place that decides what is safe to store verbatim, what is a secret\n * to drop, and what credential headers reduce to a safe *format prefix* (a\n * platform signal, never the secret itself).\n *\n * It runs in three places that must agree byte-for-byte:\n *   - the edge adapter (`@astrasyncai/adapter-lambda`) — the richest capture\n *     point (full CloudFront header arrays),\n *   - the SDK adapters (express / nextjs) — for SDK-only merchants with no edge,\n *   - (indirectly) the backend, which stores whatever the above forward.\n *\n * Pure — no Node built-ins, no I/O — so it is safe in Lambda@Edge, the browser\n * build, and Deno. Capture is cheap: at the edge and SDK it is local string\n * work, and the backend stores it on a fire-and-forget event insert, so it adds\n * ZERO verify-access decision latency. Detection (which few signals imply which\n * vendor) is a separate, curated concern — see `platform-signatures.ts`.\n */\n\n/**\n * Version of the capture semantics (what is kept, dropped, reduced, or\n * derived — and under which key names).\n *\n * Capture semantics are FROZEN within a package major version: a given\n * `schemaVersion` always means the same field vocabulary and the same\n * keep/drop/reduce rules. The number bumps only on a SEMANTIC change to\n * capture (a renamed key, a changed reduction rule) — never for additive\n * signals, and never merely because the package version moved. To tell\n * builds apart, use the `sdkVersion` already present on the verify body;\n * `schemaVersion` answers the different question \"how do I interpret this\n * stored metadata?\".\n */\nexport const CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;\n\n/**\n * The captured, sanitised view of an inbound agent's request metadata. Attached\n * to verify-access / beacon payloads as `callerMetadata.observedMetadata`.\n */\nexport interface ObservedMetadata {\n  /** Header name → value, secrets removed, verbatim otherwise. */\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Safe key-format prefix of a credential header (e.g. `sk-ant-api03`,\n   * `sk-proj`, `AIza`) — a platform signal, NEVER the secret. Absent if no\n   * credential header was present or none matched a known format.\n   */\n  apiKeyFormat?: string;\n  /**\n   * The subset of `headers` that are known platform-signal headers\n   * (`openai-organization`, `x-goog-user-project`, `anthropic-version`, …),\n   * pulled out for convenient detection + display. Values are the same\n   * sanitised strings as in `headers`.\n   */\n  platformHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Connection-layer signals (IP, ASN, country, TLS version, HTTP version,\n   * device class, TLS fingerprint). Edge adapters populate this from the\n   * platform's native connection surface — the authoritative source. SDK\n   * adapters populate it as a fallback via {@link deriveConnectionFromHeaders}\n   * when a CDN in front of the merchant injected the equivalent headers;\n   * absent when neither source had anything.\n   */\n  connection?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Number of cookie pairs the caller sent. The `cookie` header VALUE is a\n   * secret and is always dropped; the COUNT is a client-shape signal\n   * (browsers carry cookies, most automation carries none) that would\n   * otherwise be unobservable downstream. Absent when no cookie header\n   * arrived.\n   */\n  cookieCount?: number;\n  /**\n   * Query-string parameter NAMES (deduped, lowercased) — values are NEVER\n   * captured (they routinely carry OAuth codes, tokens, and PII, and no\n   * deny-list is complete). Names alone fingerprint client shape. Populated\n   * by the edge path, which sees the raw query string.\n   */\n  queryKeys?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Version of the capture semantics this object was produced under — see\n   * {@link CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION}. Optional for backward compatibility with\n   * metadata captured before the field existed.\n   */\n  schemaVersion?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of sanitising a raw header map. `headers` is always present (possibly\n * empty); `apiKeyFormat` / `platformHeaders` only when a signal was found.\n */\nexport interface SanitizeHeadersResult {\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  apiKeyFormat?: string;\n  platformHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Cookie-pair count; the cookie value itself is always dropped. */\n  cookieCount?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Header names dropped entirely — genuine secrets or our own credentials that\n * describe the request's transport, not the agent. Matched case-insensitively\n * on the exact header name.\n */\nconst SECRET_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([\n  'cookie',\n  'set-cookie',\n  'x-csrf-token',\n  'proxy-authorization',\n  'x-astrasync-signature',\n  'x-astrasync-secret',\n  'x-hub-signature',\n  'x-hub-signature-256',\n  // Short-lived verify dedupe token — must never persist in stored metadata.\n  'x-astra-verified-hop',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Header-name prefixes dropped entirely — our own credential / signing surface\n * (`x-astrasync-*`, `kya-*`) must never round-trip into stored metadata.\n */\nconst SECRET_HEADER_PREFIXES = ['x-astrasync-', 'kya-', 'kya_'];\n\n/**\n * Credential headers whose VALUE is a secret but whose FORMAT is a signal. We\n * keep the leading format prefix (up to the random tail) and drop the rest.\n */\nconst CREDENTIAL_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([\n  'authorization',\n  'x-api-key',\n  'x-goog-api-key',\n  'api-key',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Header names that carry a raw signature value (drop the value; the presence\n * is not worth a bloat risk). Matched as a suffix so `x-*-signature` variants\n * are covered without an exhaustive list.\n */\nfunction isSignatureHeader(name: string): boolean {\n  return name === 'signature' || name.endsWith('-signature') || name.endsWith('-signature-256');\n}\n\n/**\n * Known platform-signal headers — pulled into `platformHeaders` for convenient\n * detection + display. Exact names plus a few prefixes (`x-goog-`,\n * `x-stainless-` — the OpenAI/Anthropic SDK client fingerprint headers).\n */\nconst PLATFORM_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([\n  'openai-organization',\n  'openai-project',\n  'openai-version',\n  'openai-processing-ms',\n  'anthropic-version',\n  'anthropic-beta',\n  'x-goog-user-project',\n  'x-goog-api-client',\n  'user-agent',\n  'x-agent-card-url',\n  'x-agent-provider',\n]);\n// `sec-ch-*` client hints are platform signals: Chromium forks (agentic\n// browsers included) often carry their real brand in `sec-ch-ua` even when\n// the UA string mimics stock Chrome.\nconst PLATFORM_HEADER_PREFIXES = [\n  'x-goog-',\n  'x-stainless-',\n  'x-anthropic-',\n  'x-openai-',\n  'sec-ch-',\n];\n\n/**\n * Known API-key format prefixes, longest-first so `sk-ant-api03` wins over\n * `sk-ant` and `sk-`. Each is the SAFE, non-secret leading token of a\n * credential; the random tail is never captured.\n */\nconst KEY_FORMAT_PREFIXES = [\n  'sk-ant-api03',\n  'sk-ant-api',\n  'sk-ant',\n  'sk-proj',\n  'sk-svcacct',\n  'sk-or-v1',\n  'sk-or',\n  'sk-lf',\n  'sk-',\n  'gsk_',\n  'aiza',\n  'ya29',\n  'ghp_',\n  'gho_',\n  'github_pat_',\n  'xai-',\n  'pplx-',\n  'r8_',\n  'hf_',\n  'astra-',\n  'astrae-',\n];\n\n/** Size caps — the only guard against jsonb bloat from a hostile POST. */\nexport const MAX_HEADERS = 64;\nexport const MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES = 1024;\nexport const MAX_TOTAL_BYTES = 16 * 1024;\n\nfunction byteLength(s: string): number {\n  // Edge-safe (no Buffer): count UTF-8 bytes without allocating a Buffer.\n  let bytes = 0;\n  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {\n    const code = s.charCodeAt(i);\n    if (code < 0x80) bytes += 1;\n    else if (code < 0x800) bytes += 2;\n    else if (code >= 0xd800 && code <= 0xdbff) {\n      bytes += 4;\n      i++; // surrogate pair\n    } else bytes += 3;\n  }\n  return bytes;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract the safe key-format prefix from a credential header value. Strips a\n * leading `Bearer ` / `Basic ` scheme, then returns the longest known prefix\n * that the (lowercased) value starts with. Returns undefined for opaque values\n * (e.g. a bare UUID token) so we never guess a format we don't recognise.\n */\nexport function extractApiKeyFormat(rawValue: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!rawValue) return undefined;\n  let value = rawValue.trim();\n  const spaceIdx = value.indexOf(' ');\n  if (spaceIdx > 0) {\n    const scheme = value.slice(0, spaceIdx).toLowerCase();\n    if (scheme === 'bearer' || scheme === 'basic' || scheme === 'token') {\n      value = value.slice(spaceIdx + 1).trim();\n    }\n  }\n  const lower = value.toLowerCase();\n  for (const prefix of KEY_FORMAT_PREFIXES) {\n    if (lower.startsWith(prefix)) {\n      // Return the prefix as-declared in the list (canonical casing).\n      return prefix;\n    }\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction isSecretHeader(name: string): boolean {\n  if (SECRET_HEADER_NAMES.has(name)) return true;\n  if (SECRET_HEADER_PREFIXES.some((p) => name.startsWith(p))) return true;\n  if (isSignatureHeader(name)) return true;\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction isPlatformHeader(name: string): boolean {\n  if (PLATFORM_HEADER_NAMES.has(name)) return true;\n  return PLATFORM_HEADER_PREFIXES.some((p) => name.startsWith(p));\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitise a raw header map for storage. Deny-lists genuine secrets, reduces\n * credential headers to a safe format prefix, keeps everything else verbatim,\n * and enforces the size caps that bound jsonb growth.\n *\n * Accepts any string→(string|string[]|undefined) map (Node's `req.headers`,\n * CloudFront's flattened headers, a plain object). Multi-value headers are\n * joined with `, ` per RFC 7230.\n */\nexport function sanitizeHeaders(\n  raw: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> | undefined | null\n): SanitizeHeadersResult {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {};\n  const platformHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};\n  let apiKeyFormat: string | undefined;\n  let cookieCount: number | undefined;\n  let totalBytes = 0;\n  let count = 0;\n\n  if (!raw) return { headers };\n\n  for (const rawName of Object.keys(raw)) {\n    if (count >= MAX_HEADERS) break;\n    const name = rawName.toLowerCase();\n    const rawValue = raw[rawName];\n    if (rawValue === undefined) continue;\n    const joined = Array.isArray(rawValue) ? rawValue.join(', ') : String(rawValue);\n\n    // Credential headers: capture the format prefix, drop the secret.\n    if (CREDENTIAL_HEADER_NAMES.has(name)) {\n      const fmt = extractApiKeyFormat(joined);\n      if (fmt && !apiKeyFormat) apiKeyFormat = fmt;\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    // Cookie: the value is a secret (dropped below), but the PAIR COUNT is a\n    // client-shape signal worth keeping.\n    if (name === 'cookie') {\n      cookieCount = joined.split(';').filter((s) => s.trim().length > 0).length;\n    }\n\n    // Genuine secrets: drop entirely.\n    if (isSecretHeader(name)) continue;\n\n    // Everything else describing the agent: keep, bounded.\n    let value = joined;\n    if (byteLength(value) > MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES) {\n      value = value.slice(0, MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES);\n    }\n    const entryBytes = byteLength(name) + byteLength(value);\n    if (totalBytes + entryBytes > MAX_TOTAL_BYTES) continue;\n    totalBytes += entryBytes;\n    count++;\n    headers[name] = value;\n    if (isPlatformHeader(name)) platformHeaders[name] = value;\n  }\n\n  const result: SanitizeHeadersResult = { headers };\n  if (apiKeyFormat) result.apiKeyFormat = apiKeyFormat;\n  if (Object.keys(platformHeaders).length > 0) result.platformHeaders = platformHeaders;\n  if (cookieCount !== undefined) result.cookieCount = cookieCount;\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Pull the known platform-signal headers out of an ALREADY-sanitised header\n * map. `sanitizeHeaders` already computes this as a by-product; this standalone\n * form is exported for call-sites (edge, tests) that hold a sanitised map and\n * want only the platform subset. Never re-run over raw (unsanitised) headers.\n */\nexport function extractPlatformHeaders(\n  sanitized: Record<string, string> | undefined | null\n): Record<string, string> {\n  const out: Record<string, string> = {};\n  if (!sanitized) return out;\n  for (const name of Object.keys(sanitized)) {\n    if (isPlatformHeader(name.toLowerCase())) out[name.toLowerCase()] = sanitized[name];\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/**\n * Precedence-ordered CDN header sources for each derived `connection` key.\n * First present header wins; the special `x-forwarded-for` source takes the\n * LEFTMOST (client) entry of the comma-separated chain.\n */\nconst CONNECTION_HEADER_SOURCES: ReadonlyArray<readonly [key: string, headers: readonly string[]]> =\n  [\n    ['ip', ['cf-connecting-ip', 'fastly-client-ip', 'true-client-ip', 'x-real-ip']],\n    [\n      'country',\n      ['cf-ipcountry', 'x-vercel-ip-country', 'cloudfront-viewer-country', 'fastly-geo-country'],\n    ],\n    ['region', ['x-vercel-ip-country-region', 'cloudfront-viewer-country-region']],\n    ['countryRegionName', ['cloudfront-viewer-country-region-name']],\n    ['city', ['x-vercel-ip-city', 'cloudfront-viewer-city']],\n    ['latitude', ['x-vercel-ip-latitude', 'cloudfront-viewer-latitude']],\n    ['longitude', ['x-vercel-ip-longitude', 'cloudfront-viewer-longitude']],\n    ['postalCode', ['x-vercel-ip-postal-code', 'cloudfront-viewer-postal-code']],\n    ['asn', ['cloudfront-viewer-asn']],\n    ['tlsVersion', ['cloudfront-viewer-tls']],\n    ['httpVersion', ['cloudfront-viewer-http-version']],\n    ['timeZone', ['x-vercel-ip-timezone', 'cloudfront-viewer-time-zone']],\n    ['metroCode', ['cloudfront-viewer-metro-code']],\n    // TLS fingerprints can only be computed where TLS terminates. When a CDN\n    // terminates TLS in front of the merchant, its fingerprint headers ARE the\n    // connection-layer truth — normalising them here is the permanent design.\n    // CloudFront delivers JA3/JA4 only via an origin request policy and only\n    // for HTTPS viewer connections.\n    ['tlsFingerprint', ['cf-ja3-hash', 'cloudfront-viewer-ja3-fingerprint']],\n    ['ja4', ['cf-ja4', 'cloudfront-viewer-ja4-fingerprint']],\n    // Header-structure fingerprint: browser/SDK-distinctive header ordering.\n    ['headerOrder', ['cloudfront-viewer-header-order']],\n    ['headerCount', ['cloudfront-viewer-header-count']],\n  ];\n\n/**\n * Backend bound: observedMetadata.connection values longer than this fail\n * the platform's zod parse outright (boundedStringRecord(32, 256)), so every\n * emitter truncates — headerOrder routinely exceeds it.\n */\nexport const MAX_CONNECTION_VALUE_CHARS = 256;\n\n/**\n * Derive the connection-layer block from CDN-injected request headers.\n *\n * When a merchant's SDK-gated origin sits behind a CDN (Cloudflare, Fastly,\n * Vercel, CloudFront), the CDN has already seen the connection layer and\n * injected it as headers. This promotes those headers to the same\n * `connection` keys the edge adapters populate natively, so SDK-only\n * deployments still get IP / geo / TLS attribution. Precedence per key:\n *\n * - `ip`: `cf-connecting-ip` > `fastly-client-ip` > `true-client-ip` >\n *   `x-real-ip` > `cloudfront-viewer-address` (port stripped) > leftmost\n *   `x-forwarded-for`\n * - `country`: `cf-ipcountry` > `x-vercel-ip-country` >\n *   `cloudfront-viewer-country` > `fastly-geo-country`\n * - `region` / `city` / `timeZone`: Vercel then CloudFront viewer headers\n * - `countryRegionName` / `asn` / `tlsVersion` / `httpVersion` /\n *   `metroCode` / `headerOrder` / `headerCount`: `cloudfront-viewer-*`\n * - `tlsFingerprint`: `cf-ja3-hash` > `cloudfront-viewer-ja3-fingerprint`\n * - `ja4`: `cf-ja4` > `cloudfront-viewer-ja4-fingerprint`\n *\n * All keys are additive under `schemaVersion` 1 (the frozen-capture doctrine\n * bumps only for changed semantics, never for additive signals). Values are\n * truncated to MAX_CONNECTION_VALUE_CHARS — the platform's hard bound.\n *\n * Edge adapters keep their richer native collectors — native platform\n * signals are authoritative; this header derivation is the SDK-level\n * fallback. Header names are matched case-insensitively. Returns undefined\n * when no source header is present, so the `connection` key is simply\n * omitted (matching edge behaviour).\n */\nexport function deriveConnectionFromHeaders(\n  headers: Record<string, string> | undefined | null\n): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n  if (!headers) return undefined;\n  const lower: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const name of Object.keys(headers)) {\n    const value = headers[name];\n    if (typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0) lower[name.toLowerCase()] = value;\n  }\n\n  const connection: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [key, sources] of CONNECTION_HEADER_SOURCES) {\n    for (const source of sources) {\n      const value = lower[source]?.trim();\n      if (value) {\n        connection[key] = value.slice(0, MAX_CONNECTION_VALUE_CHARS);\n        break;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  // ip fallback 1: cloudfront-viewer-address arrives as ip:port — strip the\n  // trailing port only (IPv6-safe), unlike the dedicated client-ip headers.\n  // The port itself is kept as its own key: ephemeral-port patterns signal\n  // NAT/proxy connection reuse.\n  {\n    const addr = lower['cloudfront-viewer-address']?.trim();\n    const portMatch = addr?.match(/:(\\d+)$/);\n    if (portMatch) connection.sourcePort = portMatch[1];\n    if (!connection.ip && addr) connection.ip = addr.replace(/:\\d+$/, '');\n  }\n  // ip fallback 2: leftmost (client) hop of the x-forwarded-for chain.\n  if (!connection.ip) {\n    const xff = lower['x-forwarded-for'];\n    const client = xff?.split(',')[0]?.trim();\n    if (client) connection.ip = client;\n  }\n  // tlsCipher: CloudFront folds the cipher into the viewer-tls string\n  // (`TLSv1.3:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:fullHandshake`). `tlsVersion` stays\n  // verbatim (reducing it would be a semantic change → schema v2); the\n  // cipher is pulled out additively so it is queryable on its own.\n  if (!connection.tlsCipher) {\n    const cipher = connection.tlsVersion?.split(':')[1];\n    if (cipher) connection.tlsCipher = cipher;\n  }\n\n  return Object.keys(connection).length > 0 ? connection : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * The FULL metadata capture for one request at an SDK adapter (express /\n * nextjs / mcp): sanitised headers, the safe credential format prefix, the\n * platform-signal subset, the CDN-derived connection block, and the capture\n * schema version. This is the ONE builder all SDK adapters share, so their\n * verify-access bodies agree byte-for-byte.\n *\n * Connection derivation runs over the RAW header map (pre-cap) — the size\n * caps guard storage growth and must never hide a geo/IP header that\n * happened to arrive late in an oversized map.\n */\nexport function buildSdkObservedMetadata(\n  rawHeaders: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> | undefined | null\n): ObservedMetadata {\n  const { headers, apiKeyFormat, platformHeaders, cookieCount } = sanitizeHeaders(rawHeaders);\n  const flat: Record<string, string> = {};\n  if (rawHeaders) {\n    for (const name of Object.keys(rawHeaders)) {\n      const value = rawHeaders[name];\n      if (value === undefined) continue;\n      flat[name.toLowerCase()] = Array.isArray(value) ? value.join(', ') : String(value);\n    }\n  }\n  const connection = deriveConnectionFromHeaders(flat);\n  return {\n    headers,\n    ...(apiKeyFormat && { apiKeyFormat }),\n    ...(platformHeaders && { platformHeaders }),\n    ...(connection && { connection }),\n    ...(cookieCount !== undefined && { cookieCount }),\n    schemaVersion: CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Direct-path step-up approval gate (post-3.1.0 F2 follow-up).\n *\n * The verify-access spending-Limit ladder returns an \"allowed-but-escalate\"\n * outcome for a transaction value in the human-in-the-loop band\n * `[autonomousThreshold, hardLimit)`: `policyAllowed: true` (it is NOT a deny)\n * plus `requiresStepUp` / `requiresApproval`. The bridge blocks these; the\n * direct-path adapters historically gated on `identityVerified && policyAllowed`\n * alone and would therefore ADMIT (and let the merchant settle) the very\n * purchase the bridge blocks - a cross-path bypass.\n *\n * The backend now creates a pending step-up approval record and returns a\n * `stepUpApproval` object with `{ approvalId, pollUrl, expiresAt }` in the\n * verify-access response. The owner can approve/deny from the dashboard\n * (Activity → Pending Verifications). Future channels: mobile push, browser\n * extension.\n *\n * Direct-path adapters (Express/MCP/Next.js) fail closed BY DEFAULT. The\n * `stepUpApproval` info is included in the deny response so integrations can\n * surface it (\"your agent owner needs to approve this\") or poll it themselves.\n * 3.6.0 adds an opt-in hold-and-poll (`stepUpMaxWaitMs` on GatewayConfig, see\n * ./stepup-poll.ts): the adapter holds the request, polls the approval, and on\n * 'approved' re-verifies once (cache-bypassed) so the backend redeems the\n * single-use approval — the MFA model the Java SDK ships default-on. Opt-in\n * here because a minor release must not silently convert instant 403s into\n * multi-minute holds (client timeouts, connection pools, edge wall-clocks).\n *\n * Detection keys on the granular Limit flags (`requiresStepUp` /\n * `requiresApproval`, set from the verify-access `access` block) rather than\n * the `recommendation` umbrella - both because those flags ARE what drive a\n * `step_up_required` recommendation server-side, and because it keeps the\n * unverified-agent-policy `audit` outcome (a deliberate allow-and-log) from\n * being caught here.\n */\nimport type { VerificationResult, StepUpApprovalInfo } from '../types';\n\nconst APPROVAL_REASON =\n  'Transaction is above the autonomous limit and requires human approval. The agent owner can approve or deny this transaction in the AstraSync dashboard.';\n\n/** True when the outcome needs human step-up/approval. */\nexport function requiresHumanApproval(result: VerificationResult): boolean {\n  return result.requiresStepUp === true || result.requiresApproval === true;\n}\n\n/**\n * Annotate a result in place with the structured approval-required failure +\n * denial reason, so the adapters' existing deny renderers surface it like any\n * other failure. Mirrors the bridge's `commerce.intent.approval_required`.\n */\nexport function annotateApprovalRequired(result: VerificationResult): void {\n  result.failures = [\n    ...(result.failures ?? []),\n    { dimension: 'commerce.intent.approval_required', message: APPROVAL_REASON },\n  ];\n  result.denialReasons = [APPROVAL_REASON, ...(result.denialReasons ?? [])];\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract step-up approval polling info from the verification result, if\n * present. Returns undefined when no approval was created (e.g. transaction\n * below the autonomous threshold, or the backend couldn't create one).\n */\nexport function getApprovalPollingInfo(result: VerificationResult): StepUpApprovalInfo | undefined {\n  return result.stepUpApproval;\n}\n","/**\n * Step-up hold-and-poll (3.6.0) — the synchronous half of the MFA-style gate,\n * mirroring the Java SDK's `awaitStepUpApproval` / `pollStepUpStatus`.\n *\n * A verify() that comes back step_up_required carries a `stepUpApproval`\n * handle: `{ approvalId, pollUrl, expiresAt }`. The adapter HOLDS the original\n * request, polls the approval status, and on 'approved' re-verifies the same\n * request once (cache-bypassed) so the backend redeems the single-use approval\n * and returns a grant. Any other terminal outcome falls into the adapter's\n * normal fail-closed deny path.\n *\n * The poll endpoint is deliberately unauthenticated (it sits above the\n * backend router's `authenticate` middleware): the unguessable UUIDv4\n * approvalId is the capability token, and the route is rate-limited\n * (60/min/IP). No Authorization header is sent.\n */\n\nimport { sdkFetch } from '../http';\nimport { GatewayConfig, StepUpApprovalInfo, StepUpApprovalStatus, StepUpOutcome } from '../types';\n\nconst DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 3000;\nconst MIN_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 250;\nconst FALLBACK_MAX_WAIT_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;\nconst EXPIRY_GRACE_MS = 5000;\nconst POLL_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;\n\n/** Resolve the absolute poll URL. pollUrl is server-relative\n * (`/api/step-up-approvals/poll/:id`), so join it to apiBaseUrl minus its\n * `/api` suffix (the origin) — same idiom as well-known.ts. Absolute URLs\n * pass through untouched. */\nfunction resolvePollUrl(config: GatewayConfig, pollUrl: string): string {\n  if (pollUrl.startsWith('http')) return pollUrl;\n  const origin = (config.apiBaseUrl ?? '').replace(/\\/api\\/?$/, '');\n  return origin + pollUrl;\n}\n\n/**\n * One GET of the approval's poll endpoint. Returns the status string, or\n * null on any error / non-2xx / unparsable body — the hold loop treats null\n * as transient and just polls again.\n */\nexport async function pollStepUpStatus(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  approval: StepUpApprovalInfo\n): Promise<StepUpApprovalStatus | null> {\n  if (!approval.pollUrl) return null;\n  try {\n    const res = await sdkFetch(resolvePollUrl(config, approval.pollUrl), {\n      method: 'GET',\n      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(POLL_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS),\n    });\n    if (!res.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n    // Envelope shape: { success, data: { status, resolvedAt } } — a flat\n    // `status` read hangs every hold (live-UAT catch). Envelope-first with a\n    // flat fallback for forward compatibility, exactly like the Java SDK.\n    const data = body?.data;\n    const status =\n      data && typeof data === 'object' ? (data as Record<string, unknown>).status : body?.status;\n    return typeof status === 'string' ? (status as StepUpApprovalStatus) : null;\n  } catch {\n    return null; // transient poll failure — the loop just polls again\n  }\n}\n\nfunction resolveDeadline(config: GatewayConfig, approval: StepUpApprovalInfo): number {\n  const now = Date.now();\n  const maxWait = config.stepUpMaxWaitMs ?? 0;\n  if (maxWait > 0) return now + maxWait;\n  // stepUpMaxWaitMs === 0: hold until the approval itself expires (+ a small\n  // grace so an approval landing at the buzzer still resolves on the next\n  // poll). Missing/unparsable expiresAt → fixed 5-min fallback (Java parity).\n  if (approval.expiresAt) {\n    const expiry = Date.parse(approval.expiresAt);\n    if (!Number.isNaN(expiry)) return Math.max(now, expiry) + EXPIRY_GRACE_MS;\n  }\n  return now + FALLBACK_MAX_WAIT_MS;\n}\n\nfunction sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {\n  return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));\n}\n\n/**\n * Block until a pending step-up approval reaches a terminal state or the wait\n * budget runs out. Returns the terminal status, or 'timeout'.\n *\n * Unknown non-pending statuses (a future backend state) still terminate the\n * hold — they are returned as-is and land in the deny path, which is the safe\n * reading of \"not approved\".\n */\nexport async function awaitStepUpApproval(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  approval: StepUpApprovalInfo\n): Promise<StepUpOutcome> {\n  const deadline = resolveDeadline(config, approval);\n  const pollInterval = Math.max(\n    MIN_POLL_INTERVAL_MS,\n    config.stepUpPollIntervalMs ?? DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS\n  );\n\n  while (Date.now() < deadline) {\n    const status = await pollStepUpStatus(config, approval);\n    if (status && status !== 'pending') {\n      return status as StepUpOutcome;\n    }\n    const remaining = deadline - Date.now();\n    if (remaining <= 0) break;\n    await sleep(Math.min(pollInterval, remaining));\n  }\n  return 'timeout';\n}\n","/**\n * X-Astra-Verified-Hop — cross-hop verify-access dedupe marker.\n *\n * Header carrying upstream verify-access proof so an inner-hop endpoint can\n * dedupe (skip verify-access when the same ASTRA-id was already verified a\n * few ms earlier). Emitted by the MCP adapter toward tool fetches and by the\n * edge gateway toward the origin at authenticate/authorize depth. Value\n * format:\n *\n *   {astraId};{sessionId};{checkedAt-ms}\n *\n * Receivers MUST validate that `checkedAt` is recent (≤ 60s window\n * recommended) and that `astraId` matches the agent identity claimed on the\n * inner hop. The header alone is NOT proof-of-identity — it's an UNSIGNED\n * dedupe advisory: trust it (`trustVerifiedHop`) only where every network\n * path to the inner hop crosses a stripping gateway or an equivalent trusted\n * boundary, exactly like the unsigned X-AstraSync-* attestation headers.\n * Pair with the existing X-Astra-Id auth.\n */\n\nexport const MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER = 'X-Astra-Verified-Hop';\n\n/** Default acceptable age (ms) for an X-Astra-Verified-Hop header. */\nexport const MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS = 60_000;\n\nexport interface VerifiedHopMarker {\n  astraId: string;\n  sessionId?: string;\n  checkedAt: number; // epoch ms\n}\n\nexport function serializeVerifiedHop(marker: VerifiedHopMarker): string {\n  return `${marker.astraId};${marker.sessionId ?? ''};${marker.checkedAt}`;\n}\n\nexport function parseVerifiedHop(value: string | undefined | null): VerifiedHopMarker | null {\n  if (!value) return null;\n  const parts = value.split(';');\n  if (parts.length !== 3) return null;\n  const [astraId, sessionId, checkedAtRaw] = parts;\n  if (!astraId) return null;\n  const checkedAt = Number(checkedAtRaw);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(checkedAt) || checkedAt <= 0) return null;\n  return {\n    astraId,\n    ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}),\n    checkedAt,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `marker.astraId` matches the inner-hop's claimed\n * ASTRA-id AND the marker is recent enough. Inner-hop middleware uses this\n * to skip a duplicate verify-access call.\n */\nexport function isVerifiedHopValidFor(\n  marker: VerifiedHopMarker | null,\n  expectedAstraId: string,\n  opts: { maxAgeMs?: number; now?: number } = {}\n): boolean {\n  if (!marker) return false;\n  if (marker.astraId !== expectedAstraId) return false;\n  const maxAge = opts.maxAgeMs ?? MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS;\n  const now = opts.now ?? Date.now();\n  return now - marker.checkedAt <= maxAge && now >= marker.checkedAt;\n}\n","/**\n * MCP server-side helpers — companion to `transport/mcp.ts` (which handles the\n * agent-side `_meta.astrasync` block).\n *\n * Surfaces a body-aware policy hook the existing `createMiddleware` couldn't\n * provide — MCP traffic is JSON-RPC over a single endpoint (`/mcp`), so the\n * default route-pattern gating is too coarse: every request looks the same\n * URL-wise, but `initialize` is low-risk handshake while `tools/call` of a\n * payment tool is high-risk. Cohort-3 beta merchants flagged this 🟡 in the\n * v2.9.5 round.\n *\n * What lives here:\n *   - `parseMcpJsonRpc(body)`    — peels JSON-RPC method + tool name + agent\n *                                   id without committing to a particular MCP\n *                                   server framework.\n *   - `mcpToPdlss(parsed)`       — canonical mapping JSON-RPC method → PDLSS\n *                                   purpose / action / resource. Doc-stable\n *                                   so audits can correlate.\n *   - `mcpDefaultEnforced(parsed)` — whether a method is enforced by default\n *                                   so a single MCP middleware can split\n *                                   `initialize` / `tools/list` (pass-through)\n *                                   from `tools/call` (enforced).\n *   - `MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER`   — header convention for the dedupe pattern\n *                                   when an MCP tool calls an inner REST hop.\n *   - `serialize/parseVerifiedHop` helpers.\n *\n * The Express MCP adapter is in `adapters/mcp.ts` and consumes these.\n */\n\n// X-Astra-Verified-Hop helpers live in ../verified-hop (shared with the\n// edge gateway's origin-bound emission); re-exported here so existing\n// transport-level imports keep working unchanged.\nexport {\n  MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n  MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS,\n  serializeVerifiedHop,\n  parseVerifiedHop,\n  isVerifiedHopValidFor,\n} from '../verified-hop';\nexport type { VerifiedHopMarker } from '../verified-hop';\n\n/**\n * Output of `parseMcpJsonRpc`. Self-describing so the middleware doesn't have\n * to re-introspect the body to figure out gating.\n */\nexport interface ParsedMcpRequest {\n  /** JSON-RPC method (e.g. `tools/call`, `initialize`, `tools/list`). */\n  method: string;\n  /** Set when method === 'tools/call'; the tool name from `params.name`. */\n  toolName?: string;\n  /** Initialize-specific protocolVersion handshake info, when present. */\n  protocolVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Agent id read from the body, in priority order:\n   *   1. `params._meta.astrasync.agentId` (the canonical SDK location, see\n   *      `transport/mcp.ts → setMcpMeta`)\n   *   2. `params.arguments.agent_id` (legacy / hand-written tool callers)\n   * Header-supplied id (X-Astra-Id) is read separately by the adapter and\n   * compared to this for the mismatch check.\n   */\n  agentIdFromBody?: string;\n  /**\n   * Purpose extracted from the MCP body\n   * with the symmetric precedence chain. Sourced from `_meta.astrasync.purpose`\n   * (canonical SDK location) OR `params.arguments.purpose` (legacy /\n   * conventional callers). The discriminator is on `purposeSourceFromBody`.\n   * Adapter combines this with the `X-Astra-Purpose` header (header wins)\n   * before mapping; final fallback at `mcpToPdlss` is `undefined`.\n   */\n  purposeFromBody?: string;\n  /** Which body location resolved `purposeFromBody`. */\n  purposeSourceFromBody?: 'meta' | 'tool_argument';\n  /**\n   * Action extracted from the MCP body with the same\n   * symmetric chain as purpose. Sourced from `_meta.astrasync.action`\n   * (canonical) OR `params.arguments.action` (legacy). Adapter combines\n   * with the `X-Astra-Action` header (header wins) before mapping; final\n   * fallback at `mcpToPdlss` is the transport-layer default\n   * (`tools/call:<toolname>` or just `<method>`).\n   */\n  actionFromBody?: string;\n  /** Which body location resolved `actionFromBody`. */\n  actionSourceFromBody?: 'meta' | 'tool_argument';\n  /** True for handshake methods that must succeed before any tool call. */\n  isInitialize: boolean;\n  /** True for `tools/call`. */\n  isToolCall: boolean;\n  /** True for low-risk introspection (`tools/list`, `prompts/list`, etc.). */\n  isIntrospection: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Peel the JSON-RPC envelope. Returns `null` if the body isn't a JSON-RPC\n * request (callers can short-circuit with a 400 or treat as untyped traffic).\n *\n * Accepts both single-request and notification shapes. Batch requests are\n * NOT supported here — the verify-access contract is single-agent-per-call;\n * a batch body should be split before policy gating.\n */\nexport function parseMcpJsonRpc(body: unknown): ParsedMcpRequest | null {\n  if (!body || typeof body !== 'object' || Array.isArray(body)) return null;\n  const obj = body as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (obj.jsonrpc !== '2.0' && obj.jsonrpc !== '1.0') return null;\n  const method = typeof obj.method === 'string' ? obj.method : null;\n  if (!method) return null;\n  const params = obj.params as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n\n  // Tool-name lookup. MCP `tools/call` puts the tool under `params.name`.\n  let toolName: string | undefined;\n  if (method === 'tools/call' && params && typeof params.name === 'string') {\n    toolName = params.name;\n  }\n\n  // protocolVersion only on the initialize request.\n  let protocolVersion: string | undefined;\n  if (method === 'initialize' && params && typeof params.protocolVersion === 'string') {\n    protocolVersion = params.protocolVersion;\n  }\n\n  const meta = params?._meta as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n  const astrasyncMeta = meta?.astrasync as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n  const args = params?.arguments as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n\n  // Agent-id lookup with documented precedence: _meta.astrasync.agentId\n  // wins over params.arguments.agent_id. (The argument-shape uses\n  // `agent_id` snake_case for legacy conventional callers; meta is the\n  // canonical SDK location.)\n  let agentIdFromBody: string | undefined;\n  if (astrasyncMeta && typeof astrasyncMeta.agentId === 'string') {\n    agentIdFromBody = astrasyncMeta.agentId;\n  } else if (args && typeof args.agent_id === 'string') {\n    agentIdFromBody = args.agent_id;\n  }\n\n  // Round-13 (R13-1, R13-2) — symmetric body-extraction for purpose +\n  // action. Per `feedback_symmetric_fallbacks_for_symmetric_concepts.md`:\n  // these two concepts are paired in the MCP middleware, so their\n  // fallback chains MUST mirror each other exactly. Drift between them\n  // generates the same support-ticket class repeatedly (\"I set X in\n  // arguments and it didn't take\" — happened for purpose in round-12\n  // post-F19, and was about to happen for action in round-13).\n  //\n  // Body precedence (applies to both): _meta.astrasync.<key> wins over\n  // params.arguments.<key>. The discriminator is exported alongside the\n  // value so the adapter can fold it into purposeSource / actionSource\n  // for debug logging and adoption tracking.\n  const purposeBodyResult = extractFromMcpBody(astrasyncMeta, args, 'purpose');\n  const actionBodyResult = extractFromMcpBody(astrasyncMeta, args, 'action');\n\n  const isInitialize = method === 'initialize';\n  const isToolCall = method === 'tools/call';\n  const isIntrospection =\n    method === 'tools/list' ||\n    method === 'prompts/list' ||\n    method === 'resources/list' ||\n    method === 'ping' ||\n    method === 'notifications/initialized';\n\n  return {\n    method,\n    ...(toolName ? { toolName } : {}),\n    ...(protocolVersion ? { protocolVersion } : {}),\n    ...(agentIdFromBody ? { agentIdFromBody } : {}),\n    ...(purposeBodyResult.value ? { purposeFromBody: purposeBodyResult.value } : {}),\n    ...(purposeBodyResult.source ? { purposeSourceFromBody: purposeBodyResult.source } : {}),\n    ...(actionBodyResult.value ? { actionFromBody: actionBodyResult.value } : {}),\n    ...(actionBodyResult.source ? { actionSourceFromBody: actionBodyResult.source } : {}),\n    isInitialize,\n    isToolCall,\n    isIntrospection,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared body-extraction helper for the symmetric purpose + action\n * fallback chain. Returns the resolved value AND\n * the source discriminator so adapters can fold it into per-call debug\n * logs (`purpose_source` / `action_source`).\n *\n * Precedence:\n *   1. `params._meta.astrasync.<key>` — canonical SDK location, source: 'meta'\n *   2. `params.arguments.<key>`        — legacy / conventional, source: 'tool_argument'\n *   3. neither present                 — value: undefined, source: undefined\n *\n * The HTTP-header tier (`X-Astra-<concept>`) is the adapter's job; this\n * helper only handles body sources. Adapters combine the two: header\n * wins over body. See `mcpToPdlss` for the final precedence assembly.\n */\nfunction extractFromMcpBody(\n  astrasyncMeta: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,\n  args: Record<string, unknown> | undefined,\n  key: 'purpose' | 'action'\n): { value: string | undefined; source: 'meta' | 'tool_argument' | undefined } {\n  if (astrasyncMeta && typeof astrasyncMeta[key] === 'string') {\n    return { value: astrasyncMeta[key] as string, source: 'meta' };\n  }\n  if (args && typeof args[key] === 'string') {\n    return { value: args[key] as string, source: 'tool_argument' };\n  }\n  return { value: undefined, source: undefined };\n}\n\n/**\n * PDLSS mapping for an MCP request. The platform's PDLSS taxonomy is\n * `purpose / action / resource`; for MCP traffic the audit-useful dimensions\n * are the JSON-RPC method and (for `tools/call`) the tool name.\n *\n * v2.5.0 rules:\n *   - `resource` defaults to the HTTP request path (e.g. `/mcp`). Per-tool\n *     overrides via `toolGates` config let merchants map tools to specific\n *     backend resources (e.g. `/api/catalog`).\n *   - `purpose` defaults to `undefined` (backend evaluator applies\n *     skip-when-undefined). Per-tool overrides via `toolGates` config let\n *     merchants declare the semantic purpose each tool fulfils.\n *   - `action` comes only from declarations (toolGate config, header, or\n *     body). For `tools/call` with none declared it is `undefined` —\n *     evaluation is purpose-only, because a raw tool name is a transport\n *     token, not a PDLSS action, and sending it as one guarantees an\n *     action-policy mismatch. For other JSON-RPC methods the method string\n *     is used.\n */\nexport interface McpPdlssMapping {\n  purpose: string | undefined;\n  /**\n   * `undefined` when a `tools/call` request declared no action anywhere —\n   * the verify-access call then evaluates purpose-only. Tool names never\n   * travel as PDLSS actions.\n   */\n  action: string | undefined;\n  resource: string;\n  purposeSource: 'header' | 'meta' | 'tool_argument' | 'tool_gate' | undefined;\n  actionSource: 'header' | 'meta' | 'tool_argument' | 'tool_gate' | 'transport_layer' | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * v2.5.0 — PDLSS field derivation for MCP requests.\n *\n * Purpose precedence:\n *   - If `toolGate.purpose` is provided, it is authoritative (header/body ignored).\n *   - Otherwise: header → body `_meta` → body `arguments` → `undefined`.\n *\n * Resource precedence:\n *   - `toolGate.resource` if provided, else `requestPath`.\n *\n * Action precedence (3.1.0 — toolGate override added for\n * symmetry with purpose; 4.1.0 — the bare-tool-name fallback for\n * `tools/call` was removed):\n *   - `toolGate.action` authoritative → header → body `_meta` → body\n *     `arguments` → then: `undefined` for `tools/call` (purpose-only\n *     evaluation — tool names are transport tokens, never PDLSS actions),\n *     or the JSON-RPC method string for other methods (transport_layer).\n *\n * @param requestPath  The HTTP request path (e.g. '/mcp'). Required.\n * @param toolGate     Resolved per-tool config from `toolGates`, if present.\n */\nexport function mcpToPdlss(\n  parsed: ParsedMcpRequest,\n  requestPath: string,\n  headerPurpose?: string,\n  headerAction?: string,\n  toolGate?: { purpose?: string; action?: string; resource?: string }\n): McpPdlssMapping {\n  const resource = toolGate?.resource ?? requestPath;\n\n  let purpose: string | undefined;\n  let purposeSource: McpPdlssMapping['purposeSource'];\n  if (toolGate?.purpose !== undefined) {\n    purpose = toolGate.purpose;\n    purposeSource = 'tool_gate';\n  } else if (headerPurpose) {\n    purpose = headerPurpose;\n    purposeSource = 'header';\n  } else if (parsed.purposeFromBody && parsed.purposeSourceFromBody) {\n    purpose = parsed.purposeFromBody;\n    purposeSource = parsed.purposeSourceFromBody;\n  } else {\n    purpose = undefined;\n    purposeSource = undefined;\n  }\n\n  let action: string | undefined;\n  let actionSource: McpPdlssMapping['actionSource'];\n  if (toolGate?.action !== undefined) {\n    action = toolGate.action;\n    actionSource = 'tool_gate';\n  } else if (headerAction) {\n    action = headerAction;\n    actionSource = 'header';\n  } else if (parsed.actionFromBody && parsed.actionSourceFromBody) {\n    action = parsed.actionFromBody;\n    actionSource = parsed.actionSourceFromBody;\n  } else if (parsed.method === 'tools/call') {\n    // 4.1.0 fix: previously the bare tool name travelled as the PDLSS\n    // action here, which guaranteed an action-policy deny for merchants\n    // using the bare-string toolGate shorthand (tool names are transport\n    // tokens, not policy vocabulary). With nothing configured or declared,\n    // leave the action undeclared so evaluation is purpose-only.\n    action = undefined;\n    actionSource = undefined;\n  } else {\n    action = parsed.toolName ? `${parsed.method}:${parsed.toolName}` : parsed.method;\n    actionSource = 'transport_layer';\n  }\n\n  return { purpose, action, resource, purposeSource, actionSource };\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether a method is enforced (calls verify-access + gates on the server\n * decision) by default. The MCP middleware uses this to split low-risk\n * handshake / introspection traffic (pass-through) from high-risk tool\n * execution (enforced). Per-tool / per-method overrides win over this default.\n *\n *   - `initialize` / `notifications/initialized`        → false (handshake must work for unregistered probes)\n *   - `tools/list` / `prompts/list` / `resources/list`  → false (introspection is public-surface)\n *   - `ping`                                            → false\n *   - `resources/read`                                  → true\n *   - `tools/call`                                      → true  (default — overridable per-tool)\n *   - everything else                                   → true  (least-privilege fallback)\n */\nexport function mcpDefaultEnforced(parsed: ParsedMcpRequest): boolean {\n  if (parsed.isInitialize || parsed.method === 'notifications/initialized') return false;\n  if (parsed.isIntrospection) return false;\n  return true;\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway — MCP middleware\n *\n * Express-shaped middleware tailored to the JSON-RPC body of an MCP\n * (Model Context Protocol) endpoint. Closes the cohort-3 gaps the default\n * `createMiddleware` couldn't:\n *\n *   (a) **Body-aware gating**.  All MCP traffic targets the same `/mcp` URL.\n *       The default route-pattern matcher can't tell `initialize` (low risk)\n *       from `tools/call start_checkout` (high risk). This middleware peels\n *       the JSON-RPC body and applies a per-method risk tier.\n *\n *   (b) **PDLSS mapping**.  Derives purpose, action, and resource from\n *       `toolGates` config and request context. See `transport/mcp-server.ts`\n *       `mcpToPdlss()` for the exact mapping.\n *\n *   (c) **Inner-hop dedupe**.  Outbound responses set\n *       `X-Astra-Verified-Hop` so a downstream REST endpoint that the tool\n *       calls can skip a duplicate verify-access. The receiving REST\n *       middleware checks `parseVerifiedHop` and skips when valid.\n *\n *   (d) **Header-vs-body identity precedence**.  Reads ASTRA-id from\n *       `X-Astra-Id` first, body second. If both are present and disagree,\n *       returns a structured 400 by default (configurable). Pre-fix,\n *       integrators had to re-discover this on their own.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```typescript\n * import express from 'express';\n * import { createMcpMiddleware } from '@astrasyncai/verification-gateway/mcp';\n *\n * const app = express();\n * app.use(express.json());\n *\n * app.post(\n *   '/mcp',\n *   createMcpMiddleware({\n *     apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n *     apiKey: process.env.ASTRASYNC_API_KEY,\n *     // Per-tool gates — `tools/call` is enforced by default; introspection /\n *     // handshake pass through. A gated tool needs a PDLSS purpose (and ideally\n *     // an action). Set a tool/method to `'observe'` to pass it through\n *     // unenforced (still evaluated when `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed`).\n *     toolGates: {\n *       browse_catalog: { purpose: 'shopping', action: 'shopping.search' },\n *       start_checkout: { purpose: 'shopping', action: 'shopping.purchase' },\n *       health_check: 'observe',\n *     },\n *   }),\n *   yourMcpServerHandler,\n * );\n * ```\n */\n\nimport type { Request, Response, NextFunction, RequestHandler } from 'express';\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  VerificationResult,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  VerificationRequest,\n} from '../types';\nimport { verify, extractCredentials, recordDecision } from '../verify';\nimport { buildSdkObservedMetadata } from '../metadata-capture';\nimport { requiresHumanApproval, annotateApprovalRequired } from './approval-gate';\nimport { awaitStepUpApproval } from './stepup-poll';\nimport { prefetchWellKnown, getWellKnownUrls } from '../well-known';\nimport {\n  parseMcpJsonRpc,\n  mcpToPdlss,\n  mcpDefaultEnforced,\n  serializeVerifiedHop,\n  parseVerifiedHop,\n  isVerifiedHopValidFor,\n  MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n  type ParsedMcpRequest,\n} from '../transport/mcp-server';\n\ndeclare global {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-namespace\n  namespace Express {\n    interface Request {\n      mcpRequest?: ParsedMcpRequest;\n      // Declared here as well as in express.ts (identical type — the merged\n      // interfaces are compatible) so this module typechecks standalone: the\n      // grouped DTS build compiles each entry group as its own program, and\n      // mcp.ts must not depend on express.ts being in the same one.\n      agentVerification?: VerificationResult;\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Extended per-tool gate with optional PDLSS purpose + action + resource\n * overrides.\n *\n * When `purpose` is set, it is authoritative for that tool — the agent's\n * `X-Astra-Purpose` header is ignored. This lets the merchant declare what\n * semantic purpose each tool fulfils rather than trusting agent self-declaration.\n *\n * When `action` is set (symmetric with `purpose`), it is\n * authoritative over `X-Astra-Action` / body declarations, letting the\n * merchant pin a dotted-verb action (e.g. `shopping.search`) for a tool\n * whose callers would otherwise leave the action undeclared (purpose-only\n * evaluation — raw tool names never travel as PDLSS actions).\n *\n * When `resource` is set, it overrides the default (`req.path`) for that\n * tool's verify-access call — e.g. mapping `list_products` to `/api/catalog`.\n */\nexport interface ToolGateConfig {\n  purpose?: string;\n  action?: string;\n  resource?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A tool/method gate is either a {@link ToolGateConfig} (enforced — calls\n * verify-access and gates on the server decision, using the declared PDLSS\n * purpose/action) or the literal `'observe'` (passed through unenforced;\n * still evaluated when `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed` is set). SDK 5.0.0\n * removed the access-level band, so a gate no longer carries a tier — its\n * only decision is enforce vs observe.\n */\nexport type ToolGate = ToolGateConfig | 'observe';\n\nexport interface McpMiddlewareOptions extends GatewayConfig {\n  /**\n   * Per-tool gating for `tools/call` invocations. Tools not listed are\n   * enforced by default (`tools/call` calls verify-access and gates on the\n   * server decision).\n   *\n   * A gated tool declares its PDLSS `purpose` (required: the backend rejects\n   * gated calls with no resolvable purpose) and ideally a dotted-verb\n   * `action`:\n   * ```typescript\n   * toolGates: {\n   *   list_products:  { purpose: 'shopping',\n   *                     action: 'shopping.search',\n   *                     resource: '/api/catalog' },\n   *   start_checkout: { purpose: 'shopping',\n   *                     action: 'shopping.purchase',\n   *                     resource: '/api/checkout/*' },\n   *   health_check:   'observe',   // pass through unenforced\n   * }\n   * ```\n   *\n   * Set a tool to `'observe'` to pass it through without enforcement (it is\n   * still evaluated for the audit trail when `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed`\n   * is set). A gated object form with no resolvable purpose fails fast with a\n   * `PDLSS_PURPOSE_REQUIRED` 400 (the SDK never sends the raw tool name as\n   * the PDLSS action).\n   *\n   * The action axis for non-tools/call MCP methods (`tools/list`,\n   * `resources/list`, `prompts/list`, etc.) is the literal JSON-RPC method\n   * name (e.g. `'tools/list'`). Merchants gating MCP traffic by action should\n   * declare per-tool gates in `toolGates`, not endpoint-level `allowedActions`\n   * — the latter applies to REST-style action values, not MCP method strings.\n   */\n  toolGates?: Record<string, ToolGate>;\n  /**\n   * Per-method override. By default introspection / handshake methods\n   * (`tools/list`, `initialize`, `ping`, …) pass through and `tools/call` is\n   * enforced; declare a method here to enforce it (object form, with a PDLSS\n   * purpose) or set it to `'observe'` to pass it through. Matches by exact\n   * JSON-RPC method string.\n   */\n  methodGates?: Record<string, ToolGate>;\n  /**\n   * What to do when the agent id supplied in the X-Astra-Id header\n   * disagrees with the agent id in the JSON-RPC body\n   * (`params._meta.astrasync.agentId` or `params.arguments.agent_id`).\n   *\n   *   - `'reject'` (default) — return 400 `AGENT_ID_MISMATCH`. Safest.\n   *   - `'prefer-header'` — log + verify against the header value. Keeps\n   *     bodies that were authored before X-Astra-Id was the canonical\n   *     identity slot working.\n   *   - `'prefer-body'` — log + verify against the body value. Useful in\n   *     reverse-proxy setups that strip auth headers.\n   */\n  onAgentIdMismatch?: 'reject' | 'prefer-header' | 'prefer-body';\n  /** Skip verification + dedupe entirely. For testing. */\n  skip?: boolean;\n  /** Custom denied handler. Defaults to a structured JSON-RPC error response. */\n  onDenied?: (result: VerificationResult, req: Request, res: Response) => void;\n  /**\n   * If `true`, trust an inbound `X-Astra-Verified-Hop` header to skip\n   * verify-access when it carries a recent marker for the resolved agent.\n   *\n   * **DEFAULT FLIPPED TO `false` in SDK 2.4.13.** The marker\n   * is plaintext semicolon-delimited with no HMAC, so any client that sets\n   * the header (with the right format + fresh timestamp + matching ASTRA-id)\n   * skipped verify-access entirely. The per-process verify-access result\n   * cache already dedupes legitimate repeat calls — this optimization\n   * provided no additional savings, only a bypass surface.\n   *\n   * Set this to `true` ONLY if you control every upstream MCP hop that sets\n   * the header AND you trust the network path between hops (mTLS, internal\n   * VPC, etc.). For most installs, leave at the safe default.\n   *\n   * A future SDK release will either remove this option entirely OR add\n   * HMAC signing to the marker.\n   */\n  trustVerifiedHop?: boolean;\n  /** Window for accepting an upstream verified-hop marker. Default 60_000ms. */\n  verifiedHopMaxAgeMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Automatically record grant/deny decisions for every MCP call. Default\n   * `true` — matches the express adapter.\n   */\n  recordDecisions?: boolean;\n  /** Forward runtime challenge (default `true`). */\n  enableRuntimeChallenge?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Posture when the MCP middleware itself throws an internal error.\n   * Default `'open'` for backward compatibility in SDK 2.4.13. Shadow logs\n   * record what WOULD be denied with `failOnError: 'closed'` so merchants\n   * can grep correlationId for impact analysis during the observation\n   * window. Default flips to `'closed'` in a follow-up release.\n   */\n  failOnError?: 'open' | 'closed';\n}\n\n/**\n * Default MCP denied handler.\n *\n * Mirrors the express adapter — surfaces `failures[]`\n * and `correlationId` on the response so partners can render rich UX and\n * tie a denial to a log line. Also stamps `X-Astra-Gateway-Mode: enforced`\n * so the header reliably distinguishes gate-evaluated denials\n * from gate-skipped pass-throughs.\n */\n/**\n * Shared single-value HTTP header reader. Same shape used for\n * both `X-Astra-Purpose` and `X-Astra-Action` extraction (symmetric\n * fallback chain — see `mcpToPdlss` for the full precedence rule).\n * Returns the first value if the header repeats (Express turns repeated\n * headers into an array); returns undefined when the header is absent.\n */\nfunction readSingleHeader(value: string | string[] | undefined): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return value;\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value[0];\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction dedupeFailures(result: VerificationResult): void {\n  if (result.failures && result.failures.length > 1) {\n    const seen = new Set<string>();\n    result.failures = result.failures.filter((f) => {\n      const key = `${f.dimension}|${f.message}|${(f as { guidance?: string }).guidance ?? ''}`;\n      if (seen.has(key)) return false;\n      seen.add(key);\n      return true;\n    });\n  }\n  if (result.denialReasons && result.denialReasons.length > 1) {\n    result.denialReasons = [...new Set(result.denialReasons)];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction defaultMcpDenied(result: VerificationResult, req: Request, res: Response): void {\n  // JSON-RPC error envelope so MCP-aware clients render it correctly.\n  const id = (req.body as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.id ?? null;\n\n  // 4.0.0 BREAKING: the integration's OWN key was rejected — not the agent's\n  // fault, not transient. 503 + a dedicated JSON-RPC code so MCP clients can\n  // tell \"this server's verification layer is broken\" from their own denial.\n  if (result.misconfigured) {\n    res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n    res.status(503).json({\n      jsonrpc: '2.0',\n      id,\n      error: {\n        // -32002 → merchant verification misconfigured (see -32000/-32001 below)\n        code: -32002,\n        message:\n          result.denialReasons?.[0] ?? \"This server's AstraSync integration is misconfigured\",\n        data: {\n          guidance: result.guidance,\n          failures: result.failures,\n          correlationId: result.correlationId,\n        },\n      },\n    });\n    return;\n  }\n\n  // Round-18 G4: see express.defaultOnDenied for full rationale on the\n  // identity-vs-policy split → 401/403 mapping. Same logic here so MCP\n  // clients get HTTP status semantics aligned with REST adapters.\n  const status = !result.identityVerified ? 401 : 403;\n\n  res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n\n  res.status(status).json({\n    jsonrpc: '2.0',\n    id,\n    error: {\n      // JSON-RPC error codes:\n      //   -32000 → unauthorized (no identity resolved)\n      //   -32001 → insufficient access (identity OK, policy denied)\n      //   -32002 → merchant verification misconfigured (handled above)\n      code: !result.identityVerified ? -32000 : -32001,\n      message: result.denialReasons?.[0] ?? 'Access denied',\n      data: {\n        guidance: result.guidance,\n        // Round-10: aggregated per-dimension detail + correlation handle.\n        failures: result.failures,\n        correlationId: result.correlationId,\n        stepUpApproval: result.stepUpApproval,\n        // 3.6.0: terminal outcome of an opt-in hold-and-poll wait (denied /\n        // expired / consumed / timeout). Absent when the feature is off.\n        ...(result.stepUpOutcome && { stepUpOutcome: result.stepUpOutcome }),\n      },\n    },\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve whether a parsed MCP request is enforced, and the gate config to\n * apply. SDK 5.0.0 removed the access-level band — a gate's only decision is\n * enforce vs observe.\n *\n * Precedence:\n *   1. Non-tools/call without `methodGates` entry → pass through\n *      (`discovery_default`). Discovery is open — agents must list tools\n *      before invoking them.\n *   2. `methodGates[method]` — per-method override (`'observe'` or a config)\n *   3. `toolGates[toolName]` — per-tool override (tools/call only)\n *   4. `mcpDefaultEnforced` — built-in default (tools/call → enforced)\n *\n * The `source` field is logged for forensics / activity-feed attribution.\n */\nfunction resolveGate(\n  parsed: ParsedMcpRequest,\n  opts: {\n    toolGates?: Record<string, ToolGate>;\n    methodGates?: Record<string, ToolGate>;\n  }\n): {\n  enforce: boolean;\n  config?: ToolGateConfig;\n  source: 'toolGate' | 'methodGate' | 'tier' | 'discovery_default';\n} {\n  if (!parsed.toolName) {\n    const methodGate = opts.methodGates?.[parsed.method];\n    if (methodGate !== undefined) {\n      return methodGate === 'observe'\n        ? { enforce: false, source: 'methodGate' }\n        : { enforce: true, config: methodGate, source: 'methodGate' };\n    }\n    // Non-tools/call methods (handshake / introspection) pass through unless a\n    // methodGate opts them in — preserves open discovery for unregistered probes.\n    return { enforce: false, source: 'discovery_default' };\n  }\n  const toolGate = opts.toolGates?.[parsed.toolName];\n  if (toolGate !== undefined) {\n    return toolGate === 'observe'\n      ? { enforce: false, source: 'toolGate' }\n      : { enforce: true, config: toolGate, source: 'toolGate' };\n  }\n  // tools/call with no explicit gate → enforced by default.\n  return { enforce: mcpDefaultEnforced(parsed), source: 'tier' };\n}\n\n/**\n * Create the MCP middleware. Attach AFTER `express.json()` — the body must\n * already be a parsed object.\n */\nexport function createMcpMiddleware(options: McpMiddlewareOptions): RequestHandler {\n  const {\n    toolGates,\n    methodGates,\n    onAgentIdMismatch = 'reject',\n    skip = false,\n    onDenied = defaultMcpDenied,\n    trustVerifiedHop = false,\n    verifiedHopMaxAgeMs,\n    recordDecisions,\n    enableRuntimeChallenge = true,\n    failOnError = 'open',\n    ...config\n  } = options;\n\n  // v2.5.0: fire-and-forget pre-fetch of well-known URLs\n  if (config.apiBaseUrl) {\n    prefetchWellKnown(config.apiBaseUrl).catch(() => {});\n  }\n\n  return async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): Promise<void> => {\n    try {\n      if (skip) return next();\n\n      const parsed = parseMcpJsonRpc(req.body);\n      if (!parsed) {\n        // Not a JSON-RPC body. Either the route is misconfigured or the\n        // client sent a non-MCP payload. We don't 400 here — let the actual\n        // MCP server handler render its own error so the middleware doesn't\n        // pre-empt valid framework error shapes.\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          // Round-10 (#49, O10): `unenforced` describes the GATE state, not\n          // the downstream response. Renamed from the ambiguous\n          // `pass-through` (which partners read as \"request succeeded\").\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'unenforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'non-jsonrpc-body');\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n      req.mcpRequest = parsed;\n\n      // ── Identity reconciliation (defect d) ─────────────────────────────\n      // Header value is the SDK-canonical slot; body slot exists for legacy\n      // hand-written tool callers and the MCP `_meta.astrasync.agentId`\n      // convention.\n      const headerRaw = req.headers['x-astra-id'] ?? req.headers['x-astra-agentid'];\n      const headerAstraId =\n        typeof headerRaw === 'string'\n          ? headerRaw\n          : Array.isArray(headerRaw)\n            ? headerRaw[0]\n            : undefined;\n      const bodyAstraId = parsed.agentIdFromBody;\n\n      let effectiveAstraId: string | undefined;\n      if (headerAstraId && bodyAstraId && headerAstraId !== bodyAstraId) {\n        if (onAgentIdMismatch === 'reject') {\n          const id = (req.body as Record<string, unknown>)?.id ?? null;\n          res.status(400).json({\n            jsonrpc: '2.0',\n            id,\n            error: {\n              code: -32602,\n              message: 'AGENT_ID_MISMATCH',\n              data: {\n                detail:\n                  'The agent id in the X-Astra-Id header disagrees with params._meta.astrasync.agentId / params.arguments.agent_id. Reconcile before calling the tool — see https://astrasync.ai/docs/mcp-integration#identity-reconciliation.',\n                headerAstraId,\n                bodyAstraId,\n              },\n            },\n          });\n          return;\n        }\n        effectiveAstraId = onAgentIdMismatch === 'prefer-header' ? headerAstraId : bodyAstraId;\n      } else {\n        effectiveAstraId = headerAstraId ?? bodyAstraId;\n      }\n\n      // ── Inner-hop dedupe (defect c) ────────────────────────────────────\n      // If a trusted upstream MCP hop already verified this exact ASTRA-id\n      // a few ms ago, we accept the marker and skip a redundant verify-access\n      // call. Only valid when the header is fresh AND matches the agent id\n      // we resolved above.\n      if (trustVerifiedHop && effectiveAstraId) {\n        const hopRaw = req.headers[MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER.toLowerCase()];\n        const hopValue =\n          typeof hopRaw === 'string' ? hopRaw : Array.isArray(hopRaw) ? hopRaw[0] : undefined;\n        const marker = parseVerifiedHop(hopValue);\n        if (\n          isVerifiedHopValidFor(marker, effectiveAstraId, {\n            ...(verifiedHopMaxAgeMs !== undefined ? { maxAgeMs: verifiedHopMaxAgeMs } : {}),\n          })\n        ) {\n          // Skip verify-access — pass straight through. Don't re-emit the\n          // header since the MCP framework will issue the response (the\n          // outer hop already tagged it for any further inner hops).\n          return next();\n        }\n      }\n\n      // ── Resolve gating ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n      const gateDecision = resolveGate(parsed, {\n        toolGates,\n        methodGates,\n      });\n\n      // ── Build verify-access request ────────────────────────────────────\n      // Round-13 (R13-5) — credentials extraction hoisted above the\n      // mcp-tier-none short-circuit (mirrors round-12 F9 express adapter\n      // restructure). The `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed` flag lets the\n      // caller turn unenforced tier-none calls into evaluated-not-enforced\n      // calls when credentials are present, so the agent verification\n      // result populates `req.agentVerification` for tier-aware handler\n      // rendering (e.g. anonymous vs verified MCP tool listings).\n      const credentials = extractCredentials(\n        req.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n        req.query as Record<string, string | undefined>\n      );\n      // Override the SDK's default credential extraction with the resolved\n      // ASTRA-id so the verify-access call sees the post-precedence value\n      // (defect d). When neither header nor body supplied an id, the SDK's\n      // anonymous-canonical-flow handles it.\n      if (effectiveAstraId) credentials.astraId = effectiveAstraId;\n\n      // Pass-through short-circuit. Default behaviour: skip verify-access for\n      // observe / handshake / introspection (must work for unregistered\n      // probes). With `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed: true` AND credentials\n      // present, fall through to verify-access for the audit trail; the\n      // post-verify gate-skipping branch below handles the rendering side.\n      // Round-12 F9 parity (closes the round-12 deferral).\n      const shouldEnforce = gateDecision.enforce;\n      if (!shouldEnforce && (!config.evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed || !credentials.astraId)) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          // Round-10 (#49, O10): `unenforced` describes the GATE state, not\n          // the downstream response.\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'unenforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'mcp-observe');\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // Per-tool gate config (purpose + action + resource overrides).\n      const gate = gateDecision.config;\n\n      const headerPurpose = readSingleHeader(req.headers['x-astra-purpose']);\n      const headerAction = readSingleHeader(req.headers['x-astra-action']);\n      const pdlss = mcpToPdlss(\n        parsed,\n        req.path,\n        headerPurpose,\n        headerAction,\n        gate ? { purpose: gate.purpose, action: gate.action, resource: gate.resource } : undefined\n      );\n\n      // Telemetry: debug log per resolution. Adoption tracking, support\n      // triage, and the `default_*` / `transport_layer` decay signals\n      // all read this. Both purpose and action emit their source so we\n      // can spot which integration path each partner is using.\n      if (config.debug) {\n        // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n        console.debug('[mcp-middleware] pdlss resolved', {\n          purpose_source: pdlss.purposeSource,\n          resolved_purpose: pdlss.purpose,\n          action_source: pdlss.actionSource,\n          resolved_action: pdlss.action,\n        });\n      }\n\n      // 3.2.0 — clear \"purpose required\" error. We only reach here on the\n      // ENFORCED path (the `!shouldEnforce` early-return is above). A gated\n      // tool call with no resolvable PDLSS purpose (none on the toolGate, no\n      // X-Astra-Purpose header, none in the body) would otherwise hit\n      // verify-access's generic \"Invalid request data\" → surface to the agent\n      // as an opaque `verify_access.api_error`. Fail fast with an actionable\n      // message instead (purpose is required post-vocabulary-unification).\n      if (!pdlss.purpose) {\n        const id = (req.body as Record<string, unknown>)?.id ?? null;\n        res.status(400).json({\n          jsonrpc: '2.0',\n          id,\n          error: {\n            code: -32602,\n            message: 'PDLSS_PURPOSE_REQUIRED',\n            data: {\n              dimension: 'pdlss.purpose',\n              detail:\n                'This tool is access-gated but the call declared no PDLSS purpose. Supply a bare-category purpose via the X-Astra-Purpose header or params._meta.astrasync.purpose, or have the merchant set the tool’s purpose in its toolGate config.',\n              resolvedAction: pdlss.action,\n            },\n          },\n        });\n        return;\n      }\n\n      const counterpartyUrl =\n        config.counterpartyUrl || `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}${req.path}`;\n      const shouldRecordDecisions = recordDecisions !== false;\n\n      const verificationRequest: VerificationRequest = {\n        credentials,\n        purpose: pdlss.purpose,\n        action: pdlss.action,\n        resource: pdlss.resource,\n        // Round-12 (F19): mark transport protocol separately from intent.\n        // The MCP middleware always sets this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers\n        // leave it unset (server-side default is 'rest').\n        invocationProtocol: 'mcp',\n        createSession: shouldRecordDecisions,\n        counterpartyUrl,\n        counterpartyType: config.counterpartyType || 'mcp_server',\n        enableRuntimeChallenge,\n        callerMetadata: {\n          sourceIp: req.ip,\n          userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] as string | undefined,\n          host: req.headers.host as string | undefined,\n          // Capture EVERY inbound header (parity with the express adapter —\n          // MCP-only merchants have no edge to do it upstream) plus the\n          // CDN-derived connection block. Local string work, secrets\n          // stripped; out of the verify cache key so it doesn't defeat\n          // caching.\n          observedMetadata: buildSdkObservedMetadata(req.headers),\n        },\n      };\n      let result = await verify(config, verificationRequest);\n\n      req.agentVerification = result;\n      let sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n      // 3.6.0 hold-and-poll (opt-in via stepUpMaxWaitMs) — see express.ts for\n      // the full rationale. On 'approved' the same request is re-verified\n      // once, cache-bypassed, so the backend redeems the single-use approval.\n      if (\n        config.stepUpMaxWaitMs !== undefined &&\n        result.policyAllowed &&\n        requiresHumanApproval(result) &&\n        result.stepUpApproval?.pollUrl\n      ) {\n        const outcome = await awaitStepUpApproval(config, result.stepUpApproval);\n        res.setHeader('X-Astra-Step-Up', outcome);\n        if (outcome === 'approved') {\n          result = await verify(config, verificationRequest, { bypassCache: true });\n          req.agentVerification = result;\n          sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n        } else {\n          result.stepUpOutcome = outcome;\n        }\n      }\n\n      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denied verifications short-circuit BEFORE the\n      // gate-level comparison. See express.ts for the full rationale —\n      // mirroring it here so the MCP path inherits the same belt-and-braces\n      // protection against access-level/help-payload conflation.\n      // 4.5.0: gate on the SERVER decision only (`policyAllowed`) — anonymous\n      // callers allowed by an audit/allow endpoint policy are honestly\n      // identity-unverified; see express.ts.\n      if (!result.policyAllowed) {\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n        }\n        dedupeFailures(result);\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // F2 direct-path fail-closed: a step-up / requires-approval outcome\n      // (policyAllowed:true, allowed-but-escalate) cannot be completed\n      // autonomously — deny and surface stepUpApproval polling info.\n      if (requiresHumanApproval(result)) {\n        annotateApprovalRequired(result);\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n        }\n        dedupeFailures(result);\n        onDenied(result, req, res);\n        return;\n      }\n\n      // Round-13 (R13-5): evaluation-without-enforcement parity with the\n      // express F9 adapter. When the route is `none` but we ran\n      // verify-access because `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed: true` AND\n      // credentials were present, skip the gates and call next() — the\n      // result is on `req.agentVerification` for the MCP handler to\n      // render tier-aware responses (e.g. anonymous vs verified\n      // tool-listing on the same `/mcp` endpoint).\n      if (!shouldEnforce) {\n        if (config.setPassThroughHeader) {\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Mode', 'enforced');\n          res.setHeader('X-Astra-Gateway-Reason', 'evaluated-not-enforced');\n        }\n        if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n          recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n        }\n        return next();\n      }\n\n      // The access decision is the server's (identityVerified / policyAllowed,\n      // denied above) — resting on a verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS\n      // match + trust score. The per-tool gate only decides WHETHER a tool is\n      // enforced at all (`shouldEnforce`, above); there is no client-side tier\n      // veto (the access-level band was removed in SDK 5.0.0).\n\n      // ── Tag the outbound response with X-Astra-Verified-Hop ────────────\n      // Inner-hop REST endpoints called by this tool can read the header\n      // and skip a duplicate verify-access. We set it on the response so\n      // downstream proxies see it; tools that perform fetch() to an inner\n      // hop should also forward it themselves (the MCP server framework\n      // controls outbound calls — out of scope here).\n      if (effectiveAstraId) {\n        res.setHeader(\n          MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n          serializeVerifiedHop({\n            astraId: effectiveAstraId,\n            ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}),\n            checkedAt: Date.now(),\n          })\n        );\n      }\n\n      if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {\n        recordDecision(config, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n      }\n      // v2.3.8 (defect #26): relay X-Astra-Unverified-Warning when the\n      // server returned an audit-mode advisory.\n      const enhancedResult = result as EnhancedVerificationResult;\n      if (enhancedResult.warningHeader) {\n        res.setHeader(enhancedResult.warningHeader.name, enhancedResult.warningHeader.value);\n      }\n      next();\n    } catch (error) {\n      // Audit F-A1-06: shadow-mode logging for fail-closed default migration.\n      // Mirror of the express adapter pattern. Default 'open' for backward\n      // compat in SDK 2.4.13; shadow logs let merchants grep correlationId\n      // for impact analysis before the default flips in a follow-up release.\n      const errorClass = error instanceof Error ? error.constructor.name : typeof error;\n      const correlationId =\n        (req.headers['x-request-id'] as string | undefined) ||\n        (req.headers['x-correlation-id'] as string | undefined) ||\n        `gen-${Date.now().toString(36)}-${Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 8)}`;\n      // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n      console.error('[VerificationGateway/MCP] Middleware error:', error);\n      // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n      console.warn(\n        `[SHADOW] would-have-denied: errorClass=${errorClass} route=${req.method}:${req.path} merchantId=${config.counterpartyId ?? 'unknown'} correlationId=${correlationId}`\n      );\n\n      if (failOnError === 'closed') {\n        const result: VerificationResult = {\n          identityVerified: false,\n          policyAllowed: false,\n          denialReasons: [`MCP middleware internal error: ${errorClass}`],\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'middleware.internal_error',\n              message: `Middleware threw ${errorClass} — failing closed`,\n            },\n          ],\n          verifiedAt: new Date(),\n          correlationId,\n        };\n        const catchUrls = config.apiBaseUrl\n          ? await getWellKnownUrls(config.apiBaseUrl).catch(() => undefined)\n          : undefined;\n        if (catchUrls) {\n          result.guidance = {\n            message: `Middleware threw ${errorClass} — failing closed`,\n            registrationUrl: catchUrls.registrationUrl,\n            documentationUrl: catchUrls.documentationUrl,\n          };\n        }\n        dedupeFailures(result);\n        return onDenied(result, req, res);\n      }\n\n      next();\n    }\n  };\n}\n\n// Re-export the helpers so consumers can mix-and-match (e.g. read the\n// verified-hop header themselves on a custom inner-hop handler).\nexport {\n  parseMcpJsonRpc,\n  mcpToPdlss,\n  mcpDefaultEnforced,\n  serializeVerifiedHop,\n  parseVerifiedHop,\n  isVerifiedHopValidFor,\n  MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER,\n};\nexport type { ParsedMcpRequest } from '../transport/mcp-server';\n"],"mappings":";AAkBO,IAAM,cAAc;;;ACDpB,IAAM,iBAAiB,iBAAiB,WAAW;AAO1D,SAAS,cAAc,aAAmD;AACxE,MAAI,CAAC,YAAa,QAAO,EAAE,cAAc,eAAe;AACxD,MAAI,uBAAuB,SAAS;AAClC,UAAM,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW;AACpC,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,YAAY,EAAG,MAAK,IAAI,cAAc,cAAc;AAClE,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;AAC9B,UAAMA,OAAM,YAAY,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,YAAY;AAC5E,WAAOA,OAAM,cAAc,CAAC,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC,cAAc,cAAc,CAAC;AAAA,EAC5E;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,YAAY;AACvF,SAAO,MAAM,cAAc,EAAE,cAAc,gBAAgB,GAAG,YAAY;AAC5E;AAEO,IAAM,WAAyB,CAAC,OAAO,SAC5C,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,SAAS,cAAc,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;;;ACf1D,SAAS,cAAc,OAA2B;AACvD,MAAI,SAAS,GAAI,QAAO;AACxB,MAAI,SAAS,GAAI,QAAO;AACxB,MAAI,SAAS,GAAI,QAAO;AACxB,SAAO;AACT;;;ACNA,IAAM,eAAe,KAAK,KAAK;AAE/B,IAAM,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAwB;AAC1C,IAAM,WAAW,oBAAI,IAA+C;AAEpE,SAAS,aAAa,YAA4B;AAGhD,QAAM,OAAO,WAAW,QAAQ,aAAa,EAAE;AAC/C,SAAO,GAAG,IAAI;AAChB;AAEA,eAAe,eAAe,YAAuD;AACnF,QAAM,MAAM,aAAa,UAAU;AACnC,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAAA,IACnC,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAAA,IACtC,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,GAAI;AAAA,EAClC,CAAC;AACD,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI;AAChB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,qEACS,SAAS,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,OAAQ,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAClC,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK,mBAAmB,CAAC,KAAK,oBAAoB,CAAC,KAAK,iBAAiB;AAC5E,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAMO,SAAS,kBAAkB,YAAuD;AACvF,QAAM,WAAW,SAAS,IAAI,UAAU;AACxC,MAAI,SAAU,QAAO;AAErB,QAAM,UAAU,eAAe,UAAU,EACtC,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS;AACd,UAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;AACrD,aAAS,OAAO,UAAU;AAC1B,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,CAAC,EACA,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ;AACd,aAAS,OAAO,UAAU;AAC1B,UAAM;AAAA,EACR,CAAC;AAEH,WAAS,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO;AAChC,SAAO;AACT;AAOA,eAAsB,iBAAiB,YAAuD;AAC5F,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU;AAElC,MAAI,OAAO;AACT,QAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,YAAY,cAAc;AAE/C,wBAAkB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,MAE1C,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AACA,WAAO,MAAM;AAAA,EACf;AAGA,QAAM,UAAU,SAAS,IAAI,UAAU;AACvC,MAAI,QAAS,QAAO;AAEpB,SAAO,kBAAkB,UAAU;AACrC;AAOO,SAAS,uBAAuB,YAA0D;AAC/F,SAAO,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU,GAAG;AAChC;;;AC1EA,IAAM,iBAAyC;AAAA,EAC7C,YAAY;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAMZ,OAAO;AACT;AAOA,IAAI,qBAAqB;AAQzB,IAAI,0BAA0B;AAE9B,eAAe,iBACb,YACA,OACA,YACA,QACe;AACf,uBAAqB;AACrB,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,WAAW,GAAG,UAAU;AAK9B,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,SAAS,UAAU,EAAE,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC;AAC5D,UAAM,cAAc,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,cAAc,KAAK;AAC5D,QAAI,YAAY,WAAW,WAAW,GAAG;AACvC,YAAM,UACJ,qCAAqC,UAAU,kCAAkC,WAAW;AAQ9F,UAAI,YAAY;AACd,cAAM,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,MAChD;AACA,cAAQ,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,2DAA2D;AAAA,IACpF,WAAW,OAAO;AAChB,cAAQ;AAAA,QACN,+CAA+C,UAAU,mBAAmB,WAAW;AAAA,MACzF;AAAA,IACF;AAKA,QAAI,QAAQ;AACV,YAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,UAAU,oCAAoC;AAAA,QAChF,SAAS,EAAE,eAAe,UAAU,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,MAC/C,CAAC;AACD,UAAI,UAAU,WAAW,KAAK;AAC5B,cAAM,OAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE;AAKrD,cAAM,UACJ,mFACI,KAAK,QAAQ,iBAAiB,KAAK,KAAK,WAAW,aAAa,yEAEnE,KAAK,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,SAAS,KAAK,MACrE;AACF,YAAI,YAAY;AACd,gBAAM,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,QAChD;AACA,gBAAQ,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MACvB,WAAW,UAAU,IAAI;AACvB,cAAM,OAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE;AAGrD,YAAI,OAAO,KAAK,iBAAiB,YAAY,KAAK,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACnE,kBAAQ;AAAA,YACN,qEAAqE,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,UAExF;AAAA,QACF,WAAW,OAAO;AAChB,kBAAQ,IAAI,iDAAiD;AAAA,QAC/D;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,QAAI,YAAY;AAGd,YAAM;AAAA,IACR;AACA,QAAI,OAAO;AACT,cAAQ,IAAI,2DAA2D,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,IACtF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAKA,IAAM,oBAAoB,oBAAI,IAA+D;AAwB7F,SAAS,YAAY,SAA8B,gBAAiC;AAClF,QAAM,IAAI,QAAQ;AAClB,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,EAAE,WAAW;AAAA,IACb,EAAE,UAAU;AAAA,IACZ,EAAE,OAAO;AAAA,IACT,QAAQ,WAAW;AAAA,IACnB,QAAQ,UAAU;AAAA,IAClB,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACxB,QAAQ,YAAY;AAAA,IACpB,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACxB,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC5B,QAAQ,YAAY;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAQpB,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAClB,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAAA,IAC3B,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC5B,QAAQ,oBAAoB,MAAM;AAAA,IAClC,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACzB,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAKzB,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC5B,QAAQ,sBAAsB;AAAA,IAC9B,QAAQ,yBAAyB,MAAM;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAMvC,QAAQ,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAAA,IACpC,QAAQ,gBAAgB,aAAa;AAAA,IACrC,QAAQ,gBAAgB,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACxC,QAAQ,gBAAgB,gBAAgB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAMxC,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACzB,QAAQ,qBAAqB;AAAA,EAC/B,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG;AACZ;AAKA,SAAS,gBACP,SACA,gBAC2B;AAC3B,QAAM,MAAM,YAAY,SAAS,cAAc;AAC/C,QAAM,SAAS,kBAAkB,IAAI,GAAG;AAExC,MAAI,UAAU,OAAO,YAAY,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AAC3C,WAAO,OAAO;AAAA,EAChB;AAEA,MAAI,QAAQ;AACV,sBAAkB,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,EAC9B;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAYA,IAAM,4BAA4B;AAElC,SAAS,YACP,SACA,QACA,eACA,gBACM;AACN,QAAM,aAAa,iBAAiB,gBAAgB,IAAI,gBAAgB;AACxE,QAAM,MAAM,YAAY,SAAS,cAAc;AAC/C,oBAAkB,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA,IACzB;AAAA,IACA,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,aAAa;AAAA,EACvC,CAAC;AACH;AAYO,SAAS,mBACd,SACA,OACkB;AAClB,QAAM,cAAgC,CAAC;AAKvC,QAAM,mBAAmB;AAKzB,QAAM,gBACJ,QAAQ,YAAY,KACpB,QAAQ,YAAY,KACpB,QAAQ,YAAY,KACpB,QAAQ,iBAAiB,KACzB,QAAQ,iBAAiB,KACzB,QAAQ,kBAAkB,KAC1B,QAAQ,kBAAkB,KAC1B,QAAQ,kBAAkB;AAC5B,MAAI,eAAe;AAIjB,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,aAAa,IACnC,cAAc,CAAC,IACf,OAAO,kBAAkB,WACvB,gBACA;AACN,QAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,iBAAiB,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG;AACzD,kBAAY,UAAU;AAAA,IACxB;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,QAAM,eAAe,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,WAAW;AACxF,MAAI,cAAc;AAChB,gBAAY,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,aAAa,CAAC,IAAI;AAAA,EACvE;AAKA,QAAM,aAAa,QAAQ,eAAe,KAAK,QAAQ,eAAe;AACtE,MAAI,YAAY;AACd,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI;AAC9D,QAAI,OAAO,cAAc,UAAU;AACjC,kBAAY,sBAAsB;AAClC,UAAI,UAAU,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACnC,oBAAY,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,MACrC;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,OAAO;AACT,QAAI,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC,YAAY,SAAS;AACzC,kBAAY,UAAU,MAAM;AAAA,IAC9B;AACA,QAAI,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC,YAAY,QAAQ;AACvC,kBAAY,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,IAC7B;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAgCA,SAAS,YAAY,MAAsD;AACzE,MAAI,CAAC,MAAM,YAAa,QAAO;AAC/B,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,IACf,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,IACnB,SACE;AAAA,EAIJ;AACF;AAUA,SAAS,uBACP,SACA,QACA,UAQI,CAAC,GACe;AACpB,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU;AACjC,QAAM,aAAa,WAAW;AAC9B,QAAM,cAAc,WAAW;AAC/B,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;AAErB,QAAM,WAAyB,cAC3B;AAAA,IACE,SACE;AAAA,IAEF,iBAAiB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,IAC1C,kBAAkB,QAAQ,aAAa,WAAW,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC5E,OAAO;AAAA,MACL;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,IACA,aACE;AAAA,IACE,SACE;AAAA,IACF,iBAAiB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,IAC1C,kBAAkB,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC5C,OAAO;AAAA,MACL;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,IACA;AAAA,IACE,SACE;AAAA,IACF,iBAAiB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,IAC1C,kBAAkB,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC5C,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAGL,GAAI,MAAM,cACN;AAAA,QACE,yEAAyE,KAAK,WAAW;AAAA,MAC3F,IACA,CAAC;AAAA,MACL;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,IACA,GAAI,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,EACpD;AAEN,SAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAIL,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAClB,eAAe;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,IACA,eAAe,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,qCAAqC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAKzE,UAAU,cACN;AAAA,MACE;AAAA,QACE,WAAW;AAAA,QACX,SAAS,UAAU;AAAA,QACnB,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,MACrB;AAAA,IACF,IACA,aACE;AAAA,MACE;AAAA,QACE,WAAW;AAAA,QACX,SAAS,UAAU;AAAA,QACnB,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,MACrB;AAAA,IACF,IACA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAGN,GAAI,eAAe,EAAE,eAAe,KAAK;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAKzC,GAAI,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,IACpC,eAAe,QAAQ;AAAA,IACvB,WAAW,QAAQ;AAAA,IACnB,YAAY,oBAAI,KAAK;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAKA,eAAe,oBACb,QACA,SA+FC;AACD,QAAM,EAAE,aAAa,GAAG,YAAY,IAAI;AAIxC,QAAM,OAAgC;AAAA,IACpC,GAAI,YAAY,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC1D,GAAI,YAAY,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC5D;AAGA,MAAI,YAAY,OAAQ,MAAK,SAAS,YAAY;AAClD,MAAI,YAAY,aAAc,MAAK,eAAe,YAAY;AAC9D,MAAI,YAAY,SAAU,MAAK,WAAW,YAAY;AACtD,MAAI,YAAY,aAAc,MAAK,eAAe,YAAY;AAC9D,MAAI,YAAY,iBAAkB,MAAK,mBAAmB,YAAY;AACtE,MAAI,YAAY,SAAU,MAAK,WAAW,YAAY;AACtD,MAAI,YAAY,kBAAmB,MAAK,oBAAoB,YAAY;AACxE,MAAI,YAAY,cAAe,MAAK,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAChE,MAAI,YAAY,kBAAkB,OAAW,MAAK,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAE9E,MAAI,YAAY;AACd,SAAK,yBAAyB,YAAY;AAC5C,MAAI,YAAY,cAAe,MAAK,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAChE,MAAI,YAAY,iBAAkB,MAAK,mBAAmB,YAAY;AACtE,MAAI,YAAY,iBAAkB,MAAK,mBAAmB,YAAY;AACtE,MAAI,YAAY,gBAAiB,MAAK,kBAAkB,YAAY;AACpE,MAAI,OAAO,eAAgB,MAAK,iBAAiB,OAAO;AACxD,MAAI,YAAY;AACd,SAAK,0BAA0B,YAAY;AAG7C,MAAI,YAAY,mBAAoB,MAAK,qBAAqB,YAAY;AAG1E,MAAI,YAAY,cAAe,MAAK,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAGhE,MAAI,YAAY,kBAAmB,MAAK,oBAAoB,YAAY;AAExE,MAAI,YAAY,cAAe,MAAK,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAGhE,MAAI,YAAY,WAAY,MAAK,aAAa,YAAY;AAI1D,MAAI,YAAY,kBAAmB,MAAK,oBAAoB,YAAY;AAIxE,MAAI,YAAY,UAAW,MAAK,YAAY,YAAY;AACxD,MAAI,YAAY,iBAAkB,MAAK,mBAAmB,YAAY;AAStE,OAAK,aAAa;AAIlB,MAAI,YAAY,kBAAkB,YAAY,YAAY,YAAY,WAAW;AAC/E,UAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MACX,GAAI,YAAY,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,YAAY,SAAS;AAAA,MAC7D,GAAI,YAAY,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,MAChE,GAAG,YAAY;AAAA,IACjB;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAG,MAAK,iBAAiB;AAAA,EAC1D;AAGA,QAAM,UAAkC;AAAA,IACtC,gBAAgB;AAAA,IAChB,GAAG,OAAO;AAAA,EACZ;AAcA,MAAI,OAAO,QAAQ;AACjB,YAAQ,eAAe,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM;AAElD,YAAQ,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,EAChC;AAEA,MAAI;AAMF,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,UAAU,yBAAyB;AAAA,MAC3E,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,MACzB,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,OAAO,mBAAmB,GAAM;AAAA,IAC9D,CAAC;AAED,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAMjC,QAAI,SAAS,WAAW,KAAK;AAC3B,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAS;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,QAGT,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM,cAAc,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,QAClE,QAAQ;AAAA,UACN,SAAS;AAAA,UACT,QAAQ;AAAA,UACR,UAAU;AAAA,YACR;AAAA,cACE,WAAW;AAAA,cACX,SACE,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,WAAW,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,cACrD,UACE,OAAO,MAAM,aAAa,WACtB,KAAK,WACL;AAAA,YACR;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,QAAI,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI;AAOhB,UAAI,SAAS,WAAW,KAAK;AAC3B,eAAO;AAAA,UACL,SAAS;AAAA,UACT,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,UACrC,WAAW;AAAA,UACX,eAAe,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,WAAW,KAAK,OAAO;AAAA,UAC5D,aACE,MAAM,eAAe,OAAO,KAAK,gBAAgB,WAC5C,KAAK,cACN;AAAA,UACN,eAAe,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,WAAW,KAAK,gBAAgB;AAAA,UAC9E,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM,cAAc,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,QACpE;AAAA,MACF;AAIA,aAAO;AAAA,QACL,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS,gBAAgB,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,QACpE,eAAe,OAAO,MAAM,kBAAkB,WAAW,KAAK,gBAAgB;AAAA,QAC9E,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM,cAAc,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY;AAAA,MACpE;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,SAAS,OAAO;AACd,UAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU;AACzD,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,SAAS;AAAA,MACT,OAAO,qCAAqC,OAAO;AAAA,IACrD;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAmBA,eAAsB,OACpB,QACA,SACA,SAC6B;AAC7B,QAAM,eAAe,EAAE,GAAG,gBAAgB,GAAG,OAAO;AAIpD,QAAM,OAAO,aAAa,aACtB,uBAAuB,aAAa,UAAU,IAC9C;AAOJ,MAAI,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,aAAa,qBAAqB,aAAa,YAAY;AACrF,QAAI,aAAa,YAAY;AAC3B,YAAM;AAAA,QACJ,aAAa;AAAA,QACb,aAAa;AAAA,QACb;AAAA,QACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF,OAAO;AACL,WAAK;AAAA,QACH,aAAa;AAAA,QACb,aAAa;AAAA,QACb;AAAA,QACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MACE,CAAC,4BACA,OAAO,kBAAkB,UAAa,OAAO,yBAAyB,SACvE;AACA,8BAA0B;AAC1B,YAAQ;AAAA,MACN;AAAA,IAIF;AAAA,EACF;AAWA,MAAI,aAAa,aAAa,KAAK,CAAC,SAAS,aAAa;AACxD,UAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB,SAAS,aAAa,cAAc;AACnE,QAAI,QAAQ;AACV,UAAI,aAAa,OAAO;AACtB,gBAAQ,IAAI,+CAA+C;AAAA,MAC7D;AAOA,YAAM,MAA0B,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO;AAC5C,UAAI,QAAQ,WAAW;AACrB,YAAI,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,MAC1B,OAAO;AACL,eAAO,IAAI;AAAA,MACb;AACA,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,QAAM,kBAAkB,EAAE,GAAG,QAAQ;AACrC,MAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,mBAAmB,aAAa,iBAAiB;AACpE,oBAAgB,kBAAkB,aAAa;AAAA,EACjD;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,oBAAoB,aAAa,kBAAkB;AACtE,oBAAgB,mBAAmB,aAAa;AAAA,EAClD;AAGA,MAAI,aAAa,OAAO;AACtB,YAAQ,IAAI,iDAAiD;AAAA,EAC/D;AAEA,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,oBAAoB,cAAc,eAAe;AAK3E,QAAM,yBAA0B,YAAwC;AACxE,QAAM,sBACJ,MAAM,QAAQ,sBAAsB,KAAK,uBAAuB,SAAS,IACpE,yBACD;AAGN,MAAI,CAAC,YAAY,SAAS;AAQxB,WAAO,uBAAuB,cAAc,YAAY,OAAO;AAAA,MAC7D,QAAQ,YAAY,YAAY,uBAAuB;AAAA,MACvD,eAAgB,YAA2C;AAAA,MAC3D,WAAY,YAAuC;AAAA,MACnD,aAAa,YAAY;AAAA,MACzB;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AAGA,MAAI,CAAC,YAAY,QAAQ,SAAS;AAIhC,UAAM,qBAAsB,YAAY,QACpC;AAMJ,UAAM,wBACH,YAAY,qBAA8D,eAC3E;AACF,UAAMC,UAAqC;AAAA,MACzC,kBAAkB;AAAA,MAClB,eAAe;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAIf,eACE,wBACC,sBAAsB,mBAAmB,SAAS,IAC/C,mBAAmB,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,IACvC,YAAY,QAAQ,SAClB,CAAC,YAAY,OAAO,MAAM,IAC1B,CAAC,eAAe;AAAA,MACxB,UAAU;AAAA,MACV,gBAAgB,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,MACpC,kBAAkB,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,MACtC,UAAU;AAAA,QACR,SAAS,YAAY,QAAQ,UAAU;AAAA,QACvC,iBAAiB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,QAC1C,kBAAkB,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,QAG5C,GAAI,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,MACpD;AAAA,MACA,YAAY,oBAAI,KAAK;AAAA;AAAA,MAErB,WAAY,YAAwC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAGpD,eAAgB,YAAwC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAGxD,WAAY,YAAwC;AAAA,MACpD,gBAAiB,YACd;AAAA,MACH,uBAAwB,YAAwC;AAAA,MAGhE,gBAAiB,YAAwC;AAAA,MAGzD,YAAa,YAAwC;AAAA,MAGrD,mBAAoB,YAAwC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAK5D,iBAAkB,YAAwC;AAAA;AAAA,MAI1D,YAAa,YAAwC;AAAA,IACvD;AAEA,WAAOA;AAAA,EACT;AAGA,QAAM,QAAmC,YAAY,QACjD;AAAA,IACE,SAAS,YAAY,MAAM;AAAA,IAC3B,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM;AAAA,IACxB,YAAY,YAAY,MAAM;AAAA,IAC9B,YAAY,cAAc,YAAY,MAAM,UAAU;AAAA,IACtD,oBAAoB,YAAY,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAAA,IAC3D,QAAQ,YAAY,MAAM;AAAA,EAC5B,IACA;AAEJ,QAAM,YAA2C,YAAY,YACzD;AAAA,IACE,UAAU,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,IAChC,MAAM,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,IAC5B,YAAY,YAAY,UAAU,cAAc;AAAA,IAChD,UAAU,YAAY,UAAU;AAAA,EAClC,IACA;AAEJ,QAAM,eAAiD,YAAY,eAC/D;AAAA,IACE,MAAM,YAAY,aAAa;AAAA,IAC/B,UAAU,YAAY,aAAa;AAAA,IACnC,YAAY,YAAY,aAAa;AAAA,EACvC,IACA;AAKJ,QAAM,sBAAsB,YAAY;AAExC,QAAM,SAAqC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IASzC,kBACG,YAAY,qBAA8D,eAC3E;AAAA,IACF,eAAe;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,eAAe,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,IACnC;AAAA,IACA,gBAAgB,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,IACpC,kBAAkB,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,IACtC,YAAY,oBAAI,KAAK;AAAA,IACrB,UAAU,aAAa;AAAA;AAAA,IAEvB,WAAY,YAAwC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAGpD,eAAgB,YAAwC;AAAA;AAAA,IAExD,WAAY,YAAwC;AAAA,IACpD,kBAAmB,YAAwC;AAAA,IAG3D,eAAgB,YAAwC;AAAA,IAGxD,gBAAiB,YACd;AAAA,IACH,uBAAwB,YAAwC;AAAA,IAGhE,eAAgB,YAAwC;AAAA,IAGxD,gBAAiB,YAAwC;AAAA,IAGzD,YAAa,YAAwC;AAAA,IAGrD,mBAAoB,YAAwC;AAAA,IAG5D,iBAAkB,YAAwC;AAAA;AAAA,IAI1D,YAAa,YAAwC;AAAA,EACvD;AAGA,MAAI,OAAO,mBAAmB,QAAQ;AAKpC,WAAO,gBAAgB;AAGvB,WAAO,gBAAgB,uBACrB,OAAO,yBAAyB,CAAC,2CAA2C;AAC9E,WAAO,WAAW,OAAO,mBACrB;AAAA,MACE,SAAS,wBAAwB,OAAO,iBAAiB,UAAU,0BAA0B;AAAA,MAC7F,iBAAiB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,MAC1C,kBAAkB,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC9C,IACA;AAAA,MACE,SAAS,OAAO,wBAAwB,CAAC,KAAK;AAAA,MAC9C,iBAAiB,MAAM,mBAAmB;AAAA,MAC1C,kBAAkB,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA,IAC9C;AAAA,EACN,WAAW,OAAO,mBAAmB,oBAAoB;AAGvD,WAAO,iBAAiB;AACxB,WAAO,gBAAgB,uBACrB,OAAO,yBAAyB,CAAC,+BAA+B;AAAA,EACpE;AAOA,QAAM,YACJ,OAAO,mBAAmB,QAC1B,OAAO,qBAAqB,QAC5B,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAC5B,MAAI,aAAa,aAAa,KAAK,OAAO,mBAAmB,UAAU,CAAC,WAAW;AACjF,gBAAY,SAAS,QAAQ,aAAa,UAAU,aAAa,cAAc;AAAA,EACjF;AAEA,SAAO;AACT;AAMA,eAAsB,eACpB,QACA,WACA,UACA,QACe;AACf,QAAM,UAAkC,EAAE,gBAAgB,mBAAmB;AAC7E,MAAI,OAAO,QAAQ;AACjB,YAAQ,eAAe,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,MAAM;AAClD,YAAQ,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,EAChC;AAEA,QAAM,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,UAAU,yBAAyB,SAAS,aAAa;AAAA,IAChF,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,UAAU,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EAC3C,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,EAEf,CAAC;AACH;;;AChnCO,IAAM,yBAAyB;AAuEtC,IAAM,sBAAsB,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EAClC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA,EAEA;AACF,CAAC;AAMD,IAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC,gBAAgB,QAAQ,MAAM;AAM9D,IAAM,0BAA0B,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EACtC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AAOD,SAAS,kBAAkB,MAAuB;AAChD,SAAO,SAAS,eAAe,KAAK,SAAS,YAAY,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAC9F;AAOA,IAAM,wBAAwB,oBAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EACpC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF,CAAC;AAID,IAAM,2BAA2B;AAAA,EAC/B;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAOA,IAAM,sBAAsB;AAAA,EAC1B;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAGO,IAAM,cAAc;AACpB,IAAM,yBAAyB;AAC/B,IAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK;AAEpC,SAAS,WAAW,GAAmB;AAErC,MAAI,QAAQ;AACZ,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK;AACjC,UAAM,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;AAC3B,QAAI,OAAO,IAAM,UAAS;AAAA,aACjB,OAAO,KAAO,UAAS;AAAA,aACvB,QAAQ,SAAU,QAAQ,OAAQ;AACzC,eAAS;AACT;AAAA,IACF,MAAO,UAAS;AAAA,EAClB;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAQO,SAAS,oBAAoB,UAAsC;AACxE,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAK;AAC1B,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;AAClC,MAAI,WAAW,GAAG;AAChB,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ,EAAE,YAAY;AACpD,QAAI,WAAW,YAAY,WAAW,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS;AACnE,cAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK;AAAA,IACzC;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,YAAY;AAChC,aAAW,UAAU,qBAAqB;AACxC,QAAI,MAAM,WAAW,MAAM,GAAG;AAE5B,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,MAAuB;AAC7C,MAAI,oBAAoB,IAAI,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AAC1C,MAAI,uBAAuB,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AACnE,MAAI,kBAAkB,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AACpC,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,iBAAiB,MAAuB;AAC/C,MAAI,sBAAsB,IAAI,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AAC5C,SAAO,yBAAyB,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;AAChE;AAWO,SAAS,gBACd,KACuB;AACvB,QAAM,UAAkC,CAAC;AACzC,QAAM,kBAA0C,CAAC;AACjD,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,aAAa;AACjB,MAAI,QAAQ;AAEZ,MAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,QAAQ;AAE3B,aAAW,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,GAAG;AACtC,QAAI,SAAS,YAAa;AAC1B,UAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY;AACjC,UAAM,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO;AAC5B,QAAI,aAAa,OAAW;AAC5B,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ;AAG9E,QAAI,wBAAwB,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG;AACrC,YAAM,MAAM,oBAAoB,MAAM;AACtC,UAAI,OAAO,CAAC,aAAc,gBAAe;AACzC;AAAA,IACF;AAIA,QAAI,SAAS,UAAU;AACrB,oBAAc,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,IACrE;AAGA,QAAI,eAAe,IAAI,EAAG;AAG1B,QAAI,QAAQ;AACZ,QAAI,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,wBAAwB;AAC9C,cAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,sBAAsB;AAAA,IAC/C;AACA,UAAM,aAAa,WAAW,IAAI,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK;AACtD,QAAI,aAAa,aAAa,gBAAiB;AAC/C,kBAAc;AACd;AACA,YAAQ,IAAI,IAAI;AAChB,QAAI,iBAAiB,IAAI,EAAG,iBAAgB,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,EACtD;AAEA,QAAM,SAAgC,EAAE,QAAQ;AAChD,MAAI,aAAc,QAAO,eAAe;AACxC,MAAI,OAAO,KAAK,eAAe,EAAE,SAAS,EAAG,QAAO,kBAAkB;AACtE,MAAI,gBAAgB,OAAW,QAAO,cAAc;AACpD,SAAO;AACT;AAwBA,IAAM,4BACJ;AAAA,EACE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,oBAAoB,oBAAoB,kBAAkB,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,EAC9E;AAAA,IACE;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,gBAAgB,uBAAuB,6BAA6B,oBAAoB;AAAA,EAC3F;AAAA,EACA,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,8BAA8B,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAAA,EAC7E,CAAC,qBAAqB,CAAC,uCAAuC,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/D,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,oBAAoB,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAAA,EACvD,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,wBAAwB,4BAA4B,CAAC;AAAA,EACnE,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,yBAAyB,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAAA,EACtE,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,2BAA2B,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAAA,EAC3E,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAAA,EACjC,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAAA,EACxC,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAAA,EAClD,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,wBAAwB,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAAA,EACpE,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,8BAA8B,CAAC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAM9C,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,eAAe,mCAAmC,CAAC;AAAA,EACvE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,mCAAmC,CAAC;AAAA;AAAA,EAEvD,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC;AAAA,EAClD,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC;AACpD;AAOK,IAAM,6BAA6B;AAgCnC,SAAS,4BACd,SACoC;AACpC,MAAI,CAAC,QAAS,QAAO;AACrB,QAAM,QAAgC,CAAC;AACvC,aAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG;AACvC,UAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC1B,QAAI,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS,EAAG,OAAM,KAAK,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI;AAAA,EACjF;AAEA,QAAM,aAAqC,CAAC;AAC5C,aAAW,CAAC,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,2BAA2B;AACtD,eAAW,UAAU,SAAS;AAC5B,YAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,KAAK;AAClC,UAAI,OAAO;AACT,mBAAW,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,0BAA0B;AAC3D;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAKA;AACE,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B,GAAG,KAAK;AACtD,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,MAAM,SAAS;AACvC,QAAI,UAAW,YAAW,aAAa,UAAU,CAAC;AAClD,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW,MAAM,KAAM,YAAW,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,EACtE;AAEA,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI;AAClB,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB;AACnC,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK;AACxC,QAAI,OAAQ,YAAW,KAAK;AAAA,EAC9B;AAKA,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW;AACzB,UAAM,SAAS,WAAW,YAAY,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAClD,QAAI,OAAQ,YAAW,YAAY;AAAA,EACrC;AAEA,SAAO,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,aAAa;AAC3D;AAaO,SAAS,yBACd,YACkB;AAClB,QAAM,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,iBAAiB,YAAY,IAAI,gBAAgB,UAAU;AAC1F,QAAM,OAA+B,CAAC;AACtC,MAAI,YAAY;AACd,eAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,GAAG;AAC1C,YAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,IAAI;AAC7B,UAAI,UAAU,OAAW;AACzB,WAAK,KAAK,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACnF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,aAAa,4BAA4B,IAAI;AACnD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,GAAI,gBAAgB,EAAE,aAAa;AAAA,IACnC,GAAI,mBAAmB,EAAE,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACzC,GAAI,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW;AAAA,IAC/B,GAAI,gBAAgB,UAAa,EAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAC/C,eAAe;AAAA,EACjB;AACF;;;AC1cA,IAAM,kBACJ;AAGK,SAAS,sBAAsB,QAAqC;AACzE,SAAO,OAAO,mBAAmB,QAAQ,OAAO,qBAAqB;AACvE;AAOO,SAAS,yBAAyB,QAAkC;AACzE,SAAO,WAAW;AAAA,IAChB,GAAI,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC;AAAA,IACxB,EAAE,WAAW,qCAAqC,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC7E;AACA,SAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,iBAAiB,GAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAE;AAC1E;;;ACnCA,IAAM,2BAA2B;AACjC,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAC7B,IAAM,uBAAuB,IAAI,KAAK;AACtC,IAAM,kBAAkB;AACxB,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAMhC,SAAS,eAAe,QAAuB,SAAyB;AACtE,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AACvC,QAAM,UAAU,OAAO,cAAc,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,EAAE;AAChE,SAAO,SAAS;AAClB;AAOA,eAAsB,iBACpB,QACA,UACsC;AACtC,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,QAAS,QAAO;AAC9B,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,SAAS,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,MACnE,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,uBAAuB;AAAA,IACrD,CAAC;AACD,QAAI,CAAC,IAAI,GAAI,QAAO;AACpB,UAAM,OAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK;AAI7B,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM;AACnB,UAAM,SACJ,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS,WAAY,KAAiC,SAAS,MAAM;AACtF,WAAO,OAAO,WAAW,WAAY,SAAkC;AAAA,EACzE,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,gBAAgB,QAAuB,UAAsC;AACpF,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACrB,QAAM,UAAU,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAC1C,MAAI,UAAU,EAAG,QAAO,MAAM;AAI9B,MAAI,SAAS,WAAW;AACtB,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS;AAC5C,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,MAAM,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,EAC5D;AACA,SAAO,MAAM;AACf;AAEA,SAAS,MAAM,IAA2B;AACxC,SAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,YAAY,WAAW,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;AACzD;AAUA,eAAsB,oBACpB,QACA,UACwB;AACxB,QAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB,QAAQ,QAAQ;AACjD,QAAM,eAAe,KAAK;AAAA,IACxB;AAAA,IACA,OAAO,wBAAwB;AAAA,EACjC;AAEA,SAAO,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,UAAU;AAC5B,UAAM,SAAS,MAAM,iBAAiB,QAAQ,QAAQ;AACtD,QAAI,UAAU,WAAW,WAAW;AAClC,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AACA,UAAM,YAAY,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AACtC,QAAI,aAAa,EAAG;AACpB,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,cAAc,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/C;AACA,SAAO;AACT;;;AC3FO,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAGhC,IAAM,8BAA8B;AAQpC,SAAS,qBAAqB,QAAmC;AACtE,SAAO,GAAG,OAAO,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,aAAa,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS;AACxE;AAEO,SAAS,iBAAiB,OAA4D;AAC3F,MAAI,CAAC,MAAO,QAAO;AACnB,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG;AAC7B,MAAI,MAAM,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;AAC/B,QAAM,CAAC,SAAS,WAAW,YAAY,IAAI;AAC3C,MAAI,CAAC,QAAS,QAAO;AACrB,QAAM,YAAY,OAAO,YAAY;AACrC,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS,KAAK,aAAa,EAAG,QAAO;AAC1D,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,GAAI,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAOO,SAAS,sBACd,QACA,iBACA,OAA4C,CAAC,GACpC;AACT,MAAI,CAAC,OAAQ,QAAO;AACpB,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,gBAAiB,QAAO;AAC/C,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,YAAY;AAChC,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI;AACjC,SAAO,MAAM,OAAO,aAAa,UAAU,OAAO,OAAO;AAC3D;;;ACkCO,SAAS,gBAAgB,MAAwC;AACtE,MAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AACrE,QAAM,MAAM;AACZ,MAAI,IAAI,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI,YAAY,MAAO,QAAO;AAC3D,QAAM,SAAS,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,WAAW,IAAI,SAAS;AAC7D,MAAI,CAAC,OAAQ,QAAO;AACpB,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI;AAGnB,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,WAAW,gBAAgB,UAAU,OAAO,OAAO,SAAS,UAAU;AACxE,eAAW,OAAO;AAAA,EACpB;AAGA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,WAAW,gBAAgB,UAAU,OAAO,OAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU;AACnF,sBAAkB,OAAO;AAAA,EAC3B;AAEA,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;AACrB,QAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAC5B,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;AAMrB,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,iBAAiB,OAAO,cAAc,YAAY,UAAU;AAC9D,sBAAkB,cAAc;AAAA,EAClC,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,aAAa,UAAU;AACpD,sBAAkB,KAAK;AAAA,EACzB;AAcA,QAAM,oBAAoB,mBAAmB,eAAe,MAAM,SAAS;AAC3E,QAAM,mBAAmB,mBAAmB,eAAe,MAAM,QAAQ;AAEzE,QAAM,eAAe,WAAW;AAChC,QAAM,aAAa,WAAW;AAC9B,QAAM,kBACJ,WAAW,gBACX,WAAW,kBACX,WAAW,oBACX,WAAW,UACX,WAAW;AAEb,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,GAAI,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/B,GAAI,kBAAkB,EAAE,gBAAgB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC7C,GAAI,kBAAkB,EAAE,gBAAgB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC7C,GAAI,kBAAkB,QAAQ,EAAE,iBAAiB,kBAAkB,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC9E,GAAI,kBAAkB,SAAS,EAAE,uBAAuB,kBAAkB,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACtF,GAAI,iBAAiB,QAAQ,EAAE,gBAAgB,iBAAiB,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC3E,GAAI,iBAAiB,SAAS,EAAE,sBAAsB,iBAAiB,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACnF;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAiBA,SAAS,mBACP,eACA,MACA,KAC6E;AAC7E,MAAI,iBAAiB,OAAO,cAAc,GAAG,MAAM,UAAU;AAC3D,WAAO,EAAE,OAAO,cAAc,GAAG,GAAa,QAAQ,OAAO;AAAA,EAC/D;AACA,MAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,UAAU;AACzC,WAAO,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,GAAa,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAAA,EAC/D;AACA,SAAO,EAAE,OAAO,QAAW,QAAQ,OAAU;AAC/C;AAuDO,SAAS,WACd,QACA,aACA,eACA,cACA,UACiB;AACjB,QAAM,WAAW,UAAU,YAAY;AAEvC,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,UAAU,YAAY,QAAW;AACnC,cAAU,SAAS;AACnB,oBAAgB;AAAA,EAClB,WAAW,eAAe;AACxB,cAAU;AACV,oBAAgB;AAAA,EAClB,WAAW,OAAO,mBAAmB,OAAO,uBAAuB;AACjE,cAAU,OAAO;AACjB,oBAAgB,OAAO;AAAA,EACzB,OAAO;AACL,cAAU;AACV,oBAAgB;AAAA,EAClB;AAEA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,UAAU,WAAW,QAAW;AAClC,aAAS,SAAS;AAClB,mBAAe;AAAA,EACjB,WAAW,cAAc;AACvB,aAAS;AACT,mBAAe;AAAA,EACjB,WAAW,OAAO,kBAAkB,OAAO,sBAAsB;AAC/D,aAAS,OAAO;AAChB,mBAAe,OAAO;AAAA,EACxB,WAAW,OAAO,WAAW,cAAc;AAMzC,aAAS;AACT,mBAAe;AAAA,EACjB,OAAO;AACL,aAAS,OAAO,WAAW,GAAG,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;AAC1E,mBAAe;AAAA,EACjB;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU,eAAe,aAAa;AAClE;AAeO,SAAS,mBAAmB,QAAmC;AACpE,MAAI,OAAO,gBAAgB,OAAO,WAAW,4BAA6B,QAAO;AACjF,MAAI,OAAO,gBAAiB,QAAO;AACnC,SAAO;AACT;;;ACtFA,SAAS,iBAAiB,OAA0D;AAClF,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AACtC,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG,QAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AACxC,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,QAAkC;AACxD,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACjD,UAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAY;AAC7B,WAAO,WAAW,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM;AAC9C,YAAM,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,IAAK,EAA4B,YAAY,EAAE;AACtF,UAAI,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO;AAC1B,WAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AACZ,aAAO;AAAA,IACT,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,OAAO,cAAc,SAAS,GAAG;AAC3D,WAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,aAAa,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1D;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,iBAAiB,QAA4B,KAAc,KAAqB;AAEvF,QAAM,KAAM,IAAI,MAA8C,MAAM;AAKpE,MAAI,OAAO,eAAe;AACxB,QAAI,UAAU,wBAAwB,UAAU;AAChD,QAAI,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK;AAAA,MACnB,SAAS;AAAA,MACT;AAAA,MACA,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA,QAEL,MAAM;AAAA,QACN,SACE,OAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK;AAAA,QAC/B,MAAM;AAAA,UACJ,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,UACjB,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,UACjB,eAAe,OAAO;AAAA,QACxB;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AACD;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,SAAS,CAAC,OAAO,mBAAmB,MAAM;AAEhD,MAAI,UAAU,wBAAwB,UAAU;AAEhD,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,KAAK;AAAA,IACtB,SAAS;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,IACA,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAKL,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,mBAAmB,QAAS;AAAA,MAC1C,SAAS,OAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK;AAAA,MACtC,MAAM;AAAA,QACJ,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA,QAEjB,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,QACjB,eAAe,OAAO;AAAA,QACtB,gBAAgB,OAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,QAGvB,GAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,EAAE,eAAe,OAAO,cAAc;AAAA,MACpE;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AACH;AAiBA,SAAS,YACP,QACA,MAQA;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU;AACpB,UAAM,aAAa,KAAK,cAAc,OAAO,MAAM;AACnD,QAAI,eAAe,QAAW;AAC5B,aAAO,eAAe,YAClB,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,aAAa,IACvC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,QAAQ,aAAa;AAAA,IAChE;AAGA,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,oBAAoB;AAAA,EACvD;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY,OAAO,QAAQ;AACjD,MAAI,aAAa,QAAW;AAC1B,WAAO,aAAa,YAChB,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,IACrC,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,QAAQ,WAAW;AAAA,EAC5D;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS,mBAAmB,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ,OAAO;AAC/D;AAMO,SAAS,oBAAoB,SAA+C;AACjF,QAAM;AAAA,IACJ;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,oBAAoB;AAAA,IACpB,OAAO;AAAA,IACP,WAAW;AAAA,IACX,mBAAmB;AAAA,IACnB;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,yBAAyB;AAAA,IACzB,cAAc;AAAA,IACd,GAAG;AAAA,EACL,IAAI;AAGJ,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY;AACrB,sBAAkB,OAAO,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,IAAC,CAAC;AAAA,EACrD;AAEA,SAAO,OAAO,KAAc,KAAe,SAAsC;AAC/E,QAAI;AACF,UAAI,KAAM,QAAO,KAAK;AAEtB,YAAM,SAAS,gBAAgB,IAAI,IAAI;AACvC,UAAI,CAAC,QAAQ;AAKX,YAAI,OAAO,sBAAsB;AAI/B,cAAI,UAAU,wBAAwB,YAAY;AAClD,cAAI,UAAU,0BAA0B,kBAAkB;AAAA,QAC5D;AACA,eAAO,KAAK;AAAA,MACd;AACA,UAAI,aAAa;AAMjB,YAAM,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,KAAK,IAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAC5E,YAAM,gBACJ,OAAO,cAAc,WACjB,YACA,MAAM,QAAQ,SAAS,IACrB,UAAU,CAAC,IACX;AACR,YAAM,cAAc,OAAO;AAE3B,UAAI;AACJ,UAAI,iBAAiB,eAAe,kBAAkB,aAAa;AACjE,YAAI,sBAAsB,UAAU;AAClC,gBAAM,KAAM,IAAI,MAAkC,MAAM;AACxD,cAAI,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK;AAAA,YACnB,SAAS;AAAA,YACT;AAAA,YACA,OAAO;AAAA,cACL,MAAM;AAAA,cACN,SAAS;AAAA,cACT,MAAM;AAAA,gBACJ,QACE;AAAA,gBACF;AAAA,gBACA;AAAA,cACF;AAAA,YACF;AAAA,UACF,CAAC;AACD;AAAA,QACF;AACA,2BAAmB,sBAAsB,kBAAkB,gBAAgB;AAAA,MAC7E,OAAO;AACL,2BAAmB,iBAAiB;AAAA,MACtC;AAOA,UAAI,oBAAoB,kBAAkB;AACxC,cAAM,SAAS,IAAI,QAAQ,wBAAwB,YAAY,CAAC;AAChE,cAAM,WACJ,OAAO,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI;AAC5E,cAAM,SAAS,iBAAiB,QAAQ;AACxC,YACE,sBAAsB,QAAQ,kBAAkB;AAAA,UAC9C,GAAI,wBAAwB,SAAY,EAAE,UAAU,oBAAoB,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,QAC/E,CAAC,GACD;AAIA,iBAAO,KAAK;AAAA,QACd;AAAA,MACF;AAGA,YAAM,eAAe,YAAY,QAAQ;AAAA,QACvC;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF,CAAC;AAUD,YAAM,cAAc;AAAA,QAClB,IAAI;AAAA,QACJ,IAAI;AAAA,MACN;AAKA,UAAI,iBAAkB,aAAY,UAAU;AAQ5C,YAAM,gBAAgB,aAAa;AACnC,UAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,OAAO,gCAAgC,CAAC,YAAY,UAAU;AACpF,YAAI,OAAO,sBAAsB;AAG/B,cAAI,UAAU,wBAAwB,YAAY;AAClD,cAAI,UAAU,0BAA0B,aAAa;AAAA,QACvD;AACA,eAAO,KAAK;AAAA,MACd;AAGA,YAAM,OAAO,aAAa;AAE1B,YAAM,gBAAgB,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB,CAAC;AACrE,YAAM,eAAe,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ,gBAAgB,CAAC;AACnE,YAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,QACZ;AAAA,QACA,IAAI;AAAA,QACJ;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,MACnF;AAMA,UAAI,OAAO,OAAO;AAEhB,gBAAQ,MAAM,mCAAmC;AAAA,UAC/C,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAAA,UACtB,kBAAkB,MAAM;AAAA,UACxB,eAAe,MAAM;AAAA,UACrB,iBAAiB,MAAM;AAAA,QACzB,CAAC;AAAA,MACH;AASA,UAAI,CAAC,MAAM,SAAS;AAClB,cAAM,KAAM,IAAI,MAAkC,MAAM;AACxD,YAAI,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK;AAAA,UACnB,SAAS;AAAA,UACT;AAAA,UACA,OAAO;AAAA,YACL,MAAM;AAAA,YACN,SAAS;AAAA,YACT,MAAM;AAAA,cACJ,WAAW;AAAA,cACX,QACE;AAAA,cACF,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAAA,YACxB;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF,CAAC;AACD;AAAA,MACF;AAEA,YAAM,kBACJ,OAAO,mBAAmB,GAAG,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI;AAC3E,YAAM,wBAAwB,oBAAoB;AAElD,YAAM,sBAA2C;AAAA,QAC/C;AAAA,QACA,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,QACf,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,QACd,UAAU,MAAM;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,QAIhB,oBAAoB;AAAA,QACpB,eAAe;AAAA,QACf;AAAA,QACA,kBAAkB,OAAO,oBAAoB;AAAA,QAC7C;AAAA,QACA,gBAAgB;AAAA,UACd,UAAU,IAAI;AAAA,UACd,WAAW,IAAI,QAAQ,YAAY;AAAA,UACnC,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,UAMlB,kBAAkB,yBAAyB,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,QACxD;AAAA,MACF;AACA,UAAI,SAAS,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAErD,UAAI,oBAAoB;AACxB,UAAI,YAAa,OAAsC;AAKvD,UACE,OAAO,oBAAoB,UAC3B,OAAO,iBACP,sBAAsB,MAAM,KAC5B,OAAO,gBAAgB,SACvB;AACA,cAAM,UAAU,MAAM,oBAAoB,QAAQ,OAAO,cAAc;AACvE,YAAI,UAAU,mBAAmB,OAAO;AACxC,YAAI,YAAY,YAAY;AAC1B,mBAAS,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,qBAAqB,EAAE,aAAa,KAAK,CAAC;AACxE,cAAI,oBAAoB;AACxB,sBAAa,OAAsC;AAAA,QACrD,OAAO;AACL,iBAAO,gBAAgB;AAAA,QACzB;AAAA,MACF;AASA,UAAI,CAAC,OAAO,eAAe;AACzB,YAAI,yBAAyB,WAAW;AACtC,yBAAe,QAAQ,WAAW,UAAU,OAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,UAAC,CAAC;AAAA,QACvF;AACA,uBAAe,MAAM;AACrB,iBAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AACzB;AAAA,MACF;AAKA,UAAI,sBAAsB,MAAM,GAAG;AACjC,iCAAyB,MAAM;AAC/B,YAAI,yBAAyB,WAAW;AACtC,yBAAe,QAAQ,WAAW,UAAU,OAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,UAAC,CAAC;AAAA,QACvF;AACA,uBAAe,MAAM;AACrB,iBAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AACzB;AAAA,MACF;AASA,UAAI,CAAC,eAAe;AAClB,YAAI,OAAO,sBAAsB;AAC/B,cAAI,UAAU,wBAAwB,UAAU;AAChD,cAAI,UAAU,0BAA0B,wBAAwB;AAAA,QAClE;AACA,YAAI,yBAAyB,WAAW;AACtC,yBAAe,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,UAAC,CAAC;AAAA,QAC7D;AACA,eAAO,KAAK;AAAA,MACd;AAcA,UAAI,kBAAkB;AACpB,YAAI;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,UACA,qBAAqB;AAAA,YACnB,SAAS;AAAA,YACT,GAAI,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,YACjC,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,UACtB,CAAC;AAAA,QACH;AAAA,MACF;AAEA,UAAI,yBAAyB,WAAW;AACtC,uBAAe,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,QAAC,CAAC;AAAA,MAC7D;AAGA,YAAM,iBAAiB;AACvB,UAAI,eAAe,eAAe;AAChC,YAAI,UAAU,eAAe,cAAc,MAAM,eAAe,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,MACrF;AACA,WAAK;AAAA,IACP,SAAS,OAAO;AAKd,YAAM,aAAa,iBAAiB,QAAQ,MAAM,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO;AAC5E,YAAM,gBACH,IAAI,QAAQ,cAAc,KAC1B,IAAI,QAAQ,kBAAkB,KAC/B,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AAE1E,cAAQ,MAAM,+CAA+C,KAAK;AAElE,cAAQ;AAAA,QACN,0CAA0C,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,eAAe,OAAO,kBAAkB,SAAS,kBAAkB,aAAa;AAAA,MACtK;AAEA,UAAI,gBAAgB,UAAU;AAC5B,cAAM,SAA6B;AAAA,UACjC,kBAAkB;AAAA,UAClB,eAAe;AAAA,UACf,eAAe,CAAC,kCAAkC,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,UAC9D,UAAU;AAAA,YACR;AAAA,cACE,WAAW;AAAA,cACX,SAAS,oBAAoB,UAAU;AAAA,YACzC;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,UACA,YAAY,oBAAI,KAAK;AAAA,UACrB;AAAA,QACF;AACA,cAAM,YAAY,OAAO,aACrB,MAAM,iBAAiB,OAAO,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,MAAS,IAC/D;AACJ,YAAI,WAAW;AACb,iBAAO,WAAW;AAAA,YAChB,SAAS,oBAAoB,UAAU;AAAA,YACvC,iBAAiB,UAAU;AAAA,YAC3B,kBAAkB,UAAU;AAAA,UAC9B;AAAA,QACF;AACA,uBAAe,MAAM;AACrB,eAAO,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,MAClC;AAEA,WAAK;AAAA,IACP;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":["has","result"]}