@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 5.4.2 → 5.6.0

package/dist/edge-core/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/edge-core/index.ts","../../src/version.ts","../../src/http.ts","../../src/edge-config.ts","../../src/metadata-capture.ts","../../src/platform-signatures.ts","../../src/trust-levels.ts","../../src/well-known.ts","../../src/verify.ts","../../src/edge-core/request.ts","../../src/edge-core/detect.ts","../../src/edge-core/classify.ts","../../src/edge-core/messaging.ts","../../src/verified-hop.ts","../../src/edge-core/enforce.ts","../../src/adapters/http-pdlss.ts","../../src/edge-core/events.ts","../../src/edge-core/pipeline.ts","../../src/edge-core/evaluate.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * AstraSync Trusted Agent Gateway — platform-neutral edge core.\n *\n * The shared classification/detection/verification/enforcement pipeline\n * behind the AstraSync edge adapters (`@astrasyncai/adapter-lambda`,\n * `@astrasyncai/adapter-edge`). Platform packages normalize their native\n * request shape into a {@link NormalizedRequest}, call\n * {@link evaluateEdgeRequest}, and apply the returned\n * {@link OutcomeApplication} onto their native primitives.\n */\n\nexport { classify, resolvePolicy, _patterns } from './classify';\nexport { detectCommerce, type DetectedCommerce } from './detect';\nexport { evaluateEdgeRequest, type EdgeEvaluation } from './evaluate';\nexport { applyOutcome, passUntouched, ASAT_HEADERS } from './enforce';\nexport { withBudget, emitBeacon, sampled } from './events';\nexport {\n  buildDenyBody,\n  buildManualReviewBody,\n  type DenyBody,\n  type ManualReviewBody,\n} from './messaging';\nexport { runTier, buildVerificationRequest, outcomeFromVerifyResult } from './pipeline';\nexport { headerValue, requestUrl, buildObservedMetadata } from './request';\nexport type {\n  NormalizedRequest,\n  PlatformIo,\n  OutcomeApplication,\n  TrafficTier,\n  Classification,\n  EdgeDecision,\n  TierOutcome,\n  EffectivePolicy,\n  EdgeCoreOptions,\n  EdgeLogger,\n} from './types';\n","/**\n * Single source-of-truth for the SDK's\n * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future\n * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.\n *\n * Why a constant rather than `import pkg from '../package.json'`:\n * - `tsconfig.json` sets `rootDir: ./src`; importing the sibling\n *   package.json fails the build with \"outside rootDir\".\n * - Build-time string replacement (tsup `define`, esbuild banner, etc.)\n *   adds toolchain coupling for a trivial gain.\n * - Embedded readonly constant works in every environment (Node, browser,\n *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.\n *\n * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against\n * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. A manual bump\n * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them\n * lockstep.\n */\nexport const SDK_VERSION = '5.4.1';\n","/**\n * Shared outbound-HTTP wrapper — every request the SDK makes to the\n * AstraSync backend (or anywhere else) goes through `sdkFetch` so it\n * carries an identifying User-Agent.\n *\n * Why: Node's global fetch defaults to `user-agent: node`, which is\n * indistinguishable from every other Node client on the wire. Visit\n * Intelligence observed our own SDK/beacon traffic as anonymous \"node\"\n * visits. Self-identification is the platform's own medicine.\n *\n * Browser note: some browsers filter the User-Agent request header\n * silently (never throwing), so this is a no-op there — which is correct:\n * in a browser the page's real UA is the honest identity.\n */\n\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\n\nexport const SDK_USER_AGENT = `astrasync-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;\n\n/**\n * Add the SDK User-Agent without changing the SHAPE of the caller's headers\n * (plain records stay plain records) — interceptors, adapters, and tests\n * read `init.headers` as a record, and `Headers` would also lowercase names.\n */\nfunction withUserAgent(initHeaders: HeadersInit | undefined): HeadersInit {\n  if (!initHeaders) return { 'user-agent': SDK_USER_AGENT };\n  if (initHeaders instanceof Headers) {\n    const copy = new Headers(initHeaders);\n    if (!copy.has('user-agent')) copy.set('user-agent', SDK_USER_AGENT);\n    return copy;\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(initHeaders)) {\n    const has = initHeaders.some(([name]) => name.toLowerCase() === 'user-agent');\n    return has ? initHeaders : [...initHeaders, ['user-agent', SDK_USER_AGENT]];\n  }\n  const has = Object.keys(initHeaders).some((name) => name.toLowerCase() === 'user-agent');\n  return has ? initHeaders : { 'user-agent': SDK_USER_AGENT, ...initHeaders };\n}\n\nexport const sdkFetch: typeof fetch = (input, init) =>\n  fetch(input, { ...init, headers: withUserAgent(init?.headers) });\n","/**\n * Edge verification config — the per-endpoint policy the Trusted Agent\n * Gateway edge adapters (e.g. `@astrasyncai/adapter-lambda`) fetch from the\n * AstraSync dashboard to decide how much verification friction to apply\n * to inbound traffic, and where.\n *\n * Fetch pattern mirrors `well-known.ts`: TTL cache + stale-while-revalidate\n * + in-flight dedupe, with a `_reset*` hook for tests. Fail posture is\n * deliberately asymmetric: this module can NEVER put a site into enforce\n * mode on its own — enforce only ever originates from a successfully\n * fetched config, and a config that has gone stale past `maxStaleMs`\n * degrades back to observe.\n *\n * Which EdgeConfig fields each integration consumes:\n *\n * | Field                          | Edge adapters | SDK adapters (express/nextjs/mcp) |\n * | ------------------------------ | ------------- | --------------------------------- |\n * | `mode` (observe/enforce)       | yes           | —                                 |\n * | `depth`                        | yes           | —                                 |\n * | `pathRules`                    | yes           | —                                 |\n * | `sampling.anonymousBeaconRate` | yes           | yes — the SDK anonymous beacon    |\n * | `failurePosture`               | yes           | —                                 |\n *\n * The observe/enforce × depth posture is EDGE-ONLY by design: SDK adapters\n * enforce via the dashboard route policy (`fetchRoutes`), not via this\n * config, and consume only the `sampling` block for their anonymous\n * traffic beacon.\n */\n\nimport { sdkFetch } from './http';\nimport type { GatewayConfig } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Edge posture. Canonical Trusted Agent Gateway vocabulary:\n * `observe` ≈ the gateway's `passive` posture (verify +\n * record, enforce nothing), `enforce` ≈ `active`. New value set on a new\n * field name — do NOT reuse `GatewayPosture`'s `active`/`passive` here\n * (different field, different meaning: posture governs an agent-side\n * gateway; mode governs counterparty-side edge interception).\n */\nexport type EdgeMode = 'observe' | 'enforce';\n\n/**\n * How deep the edge checks each request — what is it → who is it → are\n * they allowed:\n * - `classify`     — UA / platform-fingerprint classification only; no\n *                    credential handling.\n * - `authenticate` — establish who is calling: detect and parse agent\n *                    credentials (X-Astra-*, VI SD-JWT, RFC 9421, ACP,\n *                    UCP, AP2…) and verify presented AstraSync identities.\n * - `authorize`    — full policy decision: credentials cryptographically\n *                    proven and PDLSS-evaluated via a verify-access round\n *                    trip. (US spelling on the wire, matching\n *                    `authorizeSettlement` and HTTP `Authorization`.)\n */\nexport type EdgeVerificationDepth = 'classify' | 'authenticate' | 'authorize';\n\nexport interface EdgePathRule {\n  /**\n   * `*`-wildcard glob matched against the request path. Matching is\n   * case-INsensitive and all regex metacharacters except `*` are\n   * escaped. (Deliberately diverges from the express adapter's\n   * `matchRoute`, which is historically case-sensitive by default —\n   * new surface ships case-insensitive matching as the default.)\n   */\n  pattern: string;\n  /** Pass the request through untouched (static assets); mode/depth ignored. */\n  skip?: boolean;\n  /** Override the top-level mode for this path. */\n  mode?: EdgeMode;\n  /** Override the top-level depth for this path. */\n  depth?: EdgeVerificationDepth;\n}\n\nexport interface EdgeConfig {\n  /** Shape version — bump on breaking changes. */\n  version: 1;\n  /** Default posture for paths no rule matches. */\n  mode: EdgeMode;\n  /** Default check depth for paths no rule matches. */\n  depth: EdgeVerificationDepth;\n  /** Ordered, first-match-wins. */\n  pathRules: EdgePathRule[];\n  sampling: {\n    /** Fraction (0..1) of anonymous-bot requests that emit a beacon. */\n    anonymousBeaconRate: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * 4.5.0: the EFFECTIVE failure posture is derived from the effective\n   * mode — fail posture follows success posture. Observe fails open\n   * (unreachable backend = pass-through, site never breaks); enforce fails\n   * closed on verification-infrastructure failure (503\n   * `VERIFICATION_UNAVAILABLE`, retry-later — see edge-core/pipeline). This\n   * field is retained on the wire for adapter compatibility and as a future\n   * explicit override; it is not consulted by the 4.5.x pipeline. Note the\n   * distinction from CONFIG staleness: a config stale past 24h still has\n   * enforce degraded to observe (`degradeToObserve`) — that is config-trust\n   * hygiene, independent of runtime verification availability.\n   */\n  failurePosture: 'open' | 'closed';\n}\n\n/**\n * The safe default: observe-only, classification depth, nothing enforced.\n * Served by the backend when an endpoint has never been configured, and\n * used by `getEdgeConfig` whenever no config can be fetched.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_EDGE_CONFIG: EdgeConfig = Object.freeze({\n  version: 1,\n  mode: 'observe',\n  depth: 'classify',\n  pathRules: [],\n  sampling: Object.freeze({ anonymousBeaconRate: 0.1 }),\n  failurePosture: 'open',\n}) as EdgeConfig;\n\nconst EDGE_MODES: readonly string[] = ['observe', 'enforce'];\nconst EDGE_DEPTHS: readonly string[] = ['classify', 'authenticate', 'authorize'];\n\n/** Structural guard for configs arriving over the wire. */\nexport function isEdgeConfig(value: unknown): value is EdgeConfig {\n  if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return false;\n  const v = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (v.version !== 1) return false;\n  if (!EDGE_MODES.includes(v.mode as string)) return false;\n  if (!EDGE_DEPTHS.includes(v.depth as string)) return false;\n  if (!Array.isArray(v.pathRules)) return false;\n  for (const rule of v.pathRules) {\n    if (typeof rule !== 'object' || rule === null) return false;\n    const r = rule as Record<string, unknown>;\n    if (typeof r.pattern !== 'string' || r.pattern.length === 0) return false;\n    if (r.mode !== undefined && !EDGE_MODES.includes(r.mode as string)) return false;\n    if (r.depth !== undefined && !EDGE_DEPTHS.includes(r.depth as string)) return false;\n  }\n  const sampling = v.sampling as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n  if (\n    typeof sampling !== 'object' ||\n    sampling === null ||\n    typeof sampling.anonymousBeaconRate !== 'number' ||\n    sampling.anonymousBeaconRate < 0 ||\n    sampling.anonymousBeaconRate > 1\n  ) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return v.failurePosture === 'open';\n}\n\nexport interface FetchEdgeConfigSuccess {\n  edgeConfig: EdgeConfig;\n  etag?: string;\n}\n\nexport type FetchEdgeConfigResult = FetchEdgeConfigSuccess | { notModified: true } | null;\n\n/**\n * Fetch the edge config for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * `GET {apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/:counterpartyId/edge-config` with the same\n * auth headers as `fetchRoutes`. Pass the cached `etag` to get a cheap\n * `{ notModified: true }` on 304. Returns `null` on any failure —\n * the caller decides how to fall back.\n */\nexport async function fetchEdgeConfig(\n  config: Pick<GatewayConfig, 'apiBaseUrl' | 'apiKey'>,\n  counterpartyId: string,\n  opts?: { etag?: string; timeoutMs?: number }\n): Promise<FetchEdgeConfigResult> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { Accept: 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  if (opts?.etag) headers['If-None-Match'] = opts.etag;\n  try {\n    const response = await sdkFetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/edge-config`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(opts?.timeoutMs ?? 5000) }\n    );\n    if (response.status === 304) return { notModified: true };\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { edgeConfig?: unknown } };\n    const edgeConfig = body.data?.edgeConfig;\n    if (!isEdgeConfig(edgeConfig)) return null;\n    return { edgeConfig, etag: response.headers.get('etag') ?? undefined };\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  config: EdgeConfig;\n  etag?: string;\n  /** When the entry was last confirmed fresh (fetch or 304). */\n  lastSuccessAt: number;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 60 * 1000;\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_STALE_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();\nconst inflight = new Map<string, Promise<void>>();\n\nfunction cacheKey(apiBaseUrl: string, counterpartyId: string): string {\n  return `${apiBaseUrl}|${counterpartyId}`;\n}\n\n/** Copy of `config` with every enforce (top-level and per-rule) degraded to observe. */\nexport function degradeToObserve(config: EdgeConfig): EdgeConfig {\n  if (config.mode !== 'enforce' && !config.pathRules.some((r) => r.mode === 'enforce')) {\n    return config;\n  }\n  return {\n    ...config,\n    mode: 'observe',\n    pathRules: config.pathRules.map((r) => (r.mode === 'enforce' ? { ...r, mode: 'observe' } : r)),\n  };\n}\n\nasync function revalidate(\n  config: Pick<GatewayConfig, 'apiBaseUrl' | 'apiKey'>,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const key = cacheKey(config.apiBaseUrl, counterpartyId);\n  const existing = inflight.get(key);\n  if (existing) return existing;\n\n  const promise = fetchEdgeConfig(config, counterpartyId, { etag: cache.get(key)?.etag })\n    .then((result) => {\n      if (result === null) return; // failure — cache untouched, caller falls back\n      const now = Date.now();\n      if ('notModified' in result) {\n        const entry = cache.get(key);\n        if (entry) entry.lastSuccessAt = now;\n        return;\n      }\n      cache.set(key, { config: result.edgeConfig, etag: result.etag, lastSuccessAt: now });\n    })\n    .finally(() => {\n      inflight.delete(key);\n    });\n\n  inflight.set(key, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the edge config for an endpoint, cached. Never throws, never blocks\n * longer than one fetch.\n *\n * - Fresh cache (within `ttlMs`) → cached config, no network.\n * - Stale cache → cached config immediately + background revalidate\n *   (stale-while-revalidate). If the last successful fetch is older than\n *   `maxStaleMs` (default 24h), any enforce is degraded to observe — a\n *   long-dead backend can never keep a site enforcing.\n * - No cache → await one fetch; on failure return `DEFAULT_EDGE_CONFIG`\n *   (observe-only). Defaults never enforce.\n */\nexport async function getEdgeConfig(\n  config: Pick<GatewayConfig, 'apiBaseUrl' | 'apiKey'>,\n  counterpartyId: string,\n  opts?: { ttlMs?: number; maxStaleMs?: number }\n): Promise<EdgeConfig> {\n  const ttlMs = opts?.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_TTL_MS;\n  const maxStaleMs = opts?.maxStaleMs ?? DEFAULT_MAX_STALE_MS;\n  const key = cacheKey(config.apiBaseUrl, counterpartyId);\n\n  const entry = cache.get(key);\n  if (entry) {\n    const age = Date.now() - entry.lastSuccessAt;\n    if (age > ttlMs) {\n      revalidate(config, counterpartyId).catch(() => {\n        // background refresh failed — stale entry remains until next call\n      });\n    }\n    return age > maxStaleMs ? degradeToObserve(entry.config) : entry.config;\n  }\n\n  await revalidate(config, counterpartyId).catch(() => {\n    // fetch failed — fall through to defaults\n  });\n  return cache.get(key)?.config ?? DEFAULT_EDGE_CONFIG;\n}\n\n/**\n * First-match-wins path-rule lookup. Case-insensitive `*` globs with all\n * other regex metacharacters escaped (a literal `.` in a pattern matches\n * only `.`). Returns `undefined` when no rule matches — the caller applies\n * the config's top-level mode/depth.\n */\nexport function matchEdgePathRule(rules: EdgePathRule[], path: string): EdgePathRule | undefined {\n  for (const rule of rules) {\n    if (globToRegExp(rule.pattern).test(path)) return rule;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction globToRegExp(pattern: string): RegExp {\n  const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&').replace(/\\*/g, '.*');\n  return new RegExp(`^${escaped}$`, 'i');\n}\n\n/** Reset cache — for testing only. */\nexport function _resetEdgeConfigCache(): void {\n  cache.clear();\n  inflight.clear();\n}\n","/**\n * Maximal metadata capture — the shared, edge-safe sanitiser.\n *\n * AstraSync's thesis is total metadata capture: every header and connection\n * signal an inbound agent presents is a signal we want to keep. This module is\n * the ONE place that decides what is safe to store verbatim, what is a secret\n * to drop, and what credential headers reduce to a safe *format prefix* (a\n * platform signal, never the secret itself).\n *\n * It runs in three places that must agree byte-for-byte:\n *   - the edge adapter (`@astrasyncai/adapter-lambda`) — the richest capture\n *     point (full CloudFront header arrays),\n *   - the SDK adapters (express / nextjs) — for SDK-only merchants with no edge,\n *   - (indirectly) the backend, which stores whatever the above forward.\n *\n * Pure — no Node built-ins, no I/O — so it is safe in Lambda@Edge, the browser\n * build, and Deno. Capture is cheap: at the edge and SDK it is local string\n * work, and the backend stores it on a fire-and-forget event insert, so it adds\n * ZERO verify-access decision latency. Detection (which few signals imply which\n * vendor) is a separate, curated concern — see `platform-signatures.ts`.\n */\n\n/**\n * Version of the capture semantics (what is kept, dropped, reduced, or\n * derived — and under which key names).\n *\n * Capture semantics are FROZEN within a package major version: a given\n * `schemaVersion` always means the same field vocabulary and the same\n * keep/drop/reduce rules. The number bumps only on a SEMANTIC change to\n * capture (a renamed key, a changed reduction rule) — never for additive\n * signals, and never merely because the package version moved. To tell\n * builds apart, use the `sdkVersion` already present on the verify body;\n * `schemaVersion` answers the different question \"how do I interpret this\n * stored metadata?\".\n */\nexport const CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;\n\n/**\n * The captured, sanitised view of an inbound agent's request metadata. Attached\n * to verify-access / beacon payloads as `callerMetadata.observedMetadata`.\n */\nexport interface ObservedMetadata {\n  /** Header name → value, secrets removed, verbatim otherwise. */\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Safe key-format prefix of a credential header (e.g. `sk-ant-api03`,\n   * `sk-proj`, `AIza`) — a platform signal, NEVER the secret. Absent if no\n   * credential header was present or none matched a known format.\n   */\n  apiKeyFormat?: string;\n  /**\n   * The subset of `headers` that are known platform-signal headers\n   * (`openai-organization`, `x-goog-user-project`, `anthropic-version`, …),\n   * pulled out for convenient detection + display. Values are the same\n   * sanitised strings as in `headers`.\n   */\n  platformHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Connection-layer signals (IP, ASN, country, TLS version, HTTP version,\n   * device class, TLS fingerprint). Edge adapters populate this from the\n   * platform's native connection surface — the authoritative source. SDK\n   * adapters populate it as a fallback via {@link deriveConnectionFromHeaders}\n   * when a CDN in front of the merchant injected the equivalent headers;\n   * absent when neither source had anything.\n   */\n  connection?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Number of cookie pairs the caller sent. The `cookie` header VALUE is a\n   * secret and is always dropped; the COUNT is a client-shape signal\n   * (browsers carry cookies, most automation carries none) that would\n   * otherwise be unobservable downstream. Absent when no cookie header\n   * arrived.\n   */\n  cookieCount?: number;\n  /**\n   * Query-string parameter NAMES (deduped, lowercased) — values are NEVER\n   * captured (they routinely carry OAuth codes, tokens, and PII, and no\n   * deny-list is complete). Names alone fingerprint client shape. Populated\n   * by the edge path, which sees the raw query string.\n   */\n  queryKeys?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Version of the capture semantics this object was produced under — see\n   * {@link CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION}. Optional for backward compatibility with\n   * metadata captured before the field existed.\n   */\n  schemaVersion?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of sanitising a raw header map. `headers` is always present (possibly\n * empty); `apiKeyFormat` / `platformHeaders` only when a signal was found.\n */\nexport interface SanitizeHeadersResult {\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  apiKeyFormat?: string;\n  platformHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Cookie-pair count; the cookie value itself is always dropped. */\n  cookieCount?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Header names dropped entirely — genuine secrets or our own credentials that\n * describe the request's transport, not the agent. Matched case-insensitively\n * on the exact header name.\n */\nconst SECRET_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([\n  'cookie',\n  'set-cookie',\n  'x-csrf-token',\n  'proxy-authorization',\n  'x-astrasync-signature',\n  'x-astrasync-secret',\n  'x-hub-signature',\n  'x-hub-signature-256',\n  // Short-lived verify dedupe token — must never persist in stored metadata.\n  'x-astra-verified-hop',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Header-name prefixes dropped entirely — our own credential / signing surface\n * (`x-astrasync-*`, `kya-*`) must never round-trip into stored metadata.\n */\nconst SECRET_HEADER_PREFIXES = ['x-astrasync-', 'kya-', 'kya_'];\n\n/**\n * Credential headers whose VALUE is a secret but whose FORMAT is a signal. We\n * keep the leading format prefix (up to the random tail) and drop the rest.\n */\nconst CREDENTIAL_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([\n  'authorization',\n  'x-api-key',\n  'x-goog-api-key',\n  'api-key',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Header names that carry a raw signature value (drop the value; the presence\n * is not worth a bloat risk). Matched as a suffix so `x-*-signature` variants\n * are covered without an exhaustive list.\n */\nfunction isSignatureHeader(name: string): boolean {\n  return name === 'signature' || name.endsWith('-signature') || name.endsWith('-signature-256');\n}\n\n/**\n * Known platform-signal headers — pulled into `platformHeaders` for convenient\n * detection + display. Exact names plus a few prefixes (`x-goog-`,\n * `x-stainless-` — the OpenAI/Anthropic SDK client fingerprint headers).\n */\nconst PLATFORM_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([\n  'openai-organization',\n  'openai-project',\n  'openai-version',\n  'openai-processing-ms',\n  'anthropic-version',\n  'anthropic-beta',\n  'x-goog-user-project',\n  'x-goog-api-client',\n  'user-agent',\n  'x-agent-card-url',\n  'x-agent-provider',\n]);\n// `sec-ch-*` client hints are platform signals: Chromium forks (agentic\n// browsers included) often carry their real brand in `sec-ch-ua` even when\n// the UA string mimics stock Chrome.\nconst PLATFORM_HEADER_PREFIXES = [\n  'x-goog-',\n  'x-stainless-',\n  'x-anthropic-',\n  'x-openai-',\n  'sec-ch-',\n];\n\n/**\n * Known API-key format prefixes, longest-first so `sk-ant-api03` wins over\n * `sk-ant` and `sk-`. Each is the SAFE, non-secret leading token of a\n * credential; the random tail is never captured.\n */\nconst KEY_FORMAT_PREFIXES = [\n  'sk-ant-api03',\n  'sk-ant-api',\n  'sk-ant',\n  'sk-proj',\n  'sk-svcacct',\n  'sk-or-v1',\n  'sk-or',\n  'sk-lf',\n  'sk-',\n  'gsk_',\n  'aiza',\n  'ya29',\n  'ghp_',\n  'gho_',\n  'github_pat_',\n  'xai-',\n  'pplx-',\n  'r8_',\n  'hf_',\n  'astra-',\n  'astrae-',\n];\n\n/** Size caps — the only guard against jsonb bloat from a hostile POST. */\nexport const MAX_HEADERS = 64;\nexport const MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES = 1024;\nexport const MAX_TOTAL_BYTES = 16 * 1024;\n\nfunction byteLength(s: string): number {\n  // Edge-safe (no Buffer): count UTF-8 bytes without allocating a Buffer.\n  let bytes = 0;\n  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {\n    const code = s.charCodeAt(i);\n    if (code < 0x80) bytes += 1;\n    else if (code < 0x800) bytes += 2;\n    else if (code >= 0xd800 && code <= 0xdbff) {\n      bytes += 4;\n      i++; // surrogate pair\n    } else bytes += 3;\n  }\n  return bytes;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract the safe key-format prefix from a credential header value. Strips a\n * leading `Bearer ` / `Basic ` scheme, then returns the longest known prefix\n * that the (lowercased) value starts with. Returns undefined for opaque values\n * (e.g. a bare UUID token) so we never guess a format we don't recognise.\n */\nexport function extractApiKeyFormat(rawValue: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!rawValue) return undefined;\n  let value = rawValue.trim();\n  const spaceIdx = value.indexOf(' ');\n  if (spaceIdx > 0) {\n    const scheme = value.slice(0, spaceIdx).toLowerCase();\n    if (scheme === 'bearer' || scheme === 'basic' || scheme === 'token') {\n      value = value.slice(spaceIdx + 1).trim();\n    }\n  }\n  const lower = value.toLowerCase();\n  for (const prefix of KEY_FORMAT_PREFIXES) {\n    if (lower.startsWith(prefix)) {\n      // Return the prefix as-declared in the list (canonical casing).\n      return prefix;\n    }\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction isSecretHeader(name: string): boolean {\n  if (SECRET_HEADER_NAMES.has(name)) return true;\n  if (SECRET_HEADER_PREFIXES.some((p) => name.startsWith(p))) return true;\n  if (isSignatureHeader(name)) return true;\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction isPlatformHeader(name: string): boolean {\n  if (PLATFORM_HEADER_NAMES.has(name)) return true;\n  return PLATFORM_HEADER_PREFIXES.some((p) => name.startsWith(p));\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitise a raw header map for storage. Deny-lists genuine secrets, reduces\n * credential headers to a safe format prefix, keeps everything else verbatim,\n * and enforces the size caps that bound jsonb growth.\n *\n * Accepts any string→(string|string[]|undefined) map (Node's `req.headers`,\n * CloudFront's flattened headers, a plain object). Multi-value headers are\n * joined with `, ` per RFC 7230.\n */\nexport function sanitizeHeaders(\n  raw: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> | undefined | null\n): SanitizeHeadersResult {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {};\n  const platformHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};\n  let apiKeyFormat: string | undefined;\n  let cookieCount: number | undefined;\n  let totalBytes = 0;\n  let count = 0;\n\n  if (!raw) return { headers };\n\n  for (const rawName of Object.keys(raw)) {\n    if (count >= MAX_HEADERS) break;\n    const name = rawName.toLowerCase();\n    const rawValue = raw[rawName];\n    if (rawValue === undefined) continue;\n    const joined = Array.isArray(rawValue) ? rawValue.join(', ') : String(rawValue);\n\n    // Credential headers: capture the format prefix, drop the secret.\n    if (CREDENTIAL_HEADER_NAMES.has(name)) {\n      const fmt = extractApiKeyFormat(joined);\n      if (fmt && !apiKeyFormat) apiKeyFormat = fmt;\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    // Cookie: the value is a secret (dropped below), but the PAIR COUNT is a\n    // client-shape signal worth keeping.\n    if (name === 'cookie') {\n      cookieCount = joined.split(';').filter((s) => s.trim().length > 0).length;\n    }\n\n    // Genuine secrets: drop entirely.\n    if (isSecretHeader(name)) continue;\n\n    // Everything else describing the agent: keep, bounded.\n    let value = joined;\n    if (byteLength(value) > MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES) {\n      value = value.slice(0, MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES);\n    }\n    const entryBytes = byteLength(name) + byteLength(value);\n    if (totalBytes + entryBytes > MAX_TOTAL_BYTES) continue;\n    totalBytes += entryBytes;\n    count++;\n    headers[name] = value;\n    if (isPlatformHeader(name)) platformHeaders[name] = value;\n  }\n\n  const result: SanitizeHeadersResult = { headers };\n  if (apiKeyFormat) result.apiKeyFormat = apiKeyFormat;\n  if (Object.keys(platformHeaders).length > 0) result.platformHeaders = platformHeaders;\n  if (cookieCount !== undefined) result.cookieCount = cookieCount;\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Pull the known platform-signal headers out of an ALREADY-sanitised header\n * map. `sanitizeHeaders` already computes this as a by-product; this standalone\n * form is exported for call-sites (edge, tests) that hold a sanitised map and\n * want only the platform subset. Never re-run over raw (unsanitised) headers.\n */\nexport function extractPlatformHeaders(\n  sanitized: Record<string, string> | undefined | null\n): Record<string, string> {\n  const out: Record<string, string> = {};\n  if (!sanitized) return out;\n  for (const name of Object.keys(sanitized)) {\n    if (isPlatformHeader(name.toLowerCase())) out[name.toLowerCase()] = sanitized[name];\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/**\n * Precedence-ordered CDN header sources for each derived `connection` key.\n * First present header wins; the special `x-forwarded-for` source takes the\n * LEFTMOST (client) entry of the comma-separated chain.\n */\nconst CONNECTION_HEADER_SOURCES: ReadonlyArray<readonly [key: string, headers: readonly string[]]> =\n  [\n    ['ip', ['cf-connecting-ip', 'fastly-client-ip', 'true-client-ip', 'x-real-ip']],\n    [\n      'country',\n      ['cf-ipcountry', 'x-vercel-ip-country', 'cloudfront-viewer-country', 'fastly-geo-country'],\n    ],\n    ['region', ['x-vercel-ip-country-region', 'cloudfront-viewer-country-region']],\n    ['countryRegionName', ['cloudfront-viewer-country-region-name']],\n    ['city', ['x-vercel-ip-city', 'cloudfront-viewer-city']],\n    ['latitude', ['x-vercel-ip-latitude', 'cloudfront-viewer-latitude']],\n    ['longitude', ['x-vercel-ip-longitude', 'cloudfront-viewer-longitude']],\n    ['postalCode', ['x-vercel-ip-postal-code', 'cloudfront-viewer-postal-code']],\n    ['asn', ['cloudfront-viewer-asn']],\n    ['tlsVersion', ['cloudfront-viewer-tls']],\n    ['httpVersion', ['cloudfront-viewer-http-version']],\n    ['timeZone', ['x-vercel-ip-timezone', 'cloudfront-viewer-time-zone']],\n    ['metroCode', ['cloudfront-viewer-metro-code']],\n    // TLS fingerprints can only be computed where TLS terminates. When a CDN\n    // terminates TLS in front of the merchant, its fingerprint headers ARE the\n    // connection-layer truth — normalising them here is the permanent design.\n    // CloudFront delivers JA3/JA4 only via an origin request policy and only\n    // for HTTPS viewer connections.\n    ['tlsFingerprint', ['cf-ja3-hash', 'cloudfront-viewer-ja3-fingerprint']],\n    ['ja4', ['cf-ja4', 'cloudfront-viewer-ja4-fingerprint']],\n    // Header-structure fingerprint: browser/SDK-distinctive header ordering.\n    ['headerOrder', ['cloudfront-viewer-header-order']],\n    ['headerCount', ['cloudfront-viewer-header-count']],\n  ];\n\n/**\n * Backend bound: observedMetadata.connection values longer than this fail\n * the platform's zod parse outright (boundedStringRecord(32, 256)), so every\n * emitter truncates — headerOrder routinely exceeds it.\n */\nexport const MAX_CONNECTION_VALUE_CHARS = 256;\n\n/**\n * Derive the connection-layer block from CDN-injected request headers.\n *\n * When a merchant's SDK-gated origin sits behind a CDN (Cloudflare, Fastly,\n * Vercel, CloudFront), the CDN has already seen the connection layer and\n * injected it as headers. This promotes those headers to the same\n * `connection` keys the edge adapters populate natively, so SDK-only\n * deployments still get IP / geo / TLS attribution. Precedence per key:\n *\n * - `ip`: `cf-connecting-ip` > `fastly-client-ip` > `true-client-ip` >\n *   `x-real-ip` > `cloudfront-viewer-address` (port stripped) > leftmost\n *   `x-forwarded-for`\n * - `country`: `cf-ipcountry` > `x-vercel-ip-country` >\n *   `cloudfront-viewer-country` > `fastly-geo-country`\n * - `region` / `city` / `timeZone`: Vercel then CloudFront viewer headers\n * - `countryRegionName` / `asn` / `tlsVersion` / `httpVersion` /\n *   `metroCode` / `headerOrder` / `headerCount`: `cloudfront-viewer-*`\n * - `tlsFingerprint`: `cf-ja3-hash` > `cloudfront-viewer-ja3-fingerprint`\n * - `ja4`: `cf-ja4` > `cloudfront-viewer-ja4-fingerprint`\n *\n * All keys are additive under `schemaVersion` 1 (the frozen-capture doctrine\n * bumps only for changed semantics, never for additive signals). Values are\n * truncated to MAX_CONNECTION_VALUE_CHARS — the platform's hard bound.\n *\n * Edge adapters keep their richer native collectors — native platform\n * signals are authoritative; this header derivation is the SDK-level\n * fallback. Header names are matched case-insensitively. Returns undefined\n * when no source header is present, so the `connection` key is simply\n * omitted (matching edge behaviour).\n */\nexport function deriveConnectionFromHeaders(\n  headers: Record<string, string> | undefined | null\n): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n  if (!headers) return undefined;\n  const lower: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const name of Object.keys(headers)) {\n    const value = headers[name];\n    if (typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0) lower[name.toLowerCase()] = value;\n  }\n\n  const connection: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [key, sources] of CONNECTION_HEADER_SOURCES) {\n    for (const source of sources) {\n      const value = lower[source]?.trim();\n      if (value) {\n        connection[key] = value.slice(0, MAX_CONNECTION_VALUE_CHARS);\n        break;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  // ip fallback 1: cloudfront-viewer-address arrives as ip:port — strip the\n  // trailing port only (IPv6-safe), unlike the dedicated client-ip headers.\n  // The port itself is kept as its own key: ephemeral-port patterns signal\n  // NAT/proxy connection reuse.\n  {\n    const addr = lower['cloudfront-viewer-address']?.trim();\n    const portMatch = addr?.match(/:(\\d+)$/);\n    if (portMatch) connection.sourcePort = portMatch[1];\n    if (!connection.ip && addr) connection.ip = addr.replace(/:\\d+$/, '');\n  }\n  // ip fallback 2: leftmost (client) hop of the x-forwarded-for chain.\n  if (!connection.ip) {\n    const xff = lower['x-forwarded-for'];\n    const client = xff?.split(',')[0]?.trim();\n    if (client) connection.ip = client;\n  }\n  // tlsCipher: CloudFront folds the cipher into the viewer-tls string\n  // (`TLSv1.3:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:fullHandshake`). `tlsVersion` stays\n  // verbatim (reducing it would be a semantic change → schema v2); the\n  // cipher is pulled out additively so it is queryable on its own.\n  if (!connection.tlsCipher) {\n    const cipher = connection.tlsVersion?.split(':')[1];\n    if (cipher) connection.tlsCipher = cipher;\n  }\n\n  return Object.keys(connection).length > 0 ? connection : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * The FULL metadata capture for one request at an SDK adapter (express /\n * nextjs / mcp): sanitised headers, the safe credential format prefix, the\n * platform-signal subset, the CDN-derived connection block, and the capture\n * schema version. This is the ONE builder all SDK adapters share, so their\n * verify-access bodies agree byte-for-byte.\n *\n * Connection derivation runs over the RAW header map (pre-cap) — the size\n * caps guard storage growth and must never hide a geo/IP header that\n * happened to arrive late in an oversized map.\n */\nexport function buildSdkObservedMetadata(\n  rawHeaders: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> | undefined | null\n): ObservedMetadata {\n  const { headers, apiKeyFormat, platformHeaders, cookieCount } = sanitizeHeaders(rawHeaders);\n  const flat: Record<string, string> = {};\n  if (rawHeaders) {\n    for (const name of Object.keys(rawHeaders)) {\n      const value = rawHeaders[name];\n      if (value === undefined) continue;\n      flat[name.toLowerCase()] = Array.isArray(value) ? value.join(', ') : String(value);\n    }\n  }\n  const connection = deriveConnectionFromHeaders(flat);\n  return {\n    headers,\n    ...(apiKeyFormat && { apiKeyFormat }),\n    ...(platformHeaders && { platformHeaders }),\n    ...(connection && { connection }),\n    ...(cookieCount !== undefined && { cookieCount }),\n    schemaVersion: CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Platform-agent fingerprint signatures — the shared registry of known\n * platform-agent UA / agent-card patterns (Claude / ChatGPT / Gemini /\n * Cursor / Goose).\n *\n * Single source of truth, lifted verbatim from the backend's\n * `platform-agent-detector.service` (which now imports detection from\n * here): the backend's verify-access anonymous handler and the edge\n * adapter (`@astrasyncai/adapter-lambda`) must classify identically or\n * the three-tier visibility numbers drift between capture points.\n *\n * Pure regex — no Node built-ins, edge-safe. Detection is regex-only for\n * v2.9 — TLS fingerprinting / behavioural signatures are deferred.\n */\n\nexport type PlatformAgentVendor =\n  | 'claude'\n  | 'chatgpt'\n  | 'gemini'\n  | 'cursor'\n  | 'goose'\n  | 'perplexity'\n  | 'chatgpt-atlas'\n  | 'perplexity-comet'\n  | 'astrasync-sdk'\n  | 'unknown';\n\nexport interface PlatformFingerprint {\n  vendor: PlatformAgentVendor;\n  /** A stable identifier used as the orphan-agent dedup key. */\n  fingerprintKey: string;\n  /** Human-readable name surfaced in the admin panel. */\n  displayName: string;\n}\n\nexport interface PlatformDetectionInput {\n  userAgent?: string;\n  agentCardUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * A safe API-key format prefix observed on the caller's\n   * credential header (e.g. `sk-ant-api03`, `sk-proj`, `aiza`). A strong\n   * platform signal; never the secret. Matched against `apiKeyFormatPatterns`.\n   */\n  apiKeyFormat?: string;\n  /**\n   * The sanitised platform-signal headers (lowercased names →\n   * values), e.g. `openai-organization`, `x-goog-user-project`. Matched\n   * against `headerPatterns` (which test on `name` and `name: value`).\n   */\n  platformHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * The caller's JA4 TLS-client fingerprint (from the connection capture).\n   * Matched against `ja4Patterns`. A JA4 identifies the client TLS stack,\n   * so signatures should pair it with other evidence when attributing a\n   * vendor.\n   */\n  ja4?: string;\n  /**\n   * The caller's origin ASN (from the connection capture). Matched against\n   * `asnList` by exact membership. An ASN alone attributes an entire cloud\n   * provider — registry validation rejects ASN-only signatures.\n   */\n  asn?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A signature definition, generic over the vendor key. The seed constant\n * below uses the closed `PlatformAgentVendor` union; DB-promoted signatures\n * (backend dynamic registry, console round) carry arbitrary string vendors —\n * `matchPlatformSignature` accepts both.\n */\nexport interface PlatformSignatureDef<V extends string = string> {\n  vendor: V;\n  displayName: string;\n  uaPatterns?: RegExp[];\n  agentCardPatterns?: RegExp[];\n  /**\n   * Patterns tested against an observed API-key format prefix\n   * (e.g. `/^sk-ant/i` → claude). A credential-header format is a stronger\n   * platform signal than a spoofable User-Agent.\n   */\n  apiKeyFormatPatterns?: RegExp[];\n  /**\n   * Patterns tested against each observed platform-signal\n   * header, as both `name` and `name: value` (so `/openai-organization/i` and\n   * `/x-goog-user-project/i` match on presence).\n   */\n  headerPatterns?: RegExp[];\n  /** Patterns tested against the observed JA4 TLS-client fingerprint. */\n  ja4Patterns?: RegExp[];\n  /** Exact ASN strings this signature matches (never regex). */\n  asnList?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * A fingerprint whose vendor may be a dynamically-promoted (non-seed) key.\n * Structurally a superset of `PlatformFingerprint`.\n */\nexport interface DynamicPlatformFingerprint {\n  vendor: string;\n  fingerprintKey: string;\n  displayName: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Registry of known platform-agent signatures. Order matters — first match wins.\n *\n * Patterns are intentionally permissive (case-insensitive substring match) since\n * platform UA strings drift between versions. False positives are tolerable —\n * the orphan record is informational, not enforcement.\n */\nexport const PLATFORM_AGENT_SIGNATURES: ReadonlyArray<PlatformSignatureDef<PlatformAgentVendor>> = [\n  {\n    vendor: 'claude',\n    displayName: 'Anthropic Claude',\n    uaPatterns: [/claude/i, /anthropic/i],\n    agentCardPatterns: [/anthropic\\.com/i, /claude\\.ai/i],\n    apiKeyFormatPatterns: [/^sk-ant/i],\n    headerPatterns: [/^anthropic-version/i, /^anthropic-beta/i, /^x-anthropic-/i],\n  },\n  {\n    vendor: 'chatgpt',\n    displayName: 'OpenAI ChatGPT',\n    uaPatterns: [/chatgpt/i, /openai/i, /gpt-?\\d/i],\n    agentCardPatterns: [/openai\\.com/i, /chatgpt\\.com/i],\n    apiKeyFormatPatterns: [/^sk-proj/i, /^sk-svcacct/i],\n    headerPatterns: [/^openai-organization/i, /^openai-project/i, /^openai-version/i],\n  },\n  {\n    vendor: 'gemini',\n    displayName: 'Google Gemini',\n    uaPatterns: [/gemini/i, /google-gemini/i, /bard/i],\n    agentCardPatterns: [/gemini\\.google\\.com/i, /ai\\.google\\.dev/i],\n    apiKeyFormatPatterns: [/^aiza/i],\n    headerPatterns: [/^x-goog-user-project/i, /^x-goog-api-client/i],\n  },\n  {\n    vendor: 'cursor',\n    displayName: 'Cursor',\n    uaPatterns: [/cursor/i],\n    agentCardPatterns: [/cursor\\.sh/i, /cursor\\.com/i],\n  },\n  {\n    vendor: 'goose',\n    displayName: 'Block Goose',\n    uaPatterns: [/goose/i, /block-goose/i],\n    agentCardPatterns: [/block\\.xyz\\/goose/i, /goose\\.tools/i],\n  },\n  {\n    vendor: 'perplexity',\n    displayName: 'Perplexity',\n    uaPatterns: [/perplexity/i],\n    agentCardPatterns: [/perplexity\\.ai/i],\n    apiKeyFormatPatterns: [/^pplx-/i],\n  },\n  // Agentic browsers — versioned-token patterns ONLY (a stock Chrome UA must\n  // never match). Distinct vendor keys (not 'chatgpt'/'perplexity'): the\n  // browser product is a different surface than the assistant service, and\n  // the DB registry mirrors one row per vendor. These sit after the primary\n  // vendor entries so a UA carrying an explicit vendor token keeps its\n  // primary attribution; a browser-shaped UA with the agentic token is\n  // caught here BEFORE classify's human tier, which is what makes these\n  // visits observable at all. Token drift is real (some builds mimic Chrome\n  // outright) — re-verify against captured events when a new browser ships,\n  // and check `sec-ch-ua` platformHeaders for the real brand.\n  {\n    vendor: 'chatgpt-atlas',\n    displayName: 'ChatGPT Atlas browser',\n    uaPatterns: [/\\batlas\\/\\d/i],\n    headerPatterns: [/^sec-ch-ua: .*atlas/i],\n  },\n  {\n    vendor: 'perplexity-comet',\n    displayName: 'Perplexity Comet browser',\n    uaPatterns: [/\\bcomet\\/\\d/i],\n    headerPatterns: [/^sec-ch-ua: .*comet/i],\n  },\n  // Our own SDK self-identifies (sdkFetch stamps this UA) — first-party\n  // traffic must never pollute the unknown/anonymous pool it exists to audit.\n  {\n    vendor: 'astrasync-sdk',\n    displayName: 'AstraSync SDK',\n    uaPatterns: [/^astrasync-sdk\\//i],\n  },\n];\n\n/**\n * Generic first-match-wins matcher over an arbitrary signature set. The\n * backend's dynamic registry merges the seed constant with DB-promoted\n * signatures and calls this — ONE matching implementation everywhere\n * (fingerprint-key rule included: vendor + lowercased UA basename before\n * the first space/slash, falling back to the agent-card host).\n */\nexport function matchPlatformSignature(\n  signatures: ReadonlyArray<PlatformSignatureDef>,\n  input: PlatformDetectionInput\n): DynamicPlatformFingerprint | undefined {\n  const ua = input.userAgent ?? '';\n  const cardUrl = input.agentCardUrl ?? '';\n  const apiKeyFormat = input.apiKeyFormat ?? '';\n  const ja4 = input.ja4 ?? '';\n  const asn = input.asn ?? '';\n  // Flatten platform headers to `name` and `name: value` lines for matching.\n  const headerLines: string[] = [];\n  if (input.platformHeaders) {\n    for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(input.platformHeaders)) {\n      headerLines.push(name, `${name}: ${value}`);\n    }\n  }\n\n  for (const sig of signatures) {\n    const uaMatch = sig.uaPatterns?.some((p) => p.test(ua));\n    const cardMatch = sig.agentCardPatterns?.some((p) => p.test(cardUrl));\n    const keyMatch =\n      apiKeyFormat.length > 0 && sig.apiKeyFormatPatterns?.some((p) => p.test(apiKeyFormat));\n    const headerMatch =\n      headerLines.length > 0 &&\n      sig.headerPatterns?.some((p) => headerLines.some((line) => p.test(line)));\n    const ja4Match = ja4.length > 0 && sig.ja4Patterns?.some((p) => p.test(ja4));\n    const asnMatch = asn.length > 0 && sig.asnList?.includes(asn);\n    if (uaMatch || cardMatch || keyMatch || headerMatch || ja4Match || asnMatch) {\n      const uaBase = ua.split(/[\\s/]/)[0]?.toLowerCase() ?? '';\n      const cardHost = (() => {\n        try {\n          return cardUrl ? new URL(cardUrl).host : '';\n        } catch {\n          return '';\n        }\n      })();\n      // Prefer a UA/card basename for the dedup key; fall back to the\n      // credential format, then the connection fingerprint (still stable\n      // per-vendor keys) when only a key/header/ja4/asn matched.\n      const keyBasis =\n        uaBase || cardHost || apiKeyFormat || ja4 || (asn && `asn${asn}`) || 'unknown';\n      return {\n        vendor: sig.vendor,\n        fingerprintKey: `${sig.vendor}:${keyBasis}`,\n        displayName: sig.displayName,\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Inspect caller metadata for a known SEED platform-agent fingerprint.\n * Returns undefined if no signature matches. (Backends with the dynamic\n * registry should call `matchPlatformSignature` over their merged set\n * instead — same semantics, live signature additions included.)\n */\nexport function detectPlatformFingerprint(\n  input: PlatformDetectionInput\n): PlatformFingerprint | undefined {\n  // Seed vendors are all members of the PlatformAgentVendor union, so the\n  // narrowing cast is sound by construction.\n  return matchPlatformSignature(PLATFORM_AGENT_SIGNATURES, input) as\n    | PlatformFingerprint\n    | undefined;\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway — Trust Level helpers.\n *\n * SDK 5.0.0: the `accessLevel` band (`none`/`restricted`/`read-only`/`standard`/\n * `full`/`internal`) was removed entirely — it never gated the access decision\n * (the server does, from a verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS match + trust\n * score). What remains here is the coarse trust-level badge derived from the\n * numeric trust score, used only for display.\n */\n\nimport type { TrustLevel } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Trust level score ranges\n */\nexport const TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES: Record<TrustLevel, { min: number; max: number }> = {\n  BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },\n  SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },\n  GOLD: { min: 60, max: 79 },\n  PLATINUM: { min: 80, max: 100 },\n};\n\n/**\n * Determine trust level from score\n */\nexport function getTrustLevel(score: number): TrustLevel {\n  if (score >= 80) return 'PLATINUM';\n  if (score >= 60) return 'GOLD';\n  if (score >= 40) return 'SILVER';\n  return 'BRONZE';\n}\n","import { sdkFetch } from './http';\n/**\n * SDK-side discovery of canonical platform URLs via `/.well-known/agentic-commerce`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget pre-fetch at middleware creation; first verify() awaits\n * the in-flight promise if it hasn't resolved. 60-minute TTL with\n * stale-while-revalidate background refresh.\n */\n\nexport interface WellKnownAgenticCommerce {\n  registrationUrl: string;\n  documentationUrl: string;\n  verifyAccessUrl: string;\n  /** 5.1.0: hosted AstraSync MCP bridge endpoint (absent on self-hosted backends). */\n  mcpEndpoint?: string;\n  /** 5.1.0: bridge connector-discovery doc (absent on self-hosted backends). */\n  mcpDiscoveryUrl?: string;\n}\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  data: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n  fetchedAt: number;\n}\n\nconst CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 60 minutes\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();\nconst inflight = new Map<string, Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce>>();\n\nfunction wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl: string): string {\n  // apiBaseUrl is typically 'https://astrasync.ai/api' — strip the /api suffix\n  // to get the platform root, then append /.well-known/agentic-commerce.\n  const base = apiBaseUrl.replace(/\\/api\\/?$/, '');\n  return `${base}/.well-known/agentic-commerce`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const url = wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl);\n  const response = await sdkFetch(url, {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },\n    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),\n  });\n  if (!response.ok) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `AstraSync platform must expose /.well-known/agentic-commerce; ` +\n        `got ${response.status} from ${url}. SDK cannot initialise without it.`\n    );\n  }\n  const data = (await response.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (!data.registrationUrl || !data.documentationUrl || !data.verifyAccessUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `/.well-known/agentic-commerce response missing required fields ` +\n        `(registrationUrl, documentationUrl, verifyAccessUrl).`\n    );\n  }\n  return data as unknown as WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n}\n\n/**\n * Start a background fetch. Returns the promise for callers that need\n * to await it (first verify() call).\n */\nexport function prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const existing = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (existing) return existing;\n\n  const promise = fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl)\n    .then((data) => {\n      cache.set(apiBaseUrl, { data, fetchedAt: Date.now() });\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      return data;\n    })\n    .catch((err) => {\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      throw err;\n    });\n\n  inflight.set(apiBaseUrl, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get cached well-known URLs. If stale, triggers a background refresh\n * and returns stale data (stale-while-revalidate). If no cache exists,\n * awaits the in-flight fetch or starts a new one.\n */\nexport async function getWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const entry = cache.get(apiBaseUrl);\n\n  if (entry) {\n    if (Date.now() - entry.fetchedAt > CACHE_TTL_MS) {\n      // Stale — trigger background refresh, return stale data\n      prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl).catch(() => {\n        // Background refresh failed — stale data remains until next request\n      });\n    }\n    return entry.data;\n  }\n\n  // No cache — must await\n  const pending = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  return prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl);\n}\n\n/**\n * Synchronous cache read — returns cached URLs or undefined.\n * Never triggers a fetch. Used by verify() to avoid extra HTTP calls\n * in the hot path; adapters are responsible for prefetching.\n */\nexport function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): WellKnownAgenticCommerce | undefined {\n  return cache.get(apiBaseUrl)?.data;\n}\n\n/** Reset cache — for testing only. */\nexport function _resetWellKnownCache(): void {\n  cache.clear();\n  inflight.clear();\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Core Verification Logic\n *\n * This module handles the core verification logic, calling the AstraSync API\n * and processing the response into a standardized VerificationResult.\n */\n\nimport { sdkFetch } from './http';\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationRequest,\n  VerificationResult,\n  VerifiedAgent,\n  VerifiedDeveloper,\n  VerifiedOrganization,\n  GuidanceInfo,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  TokenGuidance,\n  RuntimeChallengeResult,\n  StepUpApprovalInfo,\n  SettlementOutcomeInfo,\n  SettlementArtifact,\n  AttemptReport,\n} from './types';\nimport { getTrustLevel } from './trust-levels';\nimport type { ObservedMetadata } from './metadata-capture';\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\nimport { getCachedWellKnownUrls, type WellKnownAgenticCommerce } from './well-known';\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values\n *\n * apiBaseUrl matches the OpenAPI authoritative server (https://astrasync.ai/api\n * for prod, https://staging.astrasync.ai/api for staging). Always include the\n * /api path prefix when overriding — registration / docs URLs are derived by\n * stripping it.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CONFIG: Partial<GatewayConfig> = {\n  apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n  // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.\n  // cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult applies the 60s\n  // default; the caller's explicit value is honoured for cacheable results.\n  // Denials and step-up escalations are NEVER cached (3.6.0) regardless of\n  // cacheTtl. Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.\n  debug: false,\n};\n\n/**\n * Init self-test state. Fires once per process on first verify() call to warn\n * if apiBaseUrl is pointing at the wrong host (e.g. a marketing site that\n * 200s with text/html instead of the API).\n */\nlet initCheckPerformed = false;\n\n/** Test-only: re-arm the one-time init self-check. */\nexport function _resetInitCheck(): void {\n  initCheckPerformed = false;\n}\n\n/** One-shot guard for v2.3.0 deprecation warning. */\nlet deprecationWarningShown = false;\n\nasync function performInitCheck(\n  apiBaseUrl: string,\n  debug?: boolean,\n  strictInit?: boolean,\n  apiKey?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  initCheckPerformed = true;\n  try {\n    const probeUrl = `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`;\n    // HEAD mirrors GET semantics (running the full request pipeline without a\n    // body) so the response carries the same content-type the marketing 404\n    // would return. OPTIONS often gets short-circuited by CORS-preflight\n    // handlers and returns no content-type, defeating the check.\n    const response = await sdkFetch(probeUrl, { method: 'HEAD' });\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n    if (contentType.startsWith('text/html')) {\n      const message =\n        `[VerificationGateway] apiBaseUrl '${apiBaseUrl}' returned HTML (content-type: ${contentType}). ` +\n        `This usually means apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing site instead of the API. ` +\n        `Expected: 'https://astrasync.ai/api' (prod) or 'https://staging.astrasync.ai/api' (staging).`;\n      // Audit F-A6-33: when strictInit is set, throw on misconfig instead\n      // of warning + continuing. Recurring footgun per\n      // `[[feedback_astrasync_api_url_canonical]]` — silent warn lets\n      // misconfigured prod deploys ship with all verify-access calls\n      // silently failing.\n      if (strictInit) {\n        throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n      }\n      console.warn(`${message} Set disableInitChecks: true on GatewayConfig to silence.`);\n    } else if (debug) {\n      console.log(\n        `[VerificationGateway] init check passed for ${apiBaseUrl} (content-type: ${contentType})`\n      );\n    }\n\n    // 4.0.0: key liveness probe. A dead API key otherwise surfaces only\n    // per-request as inbound agents get turned away — the operator should\n    // learn at deploy time. 404 = older backend without self-check: silent.\n    if (apiKey) {\n      const selfCheck = await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/self-check`, {\n        headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}` },\n      });\n      if (selfCheck.status === 401) {\n        const body = (await selfCheck.json().catch(() => ({}))) as {\n          code?: string;\n          message?: string;\n          remediation?: { manageUrl?: string };\n        };\n        const message =\n          `[VerificationGateway] the configured AstraSync API key was REJECTED at startup ` +\n          `(${body.code ?? 'api_key_invalid'}: ${body.message ?? 'invalid key'}). Every inbound agent ` +\n          `will be turned away until the key is rotated` +\n          (body.remediation?.manageUrl ? ` at ${body.remediation.manageUrl}` : '') +\n          `.`;\n        if (strictInit) {\n          throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n        }\n        console.error(message);\n      } else if (selfCheck.ok) {\n        const body = (await selfCheck.json().catch(() => ({}))) as {\n          daysToExpiry?: number | null;\n        };\n        if (typeof body.daysToExpiry === 'number' && body.daysToExpiry <= 7) {\n          console.warn(\n            `[VerificationGateway] the configured AstraSync API key expires in ${body.daysToExpiry} day(s) — ` +\n              `rotate it at Settings → Developer Tools before integrations start failing.`\n          );\n        } else if (debug) {\n          console.log('[VerificationGateway] API key self-check passed');\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (strictInit) {\n      // strict mode propagates init failures so callers get a clear,\n      // synchronous \"your config is broken\" signal at startup.\n      throw err;\n    }\n    if (debug) {\n      console.log(`[VerificationGateway] init check failed (non-blocking): ${String(err)}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple in-memory cache for verification results\n */\nconst verificationCache = new Map<string, { result: VerificationResult; expiresAt: number }>();\n\n/**\n * Generate cache key from the full request shape.\n *\n * Historically the key was credentials-only (`astraId-apiKey-jwt`),\n * which silently returned the cached result of a prior call even when the\n * subsequent call's purpose/action/counterparty/etc. differed. That was a\n * security gap — a warm cache could serve an allow verdict for a purpose the\n * agent hadn't actually been authorised for. Key now includes every field\n * that affects the backend verdict.\n *\n * MAINTAIN: when adding a field to VerificationRequest that affects the\n * backend verdict, add it to this key. Fields that don't affect verdict\n * (e.g. requestId, timestamps, sdkVersion) don't belong here — including\n * them would needlessly thrash the cache for repeated identical requests.\n *\n * 3.12.0 (Trust Record): `attemptId` and `considerationSet` are\n * deliberately EXCLUDED — like `callerMetadata.observedMetadata` they are\n * observational pass-through that never affects the verdict, and keying on\n * a per-attempt id would defeat verdict caching entirely. Cache hits get\n * their attemptId rewritten in verify() instead (never leak a prior\n * attempt's id from a cached result).\n */\nfunction getCacheKey(request: VerificationRequest, counterpartyId?: string): string {\n  const c = request.credentials;\n  return [\n    c.astraId || '',\n    c.apiKey || '',\n    c.jwt || '',\n    request.purpose || '',\n    request.action || '',\n    request.resourceType || '',\n    request.resource || '',\n    request.jurisdiction || '',\n    request.transactionValue ?? '',\n    request.currency || '',\n    // SECURITY (cross-merchant cache leak): the merchant identity is sent via\n    // `config.counterpartyId`, NOT on the request, so it was previously absent\n    // from the key — two verifies for the SAME agent/purpose/action/value but\n    // DIFFERENT merchants collided, and a grant at a permissive merchant (low\n    // trust floor) was served for a stricter one. Same bug class as the\n    // duration omission (F-A1-07). counterpartyId affects the backend verdict\n    // (trust floor / per-route policy), so it MUST key the cache.\n    counterpartyId || '',\n    request.counterpartyUrl || '',\n    request.counterpartyType || '',\n    request.isSubAgentRequest ? '1' : '0',\n    request.parentAgentId || '',\n    request.subAgentDepth ?? '',\n    // Audit F-A1-07: previously-missing dimensions that DO affect the\n    // backend verdict. Without these, two requests with different\n    // durations (e.g. 60s vs 86400s) collided on the same cache key and\n    // the shorter-duration allow served the longer-duration request.\n    request.durationRequired ?? '',\n    request.invocationProtocol || '',\n    request.enableRuntimeChallenge ? '1' : '0',\n    // callerMetadata fields contribute to risk model; include the ones\n    // backend reads. sourceIp/userAgent/forwardedFor change per-request\n    // so their inclusion effectively forces a re-check for any varying\n    // client (the right behavior — IP-driven anomaly scoring shouldn't\n    // be cached across IPs).\n    request.callerMetadata?.sourceIp || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.userAgent || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.forwardedFor || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || '',\n    // UAT2 Bug B (5.4.1): the commerce phase and cart identity DO affect the\n    // backend verdict — the confirm leg is the ONLY leg that may execute\n    // first-party settlement. Without these, a confirm within the cache TTL of\n    // its start_checkout quote was served the cached quote-leg grant (no\n    // settlementOutcome) and never reached the backend. Same F-A1-07 bug class.\n    request.commercePhase || '',\n    request.checkoutSessionId || '',\n  ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if cached result is still valid\n */\nfunction getCachedResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): VerificationResult | null {\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  const cached = verificationCache.get(key);\n\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {\n    return cached.result;\n  }\n\n  if (cached) {\n    verificationCache.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache a verification result.\n *\n * 3.6.0: uniform 60s default. The earlier step-up TTL split (300s for\n * step-up verdicts) is gone — step-up verdicts are no longer cached AT ALL\n * (see the write predicate in verify()): a cached step_up_required result\n * carries a pollUrl that goes stale (consumed/expired) and, worse, keeps\n * denying retries that the owner has already approved. When `configuredTtl`\n * is set (truthy positive number), it's honoured for cacheable results.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\n\nfunction cacheResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  result: VerificationResult,\n  configuredTtl: number | undefined,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): void {\n  const ttlSeconds = configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0 ? configuredTtl : DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  verificationCache.set(key, {\n    result,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1000,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear the verification cache\n */\nexport function clearCache(): void {\n  verificationCache.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract agent credentials from various sources\n */\nexport function extractCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  query?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n): AgentCredentials {\n  const credentials: AgentCredentials = {};\n\n  // Audit F-A1-12: ASTRA-ID shape validation. Accept only the canonical\n  // pattern (ASTRA-/ASTRAE- prefix + 1-64 url-safe chars) to prevent CRLF\n  // header injection or downstream interpolation surprises. Reject otherwise.\n  const ASTRA_ID_PATTERN = /^ASTRAE?-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;\n\n  // Check for ASTRA-ID in headers (case-insensitive). Accepts the historical\n  // X-Astra-Id name plus the X-Astra-AgentId / x-astra-agent-id alias the\n  // partner asked for in #9a — both surface the same field.\n  const astraIdHeader =\n    headers['x-astra-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-ID'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agentid'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-AgentId'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agent-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Agent-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-AGENT-ID'];\n  if (astraIdHeader) {\n    // Audit F-A1-11: guard array-confusion. If multiple X-Astra-Id headers\n    // were sent (Express collapses to comma-joined string on most paths),\n    // take only the first canonical-shaped one.\n    const raw = Array.isArray(astraIdHeader)\n      ? astraIdHeader[0]\n      : typeof astraIdHeader === 'string'\n        ? astraIdHeader\n        : undefined;\n    if (typeof raw === 'string' && ASTRA_ID_PATTERN.test(raw)) {\n      credentials.astraId = raw;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check for API key in headers\n  const apiKeyHeader = headers['x-api-key'] || headers['X-Api-Key'] || headers['X-API-KEY'];\n  if (apiKeyHeader) {\n    credentials.apiKey = Array.isArray(apiKeyHeader) ? apiKeyHeader[0] : apiKeyHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check Authorization header for Bearer token.\n  // Audit F-A1-11: defensive type guard — Array.isArray gives a non-string,\n  // and Express path quirks can produce undefined despite the truthy check.\n  const authHeader = headers['authorization'] || headers['Authorization'];\n  if (authHeader) {\n    const authValue = Array.isArray(authHeader) ? authHeader[0] : authHeader;\n    if (typeof authValue === 'string') {\n      credentials.authorizationHeader = authValue;\n      if (authValue.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n        credentials.jwt = authValue.slice(7);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check query parameters as fallback\n  if (query) {\n    if (query.astraId && !credentials.astraId) {\n      credentials.astraId = query.astraId;\n    }\n    if (query.apiKey && !credentials.apiKey) {\n      credentials.apiKey = query.apiKey;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if credentials are present\n */\nexport function hasCredentials(credentials: AgentCredentials): boolean {\n  return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);\n}\n\n/**\n * Source of a synthesised guidance response. The sources are split — the\n * `'no_credentials'` shape is the original (caller has no AstraSync\n * credentials, suggest registration). The `'api_error'` shape is for when\n * the verify-access HTTP call itself failed (5xx, network, etc.) — DON'T\n * tell a verified-but-currently-blocked partner to \"register your agent\".\n *\n * 4.0.0 adds `'merchant_misconfig'`: the backend rejected THIS INTEGRATION'S\n * own API key (401 api_key_revoked/expired/invalid). Neither the agent's\n * fault nor a platform outage — retrying won't help, and the inbound agent\n * deserves to know the site operator's integration is broken (the\n * gadget-emporium failure mode: a rotated key silently 401ing every\n * credentialed agent for days).\n */\ntype GuidanceSource = 'no_credentials' | 'api_error' | 'merchant_misconfig';\n\n/**\n * MCP-connector steering (5.1.0). Present only when the backend's well-known\n * doc advertises a hosted bridge. The copy must directly counter the observed\n * model refusal (\"go register manually on the dashboard\"): registration via\n * the connector is the agent's own next action, with the human approval built\n * into the flow.\n */\nfunction mcpGuidance(urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce): GuidanceInfo['mcp'] {\n  if (!urls?.mcpEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    endpoint: urls.mcpEndpoint,\n    discoveryUrl: urls.mcpDiscoveryUrl,\n    message:\n      'If you are operating inside an MCP-capable host (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, or any MCP client), ' +\n      'add the AstraSync MCP connector instead of integrating these URLs by hand: registration through ' +\n      'the connector is KEYLESS and HUMAN-APPROVED — your human approves in an in-chat card, and you ' +\n      'never see, hold, or transmit an API key, password, or private key.',\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Create guidance response for unverified agents or for API-error fallback.\n *\n * The source is split so the `register your agent` template\n * doesn't fire on transient backend failures. Also threads `correlationId`\n * through so adapter `onDenied` handlers can surface it on the merchant's\n * response body for log correlation.\n */\nfunction createGuidanceResponse(\n  _config: GatewayConfig,\n  reason?: string,\n  options: {\n    source?: GuidanceSource;\n    correlationId?: string;\n    /** 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server-echoed attempt handle, threaded like correlationId. */\n    attemptId?: string;\n    urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n    /** 4.0.0: backend-provided remediation URLs for the merchant (misconfig source). */\n    remediation?: { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string };\n  } = {}\n): VerificationResult {\n  const source = options.source ?? 'no_credentials';\n  const isApiError = source === 'api_error';\n  const isMisconfig = source === 'merchant_misconfig';\n  const urls = options.urls;\n\n  const guidance: GuidanceInfo = isMisconfig\n    ? {\n        message:\n          \"This site's AstraSync integration is misconfigured (its API key was revoked, expired, or rotated). \" +\n          'Your identity and the AstraSync platform are fine — contact the site operator. Retrying will not help.',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: options.remediation?.docsUrl ?? urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        steps: [\n          'Report the failure to the site operator — their AstraSync API key needs rotating',\n          'Do not retry: the failure is deterministic until the operator updates their key',\n        ],\n      }\n    : isApiError\n      ? {\n          message:\n            'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry with exponential backoff; if the issue persists, contact support with the correlationId.',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n          steps: [\n            'Retry the request with exponential backoff',\n            'If failures persist, share the correlationId with support',\n          ],\n        }\n      : {\n          message:\n            'This service verifies AI agents before granting access. Please register your agent with AstraSync.',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n          steps: [\n            // MCP steering leads when the hosted bridge is advertised — the\n            // connector is the agent-actionable path (keyless, human-approved).\n            ...(urls?.mcpEndpoint\n              ? [\n                  `Fastest path (inside an MCP host): add the AstraSync MCP connector at ${urls.mcpEndpoint} — keyless, human-approved registration`,\n                ]\n              : []),\n            'Register for an AstraSync account',\n            'Create and register your agent',\n            'Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers',\n            'Retry your request',\n          ],\n          ...(mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }),\n        };\n\n  return {\n    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or\n    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);\n    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).\n    identityVerified: false,\n    policyAllowed: false,\n    guidance,\n    denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ['No valid agent credentials provided'],\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so\n    // partners (and their custom onDenied handlers) can branch on\n    // dimension. Without this, the synthesised stub was indistinguishable\n    // from a real policy deny.\n    failures: isMisconfig\n      ? [\n          {\n            dimension: 'verify_access.merchant_misconfigured',\n            message: reason ?? 'The integration API key was rejected by AstraSync',\n            guidance: guidance.message,\n          },\n        ]\n      : isApiError\n        ? [\n            {\n              dimension: 'verify_access.api_error',\n              message: reason ?? 'Verification temporarily unavailable',\n              guidance: guidance.message,\n            },\n          ]\n        : undefined,\n    // 4.0.0: typed marker so adapters render the misconfig envelope (503 +\n    // MERCHANT_VERIFICATION_MISCONFIGURED) without string-matching.\n    ...(isMisconfig && { misconfigured: true }),\n    // 4.6.0: a transient api_error is retryable — mark it so consumers surface\n    // \"temporarily unavailable, retry\" (recommendation 'error') instead of\n    // coercing the absent recommendation to a policy 'deny'. Misconfig is\n    // deterministic and intentionally NOT marked retryable.\n    ...(isApiError && { retryable: true }),\n    correlationId: options.correlationId,\n    attemptId: options.attemptId,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Call the AstraSync verify-access API\n */\nasync function callVerifyAccessAPI(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  access?: {\n    allowed: boolean;\n    reason?: string;\n    /**\n     * Aggregated denial failures (v2.9.8+). Empty / absent when allowed.\n     * Each entry is `{ dimension, message, guidance? }` — see\n     * `AccessFailure` for the contract.\n     */\n    failures?: Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }>;\n    requiresStepUp?: boolean;\n    requiresApproval?: boolean;\n    appliedPolicy?: {\n      boundaryName: string;\n      policyVersion: string;\n    };\n    counterparty?: {\n      id: string;\n      name: string;\n      trustScoreRequirement: number;\n    };\n  };\n  agent?: {\n    kyaAgentId: string;\n    astraId: string;\n    name: string;\n    trustScore: number;\n    trustLevel: string;\n    agentStatus: string;\n    blockchainStatus: string;\n  };\n  developer?: {\n    kyaOwnerId: string;\n    fullName: string;\n    email: string;\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  organization?: {\n    name: string;\n    verified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Structured explanation of the verification decision. Tells the merchant\n   * WHY (id verified? challenge passed? request within PDLSS? trust score?)\n   * without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or other-tenant counterparty\n   * membership. Empty `attestations` unless the endpoint's access policy\n   * declared `required_attestations`.\n   */\n  verificationContext?: {\n    idVerified: boolean;\n    runtimeChallenge: {\n      status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';\n      checkedAt: string | null;\n    };\n    pdlssCheck: {\n      result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';\n      purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';\n      scope: 'approved' | 'denied';\n    };\n    dynamicTrustScore: number;\n    attestations: Array<{\n      type: string;\n      status: 'passed' | 'failed';\n      /** LMAX-POC C1: underlying check timestamp for merchant freshness gates. */\n      checkedAt: string;\n      validUntil?: string;\n      proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';\n      proof: string;\n    }>;\n  };\n  error?: string;\n  /**\n   * 4.0.0: the backend 401'd this integration's OWN API key (revoked /\n   * expired / invalid) — deterministic merchant-side misconfig, not a\n   * transient failure. `misconfigCode` carries the backend's api_key_* code\n   * and `remediation` its operator-facing URLs when present.\n   */\n  misconfig?: boolean;\n  misconfigCode?: string;\n  remediation?: { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string };\n  /**\n   * When the verify-access server response carries a\n   * correlationId on an error envelope, propagate it so the SDK can thread\n   * it through createGuidanceResponse → adapter onDenied → merchant body.\n   */\n  correlationId?: string;\n  /**\n   * 3.12.0 (Trust Record): the server echoes the attempt-chain\n   * handle top-level on every response branch (error envelopes included).\n   */\n  attemptId?: string;\n}> {\n  const { credentials, ...requestData } = request;\n\n  // Build the request body. agentId is omitted when not provided so the\n  // server treats it as an anonymous canonical-flow call (Branch A/B/C).\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n    ...(credentials.astraId && { agentId: credentials.astraId }),\n    ...(requestData.purpose && { purpose: requestData.purpose }),\n  };\n\n  // Add optional fields\n  if (requestData.action) body.action = requestData.action;\n  if (requestData.resourceType) body.resourceType = requestData.resourceType;\n  if (requestData.resource) body.resource = requestData.resource;\n  if (requestData.jurisdiction) body.jurisdiction = requestData.jurisdiction;\n  if (requestData.transactionValue) body.transactionValue = requestData.transactionValue;\n  if (requestData.currency) body.currency = requestData.currency;\n  if (requestData.isSubAgentRequest) body.isSubAgentRequest = requestData.isSubAgentRequest;\n  if (requestData.parentAgentId) body.parentAgentId = requestData.parentAgentId;\n  if (requestData.subAgentDepth !== undefined) body.subAgentDepth = requestData.subAgentDepth;\n  // Handshake Protocol v10 additions\n  if (requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge)\n    body.enableRuntimeChallenge = requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge;\n  if (requestData.createSession) body.createSession = requestData.createSession;\n  if (requestData.durationRequired) body.durationRequired = requestData.durationRequired;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyType) body.counterpartyType = requestData.counterpartyType;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyUrl) body.counterpartyUrl = requestData.counterpartyUrl;\n  if (config.counterpartyId) body.counterpartyId = config.counterpartyId;\n  if (requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions)\n    body.runtimeChallengeOptions = requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions;\n  // Round-12 (F19): transport-vs-intent separation. MCP middleware sets\n  // this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers leave it unset.\n  if (requestData.invocationProtocol) body.invocationProtocol = requestData.invocationProtocol;\n  // 5.3.0 (astra-pay): checkout-leg discriminator — first-party settlement\n  // fires only on 'confirm'; absent keeps pre-phase server behavior.\n  if (requestData.commercePhase) body.commercePhase = requestData.commercePhase;\n  // Per-cart idempotency key (checkout session id) forwarded on the confirm\n  // leg so concurrent confirms for one cart charge at most once.\n  if (requestData.checkoutSessionId) body.checkoutSessionId = requestData.checkoutSessionId;\n  // Order-plane cart lines (receipts + fulfillment email) — informational.\n  if (requestData.checkoutItems) body.checkoutItems = requestData.checkoutItems;\n  // 3.9.0 (§33.5 #1): raw commerce artifacts forwarded verbatim — the\n  // backend's Step 0.5 pipeline does the cryptographic verification\n  // server-side (adapters forward, never verify locally).\n  if (requestData.commerceArtifacts) body.commerceArtifacts = requestData.commerceArtifacts;\n  // 3.12.0 (Trust Record, §33.5 #3): attempt-chain handle + consideration set,\n  // forwarded skip-when-undefined (observedMetadata precedent) — pure\n  // observational pass-through; the server echoes attemptId on every branch.\n  if (requestData.attemptId) body.attemptId = requestData.attemptId;\n  if (requestData.considerationSet) body.considerationSet = requestData.considerationSet;\n\n  // Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): emit the SDK package version on every\n  // verify-access body so the backend can auto-populate `kya_counterparty.\n  // sdk_version` for the calling endpoint. Body field (not User-Agent\n  // header) is the canonical channel — works in Node, browser, behind\n  // Cloudflare, and across SDK bundlers without environment-specific\n  // header gymnastics. Backend's `validation.ts:verifyAccessSchema`\n  // accepts the semver regex; the auto-pop logic is forward-only.\n  body.sdkVersion = SDK_VERSION;\n\n  // Forward caller metadata when present. Merges the legacy top-level\n  // clientIp/userAgent into the nested block for backward compatibility.\n  if (requestData.callerMetadata || requestData.clientIp || requestData.userAgent) {\n    const meta = {\n      ...(requestData.clientIp && { sourceIp: requestData.clientIp }),\n      ...(requestData.userAgent && { userAgent: requestData.userAgent }),\n      ...requestData.callerMetadata,\n    };\n    if (Object.keys(meta).length > 0) body.callerMetadata = meta;\n  }\n\n  // Build headers\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    ...config.customHeaders,\n  };\n\n  // verify-access requires authentication. Use ONLY the merchant's\n  // configured apiKey for outbound auth. Previously the caller's inbound\n  // Authorization header took priority, which pivoted the verify-access\n  // call to the caller's identity — letting an attacker who supplied\n  // their own Authorization header trigger verify-access calls under\n  // THEIR account and observe the resulting verdicts for arbitrary\n  // lookups they triggered via the merchant. Audit F-A1-10.\n  //\n  // The caller-supplied JWT (if any) is already extracted to\n  // credentials.jwt and travels in the verify-access request body so\n  // backend can evaluate it as the agent's identity claim — separate from\n  // the merchant-attribution auth on the outbound HTTPS call.\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    // Legacy header kept for compatibility with any middleware that reads it directly.\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    // 4.0.0: hard timeout — without one, a backend that accepts the\n    // connection but never answers hangs the merchant's middleware and every\n    // inbound agent request behind it (observed live on a partner property).\n    // Timeouts land on the catch path below → api_error (fail-closed),\n    // NOT misconfig. The edge adapter races its own tighter withBudget.\n    const response = await sdkFetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: JSON.stringify(body),\n      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(config.verifyTimeoutMs ?? 10_000),\n    });\n\n    const data = await response.json();\n\n    // v2.3.8 (defect #29): treat 410 Gone as a deterministic deactivated-endpoint\n    // signal. Older SDKs may treat any non-2xx as transient and retry; v2.3.8+\n    // surfaces it as a structured denial with `reason: 'endpoint_deactivated'`\n    // so callers can distinguish \"endpoint gone\" from \"endpoint denied this\".\n    if (response.status === 410) {\n      return {\n        success: true,\n        // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): keep the server-echoed attempt handle even on\n        // the synthesised 410 deny shape (echoed on every branch).\n        attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n        access: {\n          allowed: false,\n          reason: 'endpoint_deactivated',\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'endpoint.deactivated',\n              message:\n                typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'Endpoint has been deactivated',\n              guidance:\n                typeof data?.guidance === 'string'\n                  ? data.guidance\n                  : 'Reactivate via POST /api/endpoints/{id}/reactivate, or update the URL on the calling agent.',\n            },\n          ],\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      // 4.0.0: a 401 from verify-access can ONLY mean the backend rejected\n      // THIS INTEGRATION'S own API key — agent denials come back as 200 with\n      // access.allowed=false. Surface it as merchant-misconfig, not a\n      // transient api_error: it is deterministic until the operator rotates\n      // the key, and the \"retry with backoff\" template actively misleads.\n      // Backends ≥ this round also send code: api_key_* + remediation URLs.\n      if (response.status === 401) {\n        return {\n          success: false,\n          error: data.message || data.error || 'Integration API key rejected',\n          misconfig: true,\n          misconfigCode: typeof data?.code === 'string' ? data.code : undefined,\n          remediation:\n            data?.remediation && typeof data.remediation === 'object'\n              ? (data.remediation as { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string })\n              : undefined,\n          correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n          attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n        };\n      }\n      // Round-10 (#47, O5): propagate correlationId on the error path too if\n      // the server happened to include one (some 5xx error envelopes carry\n      // it). Lets the SDK pass it through to the adapter onDenied handler.\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: data.message || data.error || `API returned ${response.status}`,\n        correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n        attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return data;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: `Failed to call verify-access API: ${message}`,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for a single verify() call (as opposed to GatewayConfig, which is\n * per-gateway). Mirrors the Java SDK's `verify(request, bypassCache)`.\n */\nexport interface VerifyOptions {\n  /**\n   * Skip the cache READ for this call so the request is guaranteed to reach\n   * the backend (the result is still written to the cache if cacheable).\n   * Used by the step-up hold-and-poll retry: the re-verify after an approval\n   * must hit the server to redeem the single-use approval.\n   */\n  bypassCache?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Main verification function\n */\nexport async function verify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n  // v2.5.0: read well-known URLs from cache (prefetched by adapter at middleware creation).\n  // Synchronous — never triggers a fetch. If cache is empty, guidance URLs are empty strings.\n  const urls = mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl\n    ? getCachedWellKnownUrls(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl)\n    : undefined;\n\n  // One-time init self-test — fire-and-forget by default, never blocks verify().\n  // Audit F-A6-33: when GatewayConfig.strictInit is set, the init promise is\n  // awaited and any failure throws synchronously so callers learn about\n  // misconfigured apiBaseUrl on the first verify() call rather than silently\n  // running with broken auth.\n  if (!initCheckPerformed && !mergedConfig.disableInitChecks && mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl) {\n    if (mergedConfig.strictInit) {\n      await performInitCheck(\n        mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl,\n        mergedConfig.debug,\n        true,\n        mergedConfig.apiKey\n      );\n    } else {\n      void performInitCheck(\n        mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl,\n        mergedConfig.debug,\n        false,\n        mergedConfig.apiKey\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Deprecation warning for v2.3.0 removed config fields. Fires once per process.\n  if (\n    !deprecationWarningShown &&\n    (config.minTrustScore !== undefined || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== undefined)\n  ) {\n    deprecationWarningShown = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 ' +\n        'and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access decisions ' +\n        '(verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score). To gate access ' +\n        \"to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side.\"\n    );\n  }\n\n  // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits here. We forward the\n  // request to the server with no agentId; the server applies the endpoint's\n  // unverifiedAgentPolicy and returns advisory. createGuidanceResponse remains\n  // as the offline fallback if the API itself fails (handled below).\n\n  // Check cache first. Caching on unless caller explicitly sets cacheTtl: 0\n  // to disable. Undefined falls through to the 60s default at cacheResult\n  // write time. options.bypassCache skips the read only (hold-and-poll retry\n  // must reach the backend to redeem its approval).\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && !options?.bypassCache) {\n    const cached = getCachedResult(request, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n        console.log('[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result');\n      }\n      // 3.12.0 (Trust Record, §33.5 #3): attemptId is excluded from the cache\n      // key, so the stored result may carry a PRIOR attempt's id. Overwrite it\n      // with this request's own attemptId — or drop it when this request has\n      // none — a cached verdict must never leak another attempt's handle.\n      // Shallow clone: never mutate the stored entry (a concurrent holder of\n      // the same cached object may still be reading it).\n      const hit: VerificationResult = { ...cached };\n      if (request.attemptId) {\n        hit.attemptId = request.attemptId;\n      } else {\n        delete hit.attemptId;\n      }\n      return hit;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Inject counterparty info from config if not already set in request\n  const enrichedRequest = { ...request };\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl && mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl = mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl;\n  }\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyType && mergedConfig.counterpartyType) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyType = mergedConfig.counterpartyType;\n  }\n\n  // Call the API\n  if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n    console.log('[VerificationGateway] Calling verify-access API');\n  }\n\n  const apiResponse = await callVerifyAccessAPI(mergedConfig, enrichedRequest);\n\n  // 3.6.0: the server emits a top-level denialReasons array on every deny\n  // path (same strings as the failure messages). Non-empty → authoritative;\n  // absent/empty → fall back to the client-side reconstructions below.\n  const rawServerDenialReasons = (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).denialReasons;\n  const serverDenialReasons =\n    Array.isArray(rawServerDenialReasons) && rawServerDenialReasons.length > 0\n      ? (rawServerDenialReasons as string[])\n      : undefined;\n\n  // Handle API errors\n  if (!apiResponse.success) {\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): distinguish API errors from missing-credentials.\n    // The previous default tagged any failure with the \"register your\n    // agent\" template, which is misleading to a verified partner whose\n    // verify-access call hit a 500. The `api_error` source surfaces a\n    // typed `verify_access.api_error` failure entry instead.\n    // 4.0.0: a rejected merchant key gets its own source — deterministic\n    // misconfig must not wear the \"temporarily unavailable, retry\" template.\n    return createGuidanceResponse(mergedConfig, apiResponse.error, {\n      source: apiResponse.misconfig ? 'merchant_misconfig' : 'api_error',\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as { correlationId?: string }).correlationId,\n      attemptId: (apiResponse as { attemptId?: string }).attemptId,\n      remediation: apiResponse.remediation,\n      urls,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Check access result\n  if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {\n    // v2.9.8 (defect M1): aggregated failures across every gate that\n    // denied. Surface them on the result so the integrator can see every\n    // blocker in one go instead of the previous fail-fast cascade.\n    const aggregatedFailures = (apiResponse.access as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)\n      ?.failures as Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }> | undefined;\n    // Round-18 G4: backend denied access (PDLSS or other gate); identity status\n    // depends on whether the backend resolved the caller. Read from\n    // verificationContext.idVerified; default false if absent (anonymous or\n    // identity-fail paths land here too). policyAllowed is false by definition\n    // in this branch (apiResponse.access.allowed === false).\n    const idVerifiedFromBackend =\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true;\n    const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,\n      policyAllowed: false,\n      // 3.6.0: the server now emits top-level denialReasons on every deny\n      // path — prefer it verbatim; the failure-message reconstruction remains\n      // as the fallback for older backends.\n      denialReasons:\n        serverDenialReasons ??\n        (aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0\n          ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message)\n          : apiResponse.access?.reason\n            ? [apiResponse.access.reason]\n            : ['Access denied']),\n      failures: aggregatedFailures,\n      requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n      requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n      guidance: {\n        message: apiResponse.access?.reason || 'Access denied by PDLSS policy',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        // 5.1.0: anonymous callers land on this branch — steer MCP-hosted\n        // agents to the connector (this is what the edge deny body surfaces).\n        ...(mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }),\n      },\n      verifiedAt: new Date(),\n      // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too\n      sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n      // Anonymous traffic has no session → correlationId is the per-attempt\n      // linking key (the sessionId-equivalent for anonymous callers).\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n      // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server echoes the attempt-chain handle on\n      // every branch — denials included (the funnel outlives one deny).\n      attemptId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).attemptId as string | undefined,\n      recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n        .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n      recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n        | string[]\n        | undefined,\n      stepUpApproval: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).stepUpApproval as\n        | StepUpApprovalInfo\n        | undefined,\n      settlement: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlement as\n        | SettlementArtifact\n        | undefined,\n      settlementOutcome: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementOutcome as\n        | SettlementOutcomeInfo\n        | undefined,\n    };\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  // Build successful result\n  const agent: VerifiedAgent | undefined = apiResponse.agent\n    ? {\n        astraId: apiResponse.agent.astraId,\n        name: apiResponse.agent.name,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,\n        trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),\n        blockchainVerified: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === 'verified',\n        status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus as VerifiedAgent['status'],\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const developer: VerifiedDeveloper | undefined = apiResponse.developer\n    ? {\n        astradId: apiResponse.developer.kyaOwnerId,\n        name: apiResponse.developer.fullName,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.developer.trustScore || 0,\n        verified: apiResponse.developer.identityVerified,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const organization: VerifiedOrganization | undefined = apiResponse.organization\n    ? {\n        name: apiResponse.organization.name,\n        verified: apiResponse.organization.verified,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  // Verification context — structured \"why\" the merchant gets in v2.2.4+.\n  // Carries appliedPolicy (no UUIDs), pdlssCheck summary, dynamic trust score,\n  // and policy-driven attestations. Replaces the old over-sharing `pdlss` block.\n  const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;\n\n  const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n    // 4.5.0 (probe F1): read idVerified from verificationContext with the\n    // SAME absent⇒false default as the deny branch. The previous `!== false`\n    // default manufactured `identityVerified: true` for anonymous\n    // allow_full/allow_partial/audit responses (which allow access but omit\n    // verificationContext entirely) — the \"anonymous caller labelled\n    // verified\" defect. Every authenticated success response has carried\n    // `verificationContext.idVerified: true` since v2.2.4, so a truth claim\n    // this load-bearing must never be defaulted on.\n    identityVerified:\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true,\n    policyAllowed: true,\n    agent,\n    developer,\n    organization,\n    appliedPolicy: apiResponse.access?.appliedPolicy,\n    verificationContext,\n    requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n    requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n    cacheTtl: mergedConfig.cacheTtl,\n    // Handshake Protocol v10 enhanced fields (present when backend returns them)\n    sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n    // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous responses surface correlationId\n    // (no session row exists for unverified callers).\n    correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n    // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server-echoed attempt-chain handle.\n    attemptId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).attemptId as string | undefined,\n    runtimeChallenge: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).runtimeChallenge as\n      | RuntimeChallengeResult\n      | undefined,\n    tokenGuidance: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).tokenGuidance as\n      | TokenGuidance\n      | undefined,\n    recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n    recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n      | string[]\n      | undefined,\n    warningHeader: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).warningHeader as\n      | { name: string; value: string }\n      | undefined,\n    stepUpApproval: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).stepUpApproval as\n      | StepUpApprovalInfo\n      | undefined,\n    settlement: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlement as\n      | SettlementArtifact\n      | undefined,\n    settlementOutcome: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementOutcome as\n      | SettlementOutcomeInfo\n      | undefined,\n  };\n\n  // Enforce AstraSync recommendation\n  if (result.recommendation === 'deny') {\n    // Round-18 G4: recommendation-driven deny lands on the success-path\n    // construction (identity was resolved). Flip policy only — identity stays\n    // verified — so adapters return 403 (re-auth won't help; the policy\n    // decision is the blocker).\n    result.policyAllowed = false;\n    // 3.6.0: server-sent top-level denialReasons wins; recommendationReasons\n    // reconstruction is the fallback for older backends.\n    result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ??\n      result.recommendationReasons ?? ['Access denied by AstraSync recommendation'];\n    result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge\n      ? {\n          message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || 'runtime challenge failed'}`,\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        }\n      : {\n          message: result.recommendationReasons?.[0] || 'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        };\n  } else if (result.recommendation === 'step_up_required') {\n    // The escalation signal rides on `requiresStepUp` / `stepUpApproval`, not\n    // on any masquerade of the (now-removed) access band.\n    result.requiresStepUp = true;\n    result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ??\n      result.recommendationReasons ?? ['Step-up verification required'];\n  }\n\n  // Cache the result. Never cache denials (agent may fix challenge endpoint\n  // and retry) NOR step-up escalations (3.6.0 — the same bug the Java SDK\n  // had: a cached step_up_required verdict keeps denying retries the owner\n  // has already approved, and its pollUrl goes stale once consumed/expired).\n  // Escalations stay uncached even when the caller pins an explicit cacheTtl.\n  const escalates =\n    result.requiresStepUp === true ||\n    result.requiresApproval === true ||\n    result.recommendation === 'step_up_required';\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== 'deny' && !escalates) {\n    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a counterparty's grant/deny decision for a verification session.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function recordDecision(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  sessionId: string,\n  decision: 'granted' | 'denied',\n  reason?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/${sessionId}/decision`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({ decision, reason }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report post-hoc consideration/outcome data for an attempt chain (Trust\n * Record). Use when the signal never reached verify-access: a\n * catalog served from a local cache, a transport-side deny (sku not found,\n * over budget), or a terminal outcome (settled / blocked on step-up).\n * Authenticated with the same credentials as verify(); the backend responds\n * 202 and folds the data into the attempt chain keyed by `attemptId`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed, never throws.\n */\nexport async function reportAttempt(config: GatewayConfig, report: AttemptReport): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  // counterpartyId resolution mirrors reportUnregisteredAttempt: an explicit\n  // report value wins; otherwise attribute to the configured endpoint.\n  const body = {\n    ...report,\n    ...(!report.counterpartyId &&\n      config.counterpartyId && { counterpartyId: config.counterpartyId }),\n  };\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/attempt-report`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify(body),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch the per-route policy for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * v2.9.7 moved policy authority into the dashboard — the SDK no longer\n * accepts `routes` from merchant-side source code, it fetches them from\n * here on init (and refreshes periodically).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the request fails for any reason — the caller decides\n * how to fall back (the middleware allows-all when no policy is loaded so\n * a misconfigured init doesn't take down the merchant's API).\n */\nexport async function fetchRoutes(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<RouteAccessConfigShape[] | null> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  try {\n    const response = await sdkFetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/routes`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers }\n    );\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { routes?: RouteAccessConfigShape[] } };\n    return body.data?.routes ?? [];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of an EndpointRoute as the SDK consumes it. Mirrors the\n * server's `EndpointRoute` type and the SDK's `RouteAccessConfig` — same\n * JSON moves between server and SDK unchanged.\n */\nexport interface RouteAccessConfigShape {\n  pattern: string;\n  method: string;\n  /** Pass through unenforced (observe). Replaces `minAccessLevel: 'none'`. */\n  observe?: boolean;\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  requiredPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  maxDuration?: number;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  requirePurpose?: boolean;\n  /** Send-mapping — see RouteAccessConfig in types.ts. */\n  purpose?: string;\n  action?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an agent AND automatically record the grant/deny decision.\n *\n * This is the recommended entry point for counterparties that call verify()\n * directly (e.g. MCP servers) rather than using createMiddleware().\n * It adds createSession: true, then fire-and-forgets the decision.\n */\nexport async function verifyAndRecord(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n  const result = await verify(mergedConfig, { ...request, createSession: true }, options);\n  const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n  if (sessionId) {\n    // Round-18 G4: a session is \"granted\" only if identity verified AND\n    // policy allowed; either failing is a deny.\n    if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n    } else {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n    }\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report an unregistered agent attempt (no AstraSync credentials).\n * Called by SDK adapters when an agent is redirected to /docs/agent-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    /**\n     * 3.6.0: optional — the backend attributes by counterpartyId first (sent\n     * from config below) and requires at least ONE of counterpartyId/URL.\n     * A null/undefined URL is omitted from the body, not sent as null.\n     */\n    counterpartyUrl?: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    sourceIp?: string;\n    userAgent?: string;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n    /**\n     * 3.9.0 — edge-adapter evidence fields, persisted into the\n     * event's eventData by the backend: `protocol` = detected transport/\n     * credential protocol; `evidence` = light crypto-free detection detail.\n     */\n    protocol?: string;\n    evidence?: Record<string, unknown>;\n    /**\n     * Maximal metadata capture — the full sanitised metadata for an\n     * unregistered caller (every signal legitimately visible on the wire).\n     * Persisted into eventData; feeds platform attribution and (via\n     * correlationId) registration auto-fill. Fire-and-forget, so free.\n     */\n    observedMetadata?: ObservedMetadata;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  const { counterpartyUrl, ...rest } = data;\n  const body = {\n    ...rest,\n    ...(counterpartyUrl && { counterpartyUrl }),\n    ...(config.counterpartyId && { counterpartyId: config.counterpartyId }),\n  };\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/unregistered-attempt`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(body),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check failure.\n * Called by SDK adapters when the agent's requested PDLSS exceeds\n * counterparty-defined maximums BEFORE calling verify-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    agentId: string;\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    failures: Array<{\n      field: string;\n      requested: string | number;\n      limit: string | number | string[];\n      message: string;\n    }>;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/counterparty-pre-check-failure`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n *\n * The return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s split — partners\n * writing custom handlers around `quickVerify` get the same identity/policy\n * distinction as those calling `verify()` directly. Map to HTTP status the\n * same way: `!identityVerified` → 401; `identityVerified && !policyAllowed`\n * → 403.\n */\nexport async function quickVerify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  credentials: AgentCredentials\n): Promise<{\n  identityVerified: boolean;\n  policyAllowed: boolean;\n  reason?: string;\n}> {\n  const result = await verify(config, {\n    credentials,\n    purpose: 'verification',\n  });\n\n  return {\n    identityVerified: result.identityVerified,\n    policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,\n    reason: result.denialReasons?.[0],\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Helpers over {@link NormalizedRequest} — header access, URL\n * reconstruction, and the full sanitized metadata capture.\n */\n\nimport {\n  sanitizeHeaders,\n  CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION,\n  type ObservedMetadata,\n} from '../metadata-capture';\nimport type { NormalizedRequest } from './types';\n\n/** Value of a header (name matched case-insensitively), or undefined. */\nexport function headerValue(req: NormalizedRequest, name: string): string | undefined {\n  return req.headers[name.toLowerCase()];\n}\n\n/** Full request URL as the origin will see it (scheme fixed to https). */\nexport function requestUrl(req: NormalizedRequest, host: string): string {\n  const qs = req.querystring ? `?${req.querystring}` : '';\n  return `https://${host}${req.uri}${qs}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * The FULL sanitized metadata capture for one request: every inbound\n * header (secrets stripped, credential headers reduced to a safe format\n * prefix) plus the connection-layer block the platform collected. The\n * edge is the richest capture point — the headers are already in memory —\n * and this is pure string work, so it adds no page latency. Forwarded on\n * both the verify-access call and the telemetry beacon.\n */\nexport function buildObservedMetadata(req: NormalizedRequest): ObservedMetadata {\n  const { headers, apiKeyFormat, platformHeaders, cookieCount } = sanitizeHeaders(req.headers);\n  const connection = req.connection ?? {};\n  const queryKeys = extractQueryKeys(req.querystring);\n  return {\n    headers,\n    ...(apiKeyFormat && { apiKeyFormat }),\n    ...(platformHeaders && { platformHeaders }),\n    ...(Object.keys(connection).length > 0 && { connection }),\n    ...(cookieCount !== undefined && { cookieCount }),\n    ...(queryKeys && { queryKeys }),\n    schemaVersion: CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION,\n  };\n}\n\n/** Backend bounds on queryKeys (mirrored in observedMetadataSchema). */\nconst MAX_QUERY_KEYS = 32;\nconst MAX_QUERY_KEY_CHARS = 64;\n\n/**\n * Query-string parameter NAMES only — deduped, lowercased, bounded. Values\n * are never captured (OAuth codes, tokens, PII); the name set alone\n * fingerprints client shape. Exported for tests.\n */\nexport function extractQueryKeys(querystring: string | undefined): string[] | undefined {\n  if (!querystring) return undefined;\n  let params: URLSearchParams;\n  try {\n    params = new URLSearchParams(querystring);\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  const keys: string[] = [];\n  for (const key of params.keys()) {\n    const normalized = key.toLowerCase().slice(0, MAX_QUERY_KEY_CHARS);\n    if (normalized && !keys.includes(normalized)) {\n      keys.push(normalized);\n      if (keys.length >= MAX_QUERY_KEYS) break;\n    }\n  }\n  return keys.length > 0 ? keys : undefined;\n}\n","/**\n * Crypto-free commerce-protocol detection.\n *\n * The edge only SNIFFS — header shapes, compact-JWT patterns, body field\n * names — and packages what it saw as raw `CommerceArtifactsPayload` for\n * verify-access, whose server-side pipeline does the authoritative parsing\n * and cryptographic verification. Nothing here imports jose/sd-jwt/\n * signature libraries: detection must stay cheap enough to run on every\n * non-human request, and verification must happen exactly once, in the\n * canonical sink, where it is recorded.\n */\n\nimport type { CommerceArtifactsPayload } from '../types';\nimport { headerValue, requestUrl } from './request';\nimport type { NormalizedRequest } from './types';\n\nexport interface DetectedCommerce {\n  /** Detection-order label: rfc9421-agent-pay | rfc9421-tap | rfc9421-web-bot-auth | vi-sd-jwt | ap2 | acp | ucp | mpp | x402 */\n  protocol: string;\n  artifacts: CommerceArtifactsPayload;\n  /** Light detection detail for beacons/audit — never secrets or full credentials. */\n  evidence: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/** Compact SD-JWT: JWT + `~`-separated disclosures. */\nconst SD_JWT_PATTERN = /^eyJ[\\w-]+\\.[\\w-]*\\.[\\w-]+~/;\n\n/** Decode a base64url segment to UTF-8 text (web-standard, no Buffer). */\nfunction decodeBase64Url(seg: string): string {\n  const b64 = seg.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');\n  const padded = b64 + '='.repeat((4 - (b64.length % 4)) % 4);\n  const binary = atob(padded);\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);\n  return new TextDecoder().decode(bytes);\n}\n\n/** Decode a JWT header segment without verifying anything. */\nfunction sniffJwtHeader(compact: string): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  try {\n    const seg = compact.split('.')[0];\n    return JSON.parse(decodeBase64Url(seg)) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction parseJsonBody(bodyText: string | undefined): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  if (!bodyText) return undefined;\n  try {\n    const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(bodyText);\n    return typeof parsed === 'object' && parsed !== null\n      ? (parsed as Record<string, unknown>)\n      : undefined;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Detection order (after the native X-Astra check, which classify owns):\n * SD-JWT/VI → RFC 9421 (Agent Pay / TAP / Web Bot Auth by kid namespace or\n * Signature-Agent) → ACP HMAC → UCP session → AP2 body triple → MPP → x402.\n * Returns undefined when nothing commerce-shaped is on the wire.\n *\n * When the platform truncated the body (`bodyTruncated`), body-bound\n * artifacts still forward what arrived but carry a `bodyTruncated`\n * evidence flag — the backend downgrades those signatures rather than\n * hard-failing.\n */\nexport function detectCommerce(req: NormalizedRequest, host: string): DetectedCommerce | undefined {\n  const url = requestUrl(req, host);\n  const method = req.method;\n  const headers = req.headers;\n  const jsonBody = parseJsonBody(req.bodyText);\n  const truncated = req.bodyTruncated ? { bodyTruncated: true } : {};\n\n  // --- VI / SD-JWT credential in a header ------------------------------\n  const authHeader = headerValue(req, 'authorization');\n  const bearer = authHeader?.replace(/^Bearer\\s+/i, '');\n  const mandateHeader =\n    headerValue(req, 'x-payment-mandate') ?? headerValue(req, 'payment-mandate');\n  const sdJwtCandidate = [mandateHeader, bearer].find((v) => v && SD_JWT_PATTERN.test(v));\n  if (sdJwtCandidate) {\n    const typ = sniffJwtHeader(sdJwtCandidate)?.typ;\n    return {\n      protocol: 'vi-sd-jwt',\n      artifacts: { viSdJwt: sdJwtCandidate },\n      evidence: { typ, ...truncated },\n    };\n  }\n\n  // --- RFC 9421 (Agent Pay / TAP / Web Bot Auth) ------------------------\n  const signature = headerValue(req, 'signature');\n  const signatureInput = headerValue(req, 'signature-input');\n  if (signature && signatureInput) {\n    const signatureAgent = headerValue(req, 'signature-agent');\n    const registryHint = headerValue(req, 'x-agent-registry');\n    const lowerInput = signatureInput.toLowerCase();\n    const protocol = signatureAgent\n      ? 'rfc9421-web-bot-auth'\n      : registryHint?.toLowerCase().includes('visa') || lowerInput.includes('visa')\n        ? 'rfc9421-tap'\n        : registryHint?.toLowerCase().includes('mastercard') || lowerInput.includes('mastercard')\n          ? 'rfc9421-agent-pay'\n          : 'rfc9421';\n    return {\n      protocol,\n      artifacts: {\n        rfc9421: { headers, method, url, ...(req.bodyText && { body: req.bodyText }) },\n      },\n      evidence: {\n        ...(signatureAgent && { signatureAgent }),\n        ...(registryHint && { registryHint }),\n        keyid: signatureInput.match(/keyid=\"([^\"]+)\"/)?.[1],\n        ...truncated,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  // --- ACP (HMAC-signed webhook/checkout: signature WITHOUT signature-input)\n  const acpTimestamp = headerValue(req, 'timestamp');\n  if (signature && !signatureInput && (acpTimestamp || headerValue(req, 'idempotency-key'))) {\n    return {\n      protocol: 'acp',\n      artifacts: {\n        acpRequest: {\n          method,\n          url,\n          headers,\n          ...(req.bodyText && { rawBody: req.bodyText }),\n          ...(jsonBody && { body: jsonBody }),\n        },\n      },\n      evidence: { hasTimestamp: Boolean(acpTimestamp), ...truncated },\n    };\n  }\n\n  // --- UCP checkout session ---------------------------------------------\n  if (/\\/checkout[-_]sessions(\\/|$)/.test(req.uri)) {\n    return {\n      protocol: 'ucp',\n      artifacts: { ucpRequest: { method, url, ...(jsonBody && { body: jsonBody }) } },\n      evidence: { path: req.uri, ...truncated },\n    };\n  }\n\n  // --- AP2 mandate triple in the body -----------------------------------\n  if (jsonBody) {\n    const intent = jsonBody.intent_mandate ?? jsonBody.intentMandate;\n    const cart = jsonBody.cart_mandate ?? jsonBody.cartMandate;\n    const payment = jsonBody.payment_mandate ?? jsonBody.paymentMandate;\n    if (typeof intent === 'string' || typeof cart === 'string' || typeof payment === 'string') {\n      return {\n        protocol: 'ap2',\n        artifacts: {\n          ap2Mandates: {\n            ...(typeof intent === 'string' && { intent }),\n            ...(typeof cart === 'string' && { cart }),\n            ...(typeof payment === 'string' && { payment }),\n          },\n        },\n        evidence: {\n          mandatesPresent: [\n            typeof intent === 'string' && 'intent',\n            typeof cart === 'string' && 'cart',\n            typeof payment === 'string' && 'payment',\n          ].filter(Boolean),\n          ...truncated,\n        },\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  // --- MPP (`Authorization: Payment <credential>`) -----------------------\n  if (authHeader && /^Payment\\s+/i.test(authHeader)) {\n    return {\n      protocol: 'mpp',\n      artifacts: {\n        mppRequest: {\n          method,\n          url,\n          headers,\n          ...(req.bodyText && { rawBody: req.bodyText }),\n          ...(jsonBody && { body: jsonBody }),\n        },\n      },\n      evidence: truncated,\n    };\n  }\n\n  // --- x402 (X-PAYMENT header) ------------------------------------------\n  if (headerValue(req, 'x-payment')) {\n    return {\n      protocol: 'x402',\n      artifacts: {\n        x402Request: { method, url, headers, ...(jsonBody && { body: jsonBody }) },\n      },\n      evidence: truncated,\n    };\n  }\n\n  return undefined;\n}\n","/**\n * Three-tier traffic classification (verified / identified-but-unregistered\n * / anonymous) plus the two non-tiers the gateway touches as little as\n * possible: `human` (zero network calls, zero logging) and `skipped`\n * (static assets / excluded paths).\n *\n * Cheapest checks first — the human path must add microseconds, not\n * milliseconds. Platform signatures are shared with the backend so the\n * edge and verify-access's anonymous handler classify identically.\n */\n\nimport { matchEdgePathRule, type EdgeConfig } from '../edge-config';\nimport { sanitizeHeaders } from '../metadata-capture';\nimport { detectPlatformFingerprint } from '../platform-signatures';\nimport { extractCredentials } from '../verify';\nimport { detectCommerce } from './detect';\nimport { headerValue } from './request';\nimport type { Classification, EffectivePolicy, NormalizedRequest } from './types';\n\n/** Extensions the gateway never classifies — static assets. */\nconst STATIC_EXTENSIONS =\n  /\\.(css|js|mjs|map|png|jpe?g|gif|webp|avif|svg|ico|woff2?|ttf|otf|eot|mp4|webm|pdf|txt|xml)$/i;\n\n/**\n * AstraSync's own SDK traffic (`sdkFetch` stamps this UA on every outbound\n * SDK request). Whenever a deployment's API URL transits a gateway-fronted\n * distribution, the SDK's beacon/verify calls re-enter the gateway — and a\n * beacon that gets beaconed is a self-sustaining invocation loop (the 4.4.0\n * staging outage). Self-traffic is therefore a first-class tier: pass\n * through with ZERO beacons, verify calls, or logging, checked BEFORE the\n * credentials step (SDK verify calls carry a Bearer key and would otherwise\n * tier `verified` and re-enter at authenticate/authorize depth).\n *\n * Spoofing: a caller forging this UA gets pass-through — the same treatment\n * anonymous bots already get in both modes (they only dodge the sampled\n * anonymous beacon), and the origin's own auth still applies. No new bypass.\n */\nconst SELF_UA_PATTERN = /^astrasync-sdk\\//i;\n\n/** Non-browser, non-platform CLI/library UA tokens → anonymous bot. */\nconst BOT_UA_PATTERN =\n  /curl|wget|python-requests|python-urllib|node-fetch|axios|got|okhttp|go-http-client|libwww|httpie|java\\/|ruby|php|scrapy|headless|phantomjs|selenium|playwright|puppeteer|bot|crawler|spider|slurp/i;\n\n/** Browser-shaped UA. */\nconst BROWSER_UA_PATTERN = /mozilla\\/\\d/i;\n\n/**\n * Resolve the effective mode/depth for a path from the EdgeConfig — ordered\n * first-match-wins rules with case-insensitive globs; no match falls through\n * to the config's top-level defaults. Static extensions are always skipped\n * regardless of rules (a rule can only skip MORE, never un-skip an asset).\n */\nexport function resolvePolicy(config: EdgeConfig, path: string): EffectivePolicy {\n  if (STATIC_EXTENSIONS.test(path)) {\n    return { mode: config.mode, depth: config.depth, skip: true };\n  }\n  const rule = matchEdgePathRule(config.pathRules, path);\n  if (!rule) return { mode: config.mode, depth: config.depth, skip: false };\n  return {\n    mode: rule.mode ?? config.mode,\n    depth: rule.depth ?? config.depth,\n    skip: rule.skip === true,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify one request. Order (cheapest sufficient evidence wins):\n *   0. AstraSync SDK UA → `self` (own plumbing; never beaconed — loop-proof)\n *   1. X-Astra-* credentials → `verified` candidate\n *   2. commerce-protocol credentials on the wire → `identified`\n *   3. platform UA fingerprint (Claude/ChatGPT/Gemini/…) → `identified`\n *   4. bot-shaped UA / headerless non-browser → `anonymous-bot`\n *   5. everything browser-shaped → `human`\n *\n * `depth: 'classify'` skips step 2 (no body inspection, no header sniffing\n * beyond UA) — that is the zero-friction setting.\n */\nexport function classify(\n  req: NormalizedRequest,\n  host: string,\n  depth: 'classify' | 'authenticate' | 'authorize'\n): Classification {\n  const userAgent = headerValue(req, 'user-agent') ?? '';\n\n  // 0. Our own SDK's outbound calls (beacons, verify-access, config\n  // fetches). MUST precede the credentials check — see SELF_UA_PATTERN.\n  if (SELF_UA_PATTERN.test(userAgent)) {\n    return { tier: 'self' };\n  }\n\n  // 1. Native AstraSync credentials.\n  const credentials = extractCredentials(req.headers, {});\n  if (credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt) {\n    return { tier: 'verified', protocol: 'x-astra' };\n  }\n\n  // The key-format prefix + platform-signal headers are stronger,\n  // less-spoofable platform signals than the UA. Compute once (cheap\n  // string work) and feed every fingerprint call below.\n  const { apiKeyFormat, platformHeaders } = sanitizeHeaders(req.headers);\n  const detectionInput = { userAgent, apiKeyFormat, platformHeaders };\n\n  // 2. Commerce-protocol credentials (skipped entirely at classify depth).\n  if (depth !== 'classify') {\n    const commerce = detectCommerce(req, host);\n    if (commerce) {\n      return {\n        tier: 'identified',\n        protocol: commerce.protocol,\n        artifacts: commerce.artifacts,\n        evidence: commerce.evidence,\n        fingerprint: detectPlatformFingerprint(detectionInput),\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  // 3. Platform-agent fingerprint (UA, key-format, or platform header).\n  const fingerprint = detectPlatformFingerprint(detectionInput);\n  if (fingerprint) {\n    return { tier: 'identified', protocol: 'platform-ua', fingerprint };\n  }\n\n  // 4. Bot-shaped: CLI/library UA, no UA at all, or any non-browser UA —\n  // humans arrive with Mozilla-family UAs; everything else is automation.\n  if (!userAgent || BOT_UA_PATTERN.test(userAgent) || !BROWSER_UA_PATTERN.test(userAgent)) {\n    return { tier: 'anonymous-bot', evidence: { userAgent: userAgent || '(none)' } };\n  }\n\n  // 4b. Claims to be a browser but is missing every browser fetch-metadata\n  // header — headless/spoofed. `sec-fetch-mode` is sent by all evergreen\n  // browsers; its absence on a Mozilla UA is a strong bot signal.\n  if (!headerValue(req, 'sec-fetch-mode') && !headerValue(req, 'accept-language')) {\n    return { tier: 'anonymous-bot', evidence: { userAgent, spoofedBrowser: true } };\n  }\n\n  // 5. Human traffic — the gateway gets out of the way.\n  return { tier: 'human' };\n}\n\n/** Exported for tests. */\nexport const _patterns = { STATIC_EXTENSIONS, BOT_UA_PATTERN, BROWSER_UA_PATTERN, SELF_UA_PATTERN };\n","/**\n * Protocol-specific machine-readable messaging for enforce-mode responses.\n * Agents (not humans) consume these bodies: stable error codes, the\n * failure list, and registration guidance with real URLs.\n */\n\nimport type { TierOutcome } from './types';\n\nconst PROTOCOL_MESSAGES: Record<string, string> = {\n  'vi-sd-jwt':\n    'This request presented Visa Intelligent Commerce credentials, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to pair your VI credentials with a verified identity and mandate.',\n  'rfc9421-agent-pay':\n    'This request carried a Mastercard Agent Pay signature, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to pair Agent Pay credentials with a verified identity and mandate.',\n  'rfc9421-tap':\n    'This request carried a Visa TAP signature, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to pair TAP credentials with a verified identity and mandate.',\n  'rfc9421-web-bot-auth':\n    'This request carried a Web Bot Auth signature, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to link your signed-agent identity to a verified principal.',\n  rfc9421:\n    'This request carried an RFC 9421 HTTP message signature, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to link the signing identity to a verified principal.',\n  acp: 'This request used the Agentic Commerce Protocol, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to transact on this property.',\n  ucp: 'This request used a UCP checkout session, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to transact on this property.',\n  ap2: 'This request presented AP2 mandates, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to pair your mandates with a verified identity.',\n  mpp: 'This request presented MPP payment credentials, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to transact on this property.',\n  x402: 'This request used x402 payment headers, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to transact on this property.',\n  'platform-ua':\n    'This traffic was identified as a platform AI agent without AstraSync credentials. Register the agent to access this property with a verified identity.',\n  'x-astra':\n    'The presented AstraSync credentials failed verification or were denied by this property’s access policy.',\n};\n\nexport interface DenyBody {\n  success: false;\n  error: {\n    code: 'UNAUTHORIZED' | 'INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS';\n    message: string;\n    protocol?: string;\n    failures: string[];\n    correlationId?: string;\n    guidance: {\n      message?: string;\n      registrationUrl?: string;\n      documentationUrl?: string;\n      /** 5.1.0: MCP-connector steering — the keyless, human-approved path. */\n      mcp?: { endpoint: string; discoveryUrl?: string; message: string };\n    };\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Cold-cache fallback for the MCP endpoint, gated to astrasync.ai hosts —\n * the hosted bridge only exists there; a self-hosted deployment must not\n * advertise a dead endpoint.\n */\nfunction fallbackMcpEndpoint(origin: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    const host = new URL(origin).hostname.replace(/^www\\./, '');\n    if (host === 'astrasync.ai' || host.endsWith('.astrasync.ai')) return `https://mcp.${host}/mcp`;\n  } catch {\n    // malformed apiBaseUrl — no fallback\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nexport function buildDenyBody(\n  outcome: TierOutcome,\n  apiBaseUrl: string,\n  publicBaseUrl?: string\n): DenyBody {\n  // Round-11 two-plane URL doctrine: apiBaseUrl is the VERIFY plane (edge\n  // deploys deliberately bake it to the direct origin so verify/beacon calls\n  // don't re-enter the CDN Lambda) — but every URL in this body is read by\n  // AGENTS, who must only ever see the public host. publicBaseUrl carries it;\n  // unset falls back to apiBaseUrl (pre-5.2.0 behavior, correct when the API\n  // base IS the public apex). Fixes staging deny bodies steering agents to\n  // staging-origin.* hosts incl. the dead mcp.staging-origin fallback.\n  const origin = (publicBaseUrl || apiBaseUrl).replace(/\\/api\\/?$/, '');\n  const mcpEndpoint = outcome.guidance?.mcp?.endpoint || fallbackMcpEndpoint(origin);\n  const protocolMessage =\n    (outcome.protocol && PROTOCOL_MESSAGES[outcome.protocol]) ??\n    'This request could not be verified by AstraSync.';\n  return {\n    success: false,\n    error: {\n      // UNAUTHORIZED = identity failed (register/re-authenticate helps);\n      // INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS = identity fine, policy denied (fix the mandate).\n      code: outcome.tier === 'verified' ? 'INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS' : 'UNAUTHORIZED',\n      message: protocolMessage,\n      ...(outcome.protocol && { protocol: outcome.protocol }),\n      failures: outcome.reasons,\n      ...(outcome.correlationId && { correlationId: outcome.correlationId }),\n      guidance: {\n        // `||` not `??`: verify() fills these with EMPTY STRINGS when the\n        // well-known cache is cold — empty means \"use the fallback\".\n        message:\n          outcome.guidance?.message ||\n          'Register this agent with AstraSync to receive verifiable credentials.',\n        registrationUrl: outcome.guidance?.registrationUrl || `${origin}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: outcome.guidance?.documentationUrl || `${origin}/docs/edge-adapter`,\n        ...(mcpEndpoint && {\n          mcp: {\n            endpoint: mcpEndpoint,\n            discoveryUrl:\n              outcome.guidance?.mcp?.discoveryUrl ||\n              `${mcpEndpoint.replace(/\\/mcp$/, '')}/.well-known/mcp.json`,\n            message:\n              outcome.guidance?.mcp?.message ||\n              'Inside an MCP host? Add the AstraSync MCP connector at this endpoint instead of the ' +\n                'registration URL — registration through the connector is keyless and human-approved ' +\n                '(your human approves in an in-chat card; you never handle credentials).',\n          },\n        }),\n      },\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface UnavailableBody {\n  success: false;\n  error: {\n    code: 'VERIFICATION_UNAVAILABLE';\n    message: string;\n    failures: string[];\n    correlationId?: string;\n    guidance: { message: string };\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Enforce-mode 503 for verification-infrastructure failure. Deliberately a\n * different code and status from the 403 deny: a 403 tells the agent to\n * register or fix its mandate (retrying won't help); this tells it the\n * OPPOSITE — identity and policy were never evaluated, retry with backoff.\n */\nexport function buildUnavailableBody(outcome: TierOutcome): UnavailableBody {\n  return {\n    success: false,\n    error: {\n      code: 'VERIFICATION_UNAVAILABLE',\n      message:\n        'Agent verification is temporarily unavailable and this path enforces verification. ' +\n        'Your identity was not evaluated and no denial was recorded — retry with exponential backoff.',\n      failures: outcome.reasons,\n      ...(outcome.correlationId && { correlationId: outcome.correlationId }),\n      guidance: {\n        message: 'Retry the request with exponential backoff; the condition is transient.',\n      },\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface ManualReviewBody {\n  success: false;\n  status: 'manual_review';\n  message: string;\n  stepUpApproval?: { pollUrl?: string; expiresAt?: string };\n  correlationId?: string;\n}\n\nexport function buildManualReviewBody(outcome: TierOutcome): ManualReviewBody {\n  return {\n    success: false,\n    status: 'manual_review',\n    message:\n      'This action requires human approval. Poll the step-up approval endpoint and retry once approved.',\n    ...(outcome.stepUp && { stepUpApproval: outcome.stepUp }),\n    ...(outcome.correlationId && { correlationId: outcome.correlationId }),\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * X-Astra-Verified-Hop — cross-hop verify-access dedupe marker.\n *\n * Header carrying upstream verify-access proof so an inner-hop endpoint can\n * dedupe (skip verify-access when the same ASTRA-id was already verified a\n * few ms earlier). Emitted by the MCP adapter toward tool fetches and by the\n * edge gateway toward the origin at authenticate/authorize depth. Value\n * format:\n *\n *   {astraId};{sessionId};{checkedAt-ms}\n *\n * Receivers MUST validate that `checkedAt` is recent (≤ 60s window\n * recommended) and that `astraId` matches the agent identity claimed on the\n * inner hop. The header alone is NOT proof-of-identity — it's an UNSIGNED\n * dedupe advisory: trust it (`trustVerifiedHop`) only where every network\n * path to the inner hop crosses a stripping gateway or an equivalent trusted\n * boundary, exactly like the unsigned X-AstraSync-* attestation headers.\n * Pair with the existing X-Astra-Id auth.\n */\n\nexport const MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER = 'X-Astra-Verified-Hop';\n\n/** Default acceptable age (ms) for an X-Astra-Verified-Hop header. */\nexport const MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS = 60_000;\n\nexport interface VerifiedHopMarker {\n  astraId: string;\n  sessionId?: string;\n  checkedAt: number; // epoch ms\n}\n\nexport function serializeVerifiedHop(marker: VerifiedHopMarker): string {\n  return `${marker.astraId};${marker.sessionId ?? ''};${marker.checkedAt}`;\n}\n\nexport function parseVerifiedHop(value: string | undefined | null): VerifiedHopMarker | null {\n  if (!value) return null;\n  const parts = value.split(';');\n  if (parts.length !== 3) return null;\n  const [astraId, sessionId, checkedAtRaw] = parts;\n  if (!astraId) return null;\n  const checkedAt = Number(checkedAtRaw);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(checkedAt) || checkedAt <= 0) return null;\n  return {\n    astraId,\n    ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}),\n    checkedAt,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `marker.astraId` matches the inner-hop's claimed\n * ASTRA-id AND the marker is recent enough. Inner-hop middleware uses this\n * to skip a duplicate verify-access call.\n */\nexport function isVerifiedHopValidFor(\n  marker: VerifiedHopMarker | null,\n  expectedAstraId: string,\n  opts: { maxAgeMs?: number; now?: number } = {}\n): boolean {\n  if (!marker) return false;\n  if (marker.astraId !== expectedAstraId) return false;\n  const maxAge = opts.maxAgeMs ?? MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS;\n  const now = opts.now ?? Date.now();\n  return now - marker.checkedAt <= maxAge && now >= marker.checkedAt;\n}\n","/**\n * Decision → abstract outcome-application wiring. Executed in BOTH modes\n * so observe mode records exactly what enforce mode would have done — but\n * only enforce mode is allowed to emit anything other than a pass.\n */\n\nimport { buildDenyBody, buildManualReviewBody, buildUnavailableBody } from './messaging';\nimport { MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER, serializeVerifiedHop } from '../verified-hop';\nimport type { EffectivePolicy, OutcomeApplication, TierOutcome } from './types';\n\n/** Trust-attestation headers injected on allowed requests. */\nexport const ASAT_HEADERS = {\n  trustScore: 'X-AstraSync-Trust-Score',\n  agentId: 'X-AstraSync-Agent-Id',\n  developerId: 'X-AstraSync-Developer-Id',\n  observedDecision: 'X-AstraSync-Observed-Decision',\n} as const;\n\n/**\n * Inbound header names an evaluated pass must strip: the gateway's own\n * attestation surface plus the verify-dedupe marker — both are only ever\n * allowed to originate AT the gateway, never from the viewer.\n */\nconst STRIP_HEADER_PREFIXES = ['x-astrasync-', 'x-astra-verified-hop'];\n\n/**\n * A pass that leaves the request completely untouched — used for skipped\n * paths and human traffic, which the gateway must not modify at all.\n */\nexport function passUntouched(): OutcomeApplication {\n  return { action: 'pass', injectHeaders: {}, stripHeaderPrefixes: [] };\n}\n\n/**\n * Turn a tier outcome into the abstract application the platform executes.\n * Every evaluated pass strips inbound spoofed `x-astrasync-*` headers\n * (both modes — trust headers must only ever originate at the gateway).\n *\n * Observe mode: always a pass — header hygiene plus an\n * `X-AstraSync-Observed-Decision` stamp for origin-side log correlation.\n *\n * Enforce mode: ALLOW → pass with trust-attestation headers; DENY → 403\n * machine-readable body; MANUAL_REVIEW → 202 with step-up poll info.\n */\nexport function applyOutcome(\n  options: { apiBaseUrl: string; publicBaseUrl?: string },\n  outcome: TierOutcome,\n  policy: EffectivePolicy\n): OutcomeApplication {\n  const injectHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};\n\n  // Surface a rejected property key in origin logs in BOTH modes — the\n  // outcome is allow (fail-open) so the deny stamp below never fires.\n  if (outcome.misconfig) {\n    injectHeaders[ASAT_HEADERS.observedDecision] = 'misconfig';\n  }\n\n  if (policy.mode !== 'enforce') {\n    // Shadow stamp: what enforce WOULD have done, visible in origin logs.\n    if (outcome.decision !== 'allow') {\n      injectHeaders[ASAT_HEADERS.observedDecision] = outcome.decision;\n    }\n    Object.assign(injectHeaders, asatHeaders(outcome), verifiedHopHeader(outcome));\n    return { action: 'pass', injectHeaders, stripHeaderPrefixes: STRIP_HEADER_PREFIXES };\n  }\n\n  switch (outcome.decision) {\n    case 'deny':\n      // Fail posture follows success posture (4.5.0): an infra-failure deny\n      // is a 503 retry-later, never a 403 register-first — the agent's\n      // identity was never evaluated.\n      if (outcome.unavailable) {\n        return {\n          action: 'respond',\n          status: 503,\n          headers: { 'Retry-After': '30' },\n          bodyJson: buildUnavailableBody(outcome),\n        };\n      }\n      return {\n        action: 'respond',\n        status: 403,\n        headers: {},\n        bodyJson: buildDenyBody(outcome, options.apiBaseUrl, options.publicBaseUrl),\n      };\n    case 'manual_review':\n      return {\n        action: 'respond',\n        status: 202,\n        headers: { 'Retry-After': '30' },\n        bodyJson: buildManualReviewBody(outcome),\n      };\n    default:\n      Object.assign(injectHeaders, asatHeaders(outcome), verifiedHopHeader(outcome));\n      return { action: 'pass', injectHeaders, stripHeaderPrefixes: STRIP_HEADER_PREFIXES };\n  }\n}\n\nfunction asatHeaders(outcome: TierOutcome): Record<string, string> {\n  if (!outcome.asat) return {};\n  const { trustScore, agentId, developerId } = outcome.asat;\n  return {\n    ...(trustScore !== undefined && { [ASAT_HEADERS.trustScore]: String(trustScore) }),\n    ...(agentId && { [ASAT_HEADERS.agentId]: agentId }),\n    ...(developerId && { [ASAT_HEADERS.developerId]: developerId }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify-dedupe marker toward the origin. asat is only populated when a\n * verify-access call succeeded (authenticate/authorize depth), so gating on\n * it is the depth gate — classify-depth traffic never carries a marker. An\n * SDK-middleware origin with `trustVerifiedHop` enabled can then skip its\n * duplicate verify-access for the same agent within the freshness window.\n */\nfunction verifiedHopHeader(outcome: TierOutcome): Record<string, string> {\n  const agentId = outcome.asat?.agentId;\n  if (!agentId) return {};\n  return {\n    [MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER]: serializeVerifiedHop({\n      astraId: agentId,\n      ...(outcome.sessionId && { sessionId: outcome.sessionId }),\n      checkedAt: Date.now(),\n    }),\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Shared purpose/action resolver for the HTTP adapters (express + nextjs) —\n * the vocabulary-unification layer.\n *\n * The PDLSS two-axis contract: `purpose` = bare category noun (`shopping`,\n * `data`, custom nouns like `trading`); `action` = dotted verb\n * (`shopping.search`) or an enumerated transport token. Transport verbs\n * (GET/POST/...) NEVER travel as PDLSS actions — they map through the pinned\n * method table below.\n *\n * SELF-CONTAINED on purpose: this published package cannot depend on the\n * private @astrasyncai/pdlss-vocab workspace package, so the constants are\n * duplicated here and pinned strictly equal by a monorepo CI test\n * (vocab-equality.test.ts). Change them in BOTH places or that test fails.\n */\n\n/** Pinned method→action derivation table. */\nexport const HTTP_METHOD_ACTION_TABLE: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {\n  GET: 'data.read',\n  HEAD: 'data.read',\n  OPTIONS: 'data.read',\n  POST: 'data.write',\n  PUT: 'data.write',\n  PATCH: 'data.write',\n  DELETE: 'data.delete',\n};\n\n/** Unknown methods are treated as mutating until proven otherwise. */\nexport const DEFAULT_HTTP_ACTION = 'data.write';\n\n/** Generic category emitted when nothing supplies a domain purpose. */\nexport const DEFAULT_HTTP_PURPOSE = 'data';\n\nexport function actionForHttpMethod(method: string): string {\n  return HTTP_METHOD_ACTION_TABLE[method.toUpperCase()] ?? DEFAULT_HTTP_ACTION;\n}\n\nexport type HttpPurposeSource =\n  | 'route_config'\n  | 'custom_extractor'\n  | 'header'\n  | 'legacy_header'\n  | 'query'\n  | 'action_derived'\n  | 'transport_default';\n\nexport type HttpActionSource =\n  | 'route_config'\n  | 'custom_extractor'\n  | 'header'\n  | 'purpose_header_derived'\n  | 'method_table';\n\nexport interface HttpPdlssInput {\n  method: string;\n  /** `X-Astra-Purpose` header value (agent's declaration). */\n  astraPurpose?: string;\n  /** `X-Astra-Action` header value (agent's declaration, symmetric with MCP). */\n  astraAction?: string;\n  /** Legacy `x-purpose` header — deprecated, removal scheduled for 4.0.0. */\n  legacyPurpose?: string;\n  /** Legacy `?purpose` query param (express only) — deprecated, removal 4.0.0. */\n  queryPurpose?: string;\n  /** Dashboard route config send-mapping (RouteAccessConfig.purpose/.action). */\n  routePurpose?: string;\n  routeAction?: string;\n  /** Results of the merchant's extractPurpose/extractAction options. */\n  customPurpose?: string;\n  hasCustomPurposeExtractor?: boolean;\n  customAction?: string;\n  hasCustomActionExtractor?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface HttpPdlssResolution {\n  purpose: string;\n  action: string;\n  purposeSource: HttpPurposeSource;\n  actionSource: HttpActionSource;\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalize an `X-Astra-Purpose` header value.\n *  - colon form `\"category:action\"` (legacy wire shape): take the prefix; the\n *    remainder is free-text and exists in no vocabulary — discard it and let\n *    the method table supply the action (matches pre-3.1.0 discard behavior).\n *  - dotted form `\"shopping.purchase\"` (the shape older docs taught): prefix\n *    becomes the purpose, the WHOLE token becomes an action candidate.\n *  - bare token: purpose verbatim.\n */\nexport function normalizePurposeHeader(value: string): {\n  purpose: string;\n  actionCandidate?: string;\n} {\n  const colon = value.indexOf(':');\n  if (colon >= 0) {\n    return { purpose: value.slice(0, colon) };\n  }\n  const dot = value.indexOf('.');\n  if (dot > 0 && dot < value.length - 1) {\n    return { purpose: value.slice(0, dot), actionCandidate: value };\n  }\n  return { purpose: value };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the {purpose, action} pair for one HTTP request.\n *\n * Precedence (both axes):\n *   action:  route mapping → extractAction option → X-Astra-Action header →\n *            candidate from a dotted X-Astra-Purpose → pinned method table\n *   purpose: route mapping → extractPurpose option → X-Astra-Purpose →\n *            legacy x-purpose / ?purpose → category prefix of the resolved\n *            action → 'data'\n *\n * A configured custom extractor masks the header/legacy/query steps of its\n * axis (it replaces the default chain, as extractPurpose always has); when it\n * returns undefined the axis falls through to the table/prefix fallback.\n * The route mapping is merchant policy fetched from the dashboard — it\n * outranks agent-supplied headers the way MCP toolGates do.\n */\nexport function resolveHttpPdlss(input: HttpPdlssInput): HttpPdlssResolution {\n  const fromHeader = input.astraPurpose ? normalizePurposeHeader(input.astraPurpose) : undefined;\n\n  // ── Action axis ──\n  let action: string;\n  let actionSource: HttpActionSource;\n  if (input.routeAction) {\n    action = input.routeAction;\n    actionSource = 'route_config';\n  } else if (input.hasCustomActionExtractor && input.customAction) {\n    action = input.customAction;\n    actionSource = 'custom_extractor';\n  } else if (!input.hasCustomActionExtractor && input.astraAction) {\n    action = input.astraAction;\n    actionSource = 'header';\n  } else if (!input.hasCustomActionExtractor && fromHeader?.actionCandidate) {\n    action = fromHeader.actionCandidate;\n    actionSource = 'purpose_header_derived';\n  } else {\n    action = actionForHttpMethod(input.method);\n    actionSource = 'method_table';\n  }\n\n  // ── Purpose axis ──\n  let purpose: string | undefined;\n  let purposeSource: HttpPurposeSource | undefined;\n  if (input.routePurpose) {\n    purpose = input.routePurpose;\n    purposeSource = 'route_config';\n  } else if (input.hasCustomPurposeExtractor) {\n    if (input.customPurpose) {\n      purpose = input.customPurpose;\n      purposeSource = 'custom_extractor';\n    }\n  } else if (fromHeader) {\n    purpose = fromHeader.purpose;\n    purposeSource = 'header';\n  } else if (input.legacyPurpose) {\n    purpose = input.legacyPurpose;\n    purposeSource = 'legacy_header';\n  } else if (input.queryPurpose) {\n    purpose = input.queryPurpose;\n    purposeSource = 'query';\n  }\n\n  if (!purpose) {\n    // Keep the pair coherent: an agent that sent only X-Astra-Action (or a\n    // route that mapped only the action) gets that action's own category.\n    const dot = action.indexOf('.');\n    if (dot > 0) {\n      purpose = action.slice(0, dot);\n      purposeSource = 'action_derived';\n    } else {\n      purpose = DEFAULT_HTTP_PURPOSE;\n      purposeSource = 'transport_default';\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { purpose, action, purposeSource: purposeSource!, actionSource };\n}\n","/**\n * Time-budgeted event emission.\n *\n * Some edge runtimes (Lambda@Edge) have no background-work scheduler —\n * anything not awaited before the handler returns may never run. So every\n * telemetry call is awaited under an explicit budget and DROPPED on\n * timeout: latency to the customer's traffic is bounded, and a slow\n * AstraSync API costs telemetry, never page loads. Runtimes that provide\n * `waitUntil` (Cloudflare Workers, Vercel Edge, Fastly Compute) can pass\n * it via {@link EdgeCoreOptions.waitUntil} to take beacons off the latency\n * path entirely.\n */\n\nimport { reportUnregisteredAttempt } from '../verify';\nimport { buildObservedMetadata, headerValue } from './request';\nimport type { Classification, EdgeCoreOptions, NormalizedRequest } from './types';\n\n/** Await `promise` for at most `ms`; resolve `undefined` on timeout/error. */\nexport async function withBudget<T>(promise: Promise<T>, ms: number): Promise<T | undefined> {\n  let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;\n  try {\n    return await Promise.race([\n      promise,\n      new Promise<undefined>((resolve) => {\n        timer = setTimeout(() => resolve(undefined), ms);\n      }),\n    ]);\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  } finally {\n    if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Emit an unregistered-attempt beacon for `identified` (non-crypto depths)\n * and sampled `anonymous-bot` traffic. Unauthenticated by design; the\n * backend fingerprints the UA and find-or-provisions platform agents\n * server-side.\n */\nexport async function emitBeacon(\n  options: EdgeCoreOptions,\n  req: NormalizedRequest,\n  classification: Classification,\n  budgetMs: number\n): Promise<void> {\n  const budgeted = withBudget(\n    reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n      { apiBaseUrl: options.apiBaseUrl, counterpartyId: options.counterpartyId },\n      {\n        counterpartyUrl: options.counterpartyUrl,\n        counterpartyType: 'website',\n        sourceIp: req.clientIp,\n        userAgent: headerValue(req, 'user-agent'),\n        requestPath: req.uri,\n        requestMethod: req.method,\n        // Evidence fields the backend persists into the event record.\n        protocol: classification.protocol,\n        evidence: classification.evidence,\n        // The full sanitized header + connection capture for the\n        // unregistered caller (fire-and-forget, so free).\n        observedMetadata: buildObservedMetadata(req),\n      }\n    ),\n    budgetMs\n  );\n  if (options.waitUntil) {\n    options.waitUntil(budgeted);\n    return;\n  }\n  await budgeted;\n}\n\n/** Deterministic-in-tests sampling gate. */\nexport function sampled(rate: number, random: () => number = Math.random): boolean {\n  if (rate <= 0) return false;\n  if (rate >= 1) return true;\n  return random() < rate;\n}\n","/**\n * Depth-controlled verification per tier. The edge never verifies\n * credentials itself — it forwards what it detected to verify-access, the\n * canonical sole verification sink (the backend runs the commerce\n * pipeline, records events, provisions unregistered platform agents,\n * persists sessions). What the depth setting controls is how much the edge\n * LOOKS and how much it FORWARDS:\n *\n *   classify     — what is it? UA tiers only. Zero verify-access calls;\n *                  beacons only.\n *   authenticate — who is it? + protocol detection. X-Astra agents get a\n *                  verify-access identity check; commerce/platform traffic\n *                  is beaconed with protocol + evidence (no signature\n *                  verification anywhere).\n *   authorize    — are they allowed? + artifact forwarding. X-Astra verify\n *                  calls carry commerceArtifacts; identified traffic gets an\n *                  anonymous verify-access call with artifacts +\n *                  callerMetadata so the backend cryptographically proves\n *                  and policy-evaluates once.\n */\n\nimport { resolveHttpPdlss } from '../adapters/http-pdlss';\nimport type { GatewayConfig, VerificationRequest } from '../types';\nimport { verify, extractCredentials } from '../verify';\nimport { withBudget, emitBeacon, sampled } from './events';\nimport { buildObservedMetadata, headerValue } from './request';\nimport type {\n  Classification,\n  EdgeCoreOptions,\n  EffectivePolicy,\n  NormalizedRequest,\n  TierOutcome,\n} from './types';\n\nfunction baseOutcome(classification: Classification): TierOutcome {\n  return {\n    tier: classification.tier,\n    decision: 'allow',\n    reasons: [],\n    protocol: classification.protocol,\n  };\n}\n\nexport function buildVerificationRequest(\n  options: EdgeCoreOptions,\n  req: NormalizedRequest,\n  classification: Classification,\n  includeArtifacts: boolean\n): VerificationRequest {\n  // verify-access REQUIRES a purpose. Resolve via the shared chain: the\n  // agent's X-Astra-Purpose/-Action declarations, else the pinned method\n  // table (GET → data/data.read etc.) — a transport verb never travels as\n  // a permission action.\n  const pdlss = resolveHttpPdlss({\n    method: req.method,\n    astraPurpose: headerValue(req, 'x-astra-purpose'),\n    astraAction: headerValue(req, 'x-astra-action'),\n  });\n  // Forward the caller's attempt-chain handle when well-formed\n  // (agent-declared, like x-astra-purpose — not a trust header, so no\n  // spoof-strip needed). The edge synthesises NO consideration data — it\n  // can't see offer semantics; pure pass-through.\n  const attemptId = headerValue(req, 'x-astra-attempt-id');\n  return {\n    ...(attemptId && /^att_[0-9a-f]{32}$/.test(attemptId) && { attemptId }),\n    credentials: extractCredentials(req.headers, {}),\n    purpose: pdlss.purpose,\n    action: pdlss.action,\n    resource: req.uri,\n    createSession: true,\n    counterpartyType: 'website',\n    counterpartyUrl: options.counterpartyUrl,\n    callerMetadata: {\n      sourceIp: req.clientIp,\n      userAgent: headerValue(req, 'user-agent'),\n      referer: headerValue(req, 'referer'),\n      host: headerValue(req, 'host'),\n      // The full sanitized header + connection capture. The backend stores\n      // it fire-and-forget (zero decision latency) and uses the key-format\n      // / platform headers for attribution.\n      observedMetadata: buildObservedMetadata(req),\n    },\n    ...(includeArtifacts &&\n      classification.artifacts && { commerceArtifacts: classification.artifacts }),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function outcomeFromVerifyResult(\n  classification: Classification,\n  result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof verify>>\n): TierOutcome {\n  const outcome = baseOutcome(classification);\n  outcome.sessionId = (result as { sessionId?: string }).sessionId;\n  outcome.correlationId = result.correlationId;\n  outcome.guidance = result.guidance;\n\n  // The PROPERTY'S own API key was rejected by the backend — neither an\n  // agent deny nor an infra failure. Fail OPEN in both modes: agents must\n  // not be blocked by the property's dead key. The misconfig flag stamps\n  // X-AstraSync-Observed-Decision so origin logs surface it; the owner is\n  // alerted server-side on every rejected call.\n  if (result.misconfigured) {\n    outcome.reasons = ['verification key misconfigured — fail-open (merchant_misconfig)'];\n    outcome.misconfig = true;\n    return outcome;\n  }\n\n  if (result.requiresStepUp || result.stepUpApproval) {\n    outcome.decision = 'manual_review';\n    outcome.reasons = ['step-up approval required'];\n    outcome.stepUp = {\n      pollUrl: (result.stepUpApproval as { pollUrl?: string } | undefined)?.pollUrl,\n      expiresAt: (result.stepUpApproval as { expiresAt?: string } | undefined)?.expiresAt,\n    };\n    return outcome;\n  }\n\n  if (!result.identityVerified || !result.policyAllowed) {\n    outcome.decision = 'deny';\n    outcome.reasons = result.denialReasons?.length\n      ? result.denialReasons\n      : [!result.identityVerified ? 'identity not verified' : 'denied by access policy'];\n    return outcome;\n  }\n\n  outcome.asat = {\n    trustScore: result.agent?.trustScore,\n    agentId: result.agent?.astraId,\n    developerId: result.developer?.astradId,\n  };\n  return outcome;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail posture follows success posture (4.5.0): when verification\n * infrastructure is unreachable, observe mode passes through with the\n * reason recorded, while enforce mode denies with `unavailable: true`\n * (rendered as a 503 retry-later, never a 403 register-first — the backend\n * never evaluated the caller, so no denial semantics may be claimed).\n */\nfunction unavailableOutcome(\n  classification: Classification,\n  policy: EffectivePolicy,\n  reason: string,\n  correlationId?: string\n): TierOutcome {\n  const outcome = baseOutcome(classification);\n  outcome.unavailable = true;\n  outcome.reasons = [reason];\n  if (correlationId) outcome.correlationId = correlationId;\n  if (policy.mode === 'enforce') outcome.decision = 'deny';\n  return outcome;\n}\n\n/**\n * A verify() result whose failure is the SDK's typed api_error fallback —\n * infra unavailability that verify() shaped as a deny-like result. Must not\n * match merchant_misconfigured (deterministic, handled fail-open).\n */\nfunction isApiErrorResult(result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof verify>>): boolean {\n  return (\n    (result.failures ?? []).some((f) => f.dimension === 'verify_access.api_error') === true &&\n    !result.misconfigured\n  );\n}\n/**\n * Run the tier-appropriate verification/telemetry for one classified\n * request. NEVER throws. Infra-failure handling is posture-symmetric (see\n * `unavailableOutcome`); a presented credential the BACKEND rejected\n * remains a real deny in both modes, and the property's own rejected key\n * (misconfig) remains fail-open in both modes. Internal pipeline\n * exceptions (the catch below) stay fail-open unconditionally — they are\n * gateway bugs, not verification availability, and must never take a site\n * down.\n */\nexport async function runTier(\n  options: EdgeCoreOptions,\n  req: NormalizedRequest,\n  classification: Classification,\n  policy: EffectivePolicy,\n  apiKey: string | undefined,\n  sampling: { anonymousBeaconRate: number }\n): Promise<TierOutcome> {\n  const budgets = options.budgets ?? {};\n  const beaconMs = budgets.beaconMs ?? 300;\n  const verifyMs =\n    policy.mode === 'enforce'\n      ? (budgets.verifyEnforceMs ?? 3000)\n      : (budgets.verifyObserveMs ?? 1500);\n\n  const gatewayConfig: GatewayConfig = {\n    apiBaseUrl: options.apiBaseUrl,\n    ...(apiKey && { apiKey }),\n    counterpartyId: options.counterpartyId,\n    // The gateway handles its own error semantics; init self-probes don't\n    // belong in a per-request edge function.\n    disableInitChecks: true,\n  } as GatewayConfig;\n\n  try {\n    switch (classification.tier) {\n      case 'verified': {\n        // classify depth = zero API calls, even for credentialed agents.\n        if (policy.depth === 'classify') {\n          return baseOutcome(classification);\n        }\n        const result = await withBudget(\n          verify(\n            gatewayConfig,\n            buildVerificationRequest(options, req, classification, policy.depth === 'authorize')\n          ),\n          verifyMs\n        );\n        if (!result) {\n          return unavailableOutcome(\n            classification,\n            policy,\n            'verify-access unreachable within budget'\n          );\n        }\n        if (isApiErrorResult(result)) {\n          return unavailableOutcome(\n            classification,\n            policy,\n            result.denialReasons?.[0] ?? 'verify-access api error',\n            result.correlationId\n          );\n        }\n        return outcomeFromVerifyResult(classification, result);\n      }\n\n      case 'identified': {\n        if (policy.depth === 'authorize' && classification.artifacts) {\n          // Anonymous verify-access call WITH artifacts: the backend runs\n          // the commerce pipeline, records unverified events, and\n          // provisions unregistered platform agents — one sink, recorded\n          // once.\n          const result = await withBudget(\n            verify(gatewayConfig, buildVerificationRequest(options, req, classification, true)),\n            verifyMs\n          );\n          if (!result) {\n            return unavailableOutcome(\n              classification,\n              policy,\n              'verify-access unreachable within budget'\n            );\n          }\n          if (isApiErrorResult(result)) {\n            return unavailableOutcome(\n              classification,\n              policy,\n              result.denialReasons?.[0] ?? 'verify-access api error',\n              result.correlationId\n            );\n          }\n          return outcomeFromVerifyResult(classification, result);\n        }\n        // classify/credentials depth (or no artifacts): lightweight beacon.\n        await emitBeacon(options, req, classification, beaconMs);\n        const outcome = baseOutcome(classification);\n        if (policy.mode === 'enforce' && policy.depth !== 'classify') {\n          // Unregistered agent on an enforced path: deny with guidance.\n          outcome.decision = 'deny';\n          outcome.reasons = ['agent is not registered with AstraSync'];\n        }\n        return outcome;\n      }\n\n      case 'anonymous-bot': {\n        if (sampled(sampling.anonymousBeaconRate, options.random)) {\n          await emitBeacon(\n            options,\n            req,\n            { ...classification, protocol: classification.protocol ?? 'ua-heuristic' },\n            beaconMs\n          );\n        }\n        // Anonymous bots pass through even in enforce mode — enforce gates\n        // AGENT traffic; generic bot management stays the CDN/WAF's job.\n        return baseOutcome(classification);\n      }\n\n      default:\n        return baseOutcome(classification);\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    const outcome = baseOutcome(classification);\n    outcome.reasons = [\n      `edge pipeline error — fail-open: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,\n    ];\n    return outcome;\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * The platform-neutral evaluation pipeline for one request:\n *\n *   path policy → classify → tier pipeline → outcome application\n *\n * Platform adapters own everything around this: config/secret loading,\n * request normalization, and applying the returned application onto their\n * native request/response shapes. `evaluateEdgeRequest` NEVER throws — any\n * internal failure resolves to an untouched pass (the gateway must never\n * take the site down).\n */\n\nimport type { EdgeConfig } from '../edge-config';\nimport { classify, resolvePolicy } from './classify';\nimport { applyOutcome, passUntouched } from './enforce';\nimport { runTier } from './pipeline';\nimport { headerValue } from './request';\nimport type {\n  Classification,\n  EdgeCoreOptions,\n  EffectivePolicy,\n  NormalizedRequest,\n  OutcomeApplication,\n  TierOutcome,\n} from './types';\n\nexport interface EdgeEvaluation {\n  application: OutcomeApplication;\n  policy: EffectivePolicy;\n  /** Absent when the path was skipped before classification. */\n  classification?: Classification;\n  /** Absent for skipped paths and human/self traffic (no pipeline run). */\n  outcome?: TierOutcome;\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluate one normalized request against the effective EdgeConfig.\n *\n * - Skipped paths (static assets / skip rules): untouched, zero work.\n * - Humans and self (AstraSync SDK) traffic: get out of the way. No calls,\n *   no logs, no header changes.\n * - Everything else runs the tier pipeline and yields an application the\n *   platform must execute (pass with header hygiene, or an enforce-mode\n *   response).\n */\nexport async function evaluateEdgeRequest(\n  options: EdgeCoreOptions,\n  req: NormalizedRequest,\n  config: EdgeConfig,\n  apiKey: string | undefined\n): Promise<EdgeEvaluation> {\n  const policy = resolvePolicy(config, req.uri);\n  try {\n    if (policy.skip) return { policy, application: passUntouched() };\n\n    const host =\n      headerValue(req, 'x-forwarded-host') ??\n      headerValue(req, 'host') ??\n      new URL(options.counterpartyUrl).host;\n\n    const classification = classify(req, host, policy.depth);\n\n    // Human and self (own-SDK) traffic: get out of the way. No calls, no\n    // logs, no header changes. Self MUST short-circuit here — running it\n    // through the tier pipeline would let a beacon spawn a beacon.\n    if (classification.tier === 'human' || classification.tier === 'self') {\n      return { policy, classification, application: passUntouched() };\n    }\n\n    const outcome = await runTier(options, req, classification, policy, apiKey, config.sampling);\n\n    if (outcome.decision !== 'allow') {\n      options.log?.(\n        'info',\n        policy.mode === 'enforce'\n          ? `${outcome.decision.toUpperCase()}: ${req.method} ${req.uri}`\n          : `[OBSERVE] would have been ${outcome.decision.toUpperCase()}: ${req.method} ${req.uri}`,\n        { tier: outcome.tier, protocol: outcome.protocol, reasons: outcome.reasons }\n      );\n    }\n\n    return {\n      policy,\n      classification,\n      outcome,\n      application: applyOutcome(options, outcome, policy),\n    };\n  } catch (err) {\n    // Fail-open, unconditionally.\n    options.log?.('error', 'edge evaluation error — passing request through', {\n      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),\n    });\n    return { policy, application: passUntouched() };\n  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Platform packages normalize their native\n * request shape into a {@link NormalizedRequest}, call\n * {@link evaluateEdgeRequest}, and apply the returned\n * {@link OutcomeApplication} onto their native primitives.\n */\n\nexport { classify, resolvePolicy, _patterns } from './classify';\nexport { detectCommerce, type DetectedCommerce } from './detect';\nexport { evaluateEdgeRequest, type EdgeEvaluation } from './evaluate';\nexport { applyOutcome, passUntouched, ASAT_HEADERS } from './enforce';\nexport { withBudget, emitBeacon, sampled } from './events';\nexport {\n  buildDenyBody,\n  buildManualReviewBody,\n  type DenyBody,\n  type ManualReviewBody,\n} from './messaging';\nexport { runTier, buildVerificationRequest, outcomeFromVerifyResult } from './pipeline';\nexport { headerValue, requestUrl, buildObservedMetadata } from './request';\nexport type {\n  NormalizedRequest,\n  PlatformIo,\n  OutcomeApplication,\n  TrafficTier,\n  Classification,\n  EdgeDecision,\n  TierOutcome,\n  EffectivePolicy,\n  EdgeCoreOptions,\n  EdgeLogger,\n} from './types';\n","/**\n * Single source-of-truth for the SDK's\n * package version emitted on verify-access bodies (and any future\n * telemetry). Bumped alongside `package.json#version` on every release.\n *\n * Why a constant rather than `import pkg from '../package.json'`:\n * - `tsconfig.json` sets `rootDir: ./src`; importing the sibling\n *   package.json fails the build with \"outside rootDir\".\n * - Build-time string replacement (tsup `define`, esbuild banner, etc.)\n *   adds toolchain coupling for a trivial gain.\n * - Embedded readonly constant works in every environment (Node, browser,\n *   bundlers, Deno) without runtime fs / network access.\n *\n * Release discipline: a CI lint can grep `package.json#version` against\n * this constant if the two ever diverge in the wild. A manual bump\n * is fine — bumping both in the release-ceremony commit keeps them\n * lockstep.\n */\nexport const SDK_VERSION = '5.6.0';\n","/**\n * Shared outbound-HTTP wrapper — every request the SDK makes to the\n * AstraSync backend (or anywhere else) goes through `sdkFetch` so it\n * carries an identifying User-Agent.\n *\n * Why: Node's global fetch defaults to `user-agent: node`, which is\n * indistinguishable from every other Node client on the wire. Visit\n * Intelligence observed our own SDK/beacon traffic as anonymous \"node\"\n * visits. Self-identification is the platform's own medicine.\n *\n * Browser note: some browsers filter the User-Agent request header\n * silently (never throwing), so this is a no-op there — which is correct:\n * in a browser the page's real UA is the honest identity.\n */\n\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\n\nexport const SDK_USER_AGENT = `astrasync-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;\n\n/**\n * Add the SDK User-Agent without changing the SHAPE of the caller's headers\n * (plain records stay plain records) — interceptors, adapters, and tests\n * read `init.headers` as a record, and `Headers` would also lowercase names.\n */\nfunction withUserAgent(initHeaders: HeadersInit | undefined): HeadersInit {\n  if (!initHeaders) return { 'user-agent': SDK_USER_AGENT };\n  if (initHeaders instanceof Headers) {\n    const copy = new Headers(initHeaders);\n    if (!copy.has('user-agent')) copy.set('user-agent', SDK_USER_AGENT);\n    return copy;\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(initHeaders)) {\n    const has = initHeaders.some(([name]) => name.toLowerCase() === 'user-agent');\n    return has ? initHeaders : [...initHeaders, ['user-agent', SDK_USER_AGENT]];\n  }\n  const has = Object.keys(initHeaders).some((name) => name.toLowerCase() === 'user-agent');\n  return has ? initHeaders : { 'user-agent': SDK_USER_AGENT, ...initHeaders };\n}\n\nexport const sdkFetch: typeof fetch = (input, init) =>\n  fetch(input, { ...init, headers: withUserAgent(init?.headers) });\n","/**\n * Edge verification config — the per-endpoint policy the Trusted Agent\n * Gateway edge adapters (e.g. `@astrasyncai/adapter-lambda`) fetch from the\n * AstraSync dashboard to decide how much verification friction to apply\n * to inbound traffic, and where.\n *\n * Fetch pattern mirrors `well-known.ts`: TTL cache + stale-while-revalidate\n * + in-flight dedupe, with a `_reset*` hook for tests. Fail posture is\n * deliberately asymmetric: this module can NEVER put a site into enforce\n * mode on its own — enforce only ever originates from a successfully\n * fetched config, and a config that has gone stale past `maxStaleMs`\n * degrades back to observe.\n *\n * Which EdgeConfig fields each integration consumes:\n *\n * | Field                          | Edge adapters | SDK adapters (express/nextjs/mcp) |\n * | ------------------------------ | ------------- | --------------------------------- |\n * | `mode` (observe/enforce)       | yes           | —                                 |\n * | `depth`                        | yes           | —                                 |\n * | `pathRules`                    | yes           | —                                 |\n * | `sampling.anonymousBeaconRate` | yes           | yes — the SDK anonymous beacon    |\n * | `failurePosture`               | yes           | —                                 |\n *\n * The observe/enforce × depth posture is EDGE-ONLY by design: SDK adapters\n * enforce via the dashboard route policy (`fetchRoutes`), not via this\n * config, and consume only the `sampling` block for their anonymous\n * traffic beacon.\n */\n\nimport { sdkFetch } from './http';\nimport type { GatewayConfig } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Edge posture. Canonical Trusted Agent Gateway vocabulary:\n * `observe` ≈ the gateway's `passive` posture (verify +\n * record, enforce nothing), `enforce` ≈ `active`. New value set on a new\n * field name — do NOT reuse `GatewayPosture`'s `active`/`passive` here\n * (different field, different meaning: posture governs an agent-side\n * gateway; mode governs counterparty-side edge interception).\n */\nexport type EdgeMode = 'observe' | 'enforce';\n\n/**\n * How deep the edge checks each request — what is it → who is it → are\n * they allowed:\n * - `classify`     — UA / platform-fingerprint classification only; no\n *                    credential handling.\n * - `authenticate` — establish who is calling: detect and parse agent\n *                    credentials (X-Astra-*, VI SD-JWT, RFC 9421, ACP,\n *                    UCP, AP2…) and verify presented AstraSync identities.\n * - `authorize`    — full policy decision: credentials cryptographically\n *                    proven and PDLSS-evaluated via a verify-access round\n *                    trip. (US spelling on the wire, matching\n *                    `authorizeSettlement` and HTTP `Authorization`.)\n */\nexport type EdgeVerificationDepth = 'classify' | 'authenticate' | 'authorize';\n\nexport interface EdgePathRule {\n  /**\n   * `*`-wildcard glob matched against the request path. Matching is\n   * case-INsensitive and all regex metacharacters except `*` are\n   * escaped. (Deliberately diverges from the express adapter's\n   * `matchRoute`, which is historically case-sensitive by default —\n   * new surface ships case-insensitive matching as the default.)\n   */\n  pattern: string;\n  /** Pass the request through untouched (static assets); mode/depth ignored. */\n  skip?: boolean;\n  /** Override the top-level mode for this path. */\n  mode?: EdgeMode;\n  /** Override the top-level depth for this path. */\n  depth?: EdgeVerificationDepth;\n}\n\nexport interface EdgeConfig {\n  /** Shape version — bump on breaking changes. */\n  version: 1;\n  /** Default posture for paths no rule matches. */\n  mode: EdgeMode;\n  /** Default check depth for paths no rule matches. */\n  depth: EdgeVerificationDepth;\n  /** Ordered, first-match-wins. */\n  pathRules: EdgePathRule[];\n  sampling: {\n    /** Fraction (0..1) of anonymous-bot requests that emit a beacon. */\n    anonymousBeaconRate: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * 4.5.0: the EFFECTIVE failure posture is derived from the effective\n   * mode — fail posture follows success posture. Observe fails open\n   * (unreachable backend = pass-through, site never breaks); enforce fails\n   * closed on verification-infrastructure failure (503\n   * `VERIFICATION_UNAVAILABLE`, retry-later — see edge-core/pipeline). This\n   * field is retained on the wire for adapter compatibility and as a future\n   * explicit override; it is not consulted by the 4.5.x pipeline. Note the\n   * distinction from CONFIG staleness: a config stale past 24h still has\n   * enforce degraded to observe (`degradeToObserve`) — that is config-trust\n   * hygiene, independent of runtime verification availability.\n   */\n  failurePosture: 'open' | 'closed';\n}\n\n/**\n * The safe default: observe-only, classification depth, nothing enforced.\n * Served by the backend when an endpoint has never been configured, and\n * used by `getEdgeConfig` whenever no config can be fetched.\n */\nexport const DEFAULT_EDGE_CONFIG: EdgeConfig = Object.freeze({\n  version: 1,\n  mode: 'observe',\n  depth: 'classify',\n  pathRules: [],\n  sampling: Object.freeze({ anonymousBeaconRate: 0.1 }),\n  failurePosture: 'open',\n}) as EdgeConfig;\n\nconst EDGE_MODES: readonly string[] = ['observe', 'enforce'];\nconst EDGE_DEPTHS: readonly string[] = ['classify', 'authenticate', 'authorize'];\n\n/** Structural guard for configs arriving over the wire. */\nexport function isEdgeConfig(value: unknown): value is EdgeConfig {\n  if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return false;\n  const v = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (v.version !== 1) return false;\n  if (!EDGE_MODES.includes(v.mode as string)) return false;\n  if (!EDGE_DEPTHS.includes(v.depth as string)) return false;\n  if (!Array.isArray(v.pathRules)) return false;\n  for (const rule of v.pathRules) {\n    if (typeof rule !== 'object' || rule === null) return false;\n    const r = rule as Record<string, unknown>;\n    if (typeof r.pattern !== 'string' || r.pattern.length === 0) return false;\n    if (r.mode !== undefined && !EDGE_MODES.includes(r.mode as string)) return false;\n    if (r.depth !== undefined && !EDGE_DEPTHS.includes(r.depth as string)) return false;\n  }\n  const sampling = v.sampling as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n  if (\n    typeof sampling !== 'object' ||\n    sampling === null ||\n    typeof sampling.anonymousBeaconRate !== 'number' ||\n    sampling.anonymousBeaconRate < 0 ||\n    sampling.anonymousBeaconRate > 1\n  ) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return v.failurePosture === 'open';\n}\n\nexport interface FetchEdgeConfigSuccess {\n  edgeConfig: EdgeConfig;\n  etag?: string;\n}\n\nexport type FetchEdgeConfigResult = FetchEdgeConfigSuccess | { notModified: true } | null;\n\n/**\n * Fetch the edge config for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * `GET {apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/:counterpartyId/edge-config` with the same\n * auth headers as `fetchRoutes`. Pass the cached `etag` to get a cheap\n * `{ notModified: true }` on 304. Returns `null` on any failure —\n * the caller decides how to fall back.\n */\nexport async function fetchEdgeConfig(\n  config: Pick<GatewayConfig, 'apiBaseUrl' | 'apiKey'>,\n  counterpartyId: string,\n  opts?: { etag?: string; timeoutMs?: number }\n): Promise<FetchEdgeConfigResult> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { Accept: 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  if (opts?.etag) headers['If-None-Match'] = opts.etag;\n  try {\n    const response = await sdkFetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/edge-config`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(opts?.timeoutMs ?? 5000) }\n    );\n    if (response.status === 304) return { notModified: true };\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { edgeConfig?: unknown } };\n    const edgeConfig = body.data?.edgeConfig;\n    if (!isEdgeConfig(edgeConfig)) return null;\n    return { edgeConfig, etag: response.headers.get('etag') ?? undefined };\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  config: EdgeConfig;\n  etag?: string;\n  /** When the entry was last confirmed fresh (fetch or 304). */\n  lastSuccessAt: number;\n}\n\nconst DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 60 * 1000;\nconst DEFAULT_MAX_STALE_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();\nconst inflight = new Map<string, Promise<void>>();\n\nfunction cacheKey(apiBaseUrl: string, counterpartyId: string): string {\n  return `${apiBaseUrl}|${counterpartyId}`;\n}\n\n/** Copy of `config` with every enforce (top-level and per-rule) degraded to observe. */\nexport function degradeToObserve(config: EdgeConfig): EdgeConfig {\n  if (config.mode !== 'enforce' && !config.pathRules.some((r) => r.mode === 'enforce')) {\n    return config;\n  }\n  return {\n    ...config,\n    mode: 'observe',\n    pathRules: config.pathRules.map((r) => (r.mode === 'enforce' ? { ...r, mode: 'observe' } : r)),\n  };\n}\n\nasync function revalidate(\n  config: Pick<GatewayConfig, 'apiBaseUrl' | 'apiKey'>,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const key = cacheKey(config.apiBaseUrl, counterpartyId);\n  const existing = inflight.get(key);\n  if (existing) return existing;\n\n  const promise = fetchEdgeConfig(config, counterpartyId, { etag: cache.get(key)?.etag })\n    .then((result) => {\n      if (result === null) return; // failure — cache untouched, caller falls back\n      const now = Date.now();\n      if ('notModified' in result) {\n        const entry = cache.get(key);\n        if (entry) entry.lastSuccessAt = now;\n        return;\n      }\n      cache.set(key, { config: result.edgeConfig, etag: result.etag, lastSuccessAt: now });\n    })\n    .finally(() => {\n      inflight.delete(key);\n    });\n\n  inflight.set(key, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get the edge config for an endpoint, cached. Never throws, never blocks\n * longer than one fetch.\n *\n * - Fresh cache (within `ttlMs`) → cached config, no network.\n * - Stale cache → cached config immediately + background revalidate\n *   (stale-while-revalidate). If the last successful fetch is older than\n *   `maxStaleMs` (default 24h), any enforce is degraded to observe — a\n *   long-dead backend can never keep a site enforcing.\n * - No cache → await one fetch; on failure return `DEFAULT_EDGE_CONFIG`\n *   (observe-only). Defaults never enforce.\n */\nexport async function getEdgeConfig(\n  config: Pick<GatewayConfig, 'apiBaseUrl' | 'apiKey'>,\n  counterpartyId: string,\n  opts?: { ttlMs?: number; maxStaleMs?: number }\n): Promise<EdgeConfig> {\n  const ttlMs = opts?.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_TTL_MS;\n  const maxStaleMs = opts?.maxStaleMs ?? DEFAULT_MAX_STALE_MS;\n  const key = cacheKey(config.apiBaseUrl, counterpartyId);\n\n  const entry = cache.get(key);\n  if (entry) {\n    const age = Date.now() - entry.lastSuccessAt;\n    if (age > ttlMs) {\n      revalidate(config, counterpartyId).catch(() => {\n        // background refresh failed — stale entry remains until next call\n      });\n    }\n    return age > maxStaleMs ? degradeToObserve(entry.config) : entry.config;\n  }\n\n  await revalidate(config, counterpartyId).catch(() => {\n    // fetch failed — fall through to defaults\n  });\n  return cache.get(key)?.config ?? DEFAULT_EDGE_CONFIG;\n}\n\n/**\n * First-match-wins path-rule lookup. Case-insensitive `*` globs with all\n * other regex metacharacters escaped (a literal `.` in a pattern matches\n * only `.`). Returns `undefined` when no rule matches — the caller applies\n * the config's top-level mode/depth.\n */\nexport function matchEdgePathRule(rules: EdgePathRule[], path: string): EdgePathRule | undefined {\n  for (const rule of rules) {\n    if (globToRegExp(rule.pattern).test(path)) return rule;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction globToRegExp(pattern: string): RegExp {\n  const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&').replace(/\\*/g, '.*');\n  return new RegExp(`^${escaped}$`, 'i');\n}\n\n/** Reset cache — for testing only. */\nexport function _resetEdgeConfigCache(): void {\n  cache.clear();\n  inflight.clear();\n}\n","/**\n * Maximal metadata capture — the shared, edge-safe sanitiser.\n *\n * AstraSync's thesis is total metadata capture: every header and connection\n * signal an inbound agent presents is a signal we want to keep. This module is\n * the ONE place that decides what is safe to store verbatim, what is a secret\n * to drop, and what credential headers reduce to a safe *format prefix* (a\n * platform signal, never the secret itself).\n *\n * It runs in three places that must agree byte-for-byte:\n *   - the edge adapter (`@astrasyncai/adapter-lambda`) — the richest capture\n *     point (full CloudFront header arrays),\n *   - the SDK adapters (express / nextjs) — for SDK-only merchants with no edge,\n *   - (indirectly) the backend, which stores whatever the above forward.\n *\n * Pure — no Node built-ins, no I/O — so it is safe in Lambda@Edge, the browser\n * build, and Deno. Capture is cheap: at the edge and SDK it is local string\n * work, and the backend stores it on a fire-and-forget event insert, so it adds\n * ZERO verify-access decision latency. Detection (which few signals imply which\n * vendor) is a separate, curated concern — see `platform-signatures.ts`.\n */\n\n/**\n * Version of the capture semantics (what is kept, dropped, reduced, or\n * derived — and under which key names).\n *\n * Capture semantics are FROZEN within a package major version: a given\n * `schemaVersion` always means the same field vocabulary and the same\n * keep/drop/reduce rules. The number bumps only on a SEMANTIC change to\n * capture (a renamed key, a changed reduction rule) — never for additive\n * signals, and never merely because the package version moved. To tell\n * builds apart, use the `sdkVersion` already present on the verify body;\n * `schemaVersion` answers the different question \"how do I interpret this\n * stored metadata?\".\n */\nexport const CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;\n\n/**\n * The captured, sanitised view of an inbound agent's request metadata. Attached\n * to verify-access / beacon payloads as `callerMetadata.observedMetadata`.\n */\nexport interface ObservedMetadata {\n  /** Header name → value, secrets removed, verbatim otherwise. */\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Safe key-format prefix of a credential header (e.g. `sk-ant-api03`,\n   * `sk-proj`, `AIza`) — a platform signal, NEVER the secret. Absent if no\n   * credential header was present or none matched a known format.\n   */\n  apiKeyFormat?: string;\n  /**\n   * The subset of `headers` that are known platform-signal headers\n   * (`openai-organization`, `x-goog-user-project`, `anthropic-version`, …),\n   * pulled out for convenient detection + display. Values are the same\n   * sanitised strings as in `headers`.\n   */\n  platformHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Connection-layer signals (IP, ASN, country, TLS version, HTTP version,\n   * device class, TLS fingerprint). Edge adapters populate this from the\n   * platform's native connection surface — the authoritative source. SDK\n   * adapters populate it as a fallback via {@link deriveConnectionFromHeaders}\n   * when a CDN in front of the merchant injected the equivalent headers;\n   * absent when neither source had anything.\n   */\n  connection?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * Number of cookie pairs the caller sent. The `cookie` header VALUE is a\n   * secret and is always dropped; the COUNT is a client-shape signal\n   * (browsers carry cookies, most automation carries none) that would\n   * otherwise be unobservable downstream. Absent when no cookie header\n   * arrived.\n   */\n  cookieCount?: number;\n  /**\n   * Query-string parameter NAMES (deduped, lowercased) — values are NEVER\n   * captured (they routinely carry OAuth codes, tokens, and PII, and no\n   * deny-list is complete). Names alone fingerprint client shape. Populated\n   * by the edge path, which sees the raw query string.\n   */\n  queryKeys?: string[];\n  /**\n   * Version of the capture semantics this object was produced under — see\n   * {@link CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION}. Optional for backward compatibility with\n   * metadata captured before the field existed.\n   */\n  schemaVersion?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of sanitising a raw header map. `headers` is always present (possibly\n * empty); `apiKeyFormat` / `platformHeaders` only when a signal was found.\n */\nexport interface SanitizeHeadersResult {\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  apiKeyFormat?: string;\n  platformHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Cookie-pair count; the cookie value itself is always dropped. */\n  cookieCount?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Header names dropped entirely — genuine secrets or our own credentials that\n * describe the request's transport, not the agent. Matched case-insensitively\n * on the exact header name.\n */\nconst SECRET_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([\n  'cookie',\n  'set-cookie',\n  'x-csrf-token',\n  'proxy-authorization',\n  'x-astrasync-signature',\n  'x-astrasync-secret',\n  'x-hub-signature',\n  'x-hub-signature-256',\n  // Short-lived verify dedupe token — must never persist in stored metadata.\n  'x-astra-verified-hop',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Header-name prefixes dropped entirely — our own credential / signing surface\n * (`x-astrasync-*`, `kya-*`) must never round-trip into stored metadata.\n */\nconst SECRET_HEADER_PREFIXES = ['x-astrasync-', 'kya-', 'kya_'];\n\n/**\n * Credential headers whose VALUE is a secret but whose FORMAT is a signal. We\n * keep the leading format prefix (up to the random tail) and drop the rest.\n */\nconst CREDENTIAL_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([\n  'authorization',\n  'x-api-key',\n  'x-goog-api-key',\n  'api-key',\n]);\n\n/**\n * Header names that carry a raw signature value (drop the value; the presence\n * is not worth a bloat risk). Matched as a suffix so `x-*-signature` variants\n * are covered without an exhaustive list.\n */\nfunction isSignatureHeader(name: string): boolean {\n  return name === 'signature' || name.endsWith('-signature') || name.endsWith('-signature-256');\n}\n\n/**\n * Known platform-signal headers — pulled into `platformHeaders` for convenient\n * detection + display. Exact names plus a few prefixes (`x-goog-`,\n * `x-stainless-` — the OpenAI/Anthropic SDK client fingerprint headers).\n */\nconst PLATFORM_HEADER_NAMES = new Set([\n  'openai-organization',\n  'openai-project',\n  'openai-version',\n  'openai-processing-ms',\n  'anthropic-version',\n  'anthropic-beta',\n  'x-goog-user-project',\n  'x-goog-api-client',\n  'user-agent',\n  'x-agent-card-url',\n  'x-agent-provider',\n]);\n// `sec-ch-*` client hints are platform signals: Chromium forks (agentic\n// browsers included) often carry their real brand in `sec-ch-ua` even when\n// the UA string mimics stock Chrome.\nconst PLATFORM_HEADER_PREFIXES = [\n  'x-goog-',\n  'x-stainless-',\n  'x-anthropic-',\n  'x-openai-',\n  'sec-ch-',\n];\n\n/**\n * Known API-key format prefixes, longest-first so `sk-ant-api03` wins over\n * `sk-ant` and `sk-`. Each is the SAFE, non-secret leading token of a\n * credential; the random tail is never captured.\n */\nconst KEY_FORMAT_PREFIXES = [\n  'sk-ant-api03',\n  'sk-ant-api',\n  'sk-ant',\n  'sk-proj',\n  'sk-svcacct',\n  'sk-or-v1',\n  'sk-or',\n  'sk-lf',\n  'sk-',\n  'gsk_',\n  'aiza',\n  'ya29',\n  'ghp_',\n  'gho_',\n  'github_pat_',\n  'xai-',\n  'pplx-',\n  'r8_',\n  'hf_',\n  'astra-',\n  'astrae-',\n];\n\n/** Size caps — the only guard against jsonb bloat from a hostile POST. */\nexport const MAX_HEADERS = 64;\nexport const MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES = 1024;\nexport const MAX_TOTAL_BYTES = 16 * 1024;\n\nfunction byteLength(s: string): number {\n  // Edge-safe (no Buffer): count UTF-8 bytes without allocating a Buffer.\n  let bytes = 0;\n  for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i++) {\n    const code = s.charCodeAt(i);\n    if (code < 0x80) bytes += 1;\n    else if (code < 0x800) bytes += 2;\n    else if (code >= 0xd800 && code <= 0xdbff) {\n      bytes += 4;\n      i++; // surrogate pair\n    } else bytes += 3;\n  }\n  return bytes;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract the safe key-format prefix from a credential header value. Strips a\n * leading `Bearer ` / `Basic ` scheme, then returns the longest known prefix\n * that the (lowercased) value starts with. Returns undefined for opaque values\n * (e.g. a bare UUID token) so we never guess a format we don't recognise.\n */\nexport function extractApiKeyFormat(rawValue: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!rawValue) return undefined;\n  let value = rawValue.trim();\n  const spaceIdx = value.indexOf(' ');\n  if (spaceIdx > 0) {\n    const scheme = value.slice(0, spaceIdx).toLowerCase();\n    if (scheme === 'bearer' || scheme === 'basic' || scheme === 'token') {\n      value = value.slice(spaceIdx + 1).trim();\n    }\n  }\n  const lower = value.toLowerCase();\n  for (const prefix of KEY_FORMAT_PREFIXES) {\n    if (lower.startsWith(prefix)) {\n      // Return the prefix as-declared in the list (canonical casing).\n      return prefix;\n    }\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction isSecretHeader(name: string): boolean {\n  if (SECRET_HEADER_NAMES.has(name)) return true;\n  if (SECRET_HEADER_PREFIXES.some((p) => name.startsWith(p))) return true;\n  if (isSignatureHeader(name)) return true;\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction isPlatformHeader(name: string): boolean {\n  if (PLATFORM_HEADER_NAMES.has(name)) return true;\n  return PLATFORM_HEADER_PREFIXES.some((p) => name.startsWith(p));\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitise a raw header map for storage. Deny-lists genuine secrets, reduces\n * credential headers to a safe format prefix, keeps everything else verbatim,\n * and enforces the size caps that bound jsonb growth.\n *\n * Accepts any string→(string|string[]|undefined) map (Node's `req.headers`,\n * CloudFront's flattened headers, a plain object). Multi-value headers are\n * joined with `, ` per RFC 7230.\n */\nexport function sanitizeHeaders(\n  raw: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> | undefined | null\n): SanitizeHeadersResult {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {};\n  const platformHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};\n  let apiKeyFormat: string | undefined;\n  let cookieCount: number | undefined;\n  let totalBytes = 0;\n  let count = 0;\n\n  if (!raw) return { headers };\n\n  for (const rawName of Object.keys(raw)) {\n    if (count >= MAX_HEADERS) break;\n    const name = rawName.toLowerCase();\n    const rawValue = raw[rawName];\n    if (rawValue === undefined) continue;\n    const joined = Array.isArray(rawValue) ? rawValue.join(', ') : String(rawValue);\n\n    // Credential headers: capture the format prefix, drop the secret.\n    if (CREDENTIAL_HEADER_NAMES.has(name)) {\n      const fmt = extractApiKeyFormat(joined);\n      if (fmt && !apiKeyFormat) apiKeyFormat = fmt;\n      continue;\n    }\n\n    // Cookie: the value is a secret (dropped below), but the PAIR COUNT is a\n    // client-shape signal worth keeping.\n    if (name === 'cookie') {\n      cookieCount = joined.split(';').filter((s) => s.trim().length > 0).length;\n    }\n\n    // Genuine secrets: drop entirely.\n    if (isSecretHeader(name)) continue;\n\n    // Everything else describing the agent: keep, bounded.\n    let value = joined;\n    if (byteLength(value) > MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES) {\n      value = value.slice(0, MAX_HEADER_VALUE_BYTES);\n    }\n    const entryBytes = byteLength(name) + byteLength(value);\n    if (totalBytes + entryBytes > MAX_TOTAL_BYTES) continue;\n    totalBytes += entryBytes;\n    count++;\n    headers[name] = value;\n    if (isPlatformHeader(name)) platformHeaders[name] = value;\n  }\n\n  const result: SanitizeHeadersResult = { headers };\n  if (apiKeyFormat) result.apiKeyFormat = apiKeyFormat;\n  if (Object.keys(platformHeaders).length > 0) result.platformHeaders = platformHeaders;\n  if (cookieCount !== undefined) result.cookieCount = cookieCount;\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Pull the known platform-signal headers out of an ALREADY-sanitised header\n * map. `sanitizeHeaders` already computes this as a by-product; this standalone\n * form is exported for call-sites (edge, tests) that hold a sanitised map and\n * want only the platform subset. Never re-run over raw (unsanitised) headers.\n */\nexport function extractPlatformHeaders(\n  sanitized: Record<string, string> | undefined | null\n): Record<string, string> {\n  const out: Record<string, string> = {};\n  if (!sanitized) return out;\n  for (const name of Object.keys(sanitized)) {\n    if (isPlatformHeader(name.toLowerCase())) out[name.toLowerCase()] = sanitized[name];\n  }\n  return out;\n}\n\n/**\n * Precedence-ordered CDN header sources for each derived `connection` key.\n * First present header wins; the special `x-forwarded-for` source takes the\n * LEFTMOST (client) entry of the comma-separated chain.\n */\nconst CONNECTION_HEADER_SOURCES: ReadonlyArray<readonly [key: string, headers: readonly string[]]> =\n  [\n    ['ip', ['cf-connecting-ip', 'fastly-client-ip', 'true-client-ip', 'x-real-ip']],\n    [\n      'country',\n      ['cf-ipcountry', 'x-vercel-ip-country', 'cloudfront-viewer-country', 'fastly-geo-country'],\n    ],\n    ['region', ['x-vercel-ip-country-region', 'cloudfront-viewer-country-region']],\n    ['countryRegionName', ['cloudfront-viewer-country-region-name']],\n    ['city', ['x-vercel-ip-city', 'cloudfront-viewer-city']],\n    ['latitude', ['x-vercel-ip-latitude', 'cloudfront-viewer-latitude']],\n    ['longitude', ['x-vercel-ip-longitude', 'cloudfront-viewer-longitude']],\n    ['postalCode', ['x-vercel-ip-postal-code', 'cloudfront-viewer-postal-code']],\n    ['asn', ['cloudfront-viewer-asn']],\n    ['tlsVersion', ['cloudfront-viewer-tls']],\n    ['httpVersion', ['cloudfront-viewer-http-version']],\n    ['timeZone', ['x-vercel-ip-timezone', 'cloudfront-viewer-time-zone']],\n    ['metroCode', ['cloudfront-viewer-metro-code']],\n    // TLS fingerprints can only be computed where TLS terminates. When a CDN\n    // terminates TLS in front of the merchant, its fingerprint headers ARE the\n    // connection-layer truth — normalising them here is the permanent design.\n    // CloudFront delivers JA3/JA4 only via an origin request policy and only\n    // for HTTPS viewer connections.\n    ['tlsFingerprint', ['cf-ja3-hash', 'cloudfront-viewer-ja3-fingerprint']],\n    ['ja4', ['cf-ja4', 'cloudfront-viewer-ja4-fingerprint']],\n    // Header-structure fingerprint: browser/SDK-distinctive header ordering.\n    ['headerOrder', ['cloudfront-viewer-header-order']],\n    ['headerCount', ['cloudfront-viewer-header-count']],\n  ];\n\n/**\n * Backend bound: observedMetadata.connection values longer than this fail\n * the platform's zod parse outright (boundedStringRecord(32, 256)), so every\n * emitter truncates — headerOrder routinely exceeds it.\n */\nexport const MAX_CONNECTION_VALUE_CHARS = 256;\n\n/**\n * Derive the connection-layer block from CDN-injected request headers.\n *\n * When a merchant's SDK-gated origin sits behind a CDN (Cloudflare, Fastly,\n * Vercel, CloudFront), the CDN has already seen the connection layer and\n * injected it as headers. This promotes those headers to the same\n * `connection` keys the edge adapters populate natively, so SDK-only\n * deployments still get IP / geo / TLS attribution. Precedence per key:\n *\n * - `ip`: `cf-connecting-ip` > `fastly-client-ip` > `true-client-ip` >\n *   `x-real-ip` > `cloudfront-viewer-address` (port stripped) > leftmost\n *   `x-forwarded-for`\n * - `country`: `cf-ipcountry` > `x-vercel-ip-country` >\n *   `cloudfront-viewer-country` > `fastly-geo-country`\n * - `region` / `city` / `timeZone`: Vercel then CloudFront viewer headers\n * - `countryRegionName` / `asn` / `tlsVersion` / `httpVersion` /\n *   `metroCode` / `headerOrder` / `headerCount`: `cloudfront-viewer-*`\n * - `tlsFingerprint`: `cf-ja3-hash` > `cloudfront-viewer-ja3-fingerprint`\n * - `ja4`: `cf-ja4` > `cloudfront-viewer-ja4-fingerprint`\n *\n * All keys are additive under `schemaVersion` 1 (the frozen-capture doctrine\n * bumps only for changed semantics, never for additive signals). Values are\n * truncated to MAX_CONNECTION_VALUE_CHARS — the platform's hard bound.\n *\n * Edge adapters keep their richer native collectors — native platform\n * signals are authoritative; this header derivation is the SDK-level\n * fallback. Header names are matched case-insensitively. Returns undefined\n * when no source header is present, so the `connection` key is simply\n * omitted (matching edge behaviour).\n */\nexport function deriveConnectionFromHeaders(\n  headers: Record<string, string> | undefined | null\n): Record<string, string> | undefined {\n  if (!headers) return undefined;\n  const lower: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const name of Object.keys(headers)) {\n    const value = headers[name];\n    if (typeof value === 'string' && value.length > 0) lower[name.toLowerCase()] = value;\n  }\n\n  const connection: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [key, sources] of CONNECTION_HEADER_SOURCES) {\n    for (const source of sources) {\n      const value = lower[source]?.trim();\n      if (value) {\n        connection[key] = value.slice(0, MAX_CONNECTION_VALUE_CHARS);\n        break;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  // ip fallback 1: cloudfront-viewer-address arrives as ip:port — strip the\n  // trailing port only (IPv6-safe), unlike the dedicated client-ip headers.\n  // The port itself is kept as its own key: ephemeral-port patterns signal\n  // NAT/proxy connection reuse.\n  {\n    const addr = lower['cloudfront-viewer-address']?.trim();\n    const portMatch = addr?.match(/:(\\d+)$/);\n    if (portMatch) connection.sourcePort = portMatch[1];\n    if (!connection.ip && addr) connection.ip = addr.replace(/:\\d+$/, '');\n  }\n  // ip fallback 2: leftmost (client) hop of the x-forwarded-for chain.\n  if (!connection.ip) {\n    const xff = lower['x-forwarded-for'];\n    const client = xff?.split(',')[0]?.trim();\n    if (client) connection.ip = client;\n  }\n  // tlsCipher: CloudFront folds the cipher into the viewer-tls string\n  // (`TLSv1.3:TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:fullHandshake`). `tlsVersion` stays\n  // verbatim (reducing it would be a semantic change → schema v2); the\n  // cipher is pulled out additively so it is queryable on its own.\n  if (!connection.tlsCipher) {\n    const cipher = connection.tlsVersion?.split(':')[1];\n    if (cipher) connection.tlsCipher = cipher;\n  }\n\n  return Object.keys(connection).length > 0 ? connection : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * The FULL metadata capture for one request at an SDK adapter (express /\n * nextjs / mcp): sanitised headers, the safe credential format prefix, the\n * platform-signal subset, the CDN-derived connection block, and the capture\n * schema version. This is the ONE builder all SDK adapters share, so their\n * verify-access bodies agree byte-for-byte.\n *\n * Connection derivation runs over the RAW header map (pre-cap) — the size\n * caps guard storage growth and must never hide a geo/IP header that\n * happened to arrive late in an oversized map.\n */\nexport function buildSdkObservedMetadata(\n  rawHeaders: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined> | undefined | null\n): ObservedMetadata {\n  const { headers, apiKeyFormat, platformHeaders, cookieCount } = sanitizeHeaders(rawHeaders);\n  const flat: Record<string, string> = {};\n  if (rawHeaders) {\n    for (const name of Object.keys(rawHeaders)) {\n      const value = rawHeaders[name];\n      if (value === undefined) continue;\n      flat[name.toLowerCase()] = Array.isArray(value) ? value.join(', ') : String(value);\n    }\n  }\n  const connection = deriveConnectionFromHeaders(flat);\n  return {\n    headers,\n    ...(apiKeyFormat && { apiKeyFormat }),\n    ...(platformHeaders && { platformHeaders }),\n    ...(connection && { connection }),\n    ...(cookieCount !== undefined && { cookieCount }),\n    schemaVersion: CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION,\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Platform-agent fingerprint signatures — the shared registry of known\n * platform-agent UA / agent-card patterns (Claude / ChatGPT / Gemini /\n * Cursor / Goose).\n *\n * Single source of truth, lifted verbatim from the backend's\n * `platform-agent-detector.service` (which now imports detection from\n * here): the backend's verify-access anonymous handler and the edge\n * adapter (`@astrasyncai/adapter-lambda`) must classify identically or\n * the three-tier visibility numbers drift between capture points.\n *\n * Pure regex — no Node built-ins, edge-safe. Detection is regex-only for\n * v2.9 — TLS fingerprinting / behavioural signatures are deferred.\n */\n\nexport type PlatformAgentVendor =\n  | 'claude'\n  | 'chatgpt'\n  | 'gemini'\n  | 'cursor'\n  | 'goose'\n  | 'perplexity'\n  | 'chatgpt-atlas'\n  | 'perplexity-comet'\n  | 'astrasync-sdk'\n  | 'unknown';\n\nexport interface PlatformFingerprint {\n  vendor: PlatformAgentVendor;\n  /** A stable identifier used as the orphan-agent dedup key. */\n  fingerprintKey: string;\n  /** Human-readable name surfaced in the admin panel. */\n  displayName: string;\n}\n\nexport interface PlatformDetectionInput {\n  userAgent?: string;\n  agentCardUrl?: string;\n  /**\n   * A safe API-key format prefix observed on the caller's\n   * credential header (e.g. `sk-ant-api03`, `sk-proj`, `aiza`). A strong\n   * platform signal; never the secret. Matched against `apiKeyFormatPatterns`.\n   */\n  apiKeyFormat?: string;\n  /**\n   * The sanitised platform-signal headers (lowercased names →\n   * values), e.g. `openai-organization`, `x-goog-user-project`. Matched\n   * against `headerPatterns` (which test on `name` and `name: value`).\n   */\n  platformHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  /**\n   * The caller's JA4 TLS-client fingerprint (from the connection capture).\n   * Matched against `ja4Patterns`. A JA4 identifies the client TLS stack,\n   * so signatures should pair it with other evidence when attributing a\n   * vendor.\n   */\n  ja4?: string;\n  /**\n   * The caller's origin ASN (from the connection capture). Matched against\n   * `asnList` by exact membership. An ASN alone attributes an entire cloud\n   * provider — registry validation rejects ASN-only signatures.\n   */\n  asn?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * A signature definition, generic over the vendor key. The seed constant\n * below uses the closed `PlatformAgentVendor` union; DB-promoted signatures\n * (backend dynamic registry, console round) carry arbitrary string vendors —\n * `matchPlatformSignature` accepts both.\n */\nexport interface PlatformSignatureDef<V extends string = string> {\n  vendor: V;\n  displayName: string;\n  uaPatterns?: RegExp[];\n  agentCardPatterns?: RegExp[];\n  /**\n   * Patterns tested against an observed API-key format prefix\n   * (e.g. `/^sk-ant/i` → claude). A credential-header format is a stronger\n   * platform signal than a spoofable User-Agent.\n   */\n  apiKeyFormatPatterns?: RegExp[];\n  /**\n   * Patterns tested against each observed platform-signal\n   * header, as both `name` and `name: value` (so `/openai-organization/i` and\n   * `/x-goog-user-project/i` match on presence).\n   */\n  headerPatterns?: RegExp[];\n  /** Patterns tested against the observed JA4 TLS-client fingerprint. */\n  ja4Patterns?: RegExp[];\n  /** Exact ASN strings this signature matches (never regex). */\n  asnList?: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * A fingerprint whose vendor may be a dynamically-promoted (non-seed) key.\n * Structurally a superset of `PlatformFingerprint`.\n */\nexport interface DynamicPlatformFingerprint {\n  vendor: string;\n  fingerprintKey: string;\n  displayName: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Registry of known platform-agent signatures. Order matters — first match wins.\n *\n * Patterns are intentionally permissive (case-insensitive substring match) since\n * platform UA strings drift between versions. False positives are tolerable —\n * the orphan record is informational, not enforcement.\n */\nexport const PLATFORM_AGENT_SIGNATURES: ReadonlyArray<PlatformSignatureDef<PlatformAgentVendor>> = [\n  {\n    vendor: 'claude',\n    displayName: 'Anthropic Claude',\n    uaPatterns: [/claude/i, /anthropic/i],\n    agentCardPatterns: [/anthropic\\.com/i, /claude\\.ai/i],\n    apiKeyFormatPatterns: [/^sk-ant/i],\n    headerPatterns: [/^anthropic-version/i, /^anthropic-beta/i, /^x-anthropic-/i],\n  },\n  {\n    vendor: 'chatgpt',\n    displayName: 'OpenAI ChatGPT',\n    uaPatterns: [/chatgpt/i, /openai/i, /gpt-?\\d/i],\n    agentCardPatterns: [/openai\\.com/i, /chatgpt\\.com/i],\n    apiKeyFormatPatterns: [/^sk-proj/i, /^sk-svcacct/i],\n    headerPatterns: [/^openai-organization/i, /^openai-project/i, /^openai-version/i],\n  },\n  {\n    vendor: 'gemini',\n    displayName: 'Google Gemini',\n    uaPatterns: [/gemini/i, /google-gemini/i, /bard/i],\n    agentCardPatterns: [/gemini\\.google\\.com/i, /ai\\.google\\.dev/i],\n    apiKeyFormatPatterns: [/^aiza/i],\n    headerPatterns: [/^x-goog-user-project/i, /^x-goog-api-client/i],\n  },\n  {\n    vendor: 'cursor',\n    displayName: 'Cursor',\n    uaPatterns: [/cursor/i],\n    agentCardPatterns: [/cursor\\.sh/i, /cursor\\.com/i],\n  },\n  {\n    vendor: 'goose',\n    displayName: 'Block Goose',\n    uaPatterns: [/goose/i, /block-goose/i],\n    agentCardPatterns: [/block\\.xyz\\/goose/i, /goose\\.tools/i],\n  },\n  {\n    vendor: 'perplexity',\n    displayName: 'Perplexity',\n    uaPatterns: [/perplexity/i],\n    agentCardPatterns: [/perplexity\\.ai/i],\n    apiKeyFormatPatterns: [/^pplx-/i],\n  },\n  // Agentic browsers — versioned-token patterns ONLY (a stock Chrome UA must\n  // never match). Distinct vendor keys (not 'chatgpt'/'perplexity'): the\n  // browser product is a different surface than the assistant service, and\n  // the DB registry mirrors one row per vendor. These sit after the primary\n  // vendor entries so a UA carrying an explicit vendor token keeps its\n  // primary attribution; a browser-shaped UA with the agentic token is\n  // caught here BEFORE classify's human tier, which is what makes these\n  // visits observable at all. Token drift is real (some builds mimic Chrome\n  // outright) — re-verify against captured events when a new browser ships,\n  // and check `sec-ch-ua` platformHeaders for the real brand.\n  {\n    vendor: 'chatgpt-atlas',\n    displayName: 'ChatGPT Atlas browser',\n    uaPatterns: [/\\batlas\\/\\d/i],\n    headerPatterns: [/^sec-ch-ua: .*atlas/i],\n  },\n  {\n    vendor: 'perplexity-comet',\n    displayName: 'Perplexity Comet browser',\n    uaPatterns: [/\\bcomet\\/\\d/i],\n    headerPatterns: [/^sec-ch-ua: .*comet/i],\n  },\n  // Our own SDK self-identifies (sdkFetch stamps this UA) — first-party\n  // traffic must never pollute the unknown/anonymous pool it exists to audit.\n  {\n    vendor: 'astrasync-sdk',\n    displayName: 'AstraSync SDK',\n    uaPatterns: [/^astrasync-sdk\\//i],\n  },\n];\n\n/**\n * Generic first-match-wins matcher over an arbitrary signature set. The\n * backend's dynamic registry merges the seed constant with DB-promoted\n * signatures and calls this — ONE matching implementation everywhere\n * (fingerprint-key rule included: vendor + lowercased UA basename before\n * the first space/slash, falling back to the agent-card host).\n */\nexport function matchPlatformSignature(\n  signatures: ReadonlyArray<PlatformSignatureDef>,\n  input: PlatformDetectionInput\n): DynamicPlatformFingerprint | undefined {\n  const ua = input.userAgent ?? '';\n  const cardUrl = input.agentCardUrl ?? '';\n  const apiKeyFormat = input.apiKeyFormat ?? '';\n  const ja4 = input.ja4 ?? '';\n  const asn = input.asn ?? '';\n  // Flatten platform headers to `name` and `name: value` lines for matching.\n  const headerLines: string[] = [];\n  if (input.platformHeaders) {\n    for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(input.platformHeaders)) {\n      headerLines.push(name, `${name}: ${value}`);\n    }\n  }\n\n  for (const sig of signatures) {\n    const uaMatch = sig.uaPatterns?.some((p) => p.test(ua));\n    const cardMatch = sig.agentCardPatterns?.some((p) => p.test(cardUrl));\n    const keyMatch =\n      apiKeyFormat.length > 0 && sig.apiKeyFormatPatterns?.some((p) => p.test(apiKeyFormat));\n    const headerMatch =\n      headerLines.length > 0 &&\n      sig.headerPatterns?.some((p) => headerLines.some((line) => p.test(line)));\n    const ja4Match = ja4.length > 0 && sig.ja4Patterns?.some((p) => p.test(ja4));\n    const asnMatch = asn.length > 0 && sig.asnList?.includes(asn);\n    if (uaMatch || cardMatch || keyMatch || headerMatch || ja4Match || asnMatch) {\n      const uaBase = ua.split(/[\\s/]/)[0]?.toLowerCase() ?? '';\n      const cardHost = (() => {\n        try {\n          return cardUrl ? new URL(cardUrl).host : '';\n        } catch {\n          return '';\n        }\n      })();\n      // Prefer a UA/card basename for the dedup key; fall back to the\n      // credential format, then the connection fingerprint (still stable\n      // per-vendor keys) when only a key/header/ja4/asn matched.\n      const keyBasis =\n        uaBase || cardHost || apiKeyFormat || ja4 || (asn && `asn${asn}`) || 'unknown';\n      return {\n        vendor: sig.vendor,\n        fingerprintKey: `${sig.vendor}:${keyBasis}`,\n        displayName: sig.displayName,\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  return undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Inspect caller metadata for a known SEED platform-agent fingerprint.\n * Returns undefined if no signature matches. (Backends with the dynamic\n * registry should call `matchPlatformSignature` over their merged set\n * instead — same semantics, live signature additions included.)\n */\nexport function detectPlatformFingerprint(\n  input: PlatformDetectionInput\n): PlatformFingerprint | undefined {\n  // Seed vendors are all members of the PlatformAgentVendor union, so the\n  // narrowing cast is sound by construction.\n  return matchPlatformSignature(PLATFORM_AGENT_SIGNATURES, input) as\n    | PlatformFingerprint\n    | undefined;\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway — Trust Level helpers.\n *\n * SDK 5.0.0: the `accessLevel` band (`none`/`restricted`/`read-only`/`standard`/\n * `full`/`internal`) was removed entirely — it never gated the access decision\n * (the server does, from a verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS match + trust\n * score). What remains here is the coarse trust-level badge derived from the\n * numeric trust score, used only for display.\n */\n\nimport type { TrustLevel } from './types';\n\n/**\n * Trust level score ranges\n */\nexport const TRUST_LEVEL_RANGES: Record<TrustLevel, { min: number; max: number }> = {\n  BRONZE: { min: 0, max: 39 },\n  SILVER: { min: 40, max: 59 },\n  GOLD: { min: 60, max: 79 },\n  PLATINUM: { min: 80, max: 100 },\n};\n\n/**\n * Determine trust level from score\n */\nexport function getTrustLevel(score: number): TrustLevel {\n  if (score >= 80) return 'PLATINUM';\n  if (score >= 60) return 'GOLD';\n  if (score >= 40) return 'SILVER';\n  return 'BRONZE';\n}\n","import { sdkFetch } from './http';\n/**\n * SDK-side discovery of canonical platform URLs via `/.well-known/agentic-commerce`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget pre-fetch at middleware creation; first verify() awaits\n * the in-flight promise if it hasn't resolved. 60-minute TTL with\n * stale-while-revalidate background refresh.\n */\n\nexport interface WellKnownAgenticCommerce {\n  registrationUrl: string;\n  documentationUrl: string;\n  verifyAccessUrl: string;\n  /** 5.1.0: hosted AstraSync MCP bridge endpoint (absent on self-hosted backends). */\n  mcpEndpoint?: string;\n  /** 5.1.0: bridge connector-discovery doc (absent on self-hosted backends). */\n  mcpDiscoveryUrl?: string;\n}\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  data: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n  fetchedAt: number;\n}\n\nconst CACHE_TTL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 60 minutes\n\nconst cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>();\nconst inflight = new Map<string, Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce>>();\n\nfunction wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl: string): string {\n  // apiBaseUrl is typically 'https://astrasync.ai/api' — strip the /api suffix\n  // to get the platform root, then append /.well-known/agentic-commerce.\n  const base = apiBaseUrl.replace(/\\/api\\/?$/, '');\n  return `${base}/.well-known/agentic-commerce`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const url = wellKnownUrl(apiBaseUrl);\n  const response = await sdkFetch(url, {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },\n    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5000),\n  });\n  if (!response.ok) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `AstraSync platform must expose /.well-known/agentic-commerce; ` +\n        `got ${response.status} from ${url}. SDK cannot initialise without it.`\n    );\n  }\n  const data = (await response.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (!data.registrationUrl || !data.documentationUrl || !data.verifyAccessUrl) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `/.well-known/agentic-commerce response missing required fields ` +\n        `(registrationUrl, documentationUrl, verifyAccessUrl).`\n    );\n  }\n  return data as unknown as WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n}\n\n/**\n * Start a background fetch. Returns the promise for callers that need\n * to await it (first verify() call).\n */\nexport function prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const existing = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (existing) return existing;\n\n  const promise = fetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl)\n    .then((data) => {\n      cache.set(apiBaseUrl, { data, fetchedAt: Date.now() });\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      return data;\n    })\n    .catch((err) => {\n      inflight.delete(apiBaseUrl);\n      throw err;\n    });\n\n  inflight.set(apiBaseUrl, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\n/**\n * Get cached well-known URLs. If stale, triggers a background refresh\n * and returns stale data (stale-while-revalidate). If no cache exists,\n * awaits the in-flight fetch or starts a new one.\n */\nexport async function getWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): Promise<WellKnownAgenticCommerce> {\n  const entry = cache.get(apiBaseUrl);\n\n  if (entry) {\n    if (Date.now() - entry.fetchedAt > CACHE_TTL_MS) {\n      // Stale — trigger background refresh, return stale data\n      prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl).catch(() => {\n        // Background refresh failed — stale data remains until next request\n      });\n    }\n    return entry.data;\n  }\n\n  // No cache — must await\n  const pending = inflight.get(apiBaseUrl);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  return prefetchWellKnown(apiBaseUrl);\n}\n\n/**\n * Synchronous cache read — returns cached URLs or undefined.\n * Never triggers a fetch. Used by verify() to avoid extra HTTP calls\n * in the hot path; adapters are responsible for prefetching.\n */\nexport function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl: string): WellKnownAgenticCommerce | undefined {\n  return cache.get(apiBaseUrl)?.data;\n}\n\n/** Reset cache — for testing only. */\nexport function _resetWellKnownCache(): void {\n  cache.clear();\n  inflight.clear();\n}\n","/**\n * AstraSync Universal Verification Gateway - Core Verification Logic\n *\n * This module handles the core verification logic, calling the AstraSync API\n * and processing the response into a standardized VerificationResult.\n */\n\nimport { sdkFetch } from './http';\nimport type {\n  GatewayConfig,\n  AgentCredentials,\n  VerificationRequest,\n  VerificationResult,\n  VerifiedAgent,\n  VerifiedDeveloper,\n  VerifiedOrganization,\n  GuidanceInfo,\n  EnhancedVerificationResult,\n  TokenGuidance,\n  RuntimeChallengeResult,\n  StepUpApprovalInfo,\n  SettlementOutcomeInfo,\n  MerchantSettlementToken,\n  FulfilmentInfo,\n  SettlementArtifact,\n  AttemptReport,\n} from './types';\nimport { getTrustLevel } from './trust-levels';\nimport type { ObservedMetadata } from './metadata-capture';\nimport { SDK_VERSION } from './version';\nimport { getCachedWellKnownUrls, type WellKnownAgenticCommerce } from './well-known';\n\n/**\n * Default configuration values\n *\n * apiBaseUrl matches the OpenAPI authoritative server (https://astrasync.ai/api\n * for prod, https://staging.astrasync.ai/api for staging). Always include the\n * /api path prefix when overriding — registration / docs URLs are derived by\n * stripping it.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CONFIG: Partial<GatewayConfig> = {\n  apiBaseUrl: 'https://astrasync.ai/api',\n  // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.\n  // cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult applies the 60s\n  // default; the caller's explicit value is honoured for cacheable results.\n  // Denials and step-up escalations are NEVER cached (3.6.0) regardless of\n  // cacheTtl. Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.\n  debug: false,\n};\n\n/**\n * Init self-test state. Fires once per process on first verify() call to warn\n * if apiBaseUrl is pointing at the wrong host (e.g. a marketing site that\n * 200s with text/html instead of the API).\n */\nlet initCheckPerformed = false;\n\n/** Test-only: re-arm the one-time init self-check. */\nexport function _resetInitCheck(): void {\n  initCheckPerformed = false;\n}\n\n/** One-shot guard for v2.3.0 deprecation warning. */\nlet deprecationWarningShown = false;\n\nasync function performInitCheck(\n  apiBaseUrl: string,\n  debug?: boolean,\n  strictInit?: boolean,\n  apiKey?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  initCheckPerformed = true;\n  try {\n    const probeUrl = `${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`;\n    // HEAD mirrors GET semantics (running the full request pipeline without a\n    // body) so the response carries the same content-type the marketing 404\n    // would return. OPTIONS often gets short-circuited by CORS-preflight\n    // handlers and returns no content-type, defeating the check.\n    const response = await sdkFetch(probeUrl, { method: 'HEAD' });\n    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';\n    if (contentType.startsWith('text/html')) {\n      const message =\n        `[VerificationGateway] apiBaseUrl '${apiBaseUrl}' returned HTML (content-type: ${contentType}). ` +\n        `This usually means apiBaseUrl is pointing at a marketing site instead of the API. ` +\n        `Expected: 'https://astrasync.ai/api' (prod) or 'https://staging.astrasync.ai/api' (staging).`;\n      // Audit F-A6-33: when strictInit is set, throw on misconfig instead\n      // of warning + continuing. Recurring footgun per\n      // `[[feedback_astrasync_api_url_canonical]]` — silent warn lets\n      // misconfigured prod deploys ship with all verify-access calls\n      // silently failing.\n      if (strictInit) {\n        throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n      }\n      console.warn(`${message} Set disableInitChecks: true on GatewayConfig to silence.`);\n    } else if (debug) {\n      console.log(\n        `[VerificationGateway] init check passed for ${apiBaseUrl} (content-type: ${contentType})`\n      );\n    }\n\n    // 4.0.0: key liveness probe. A dead API key otherwise surfaces only\n    // per-request as inbound agents get turned away — the operator should\n    // learn at deploy time. 404 = older backend without self-check: silent.\n    if (apiKey) {\n      const selfCheck = await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/self-check`, {\n        headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}` },\n      });\n      if (selfCheck.status === 401) {\n        const body = (await selfCheck.json().catch(() => ({}))) as {\n          code?: string;\n          message?: string;\n          remediation?: { manageUrl?: string };\n        };\n        const message =\n          `[VerificationGateway] the configured AstraSync API key was REJECTED at startup ` +\n          `(${body.code ?? 'api_key_invalid'}: ${body.message ?? 'invalid key'}). Every inbound agent ` +\n          `will be turned away until the key is rotated` +\n          (body.remediation?.manageUrl ? ` at ${body.remediation.manageUrl}` : '') +\n          `.`;\n        if (strictInit) {\n          throw new Error(`${message} (strictInit=true)`);\n        }\n        console.error(message);\n      } else if (selfCheck.ok) {\n        const body = (await selfCheck.json().catch(() => ({}))) as {\n          daysToExpiry?: number | null;\n        };\n        if (typeof body.daysToExpiry === 'number' && body.daysToExpiry <= 7) {\n          console.warn(\n            `[VerificationGateway] the configured AstraSync API key expires in ${body.daysToExpiry} day(s) — ` +\n              `rotate it at Settings → Developer Tools before integrations start failing.`\n          );\n        } else if (debug) {\n          console.log('[VerificationGateway] API key self-check passed');\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (strictInit) {\n      // strict mode propagates init failures so callers get a clear,\n      // synchronous \"your config is broken\" signal at startup.\n      throw err;\n    }\n    if (debug) {\n      console.log(`[VerificationGateway] init check failed (non-blocking): ${String(err)}`);\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple in-memory cache for verification results\n */\nconst verificationCache = new Map<string, { result: VerificationResult; expiresAt: number }>();\n\n/**\n * Generate cache key from the full request shape.\n *\n * Historically the key was credentials-only (`astraId-apiKey-jwt`),\n * which silently returned the cached result of a prior call even when the\n * subsequent call's purpose/action/counterparty/etc. differed. That was a\n * security gap — a warm cache could serve an allow verdict for a purpose the\n * agent hadn't actually been authorised for. Key now includes every field\n * that affects the backend verdict.\n *\n * MAINTAIN: when adding a field to VerificationRequest that affects the\n * backend verdict, add it to this key. Fields that don't affect verdict\n * (e.g. requestId, timestamps, sdkVersion) don't belong here — including\n * them would needlessly thrash the cache for repeated identical requests.\n *\n * 3.12.0 (Trust Record): `attemptId` and `considerationSet` are\n * deliberately EXCLUDED — like `callerMetadata.observedMetadata` they are\n * observational pass-through that never affects the verdict, and keying on\n * a per-attempt id would defeat verdict caching entirely. Cache hits get\n * their attemptId rewritten in verify() instead (never leak a prior\n * attempt's id from a cached result).\n */\nfunction getCacheKey(request: VerificationRequest, counterpartyId?: string): string {\n  const c = request.credentials;\n  return [\n    c.astraId || '',\n    c.apiKey || '',\n    c.jwt || '',\n    request.purpose || '',\n    request.action || '',\n    request.resourceType || '',\n    request.resource || '',\n    request.jurisdiction || '',\n    request.transactionValue ?? '',\n    request.currency || '',\n    // SECURITY (cross-merchant cache leak): the merchant identity is sent via\n    // `config.counterpartyId`, NOT on the request, so it was previously absent\n    // from the key — two verifies for the SAME agent/purpose/action/value but\n    // DIFFERENT merchants collided, and a grant at a permissive merchant (low\n    // trust floor) was served for a stricter one. Same bug class as the\n    // duration omission (F-A1-07). counterpartyId affects the backend verdict\n    // (trust floor / per-route policy), so it MUST key the cache.\n    counterpartyId || '',\n    request.counterpartyUrl || '',\n    request.counterpartyType || '',\n    request.isSubAgentRequest ? '1' : '0',\n    request.parentAgentId || '',\n    request.subAgentDepth ?? '',\n    // Audit F-A1-07: previously-missing dimensions that DO affect the\n    // backend verdict. Without these, two requests with different\n    // durations (e.g. 60s vs 86400s) collided on the same cache key and\n    // the shorter-duration allow served the longer-duration request.\n    request.durationRequired ?? '',\n    request.invocationProtocol || '',\n    request.enableRuntimeChallenge ? '1' : '0',\n    // callerMetadata fields contribute to risk model; include the ones\n    // backend reads. sourceIp/userAgent/forwardedFor change per-request\n    // so their inclusion effectively forces a re-check for any varying\n    // client (the right behavior — IP-driven anomaly scoring shouldn't\n    // be cached across IPs).\n    request.callerMetadata?.sourceIp || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.userAgent || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.forwardedFor || '',\n    request.callerMetadata?.agentCardUrl || '',\n    // UAT2 Bug B (5.4.1): the commerce phase and cart identity DO affect the\n    // backend verdict — the confirm leg is the ONLY leg that may execute\n    // first-party settlement. Without these, a confirm within the cache TTL of\n    // its start_checkout quote was served the cached quote-leg grant (no\n    // settlementOutcome) and never reached the backend. Same F-A1-07 bug class.\n    request.commercePhase || '',\n    request.checkoutSessionId || '',\n  ].join('|');\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if cached result is still valid\n */\nfunction getCachedResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): VerificationResult | null {\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  const cached = verificationCache.get(key);\n\n  if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {\n    return cached.result;\n  }\n\n  if (cached) {\n    verificationCache.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  return null;\n}\n\n/**\n * Cache a verification result.\n *\n * 3.6.0: uniform 60s default. The earlier step-up TTL split (300s for\n * step-up verdicts) is gone — step-up verdicts are no longer cached AT ALL\n * (see the write predicate in verify()): a cached step_up_required result\n * carries a pollUrl that goes stale (consumed/expired) and, worse, keeps\n * denying retries that the owner has already approved. When `configuredTtl`\n * is set (truthy positive number), it's honoured for cacheable results.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 60;\n\nfunction cacheResult(\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  result: VerificationResult,\n  configuredTtl: number | undefined,\n  counterpartyId?: string\n): void {\n  const ttlSeconds = configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0 ? configuredTtl : DEFAULT_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS;\n  const key = getCacheKey(request, counterpartyId);\n  verificationCache.set(key, {\n    result,\n    expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1000,\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear the verification cache\n */\nexport function clearCache(): void {\n  verificationCache.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Extract agent credentials from various sources\n */\nexport function extractCredentials(\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,\n  query?: Record<string, string | undefined>\n): AgentCredentials {\n  const credentials: AgentCredentials = {};\n\n  // Audit F-A1-12: ASTRA-ID shape validation. Accept only the canonical\n  // pattern (ASTRA-/ASTRAE- prefix + 1-64 url-safe chars) to prevent CRLF\n  // header injection or downstream interpolation surprises. Reject otherwise.\n  const ASTRA_ID_PATTERN = /^ASTRAE?-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;\n\n  // Check for ASTRA-ID in headers (case-insensitive). Accepts the historical\n  // X-Astra-Id name plus the X-Astra-AgentId / x-astra-agent-id alias the\n  // partner asked for in #9a — both surface the same field.\n  const astraIdHeader =\n    headers['x-astra-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-ID'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agentid'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-AgentId'] ||\n    headers['x-astra-agent-id'] ||\n    headers['X-Astra-Agent-Id'] ||\n    headers['X-ASTRA-AGENT-ID'];\n  if (astraIdHeader) {\n    // Audit F-A1-11: guard array-confusion. If multiple X-Astra-Id headers\n    // were sent (Express collapses to comma-joined string on most paths),\n    // take only the first canonical-shaped one.\n    const raw = Array.isArray(astraIdHeader)\n      ? astraIdHeader[0]\n      : typeof astraIdHeader === 'string'\n        ? astraIdHeader\n        : undefined;\n    if (typeof raw === 'string' && ASTRA_ID_PATTERN.test(raw)) {\n      credentials.astraId = raw;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check for API key in headers\n  const apiKeyHeader = headers['x-api-key'] || headers['X-Api-Key'] || headers['X-API-KEY'];\n  if (apiKeyHeader) {\n    credentials.apiKey = Array.isArray(apiKeyHeader) ? apiKeyHeader[0] : apiKeyHeader;\n  }\n\n  // Check Authorization header for Bearer token.\n  // Audit F-A1-11: defensive type guard — Array.isArray gives a non-string,\n  // and Express path quirks can produce undefined despite the truthy check.\n  const authHeader = headers['authorization'] || headers['Authorization'];\n  if (authHeader) {\n    const authValue = Array.isArray(authHeader) ? authHeader[0] : authHeader;\n    if (typeof authValue === 'string') {\n      credentials.authorizationHeader = authValue;\n      if (authValue.startsWith('Bearer ')) {\n        credentials.jwt = authValue.slice(7);\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Check query parameters as fallback\n  if (query) {\n    if (query.astraId && !credentials.astraId) {\n      credentials.astraId = query.astraId;\n    }\n    if (query.apiKey && !credentials.apiKey) {\n      credentials.apiKey = query.apiKey;\n    }\n  }\n\n  return credentials;\n}\n\n/**\n * Check if credentials are present\n */\nexport function hasCredentials(credentials: AgentCredentials): boolean {\n  return !!(credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt);\n}\n\n/**\n * Source of a synthesised guidance response. The sources are split — the\n * `'no_credentials'` shape is the original (caller has no AstraSync\n * credentials, suggest registration). The `'api_error'` shape is for when\n * the verify-access HTTP call itself failed (5xx, network, etc.) — DON'T\n * tell a verified-but-currently-blocked partner to \"register your agent\".\n *\n * 4.0.0 adds `'merchant_misconfig'`: the backend rejected THIS INTEGRATION'S\n * own API key (401 api_key_revoked/expired/invalid). Neither the agent's\n * fault nor a platform outage — retrying won't help, and the inbound agent\n * deserves to know the site operator's integration is broken (the\n * gadget-emporium failure mode: a rotated key silently 401ing every\n * credentialed agent for days).\n */\ntype GuidanceSource = 'no_credentials' | 'api_error' | 'merchant_misconfig';\n\n/**\n * MCP-connector steering (5.1.0). Present only when the backend's well-known\n * doc advertises a hosted bridge. The copy must directly counter the observed\n * model refusal (\"go register manually on the dashboard\"): registration via\n * the connector is the agent's own next action, with the human approval built\n * into the flow.\n */\nfunction mcpGuidance(urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce): GuidanceInfo['mcp'] {\n  if (!urls?.mcpEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    endpoint: urls.mcpEndpoint,\n    discoveryUrl: urls.mcpDiscoveryUrl,\n    message:\n      'If you are operating inside an MCP-capable host (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, or any MCP client), ' +\n      'add the AstraSync MCP connector instead of integrating these URLs by hand: registration through ' +\n      'the connector is KEYLESS and HUMAN-APPROVED — your human approves in an in-chat card, and you ' +\n      'never see, hold, or transmit an API key, password, or private key.',\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Create guidance response for unverified agents or for API-error fallback.\n *\n * The source is split so the `register your agent` template\n * doesn't fire on transient backend failures. Also threads `correlationId`\n * through so adapter `onDenied` handlers can surface it on the merchant's\n * response body for log correlation.\n */\nfunction createGuidanceResponse(\n  _config: GatewayConfig,\n  reason?: string,\n  options: {\n    source?: GuidanceSource;\n    correlationId?: string;\n    /** 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server-echoed attempt handle, threaded like correlationId. */\n    attemptId?: string;\n    urls?: WellKnownAgenticCommerce;\n    /** 4.0.0: backend-provided remediation URLs for the merchant (misconfig source). */\n    remediation?: { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string };\n  } = {}\n): VerificationResult {\n  const source = options.source ?? 'no_credentials';\n  const isApiError = source === 'api_error';\n  const isMisconfig = source === 'merchant_misconfig';\n  const urls = options.urls;\n\n  const guidance: GuidanceInfo = isMisconfig\n    ? {\n        message:\n          \"This site's AstraSync integration is misconfigured (its API key was revoked, expired, or rotated). \" +\n          'Your identity and the AstraSync platform are fine — contact the site operator. Retrying will not help.',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: options.remediation?.docsUrl ?? urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        steps: [\n          'Report the failure to the site operator — their AstraSync API key needs rotating',\n          'Do not retry: the failure is deterministic until the operator updates their key',\n        ],\n      }\n    : isApiError\n      ? {\n          message:\n            'Verification is temporarily unavailable. Retry with exponential backoff; if the issue persists, contact support with the correlationId.',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n          steps: [\n            'Retry the request with exponential backoff',\n            'If failures persist, share the correlationId with support',\n          ],\n        }\n      : {\n          message:\n            'This service verifies AI agents before granting access. Please register your agent with AstraSync.',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n          steps: [\n            // MCP steering leads when the hosted bridge is advertised — the\n            // connector is the agent-actionable path (keyless, human-approved).\n            ...(urls?.mcpEndpoint\n              ? [\n                  `Fastest path (inside an MCP host): add the AstraSync MCP connector at ${urls.mcpEndpoint} — keyless, human-approved registration`,\n                ]\n              : []),\n            'Register for an AstraSync account',\n            'Create and register your agent',\n            'Add your ASTRA-ID to request headers',\n            'Retry your request',\n          ],\n          ...(mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }),\n        };\n\n  return {\n    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or\n    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);\n    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).\n    identityVerified: false,\n    policyAllowed: false,\n    guidance,\n    denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ['No valid agent credentials provided'],\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so\n    // partners (and their custom onDenied handlers) can branch on\n    // dimension. Without this, the synthesised stub was indistinguishable\n    // from a real policy deny.\n    failures: isMisconfig\n      ? [\n          {\n            dimension: 'verify_access.merchant_misconfigured',\n            message: reason ?? 'The integration API key was rejected by AstraSync',\n            guidance: guidance.message,\n          },\n        ]\n      : isApiError\n        ? [\n            {\n              dimension: 'verify_access.api_error',\n              message: reason ?? 'Verification temporarily unavailable',\n              guidance: guidance.message,\n            },\n          ]\n        : undefined,\n    // 4.0.0: typed marker so adapters render the misconfig envelope (503 +\n    // MERCHANT_VERIFICATION_MISCONFIGURED) without string-matching.\n    ...(isMisconfig && { misconfigured: true }),\n    // 4.6.0: a transient api_error is retryable — mark it so consumers surface\n    // \"temporarily unavailable, retry\" (recommendation 'error') instead of\n    // coercing the absent recommendation to a policy 'deny'. Misconfig is\n    // deterministic and intentionally NOT marked retryable.\n    ...(isApiError && { retryable: true }),\n    correlationId: options.correlationId,\n    attemptId: options.attemptId,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Call the AstraSync verify-access API\n */\nasync function callVerifyAccessAPI(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest\n): Promise<{\n  success: boolean;\n  access?: {\n    allowed: boolean;\n    reason?: string;\n    /**\n     * Aggregated denial failures (v2.9.8+). Empty / absent when allowed.\n     * Each entry is `{ dimension, message, guidance? }` — see\n     * `AccessFailure` for the contract.\n     */\n    failures?: Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }>;\n    requiresStepUp?: boolean;\n    requiresApproval?: boolean;\n    appliedPolicy?: {\n      boundaryName: string;\n      policyVersion: string;\n    };\n    counterparty?: {\n      id: string;\n      name: string;\n      trustScoreRequirement: number;\n    };\n  };\n  agent?: {\n    kyaAgentId: string;\n    astraId: string;\n    name: string;\n    trustScore: number;\n    trustLevel: string;\n    agentStatus: string;\n    blockchainStatus: string;\n  };\n  developer?: {\n    kyaOwnerId: string;\n    fullName: string;\n    email: string;\n    identityVerified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  organization?: {\n    name: string;\n    verified: boolean;\n    trustScore: number;\n  };\n  /**\n   * Structured explanation of the verification decision. Tells the merchant\n   * WHY (id verified? challenge passed? request within PDLSS? trust score?)\n   * without exposing thresholds, scope lists, or other-tenant counterparty\n   * membership. Empty `attestations` unless the endpoint's access policy\n   * declared `required_attestations`.\n   */\n  verificationContext?: {\n    idVerified: boolean;\n    runtimeChallenge: {\n      status: 'passed' | 'skipped' | 'failed' | 'timeout' | 'not_supported';\n      checkedAt: string | null;\n    };\n    pdlssCheck: {\n      result: 'within' | 'exceeded' | 'denied' | 'not_evaluated';\n      purpose: 'approved' | 'denied';\n      scope: 'approved' | 'denied';\n    };\n    dynamicTrustScore: number;\n    attestations: Array<{\n      type: string;\n      status: 'passed' | 'failed';\n      /** LMAX-POC C1: underlying check timestamp for merchant freshness gates. */\n      checkedAt: string;\n      validUntil?: string;\n      proofType: 'reference' | 'zkp';\n      proof: string;\n    }>;\n  };\n  error?: string;\n  /**\n   * 4.0.0: the backend 401'd this integration's OWN API key (revoked /\n   * expired / invalid) — deterministic merchant-side misconfig, not a\n   * transient failure. `misconfigCode` carries the backend's api_key_* code\n   * and `remediation` its operator-facing URLs when present.\n   */\n  misconfig?: boolean;\n  misconfigCode?: string;\n  remediation?: { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string };\n  /**\n   * When the verify-access server response carries a\n   * correlationId on an error envelope, propagate it so the SDK can thread\n   * it through createGuidanceResponse → adapter onDenied → merchant body.\n   */\n  correlationId?: string;\n  /**\n   * 3.12.0 (Trust Record): the server echoes the attempt-chain\n   * handle top-level on every response branch (error envelopes included).\n   */\n  attemptId?: string;\n}> {\n  const { credentials, ...requestData } = request;\n\n  // Build the request body. agentId is omitted when not provided so the\n  // server treats it as an anonymous canonical-flow call (Branch A/B/C).\n  const body: Record<string, unknown> = {\n    ...(credentials.astraId && { agentId: credentials.astraId }),\n    ...(requestData.purpose && { purpose: requestData.purpose }),\n  };\n\n  // Add optional fields\n  if (requestData.action) body.action = requestData.action;\n  if (requestData.resourceType) body.resourceType = requestData.resourceType;\n  if (requestData.resource) body.resource = requestData.resource;\n  if (requestData.jurisdiction) body.jurisdiction = requestData.jurisdiction;\n  if (requestData.transactionValue) body.transactionValue = requestData.transactionValue;\n  if (requestData.currency) body.currency = requestData.currency;\n  if (requestData.isSubAgentRequest) body.isSubAgentRequest = requestData.isSubAgentRequest;\n  if (requestData.parentAgentId) body.parentAgentId = requestData.parentAgentId;\n  if (requestData.subAgentDepth !== undefined) body.subAgentDepth = requestData.subAgentDepth;\n  // Handshake Protocol v10 additions\n  if (requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge)\n    body.enableRuntimeChallenge = requestData.enableRuntimeChallenge;\n  if (requestData.createSession) body.createSession = requestData.createSession;\n  if (requestData.durationRequired) body.durationRequired = requestData.durationRequired;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyType) body.counterpartyType = requestData.counterpartyType;\n  if (requestData.counterpartyUrl) body.counterpartyUrl = requestData.counterpartyUrl;\n  if (config.counterpartyId) body.counterpartyId = config.counterpartyId;\n  if (requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions)\n    body.runtimeChallengeOptions = requestData.runtimeChallengeOptions;\n  // Round-12 (F19): transport-vs-intent separation. MCP middleware sets\n  // this to 'mcp'; non-MCP callers leave it unset.\n  if (requestData.invocationProtocol) body.invocationProtocol = requestData.invocationProtocol;\n  // 5.3.0 (astra-pay): checkout-leg discriminator — first-party settlement\n  // fires only on 'confirm'; absent keeps pre-phase server behavior.\n  if (requestData.commercePhase) body.commercePhase = requestData.commercePhase;\n  // Per-cart idempotency key (checkout session id) forwarded on the confirm\n  // leg so concurrent confirms for one cart charge at most once.\n  if (requestData.checkoutSessionId) body.checkoutSessionId = requestData.checkoutSessionId;\n  // Order-plane cart lines (receipts + fulfillment email) — informational.\n  if (requestData.checkoutItems) body.checkoutItems = requestData.checkoutItems;\n  // 5.6.0 (astra-pay): transit-only fulfilment contact — echoed back in\n  // result.fulfilment for first-party confirms, never persisted server-side.\n  if (requestData.buyerEmail) body.buyerEmail = requestData.buyerEmail;\n  // 3.9.0 (§33.5 #1): raw commerce artifacts forwarded verbatim — the\n  // backend's Step 0.5 pipeline does the cryptographic verification\n  // server-side (adapters forward, never verify locally).\n  if (requestData.commerceArtifacts) body.commerceArtifacts = requestData.commerceArtifacts;\n  // 3.12.0 (Trust Record, §33.5 #3): attempt-chain handle + consideration set,\n  // forwarded skip-when-undefined (observedMetadata precedent) — pure\n  // observational pass-through; the server echoes attemptId on every branch.\n  if (requestData.attemptId) body.attemptId = requestData.attemptId;\n  if (requestData.considerationSet) body.considerationSet = requestData.considerationSet;\n\n  // Round-13 (F14 closure / R13-7): emit the SDK package version on every\n  // verify-access body so the backend can auto-populate `kya_counterparty.\n  // sdk_version` for the calling endpoint. Body field (not User-Agent\n  // header) is the canonical channel — works in Node, browser, behind\n  // Cloudflare, and across SDK bundlers without environment-specific\n  // header gymnastics. Backend's `validation.ts:verifyAccessSchema`\n  // accepts the semver regex; the auto-pop logic is forward-only.\n  body.sdkVersion = SDK_VERSION;\n\n  // Forward caller metadata when present. Merges the legacy top-level\n  // clientIp/userAgent into the nested block for backward compatibility.\n  if (requestData.callerMetadata || requestData.clientIp || requestData.userAgent) {\n    const meta = {\n      ...(requestData.clientIp && { sourceIp: requestData.clientIp }),\n      ...(requestData.userAgent && { userAgent: requestData.userAgent }),\n      ...requestData.callerMetadata,\n    };\n    if (Object.keys(meta).length > 0) body.callerMetadata = meta;\n  }\n\n  // Build headers\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n    ...config.customHeaders,\n  };\n\n  // verify-access requires authentication. Use ONLY the merchant's\n  // configured apiKey for outbound auth. Previously the caller's inbound\n  // Authorization header took priority, which pivoted the verify-access\n  // call to the caller's identity — letting an attacker who supplied\n  // their own Authorization header trigger verify-access calls under\n  // THEIR account and observe the resulting verdicts for arbitrary\n  // lookups they triggered via the merchant. Audit F-A1-10.\n  //\n  // The caller-supplied JWT (if any) is already extracted to\n  // credentials.jwt and travels in the verify-access request body so\n  // backend can evaluate it as the agent's identity claim — separate from\n  // the merchant-attribution auth on the outbound HTTPS call.\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    // Legacy header kept for compatibility with any middleware that reads it directly.\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  try {\n    // 4.0.0: hard timeout — without one, a backend that accepts the\n    // connection but never answers hangs the merchant's middleware and every\n    // inbound agent request behind it (observed live on a partner property).\n    // Timeouts land on the catch path below → api_error (fail-closed),\n    // NOT misconfig. The edge adapter races its own tighter withBudget.\n    const response = await sdkFetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body: JSON.stringify(body),\n      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(config.verifyTimeoutMs ?? 10_000),\n    });\n\n    const data = await response.json();\n\n    // v2.3.8 (defect #29): treat 410 Gone as a deterministic deactivated-endpoint\n    // signal. Older SDKs may treat any non-2xx as transient and retry; v2.3.8+\n    // surfaces it as a structured denial with `reason: 'endpoint_deactivated'`\n    // so callers can distinguish \"endpoint gone\" from \"endpoint denied this\".\n    if (response.status === 410) {\n      return {\n        success: true,\n        // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): keep the server-echoed attempt handle even on\n        // the synthesised 410 deny shape (echoed on every branch).\n        attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n        access: {\n          allowed: false,\n          reason: 'endpoint_deactivated',\n          failures: [\n            {\n              dimension: 'endpoint.deactivated',\n              message:\n                typeof data?.message === 'string' ? data.message : 'Endpoint has been deactivated',\n              guidance:\n                typeof data?.guidance === 'string'\n                  ? data.guidance\n                  : 'Reactivate via POST /api/endpoints/{id}/reactivate, or update the URL on the calling agent.',\n            },\n          ],\n        },\n      };\n    }\n\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      // 4.0.0: a 401 from verify-access can ONLY mean the backend rejected\n      // THIS INTEGRATION'S own API key — agent denials come back as 200 with\n      // access.allowed=false. Surface it as merchant-misconfig, not a\n      // transient api_error: it is deterministic until the operator rotates\n      // the key, and the \"retry with backoff\" template actively misleads.\n      // Backends ≥ this round also send code: api_key_* + remediation URLs.\n      if (response.status === 401) {\n        return {\n          success: false,\n          error: data.message || data.error || 'Integration API key rejected',\n          misconfig: true,\n          misconfigCode: typeof data?.code === 'string' ? data.code : undefined,\n          remediation:\n            data?.remediation && typeof data.remediation === 'object'\n              ? (data.remediation as { docsUrl?: string; manageUrl?: string })\n              : undefined,\n          correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n          attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n        };\n      }\n      // Round-10 (#47, O5): propagate correlationId on the error path too if\n      // the server happened to include one (some 5xx error envelopes carry\n      // it). Lets the SDK pass it through to the adapter onDenied handler.\n      return {\n        success: false,\n        error: data.message || data.error || `API returned ${response.status}`,\n        correlationId: typeof data?.correlationId === 'string' ? data.correlationId : undefined,\n        attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === 'string' ? data.attemptId : undefined,\n      };\n    }\n\n    return data;\n  } catch (error) {\n    const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Unknown error';\n    return {\n      success: false,\n      error: `Failed to call verify-access API: ${message}`,\n    };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for a single verify() call (as opposed to GatewayConfig, which is\n * per-gateway). Mirrors the Java SDK's `verify(request, bypassCache)`.\n */\nexport interface VerifyOptions {\n  /**\n   * Skip the cache READ for this call so the request is guaranteed to reach\n   * the backend (the result is still written to the cache if cacheable).\n   * Used by the step-up hold-and-poll retry: the re-verify after an approval\n   * must hit the server to redeem the single-use approval.\n   */\n  bypassCache?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Main verification function\n */\nexport async function verify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n\n  // v2.5.0: read well-known URLs from cache (prefetched by adapter at middleware creation).\n  // Synchronous — never triggers a fetch. If cache is empty, guidance URLs are empty strings.\n  const urls = mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl\n    ? getCachedWellKnownUrls(mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl)\n    : undefined;\n\n  // One-time init self-test — fire-and-forget by default, never blocks verify().\n  // Audit F-A6-33: when GatewayConfig.strictInit is set, the init promise is\n  // awaited and any failure throws synchronously so callers learn about\n  // misconfigured apiBaseUrl on the first verify() call rather than silently\n  // running with broken auth.\n  if (!initCheckPerformed && !mergedConfig.disableInitChecks && mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl) {\n    if (mergedConfig.strictInit) {\n      await performInitCheck(\n        mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl,\n        mergedConfig.debug,\n        true,\n        mergedConfig.apiKey\n      );\n    } else {\n      void performInitCheck(\n        mergedConfig.apiBaseUrl,\n        mergedConfig.debug,\n        false,\n        mergedConfig.apiKey\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Deprecation warning for v2.3.0 removed config fields. Fires once per process.\n  if (\n    !deprecationWarningShown &&\n    (config.minTrustScore !== undefined || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== undefined)\n  ) {\n    deprecationWarningShown = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 ' +\n        'and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access decisions ' +\n        '(verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score). To gate access ' +\n        \"to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side.\"\n    );\n  }\n\n  // v2.3.0: anonymous traffic no longer short-circuits here. We forward the\n  // request to the server with no agentId; the server applies the endpoint's\n  // unverifiedAgentPolicy and returns advisory. createGuidanceResponse remains\n  // as the offline fallback if the API itself fails (handled below).\n\n  // Check cache first. Caching on unless caller explicitly sets cacheTtl: 0\n  // to disable. Undefined falls through to the 60s default at cacheResult\n  // write time. options.bypassCache skips the read only (hold-and-poll retry\n  // must reach the backend to redeem its approval).\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && !options?.bypassCache) {\n    const cached = getCachedResult(request, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n    if (cached) {\n      if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n        console.log('[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result');\n      }\n      // 3.12.0 (Trust Record, §33.5 #3): attemptId is excluded from the cache\n      // key, so the stored result may carry a PRIOR attempt's id. Overwrite it\n      // with this request's own attemptId — or drop it when this request has\n      // none — a cached verdict must never leak another attempt's handle.\n      // Shallow clone: never mutate the stored entry (a concurrent holder of\n      // the same cached object may still be reading it).\n      const hit: VerificationResult = { ...cached };\n      if (request.attemptId) {\n        hit.attemptId = request.attemptId;\n      } else {\n        delete hit.attemptId;\n      }\n      return hit;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Inject counterparty info from config if not already set in request\n  const enrichedRequest = { ...request };\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl && mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyUrl = mergedConfig.counterpartyUrl;\n  }\n  if (!enrichedRequest.counterpartyType && mergedConfig.counterpartyType) {\n    enrichedRequest.counterpartyType = mergedConfig.counterpartyType;\n  }\n\n  // Call the API\n  if (mergedConfig.debug) {\n    console.log('[VerificationGateway] Calling verify-access API');\n  }\n\n  const apiResponse = await callVerifyAccessAPI(mergedConfig, enrichedRequest);\n\n  // 3.6.0: the server emits a top-level denialReasons array on every deny\n  // path (same strings as the failure messages). Non-empty → authoritative;\n  // absent/empty → fall back to the client-side reconstructions below.\n  const rawServerDenialReasons = (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).denialReasons;\n  const serverDenialReasons =\n    Array.isArray(rawServerDenialReasons) && rawServerDenialReasons.length > 0\n      ? (rawServerDenialReasons as string[])\n      : undefined;\n\n  // Handle API errors\n  if (!apiResponse.success) {\n    // Round-10 (#47, O5): distinguish API errors from missing-credentials.\n    // The previous default tagged any failure with the \"register your\n    // agent\" template, which is misleading to a verified partner whose\n    // verify-access call hit a 500. The `api_error` source surfaces a\n    // typed `verify_access.api_error` failure entry instead.\n    // 4.0.0: a rejected merchant key gets its own source — deterministic\n    // misconfig must not wear the \"temporarily unavailable, retry\" template.\n    return createGuidanceResponse(mergedConfig, apiResponse.error, {\n      source: apiResponse.misconfig ? 'merchant_misconfig' : 'api_error',\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as { correlationId?: string }).correlationId,\n      attemptId: (apiResponse as { attemptId?: string }).attemptId,\n      remediation: apiResponse.remediation,\n      urls,\n    });\n  }\n\n  // Check access result\n  if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {\n    // v2.9.8 (defect M1): aggregated failures across every gate that\n    // denied. Surface them on the result so the integrator can see every\n    // blocker in one go instead of the previous fail-fast cascade.\n    const aggregatedFailures = (apiResponse.access as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)\n      ?.failures as Array<{ dimension: string; message: string; guidance?: string }> | undefined;\n    // Round-18 G4: backend denied access (PDLSS or other gate); identity status\n    // depends on whether the backend resolved the caller. Read from\n    // verificationContext.idVerified; default false if absent (anonymous or\n    // identity-fail paths land here too). policyAllowed is false by definition\n    // in this branch (apiResponse.access.allowed === false).\n    const idVerifiedFromBackend =\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true;\n    const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,\n      policyAllowed: false,\n      // 3.6.0: the server now emits top-level denialReasons on every deny\n      // path — prefer it verbatim; the failure-message reconstruction remains\n      // as the fallback for older backends.\n      denialReasons:\n        serverDenialReasons ??\n        (aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0\n          ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message)\n          : apiResponse.access?.reason\n            ? [apiResponse.access.reason]\n            : ['Access denied']),\n      failures: aggregatedFailures,\n      requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n      requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n      guidance: {\n        message: apiResponse.access?.reason || 'Access denied by PDLSS policy',\n        registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n        documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        // 5.1.0: anonymous callers land on this branch — steer MCP-hosted\n        // agents to the connector (this is what the edge deny body surfaces).\n        ...(mcpGuidance(urls) && { mcp: mcpGuidance(urls) }),\n      },\n      verifiedAt: new Date(),\n      // Extract sessionId so decisions can be recorded for denials too\n      sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n      // Anonymous traffic has no session → correlationId is the per-attempt\n      // linking key (the sessionId-equivalent for anonymous callers).\n      correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n      // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server echoes the attempt-chain handle on\n      // every branch — denials included (the funnel outlives one deny).\n      attemptId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).attemptId as string | undefined,\n      recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n        .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n      recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n        | string[]\n        | undefined,\n      stepUpApproval: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).stepUpApproval as\n        | StepUpApprovalInfo\n        | undefined,\n      settlement: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlement as\n        | SettlementArtifact\n        | undefined,\n      settlementOutcome: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementOutcome as\n        | SettlementOutcomeInfo\n        | undefined,\n      // 5.5.0 self-settlement: merchant-only material — passes through to the\n      // MERCHANT caller only (bridge callers strip it before the agent plane).\n      settlementToken: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementToken as\n        | MerchantSettlementToken\n        | undefined,\n      // 5.6.0: fulfilment contact — merchant-only lane, same strip rule.\n      fulfilment: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).fulfilment as FulfilmentInfo | undefined,\n    };\n\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  // Build successful result\n  const agent: VerifiedAgent | undefined = apiResponse.agent\n    ? {\n        astraId: apiResponse.agent.astraId,\n        name: apiResponse.agent.name,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.agent.trustScore,\n        trustLevel: getTrustLevel(apiResponse.agent.trustScore),\n        blockchainVerified: apiResponse.agent.blockchainStatus === 'verified',\n        status: apiResponse.agent.agentStatus as VerifiedAgent['status'],\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const developer: VerifiedDeveloper | undefined = apiResponse.developer\n    ? {\n        astradId: apiResponse.developer.kyaOwnerId,\n        name: apiResponse.developer.fullName,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.developer.trustScore || 0,\n        verified: apiResponse.developer.identityVerified,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  const organization: VerifiedOrganization | undefined = apiResponse.organization\n    ? {\n        name: apiResponse.organization.name,\n        verified: apiResponse.organization.verified,\n        trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore,\n      }\n    : undefined;\n\n  // Verification context — structured \"why\" the merchant gets in v2.2.4+.\n  // Carries appliedPolicy (no UUIDs), pdlssCheck summary, dynamic trust score,\n  // and policy-driven attestations. Replaces the old over-sharing `pdlss` block.\n  const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;\n\n  const result: EnhancedVerificationResult = {\n    // 4.5.0 (probe F1): read idVerified from verificationContext with the\n    // SAME absent⇒false default as the deny branch. The previous `!== false`\n    // default manufactured `identityVerified: true` for anonymous\n    // allow_full/allow_partial/audit responses (which allow access but omit\n    // verificationContext entirely) — the \"anonymous caller labelled\n    // verified\" defect. Every authenticated success response has carried\n    // `verificationContext.idVerified: true` since v2.2.4, so a truth claim\n    // this load-bearing must never be defaulted on.\n    identityVerified:\n      (apiResponse.verificationContext as { idVerified?: boolean } | undefined)?.idVerified ===\n      true,\n    policyAllowed: true,\n    agent,\n    developer,\n    organization,\n    appliedPolicy: apiResponse.access?.appliedPolicy,\n    verificationContext,\n    requiresStepUp: apiResponse.access?.requiresStepUp,\n    requiresApproval: apiResponse.access?.requiresApproval,\n    verifiedAt: new Date(),\n    cacheTtl: mergedConfig.cacheTtl,\n    // Handshake Protocol v10 enhanced fields (present when backend returns them)\n    sessionId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).sessionId as string | undefined,\n    // v2.3.10 (defect #34, round-4): anonymous responses surface correlationId\n    // (no session row exists for unverified callers).\n    correlationId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).correlationId as string | undefined,\n    // 3.12.0 (Trust Record): server-echoed attempt-chain handle.\n    attemptId: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).attemptId as string | undefined,\n    runtimeChallenge: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).runtimeChallenge as\n      | RuntimeChallengeResult\n      | undefined,\n    tokenGuidance: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).tokenGuidance as\n      | TokenGuidance\n      | undefined,\n    recommendation: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>)\n      .recommendation as EnhancedVerificationResult['recommendation'],\n    recommendationReasons: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).recommendationReasons as\n      | string[]\n      | undefined,\n    warningHeader: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).warningHeader as\n      | { name: string; value: string }\n      | undefined,\n    stepUpApproval: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).stepUpApproval as\n      | StepUpApprovalInfo\n      | undefined,\n    settlement: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlement as\n      | SettlementArtifact\n      | undefined,\n    settlementOutcome: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementOutcome as\n      | SettlementOutcomeInfo\n      | undefined,\n    settlementToken: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).settlementToken as\n      | MerchantSettlementToken\n      | undefined,\n    // 5.6.0: fulfilment contact — merchant-only lane, same strip rule.\n    fulfilment: (apiResponse as Record<string, unknown>).fulfilment as FulfilmentInfo | undefined,\n  };\n\n  // Enforce AstraSync recommendation\n  if (result.recommendation === 'deny') {\n    // Round-18 G4: recommendation-driven deny lands on the success-path\n    // construction (identity was resolved). Flip policy only — identity stays\n    // verified — so adapters return 403 (re-auth won't help; the policy\n    // decision is the blocker).\n    result.policyAllowed = false;\n    // 3.6.0: server-sent top-level denialReasons wins; recommendationReasons\n    // reconstruction is the fallback for older backends.\n    result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ??\n      result.recommendationReasons ?? ['Access denied by AstraSync recommendation'];\n    result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge\n      ? {\n          message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || 'runtime challenge failed'}`,\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        }\n      : {\n          message: result.recommendationReasons?.[0] || 'Access denied by AstraSync recommendation',\n          registrationUrl: urls?.registrationUrl ?? '',\n          documentationUrl: urls?.documentationUrl ?? '',\n        };\n  } else if (result.recommendation === 'step_up_required') {\n    // The escalation signal rides on `requiresStepUp` / `stepUpApproval`, not\n    // on any masquerade of the (now-removed) access band.\n    result.requiresStepUp = true;\n    result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ??\n      result.recommendationReasons ?? ['Step-up verification required'];\n  }\n\n  // Cache the result. Never cache denials (agent may fix challenge endpoint\n  // and retry) NOR step-up escalations (3.6.0 — the same bug the Java SDK\n  // had: a cached step_up_required verdict keeps denying retries the owner\n  // has already approved, and its pollUrl goes stale once consumed/expired).\n  // Escalations stay uncached even when the caller pins an explicit cacheTtl.\n  const escalates =\n    result.requiresStepUp === true ||\n    result.requiresApproval === true ||\n    result.recommendation === 'step_up_required';\n  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== 'deny' && !escalates) {\n    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl, mergedConfig.counterpartyId);\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Record a counterparty's grant/deny decision for a verification session.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function recordDecision(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  sessionId: string,\n  decision: 'granted' | 'denied',\n  reason?: string\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${config.apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/${sessionId}/decision`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify({ decision, reason }),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report post-hoc consideration/outcome data for an attempt chain (Trust\n * Record). Use when the signal never reached verify-access: a\n * catalog served from a local cache, a transport-side deny (sku not found,\n * over budget), or a terminal outcome (settled / blocked on step-up).\n * Authenticated with the same credentials as verify(); the backend responds\n * 202 and folds the data into the attempt chain keyed by `attemptId`.\n *\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed, never throws.\n */\nexport async function reportAttempt(config: GatewayConfig, report: AttemptReport): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n\n  // counterpartyId resolution mirrors reportUnregisteredAttempt: an explicit\n  // report value wins; otherwise attribute to the configured endpoint.\n  const body = {\n    ...report,\n    ...(!report.counterpartyId &&\n      config.counterpartyId && { counterpartyId: config.counterpartyId }),\n  };\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/agents/verify-access/attempt-report`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body: JSON.stringify(body),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Fetch the per-route policy for an endpoint from the AstraSync backend.\n * v2.9.7 moved policy authority into the dashboard — the SDK no longer\n * accepts `routes` from merchant-side source code, it fetches them from\n * here on init (and refreshes periodically).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the request fails for any reason — the caller decides\n * how to fall back (the middleware allows-all when no policy is loaded so\n * a misconfigured init doesn't take down the merchant's API).\n */\nexport async function fetchRoutes(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  counterpartyId: string\n): Promise<RouteAccessConfigShape[] | null> {\n  if (!counterpartyId) return null;\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };\n  if (config.apiKey) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${config.apiKey}`;\n    headers['X-API-Key'] = config.apiKey;\n  }\n  try {\n    const response = await sdkFetch(\n      `${config.apiBaseUrl}/endpoints/${encodeURIComponent(counterpartyId)}/routes`,\n      { method: 'GET', headers }\n    );\n    if (!response.ok) return null;\n    const body = (await response.json()) as { data?: { routes?: RouteAccessConfigShape[] } };\n    return body.data?.routes ?? [];\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Minimal shape of an EndpointRoute as the SDK consumes it. Mirrors the\n * server's `EndpointRoute` type and the SDK's `RouteAccessConfig` — same\n * JSON moves between server and SDK unchanged.\n */\nexport interface RouteAccessConfigShape {\n  pattern: string;\n  method: string;\n  /** Pass through unenforced (observe). Replaces `minAccessLevel: 'none'`. */\n  observe?: boolean;\n  minTrustScore?: number;\n  requiredPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedPurposes?: string[];\n  allowedJurisdictions?: string[];\n  maxDuration?: number;\n  maxTransactionValue?: number;\n  requirePurpose?: boolean;\n  /** Send-mapping — see RouteAccessConfig in types.ts. */\n  purpose?: string;\n  action?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an agent AND automatically record the grant/deny decision.\n *\n * This is the recommended entry point for counterparties that call verify()\n * directly (e.g. MCP servers) rather than using createMiddleware().\n * It adds createSession: true, then fire-and-forgets the decision.\n */\nexport async function verifyAndRecord(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  request: VerificationRequest,\n  options?: VerifyOptions\n): Promise<VerificationResult> {\n  const mergedConfig = { ...DEFAULT_CONFIG, ...config };\n  const result = await verify(mergedConfig, { ...request, createSession: true }, options);\n  const sessionId = (result as EnhancedVerificationResult).sessionId;\n\n  if (sessionId) {\n    // Round-18 G4: a session is \"granted\" only if identity verified AND\n    // policy allowed; either failing is a deny.\n    if (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed) {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'granted').catch(() => {});\n    } else {\n      recordDecision(mergedConfig, sessionId, 'denied', result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {});\n    }\n  }\n\n  return result;\n}\n\n/**\n * Report an unregistered agent attempt (no AstraSync credentials).\n * Called by SDK adapters when an agent is redirected to /docs/agent-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    /**\n     * 3.6.0: optional — the backend attributes by counterpartyId first (sent\n     * from config below) and requires at least ONE of counterpartyId/URL.\n     * A null/undefined URL is omitted from the body, not sent as null.\n     */\n    counterpartyUrl?: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    sourceIp?: string;\n    userAgent?: string;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n    /**\n     * 3.9.0 — edge-adapter evidence fields, persisted into the\n     * event's eventData by the backend: `protocol` = detected transport/\n     * credential protocol; `evidence` = light crypto-free detection detail.\n     */\n    protocol?: string;\n    evidence?: Record<string, unknown>;\n    /**\n     * Maximal metadata capture — the full sanitised metadata for an\n     * unregistered caller (every signal legitimately visible on the wire).\n     * Persisted into eventData; feeds platform attribution and (via\n     * correlationId) registration auto-fill. Fire-and-forget, so free.\n     */\n    observedMetadata?: ObservedMetadata;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  const { counterpartyUrl, ...rest } = data;\n  const body = {\n    ...rest,\n    ...(counterpartyUrl && { counterpartyUrl }),\n    ...(config.counterpartyId && { counterpartyId: config.counterpartyId }),\n  };\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/unregistered-attempt`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(body),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Report a counterparty-side PDLSS pre-check failure.\n * Called by SDK adapters when the agent's requested PDLSS exceeds\n * counterparty-defined maximums BEFORE calling verify-access.\n * Fire-and-forget — errors are silently swallowed.\n */\nexport async function reportCounterpartyPreCheckFailure(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  data: {\n    agentId: string;\n    counterpartyUrl: string;\n    counterpartyType?: string;\n    failures: Array<{\n      field: string;\n      requested: string | number;\n      limit: string | number | string[];\n      message: string;\n    }>;\n    requestPath?: string;\n    requestMethod?: string;\n  }\n): Promise<void> {\n  const apiBaseUrl = config.apiBaseUrl || DEFAULT_CONFIG.apiBaseUrl!;\n\n  await sdkFetch(`${apiBaseUrl}/verification-activity/counterparty-pre-check-failure`, {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  }).catch(() => {\n    /* fire-and-forget */\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Quick verification — checks credentials and policy in one call.\n *\n * The return shape mirrors `VerificationResult`'s split — partners\n * writing custom handlers around `quickVerify` get the same identity/policy\n * distinction as those calling `verify()` directly. Map to HTTP status the\n * same way: `!identityVerified` → 401; `identityVerified && !policyAllowed`\n * → 403.\n */\nexport async function quickVerify(\n  config: GatewayConfig,\n  credentials: AgentCredentials\n): Promise<{\n  identityVerified: boolean;\n  policyAllowed: boolean;\n  reason?: string;\n}> {\n  const result = await verify(config, {\n    credentials,\n    purpose: 'verification',\n  });\n\n  return {\n    identityVerified: result.identityVerified,\n    policyAllowed: result.policyAllowed,\n    reason: result.denialReasons?.[0],\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Helpers over {@link NormalizedRequest} — header access, URL\n * reconstruction, and the full sanitized metadata capture.\n */\n\nimport {\n  sanitizeHeaders,\n  CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION,\n  type ObservedMetadata,\n} from '../metadata-capture';\nimport type { NormalizedRequest } from './types';\n\n/** Value of a header (name matched case-insensitively), or undefined. */\nexport function headerValue(req: NormalizedRequest, name: string): string | undefined {\n  return req.headers[name.toLowerCase()];\n}\n\n/** Full request URL as the origin will see it (scheme fixed to https). */\nexport function requestUrl(req: NormalizedRequest, host: string): string {\n  const qs = req.querystring ? `?${req.querystring}` : '';\n  return `https://${host}${req.uri}${qs}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * The FULL sanitized metadata capture for one request: every inbound\n * header (secrets stripped, credential headers reduced to a safe format\n * prefix) plus the connection-layer block the platform collected. The\n * edge is the richest capture point — the headers are already in memory —\n * and this is pure string work, so it adds no page latency. Forwarded on\n * both the verify-access call and the telemetry beacon.\n */\nexport function buildObservedMetadata(req: NormalizedRequest): ObservedMetadata {\n  const { headers, apiKeyFormat, platformHeaders, cookieCount } = sanitizeHeaders(req.headers);\n  const connection = req.connection ?? {};\n  const queryKeys = extractQueryKeys(req.querystring);\n  return {\n    headers,\n    ...(apiKeyFormat && { apiKeyFormat }),\n    ...(platformHeaders && { platformHeaders }),\n    ...(Object.keys(connection).length > 0 && { connection }),\n    ...(cookieCount !== undefined && { cookieCount }),\n    ...(queryKeys && { queryKeys }),\n    schemaVersion: CAPTURE_SCHEMA_VERSION,\n  };\n}\n\n/** Backend bounds on queryKeys (mirrored in observedMetadataSchema). */\nconst MAX_QUERY_KEYS = 32;\nconst MAX_QUERY_KEY_CHARS = 64;\n\n/**\n * Query-string parameter NAMES only — deduped, lowercased, bounded. Values\n * are never captured (OAuth codes, tokens, PII); the name set alone\n * fingerprints client shape. Exported for tests.\n */\nexport function extractQueryKeys(querystring: string | undefined): string[] | undefined {\n  if (!querystring) return undefined;\n  let params: URLSearchParams;\n  try {\n    params = new URLSearchParams(querystring);\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  const keys: string[] = [];\n  for (const key of params.keys()) {\n    const normalized = key.toLowerCase().slice(0, MAX_QUERY_KEY_CHARS);\n    if (normalized && !keys.includes(normalized)) {\n      keys.push(normalized);\n      if (keys.length >= MAX_QUERY_KEYS) break;\n    }\n  }\n  return keys.length > 0 ? keys : undefined;\n}\n","/**\n * Crypto-free commerce-protocol detection.\n *\n * The edge only SNIFFS — header shapes, compact-JWT patterns, body field\n * names — and packages what it saw as raw `CommerceArtifactsPayload` for\n * verify-access, whose server-side pipeline does the authoritative parsing\n * and cryptographic verification. Nothing here imports jose/sd-jwt/\n * signature libraries: detection must stay cheap enough to run on every\n * non-human request, and verification must happen exactly once, in the\n * canonical sink, where it is recorded.\n */\n\nimport type { CommerceArtifactsPayload } from '../types';\nimport { headerValue, requestUrl } from './request';\nimport type { NormalizedRequest } from './types';\n\nexport interface DetectedCommerce {\n  /** Detection-order label: rfc9421-agent-pay | rfc9421-tap | rfc9421-web-bot-auth | vi-sd-jwt | ap2 | acp | ucp | mpp | x402 */\n  protocol: string;\n  artifacts: CommerceArtifactsPayload;\n  /** Light detection detail for beacons/audit — never secrets or full credentials. */\n  evidence: Record<string, unknown>;\n}\n\n/** Compact SD-JWT: JWT + `~`-separated disclosures. */\nconst SD_JWT_PATTERN = /^eyJ[\\w-]+\\.[\\w-]*\\.[\\w-]+~/;\n\n/** Decode a base64url segment to UTF-8 text (web-standard, no Buffer). */\nfunction decodeBase64Url(seg: string): string {\n  const b64 = seg.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');\n  const padded = b64 + '='.repeat((4 - (b64.length % 4)) % 4);\n  const binary = atob(padded);\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);\n  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i);\n  return new TextDecoder().decode(bytes);\n}\n\n/** Decode a JWT header segment without verifying anything. */\nfunction sniffJwtHeader(compact: string): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  try {\n    const seg = compact.split('.')[0];\n    return JSON.parse(decodeBase64Url(seg)) as Record<string, unknown>;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction parseJsonBody(bodyText: string | undefined): Record<string, unknown> | undefined {\n  if (!bodyText) return undefined;\n  try {\n    const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(bodyText);\n    return typeof parsed === 'object' && parsed !== null\n      ? (parsed as Record<string, unknown>)\n      : undefined;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Detection order (after the native X-Astra check, which classify owns):\n * SD-JWT/VI → RFC 9421 (Agent Pay / TAP / Web Bot Auth by kid namespace or\n * Signature-Agent) → ACP HMAC → UCP session → AP2 body triple → MPP → x402.\n * Returns undefined when nothing commerce-shaped is on the wire.\n *\n * When the platform truncated the body (`bodyTruncated`), body-bound\n * artifacts still forward what arrived but carry a `bodyTruncated`\n * evidence flag — the backend downgrades those signatures rather than\n * hard-failing.\n */\nexport function detectCommerce(req: NormalizedRequest, host: string): DetectedCommerce | undefined {\n  const url = requestUrl(req, host);\n  const method = req.method;\n  const headers = req.headers;\n  const jsonBody = parseJsonBody(req.bodyText);\n  const truncated = req.bodyTruncated ? { bodyTruncated: true } : {};\n\n  // --- VI / SD-JWT credential in a header ------------------------------\n  const authHeader = headerValue(req, 'authorization');\n  const bearer = authHeader?.replace(/^Bearer\\s+/i, '');\n  const mandateHeader =\n    headerValue(req, 'x-payment-mandate') ?? headerValue(req, 'payment-mandate');\n  const sdJwtCandidate = [mandateHeader, bearer].find((v) => v && SD_JWT_PATTERN.test(v));\n  if (sdJwtCandidate) {\n    const typ = sniffJwtHeader(sdJwtCandidate)?.typ;\n    return {\n      protocol: 'vi-sd-jwt',\n      artifacts: { viSdJwt: sdJwtCandidate },\n      evidence: { typ, ...truncated },\n    };\n  }\n\n  // --- RFC 9421 (Agent Pay / TAP / Web Bot Auth) ------------------------\n  const signature = headerValue(req, 'signature');\n  const signatureInput = headerValue(req, 'signature-input');\n  if (signature && signatureInput) {\n    const signatureAgent = headerValue(req, 'signature-agent');\n    const registryHint = headerValue(req, 'x-agent-registry');\n    const lowerInput = signatureInput.toLowerCase();\n    const protocol = signatureAgent\n      ? 'rfc9421-web-bot-auth'\n      : registryHint?.toLowerCase().includes('visa') || lowerInput.includes('visa')\n        ? 'rfc9421-tap'\n        : registryHint?.toLowerCase().includes('mastercard') || lowerInput.includes('mastercard')\n          ? 'rfc9421-agent-pay'\n          : 'rfc9421';\n    return {\n      protocol,\n      artifacts: {\n        rfc9421: { headers, method, url, ...(req.bodyText && { body: req.bodyText }) },\n      },\n      evidence: {\n        ...(signatureAgent && { signatureAgent }),\n        ...(registryHint && { registryHint }),\n        keyid: signatureInput.match(/keyid=\"([^\"]+)\"/)?.[1],\n        ...truncated,\n      },\n    };\n  }\n\n  // --- ACP (HMAC-signed webhook/checkout: signature WITHOUT signature-input)\n  const acpTimestamp = headerValue(req, 'timestamp');\n  if (signature && !signatureInput && (acpTimestamp || headerValue(req, 'idempotency-key'))) {\n    return {\n      protocol: 'acp',\n      artifacts: {\n        acpRequest: {\n          method,\n          url,\n          headers,\n          ...(req.bodyText && { rawBody: req.bodyText }),\n          ...(jsonBody && { body: jsonBody }),\n        },\n      },\n      evidence: { hasTimestamp: Boolean(acpTimestamp), ...truncated },\n    };\n  }\n\n  // --- UCP checkout session ---------------------------------------------\n  if (/\\/checkout[-_]sessions(\\/|$)/.test(req.uri)) {\n    return {\n      protocol: 'ucp',\n      artifacts: { ucpRequest: { method, url, ...(jsonBody && { body: jsonBody }) } },\n      evidence: { path: req.uri, ...truncated },\n    };\n  }\n\n  // --- AP2 mandate triple in the body -----------------------------------\n  if (jsonBody) {\n    const intent = jsonBody.intent_mandate ?? jsonBody.intentMandate;\n    const cart = jsonBody.cart_mandate ?? jsonBody.cartMandate;\n    const payment = jsonBody.payment_mandate ?? jsonBody.paymentMandate;\n    if (typeof intent === 'string' || typeof cart === 'string' || typeof payment === 'string') {\n      return {\n        protocol: 'ap2',\n        artifacts: {\n          ap2Mandates: {\n            ...(typeof intent === 'string' && { intent }),\n            ...(typeof cart === 'string' && { cart }),\n            ...(typeof payment === 'string' && { payment }),\n          },\n        },\n        evidence: {\n          mandatesPresent: [\n            typeof intent === 'string' && 'intent',\n            typeof cart === 'string' && 'cart',\n            typeof payment === 'string' && 'payment',\n          ].filter(Boolean),\n          ...truncated,\n        },\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  // --- MPP (`Authorization: Payment <credential>`) -----------------------\n  if (authHeader && /^Payment\\s+/i.test(authHeader)) {\n    return {\n      protocol: 'mpp',\n      artifacts: {\n        mppRequest: {\n          method,\n          url,\n          headers,\n          ...(req.bodyText && { rawBody: req.bodyText }),\n          ...(jsonBody && { body: jsonBody }),\n        },\n      },\n      evidence: truncated,\n    };\n  }\n\n  // --- x402 (X-PAYMENT header) ------------------------------------------\n  if (headerValue(req, 'x-payment')) {\n    return {\n      protocol: 'x402',\n      artifacts: {\n        x402Request: { method, url, headers, ...(jsonBody && { body: jsonBody }) },\n      },\n      evidence: truncated,\n    };\n  }\n\n  return undefined;\n}\n","/**\n * Three-tier traffic classification (verified / identified-but-unregistered\n * / anonymous) plus the two non-tiers the gateway touches as little as\n * possible: `human` (zero network calls, zero logging) and `skipped`\n * (static assets / excluded paths).\n *\n * Cheapest checks first — the human path must add microseconds, not\n * milliseconds. Platform signatures are shared with the backend so the\n * edge and verify-access's anonymous handler classify identically.\n */\n\nimport { matchEdgePathRule, type EdgeConfig } from '../edge-config';\nimport { sanitizeHeaders } from '../metadata-capture';\nimport { detectPlatformFingerprint } from '../platform-signatures';\nimport { extractCredentials } from '../verify';\nimport { detectCommerce } from './detect';\nimport { headerValue } from './request';\nimport type { Classification, EffectivePolicy, NormalizedRequest } from './types';\n\n/** Extensions the gateway never classifies — static assets. */\nconst STATIC_EXTENSIONS =\n  /\\.(css|js|mjs|map|png|jpe?g|gif|webp|avif|svg|ico|woff2?|ttf|otf|eot|mp4|webm|pdf|txt|xml)$/i;\n\n/**\n * AstraSync's own SDK traffic (`sdkFetch` stamps this UA on every outbound\n * SDK request). Whenever a deployment's API URL transits a gateway-fronted\n * distribution, the SDK's beacon/verify calls re-enter the gateway — and a\n * beacon that gets beaconed is a self-sustaining invocation loop (the 4.4.0\n * staging outage). Self-traffic is therefore a first-class tier: pass\n * through with ZERO beacons, verify calls, or logging, checked BEFORE the\n * credentials step (SDK verify calls carry a Bearer key and would otherwise\n * tier `verified` and re-enter at authenticate/authorize depth).\n *\n * Spoofing: a caller forging this UA gets pass-through — the same treatment\n * anonymous bots already get in both modes (they only dodge the sampled\n * anonymous beacon), and the origin's own auth still applies. No new bypass.\n */\nconst SELF_UA_PATTERN = /^astrasync-sdk\\//i;\n\n/** Non-browser, non-platform CLI/library UA tokens → anonymous bot. */\nconst BOT_UA_PATTERN =\n  /curl|wget|python-requests|python-urllib|node-fetch|axios|got|okhttp|go-http-client|libwww|httpie|java\\/|ruby|php|scrapy|headless|phantomjs|selenium|playwright|puppeteer|bot|crawler|spider|slurp/i;\n\n/** Browser-shaped UA. */\nconst BROWSER_UA_PATTERN = /mozilla\\/\\d/i;\n\n/**\n * Resolve the effective mode/depth for a path from the EdgeConfig — ordered\n * first-match-wins rules with case-insensitive globs; no match falls through\n * to the config's top-level defaults. Static extensions are always skipped\n * regardless of rules (a rule can only skip MORE, never un-skip an asset).\n */\nexport function resolvePolicy(config: EdgeConfig, path: string): EffectivePolicy {\n  if (STATIC_EXTENSIONS.test(path)) {\n    return { mode: config.mode, depth: config.depth, skip: true };\n  }\n  const rule = matchEdgePathRule(config.pathRules, path);\n  if (!rule) return { mode: config.mode, depth: config.depth, skip: false };\n  return {\n    mode: rule.mode ?? config.mode,\n    depth: rule.depth ?? config.depth,\n    skip: rule.skip === true,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Classify one request. Order (cheapest sufficient evidence wins):\n *   0. AstraSync SDK UA → `self` (own plumbing; never beaconed — loop-proof)\n *   1. X-Astra-* credentials → `verified` candidate\n *   2. commerce-protocol credentials on the wire → `identified`\n *   3. platform UA fingerprint (Claude/ChatGPT/Gemini/…) → `identified`\n *   4. bot-shaped UA / headerless non-browser → `anonymous-bot`\n *   5. everything browser-shaped → `human`\n *\n * `depth: 'classify'` skips step 2 (no body inspection, no header sniffing\n * beyond UA) — that is the zero-friction setting.\n */\nexport function classify(\n  req: NormalizedRequest,\n  host: string,\n  depth: 'classify' | 'authenticate' | 'authorize'\n): Classification {\n  const userAgent = headerValue(req, 'user-agent') ?? '';\n\n  // 0. Our own SDK's outbound calls (beacons, verify-access, config\n  // fetches). MUST precede the credentials check — see SELF_UA_PATTERN.\n  if (SELF_UA_PATTERN.test(userAgent)) {\n    return { tier: 'self' };\n  }\n\n  // 1. Native AstraSync credentials.\n  const credentials = extractCredentials(req.headers, {});\n  if (credentials.astraId || credentials.apiKey || credentials.jwt) {\n    return { tier: 'verified', protocol: 'x-astra' };\n  }\n\n  // The key-format prefix + platform-signal headers are stronger,\n  // less-spoofable platform signals than the UA. Compute once (cheap\n  // string work) and feed every fingerprint call below.\n  const { apiKeyFormat, platformHeaders } = sanitizeHeaders(req.headers);\n  const detectionInput = { userAgent, apiKeyFormat, platformHeaders };\n\n  // 2. Commerce-protocol credentials (skipped entirely at classify depth).\n  if (depth !== 'classify') {\n    const commerce = detectCommerce(req, host);\n    if (commerce) {\n      return {\n        tier: 'identified',\n        protocol: commerce.protocol,\n        artifacts: commerce.artifacts,\n        evidence: commerce.evidence,\n        fingerprint: detectPlatformFingerprint(detectionInput),\n      };\n    }\n  }\n\n  // 3. Platform-agent fingerprint (UA, key-format, or platform header).\n  const fingerprint = detectPlatformFingerprint(detectionInput);\n  if (fingerprint) {\n    return { tier: 'identified', protocol: 'platform-ua', fingerprint };\n  }\n\n  // 4. Bot-shaped: CLI/library UA, no UA at all, or any non-browser UA —\n  // humans arrive with Mozilla-family UAs; everything else is automation.\n  if (!userAgent || BOT_UA_PATTERN.test(userAgent) || !BROWSER_UA_PATTERN.test(userAgent)) {\n    return { tier: 'anonymous-bot', evidence: { userAgent: userAgent || '(none)' } };\n  }\n\n  // 4b. Claims to be a browser but is missing every browser fetch-metadata\n  // header — headless/spoofed. `sec-fetch-mode` is sent by all evergreen\n  // browsers; its absence on a Mozilla UA is a strong bot signal.\n  if (!headerValue(req, 'sec-fetch-mode') && !headerValue(req, 'accept-language')) {\n    return { tier: 'anonymous-bot', evidence: { userAgent, spoofedBrowser: true } };\n  }\n\n  // 5. Human traffic — the gateway gets out of the way.\n  return { tier: 'human' };\n}\n\n/** Exported for tests. */\nexport const _patterns = { STATIC_EXTENSIONS, BOT_UA_PATTERN, BROWSER_UA_PATTERN, SELF_UA_PATTERN };\n","/**\n * Protocol-specific machine-readable messaging for enforce-mode responses.\n * Agents (not humans) consume these bodies: stable error codes, the\n * failure list, and registration guidance with real URLs.\n */\n\nimport type { TierOutcome } from './types';\n\nconst PROTOCOL_MESSAGES: Record<string, string> = {\n  'vi-sd-jwt':\n    'This request presented Visa Intelligent Commerce credentials, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to pair your VI credentials with a verified identity and mandate.',\n  'rfc9421-agent-pay':\n    'This request carried a Mastercard Agent Pay signature, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to pair Agent Pay credentials with a verified identity and mandate.',\n  'rfc9421-tap':\n    'This request carried a Visa TAP signature, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to pair TAP credentials with a verified identity and mandate.',\n  'rfc9421-web-bot-auth':\n    'This request carried a Web Bot Auth signature, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to link your signed-agent identity to a verified principal.',\n  rfc9421:\n    'This request carried an RFC 9421 HTTP message signature, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to link the signing identity to a verified principal.',\n  acp: 'This request used the Agentic Commerce Protocol, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to transact on this property.',\n  ucp: 'This request used a UCP checkout session, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to transact on this property.',\n  ap2: 'This request presented AP2 mandates, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to pair your mandates with a verified identity.',\n  mpp: 'This request presented MPP payment credentials, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to transact on this property.',\n  x402: 'This request used x402 payment headers, but the agent is not verified with AstraSync. Register the agent to transact on this property.',\n  'platform-ua':\n    'This traffic was identified as a platform AI agent without AstraSync credentials. Register the agent to access this property with a verified identity.',\n  'x-astra':\n    'The presented AstraSync credentials failed verification or were denied by this property’s access policy.',\n};\n\nexport interface DenyBody {\n  success: false;\n  error: {\n    code: 'UNAUTHORIZED' | 'INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS';\n    message: string;\n    protocol?: string;\n    failures: string[];\n    correlationId?: string;\n    guidance: {\n      message?: string;\n      registrationUrl?: string;\n      documentationUrl?: string;\n      /** 5.1.0: MCP-connector steering — the keyless, human-approved path. */\n      mcp?: { endpoint: string; discoveryUrl?: string; message: string };\n    };\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Cold-cache fallback for the MCP endpoint, gated to astrasync.ai hosts —\n * the hosted bridge only exists there; a self-hosted deployment must not\n * advertise a dead endpoint.\n */\nfunction fallbackMcpEndpoint(origin: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    const host = new URL(origin).hostname.replace(/^www\\./, '');\n    if (host === 'astrasync.ai' || host.endsWith('.astrasync.ai')) return `https://mcp.${host}/mcp`;\n  } catch {\n    // malformed apiBaseUrl — no fallback\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nexport function buildDenyBody(\n  outcome: TierOutcome,\n  apiBaseUrl: string,\n  publicBaseUrl?: string\n): DenyBody {\n  // Round-11 two-plane URL doctrine: apiBaseUrl is the VERIFY plane (edge\n  // deploys deliberately bake it to the direct origin so verify/beacon calls\n  // don't re-enter the CDN Lambda) — but every URL in this body is read by\n  // AGENTS, who must only ever see the public host. publicBaseUrl carries it;\n  // unset falls back to apiBaseUrl (pre-5.2.0 behavior, correct when the API\n  // base IS the public apex). Fixes staging deny bodies steering agents to\n  // staging-origin.* hosts incl. the dead mcp.staging-origin fallback.\n  const origin = (publicBaseUrl || apiBaseUrl).replace(/\\/api\\/?$/, '');\n  const mcpEndpoint = outcome.guidance?.mcp?.endpoint || fallbackMcpEndpoint(origin);\n  const protocolMessage =\n    (outcome.protocol && PROTOCOL_MESSAGES[outcome.protocol]) ??\n    'This request could not be verified by AstraSync.';\n  return {\n    success: false,\n    error: {\n      // UNAUTHORIZED = identity failed (register/re-authenticate helps);\n      // INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS = identity fine, policy denied (fix the mandate).\n      code: outcome.tier === 'verified' ? 'INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS' : 'UNAUTHORIZED',\n      message: protocolMessage,\n      ...(outcome.protocol && { protocol: outcome.protocol }),\n      failures: outcome.reasons,\n      ...(outcome.correlationId && { correlationId: outcome.correlationId }),\n      guidance: {\n        // `||` not `??`: verify() fills these with EMPTY STRINGS when the\n        // well-known cache is cold — empty means \"use the fallback\".\n        message:\n          outcome.guidance?.message ||\n          'Register this agent with AstraSync to receive verifiable credentials.',\n        registrationUrl: outcome.guidance?.registrationUrl || `${origin}/register`,\n        documentationUrl: outcome.guidance?.documentationUrl || `${origin}/docs/edge-adapter`,\n        ...(mcpEndpoint && {\n          mcp: {\n            endpoint: mcpEndpoint,\n            discoveryUrl:\n              outcome.guidance?.mcp?.discoveryUrl ||\n              `${mcpEndpoint.replace(/\\/mcp$/, '')}/.well-known/mcp.json`,\n            message:\n              outcome.guidance?.mcp?.message ||\n              'Inside an MCP host? Add the AstraSync MCP connector at this endpoint instead of the ' +\n                'registration URL — registration through the connector is keyless and human-approved ' +\n                '(your human approves in an in-chat card; you never handle credentials).',\n          },\n        }),\n      },\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface UnavailableBody {\n  success: false;\n  error: {\n    code: 'VERIFICATION_UNAVAILABLE';\n    message: string;\n    failures: string[];\n    correlationId?: string;\n    guidance: { message: string };\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Enforce-mode 503 for verification-infrastructure failure. Deliberately a\n * different code and status from the 403 deny: a 403 tells the agent to\n * register or fix its mandate (retrying won't help); this tells it the\n * OPPOSITE — identity and policy were never evaluated, retry with backoff.\n */\nexport function buildUnavailableBody(outcome: TierOutcome): UnavailableBody {\n  return {\n    success: false,\n    error: {\n      code: 'VERIFICATION_UNAVAILABLE',\n      message:\n        'Agent verification is temporarily unavailable and this path enforces verification. ' +\n        'Your identity was not evaluated and no denial was recorded — retry with exponential backoff.',\n      failures: outcome.reasons,\n      ...(outcome.correlationId && { correlationId: outcome.correlationId }),\n      guidance: {\n        message: 'Retry the request with exponential backoff; the condition is transient.',\n      },\n    },\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface ManualReviewBody {\n  success: false;\n  status: 'manual_review';\n  message: string;\n  stepUpApproval?: { pollUrl?: string; expiresAt?: string };\n  correlationId?: string;\n}\n\nexport function buildManualReviewBody(outcome: TierOutcome): ManualReviewBody {\n  return {\n    success: false,\n    status: 'manual_review',\n    message:\n      'This action requires human approval. Poll the step-up approval endpoint and retry once approved.',\n    ...(outcome.stepUp && { stepUpApproval: outcome.stepUp }),\n    ...(outcome.correlationId && { correlationId: outcome.correlationId }),\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * X-Astra-Verified-Hop — cross-hop verify-access dedupe marker.\n *\n * Header carrying upstream verify-access proof so an inner-hop endpoint can\n * dedupe (skip verify-access when the same ASTRA-id was already verified a\n * few ms earlier). Emitted by the MCP adapter toward tool fetches and by the\n * edge gateway toward the origin at authenticate/authorize depth. Value\n * format:\n *\n *   {astraId};{sessionId};{checkedAt-ms}\n *\n * Receivers MUST validate that `checkedAt` is recent (≤ 60s window\n * recommended) and that `astraId` matches the agent identity claimed on the\n * inner hop. The header alone is NOT proof-of-identity — it's an UNSIGNED\n * dedupe advisory: trust it (`trustVerifiedHop`) only where every network\n * path to the inner hop crosses a stripping gateway or an equivalent trusted\n * boundary, exactly like the unsigned X-AstraSync-* attestation headers.\n * Pair with the existing X-Astra-Id auth.\n */\n\nexport const MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER = 'X-Astra-Verified-Hop';\n\n/** Default acceptable age (ms) for an X-Astra-Verified-Hop header. */\nexport const MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS = 60_000;\n\nexport interface VerifiedHopMarker {\n  astraId: string;\n  sessionId?: string;\n  checkedAt: number; // epoch ms\n}\n\nexport function serializeVerifiedHop(marker: VerifiedHopMarker): string {\n  return `${marker.astraId};${marker.sessionId ?? ''};${marker.checkedAt}`;\n}\n\nexport function parseVerifiedHop(value: string | undefined | null): VerifiedHopMarker | null {\n  if (!value) return null;\n  const parts = value.split(';');\n  if (parts.length !== 3) return null;\n  const [astraId, sessionId, checkedAtRaw] = parts;\n  if (!astraId) return null;\n  const checkedAt = Number(checkedAtRaw);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(checkedAt) || checkedAt <= 0) return null;\n  return {\n    astraId,\n    ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}),\n    checkedAt,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when `marker.astraId` matches the inner-hop's claimed\n * ASTRA-id AND the marker is recent enough. Inner-hop middleware uses this\n * to skip a duplicate verify-access call.\n */\nexport function isVerifiedHopValidFor(\n  marker: VerifiedHopMarker | null,\n  expectedAstraId: string,\n  opts: { maxAgeMs?: number; now?: number } = {}\n): boolean {\n  if (!marker) return false;\n  if (marker.astraId !== expectedAstraId) return false;\n  const maxAge = opts.maxAgeMs ?? MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_MAX_AGE_MS;\n  const now = opts.now ?? Date.now();\n  return now - marker.checkedAt <= maxAge && now >= marker.checkedAt;\n}\n","/**\n * Decision → abstract outcome-application wiring. Executed in BOTH modes\n * so observe mode records exactly what enforce mode would have done — but\n * only enforce mode is allowed to emit anything other than a pass.\n */\n\nimport { buildDenyBody, buildManualReviewBody, buildUnavailableBody } from './messaging';\nimport { MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER, serializeVerifiedHop } from '../verified-hop';\nimport type { EffectivePolicy, OutcomeApplication, TierOutcome } from './types';\n\n/** Trust-attestation headers injected on allowed requests. */\nexport const ASAT_HEADERS = {\n  trustScore: 'X-AstraSync-Trust-Score',\n  agentId: 'X-AstraSync-Agent-Id',\n  developerId: 'X-AstraSync-Developer-Id',\n  observedDecision: 'X-AstraSync-Observed-Decision',\n} as const;\n\n/**\n * Inbound header names an evaluated pass must strip: the gateway's own\n * attestation surface plus the verify-dedupe marker — both are only ever\n * allowed to originate AT the gateway, never from the viewer.\n */\nconst STRIP_HEADER_PREFIXES = ['x-astrasync-', 'x-astra-verified-hop'];\n\n/**\n * A pass that leaves the request completely untouched — used for skipped\n * paths and human traffic, which the gateway must not modify at all.\n */\nexport function passUntouched(): OutcomeApplication {\n  return { action: 'pass', injectHeaders: {}, stripHeaderPrefixes: [] };\n}\n\n/**\n * Turn a tier outcome into the abstract application the platform executes.\n * Every evaluated pass strips inbound spoofed `x-astrasync-*` headers\n * (both modes — trust headers must only ever originate at the gateway).\n *\n * Observe mode: always a pass — header hygiene plus an\n * `X-AstraSync-Observed-Decision` stamp for origin-side log correlation.\n *\n * Enforce mode: ALLOW → pass with trust-attestation headers; DENY → 403\n * machine-readable body; MANUAL_REVIEW → 202 with step-up poll info.\n */\nexport function applyOutcome(\n  options: { apiBaseUrl: string; publicBaseUrl?: string },\n  outcome: TierOutcome,\n  policy: EffectivePolicy\n): OutcomeApplication {\n  const injectHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};\n\n  // Surface a rejected property key in origin logs in BOTH modes — the\n  // outcome is allow (fail-open) so the deny stamp below never fires.\n  if (outcome.misconfig) {\n    injectHeaders[ASAT_HEADERS.observedDecision] = 'misconfig';\n  }\n\n  if (policy.mode !== 'enforce') {\n    // Shadow stamp: what enforce WOULD have done, visible in origin logs.\n    if (outcome.decision !== 'allow') {\n      injectHeaders[ASAT_HEADERS.observedDecision] = outcome.decision;\n    }\n    Object.assign(injectHeaders, asatHeaders(outcome), verifiedHopHeader(outcome));\n    return { action: 'pass', injectHeaders, stripHeaderPrefixes: STRIP_HEADER_PREFIXES };\n  }\n\n  switch (outcome.decision) {\n    case 'deny':\n      // Fail posture follows success posture (4.5.0): an infra-failure deny\n      // is a 503 retry-later, never a 403 register-first — the agent's\n      // identity was never evaluated.\n      if (outcome.unavailable) {\n        return {\n          action: 'respond',\n          status: 503,\n          headers: { 'Retry-After': '30' },\n          bodyJson: buildUnavailableBody(outcome),\n        };\n      }\n      return {\n        action: 'respond',\n        status: 403,\n        headers: {},\n        bodyJson: buildDenyBody(outcome, options.apiBaseUrl, options.publicBaseUrl),\n      };\n    case 'manual_review':\n      return {\n        action: 'respond',\n        status: 202,\n        headers: { 'Retry-After': '30' },\n        bodyJson: buildManualReviewBody(outcome),\n      };\n    default:\n      Object.assign(injectHeaders, asatHeaders(outcome), verifiedHopHeader(outcome));\n      return { action: 'pass', injectHeaders, stripHeaderPrefixes: STRIP_HEADER_PREFIXES };\n  }\n}\n\nfunction asatHeaders(outcome: TierOutcome): Record<string, string> {\n  if (!outcome.asat) return {};\n  const { trustScore, agentId, developerId } = outcome.asat;\n  return {\n    ...(trustScore !== undefined && { [ASAT_HEADERS.trustScore]: String(trustScore) }),\n    ...(agentId && { [ASAT_HEADERS.agentId]: agentId }),\n    ...(developerId && { [ASAT_HEADERS.developerId]: developerId }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify-dedupe marker toward the origin. asat is only populated when a\n * verify-access call succeeded (authenticate/authorize depth), so gating on\n * it is the depth gate — classify-depth traffic never carries a marker. An\n * SDK-middleware origin with `trustVerifiedHop` enabled can then skip its\n * duplicate verify-access for the same agent within the freshness window.\n */\nfunction verifiedHopHeader(outcome: TierOutcome): Record<string, string> {\n  const agentId = outcome.asat?.agentId;\n  if (!agentId) return {};\n  return {\n    [MCP_VERIFIED_HOP_HEADER]: serializeVerifiedHop({\n      astraId: agentId,\n      ...(outcome.sessionId && { sessionId: outcome.sessionId }),\n      checkedAt: Date.now(),\n    }),\n  };\n}\n","/**\n * Shared purpose/action resolver for the HTTP adapters (express + nextjs) —\n * the vocabulary-unification layer.\n *\n * The PDLSS two-axis contract: `purpose` = bare category noun (`shopping`,\n * `data`, custom nouns like `trading`); `action` = dotted verb\n * (`shopping.search`) or an enumerated transport token. Transport verbs\n * (GET/POST/...) NEVER travel as PDLSS actions — they map through the pinned\n * method table below.\n *\n * SELF-CONTAINED on purpose: this published package cannot depend on the\n * private @astrasyncai/pdlss-vocab workspace package, so the constants are\n * duplicated here and pinned strictly equal by a monorepo CI test\n * (vocab-equality.test.ts). Change them in BOTH places or that test fails.\n */\n\n/** Pinned method→action derivation table. */\nexport const HTTP_METHOD_ACTION_TABLE: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {\n  GET: 'data.read',\n  HEAD: 'data.read',\n  OPTIONS: 'data.read',\n  POST: 'data.write',\n  PUT: 'data.write',\n  PATCH: 'data.write',\n  DELETE: 'data.delete',\n};\n\n/** Unknown methods are treated as mutating until proven otherwise. */\nexport const DEFAULT_HTTP_ACTION = 'data.write';\n\n/** Generic category emitted when nothing supplies a domain purpose. */\nexport const DEFAULT_HTTP_PURPOSE = 'data';\n\nexport function actionForHttpMethod(method: string): string {\n  return HTTP_METHOD_ACTION_TABLE[method.toUpperCase()] ?? DEFAULT_HTTP_ACTION;\n}\n\nexport type HttpPurposeSource =\n  | 'route_config'\n  | 'custom_extractor'\n  | 'header'\n  | 'legacy_header'\n  | 'query'\n  | 'action_derived'\n  | 'transport_default';\n\nexport type HttpActionSource =\n  | 'route_config'\n  | 'custom_extractor'\n  | 'header'\n  | 'purpose_header_derived'\n  | 'method_table';\n\nexport interface HttpPdlssInput {\n  method: string;\n  /** `X-Astra-Purpose` header value (agent's declaration). */\n  astraPurpose?: string;\n  /** `X-Astra-Action` header value (agent's declaration, symmetric with MCP). */\n  astraAction?: string;\n  /** Legacy `x-purpose` header — deprecated, removal scheduled for 4.0.0. */\n  legacyPurpose?: string;\n  /** Legacy `?purpose` query param (express only) — deprecated, removal 4.0.0. */\n  queryPurpose?: string;\n  /** Dashboard route config send-mapping (RouteAccessConfig.purpose/.action). */\n  routePurpose?: string;\n  routeAction?: string;\n  /** Results of the merchant's extractPurpose/extractAction options. */\n  customPurpose?: string;\n  hasCustomPurposeExtractor?: boolean;\n  customAction?: string;\n  hasCustomActionExtractor?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface HttpPdlssResolution {\n  purpose: string;\n  action: string;\n  purposeSource: HttpPurposeSource;\n  actionSource: HttpActionSource;\n}\n\n/**\n * Normalize an `X-Astra-Purpose` header value.\n *  - colon form `\"category:action\"` (legacy wire shape): take the prefix; the\n *    remainder is free-text and exists in no vocabulary — discard it and let\n *    the method table supply the action (matches pre-3.1.0 discard behavior).\n *  - dotted form `\"shopping.purchase\"` (the shape older docs taught): prefix\n *    becomes the purpose, the WHOLE token becomes an action candidate.\n *  - bare token: purpose verbatim.\n */\nexport function normalizePurposeHeader(value: string): {\n  purpose: string;\n  actionCandidate?: string;\n} {\n  const colon = value.indexOf(':');\n  if (colon >= 0) {\n    return { purpose: value.slice(0, colon) };\n  }\n  const dot = value.indexOf('.');\n  if (dot > 0 && dot < value.length - 1) {\n    return { purpose: value.slice(0, dot), actionCandidate: value };\n  }\n  return { purpose: value };\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the {purpose, action} pair for one HTTP request.\n *\n * Precedence (both axes):\n *   action:  route mapping → extractAction option → X-Astra-Action header →\n *            candidate from a dotted X-Astra-Purpose → pinned method table\n *   purpose: route mapping → extractPurpose option → X-Astra-Purpose →\n *            legacy x-purpose / ?purpose → category prefix of the resolved\n *            action → 'data'\n *\n * A configured custom extractor masks the header/legacy/query steps of its\n * axis (it replaces the default chain, as extractPurpose always has); when it\n * returns undefined the axis falls through to the table/prefix fallback.\n * The route mapping is merchant policy fetched from the dashboard — it\n * outranks agent-supplied headers the way MCP toolGates do.\n */\nexport function resolveHttpPdlss(input: HttpPdlssInput): HttpPdlssResolution {\n  const fromHeader = input.astraPurpose ? normalizePurposeHeader(input.astraPurpose) : undefined;\n\n  // ── Action axis ──\n  let action: string;\n  let actionSource: HttpActionSource;\n  if (input.routeAction) {\n    action = input.routeAction;\n    actionSource = 'route_config';\n  } else if (input.hasCustomActionExtractor && input.customAction) {\n    action = input.customAction;\n    actionSource = 'custom_extractor';\n  } else if (!input.hasCustomActionExtractor && input.astraAction) {\n    action = input.astraAction;\n    actionSource = 'header';\n  } else if (!input.hasCustomActionExtractor && fromHeader?.actionCandidate) {\n    action = fromHeader.actionCandidate;\n    actionSource = 'purpose_header_derived';\n  } else {\n    action = actionForHttpMethod(input.method);\n    actionSource = 'method_table';\n  }\n\n  // ── Purpose axis ──\n  let purpose: string | undefined;\n  let purposeSource: HttpPurposeSource | undefined;\n  if (input.routePurpose) {\n    purpose = input.routePurpose;\n    purposeSource = 'route_config';\n  } else if (input.hasCustomPurposeExtractor) {\n    if (input.customPurpose) {\n      purpose = input.customPurpose;\n      purposeSource = 'custom_extractor';\n    }\n  } else if (fromHeader) {\n    purpose = fromHeader.purpose;\n    purposeSource = 'header';\n  } else if (input.legacyPurpose) {\n    purpose = input.legacyPurpose;\n    purposeSource = 'legacy_header';\n  } else if (input.queryPurpose) {\n    purpose = input.queryPurpose;\n    purposeSource = 'query';\n  }\n\n  if (!purpose) {\n    // Keep the pair coherent: an agent that sent only X-Astra-Action (or a\n    // route that mapped only the action) gets that action's own category.\n    const dot = action.indexOf('.');\n    if (dot > 0) {\n      purpose = action.slice(0, dot);\n      purposeSource = 'action_derived';\n    } else {\n      purpose = DEFAULT_HTTP_PURPOSE;\n      purposeSource = 'transport_default';\n    }\n  }\n\n  return { purpose, action, purposeSource: purposeSource!, actionSource };\n}\n","/**\n * Time-budgeted event emission.\n *\n * Some edge runtimes (Lambda@Edge) have no background-work scheduler —\n * anything not awaited before the handler returns may never run. So every\n * telemetry call is awaited under an explicit budget and DROPPED on\n * timeout: latency to the customer's traffic is bounded, and a slow\n * AstraSync API costs telemetry, never page loads. Runtimes that provide\n * `waitUntil` (Cloudflare Workers, Vercel Edge, Fastly Compute) can pass\n * it via {@link EdgeCoreOptions.waitUntil} to take beacons off the latency\n * path entirely.\n */\n\nimport { reportUnregisteredAttempt } from '../verify';\nimport { buildObservedMetadata, headerValue } from './request';\nimport type { Classification, EdgeCoreOptions, NormalizedRequest } from './types';\n\n/** Await `promise` for at most `ms`; resolve `undefined` on timeout/error. */\nexport async function withBudget<T>(promise: Promise<T>, ms: number): Promise<T | undefined> {\n  let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;\n  try {\n    return await Promise.race([\n      promise,\n      new Promise<undefined>((resolve) => {\n        timer = setTimeout(() => resolve(undefined), ms);\n      }),\n    ]);\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  } finally {\n    if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Emit an unregistered-attempt beacon for `identified` (non-crypto depths)\n * and sampled `anonymous-bot` traffic. Unauthenticated by design; the\n * backend fingerprints the UA and find-or-provisions platform agents\n * server-side.\n */\nexport async function emitBeacon(\n  options: EdgeCoreOptions,\n  req: NormalizedRequest,\n  classification: Classification,\n  budgetMs: number\n): Promise<void> {\n  const budgeted = withBudget(\n    reportUnregisteredAttempt(\n      { apiBaseUrl: options.apiBaseUrl, counterpartyId: options.counterpartyId },\n      {\n        counterpartyUrl: options.counterpartyUrl,\n        counterpartyType: 'website',\n        sourceIp: req.clientIp,\n        userAgent: headerValue(req, 'user-agent'),\n        requestPath: req.uri,\n        requestMethod: req.method,\n        // Evidence fields the backend persists into the event record.\n        protocol: classification.protocol,\n        evidence: classification.evidence,\n        // The full sanitized header + connection capture for the\n        // unregistered caller (fire-and-forget, so free).\n        observedMetadata: buildObservedMetadata(req),\n      }\n    ),\n    budgetMs\n  );\n  if (options.waitUntil) {\n    options.waitUntil(budgeted);\n    return;\n  }\n  await budgeted;\n}\n\n/** Deterministic-in-tests sampling gate. */\nexport function sampled(rate: number, random: () => number = Math.random): boolean {\n  if (rate <= 0) return false;\n  if (rate >= 1) return true;\n  return random() < rate;\n}\n","/**\n * Depth-controlled verification per tier. The edge never verifies\n * credentials itself — it forwards what it detected to verify-access, the\n * canonical sole verification sink (the backend runs the commerce\n * pipeline, records events, provisions unregistered platform agents,\n * persists sessions). What the depth setting controls is how much the edge\n * LOOKS and how much it FORWARDS:\n *\n *   classify     — what is it? UA tiers only. Zero verify-access calls;\n *                  beacons only.\n *   authenticate — who is it? + protocol detection. X-Astra agents get a\n *                  verify-access identity check; commerce/platform traffic\n *                  is beaconed with protocol + evidence (no signature\n *                  verification anywhere).\n *   authorize    — are they allowed? + artifact forwarding. X-Astra verify\n *                  calls carry commerceArtifacts; identified traffic gets an\n *                  anonymous verify-access call with artifacts +\n *                  callerMetadata so the backend cryptographically proves\n *                  and policy-evaluates once.\n */\n\nimport { resolveHttpPdlss } from '../adapters/http-pdlss';\nimport type { GatewayConfig, VerificationRequest } from '../types';\nimport { verify, extractCredentials } from '../verify';\nimport { withBudget, emitBeacon, sampled } from './events';\nimport { buildObservedMetadata, headerValue } from './request';\nimport type {\n  Classification,\n  EdgeCoreOptions,\n  EffectivePolicy,\n  NormalizedRequest,\n  TierOutcome,\n} from './types';\n\nfunction baseOutcome(classification: Classification): TierOutcome {\n  return {\n    tier: classification.tier,\n    decision: 'allow',\n    reasons: [],\n    protocol: classification.protocol,\n  };\n}\n\nexport function buildVerificationRequest(\n  options: EdgeCoreOptions,\n  req: NormalizedRequest,\n  classification: Classification,\n  includeArtifacts: boolean\n): VerificationRequest {\n  // verify-access REQUIRES a purpose. Resolve via the shared chain: the\n  // agent's X-Astra-Purpose/-Action declarations, else the pinned method\n  // table (GET → data/data.read etc.) — a transport verb never travels as\n  // a permission action.\n  const pdlss = resolveHttpPdlss({\n    method: req.method,\n    astraPurpose: headerValue(req, 'x-astra-purpose'),\n    astraAction: headerValue(req, 'x-astra-action'),\n  });\n  // Forward the caller's attempt-chain handle when well-formed\n  // (agent-declared, like x-astra-purpose — not a trust header, so no\n  // spoof-strip needed). The edge synthesises NO consideration data — it\n  // can't see offer semantics; pure pass-through.\n  const attemptId = headerValue(req, 'x-astra-attempt-id');\n  return {\n    ...(attemptId && /^att_[0-9a-f]{32}$/.test(attemptId) && { attemptId }),\n    credentials: extractCredentials(req.headers, {}),\n    purpose: pdlss.purpose,\n    action: pdlss.action,\n    resource: req.uri,\n    createSession: true,\n    counterpartyType: 'website',\n    counterpartyUrl: options.counterpartyUrl,\n    callerMetadata: {\n      sourceIp: req.clientIp,\n      userAgent: headerValue(req, 'user-agent'),\n      referer: headerValue(req, 'referer'),\n      host: headerValue(req, 'host'),\n      // The full sanitized header + connection capture. The backend stores\n      // it fire-and-forget (zero decision latency) and uses the key-format\n      // / platform headers for attribution.\n      observedMetadata: buildObservedMetadata(req),\n    },\n    ...(includeArtifacts &&\n      classification.artifacts && { commerceArtifacts: classification.artifacts }),\n  };\n}\n\nexport function outcomeFromVerifyResult(\n  classification: Classification,\n  result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof verify>>\n): TierOutcome {\n  const outcome = baseOutcome(classification);\n  outcome.sessionId = (result as { sessionId?: string }).sessionId;\n  outcome.correlationId = result.correlationId;\n  outcome.guidance = result.guidance;\n\n  // The PROPERTY'S own API key was rejected by the backend — neither an\n  // agent deny nor an infra failure. Fail OPEN in both modes: agents must\n  // not be blocked by the property's dead key. The misconfig flag stamps\n  // X-AstraSync-Observed-Decision so origin logs surface it; the owner is\n  // alerted server-side on every rejected call.\n  if (result.misconfigured) {\n    outcome.reasons = ['verification key misconfigured — fail-open (merchant_misconfig)'];\n    outcome.misconfig = true;\n    return outcome;\n  }\n\n  if (result.requiresStepUp || result.stepUpApproval) {\n    outcome.decision = 'manual_review';\n    outcome.reasons = ['step-up approval required'];\n    outcome.stepUp = {\n      pollUrl: (result.stepUpApproval as { pollUrl?: string } | undefined)?.pollUrl,\n      expiresAt: (result.stepUpApproval as { expiresAt?: string } | undefined)?.expiresAt,\n    };\n    return outcome;\n  }\n\n  if (!result.identityVerified || !result.policyAllowed) {\n    outcome.decision = 'deny';\n    outcome.reasons = result.denialReasons?.length\n      ? result.denialReasons\n      : [!result.identityVerified ? 'identity not verified' : 'denied by access policy'];\n    return outcome;\n  }\n\n  outcome.asat = {\n    trustScore: result.agent?.trustScore,\n    agentId: result.agent?.astraId,\n    developerId: result.developer?.astradId,\n  };\n  return outcome;\n}\n\n/**\n * Fail posture follows success posture (4.5.0): when verification\n * infrastructure is unreachable, observe mode passes through with the\n * reason recorded, while enforce mode denies with `unavailable: true`\n * (rendered as a 503 retry-later, never a 403 register-first — the backend\n * never evaluated the caller, so no denial semantics may be claimed).\n */\nfunction unavailableOutcome(\n  classification: Classification,\n  policy: EffectivePolicy,\n  reason: string,\n  correlationId?: string\n): TierOutcome {\n  const outcome = baseOutcome(classification);\n  outcome.unavailable = true;\n  outcome.reasons = [reason];\n  if (correlationId) outcome.correlationId = correlationId;\n  if (policy.mode === 'enforce') outcome.decision = 'deny';\n  return outcome;\n}\n\n/**\n * A verify() result whose failure is the SDK's typed api_error fallback —\n * infra unavailability that verify() shaped as a deny-like result. Must not\n * match merchant_misconfigured (deterministic, handled fail-open).\n */\nfunction isApiErrorResult(result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof verify>>): boolean {\n  return (\n    (result.failures ?? []).some((f) => f.dimension === 'verify_access.api_error') === true &&\n    !result.misconfigured\n  );\n}\n/**\n * Run the tier-appropriate verification/telemetry for one classified\n * request. NEVER throws. Infra-failure handling is posture-symmetric (see\n * `unavailableOutcome`); a presented credential the BACKEND rejected\n * remains a real deny in both modes, and the property's own rejected key\n * (misconfig) remains fail-open in both modes. Internal pipeline\n * exceptions (the catch below) stay fail-open unconditionally — they are\n * gateway bugs, not verification availability, and must never take a site\n * down.\n */\nexport async function runTier(\n  options: EdgeCoreOptions,\n  req: NormalizedRequest,\n  classification: Classification,\n  policy: EffectivePolicy,\n  apiKey: string | undefined,\n  sampling: { anonymousBeaconRate: number }\n): Promise<TierOutcome> {\n  const budgets = options.budgets ?? {};\n  const beaconMs = budgets.beaconMs ?? 300;\n  const verifyMs =\n    policy.mode === 'enforce'\n      ? (budgets.verifyEnforceMs ?? 3000)\n      : (budgets.verifyObserveMs ?? 1500);\n\n  const gatewayConfig: GatewayConfig = {\n    apiBaseUrl: options.apiBaseUrl,\n    ...(apiKey && { apiKey }),\n    counterpartyId: options.counterpartyId,\n    // The gateway handles its own error semantics; init self-probes don't\n    // belong in a per-request edge function.\n    disableInitChecks: true,\n  } as GatewayConfig;\n\n  try {\n    switch (classification.tier) {\n      case 'verified': {\n        // classify depth = zero API calls, even for credentialed agents.\n        if (policy.depth === 'classify') {\n          return baseOutcome(classification);\n        }\n        const result = await withBudget(\n          verify(\n            gatewayConfig,\n            buildVerificationRequest(options, req, classification, policy.depth === 'authorize')\n          ),\n          verifyMs\n        );\n        if (!result) {\n          return unavailableOutcome(\n            classification,\n            policy,\n            'verify-access unreachable within budget'\n          );\n        }\n        if (isApiErrorResult(result)) {\n          return unavailableOutcome(\n            classification,\n            policy,\n            result.denialReasons?.[0] ?? 'verify-access api error',\n            result.correlationId\n          );\n        }\n        return outcomeFromVerifyResult(classification, result);\n      }\n\n      case 'identified': {\n        if (policy.depth === 'authorize' && classification.artifacts) {\n          // Anonymous verify-access call WITH artifacts: the backend runs\n          // the commerce pipeline, records unverified events, and\n          // provisions unregistered platform agents — one sink, recorded\n          // once.\n          const result = await withBudget(\n            verify(gatewayConfig, buildVerificationRequest(options, req, classification, true)),\n            verifyMs\n          );\n          if (!result) {\n            return unavailableOutcome(\n              classification,\n              policy,\n              'verify-access unreachable within budget'\n            );\n          }\n          if (isApiErrorResult(result)) {\n            return unavailableOutcome(\n              classification,\n              policy,\n              result.denialReasons?.[0] ?? 'verify-access api error',\n              result.correlationId\n            );\n          }\n          return outcomeFromVerifyResult(classification, result);\n        }\n        // classify/credentials depth (or no artifacts): lightweight beacon.\n        await emitBeacon(options, req, classification, beaconMs);\n        const outcome = baseOutcome(classification);\n        if (policy.mode === 'enforce' && policy.depth !== 'classify') {\n          // Unregistered agent on an enforced path: deny with guidance.\n          outcome.decision = 'deny';\n          outcome.reasons = ['agent is not registered with AstraSync'];\n        }\n        return outcome;\n      }\n\n      case 'anonymous-bot': {\n        if (sampled(sampling.anonymousBeaconRate, options.random)) {\n          await emitBeacon(\n            options,\n            req,\n            { ...classification, protocol: classification.protocol ?? 'ua-heuristic' },\n            beaconMs\n          );\n        }\n        // Anonymous bots pass through even in enforce mode — enforce gates\n        // AGENT traffic; generic bot management stays the CDN/WAF's job.\n        return baseOutcome(classification);\n      }\n\n      default:\n        return baseOutcome(classification);\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    const outcome = baseOutcome(classification);\n    outcome.reasons = [\n      `edge pipeline error — fail-open: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,\n    ];\n    return outcome;\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * The platform-neutral evaluation pipeline for one request:\n *\n *   path policy → classify → tier pipeline → outcome application\n *\n * Platform adapters own everything around this: config/secret loading,\n * request normalization, and applying the returned application onto their\n * native request/response shapes. `evaluateEdgeRequest` NEVER throws — any\n * internal failure resolves to an untouched pass (the gateway must never\n * take the site down).\n */\n\nimport type { EdgeConfig } from '../edge-config';\nimport { classify, resolvePolicy } from './classify';\nimport { applyOutcome, passUntouched } from './enforce';\nimport { runTier } from './pipeline';\nimport { headerValue } from './request';\nimport type {\n  Classification,\n  EdgeCoreOptions,\n  EffectivePolicy,\n  NormalizedRequest,\n  OutcomeApplication,\n  TierOutcome,\n} from './types';\n\nexport interface EdgeEvaluation {\n  application: OutcomeApplication;\n  policy: EffectivePolicy;\n  /** Absent when the path was skipped before classification. */\n  classification?: Classification;\n  /** Absent for skipped paths and human/self traffic (no pipeline run). */\n  outcome?: TierOutcome;\n}\n\n/**\n * Evaluate one normalized request against the effective EdgeConfig.\n *\n * - Skipped paths (static assets / skip rules): untouched, zero work.\n * - Humans and self (AstraSync SDK) traffic: get out of the way. No calls,\n *   no logs, no header changes.\n * - Everything else runs the tier pipeline and yields an application the\n *   platform must execute (pass with header hygiene, or an enforce-mode\n *   response).\n */\nexport async function evaluateEdgeRequest(\n  options: EdgeCoreOptions,\n  req: NormalizedRequest,\n  config: EdgeConfig,\n  apiKey: string | undefined\n): Promise<EdgeEvaluation> {\n  const policy = resolvePolicy(config, req.uri);\n  try {\n    if (policy.skip) return { policy, application: passUntouched() };\n\n    const host =\n      headerValue(req, 'x-forwarded-host') ??\n      headerValue(req, 'host') ??\n      new URL(options.counterpartyUrl).host;\n\n    const classification = classify(req, host, policy.depth);\n\n    // Human and self (own-SDK) traffic: get out of the way. No calls, no\n    // logs, no header changes. Self MUST short-circuit here — running it\n    // through the tier pipeline would let a beacon spawn a beacon.\n    if (classification.tier === 'human' || classification.tier === 'self') {\n      return { policy, classification, application: passUntouched() };\n    }\n\n    const outcome = await runTier(options, req, classification, policy, apiKey, config.sampling);\n\n    if (outcome.decision !== 'allow') {\n      options.log?.(\n        'info',\n        policy.mode === 'enforce'\n          ? `${outcome.decision.toUpperCase()}: ${req.method} ${req.uri}`\n          : `[OBSERVE] would have been ${outcome.decision.toUpperCase()}: ${req.method} ${req.uri}`,\n        { tier: outcome.tier, protocol: outcome.protocol, reasons: outcome.reasons }\n      );\n    }\n\n    return {\n      policy,\n      classification,\n      outcome,\n      application: applyOutcome(options, outcome, policy),\n    };\n  } catch (err) {\n    // Fail-open, unconditionally.\n    options.log?.('error', 'edge evaluation error — passing request through', {\n      error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),\n    });\n    return { policy, application: passUntouched() };\n  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