@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 4.5.1 → 5.0.0

package/dist/{types-DwSfO7Sb.d.ts → types-BK2POWNc.d.ts}

@@ -10,37 +10,6 @@ import { ObservedMetadata } from './metadata-capture.js';
  * Trust levels assigned to agents based on their composite trust score
  */
 type TrustLevel = 'BRONZE' | 'SILVER' | 'GOLD' | 'PLATINUM';
-/**
- * Access levels granted based on verification result. Server is the single
- * source of truth — these values are the resolved decision the server returns
- * in `access.accessLevel`. SDK reads them verbatim (no client-side remap).
- *
- * For ANONYMOUS / unverified callers, the level is determined by the
- * endpoint's `unverifiedAgentPolicy` per the verify-access canonical flow:
- * - deny: `none` — caller is denied + advised to register
- * - allow_partial: `restricted` — reduced/browse-only access + advised
- * - allow_full: `standard` — unrestricted + advised to register for next time
- * Every branch ALWAYS emits a verification event + queues a blockchain record.
- *
- * For VERIFIED callers, the level is resolved server-side from the
- * agent's live trust score plus the endpoint's `trust_score_requirement`:
- * - none: agent below endpoint gate (denied; access.allowed=false)
- * - restricted: 0–19 trust score (registration-prompt only, no real capability)
- * - read-only: 20–39 trust score (browse, no mutations)
- * - standard: 40–69 trust score (PDLSS-scoped operations)
- * - full: 70+ trust score (PDLSS-scoped, high-trust)
- * - internal: same-org membership, regardless of score
- *
- * v2.3.9 renamed the `'guidance'` band → `'restricted'`. The old name
- * collided with the `guidance: {registrationUrl, ...}` help-payload object
- * on VerificationResult, and the collision let denied requests pass any
- * route gated at `'guidance'` (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance')
- * === true`). Banded vocabulary stays capability-noun (none / restricted /
- * read-only / standard / full / internal); response-shape descriptors stay
- * nouns (guidance, advisory). Adapters additionally short-circuit on
- * `!result.identityVerified || !result.policyAllowed` as belt-and-braces.
- */
-type AccessLevel = 'none' | 'restricted' | 'read-only' | 'standard' | 'full' | 'internal';
 /**
  * Types of counterparties that can integrate the gateway
  */
@@ -66,14 +35,12 @@ interface GatewayConfig {
     apiBaseUrl: string;
     /** API key for authenticating with AstraSync. */
     apiKey?: string;
-    /** Default access level for unverified requests */
-    defaultAccessLevel?: AccessLevel;
     /**
      * @deprecated Removed in v2.3.0 — server is the single source of truth for
-     * access-level decisions. Setting this no longer affects access decisions
-     * (the SDK reads `access.accessLevel` from the verify-access response).
-     * If you need a higher gate for an endpoint, configure it server-side via
-     * the endpoint's `trust_score_requirement`.
+     * access decisions (verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score).
+     * Setting this no longer affects access decisions. If you need a higher gate
+     * for an endpoint, configure it server-side via the endpoint's
+     * `trust_score_requirement`.
      */
     minTrustScore?: number;
     /**
@@ -168,12 +135,11 @@ interface GatewayConfig {
     dashboardUrl?: string;
     /**
      * When true, the middleware calls verify-access for any request that presents
-     * AstraSync credentials, even on routes / MCP risk-tiers with
-     * `minAccessLevel: 'none'`. Populates `req.agentVerification` and
-     * records the verification event for the audit trail. Enforcement
-     * still respects route / tier policy — a `none` floor still grants
-     * regardless of access level. Default false to preserve existing
-     * behaviour.
+     * AstraSync credentials, even on `observe`-marked routes / tools that would
+     * otherwise pass through unevaluated. Populates `req.agentVerification` and
+     * records the verification event for the audit trail. Enforcement still
+     * respects the gate — an `observe` marker still passes through regardless of
+     * the server decision. Default false to preserve existing behaviour.
      *
      * Use this when a single endpoint serves both anonymous and verified
      * traffic with different response shapes (e.g. anonymous catalog vs
@@ -428,8 +394,6 @@ interface VerificationResult {
      * unverified caller's policy field is `false` by definition.
      */
     policyAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Access level granted */
-    accessLevel: AccessLevel;
     /** Verified agent info (if verified) */
     agent?: VerifiedAgent;
     /** Developer info (if available) */
@@ -475,6 +439,14 @@ interface VerificationResult {
      * `MERCHANT_VERIFICATION_MISCONFIGURED` instead of a misleading 401.
      */
     misconfigured?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * 4.6.0: a TRANSIENT infrastructure failure (`verify_access.api_error` — a
+     * 5xx / timeout / CSRF-403 reaching the verify-access backend), NOT a policy
+     * deny and NOT a deterministic misconfig. Consumers should surface it as an
+     * error-and-retry (recommendation `'error'`), never as a policy denial. Unset
+     * on misconfig (deterministic — retrying will not help) and on real denials.
+     */
+    retryable?: boolean;
     /** Whether step-up authentication is required */
     requiresStepUp?: boolean;
     /** Whether approval is required */
@@ -765,10 +737,12 @@ interface RouteAccessConfig {
     /** HTTP method (or * for all) */
     method: string | '*';
     /**
-     * @deprecated 3.2.0 — the access-level band no longer gates.
-     * Optional/ignored; retained for back-compat. Use `minTrustScore` to tighten.
+     * Pass this route through unenforced (observe). The middleware skips gating
+     * on the server decision; with `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed` set it still
+     * calls verify-access for the audit trail and populates `req.agentVerification`.
+     * Replaces the old `minAccessLevel: 'none'` sentinel (SDK 5.0.0).
      */
-    minAccessLevel?: AccessLevel;
+    observe?: boolean;
     /** Minimum trust score required (optional) */
     minTrustScore?: number;
     /** Required purposes (optional, agent must declare one of these) */
@@ -944,7 +918,6 @@ interface NextJsMiddlewareOptions extends GatewayConfig {
         title?: string;
         message?: string;
         allowGuestAccess?: boolean;
-        guestAccessLevel?: AccessLevel;
     };
     /** Enable runtime challenge for all verify-access calls (default: true) */
     enableRuntimeChallenge?: boolean;
@@ -1086,4 +1059,4 @@ interface VerificationInterstitialProps {
 /** @deprecated Renamed VerificationInterstitialProps in 4.1.0; alias removed next major. */
 type CommerceShieldProps = VerificationInterstitialProps;
 
-export type { AccessFailure as A, VerifiedOrganization as B, CallerMetadata as C, EnhancedVerificationResult as E, FiatSettlementBinding as F, GatewayConfig as G, NextJsMiddlewareOptions as N, PDLSSInfo as P, RouteAccessConfig as R, SDKOptions as S, TokenGuidance as T, VerificationInterstitialProps as V, AccessLevel as a, AgentCredentials as b, AstraSyncCredentials as c, AttemptOutcome as d, AttemptReport as e, CommerceArtifactsPayload as f, CommerceShieldProps as g, ConsiderationItem as h, ConsiderationSet as i, CounterpartyType as j, ExpressMiddlewareOptions as k, GuidanceInfo as l, ProtocolTransport as m, RuntimeChallengeResult as n, SettlementArtifact as o, SettlementArtifactBinding as p, SettlementArtifactBindingBase as q, StablecoinSettlementBinding as r, StepUpApprovalInfo as s, StepUpApprovalStatus as t, StepUpOutcome as u, TrustLevel as v, VerificationRequest as w, VerificationResult as x, VerifiedAgent as y, VerifiedDeveloper as z };
+export type { AccessFailure as A, CallerMetadata as C, EnhancedVerificationResult as E, FiatSettlementBinding as F, GatewayConfig as G, NextJsMiddlewareOptions as N, PDLSSInfo as P, RouteAccessConfig as R, SDKOptions as S, TokenGuidance as T, VerificationInterstitialProps as V, AgentCredentials as a, AstraSyncCredentials as b, AttemptOutcome as c, AttemptReport as d, CommerceArtifactsPayload as e, CommerceShieldProps as f, ConsiderationItem as g, ConsiderationSet as h, CounterpartyType as i, ExpressMiddlewareOptions as j, GuidanceInfo as k, ProtocolTransport as l, RuntimeChallengeResult as m, SettlementArtifact as n, SettlementArtifactBinding as o, SettlementArtifactBindingBase as p, StablecoinSettlementBinding as q, StepUpApprovalInfo as r, StepUpApprovalStatus as s, StepUpOutcome as t, TrustLevel as u, VerificationRequest as v, VerificationResult as w, VerifiedAgent as x, VerifiedDeveloper as y, VerifiedOrganization as z };

package/dist/{types-C0zfSXMB.d.mts → types-CJjZvPr9.d.mts}

@@ -10,37 +10,6 @@ import { ObservedMetadata } from './metadata-capture.mjs';
  * Trust levels assigned to agents based on their composite trust score
  */
 type TrustLevel = 'BRONZE' | 'SILVER' | 'GOLD' | 'PLATINUM';
-/**
- * Access levels granted based on verification result. Server is the single
- * source of truth — these values are the resolved decision the server returns
- * in `access.accessLevel`. SDK reads them verbatim (no client-side remap).
- *
- * For ANONYMOUS / unverified callers, the level is determined by the
- * endpoint's `unverifiedAgentPolicy` per the verify-access canonical flow:
- * - deny: `none` — caller is denied + advised to register
- * - allow_partial: `restricted` — reduced/browse-only access + advised
- * - allow_full: `standard` — unrestricted + advised to register for next time
- * Every branch ALWAYS emits a verification event + queues a blockchain record.
- *
- * For VERIFIED callers, the level is resolved server-side from the
- * agent's live trust score plus the endpoint's `trust_score_requirement`:
- * - none: agent below endpoint gate (denied; access.allowed=false)
- * - restricted: 0–19 trust score (registration-prompt only, no real capability)
- * - read-only: 20–39 trust score (browse, no mutations)
- * - standard: 40–69 trust score (PDLSS-scoped operations)
- * - full: 70+ trust score (PDLSS-scoped, high-trust)
- * - internal: same-org membership, regardless of score
- *
- * v2.3.9 renamed the `'guidance'` band → `'restricted'`. The old name
- * collided with the `guidance: {registrationUrl, ...}` help-payload object
- * on VerificationResult, and the collision let denied requests pass any
- * route gated at `'guidance'` (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance')
- * === true`). Banded vocabulary stays capability-noun (none / restricted /
- * read-only / standard / full / internal); response-shape descriptors stay
- * nouns (guidance, advisory). Adapters additionally short-circuit on
- * `!result.identityVerified || !result.policyAllowed` as belt-and-braces.
- */
-type AccessLevel = 'none' | 'restricted' | 'read-only' | 'standard' | 'full' | 'internal';
 /**
  * Types of counterparties that can integrate the gateway
  */
@@ -66,14 +35,12 @@ interface GatewayConfig {
     apiBaseUrl: string;
     /** API key for authenticating with AstraSync. */
     apiKey?: string;
-    /** Default access level for unverified requests */
-    defaultAccessLevel?: AccessLevel;
     /**
      * @deprecated Removed in v2.3.0 — server is the single source of truth for
-     * access-level decisions. Setting this no longer affects access decisions
-     * (the SDK reads `access.accessLevel` from the verify-access response).
-     * If you need a higher gate for an endpoint, configure it server-side via
-     * the endpoint's `trust_score_requirement`.
+     * access decisions (verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score).
+     * Setting this no longer affects access decisions. If you need a higher gate
+     * for an endpoint, configure it server-side via the endpoint's
+     * `trust_score_requirement`.
      */
     minTrustScore?: number;
     /**
@@ -168,12 +135,11 @@ interface GatewayConfig {
     dashboardUrl?: string;
     /**
      * When true, the middleware calls verify-access for any request that presents
-     * AstraSync credentials, even on routes / MCP risk-tiers with
-     * `minAccessLevel: 'none'`. Populates `req.agentVerification` and
-     * records the verification event for the audit trail. Enforcement
-     * still respects route / tier policy — a `none` floor still grants
-     * regardless of access level. Default false to preserve existing
-     * behaviour.
+     * AstraSync credentials, even on `observe`-marked routes / tools that would
+     * otherwise pass through unevaluated. Populates `req.agentVerification` and
+     * records the verification event for the audit trail. Enforcement still
+     * respects the gate — an `observe` marker still passes through regardless of
+     * the server decision. Default false to preserve existing behaviour.
      *
      * Use this when a single endpoint serves both anonymous and verified
      * traffic with different response shapes (e.g. anonymous catalog vs
@@ -428,8 +394,6 @@ interface VerificationResult {
      * unverified caller's policy field is `false` by definition.
      */
     policyAllowed: boolean;
-    /** Access level granted */
-    accessLevel: AccessLevel;
     /** Verified agent info (if verified) */
     agent?: VerifiedAgent;
     /** Developer info (if available) */
@@ -475,6 +439,14 @@ interface VerificationResult {
      * `MERCHANT_VERIFICATION_MISCONFIGURED` instead of a misleading 401.
      */
     misconfigured?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * 4.6.0: a TRANSIENT infrastructure failure (`verify_access.api_error` — a
+     * 5xx / timeout / CSRF-403 reaching the verify-access backend), NOT a policy
+     * deny and NOT a deterministic misconfig. Consumers should surface it as an
+     * error-and-retry (recommendation `'error'`), never as a policy denial. Unset
+     * on misconfig (deterministic — retrying will not help) and on real denials.
+     */
+    retryable?: boolean;
     /** Whether step-up authentication is required */
     requiresStepUp?: boolean;
     /** Whether approval is required */
@@ -765,10 +737,12 @@ interface RouteAccessConfig {
     /** HTTP method (or * for all) */
     method: string | '*';
     /**
-     * @deprecated 3.2.0 — the access-level band no longer gates.
-     * Optional/ignored; retained for back-compat. Use `minTrustScore` to tighten.
+     * Pass this route through unenforced (observe). The middleware skips gating
+     * on the server decision; with `evaluateAlwaysIfCredentialed` set it still
+     * calls verify-access for the audit trail and populates `req.agentVerification`.
+     * Replaces the old `minAccessLevel: 'none'` sentinel (SDK 5.0.0).
      */
-    minAccessLevel?: AccessLevel;
+    observe?: boolean;
     /** Minimum trust score required (optional) */
     minTrustScore?: number;
     /** Required purposes (optional, agent must declare one of these) */
@@ -944,7 +918,6 @@ interface NextJsMiddlewareOptions extends GatewayConfig {
         title?: string;
         message?: string;
         allowGuestAccess?: boolean;
-        guestAccessLevel?: AccessLevel;
     };
     /** Enable runtime challenge for all verify-access calls (default: true) */
     enableRuntimeChallenge?: boolean;
@@ -1086,4 +1059,4 @@ interface VerificationInterstitialProps {
 /** @deprecated Renamed VerificationInterstitialProps in 4.1.0; alias removed next major. */
 type CommerceShieldProps = VerificationInterstitialProps;
 
-export type { AccessFailure as A, VerifiedOrganization as B, CallerMetadata as C, EnhancedVerificationResult as E, FiatSettlementBinding as F, GatewayConfig as G, NextJsMiddlewareOptions as N, PDLSSInfo as P, RouteAccessConfig as R, SDKOptions as S, TokenGuidance as T, VerificationInterstitialProps as V, AccessLevel as a, AgentCredentials as b, AstraSyncCredentials as c, AttemptOutcome as d, AttemptReport as e, CommerceArtifactsPayload as f, CommerceShieldProps as g, ConsiderationItem as h, ConsiderationSet as i, CounterpartyType as j, ExpressMiddlewareOptions as k, GuidanceInfo as l, ProtocolTransport as m, RuntimeChallengeResult as n, SettlementArtifact as o, SettlementArtifactBinding as p, SettlementArtifactBindingBase as q, StablecoinSettlementBinding as r, StepUpApprovalInfo as s, StepUpApprovalStatus as t, StepUpOutcome as u, TrustLevel as v, VerificationRequest as w, VerificationResult as x, VerifiedAgent as y, VerifiedDeveloper as z };
+export type { AccessFailure as A, CallerMetadata as C, EnhancedVerificationResult as E, FiatSettlementBinding as F, GatewayConfig as G, NextJsMiddlewareOptions as N, PDLSSInfo as P, RouteAccessConfig as R, SDKOptions as S, TokenGuidance as T, VerificationInterstitialProps as V, AgentCredentials as a, AstraSyncCredentials as b, AttemptOutcome as c, AttemptReport as d, CommerceArtifactsPayload as e, CommerceShieldProps as f, ConsiderationItem as g, ConsiderationSet as h, CounterpartyType as i, ExpressMiddlewareOptions as j, GuidanceInfo as k, ProtocolTransport as l, RuntimeChallengeResult as m, SettlementArtifact as n, SettlementArtifactBinding as o, SettlementArtifactBindingBase as p, StablecoinSettlementBinding as q, StepUpApprovalInfo as r, StepUpApprovalStatus as s, StepUpOutcome as t, TrustLevel as u, VerificationRequest as v, VerificationResult as w, VerifiedAgent as x, VerifiedDeveloper as y, VerifiedOrganization as z };

package/dist/{types-C7Rb-w0d.d.mts → types-CXf3q4kZ.d.ts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as AccessLevel, j as CounterpartyType, T as TokenGuidance } from './types-C0zfSXMB.mjs';
+import { i as CounterpartyType, T as TokenGuidance } from './types-BK2POWNc.js';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Gateway - Types for gateway modes, local evaluation, and adapter interface.
@@ -38,8 +38,6 @@ interface AstraSyncGatewayConfig {
     traceEnabled?: boolean;
     /** Trace log directory (default: .astrasync/traces/) */
     tracePath?: string;
-    /** Default access level for unverified requests */
-    defaultAccessLevel?: AccessLevel;
     /** Minimum trust score for standard access (online/hybrid) */
     minTrustScore?: number;
     /** Minimum trust score for full access (online/hybrid) */
@@ -120,6 +118,19 @@ interface LocalScope {
     blockedResources?: string[];
 }
 interface LocalLimits {
+    /**
+     * Autonomous Limit — a transaction value at or below this is granted without
+     * escalation. A value in the band `[autonomousThreshold, maxTransactionAmount)`
+     * requires human approval (step-up → MANUAL_REVIEW), mirroring the backend
+     * `checkWithinLimits` ladder. When omitted there is no autonomous band: every
+     * positive value below the Hard Limit is granted (legacy flat-cap behaviour).
+     */
+    autonomousThreshold?: number;
+    /**
+     * Hard Limit — a transaction value at or above this is denied outright. (Named
+     * `maxTransactionAmount` for backward compatibility with existing local policy
+     * files; it is the SDK equivalent of the backend `approvalThreshold`.)
+     */
     maxTransactionAmount?: number;
     maxRequestsPerHour?: number;
     currency?: string;

package/dist/{types-nIh3HtuA.d.ts → types-DQmop7ZW.d.mts}

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { a as AccessLevel, j as CounterpartyType, T as TokenGuidance } from './types-DwSfO7Sb.js';
+import { i as CounterpartyType, T as TokenGuidance } from './types-CJjZvPr9.mjs';
 
 /**
  * AstraSync Gateway - Types for gateway modes, local evaluation, and adapter interface.
@@ -38,8 +38,6 @@ interface AstraSyncGatewayConfig {
     traceEnabled?: boolean;
     /** Trace log directory (default: .astrasync/traces/) */
     tracePath?: string;
-    /** Default access level for unverified requests */
-    defaultAccessLevel?: AccessLevel;
     /** Minimum trust score for standard access (online/hybrid) */
     minTrustScore?: number;
     /** Minimum trust score for full access (online/hybrid) */
@@ -120,6 +118,19 @@ interface LocalScope {
     blockedResources?: string[];
 }
 interface LocalLimits {
+    /**
+     * Autonomous Limit — a transaction value at or below this is granted without
+     * escalation. A value in the band `[autonomousThreshold, maxTransactionAmount)`
+     * requires human approval (step-up → MANUAL_REVIEW), mirroring the backend
+     * `checkWithinLimits` ladder. When omitted there is no autonomous band: every
+     * positive value below the Hard Limit is granted (legacy flat-cap behaviour).
+     */
+    autonomousThreshold?: number;
+    /**
+     * Hard Limit — a transaction value at or above this is denied outright. (Named
+     * `maxTransactionAmount` for backward compatibility with existing local policy
+     * files; it is the SDK equivalent of the backend `approvalThreshold`.)
+     */
     maxTransactionAmount?: number;
     maxRequestsPerHour?: number;
     currency?: string;

package/dist/ui/index.d.mts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { V as VerificationInterstitialProps, x as VerificationResult, b as AgentCredentials, l as GuidanceInfo, v as TrustLevel } from '../types-C0zfSXMB.mjs';
+import { V as VerificationInterstitialProps, w as VerificationResult, a as AgentCredentials, k as GuidanceInfo, u as TrustLevel } from '../types-CJjZvPr9.mjs';
 import '../metadata-capture.mjs';
 
 /**
@@ -110,17 +110,6 @@ interface TrustLevelBadgeProps {
     /** Custom class name */
     className?: string;
 }
-/**
- * Access level indicator props
- */
-interface AccessLevelIndicatorProps {
-    /** Current access level */
-    accessLevel: string;
-    /** Required access level */
-    requiredLevel?: string;
-    /** Custom class name */
-    className?: string;
-}
 /**
  * Guidance card component
  */
@@ -129,10 +118,6 @@ declare function GuidanceCard({ guidance, title, compact, className, }: Guidance
  * Trust level badge component
  */
 declare function TrustLevelBadge({ level, score, size, className, }: TrustLevelBadgeProps): JSX.Element;
-/**
- * Access level indicator component
- */
-declare function AccessLevelIndicator({ accessLevel, requiredLevel, className, }: AccessLevelIndicatorProps): JSX.Element;
 /**
  * Denial reasons list component
  */
@@ -142,4 +127,4 @@ interface DenialReasonsProps {
 }
 declare function DenialReasons({ reasons, className }: DenialReasonsProps): JSX.Element;
 
-export { AccessLevelIndicator, type AccessLevelIndicatorProps, VerificationInterstitial as CommerceShield, VerificationInterstitialProps as CommerceShieldProps, CredentialPrompt, type CredentialPromptProps, DenialReasons, type DenialReasonsProps, GuidanceCard, type GuidanceCardProps, TrustLevelBadge, type TrustLevelBadgeProps, VerificationInterstitial, VerificationInterstitialProps, useVerificationInterstitial as useCommerceShield, useCredentialPrompt, useVerificationInterstitial };
+export { VerificationInterstitial as CommerceShield, VerificationInterstitialProps as CommerceShieldProps, CredentialPrompt, type CredentialPromptProps, DenialReasons, type DenialReasonsProps, GuidanceCard, type GuidanceCardProps, TrustLevelBadge, type TrustLevelBadgeProps, VerificationInterstitial, VerificationInterstitialProps, useVerificationInterstitial as useCommerceShield, useCredentialPrompt, useVerificationInterstitial };

package/dist/ui/index.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { V as VerificationInterstitialProps, x as VerificationResult, b as AgentCredentials, l as GuidanceInfo, v as TrustLevel } from '../types-DwSfO7Sb.js';
+import { V as VerificationInterstitialProps, w as VerificationResult, a as AgentCredentials, k as GuidanceInfo, u as TrustLevel } from '../types-BK2POWNc.js';
 import '../metadata-capture.js';
 
 /**
@@ -110,17 +110,6 @@ interface TrustLevelBadgeProps {
     /** Custom class name */
     className?: string;
 }
-/**
- * Access level indicator props
- */
-interface AccessLevelIndicatorProps {
-    /** Current access level */
-    accessLevel: string;
-    /** Required access level */
-    requiredLevel?: string;
-    /** Custom class name */
-    className?: string;
-}
 /**
  * Guidance card component
  */
@@ -129,10 +118,6 @@ declare function GuidanceCard({ guidance, title, compact, className, }: Guidance
  * Trust level badge component
  */
 declare function TrustLevelBadge({ level, score, size, className, }: TrustLevelBadgeProps): JSX.Element;
-/**
- * Access level indicator component
- */
-declare function AccessLevelIndicator({ accessLevel, requiredLevel, className, }: AccessLevelIndicatorProps): JSX.Element;
 /**
  * Denial reasons list component
  */
@@ -142,4 +127,4 @@ interface DenialReasonsProps {
 }
 declare function DenialReasons({ reasons, className }: DenialReasonsProps): JSX.Element;
 
-export { AccessLevelIndicator, type AccessLevelIndicatorProps, VerificationInterstitial as CommerceShield, VerificationInterstitialProps as CommerceShieldProps, CredentialPrompt, type CredentialPromptProps, DenialReasons, type DenialReasonsProps, GuidanceCard, type GuidanceCardProps, TrustLevelBadge, type TrustLevelBadgeProps, VerificationInterstitial, VerificationInterstitialProps, useVerificationInterstitial as useCommerceShield, useCredentialPrompt, useVerificationInterstitial };
+export { VerificationInterstitial as CommerceShield, VerificationInterstitialProps as CommerceShieldProps, CredentialPrompt, type CredentialPromptProps, DenialReasons, type DenialReasonsProps, GuidanceCard, type GuidanceCardProps, TrustLevelBadge, type TrustLevelBadgeProps, VerificationInterstitial, VerificationInterstitialProps, useVerificationInterstitial as useCommerceShield, useCredentialPrompt, useVerificationInterstitial };

package/dist/ui/index.js

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: tru
 // src/ui/index.ts
 var ui_exports = {};
 __export(ui_exports, {
-  AccessLevelIndicator: () => AccessLevelIndicator,
   CommerceShield: () => VerificationInterstitial,
   CredentialPrompt: () => CredentialPrompt,
   DenialReasons: () => DenialReasons,
@@ -233,7 +232,7 @@ function useVerificationInterstitial(verificationResult) {
   const [dismissed, setDismissed] = import_react.default.useState(false);
   import_react.default.useEffect(() => {
     if (verificationResult && !dismissed) {
-      const shouldShow = !verificationResult.identityVerified || !verificationResult.policyAllowed || verificationResult.accessLevel === "none" || verificationResult.accessLevel === "restricted";
+      const shouldShow = !verificationResult.identityVerified || !verificationResult.policyAllowed;
       setVisible(shouldShow);
     }
   }, [verificationResult, dismissed]);
@@ -725,46 +724,6 @@ function TrustLevelBadge({
     }
   );
 }
-function AccessLevelIndicator({
-  accessLevel,
-  requiredLevel,
-  className
-}) {
-  const getStatus = () => {
-    if (accessLevel === "none" || accessLevel === "restricted") {
-      return "denied";
-    }
-    if (requiredLevel) {
-      const levels = ["none", "restricted", "read-only", "standard", "full", "internal"];
-      const currentIndex = levels.indexOf(accessLevel);
-      const requiredIndex = levels.indexOf(requiredLevel);
-      if (currentIndex < requiredIndex) {
-        return "limited";
-      }
-    }
-    return "allowed";
-  };
-  const status = getStatus();
-  const statusColors = {
-    allowed: styles.indicatorAllowed,
-    denied: styles.indicatorDenied,
-    limited: styles.indicatorLimited
-  };
-  const statusLabels = {
-    allowed: "Access Granted",
-    denied: "Access Denied",
-    limited: "Limited Access"
-  };
-  return /* @__PURE__ */ (0, import_jsx_runtime3.jsxs)("div", { style: styles.indicator, className, children: [
-    /* @__PURE__ */ (0, import_jsx_runtime3.jsx)("span", { style: { ...styles.indicatorDot, ...statusColors[status] } }),
-    /* @__PURE__ */ (0, import_jsx_runtime3.jsx)("span", { children: statusLabels[status] }),
-    /* @__PURE__ */ (0, import_jsx_runtime3.jsxs)("span", { style: { color: "#94a3b8" }, children: [
-      "(",
-      accessLevel,
-      ")"
-    ] })
-  ] });
-}
 function DenialReasons({ reasons, className }) {
   if (reasons.length === 0) {
     return /* @__PURE__ */ (0, import_jsx_runtime3.jsx)(import_jsx_runtime3.Fragment, {});
@@ -816,7 +775,6 @@ function DenialReasons({ reasons, className }) {
 }
 // Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
 0 && (module.exports = {
-  AccessLevelIndicator,
   CommerceShield,
   CredentialPrompt,
   DenialReasons,