@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 4.5.1 → 5.0.0

package/dist/adapters/nextjs.mjs

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 // src/version.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "4.5.1";
+var SDK_VERSION = "5.0.0";
 
 // src/http.ts
 var SDK_USER_AGENT = `astrasync-sdk/${SDK_VERSION}`;
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ async function awaitStepUpApproval(config, approval) {
   return "timeout";
 }
 
-// src/access-levels.ts
+// src/trust-levels.ts
 function getTrustLevel(score) {
   if (score >= 80) return "PLATINUM";
   if (score >= 60) return "GOLD";
@@ -95,11 +95,6 @@ function getCachedWellKnownUrls(apiBaseUrl) {
 // src/verify.ts
 var DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
   apiBaseUrl: "https://astrasync.ai/api",
-  // v2.3.9 (defect #30): default for unconfigured callers is `'none'` (no
-  // access). Pre-rename this defaulted to `'guidance'`, which combined with
-  // a route gated at `'guidance'` to silently let unverified traffic
-  // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).
-  defaultAccessLevel: "none",
   // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.
   // cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult applies the 60s
   // default; the caller's explicit value is honoured for cacheable results.
@@ -294,13 +289,6 @@ function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
     // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).
     identityVerified: false,
     policyAllowed: false,
-    // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
-    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||
-    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has
-    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters
-    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct
-    // semantics.
-    accessLevel: "none",
     guidance,
     denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ["No valid agent credentials provided"],
     // Round-10 (#47, O5): on API-error fallback, surface a typed failure so
@@ -323,6 +311,11 @@ function createGuidanceResponse(_config, reason, options = {}) {
     // 4.0.0: typed marker so adapters render the misconfig envelope (503 +
     // MERCHANT_VERIFICATION_MISCONFIGURED) without string-matching.
     ...isMisconfig && { misconfigured: true },
+    // 4.6.0: a transient api_error is retryable — mark it so consumers surface
+    // "temporarily unavailable, retry" (recommendation 'error') instead of
+    // coercing the absent recommendation to a policy 'deny'. Misconfig is
+    // deterministic and intentionally NOT marked retryable.
+    ...isApiError && { retryable: true },
     correlationId: options.correlationId,
     attemptId: options.attemptId,
     verifiedAt: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date()
@@ -389,7 +382,6 @@ async function callVerifyAccessAPI(config, request) {
         attemptId: typeof data?.attemptId === "string" ? data.attemptId : void 0,
         access: {
           allowed: false,
-          accessLevel: "none",
           reason: "endpoint_deactivated",
           failures: [
             {
@@ -452,7 +444,7 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
   if (!deprecationWarningShown && (config.minTrustScore !== void 0 || config.minTrustScoreForFull !== void 0)) {
     deprecationWarningShown = true;
     console.warn(
-      "[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions (the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side."
+      "[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access decisions (verified ID + runtime challenge + PDLSS + trust score). To gate access to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side."
     );
   }
   if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && !options?.bypassCache) {
@@ -498,14 +490,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     const result2 = {
       identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,
       policyAllowed: false,
-      // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
-      // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the
-      // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let
-      // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because
-      // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now
-      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before
-      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.
-      accessLevel: "none",
       // 3.6.0: the server now emits top-level denialReasons on every deny
       // path — prefer it verbatim; the failure-message reconstruction remains
       // as the fallback for older backends.
@@ -554,7 +538,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     trustScore: apiResponse.organization.trustScore
   } : void 0;
   const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;
-  const accessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? "standard";
   const result = {
     // 4.5.0 (probe F1): read idVerified from verificationContext with the
     // SAME absent⇒false default as the deny branch. The previous `!== false`
@@ -566,7 +549,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
     // this load-bearing must never be defaulted on.
     identityVerified: apiResponse.verificationContext?.idVerified === true,
     policyAllowed: true,
-    accessLevel,
     agent,
     developer,
     organization,
@@ -593,7 +575,6 @@ async function verify(config, request, options) {
   };
   if (result.recommendation === "deny") {
     result.policyAllowed = false;
-    result.accessLevel = "none";
     result.denialReasons = serverDenialReasons ?? result.recommendationReasons ?? ["Access denied by AstraSync recommendation"];
     result.guidance = result.runtimeChallenge ? {
       message: `Verification failed: ${result.runtimeChallenge.reason || "runtime challenge failed"}`,
@@ -1728,7 +1709,7 @@ function createMiddleware(options) {
       beaconPassThrough?.(request, pathname);
       return NextResponse.next();
     }
-    if (routeConfig.minAccessLevel === "none") {
+    if (routeConfig.observe) {
       beaconPassThrough?.(request, pathname);
       return NextResponse.next();
     }
@@ -1758,7 +1739,6 @@ function createMiddleware(options) {
       const preCheckResult = {
         identityVerified: false,
         policyAllowed: false,
-        accessLevel: "none",
         denialReasons: preCheckFailures.map((f) => f.message),
         guidance: {
           message: "Request exceeds counterparty-defined PDLSS limits.",
@@ -1896,7 +1876,6 @@ function createMiddleware(options) {
     }
     response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Identity-Verified", result.identityVerified.toString());
     response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Policy-Allowed", result.policyAllowed.toString());
-    response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Access-Level", result.accessLevel);
     if (result.agent) {
       response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Agent-Id", result.agent.astraId);
     }