@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 2.4.8 → 2.4.10

package/dist/adapters/express.mjs

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ function hasMinimumAccess(actual, required) {
 }
 
 // src/version.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "2.4.7";
+var SDK_VERSION = "2.4.10";
 
 // src/verify.ts
 var DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
@@ -29,8 +29,10 @@ var DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
   // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).
   defaultAccessLevel: "none",
   // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.
-  cacheTtl: 300,
-  // 5 minutes
+  // Round-18.5 F4: cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult
+  // applies the split default (60s autonomous / 300s step-up). When the
+  // caller sets cacheTtl explicitly, that value is honoured uniformly.
+  // Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.
   debug: false
 };
 var initCheckPerformed = false;
@@ -57,11 +59,28 @@ async function performInitCheck(apiBaseUrl, debug) {
   }
 }
 var verificationCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-function getCacheKey(credentials) {
-  return `${credentials.astraId || ""}-${credentials.apiKey || ""}-${credentials.jwt || ""}`;
+function getCacheKey(request) {
+  const c = request.credentials;
+  return [
+    c.astraId || "",
+    c.apiKey || "",
+    c.jwt || "",
+    request.purpose || "",
+    request.action || "",
+    request.resourceType || "",
+    request.resource || "",
+    request.jurisdiction || "",
+    request.transactionValue ?? "",
+    request.currency || "",
+    request.counterpartyUrl || "",
+    request.counterpartyType || "",
+    request.isSubAgentRequest ? "1" : "0",
+    request.parentAgentId || "",
+    request.subAgentDepth ?? ""
+  ].join("|");
 }
-function getCachedResult(credentials) {
-  const key = getCacheKey(credentials);
+function getCachedResult(request) {
+  const key = getCacheKey(request);
   const cached = verificationCache.get(key);
   if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {
     return cached.result;
@@ -71,8 +90,11 @@ function getCachedResult(credentials) {
   }
   return null;
 }
-function cacheResult(credentials, result, ttlSeconds) {
-  const key = getCacheKey(credentials);
+var DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS = 60;
+var DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS = 300;
+function cacheResult(request, result, configuredTtl) {
+  const ttlSeconds = configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0 ? configuredTtl : result.requiresStepUp ? DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS : DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS;
+  const key = getCacheKey(request);
   verificationCache.set(key, {
     result,
     expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1e3
@@ -129,12 +151,17 @@ function createGuidanceResponse(config, reason, options = {}) {
     ]
   };
   return {
-    verified: false,
+    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or
+    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);
+    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).
+    identityVerified: false,
+    policyAllowed: false,
     // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
-    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `verified === false` before
-    // the gate check, but the access level still has to be honest at the
-    // data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters in other languages,
-    // custom integrations) inherit the correct semantics.
+    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||
+    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has
+    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters
+    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct
+    // semantics.
     accessLevel: "none",
     guidance,
     denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ["No valid agent credentials provided"],
@@ -250,8 +277,8 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
       "[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions (the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side."
     );
   }
-  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl && mergedConfig.cacheTtl > 0) {
-    const cached = getCachedResult(request.credentials);
+  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0) {
+    const cached = getCachedResult(request);
     if (cached) {
       if (mergedConfig.debug) {
         console.log("[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result");
@@ -278,15 +305,17 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
   }
   if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {
     const aggregatedFailures = apiResponse.access?.failures;
+    const idVerifiedFromBackend = apiResponse.verificationContext?.idVerified === true;
     const result2 = {
-      verified: false,
+      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,
+      policyAllowed: false,
       // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
       // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the
       // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let
       // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because
       // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now
-      // ALSO short-circuit on `verified === false` before the gate check —
-      // belt-and-braces.
+      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before
+      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.
       accessLevel: "none",
       denialReasons: aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0 ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message) : apiResponse.access?.reason ? [apiResponse.access.reason] : ["Access denied"],
       failures: aggregatedFailures,
@@ -330,7 +359,13 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
   const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;
   const accessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? "standard";
   const result = {
-    verified: true,
+    // Round-18 G4: backend allowed access. Identity is verified (we resolved
+    // the caller to an agent) and policy passed all gates. Read idVerified
+    // from verificationContext for symmetry with the deny branch; default true
+    // on success path since `access.allowed === true` implies identity was
+    // resolvable (anonymous-allow paths flow through createGuidanceResponse).
+    identityVerified: apiResponse.verificationContext?.idVerified !== false,
+    policyAllowed: true,
     accessLevel,
     agent,
     developer,
@@ -353,7 +388,7 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
     warningHeader: apiResponse.warningHeader
   };
   if (result.recommendation === "deny") {
-    result.verified = false;
+    result.policyAllowed = false;
     result.accessLevel = "none";
     result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || [
       "Access denied by AstraSync recommendation"
@@ -372,8 +407,8 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
     }
     result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || ["Step-up verification required"];
   }
-  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl && mergedConfig.cacheTtl > 0 && result.recommendation !== "deny") {
-    cacheResult(request.credentials, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl);
+  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== "deny") {
+    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl);
   }
   return result;
 }
@@ -470,8 +505,15 @@ function extractHttpCredentials(headers) {
 // src/pdlss-pre-check.ts
 function performCounterpartyPreCheck(routeConfig, astraCreds, purpose) {
   const failures = [];
-  if (routeConfig.allowedPurposes && routeConfig.allowedPurposes.length > 0 && purpose) {
-    if (!routeConfig.allowedPurposes.includes(purpose)) {
+  if (purpose) {
+    if (!routeConfig.allowedPurposes || routeConfig.allowedPurposes.length === 0) {
+      failures.push({
+        field: "purpose",
+        requested: purpose,
+        limit: [],
+        message: `Purpose "${purpose}" not allowed: route declares no allowedPurposes. The endpoint owner must enumerate allowedPurposes on the route config to authorise specific purposes.`
+      });
+    } else if (!routeConfig.allowedPurposes.includes(purpose)) {
       failures.push({
         field: "purpose",
         requested: purpose,
@@ -501,9 +543,16 @@ function performCounterpartyPreCheck(routeConfig, astraCreds, purpose) {
       });
     }
   }
-  if (routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions && routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.length > 0 && astraCreds?.pdlss?.scope?.jurisdiction) {
+  if (astraCreds?.pdlss?.scope?.jurisdiction) {
     const requested = astraCreds.pdlss.scope.jurisdiction;
-    if (!routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.includes(requested)) {
+    if (!routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions || routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.length === 0) {
+      failures.push({
+        field: "jurisdiction",
+        requested,
+        limit: [],
+        message: `Jurisdiction "${requested}" not allowed: route declares no allowedJurisdictions. The endpoint owner must enumerate allowedJurisdictions on the route config to authorise specific jurisdictions.`
+      });
+    } else if (!routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.includes(requested)) {
       failures.push({
         field: "jurisdiction",
         requested,
@@ -566,12 +615,12 @@ function findRouteConfig(routes, path, method) {
   });
 }
 function defaultOnDenied(result, _req, res) {
-  const statusCode = result.verified ? 403 : 401;
+  const statusCode = !result.identityVerified ? 401 : 403;
   res.setHeader("X-Astra-Gateway-Mode", "enforced");
   res.status(statusCode).json({
     success: false,
     error: {
-      code: result.verified ? "INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS" : "UNAUTHORIZED",
+      code: !result.identityVerified ? "UNAUTHORIZED" : "INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS",
       message: result.denialReasons?.[0] || "Access denied",
       accessLevel: result.accessLevel,
       guidance: result.guidance,
@@ -665,7 +714,8 @@ function createMiddleware(options) {
       const preCheckFailures = performCounterpartyPreCheck(routeConfig, astraCreds, purpose);
       if (preCheckFailures.length > 0) {
         const result2 = {
-          verified: false,
+          identityVerified: false,
+          policyAllowed: false,
           accessLevel: "none",
           denialReasons: preCheckFailures.map((f) => f.message),
           guidance: {
@@ -714,7 +764,7 @@ function createMiddleware(options) {
       });
       req.agentVerification = result;
       const sessionId = result.sessionId;
-      if (!result.verified) {
+      if (!result.identityVerified || !result.policyAllowed) {
         if (shouldRecordDecisions && sessionId) {
           recordDecision(config, sessionId, "denied", result.denialReasons?.[0]).catch(() => {
           });