@astrasyncai/verification-gateway 2.4.8 → 2.4.10

package/dist/adapters/nextjs.mjs

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ function hasMinimumAccess(actual, required) {
 }
 
 // src/version.ts
-var SDK_VERSION = "2.4.7";
+var SDK_VERSION = "2.4.10";
 
 // src/verify.ts
 var DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
@@ -29,8 +29,10 @@ var DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
   // through (`hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`).
   defaultAccessLevel: "none",
   // minTrustScore + minTrustScoreForFull deprecated in v2.3.0 — server decides.
-  cacheTtl: 300,
-  // 5 minutes
+  // Round-18.5 F4: cacheTtl deliberately unset. When undefined, cacheResult
+  // applies the split default (60s autonomous / 300s step-up). When the
+  // caller sets cacheTtl explicitly, that value is honoured uniformly.
+  // Set cacheTtl: 0 to disable caching entirely.
   debug: false
 };
 var initCheckPerformed = false;
@@ -57,11 +59,28 @@ async function performInitCheck(apiBaseUrl, debug) {
   }
 }
 var verificationCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-function getCacheKey(credentials) {
-  return `${credentials.astraId || ""}-${credentials.apiKey || ""}-${credentials.jwt || ""}`;
+function getCacheKey(request) {
+  const c = request.credentials;
+  return [
+    c.astraId || "",
+    c.apiKey || "",
+    c.jwt || "",
+    request.purpose || "",
+    request.action || "",
+    request.resourceType || "",
+    request.resource || "",
+    request.jurisdiction || "",
+    request.transactionValue ?? "",
+    request.currency || "",
+    request.counterpartyUrl || "",
+    request.counterpartyType || "",
+    request.isSubAgentRequest ? "1" : "0",
+    request.parentAgentId || "",
+    request.subAgentDepth ?? ""
+  ].join("|");
 }
-function getCachedResult(credentials) {
-  const key = getCacheKey(credentials);
+function getCachedResult(request) {
+  const key = getCacheKey(request);
   const cached = verificationCache.get(key);
   if (cached && cached.expiresAt > Date.now()) {
     return cached.result;
@@ -71,8 +90,11 @@ function getCachedResult(credentials) {
   }
   return null;
 }
-function cacheResult(credentials, result, ttlSeconds) {
-  const key = getCacheKey(credentials);
+var DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS = 60;
+var DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS = 300;
+function cacheResult(request, result, configuredTtl) {
+  const ttlSeconds = configuredTtl && configuredTtl > 0 ? configuredTtl : result.requiresStepUp ? DEFAULT_STEP_UP_TTL_SECONDS : DEFAULT_AUTONOMOUS_TTL_SECONDS;
+  const key = getCacheKey(request);
   verificationCache.set(key, {
     result,
     expiresAt: Date.now() + ttlSeconds * 1e3
@@ -101,12 +123,17 @@ function createGuidanceResponse(config, reason, options = {}) {
     ]
   };
   return {
-    verified: false,
+    // Round-18 G4: createGuidanceResponse fires for unverified-agent path or
+    // API-error fallback. Identity is not verified (no agent resolved);
+    // policy is not evaluated (we never reached the gate).
+    identityVerified: false,
+    policyAllowed: false,
     // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
-    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `verified === false` before
-    // the gate check, but the access level still has to be honest at the
-    // data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters in other languages,
-    // custom integrations) inherit the correct semantics.
+    // Adapters additionally short-circuit on `!identityVerified ||
+    // !policyAllowed` before the gate check, but the access level still has
+    // to be honest at the data layer so downstream consumers (SDK adapters
+    // in other languages, custom integrations) inherit the correct
+    // semantics.
     accessLevel: "none",
     guidance,
     denialReasons: reason ? [reason] : ["No valid agent credentials provided"],
@@ -222,8 +249,8 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
       "[VerificationGateway] minTrustScore / minTrustScoreForFull are deprecated in v2.3.0 and have no effect. Server is now the single source of truth for access-level decisions (the SDK reads access.accessLevel from the verify-access response). To gate access to an endpoint, configure the endpoint's trust_score_requirement server-side."
     );
   }
-  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl && mergedConfig.cacheTtl > 0) {
-    const cached = getCachedResult(request.credentials);
+  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0) {
+    const cached = getCachedResult(request);
     if (cached) {
       if (mergedConfig.debug) {
         console.log("[VerificationGateway] Returning cached result");
@@ -250,15 +277,17 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
   }
   if (!apiResponse.access?.allowed) {
     const aggregatedFailures = apiResponse.access?.failures;
+    const idVerifiedFromBackend = apiResponse.verificationContext?.idVerified === true;
     const result2 = {
-      verified: false,
+      identityVerified: idVerifiedFromBackend,
+      policyAllowed: false,
       // v2.3.9 (defect #30): denials grant `'none'`, NEVER a positive band.
       // Pre-rename this hardcoded `'guidance'`, which conflated with the
       // colocated `guidance: {...}` help-payload object below and let
       // denied requests pass any route gated at `'guidance'` because
       // `hasMinimumAccess('guidance', 'guidance') === true`. Adapters now
-      // ALSO short-circuit on `verified === false` before the gate check —
-      // belt-and-braces.
+      // ALSO short-circuit on `!identityVerified || !policyAllowed` before
+      // the gate check — belt-and-braces.
       accessLevel: "none",
       denialReasons: aggregatedFailures && aggregatedFailures.length > 0 ? aggregatedFailures.map((f) => f.message) : apiResponse.access?.reason ? [apiResponse.access.reason] : ["Access denied"],
       failures: aggregatedFailures,
@@ -302,7 +331,13 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
   const verificationContext = apiResponse.verificationContext;
   const accessLevel = apiResponse.access?.accessLevel ?? "standard";
   const result = {
-    verified: true,
+    // Round-18 G4: backend allowed access. Identity is verified (we resolved
+    // the caller to an agent) and policy passed all gates. Read idVerified
+    // from verificationContext for symmetry with the deny branch; default true
+    // on success path since `access.allowed === true` implies identity was
+    // resolvable (anonymous-allow paths flow through createGuidanceResponse).
+    identityVerified: apiResponse.verificationContext?.idVerified !== false,
+    policyAllowed: true,
     accessLevel,
     agent,
     developer,
@@ -325,7 +360,7 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
     warningHeader: apiResponse.warningHeader
   };
   if (result.recommendation === "deny") {
-    result.verified = false;
+    result.policyAllowed = false;
     result.accessLevel = "none";
     result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || [
       "Access denied by AstraSync recommendation"
@@ -344,8 +379,8 @@ async function verify(config, request) {
     }
     result.denialReasons = result.recommendationReasons || ["Step-up verification required"];
   }
-  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl && mergedConfig.cacheTtl > 0 && result.recommendation !== "deny") {
-    cacheResult(request.credentials, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl);
+  if (mergedConfig.cacheTtl !== 0 && result.recommendation !== "deny") {
+    cacheResult(request, result, mergedConfig.cacheTtl);
   }
   return result;
 }
@@ -420,8 +455,15 @@ function extractHttpCredentials(headers) {
 // src/pdlss-pre-check.ts
 function performCounterpartyPreCheck(routeConfig, astraCreds, purpose) {
   const failures = [];
-  if (routeConfig.allowedPurposes && routeConfig.allowedPurposes.length > 0 && purpose) {
-    if (!routeConfig.allowedPurposes.includes(purpose)) {
+  if (purpose) {
+    if (!routeConfig.allowedPurposes || routeConfig.allowedPurposes.length === 0) {
+      failures.push({
+        field: "purpose",
+        requested: purpose,
+        limit: [],
+        message: `Purpose "${purpose}" not allowed: route declares no allowedPurposes. The endpoint owner must enumerate allowedPurposes on the route config to authorise specific purposes.`
+      });
+    } else if (!routeConfig.allowedPurposes.includes(purpose)) {
       failures.push({
         field: "purpose",
         requested: purpose,
@@ -451,9 +493,16 @@ function performCounterpartyPreCheck(routeConfig, astraCreds, purpose) {
       });
     }
   }
-  if (routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions && routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.length > 0 && astraCreds?.pdlss?.scope?.jurisdiction) {
+  if (astraCreds?.pdlss?.scope?.jurisdiction) {
     const requested = astraCreds.pdlss.scope.jurisdiction;
-    if (!routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.includes(requested)) {
+    if (!routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions || routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.length === 0) {
+      failures.push({
+        field: "jurisdiction",
+        requested,
+        limit: [],
+        message: `Jurisdiction "${requested}" not allowed: route declares no allowedJurisdictions. The endpoint owner must enumerate allowedJurisdictions on the route config to authorise specific jurisdictions.`
+      });
+    } else if (!routeConfig.allowedJurisdictions.includes(requested)) {
       failures.push({
         field: "jurisdiction",
         requested,
@@ -744,7 +793,8 @@ function createMiddleware(options) {
     const preCheckFailures = performCounterpartyPreCheck(routeConfig, astraCreds, purpose);
     if (preCheckFailures.length > 0) {
       const preCheckResult = {
-        verified: false,
+        identityVerified: false,
+        policyAllowed: false,
         accessLevel: "none",
         denialReasons: preCheckFailures.map((f) => f.message),
         guidance: {
@@ -807,20 +857,22 @@ function createMiddleware(options) {
         agentCardUrl: request.headers.get("x-astrasync-agent-card") || void 0
       }
     });
-    if (!result.verified || !hasMinimumAccess(result.accessLevel, routeConfig.minAccessLevel)) {
+    if (!result.identityVerified || !result.policyAllowed || !hasMinimumAccess(result.accessLevel, routeConfig.minAccessLevel)) {
       if (pathname.startsWith("/api/")) {
         return NextResponse.json(
           {
             success: false,
             error: {
-              code: result.verified ? "INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS" : "UNAUTHORIZED",
+              // Round-18 G4: 401 → identity missing (re-auth); 403 → identity
+              // OK, policy denied (update PDLSS / step up).
+              code: !result.identityVerified ? "UNAUTHORIZED" : "INSUFFICIENT_ACCESS",
               message: result.denialReasons?.[0] || "Access denied",
               accessLevel: result.accessLevel,
               required: routeConfig.minAccessLevel,
               guidance: result.guidance
             }
           },
-          { status: result.verified ? 403 : 401 }
+          { status: !result.identityVerified ? 401 : 403 }
         );
       }
       if (showCommerceShield) {
@@ -835,7 +887,12 @@ function createMiddleware(options) {
       return NextResponse.redirect(new URL("/unauthorized", request.url));
     }
     const response = NextResponse.next();
-    response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Verified", result.verified.toString());
+    response.headers.set(
+      "X-AstraSync-Verified",
+      (result.identityVerified && result.policyAllowed).toString()
+    );
+    response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Identity-Verified", result.identityVerified.toString());
+    response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Policy-Allowed", result.policyAllowed.toString());
     response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Access-Level", result.accessLevel);
     if (result.agent) {
       response.headers.set("X-AstraSync-Agent-Id", result.agent.astraId);