@arcis/node 1.6.3 → 1.6.5

package/dist/logging/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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no magic numbers\n */\n\n// =============================================================================\n// INPUT LIMITS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const INPUT = {\n  /** Default maximum input size (1MB) */\n  DEFAULT_MAX_SIZE: 1_000_000,\n  /** Maximum recursion depth for nested objects */\n  MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH: 10,\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// RATE LIMITING\n// =============================================================================\nexport const RATE_LIMIT = {\n  /** Default window size (1 minute) */\n  DEFAULT_WINDOW_MS: 60_000,\n  /** Default max requests per window */\n  DEFAULT_MAX_REQUESTS: 100,\n  /** Default HTTP status code for rate limited responses */\n  DEFAULT_STATUS_CODE: 429,\n  /** Default error message */\n  DEFAULT_MESSAGE: 'Too many requests, please try again later.',\n  /** Minimum window size (1 second) */\n  MIN_WINDOW_MS: 1_000,\n  /** Maximum window size (24 hours) */\n  MAX_WINDOW_MS: 86_400_000,\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// SECURITY HEADERS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const HEADERS = {\n  /** Default Content Security Policy */\n  DEFAULT_CSP: [\n    \"default-src 'self'\",\n    \"script-src 'self'\",\n    \"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'\",\n    \"img-src 'self' data: https:\",\n    \"font-src 'self'\",\n    \"object-src 'none'\",\n    \"frame-ancestors 'none'\",\n  ].join('; '),\n  /** Default HSTS max age (1 year in seconds) */\n  HSTS_MAX_AGE: 31_536_000,\n  /** Default X-Frame-Options value */\n  FRAME_OPTIONS: 'DENY' as const,\n  /** Default X-Content-Type-Options value */\n  CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS: 'nosniff',\n  /** Default Referrer-Policy value */\n  REFERRER_POLICY: 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin',\n  /** Default Permissions-Policy value */\n  PERMISSIONS_POLICY: 'geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()',\n  /** Default Cache-Control value for security */\n  CACHE_CONTROL: 'no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate',\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// XSS PATTERNS (ReDoS-safe)\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Detection patterns — used to flag whether a string contains XSS payloads.\n * Must stay in sync with XSS_REMOVE_PATTERNS below.\n */\nexport const XSS_PATTERNS = [\n  /** Script tags (ReDoS-safe version) */\n  /<script[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/script>/gi,\n  /** javascript: protocol (allow optional spaces before colon) */\n  /javascript\\s*:/gi,\n  /** vbscript: protocol */\n  /vbscript\\s*:/gi,\n  /** Event handlers (onclick, onerror, etc.) — any separator before attribute */\n  /(?:[\\s/])on\\w+\\s*=/gi,\n  /** iframe tags */\n  /<iframe/gi,\n  /** object tags */\n  /<object/gi,\n  /** embed tags */\n  /<embed/gi,\n  /** data: URIs (only dangerous ones, avoid false positives) */\n  /(?:^|[\\s\"'=])data:/gi,\n  /** URL-encoded script tags */\n  /%3Cscript/gi,\n  /** SVG with onload */\n  /<svg[^>]*onload/gi,\n  /** form tags — phishing/credential harvesting via action= redirection */\n  /<form[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** meta tags — http-equiv refresh redirects or CSP bypass */\n  /<meta[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** base href hijacking — redirects all relative URLs to attacker domain */\n  /<base[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** link tag injection — stylesheet or preload CSRF attacks */\n  /<link[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** style tag — CSS expression() / behavior: / IE-era attacks. Mirrors\n   *  Python's xss-style-tag from packages/core/patterns.json. */\n  /<style[\\s>]/gi,\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * Removal patterns — used by sanitizeXss() to strip dangerous content.\n * More targeted than XSS_PATTERNS: each pattern captures the full dangerous\n * substring (tag, attribute + value, protocol) so it can be replaced safely.\n * Must stay in sync with XSS_PATTERNS above.\n */\nexport const XSS_REMOVE_PATTERNS = [\n  /** Full script blocks (content + tags) */\n  /<script[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/script>/gi,\n  /** Standalone/unclosed script tags */\n  /<script[^>]*>/gi,\n  /** style — CSS expression() and behavior: attacks (IE-era but still relevant) */\n  /<style[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/style>/gi,\n  /<style[^>]*/gi,\n  /** iframe — full block and partial/unclosed */\n  /<iframe[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/iframe>/gi,\n  /<iframe[^>]*/gi,\n  /** object — full block and partial/unclosed */\n  /<object[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/object>/gi,\n  /<object[^>]*/gi,\n  /** embed tags */\n  /<embed[^>]*/gi,\n  /** SVG with inline event handlers */\n  /<svg[^>]*onload[^>]*>/gi,\n  /** URL-encoded script tags */\n  /%3Cscript/gi,\n  /** Event handlers with quoted values: onclick=\"...\", onerror='...' */\n  /(?:[\\s/])on\\w+\\s*=\\s*[\"'][^\"']*[\"']/gi,\n  /** Event handlers with unquoted values: onload=value */\n  /(?:[\\s/])on\\w+\\s*=\\s*[^\\s>]*/gi,\n  /** javascript: and vbscript: protocols (allow optional spaces before colon) */\n  /javascript\\s*:/gi,\n  /vbscript\\s*:/gi,\n  /** data: URIs with HTML or SVG content (SVG can run JS via inline event handlers) */\n  /data\\s*:\\s*(?:text\\/html|image\\/svg)[^>\\s]*/gi,\n  /** form tag injection — phishing via action= redirection */\n  /<form[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n  /** meta tag injection — http-equiv refresh or CSP bypass */\n  /<meta[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n  /** base href hijacking */\n  /<base[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n  /** link tag injection — stylesheet or preload attacks */\n  /<link[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// SQL INJECTION PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const SQL_PATTERNS = [\n  /** SQL keywords */\n  /(\\b(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|UNION|ALTER|CREATE|TRUNCATE|EXEC|EXECUTE)\\b)/gi,\n  /** SQL comments: ANSI (--), C-style (slash-star ... star-slash), MySQL (#) */\n  /(--|\\/\\*|\\*\\/|#)/g,\n  /** SQL statement separators */\n  /(;|\\|\\||&&)/g,\n  /** Boolean injection: OR 1=1 */\n  /\\bOR\\s+\\d+\\s*=\\s*\\d+/gi,\n  /** Boolean injection: OR 'a'='a' or OR \"a\"=\"a\" (including mixed quotes) */\n  /\\bOR\\s+(['\"])[^'\"]*\\1\\s*=\\s*(['\"])[^'\"]*\\2/gi,\n  /\\bOR\\s+('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")\\s*=\\s*('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")/gi,\n  /** Boolean injection: AND 1=1 */\n  /\\bAND\\s+\\d+\\s*=\\s*\\d+/gi,\n  /** Boolean injection: AND 'a'='a' or AND \"a\"=\"a\" (including mixed quotes) */\n  /\\bAND\\s+(['\"])[^'\"]*\\1\\s*=\\s*(['\"])[^'\"]*\\2/gi,\n  /\\bAND\\s+('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")\\s*=\\s*('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: SLEEP() */\n  /\\bSLEEP\\s*\\(\\s*\\d+\\s*\\)/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: BENCHMARK() */\n  /\\bBENCHMARK\\s*\\(/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: PostgreSQL pg_sleep() */\n  /\\bpg_sleep\\s*\\(/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: MSSQL WAITFOR DELAY */\n  /\\bWAITFOR\\s+DELAY\\b/gi,\n  /**\n   * Oracle DBMS_* stdlib packages used for time-based blind SQLi\n   * (DBMS_LOCK.SLEEP, DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE) and other Oracle\n   * abuse paths. No legitimate user input contains these. Mirrors\n   * `sqli-oracle-dbms-packages` in packages/core/patterns.json —\n   * improvements.md §1.1.e Q3. Must stay in sync until Node\n   * migrates to patterns.json-at-runtime (planned v1.7).\n   */\n  /\\bDBMS_(?:LOCK|PIPE|UTILITY|XSLPROCESSOR|JAVA|OUTPUT|SCHEDULER)\\b/gi,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// PATH TRAVERSAL PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const PATH_PATTERNS = [\n  /** Unix path traversal */\n  /\\.\\.\\//g,\n  /** Windows path traversal */\n  /\\.\\.\\\\/g,\n  /** URL-encoded traversal (%2e%2e) */\n  /%2e%2e/gi,\n  /** Double URL-encoded traversal (%252e) */\n  /%252e/gi,\n  /** Mixed encoding: ..%2F */\n  /\\.\\.%2F/gi,\n  /** Mixed encoding: %2e./ and .%2e/ */\n  /%2e\\.[\\\\/]/gi,\n  /\\.%2e[\\\\/]/gi,\n  /** Fully URL-encoded: %2e%2e%2f */\n  /%2e%2e%2f/gi,\n  /** Double URL-encoded forward slash: %252f */\n  /%252f/gi,\n  /** Dotdotslash bypass: ....// or ....\\\\ */\n  /\\.{2,}[/\\\\]{2,}/g,\n  /** Null byte injection in paths */\n  /\\0/g,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// COMMAND INJECTION PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const COMMAND_PATTERNS = [\n  /**\n   * Shell metacharacters that enable command chaining/substitution.\n   * Bare ( and ) are excluded — they appear in common legitimate values\n   * (function calls in code fields, math expressions, etc.).\n   * Command substitution is caught by the $( combined pattern below.\n   * NOTE: ';', '&', '|' may appear in legitimate URL query strings\n   * and Markdown; consider disabling command checking (command: false)\n   * for fields that intentionally allow those characters.\n   */\n  /[;&|`]/g,\n  /** Command substitution: $( ... ) — matched as a pair to reduce false positives */\n  /\\$\\(/g,\n  /**\n   * POSIX shell IFS-substitution: ${IFS} or ${IFS%??}.\n   * Attackers use this to inject spaces past metacharacter filters\n   * in payloads like `;cat${IFS}/etc/passwd`. Mirrors\n   * `cmdi-ifs-bypass` in packages/core/patterns.json — improvements.md\n   * §1.1.e Q5. Must stay in sync until Node migrates to\n   * patterns.json-at-runtime (planned v1.7).\n   */\n  /\\$\\{IFS(?:%[^}]*)?\\}/g,\n  /** URL-encoded control characters (%00-%0F): null, tab, vtab, formfeed, LF, CR */\n  /%0[0-9a-f]/gi,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// DANGEROUS KEYS\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Prototype pollution keys to block.\n * Stored lowercase — always compare with key.toLowerCase().\n *\n * Includes:\n * - __proto__: direct prototype assignment\n * - constructor: access to constructor.prototype chain\n * - prototype: direct prototype property\n * - __defineGetter__/__defineSetter__: legacy property definition (can override getters/setters)\n * - __lookupGetter__/__lookupSetter__: legacy property introspection\n */\nexport const DANGEROUS_PROTO_KEYS = new Set([\n  '__proto__',\n  'constructor',\n  'prototype',\n  '__definegetter__',\n  '__definesetter__',\n  '__lookupgetter__',\n  '__lookupsetter__',\n]);\n\n/** MongoDB operators to block */\nexport const NOSQL_DANGEROUS_KEYS = new Set([\n  // Comparison\n  '$gt', '$gte', '$lt', '$lte', '$ne', '$eq', '$in', '$nin',\n  // Logical\n  '$and', '$or', '$not', '$nor',\n  // Element / evaluation\n  '$exists', '$type', '$regex', '$where', '$expr', '$mod', '$text', '$jsonSchema',\n  // Array\n  '$elemMatch', '$all', '$size',\n  // JavaScript execution (critical)\n  '$function', '$accumulator',\n  // Aggregation pipeline operators (injectable via $lookup etc.)\n  '$lookup', '$match', '$project', '$group', '$sort', '$limit', '$skip',\n  '$unwind', '$addFields', '$replaceRoot',\n]);\n\n// =============================================================================\n// REDACTION\n// =============================================================================\nexport const REDACTION = {\n  /** Replacement text for redacted values */\n  REPLACEMENT: '[REDACTED]',\n  /** Truncation indicator */\n  TRUNCATED: '[TRUNCATED]',\n  /** Max depth indicator */\n  MAX_DEPTH: '[MAX_DEPTH]',\n  /** Default max message length */\n  DEFAULT_MAX_LENGTH: 10_000,\n  /** Default sensitive keys to redact */\n  SENSITIVE_KEYS: new Set([\n    'password', 'passwd', 'pwd', 'secret', 'token', 'apikey',\n    'api_key', 'apiKey', 'auth', 'authorization', 'credit_card',\n    'creditcard', 'cc', 'ssn', 'social_security', 'private_key',\n    'privateKey', 'access_token', 'accessToken', 'refresh_token',\n    'refreshToken', 'bearer', 'jwt', 'session', 'cookie',\n    'credentials', 'x-api-key', 'x-auth-token',\n  ]),\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// VALIDATION PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const VALIDATION = {\n  /**\n   * Email regex pattern.\n   * Rejects consecutive dots in local part (e.g. test..foo@example.com),\n   * leading/trailing dots, and other common invalid forms.\n   */\n  EMAIL: /^[^\\s@.][^\\s@]*(?:\\.[^\\s@.][^\\s@]*)*@[^\\s@]+\\.[^\\s@]+$/,\n  /**\n   * URL regex pattern.\n   * Only allows http:// and https:// (case-insensitive scheme per\n   * RFC 3986); explicitly rejects javascript:, data:, vbscript:, and\n   * other dangerous URI schemes.\n   */\n  URL: /^https?:\\/\\/[^\\s/$.?#][^\\s]*$/i,\n  /** UUID regex pattern (v4) */\n  UUID: /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i,\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ERROR MESSAGES\n// =============================================================================\nexport const ERRORS = {\n  /** Generic error message (production) */\n  INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR: 'Internal Server Error',\n  /** Input too large error */\n  INPUT_TOO_LARGE: (maxSize: number) => `Input exceeds maximum size of ${maxSize} bytes`,\n  /** Validation error messages */\n  VALIDATION: {\n    REQUIRED: (field: string) => `${field} is required`,\n    INVALID_TYPE: (field: string, type: string) => `${field} must be a ${type}`,\n    MIN_LENGTH: (field: string, min: number) => `${field} must be at least ${min} characters`,\n    MAX_LENGTH: (field: string, max: number) => `${field} must be at most ${max} characters`,\n    MIN_VALUE: (field: string, min: number) => `${field} must be at least ${min}`,\n    MAX_VALUE: (field: string, max: number) => `${field} must be at most ${max}`,\n    INVALID_FORMAT: (field: string) => `${field} format is invalid`,\n    INVALID_EMAIL: (field: string) => `${field} must be a valid email`,\n    INVALID_URL: (field: string) => `${field} must be a valid URL`,\n    INVALID_UUID: (field: string) => `${field} must be a valid UUID`,\n    INVALID_ENUM: (field: string, values: unknown[]) => `${field} must be one of: ${values.join(', ')}`,\n    MIN_ITEMS: (field: string, min: number) => `${field} must have at least ${min} items`,\n    MAX_ITEMS: (field: string, max: number) => `${field} must have at most ${max} items`,\n  },\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// BLOCKED TEXT (for sanitizer replacements)\n// =============================================================================\nexport const BLOCKED = '[BLOCKED]' as const;\n","/**\n * @module @arcis/node/logging/redactor\n * Safe logging with PII/secret redaction\n */\n\nimport { REDACTION, INPUT } from '../core/constants';\nimport type { LogOptions, SafeLogger } from '../core/types';\n\nconst LOG_LEVELS: Record<string, number> = {\n  debug: 0,\n  info: 1,\n  warn: 2,\n  error: 3,\n  silent: 4,\n};\n\n/**\n * Create a safe logger that redacts sensitive data and prevents log injection.\n * \n * @param options - Logger configuration\n * @returns SafeLogger instance\n * \n * @example\n * const logger = createSafeLogger();\n * logger.info('User login', { email: 'user@test.com', password: 'secret' });\n * // Logs: { \"email\": \"user@test.com\", \"password\": \"[REDACTED]\" }\n * \n * @example\n * // With custom redact keys\n * const logger = createSafeLogger({ redactKeys: ['customToken', 'internalId'] });\n */\nexport function createSafeLogger(options: LogOptions = {}): SafeLogger {\n  const {\n    redactKeys = [],\n    maxLength = REDACTION.DEFAULT_MAX_LENGTH,\n    redactPatterns = [],\n    level: minLevel = 'debug',\n  } = options;\n\n  const minLevelNum = LOG_LEVELS[minLevel] ?? 0;\n\n  // Combine default and custom keys (lowercase for case-insensitive matching)\n  const allRedactKeys = new Set([\n    ...Array.from(REDACTION.SENSITIVE_KEYS),\n    ...redactKeys.map(k => k.toLowerCase()),\n  ]);\n\n  /**\n   * Redact sensitive data from an object recursively.\n   */\n  function redact(obj: unknown, depth = 0): unknown {\n    if (depth > INPUT.MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH) return REDACTION.MAX_DEPTH;\n    if (obj === null || obj === undefined) return obj;\n\n    if (typeof obj === 'string') {\n      return redactString(obj, maxLength, redactPatterns);\n    }\n\n    if (typeof obj !== 'object') return obj;\n\n    if (Array.isArray(obj)) {\n      return obj.map(item => redact(item, depth + 1));\n    }\n\n    const result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(obj as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      if (allRedactKeys.has(key.toLowerCase())) {\n        result[key] = REDACTION.REPLACEMENT;\n      } else {\n        result[key] = redact(value, depth + 1);\n      }\n    }\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Log a message at the specified level.\n   */\n  function log(level: string, message: string, data?: unknown): void {\n    // Early exit: skip all work if message level is below minimum\n    const levelNum = LOG_LEVELS[level] ?? 0;\n    if (levelNum < minLevelNum) return;\n\n    const entry: Record<string, unknown> = {\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      level,\n      message: redactString(message, maxLength, redactPatterns),\n    };\n\n    if (data !== undefined) {\n      entry.data = redact(data);\n    }\n\n    // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n    console.log(JSON.stringify(entry));\n  }\n\n  return {\n    log,\n    info: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('info', msg, data),\n    warn: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('warn', msg, data),\n    error: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('error', msg, data),\n    debug: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('debug', msg, data),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact a string value.\n * Removes newlines (log injection prevention), applies patterns, and truncates.\n */\nfunction redactString(str: string, maxLength: number, patterns: RegExp[]): string {\n  // Remove newlines/tabs (log injection prevention) and genuine control characters.\n  // Only strip C0/C1 control chars and null bytes — preserve all printable Unicode\n  // (CJK, Cyrillic, Arabic, etc.) so multilingual content isn't silently lost.\n  let safe = str\n    .replace(/[\\r\\n\\t]/g, ' ')\n    .replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0B\\x0C\\x0E-\\x1F\\x7F\\x80-\\x9F]/g, '');\n\n  // Apply custom redaction patterns\n  for (const pattern of patterns) {\n    safe = safe.replace(pattern, REDACTION.REPLACEMENT);\n  }\n\n  // Truncate if too long\n  if (safe.length > maxLength) {\n    safe = safe.substring(0, maxLength) + `...${REDACTION.TRUNCATED}`;\n  }\n\n  return safe;\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a redactor function for custom use.\n * \n * @param sensitiveKeys - Keys to redact\n * @returns Redactor function\n */\nexport function createRedactor(sensitiveKeys: string[] = []): (obj: unknown) => unknown {\n  const allKeys = new Set([\n    ...Array.from(REDACTION.SENSITIVE_KEYS),\n    ...sensitiveKeys.map(k => k.toLowerCase()),\n  ]);\n\n  function redact(obj: unknown, depth = 0): unknown {\n    if (depth > INPUT.MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH) return REDACTION.MAX_DEPTH;\n    if (obj === null || obj === undefined) return obj;\n    if (typeof obj !== 'object') return obj;\n\n    if (Array.isArray(obj)) {\n      return obj.map(item => redact(item, depth + 1));\n    }\n\n    const result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(obj as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      if (allKeys.has(key.toLowerCase())) {\n        result[key] = REDACTION.REPLACEMENT;\n      } else {\n        result[key] = redact(value, depth + 1);\n      }\n    }\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  return redact;\n}\n\n/**\n * Alias for createSafeLogger\n * @see createSafeLogger\n */\nexport const safeLog = createSafeLogger;\n"]}
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no magic numbers\n */\n\n// =============================================================================\n// INPUT LIMITS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const INPUT = {\n  /** Default maximum input size (1MB) */\n  DEFAULT_MAX_SIZE: 1_000_000,\n  /** Maximum recursion depth for nested objects */\n  MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH: 10,\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// RATE LIMITING\n// =============================================================================\nexport const RATE_LIMIT = {\n  /** Default window size (1 minute) */\n  DEFAULT_WINDOW_MS: 60_000,\n  /** Default max requests per window */\n  DEFAULT_MAX_REQUESTS: 100,\n  /** Default HTTP status code for rate limited responses */\n  DEFAULT_STATUS_CODE: 429,\n  /** Default error message */\n  DEFAULT_MESSAGE: 'Too many requests, please try again later.',\n  /** Minimum window size (1 second) */\n  MIN_WINDOW_MS: 1_000,\n  /** Maximum window size (24 hours) */\n  MAX_WINDOW_MS: 86_400_000,\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// SECURITY HEADERS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const HEADERS = {\n  /** Default Content Security Policy */\n  DEFAULT_CSP: [\n    \"default-src 'self'\",\n    \"script-src 'self'\",\n    \"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'\",\n    \"img-src 'self' data: https:\",\n    \"font-src 'self'\",\n    \"object-src 'none'\",\n    \"frame-ancestors 'none'\",\n  ].join('; '),\n  /** Default HSTS max age (1 year in seconds) */\n  HSTS_MAX_AGE: 31_536_000,\n  /** Default X-Frame-Options value */\n  FRAME_OPTIONS: 'DENY' as const,\n  /** Default X-Content-Type-Options value */\n  CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS: 'nosniff',\n  /** Default Referrer-Policy value */\n  REFERRER_POLICY: 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin',\n  /** Default Permissions-Policy value */\n  PERMISSIONS_POLICY: 'geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()',\n  /** Default Cache-Control value for security */\n  CACHE_CONTROL: 'no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate',\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// XSS PATTERNS (ReDoS-safe)\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Detection patterns — used to flag whether a string contains XSS payloads.\n * Must stay in sync with XSS_REMOVE_PATTERNS below.\n */\nexport const XSS_PATTERNS = [\n  /** Script tags (ReDoS-safe version) */\n  /<script[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/script>/gi,\n  /** javascript: protocol (allow optional spaces before colon) */\n  /javascript\\s*:/gi,\n  /** vbscript: protocol */\n  /vbscript\\s*:/gi,\n  /** Event handlers (onclick, onerror, etc.) — any separator before attribute */\n  /(?:[\\s/])on\\w+\\s*=/gi,\n  /** iframe tags */\n  /<iframe/gi,\n  /** object tags */\n  /<object/gi,\n  /** embed tags */\n  /<embed/gi,\n  /** data: URIs (only dangerous ones, avoid false positives) */\n  /(?:^|[\\s\"'=])data:/gi,\n  /** URL-encoded script tags */\n  /%3Cscript/gi,\n  /** SVG with onload */\n  /<svg[^>]*onload/gi,\n  /** form tags — phishing/credential harvesting via action= redirection */\n  /<form[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** meta tags — http-equiv refresh redirects or CSP bypass */\n  /<meta[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** base href hijacking — redirects all relative URLs to attacker domain */\n  /<base[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** link tag injection — stylesheet or preload CSRF attacks */\n  /<link[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** style tag — CSS expression() / behavior: / IE-era attacks. Mirrors\n   *  Python's xss-style-tag from packages/core/patterns.json. */\n  /<style[\\s>]/gi,\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * Removal patterns — used by sanitizeXss() to strip dangerous content.\n * More targeted than XSS_PATTERNS: each pattern captures the full dangerous\n * substring (tag, attribute + value, protocol) so it can be replaced safely.\n * Must stay in sync with XSS_PATTERNS above.\n */\nexport const XSS_REMOVE_PATTERNS = [\n  /** Full script blocks (content + tags) */\n  /<script[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/script>/gi,\n  /** Standalone/unclosed script tags */\n  /<script[^>]*>/gi,\n  /** style — CSS expression() and behavior: attacks (IE-era but still relevant) */\n  /<style[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/style>/gi,\n  /<style[^>]*/gi,\n  /** iframe — full block and partial/unclosed */\n  /<iframe[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/iframe>/gi,\n  /<iframe[^>]*/gi,\n  /** object — full block and partial/unclosed */\n  /<object[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/object>/gi,\n  /<object[^>]*/gi,\n  /** embed tags */\n  /<embed[^>]*/gi,\n  /** SVG with inline event handlers */\n  /<svg[^>]*onload[^>]*>/gi,\n  /** URL-encoded script tags */\n  /%3Cscript/gi,\n  /** Event handlers with quoted values: onclick=\"...\", onerror='...' */\n  /(?:[\\s/])on\\w+\\s*=\\s*[\"'][^\"']*[\"']/gi,\n  /** Event handlers with unquoted values: onload=value */\n  /(?:[\\s/])on\\w+\\s*=\\s*[^\\s>]*/gi,\n  /** javascript: and vbscript: protocols (allow optional spaces before colon) */\n  /javascript\\s*:/gi,\n  /vbscript\\s*:/gi,\n  /** data: URIs with HTML or SVG content (SVG can run JS via inline event handlers) */\n  /data\\s*:\\s*(?:text\\/html|image\\/svg)[^>\\s]*/gi,\n  /** form tag injection — phishing via action= redirection */\n  /<form[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n  /** meta tag injection — http-equiv refresh or CSP bypass */\n  /<meta[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n  /** base href hijacking */\n  /<base[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n  /** link tag injection — stylesheet or preload attacks */\n  /<link[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// SQL INJECTION PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const SQL_PATTERNS = [\n  /**\n   * Multi-token SQL attack shapes that never appear in normal English.\n   * Replaces the older bare-keyword pattern `\\b(SELECT|INSERT|...)\\b`\n   * which false-positived on natural language (\"please select an option\",\n   * \"I'll update you tomorrow\", \"delete this file\"). Each shape below\n   * is a token combination that real attackers use and benign users\n   * essentially never type. Matches `sqli-keywords` in\n   * packages/core/patterns.json. Benchmark FP class B3, 2026-06-07.\n   *\n   * Catches:\n   *   UNION SELECT / UNION ALL SELECT          (data exfiltration)\n   *   DROP|TRUNCATE TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|...   (DDL destruction)\n   *   INTO OUTFILE / INTO DUMPFILE             (MySQL file write RCE)\n   *   ATTACH DATABASE                          (SQLite hijack)\n   *   CREATE USER|FUNCTION|TRIGGER|PROCEDURE   (privilege escalation)\n   *   GRANT ALL|SELECT|INSERT|...              (privilege grant)\n   *   xp_cmdshell / sp_executesql              (SQL Server RCE)\n   *   SHUTDOWN                                 (DoS)\n   */\n  /(\\bUNION\\s+(?:ALL\\s+)?SELECT\\b)|(\\b(?:DROP|TRUNCATE)\\s+(?:TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|VIEW|SCHEMA)\\b)|(\\bINTO\\s+(?:OUTFILE|DUMPFILE)\\b)|(\\bATTACH\\s+DATABASE\\b)|(\\bCREATE\\s+(?:USER|FUNCTION|TRIGGER|PROCEDURE)\\b)|(\\bGRANT\\s+(?:ALL|SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE)\\b)|(\\bSHUTDOWN\\b)|(\\bxp_cmdshell\\b)|(\\bsp_executesql\\b)/gi,\n  /**\n   * SQL comments: ANSI (--), C-style (slash-star ... star-slash).\n   * MySQL `#` line comment intentionally excluded: a bare `#` matches\n   * every hex color (#FF5300), hashtag (#trending), issue ref (#123),\n   * markdown heading (# Title). Real `admin' #`-style injections are\n   * already caught by the quote/semicolon + keyword/boolean patterns\n   * below — `#` adds nothing as a primary signal and a lot of FP noise.\n   * Matches `sqli-comments` rule in packages/core/patterns.json (which\n   * also excludes `#`). Benchmark FP class B1, found 2026-06-07.\n   */\n  /(--|\\/\\*|\\*\\/)/g,\n  /** SQL statement separators */\n  /(;|\\|\\||&&)/g,\n  /** Boolean injection: OR 1=1 */\n  /\\bOR\\s+\\d+\\s*=\\s*\\d+/gi,\n  /** Boolean injection: OR 'a'='a' or OR \"a\"=\"a\" (including mixed quotes) */\n  /\\bOR\\s+(['\"])[^'\"]*\\1\\s*=\\s*(['\"])[^'\"]*\\2/gi,\n  /\\bOR\\s+('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")\\s*=\\s*('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")/gi,\n  /** Boolean injection: AND 1=1 */\n  /\\bAND\\s+\\d+\\s*=\\s*\\d+/gi,\n  /** Boolean injection: AND 'a'='a' or AND \"a\"=\"a\" (including mixed quotes) */\n  /\\bAND\\s+(['\"])[^'\"]*\\1\\s*=\\s*(['\"])[^'\"]*\\2/gi,\n  /\\bAND\\s+('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")\\s*=\\s*('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: SLEEP() */\n  /\\bSLEEP\\s*\\(\\s*\\d+\\s*\\)/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: BENCHMARK() */\n  /\\bBENCHMARK\\s*\\(/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: PostgreSQL pg_sleep() */\n  /\\bpg_sleep\\s*\\(/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: MSSQL WAITFOR DELAY */\n  /\\bWAITFOR\\s+DELAY\\b/gi,\n  /**\n   * Oracle DBMS_* stdlib packages used for time-based blind SQLi\n   * (DBMS_LOCK.SLEEP, DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE) and other Oracle\n   * abuse paths. No legitimate user input contains these. Mirrors\n   * `sqli-oracle-dbms-packages` in packages/core/patterns.json —\n   * improvements.md §1.1.e Q3. Must stay in sync until Node\n   * migrates to patterns.json-at-runtime (planned v1.7).\n   */\n  /\\bDBMS_(?:LOCK|PIPE|UTILITY|XSLPROCESSOR|JAVA|OUTPUT|SCHEDULER)\\b/gi,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// PATH TRAVERSAL PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const PATH_PATTERNS = [\n  /** Unix path traversal */\n  /\\.\\.\\//g,\n  /** Windows path traversal */\n  /\\.\\.\\\\/g,\n  /** URL-encoded traversal (%2e%2e) */\n  /%2e%2e/gi,\n  /** Double URL-encoded traversal (%252e) */\n  /%252e/gi,\n  /** Mixed encoding: ..%2F */\n  /\\.\\.%2F/gi,\n  /** Mixed encoding: %2e./ and .%2e/ */\n  /%2e\\.[\\\\/]/gi,\n  /\\.%2e[\\\\/]/gi,\n  /** Fully URL-encoded: %2e%2e%2f */\n  /%2e%2e%2f/gi,\n  /** Double URL-encoded forward slash: %252f */\n  /%252f/gi,\n  /** Dotdotslash bypass: ....// or ....\\\\ */\n  /\\.{2,}[/\\\\]{2,}/g,\n  /** Null byte injection in paths */\n  /\\0/g,\n  /**\n   * Mixed encoding: literal `..` + URL-encoded slash (`..%2F`).\n   * Existed in old Node SQL_PATTERNS history; restated explicitly here\n   * for parity with patterns.json `path-mixed-encoded`. Benchmark B6.\n   */\n  /\\.\\.%2[fF]/g,\n  /**\n   * Overlong UTF-8 encoding of `.` (`%C0%AE`). Historic IIS/Apache\n   * decoder bypass — legitimate `.` is always `%2E`; overlong-form\n   * encoding only appears in evasion attempts. Benchmark B6 gap that\n   * neither SDK caught before 2026-06-07.\n   */\n  /%[Cc]0%[Aa][Ee]/g,\n  /**\n   * Windows UNC paths (`\\\\server\\share`) in user input. Legitimate\n   * web-app inputs never contain UNC references; attacker UNC\n   * payloads leak SMB auth or pull remote payloads. Benchmark B6.\n   */\n  /\\\\\\\\[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+\\\\/g,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// COMMAND INJECTION PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const COMMAND_PATTERNS = [\n  /**\n   * Shell metacharacters that enable command chaining/substitution.\n   * Bare ( and ) are excluded — they appear in common legitimate values\n   * (function calls in code fields, math expressions, etc.).\n   * Command substitution is caught by the $( combined pattern below.\n   * NOTE: ';', '&', '|' may appear in legitimate URL query strings\n   * and Markdown; consider disabling command checking (command: false)\n   * for fields that intentionally allow those characters.\n   */\n  /[;&|`]/g,\n  /** Command substitution: $( ... ) — matched as a pair to reduce false positives */\n  /\\$\\(/g,\n  /**\n   * POSIX shell IFS-substitution: ${IFS} or ${IFS%??}.\n   * Attackers use this to inject spaces past metacharacter filters\n   * in payloads like `;cat${IFS}/etc/passwd`. Mirrors\n   * `cmdi-ifs-bypass` in packages/core/patterns.json — improvements.md\n   * §1.1.e Q5. Must stay in sync until Node migrates to\n   * patterns.json-at-runtime (planned v1.7).\n   */\n  /\\$\\{IFS(?:%[^}]*)?\\}/g,\n  /** URL-encoded control characters (%00-%0F): null, tab, vtab, formfeed, LF, CR */\n  /%0[0-9a-f]/gi,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// DANGEROUS KEYS\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Prototype pollution keys to block.\n * Stored lowercase — always compare with key.toLowerCase().\n *\n * Includes:\n * - __proto__: direct prototype assignment\n * - constructor: access to constructor.prototype chain\n * - prototype: direct prototype property\n * - __defineGetter__/__defineSetter__: legacy property definition (can override getters/setters)\n * - __lookupGetter__/__lookupSetter__: legacy property introspection\n */\nexport const DANGEROUS_PROTO_KEYS = new Set([\n  '__proto__',\n  'constructor',\n  'prototype',\n  '__definegetter__',\n  '__definesetter__',\n  '__lookupgetter__',\n  '__lookupsetter__',\n]);\n\n/** MongoDB operators to block */\nexport const NOSQL_DANGEROUS_KEYS = new Set([\n  // Comparison\n  '$gt', '$gte', '$lt', '$lte', '$ne', '$eq', '$in', '$nin',\n  // Logical\n  '$and', '$or', '$not', '$nor',\n  // Element / evaluation\n  '$exists', '$type', '$regex', '$where', '$expr', '$mod', '$text', '$jsonSchema',\n  // Array\n  '$elemMatch', '$all', '$size',\n  // JavaScript execution (critical)\n  '$function', '$accumulator',\n  // Aggregation pipeline operators (injectable via $lookup etc.)\n  '$lookup', '$match', '$project', '$group', '$sort', '$limit', '$skip',\n  '$unwind', '$addFields', '$replaceRoot',\n]);\n\n// =============================================================================\n// REDACTION\n// =============================================================================\nexport const REDACTION = {\n  /** Replacement text for redacted values */\n  REPLACEMENT: '[REDACTED]',\n  /** Truncation indicator */\n  TRUNCATED: '[TRUNCATED]',\n  /** Max depth indicator */\n  MAX_DEPTH: '[MAX_DEPTH]',\n  /** Default max message length */\n  DEFAULT_MAX_LENGTH: 10_000,\n  /** Default sensitive keys to redact */\n  SENSITIVE_KEYS: new Set([\n    'password', 'passwd', 'pwd', 'secret', 'token', 'apikey',\n    'api_key', 'apiKey', 'auth', 'authorization', 'credit_card',\n    'creditcard', 'cc', 'ssn', 'social_security', 'private_key',\n    'privateKey', 'access_token', 'accessToken', 'refresh_token',\n    'refreshToken', 'bearer', 'jwt', 'session', 'cookie',\n    'credentials', 'x-api-key', 'x-auth-token',\n  ]),\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// VALIDATION PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const VALIDATION = {\n  /**\n   * Email regex pattern.\n   * Rejects consecutive dots in local part (e.g. test..foo@example.com),\n   * leading/trailing dots, and other common invalid forms.\n   */\n  EMAIL: /^[^\\s@.][^\\s@]*(?:\\.[^\\s@.][^\\s@]*)*@[^\\s@]+\\.[^\\s@]+$/,\n  /**\n   * URL regex pattern.\n   * Only allows http:// and https:// (case-insensitive scheme per\n   * RFC 3986); explicitly rejects javascript:, data:, vbscript:, and\n   * other dangerous URI schemes.\n   */\n  URL: /^https?:\\/\\/[^\\s/$.?#][^\\s]*$/i,\n  /** UUID regex pattern (v4) */\n  UUID: /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i,\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ERROR MESSAGES\n// =============================================================================\nexport const ERRORS = {\n  /** Generic error message (production) */\n  INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR: 'Internal Server Error',\n  /** Input too large error */\n  INPUT_TOO_LARGE: (maxSize: number) => `Input exceeds maximum size of ${maxSize} bytes`,\n  /** Validation error messages */\n  VALIDATION: {\n    REQUIRED: (field: string) => `${field} is required`,\n    INVALID_TYPE: (field: string, type: string) => `${field} must be a ${type}`,\n    MIN_LENGTH: (field: string, min: number) => `${field} must be at least ${min} characters`,\n    MAX_LENGTH: (field: string, max: number) => `${field} must be at most ${max} characters`,\n    MIN_VALUE: (field: string, min: number) => `${field} must be at least ${min}`,\n    MAX_VALUE: (field: string, max: number) => `${field} must be at most ${max}`,\n    INVALID_FORMAT: (field: string) => `${field} format is invalid`,\n    INVALID_EMAIL: (field: string) => `${field} must be a valid email`,\n    INVALID_URL: (field: string) => `${field} must be a valid URL`,\n    INVALID_UUID: (field: string) => `${field} must be a valid UUID`,\n    INVALID_ENUM: (field: string, values: unknown[]) => `${field} must be one of: ${values.join(', ')}`,\n    MIN_ITEMS: (field: string, min: number) => `${field} must have at least ${min} items`,\n    MAX_ITEMS: (field: string, max: number) => `${field} must have at most ${max} items`,\n  },\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// BLOCKED TEXT (for sanitizer replacements)\n// =============================================================================\nexport const BLOCKED = '[BLOCKED]' as const;\n","/**\n * @module @arcis/node/logging/redactor\n * Safe logging with PII/secret redaction\n */\n\nimport { REDACTION, INPUT } from '../core/constants';\nimport type { LogOptions, SafeLogger } from '../core/types';\n\nconst LOG_LEVELS: Record<string, number> = {\n  debug: 0,\n  info: 1,\n  warn: 2,\n  error: 3,\n  silent: 4,\n};\n\n/**\n * Create a safe logger that redacts sensitive data and prevents log injection.\n * \n * @param options - Logger configuration\n * @returns SafeLogger instance\n * \n * @example\n * const logger = createSafeLogger();\n * logger.info('User login', { email: 'user@test.com', password: 'secret' });\n * // Logs: { \"email\": \"user@test.com\", \"password\": \"[REDACTED]\" }\n * \n * @example\n * // With custom redact keys\n * const logger = createSafeLogger({ redactKeys: ['customToken', 'internalId'] });\n */\nexport function createSafeLogger(options: LogOptions = {}): SafeLogger {\n  const {\n    redactKeys = [],\n    maxLength = REDACTION.DEFAULT_MAX_LENGTH,\n    redactPatterns = [],\n    level: minLevel = 'debug',\n  } = options;\n\n  const minLevelNum = LOG_LEVELS[minLevel] ?? 0;\n\n  // Combine default and custom keys (lowercase for case-insensitive matching)\n  const allRedactKeys = new Set([\n    ...Array.from(REDACTION.SENSITIVE_KEYS),\n    ...redactKeys.map(k => k.toLowerCase()),\n  ]);\n\n  /**\n   * Redact sensitive data from an object recursively.\n   */\n  function redact(obj: unknown, depth = 0): unknown {\n    if (depth > INPUT.MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH) return REDACTION.MAX_DEPTH;\n    if (obj === null || obj === undefined) return obj;\n\n    if (typeof obj === 'string') {\n      return redactString(obj, maxLength, redactPatterns);\n    }\n\n    if (typeof obj !== 'object') return obj;\n\n    if (Array.isArray(obj)) {\n      return obj.map(item => redact(item, depth + 1));\n    }\n\n    const result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(obj as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      if (allRedactKeys.has(key.toLowerCase())) {\n        result[key] = REDACTION.REPLACEMENT;\n      } else {\n        result[key] = redact(value, depth + 1);\n      }\n    }\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Log a message at the specified level.\n   */\n  function log(level: string, message: string, data?: unknown): void {\n    // Early exit: skip all work if message level is below minimum\n    const levelNum = LOG_LEVELS[level] ?? 0;\n    if (levelNum < minLevelNum) return;\n\n    const entry: Record<string, unknown> = {\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      level,\n      message: redactString(message, maxLength, redactPatterns),\n    };\n\n    if (data !== undefined) {\n      entry.data = redact(data);\n    }\n\n    // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n    console.log(JSON.stringify(entry));\n  }\n\n  return {\n    log,\n    info: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('info', msg, data),\n    warn: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('warn', msg, data),\n    error: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('error', msg, data),\n    debug: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('debug', msg, data),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact a string value.\n * Removes newlines (log injection prevention), applies patterns, and truncates.\n */\nfunction redactString(str: string, maxLength: number, patterns: RegExp[]): string {\n  // Remove newlines/tabs (log injection prevention) and genuine control characters.\n  // Only strip C0/C1 control chars and null bytes — preserve all printable Unicode\n  // (CJK, Cyrillic, Arabic, etc.) so multilingual content isn't silently lost.\n  let safe = str\n    .replace(/[\\r\\n\\t]/g, ' ')\n    .replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0B\\x0C\\x0E-\\x1F\\x7F\\x80-\\x9F]/g, '');\n\n  // Apply custom redaction patterns\n  for (const pattern of patterns) {\n    safe = safe.replace(pattern, REDACTION.REPLACEMENT);\n  }\n\n  // Truncate if too long\n  if (safe.length > maxLength) {\n    safe = safe.substring(0, maxLength) + `...${REDACTION.TRUNCATED}`;\n  }\n\n  return safe;\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a redactor function for custom use.\n * \n * @param sensitiveKeys - Keys to redact\n * @returns Redactor function\n */\nexport function createRedactor(sensitiveKeys: string[] = []): (obj: unknown) => unknown {\n  const allKeys = new Set([\n    ...Array.from(REDACTION.SENSITIVE_KEYS),\n    ...sensitiveKeys.map(k => k.toLowerCase()),\n  ]);\n\n  function redact(obj: unknown, depth = 0): unknown {\n    if (depth > INPUT.MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH) return REDACTION.MAX_DEPTH;\n    if (obj === null || obj === undefined) return obj;\n    if (typeof obj !== 'object') return obj;\n\n    if (Array.isArray(obj)) {\n      return obj.map(item => redact(item, depth + 1));\n    }\n\n    const result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(obj as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      if (allKeys.has(key.toLowerCase())) {\n        result[key] = REDACTION.REPLACEMENT;\n      } else {\n        result[key] = redact(value, depth + 1);\n      }\n    }\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  return redact;\n}\n\n/**\n * Alias for createSafeLogger\n * @see createSafeLogger\n */\nexport const safeLog = createSafeLogger;\n"]}

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no magic numbers\n */\n\n// =============================================================================\n// INPUT LIMITS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const INPUT = {\n  /** Default maximum input size (1MB) */\n  DEFAULT_MAX_SIZE: 1_000_000,\n  /** Maximum recursion depth for nested objects */\n  MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH: 10,\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// RATE LIMITING\n// =============================================================================\nexport const RATE_LIMIT = {\n  /** Default window size (1 minute) */\n  DEFAULT_WINDOW_MS: 60_000,\n  /** Default max requests per window */\n  DEFAULT_MAX_REQUESTS: 100,\n  /** Default HTTP status code for rate limited responses */\n  DEFAULT_STATUS_CODE: 429,\n  /** Default error message */\n  DEFAULT_MESSAGE: 'Too many requests, please try again later.',\n  /** Minimum window size (1 second) */\n  MIN_WINDOW_MS: 1_000,\n  /** Maximum window size (24 hours) */\n  MAX_WINDOW_MS: 86_400_000,\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// SECURITY HEADERS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const HEADERS = {\n  /** Default Content Security Policy */\n  DEFAULT_CSP: [\n    \"default-src 'self'\",\n    \"script-src 'self'\",\n    \"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'\",\n    \"img-src 'self' data: https:\",\n    \"font-src 'self'\",\n    \"object-src 'none'\",\n    \"frame-ancestors 'none'\",\n  ].join('; '),\n  /** Default HSTS max age (1 year in seconds) */\n  HSTS_MAX_AGE: 31_536_000,\n  /** Default X-Frame-Options value */\n  FRAME_OPTIONS: 'DENY' as const,\n  /** Default X-Content-Type-Options value */\n  CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS: 'nosniff',\n  /** Default Referrer-Policy value */\n  REFERRER_POLICY: 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin',\n  /** Default Permissions-Policy value */\n  PERMISSIONS_POLICY: 'geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()',\n  /** Default Cache-Control value for security */\n  CACHE_CONTROL: 'no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate',\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// XSS PATTERNS (ReDoS-safe)\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Detection patterns — used to flag whether a string contains XSS payloads.\n * Must stay in sync with XSS_REMOVE_PATTERNS below.\n */\nexport const XSS_PATTERNS = [\n  /** Script tags (ReDoS-safe version) */\n  /<script[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/script>/gi,\n  /** javascript: protocol (allow optional spaces before colon) */\n  /javascript\\s*:/gi,\n  /** vbscript: protocol */\n  /vbscript\\s*:/gi,\n  /** Event handlers (onclick, onerror, etc.) — any separator before attribute */\n  /(?:[\\s/])on\\w+\\s*=/gi,\n  /** iframe tags */\n  /<iframe/gi,\n  /** object tags */\n  /<object/gi,\n  /** embed tags */\n  /<embed/gi,\n  /** data: URIs (only dangerous ones, avoid false positives) */\n  /(?:^|[\\s\"'=])data:/gi,\n  /** URL-encoded script tags */\n  /%3Cscript/gi,\n  /** SVG with onload */\n  /<svg[^>]*onload/gi,\n  /** form tags — phishing/credential harvesting via action= redirection */\n  /<form[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** meta tags — http-equiv refresh redirects or CSP bypass */\n  /<meta[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** base href hijacking — redirects all relative URLs to attacker domain */\n  /<base[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** link tag injection — stylesheet or preload CSRF attacks */\n  /<link[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** style tag — CSS expression() / behavior: / IE-era attacks. Mirrors\n   *  Python's xss-style-tag from packages/core/patterns.json. */\n  /<style[\\s>]/gi,\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * Removal patterns — used by sanitizeXss() to strip dangerous content.\n * More targeted than XSS_PATTERNS: each pattern captures the full dangerous\n * substring (tag, attribute + value, protocol) so it can be replaced safely.\n * Must stay in sync with XSS_PATTERNS above.\n */\nexport const XSS_REMOVE_PATTERNS = [\n  /** Full script blocks (content + tags) */\n  /<script[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/script>/gi,\n  /** Standalone/unclosed script tags */\n  /<script[^>]*>/gi,\n  /** style — CSS expression() and behavior: attacks (IE-era but still relevant) */\n  /<style[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/style>/gi,\n  /<style[^>]*/gi,\n  /** iframe — full block and partial/unclosed */\n  /<iframe[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/iframe>/gi,\n  /<iframe[^>]*/gi,\n  /** object — full block and partial/unclosed */\n  /<object[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/object>/gi,\n  /<object[^>]*/gi,\n  /** embed tags */\n  /<embed[^>]*/gi,\n  /** SVG with inline event handlers */\n  /<svg[^>]*onload[^>]*>/gi,\n  /** URL-encoded script tags */\n  /%3Cscript/gi,\n  /** Event handlers with quoted values: onclick=\"...\", onerror='...' */\n  /(?:[\\s/])on\\w+\\s*=\\s*[\"'][^\"']*[\"']/gi,\n  /** Event handlers with unquoted values: onload=value */\n  /(?:[\\s/])on\\w+\\s*=\\s*[^\\s>]*/gi,\n  /** javascript: and vbscript: protocols (allow optional spaces before colon) */\n  /javascript\\s*:/gi,\n  /vbscript\\s*:/gi,\n  /** data: URIs with HTML or SVG content (SVG can run JS via inline event handlers) */\n  /data\\s*:\\s*(?:text\\/html|image\\/svg)[^>\\s]*/gi,\n  /** form tag injection — phishing via action= redirection */\n  /<form[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n  /** meta tag injection — http-equiv refresh or CSP bypass */\n  /<meta[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n  /** base href hijacking */\n  /<base[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n  /** link tag injection — stylesheet or preload attacks */\n  /<link[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// SQL INJECTION PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const SQL_PATTERNS = [\n  /** SQL keywords */\n  /(\\b(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|UNION|ALTER|CREATE|TRUNCATE|EXEC|EXECUTE)\\b)/gi,\n  /** SQL comments: ANSI (--), C-style (slash-star ... star-slash), MySQL (#) */\n  /(--|\\/\\*|\\*\\/|#)/g,\n  /** SQL statement separators */\n  /(;|\\|\\||&&)/g,\n  /** Boolean injection: OR 1=1 */\n  /\\bOR\\s+\\d+\\s*=\\s*\\d+/gi,\n  /** Boolean injection: OR 'a'='a' or OR \"a\"=\"a\" (including mixed quotes) */\n  /\\bOR\\s+(['\"])[^'\"]*\\1\\s*=\\s*(['\"])[^'\"]*\\2/gi,\n  /\\bOR\\s+('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")\\s*=\\s*('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")/gi,\n  /** Boolean injection: AND 1=1 */\n  /\\bAND\\s+\\d+\\s*=\\s*\\d+/gi,\n  /** Boolean injection: AND 'a'='a' or AND \"a\"=\"a\" (including mixed quotes) */\n  /\\bAND\\s+(['\"])[^'\"]*\\1\\s*=\\s*(['\"])[^'\"]*\\2/gi,\n  /\\bAND\\s+('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")\\s*=\\s*('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: SLEEP() */\n  /\\bSLEEP\\s*\\(\\s*\\d+\\s*\\)/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: BENCHMARK() */\n  /\\bBENCHMARK\\s*\\(/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: PostgreSQL pg_sleep() */\n  /\\bpg_sleep\\s*\\(/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: MSSQL WAITFOR DELAY */\n  /\\bWAITFOR\\s+DELAY\\b/gi,\n  /**\n   * Oracle DBMS_* stdlib packages used for time-based blind SQLi\n   * (DBMS_LOCK.SLEEP, DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE) and other Oracle\n   * abuse paths. No legitimate user input contains these. Mirrors\n   * `sqli-oracle-dbms-packages` in packages/core/patterns.json —\n   * improvements.md §1.1.e Q3. Must stay in sync until Node\n   * migrates to patterns.json-at-runtime (planned v1.7).\n   */\n  /\\bDBMS_(?:LOCK|PIPE|UTILITY|XSLPROCESSOR|JAVA|OUTPUT|SCHEDULER)\\b/gi,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// PATH TRAVERSAL PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const PATH_PATTERNS = [\n  /** Unix path traversal */\n  /\\.\\.\\//g,\n  /** Windows path traversal */\n  /\\.\\.\\\\/g,\n  /** URL-encoded traversal (%2e%2e) */\n  /%2e%2e/gi,\n  /** Double URL-encoded traversal (%252e) */\n  /%252e/gi,\n  /** Mixed encoding: ..%2F */\n  /\\.\\.%2F/gi,\n  /** Mixed encoding: %2e./ and .%2e/ */\n  /%2e\\.[\\\\/]/gi,\n  /\\.%2e[\\\\/]/gi,\n  /** Fully URL-encoded: %2e%2e%2f */\n  /%2e%2e%2f/gi,\n  /** Double URL-encoded forward slash: %252f */\n  /%252f/gi,\n  /** Dotdotslash bypass: ....// or ....\\\\ */\n  /\\.{2,}[/\\\\]{2,}/g,\n  /** Null byte injection in paths */\n  /\\0/g,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// COMMAND INJECTION PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const COMMAND_PATTERNS = [\n  /**\n   * Shell metacharacters that enable command chaining/substitution.\n   * Bare ( and ) are excluded — they appear in common legitimate values\n   * (function calls in code fields, math expressions, etc.).\n   * Command substitution is caught by the $( combined pattern below.\n   * NOTE: ';', '&', '|' may appear in legitimate URL query strings\n   * and Markdown; consider disabling command checking (command: false)\n   * for fields that intentionally allow those characters.\n   */\n  /[;&|`]/g,\n  /** Command substitution: $( ... ) — matched as a pair to reduce false positives */\n  /\\$\\(/g,\n  /**\n   * POSIX shell IFS-substitution: ${IFS} or ${IFS%??}.\n   * Attackers use this to inject spaces past metacharacter filters\n   * in payloads like `;cat${IFS}/etc/passwd`. Mirrors\n   * `cmdi-ifs-bypass` in packages/core/patterns.json — improvements.md\n   * §1.1.e Q5. Must stay in sync until Node migrates to\n   * patterns.json-at-runtime (planned v1.7).\n   */\n  /\\$\\{IFS(?:%[^}]*)?\\}/g,\n  /** URL-encoded control characters (%00-%0F): null, tab, vtab, formfeed, LF, CR */\n  /%0[0-9a-f]/gi,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// DANGEROUS KEYS\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Prototype pollution keys to block.\n * Stored lowercase — always compare with key.toLowerCase().\n *\n * Includes:\n * - __proto__: direct prototype assignment\n * - constructor: access to constructor.prototype chain\n * - prototype: direct prototype property\n * - __defineGetter__/__defineSetter__: legacy property definition (can override getters/setters)\n * - __lookupGetter__/__lookupSetter__: legacy property introspection\n */\nexport const DANGEROUS_PROTO_KEYS = new Set([\n  '__proto__',\n  'constructor',\n  'prototype',\n  '__definegetter__',\n  '__definesetter__',\n  '__lookupgetter__',\n  '__lookupsetter__',\n]);\n\n/** MongoDB operators to block */\nexport const NOSQL_DANGEROUS_KEYS = new Set([\n  // Comparison\n  '$gt', '$gte', '$lt', '$lte', '$ne', '$eq', '$in', '$nin',\n  // Logical\n  '$and', '$or', '$not', '$nor',\n  // Element / evaluation\n  '$exists', '$type', '$regex', '$where', '$expr', '$mod', '$text', '$jsonSchema',\n  // Array\n  '$elemMatch', '$all', '$size',\n  // JavaScript execution (critical)\n  '$function', '$accumulator',\n  // Aggregation pipeline operators (injectable via $lookup etc.)\n  '$lookup', '$match', '$project', '$group', '$sort', '$limit', '$skip',\n  '$unwind', '$addFields', '$replaceRoot',\n]);\n\n// =============================================================================\n// REDACTION\n// =============================================================================\nexport const REDACTION = {\n  /** Replacement text for redacted values */\n  REPLACEMENT: '[REDACTED]',\n  /** Truncation indicator */\n  TRUNCATED: '[TRUNCATED]',\n  /** Max depth indicator */\n  MAX_DEPTH: '[MAX_DEPTH]',\n  /** Default max message length */\n  DEFAULT_MAX_LENGTH: 10_000,\n  /** Default sensitive keys to redact */\n  SENSITIVE_KEYS: new Set([\n    'password', 'passwd', 'pwd', 'secret', 'token', 'apikey',\n    'api_key', 'apiKey', 'auth', 'authorization', 'credit_card',\n    'creditcard', 'cc', 'ssn', 'social_security', 'private_key',\n    'privateKey', 'access_token', 'accessToken', 'refresh_token',\n    'refreshToken', 'bearer', 'jwt', 'session', 'cookie',\n    'credentials', 'x-api-key', 'x-auth-token',\n  ]),\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// VALIDATION PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const VALIDATION = {\n  /**\n   * Email regex pattern.\n   * Rejects consecutive dots in local part (e.g. test..foo@example.com),\n   * leading/trailing dots, and other common invalid forms.\n   */\n  EMAIL: /^[^\\s@.][^\\s@]*(?:\\.[^\\s@.][^\\s@]*)*@[^\\s@]+\\.[^\\s@]+$/,\n  /**\n   * URL regex pattern.\n   * Only allows http:// and https:// (case-insensitive scheme per\n   * RFC 3986); explicitly rejects javascript:, data:, vbscript:, and\n   * other dangerous URI schemes.\n   */\n  URL: /^https?:\\/\\/[^\\s/$.?#][^\\s]*$/i,\n  /** UUID regex pattern (v4) */\n  UUID: /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i,\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ERROR MESSAGES\n// =============================================================================\nexport const ERRORS = {\n  /** Generic error message (production) */\n  INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR: 'Internal Server Error',\n  /** Input too large error */\n  INPUT_TOO_LARGE: (maxSize: number) => `Input exceeds maximum size of ${maxSize} bytes`,\n  /** Validation error messages */\n  VALIDATION: {\n    REQUIRED: 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number) => `${field} must have at most ${max} items`,\n  },\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// BLOCKED TEXT (for sanitizer replacements)\n// =============================================================================\nexport const BLOCKED = '[BLOCKED]' as const;\n","/**\n * @module @arcis/node/logging/redactor\n * Safe logging with PII/secret redaction\n */\n\nimport { REDACTION, INPUT } from '../core/constants';\nimport type { LogOptions, SafeLogger } from '../core/types';\n\nconst LOG_LEVELS: Record<string, number> = {\n  debug: 0,\n  info: 1,\n  warn: 2,\n  error: 3,\n  silent: 4,\n};\n\n/**\n * Create a safe logger that redacts sensitive data and prevents log injection.\n * \n * @param options - Logger configuration\n * @returns SafeLogger instance\n * \n * @example\n * const logger = createSafeLogger();\n * logger.info('User login', { email: 'user@test.com', password: 'secret' });\n * // Logs: { \"email\": 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redactString(obj, maxLength, redactPatterns);\n    }\n\n    if (typeof obj !== 'object') return obj;\n\n    if (Array.isArray(obj)) {\n      return obj.map(item => redact(item, depth + 1));\n    }\n\n    const result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(obj as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      if (allRedactKeys.has(key.toLowerCase())) {\n        result[key] = REDACTION.REPLACEMENT;\n      } else {\n        result[key] = redact(value, depth + 1);\n      }\n    }\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Log a message at the specified level.\n   */\n  function log(level: string, message: string, data?: unknown): void {\n    // Early exit: skip all work if message level is below minimum\n    const levelNum = LOG_LEVELS[level] ?? 0;\n    if (levelNum < minLevelNum) return;\n\n    const entry: Record<string, unknown> = {\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      level,\n      message: redactString(message, maxLength, redactPatterns),\n    };\n\n    if (data !== undefined) {\n      entry.data = redact(data);\n    }\n\n    // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n    console.log(JSON.stringify(entry));\n  }\n\n  return {\n    log,\n    info: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('info', msg, data),\n    warn: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('warn', msg, data),\n    error: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('error', msg, data),\n    debug: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('debug', msg, data),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact a string value.\n * Removes newlines (log injection prevention), applies patterns, and truncates.\n */\nfunction redactString(str: string, maxLength: number, patterns: RegExp[]): string {\n  // Remove newlines/tabs (log injection prevention) and genuine control characters.\n  // Only strip C0/C1 control chars and null bytes — preserve all printable Unicode\n  // (CJK, Cyrillic, Arabic, etc.) so multilingual content isn't silently lost.\n  let safe = str\n    .replace(/[\\r\\n\\t]/g, ' ')\n    .replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0B\\x0C\\x0E-\\x1F\\x7F\\x80-\\x9F]/g, '');\n\n  // Apply custom redaction patterns\n  for (const pattern of patterns) {\n    safe = safe.replace(pattern, REDACTION.REPLACEMENT);\n  }\n\n  // Truncate if too long\n  if (safe.length > maxLength) {\n    safe = safe.substring(0, maxLength) + `...${REDACTION.TRUNCATED}`;\n  }\n\n  return safe;\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a redactor function for custom use.\n * \n * @param sensitiveKeys - Keys to redact\n * @returns Redactor function\n */\nexport function createRedactor(sensitiveKeys: string[] = []): (obj: unknown) => unknown {\n  const allKeys = new Set([\n    ...Array.from(REDACTION.SENSITIVE_KEYS),\n    ...sensitiveKeys.map(k => k.toLowerCase()),\n  ]);\n\n  function redact(obj: unknown, depth = 0): unknown {\n    if (depth > INPUT.MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH) return REDACTION.MAX_DEPTH;\n    if (obj === null || obj === undefined) return obj;\n    if (typeof obj !== 'object') return obj;\n\n    if (Array.isArray(obj)) {\n      return obj.map(item => redact(item, depth + 1));\n    }\n\n    const result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(obj as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      if (allKeys.has(key.toLowerCase())) {\n        result[key] = REDACTION.REPLACEMENT;\n      } else {\n        result[key] = redact(value, depth + 1);\n      }\n    }\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  return redact;\n}\n\n/**\n * Alias for createSafeLogger\n * @see createSafeLogger\n */\nexport const safeLog = createSafeLogger;\n"]}
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no magic numbers\n */\n\n// =============================================================================\n// INPUT LIMITS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const INPUT = {\n  /** Default maximum input size (1MB) */\n  DEFAULT_MAX_SIZE: 1_000_000,\n  /** Maximum recursion depth for nested objects */\n  MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH: 10,\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// RATE LIMITING\n// =============================================================================\nexport const RATE_LIMIT = {\n  /** Default window size (1 minute) */\n  DEFAULT_WINDOW_MS: 60_000,\n  /** Default max requests per window */\n  DEFAULT_MAX_REQUESTS: 100,\n  /** Default HTTP status code for rate limited responses */\n  DEFAULT_STATUS_CODE: 429,\n  /** Default error message */\n  DEFAULT_MESSAGE: 'Too many requests, please try again later.',\n  /** Minimum window size (1 second) */\n  MIN_WINDOW_MS: 1_000,\n  /** Maximum window size (24 hours) */\n  MAX_WINDOW_MS: 86_400_000,\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// SECURITY HEADERS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const HEADERS = {\n  /** Default Content Security Policy */\n  DEFAULT_CSP: [\n    \"default-src 'self'\",\n    \"script-src 'self'\",\n    \"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'\",\n    \"img-src 'self' data: https:\",\n    \"font-src 'self'\",\n    \"object-src 'none'\",\n    \"frame-ancestors 'none'\",\n  ].join('; '),\n  /** Default HSTS max age (1 year in seconds) */\n  HSTS_MAX_AGE: 31_536_000,\n  /** Default X-Frame-Options value */\n  FRAME_OPTIONS: 'DENY' as const,\n  /** Default X-Content-Type-Options value */\n  CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS: 'nosniff',\n  /** Default Referrer-Policy value */\n  REFERRER_POLICY: 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin',\n  /** Default Permissions-Policy value */\n  PERMISSIONS_POLICY: 'geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()',\n  /** Default Cache-Control value for security */\n  CACHE_CONTROL: 'no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate',\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// XSS PATTERNS (ReDoS-safe)\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Detection patterns — used to flag whether a string contains XSS payloads.\n * Must stay in sync with XSS_REMOVE_PATTERNS below.\n */\nexport const XSS_PATTERNS = [\n  /** Script tags (ReDoS-safe version) */\n  /<script[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/script>/gi,\n  /** javascript: protocol (allow optional spaces before colon) */\n  /javascript\\s*:/gi,\n  /** vbscript: protocol */\n  /vbscript\\s*:/gi,\n  /** Event handlers (onclick, onerror, etc.) — any separator before attribute */\n  /(?:[\\s/])on\\w+\\s*=/gi,\n  /** iframe tags */\n  /<iframe/gi,\n  /** object tags */\n  /<object/gi,\n  /** embed tags */\n  /<embed/gi,\n  /** data: URIs (only dangerous ones, avoid false positives) */\n  /(?:^|[\\s\"'=])data:/gi,\n  /** URL-encoded script tags */\n  /%3Cscript/gi,\n  /** SVG with onload */\n  /<svg[^>]*onload/gi,\n  /** form tags — phishing/credential harvesting via action= redirection */\n  /<form[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** meta tags — http-equiv refresh redirects or CSP bypass */\n  /<meta[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** base href hijacking — redirects all relative URLs to attacker domain */\n  /<base[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** link tag injection — stylesheet or preload CSRF attacks */\n  /<link[\\s>]/gi,\n  /** style tag — CSS expression() / behavior: / IE-era attacks. Mirrors\n   *  Python's xss-style-tag from packages/core/patterns.json. */\n  /<style[\\s>]/gi,\n] as const;\n\n/**\n * Removal patterns — used by sanitizeXss() to strip dangerous content.\n * More targeted than XSS_PATTERNS: each pattern captures the full dangerous\n * substring (tag, attribute + value, protocol) so it can be replaced safely.\n * Must stay in sync with XSS_PATTERNS above.\n */\nexport const XSS_REMOVE_PATTERNS = [\n  /** Full script blocks (content + tags) */\n  /<script[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/script>/gi,\n  /** Standalone/unclosed script tags */\n  /<script[^>]*>/gi,\n  /** style — CSS expression() and behavior: attacks (IE-era but still relevant) */\n  /<style[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/style>/gi,\n  /<style[^>]*/gi,\n  /** iframe — full block and partial/unclosed */\n  /<iframe[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/iframe>/gi,\n  /<iframe[^>]*/gi,\n  /** object — full block and partial/unclosed */\n  /<object[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/object>/gi,\n  /<object[^>]*/gi,\n  /** embed tags */\n  /<embed[^>]*/gi,\n  /** SVG with inline event handlers */\n  /<svg[^>]*onload[^>]*>/gi,\n  /** URL-encoded script tags */\n  /%3Cscript/gi,\n  /** Event handlers with quoted values: onclick=\"...\", onerror='...' */\n  /(?:[\\s/])on\\w+\\s*=\\s*[\"'][^\"']*[\"']/gi,\n  /** Event handlers with unquoted values: onload=value */\n  /(?:[\\s/])on\\w+\\s*=\\s*[^\\s>]*/gi,\n  /** javascript: and vbscript: protocols (allow optional spaces before colon) */\n  /javascript\\s*:/gi,\n  /vbscript\\s*:/gi,\n  /** data: URIs with HTML or SVG content (SVG can run JS via inline event handlers) */\n  /data\\s*:\\s*(?:text\\/html|image\\/svg)[^>\\s]*/gi,\n  /** form tag injection — phishing via action= redirection */\n  /<form[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n  /** meta tag injection — http-equiv refresh or CSP bypass */\n  /<meta[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n  /** base href hijacking */\n  /<base[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n  /** link tag injection — stylesheet or preload attacks */\n  /<link[\\s>][^>]*/gi,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// SQL INJECTION PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const SQL_PATTERNS = [\n  /**\n   * Multi-token SQL attack shapes that never appear in normal English.\n   * Replaces the older bare-keyword pattern `\\b(SELECT|INSERT|...)\\b`\n   * which false-positived on natural language (\"please select an option\",\n   * \"I'll update you tomorrow\", \"delete this file\"). Each shape below\n   * is a token combination that real attackers use and benign users\n   * essentially never type. Matches `sqli-keywords` in\n   * packages/core/patterns.json. Benchmark FP class B3, 2026-06-07.\n   *\n   * Catches:\n   *   UNION SELECT / UNION ALL SELECT          (data exfiltration)\n   *   DROP|TRUNCATE TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|...   (DDL destruction)\n   *   INTO OUTFILE / INTO DUMPFILE             (MySQL file write RCE)\n   *   ATTACH DATABASE                          (SQLite hijack)\n   *   CREATE USER|FUNCTION|TRIGGER|PROCEDURE   (privilege escalation)\n   *   GRANT ALL|SELECT|INSERT|...              (privilege grant)\n   *   xp_cmdshell / sp_executesql              (SQL Server RCE)\n   *   SHUTDOWN                                 (DoS)\n   */\n  /(\\bUNION\\s+(?:ALL\\s+)?SELECT\\b)|(\\b(?:DROP|TRUNCATE)\\s+(?:TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|VIEW|SCHEMA)\\b)|(\\bINTO\\s+(?:OUTFILE|DUMPFILE)\\b)|(\\bATTACH\\s+DATABASE\\b)|(\\bCREATE\\s+(?:USER|FUNCTION|TRIGGER|PROCEDURE)\\b)|(\\bGRANT\\s+(?:ALL|SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE)\\b)|(\\bSHUTDOWN\\b)|(\\bxp_cmdshell\\b)|(\\bsp_executesql\\b)/gi,\n  /**\n   * SQL comments: ANSI (--), C-style (slash-star ... star-slash).\n   * MySQL `#` line comment intentionally excluded: a bare `#` matches\n   * every hex color (#FF5300), hashtag (#trending), issue ref (#123),\n   * markdown heading (# Title). Real `admin' #`-style injections are\n   * already caught by the quote/semicolon + keyword/boolean patterns\n   * below — `#` adds nothing as a primary signal and a lot of FP noise.\n   * Matches `sqli-comments` rule in packages/core/patterns.json (which\n   * also excludes `#`). Benchmark FP class B1, found 2026-06-07.\n   */\n  /(--|\\/\\*|\\*\\/)/g,\n  /** SQL statement separators */\n  /(;|\\|\\||&&)/g,\n  /** Boolean injection: OR 1=1 */\n  /\\bOR\\s+\\d+\\s*=\\s*\\d+/gi,\n  /** Boolean injection: OR 'a'='a' or OR \"a\"=\"a\" (including mixed quotes) */\n  /\\bOR\\s+(['\"])[^'\"]*\\1\\s*=\\s*(['\"])[^'\"]*\\2/gi,\n  /\\bOR\\s+('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")\\s*=\\s*('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")/gi,\n  /** Boolean injection: AND 1=1 */\n  /\\bAND\\s+\\d+\\s*=\\s*\\d+/gi,\n  /** Boolean injection: AND 'a'='a' or AND \"a\"=\"a\" (including mixed quotes) */\n  /\\bAND\\s+(['\"])[^'\"]*\\1\\s*=\\s*(['\"])[^'\"]*\\2/gi,\n  /\\bAND\\s+('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")\\s*=\\s*('[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\")/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: SLEEP() */\n  /\\bSLEEP\\s*\\(\\s*\\d+\\s*\\)/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: BENCHMARK() */\n  /\\bBENCHMARK\\s*\\(/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: PostgreSQL pg_sleep() */\n  /\\bpg_sleep\\s*\\(/gi,\n  /** Time-based blind: MSSQL WAITFOR DELAY */\n  /\\bWAITFOR\\s+DELAY\\b/gi,\n  /**\n   * Oracle DBMS_* stdlib packages used for time-based blind SQLi\n   * (DBMS_LOCK.SLEEP, DBMS_PIPE.RECEIVE_MESSAGE) and other Oracle\n   * abuse paths. No legitimate user input contains these. Mirrors\n   * `sqli-oracle-dbms-packages` in packages/core/patterns.json —\n   * improvements.md §1.1.e Q3. Must stay in sync until Node\n   * migrates to patterns.json-at-runtime (planned v1.7).\n   */\n  /\\bDBMS_(?:LOCK|PIPE|UTILITY|XSLPROCESSOR|JAVA|OUTPUT|SCHEDULER)\\b/gi,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// PATH TRAVERSAL PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const PATH_PATTERNS = [\n  /** Unix path traversal */\n  /\\.\\.\\//g,\n  /** Windows path traversal */\n  /\\.\\.\\\\/g,\n  /** URL-encoded traversal (%2e%2e) */\n  /%2e%2e/gi,\n  /** Double URL-encoded traversal (%252e) */\n  /%252e/gi,\n  /** Mixed encoding: ..%2F */\n  /\\.\\.%2F/gi,\n  /** Mixed encoding: %2e./ and .%2e/ */\n  /%2e\\.[\\\\/]/gi,\n  /\\.%2e[\\\\/]/gi,\n  /** Fully URL-encoded: %2e%2e%2f */\n  /%2e%2e%2f/gi,\n  /** Double URL-encoded forward slash: %252f */\n  /%252f/gi,\n  /** Dotdotslash bypass: ....// or ....\\\\ */\n  /\\.{2,}[/\\\\]{2,}/g,\n  /** Null byte injection in paths */\n  /\\0/g,\n  /**\n   * Mixed encoding: literal `..` + URL-encoded slash (`..%2F`).\n   * Existed in old Node SQL_PATTERNS history; restated explicitly here\n   * for parity with patterns.json `path-mixed-encoded`. Benchmark B6.\n   */\n  /\\.\\.%2[fF]/g,\n  /**\n   * Overlong UTF-8 encoding of `.` (`%C0%AE`). Historic IIS/Apache\n   * decoder bypass — legitimate `.` is always `%2E`; overlong-form\n   * encoding only appears in evasion attempts. Benchmark B6 gap that\n   * neither SDK caught before 2026-06-07.\n   */\n  /%[Cc]0%[Aa][Ee]/g,\n  /**\n   * Windows UNC paths (`\\\\server\\share`) in user input. Legitimate\n   * web-app inputs never contain UNC references; attacker UNC\n   * payloads leak SMB auth or pull remote payloads. Benchmark B6.\n   */\n  /\\\\\\\\[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+\\\\/g,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// COMMAND INJECTION PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const COMMAND_PATTERNS = [\n  /**\n   * Shell metacharacters that enable command chaining/substitution.\n   * Bare ( and ) are excluded — they appear in common legitimate values\n   * (function calls in code fields, math expressions, etc.).\n   * Command substitution is caught by the $( combined pattern below.\n   * NOTE: ';', '&', '|' may appear in legitimate URL query strings\n   * and Markdown; consider disabling command checking (command: false)\n   * for fields that intentionally allow those characters.\n   */\n  /[;&|`]/g,\n  /** Command substitution: $( ... ) — matched as a pair to reduce false positives */\n  /\\$\\(/g,\n  /**\n   * POSIX shell IFS-substitution: ${IFS} or ${IFS%??}.\n   * Attackers use this to inject spaces past metacharacter filters\n   * in payloads like `;cat${IFS}/etc/passwd`. Mirrors\n   * `cmdi-ifs-bypass` in packages/core/patterns.json — improvements.md\n   * §1.1.e Q5. Must stay in sync until Node migrates to\n   * patterns.json-at-runtime (planned v1.7).\n   */\n  /\\$\\{IFS(?:%[^}]*)?\\}/g,\n  /** URL-encoded control characters (%00-%0F): null, tab, vtab, formfeed, LF, CR */\n  /%0[0-9a-f]/gi,\n] as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// DANGEROUS KEYS\n// =============================================================================\n\n/**\n * Prototype pollution keys to block.\n * Stored lowercase — always compare with key.toLowerCase().\n *\n * Includes:\n * - __proto__: direct prototype assignment\n * - constructor: access to constructor.prototype chain\n * - prototype: direct prototype property\n * - __defineGetter__/__defineSetter__: legacy property definition (can override getters/setters)\n * - __lookupGetter__/__lookupSetter__: legacy property introspection\n */\nexport const DANGEROUS_PROTO_KEYS = new Set([\n  '__proto__',\n  'constructor',\n  'prototype',\n  '__definegetter__',\n  '__definesetter__',\n  '__lookupgetter__',\n  '__lookupsetter__',\n]);\n\n/** MongoDB operators to block */\nexport const NOSQL_DANGEROUS_KEYS = new Set([\n  // Comparison\n  '$gt', '$gte', '$lt', '$lte', '$ne', '$eq', '$in', '$nin',\n  // Logical\n  '$and', '$or', '$not', '$nor',\n  // Element / evaluation\n  '$exists', '$type', '$regex', '$where', '$expr', '$mod', '$text', '$jsonSchema',\n  // Array\n  '$elemMatch', '$all', '$size',\n  // JavaScript execution (critical)\n  '$function', '$accumulator',\n  // Aggregation pipeline operators (injectable via $lookup etc.)\n  '$lookup', '$match', '$project', '$group', '$sort', '$limit', '$skip',\n  '$unwind', '$addFields', '$replaceRoot',\n]);\n\n// =============================================================================\n// REDACTION\n// =============================================================================\nexport const REDACTION = {\n  /** Replacement text for redacted values */\n  REPLACEMENT: '[REDACTED]',\n  /** Truncation indicator */\n  TRUNCATED: '[TRUNCATED]',\n  /** Max depth indicator */\n  MAX_DEPTH: '[MAX_DEPTH]',\n  /** Default max message length */\n  DEFAULT_MAX_LENGTH: 10_000,\n  /** Default sensitive keys to redact */\n  SENSITIVE_KEYS: new Set([\n    'password', 'passwd', 'pwd', 'secret', 'token', 'apikey',\n    'api_key', 'apiKey', 'auth', 'authorization', 'credit_card',\n    'creditcard', 'cc', 'ssn', 'social_security', 'private_key',\n    'privateKey', 'access_token', 'accessToken', 'refresh_token',\n    'refreshToken', 'bearer', 'jwt', 'session', 'cookie',\n    'credentials', 'x-api-key', 'x-auth-token',\n  ]),\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// VALIDATION PATTERNS\n// =============================================================================\nexport const VALIDATION = {\n  /**\n   * Email regex pattern.\n   * Rejects consecutive dots in local part (e.g. test..foo@example.com),\n   * leading/trailing dots, and other common invalid forms.\n   */\n  EMAIL: /^[^\\s@.][^\\s@]*(?:\\.[^\\s@.][^\\s@]*)*@[^\\s@]+\\.[^\\s@]+$/,\n  /**\n   * URL regex pattern.\n   * Only allows http:// and https:// (case-insensitive scheme per\n   * RFC 3986); explicitly rejects javascript:, data:, vbscript:, and\n   * other dangerous URI schemes.\n   */\n  URL: /^https?:\\/\\/[^\\s/$.?#][^\\s]*$/i,\n  /** UUID regex pattern (v4) */\n  UUID: /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i,\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// ERROR MESSAGES\n// =============================================================================\nexport const ERRORS = {\n  /** Generic error message (production) */\n  INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR: 'Internal Server Error',\n  /** Input too large error */\n  INPUT_TOO_LARGE: (maxSize: number) => `Input exceeds maximum size of ${maxSize} bytes`,\n  /** Validation error messages */\n  VALIDATION: {\n    REQUIRED: (field: string) => `${field} is required`,\n    INVALID_TYPE: (field: string, type: string) => `${field} must be a ${type}`,\n    MIN_LENGTH: (field: string, min: number) => `${field} must be at least ${min} characters`,\n    MAX_LENGTH: (field: string, max: number) => `${field} must be at most ${max} characters`,\n    MIN_VALUE: (field: string, min: number) => `${field} must be at least ${min}`,\n    MAX_VALUE: (field: string, max: number) => `${field} must be at most ${max}`,\n    INVALID_FORMAT: (field: string) => `${field} format is invalid`,\n    INVALID_EMAIL: (field: string) => `${field} must be a valid email`,\n    INVALID_URL: (field: string) => `${field} must be a valid URL`,\n    INVALID_UUID: (field: string) => `${field} must be a valid UUID`,\n    INVALID_ENUM: (field: string, values: unknown[]) => `${field} must be one of: ${values.join(', ')}`,\n    MIN_ITEMS: (field: string, min: number) => `${field} must have at least ${min} items`,\n    MAX_ITEMS: (field: string, max: number) => `${field} must have at most ${max} items`,\n  },\n} as const;\n\n// =============================================================================\n// BLOCKED TEXT (for sanitizer replacements)\n// =============================================================================\nexport const BLOCKED = '[BLOCKED]' as const;\n","/**\n * @module @arcis/node/logging/redactor\n * Safe logging with PII/secret redaction\n */\n\nimport { REDACTION, INPUT } from '../core/constants';\nimport type { LogOptions, SafeLogger } from '../core/types';\n\nconst LOG_LEVELS: Record<string, number> = {\n  debug: 0,\n  info: 1,\n  warn: 2,\n  error: 3,\n  silent: 4,\n};\n\n/**\n * Create a safe logger that redacts sensitive data and prevents log injection.\n * \n * @param options - Logger configuration\n * @returns SafeLogger instance\n * \n * @example\n * const logger = createSafeLogger();\n * logger.info('User login', { email: 'user@test.com', password: 'secret' });\n * // Logs: { \"email\": \"user@test.com\", \"password\": \"[REDACTED]\" }\n * \n * @example\n * // With custom redact keys\n * const logger = createSafeLogger({ redactKeys: ['customToken', 'internalId'] });\n */\nexport function createSafeLogger(options: LogOptions = {}): SafeLogger {\n  const {\n    redactKeys = [],\n    maxLength = REDACTION.DEFAULT_MAX_LENGTH,\n    redactPatterns = [],\n    level: minLevel = 'debug',\n  } = options;\n\n  const minLevelNum = LOG_LEVELS[minLevel] ?? 0;\n\n  // Combine default and custom keys (lowercase for case-insensitive matching)\n  const allRedactKeys = new Set([\n    ...Array.from(REDACTION.SENSITIVE_KEYS),\n    ...redactKeys.map(k => k.toLowerCase()),\n  ]);\n\n  /**\n   * Redact sensitive data from an object recursively.\n   */\n  function redact(obj: unknown, depth = 0): unknown {\n    if (depth > INPUT.MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH) return REDACTION.MAX_DEPTH;\n    if (obj === null || obj === undefined) return obj;\n\n    if (typeof obj === 'string') {\n      return redactString(obj, maxLength, redactPatterns);\n    }\n\n    if (typeof obj !== 'object') return obj;\n\n    if (Array.isArray(obj)) {\n      return obj.map(item => redact(item, depth + 1));\n    }\n\n    const result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(obj as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      if (allRedactKeys.has(key.toLowerCase())) {\n        result[key] = REDACTION.REPLACEMENT;\n      } else {\n        result[key] = redact(value, depth + 1);\n      }\n    }\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Log a message at the specified level.\n   */\n  function log(level: string, message: string, data?: unknown): void {\n    // Early exit: skip all work if message level is below minimum\n    const levelNum = LOG_LEVELS[level] ?? 0;\n    if (levelNum < minLevelNum) return;\n\n    const entry: Record<string, unknown> = {\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      level,\n      message: redactString(message, maxLength, redactPatterns),\n    };\n\n    if (data !== undefined) {\n      entry.data = redact(data);\n    }\n\n    // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n    console.log(JSON.stringify(entry));\n  }\n\n  return {\n    log,\n    info: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('info', msg, data),\n    warn: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('warn', msg, data),\n    error: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('error', msg, data),\n    debug: (msg: string, data?: unknown) => log('debug', msg, data),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Redact a string value.\n * Removes newlines (log injection prevention), applies patterns, and truncates.\n */\nfunction redactString(str: string, maxLength: number, patterns: RegExp[]): string {\n  // Remove newlines/tabs (log injection prevention) and genuine control characters.\n  // Only strip C0/C1 control chars and null bytes — preserve all printable Unicode\n  // (CJK, Cyrillic, Arabic, etc.) so multilingual content isn't silently lost.\n  let safe = str\n    .replace(/[\\r\\n\\t]/g, ' ')\n    .replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0B\\x0C\\x0E-\\x1F\\x7F\\x80-\\x9F]/g, '');\n\n  // Apply custom redaction patterns\n  for (const pattern of patterns) {\n    safe = safe.replace(pattern, REDACTION.REPLACEMENT);\n  }\n\n  // Truncate if too long\n  if (safe.length > maxLength) {\n    safe = safe.substring(0, maxLength) + `...${REDACTION.TRUNCATED}`;\n  }\n\n  return safe;\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a redactor function for custom use.\n * \n * @param sensitiveKeys - Keys to redact\n * @returns Redactor function\n */\nexport function createRedactor(sensitiveKeys: string[] = []): (obj: unknown) => unknown {\n  const allKeys = new Set([\n    ...Array.from(REDACTION.SENSITIVE_KEYS),\n    ...sensitiveKeys.map(k => k.toLowerCase()),\n  ]);\n\n  function redact(obj: unknown, depth = 0): unknown {\n    if (depth > INPUT.MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH) return REDACTION.MAX_DEPTH;\n    if (obj === null || obj === undefined) return obj;\n    if (typeof obj !== 'object') return obj;\n\n    if (Array.isArray(obj)) {\n      return obj.map(item => redact(item, depth + 1));\n    }\n\n    const result: Record<string, unknown> = {};\n    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(obj as Record<string, unknown>)) {\n      if (allKeys.has(key.toLowerCase())) {\n        result[key] = REDACTION.REPLACEMENT;\n      } else {\n        result[key] = redact(value, depth + 1);\n      }\n    }\n    return result;\n  }\n\n  return redact;\n}\n\n/**\n * Alias for createSafeLogger\n * @see createSafeLogger\n */\nexport const safeLog = createSafeLogger;\n"]}

package/dist/middleware/index.js

@@ -117,10 +117,37 @@ var XSS_REMOVE_PATTERNS = [
   /<link[\s>][^>]*/gi
 ];
 var SQL_PATTERNS = [
-  /** SQL keywords */
-  /(\b(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|UNION|ALTER|CREATE|TRUNCATE|EXEC|EXECUTE)\b)/gi,
-  /** SQL comments: ANSI (--), C-style (slash-star ... star-slash), MySQL (#) */
-  /(--|\/\*|\*\/|#)/g,
+  /**
+   * Multi-token SQL attack shapes that never appear in normal English.
+   * Replaces the older bare-keyword pattern `\b(SELECT|INSERT|...)\b`
+   * which false-positived on natural language ("please select an option",
+   * "I'll update you tomorrow", "delete this file"). Each shape below
+   * is a token combination that real attackers use and benign users
+   * essentially never type. Matches `sqli-keywords` in
+   * packages/core/patterns.json. Benchmark FP class B3, 2026-06-07.
+   *
+   * Catches:
+   *   UNION SELECT / UNION ALL SELECT          (data exfiltration)
+   *   DROP|TRUNCATE TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|...   (DDL destruction)
+   *   INTO OUTFILE / INTO DUMPFILE             (MySQL file write RCE)
+   *   ATTACH DATABASE                          (SQLite hijack)
+   *   CREATE USER|FUNCTION|TRIGGER|PROCEDURE   (privilege escalation)
+   *   GRANT ALL|SELECT|INSERT|...              (privilege grant)
+   *   xp_cmdshell / sp_executesql              (SQL Server RCE)
+   *   SHUTDOWN                                 (DoS)
+   */
+  /(\bUNION\s+(?:ALL\s+)?SELECT\b)|(\b(?:DROP|TRUNCATE)\s+(?:TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|VIEW|SCHEMA)\b)|(\bINTO\s+(?:OUTFILE|DUMPFILE)\b)|(\bATTACH\s+DATABASE\b)|(\bCREATE\s+(?:USER|FUNCTION|TRIGGER|PROCEDURE)\b)|(\bGRANT\s+(?:ALL|SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE)\b)|(\bSHUTDOWN\b)|(\bxp_cmdshell\b)|(\bsp_executesql\b)/gi,
+  /**
+   * SQL comments: ANSI (--), C-style (slash-star ... star-slash).
+   * MySQL `#` line comment intentionally excluded: a bare `#` matches
+   * every hex color (#FF5300), hashtag (#trending), issue ref (#123),
+   * markdown heading (# Title). Real `admin' #`-style injections are
+   * already caught by the quote/semicolon + keyword/boolean patterns
+   * below — `#` adds nothing as a primary signal and a lot of FP noise.
+   * Matches `sqli-comments` rule in packages/core/patterns.json (which
+   * also excludes `#`). Benchmark FP class B1, found 2026-06-07.
+   */
+  /(--|\/\*|\*\/)/g,
   /** SQL statement separators */
   /(;|\|\||&&)/g,
   /** Boolean injection: OR 1=1 */
@@ -172,7 +199,26 @@ var PATH_PATTERNS = [
   /** Dotdotslash bypass: ....// or ....\\ */
   /\.{2,}[/\\]{2,}/g,
   /** Null byte injection in paths */
-  /\0/g
+  /\0/g,
+  /**
+   * Mixed encoding: literal `..` + URL-encoded slash (`..%2F`).
+   * Existed in old Node SQL_PATTERNS history; restated explicitly here
+   * for parity with patterns.json `path-mixed-encoded`. Benchmark B6.
+   */
+  /\.\.%2[fF]/g,
+  /**
+   * Overlong UTF-8 encoding of `.` (`%C0%AE`). Historic IIS/Apache
+   * decoder bypass — legitimate `.` is always `%2E`; overlong-form
+   * encoding only appears in evasion attempts. Benchmark B6 gap that
+   * neither SDK caught before 2026-06-07.
+   */
+  /%[Cc]0%[Aa][Ee]/g,
+  /**
+   * Windows UNC paths (`\\server\share`) in user input. Legitimate
+   * web-app inputs never contain UNC references; attacker UNC
+   * payloads leak SMB auth or pull remote payloads. Benchmark B6.
+   */
+  /\\\\[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+\\/g
 ];
 var COMMAND_PATTERNS = [
   /**
@@ -943,12 +989,13 @@ function detectXxe(input) {
 }
 
 // src/sanitizers/ldap.ts
-var LDAP_DETECT_PATTERN = /[*()\\\x00]/;
+var LDAP_WILDCARD_VALUE_PATTERN = /=\s*\*/;
+var LDAP_NUL_PATTERN = /\x00/;
 var LDAP_INJECTION_PATTERN = /\)\s*\(|\*\s*\)\s*\(/;
 var LDAP_NOT_BYPASS_PATTERN = /\)\s*\(\s*!|&\s*\(\s*!|\|\s*\(\s*!/;
 function detectLdapInjection(input) {
   if (typeof input !== "string") return false;
-  return LDAP_DETECT_PATTERN.test(input) || LDAP_INJECTION_PATTERN.test(input) || LDAP_NOT_BYPASS_PATTERN.test(input);
+  return LDAP_INJECTION_PATTERN.test(input) || LDAP_NOT_BYPASS_PATTERN.test(input) || LDAP_WILDCARD_VALUE_PATTERN.test(input) || LDAP_NUL_PATTERN.test(input);
 }
 
 // src/sanitizers/xpath.ts