@arcis/node 1.6.3 → 1.6.5

package/dist/index.js

@@ -142,10 +142,37 @@ var XSS_REMOVE_PATTERNS = [
   /<link[\s>][^>]*/gi
 ];
 var SQL_PATTERNS = [
-  /** SQL keywords */
-  /(\b(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE|DROP|UNION|ALTER|CREATE|TRUNCATE|EXEC|EXECUTE)\b)/gi,
-  /** SQL comments: ANSI (--), C-style (slash-star ... star-slash), MySQL (#) */
-  /(--|\/\*|\*\/|#)/g,
+  /**
+   * Multi-token SQL attack shapes that never appear in normal English.
+   * Replaces the older bare-keyword pattern `\b(SELECT|INSERT|...)\b`
+   * which false-positived on natural language ("please select an option",
+   * "I'll update you tomorrow", "delete this file"). Each shape below
+   * is a token combination that real attackers use and benign users
+   * essentially never type. Matches `sqli-keywords` in
+   * packages/core/patterns.json. Benchmark FP class B3, 2026-06-07.
+   *
+   * Catches:
+   *   UNION SELECT / UNION ALL SELECT          (data exfiltration)
+   *   DROP|TRUNCATE TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|...   (DDL destruction)
+   *   INTO OUTFILE / INTO DUMPFILE             (MySQL file write RCE)
+   *   ATTACH DATABASE                          (SQLite hijack)
+   *   CREATE USER|FUNCTION|TRIGGER|PROCEDURE   (privilege escalation)
+   *   GRANT ALL|SELECT|INSERT|...              (privilege grant)
+   *   xp_cmdshell / sp_executesql              (SQL Server RCE)
+   *   SHUTDOWN                                 (DoS)
+   */
+  /(\bUNION\s+(?:ALL\s+)?SELECT\b)|(\b(?:DROP|TRUNCATE)\s+(?:TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|VIEW|SCHEMA)\b)|(\bINTO\s+(?:OUTFILE|DUMPFILE)\b)|(\bATTACH\s+DATABASE\b)|(\bCREATE\s+(?:USER|FUNCTION|TRIGGER|PROCEDURE)\b)|(\bGRANT\s+(?:ALL|SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE)\b)|(\bSHUTDOWN\b)|(\bxp_cmdshell\b)|(\bsp_executesql\b)/gi,
+  /**
+   * SQL comments: ANSI (--), C-style (slash-star ... star-slash).
+   * MySQL `#` line comment intentionally excluded: a bare `#` matches
+   * every hex color (#FF5300), hashtag (#trending), issue ref (#123),
+   * markdown heading (# Title). Real `admin' #`-style injections are
+   * already caught by the quote/semicolon + keyword/boolean patterns
+   * below — `#` adds nothing as a primary signal and a lot of FP noise.
+   * Matches `sqli-comments` rule in packages/core/patterns.json (which
+   * also excludes `#`). Benchmark FP class B1, found 2026-06-07.
+   */
+  /(--|\/\*|\*\/)/g,
   /** SQL statement separators */
   /(;|\|\||&&)/g,
   /** Boolean injection: OR 1=1 */
@@ -197,7 +224,26 @@ var PATH_PATTERNS = [
   /** Dotdotslash bypass: ....// or ....\\ */
   /\.{2,}[/\\]{2,}/g,
   /** Null byte injection in paths */
-  /\0/g
+  /\0/g,
+  /**
+   * Mixed encoding: literal `..` + URL-encoded slash (`..%2F`).
+   * Existed in old Node SQL_PATTERNS history; restated explicitly here
+   * for parity with patterns.json `path-mixed-encoded`. Benchmark B6.
+   */
+  /\.\.%2[fF]/g,
+  /**
+   * Overlong UTF-8 encoding of `.` (`%C0%AE`). Historic IIS/Apache
+   * decoder bypass — legitimate `.` is always `%2E`; overlong-form
+   * encoding only appears in evasion attempts. Benchmark B6 gap that
+   * neither SDK caught before 2026-06-07.
+   */
+  /%[Cc]0%[Aa][Ee]/g,
+  /**
+   * Windows UNC paths (`\\server\share`) in user input. Legitimate
+   * web-app inputs never contain UNC references; attacker UNC
+   * payloads leak SMB auth or pull remote payloads. Benchmark B6.
+   */
+  /\\\\[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+\\/g
 ];
 var COMMAND_PATTERNS = [
   /**
@@ -1099,12 +1145,13 @@ function detectXxe(input) {
 }
 
 // src/sanitizers/ldap.ts
-var LDAP_DETECT_PATTERN = /[*()\\\x00]/;
+var LDAP_WILDCARD_VALUE_PATTERN = /=\s*\*/;
+var LDAP_NUL_PATTERN = /\x00/;
 var LDAP_INJECTION_PATTERN = /\)\s*\(|\*\s*\)\s*\(/;
 var LDAP_NOT_BYPASS_PATTERN = /\)\s*\(\s*!|&\s*\(\s*!|\|\s*\(\s*!/;
 function detectLdapInjection(input) {
   if (typeof input !== "string") return false;
-  return LDAP_DETECT_PATTERN.test(input) || LDAP_INJECTION_PATTERN.test(input) || LDAP_NOT_BYPASS_PATTERN.test(input);
+  return LDAP_INJECTION_PATTERN.test(input) || LDAP_NOT_BYPASS_PATTERN.test(input) || LDAP_WILDCARD_VALUE_PATTERN.test(input) || LDAP_NUL_PATTERN.test(input);
 }
 
 // src/sanitizers/xpath.ts