@apifuse/provider-sdk 2.2.0-beta.4 → 2.2.0-beta.40

package/src/error-resolution.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+import type { ProviderErrorStatus } from "./types.js";
+
+// This set suppresses the unregistered-provider-error-code signal for codes
+// intentionally emitted by SDK paths. It is not the complete authority for
+// runtime error resolution: branded errors and additional canonical SDK codes
+// must also remain immune to provider-declared status/retryability overrides.
+export const SDK_OWNED_PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES = new Set([
+	"MISSING_SECRET",
+	"AUTH_PROMPT_UNAVAILABLE",
+	"BROWSER_CDP_POOL_REQUIRED",
+	"BROWSER_RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED",
+	"STEALTH_RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED",
+	"SSE_EVENT_UNDECLARED",
+	"STREAM_EVENT_TOO_LARGE",
+	"STREAM_CHUNK_TOO_LARGE",
+	"SSE_RESULT_UNSUPPORTED",
+	"STREAM_RESULT_UNSUPPORTED",
+	"AUTH_FLOW_NOT_CONFIGURED",
+	"refresh_not_supported",
+	"RUNTIME_UNSUPPORTED",
+	"PROVIDER_STATE_UNSUPPORTED",
+	"CHOICE_TOKEN_MASTER_SECRET_NOT_CONFIGURED",
+	"CHOICE_STATE_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE",
+	"CHOICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE",
+	"CHOICE_CONTEXT_REQUIRED",
+	"unsupported_stealth_cookie_store_version",
+	"provider_secret_error",
+	"credential_key_error",
+	"credential_mode_error",
+	"flow_expired",
+	"turn_validation_error",
+	"context_access_error",
+	"OCR_UPSTREAM_FAILED",
+	"UNSUPPORTED_STT_OPTION",
+	"INVALID_STT_AUDIO",
+	"STT_AUDIO_TOO_LARGE",
+	"STT_UPSTREAM_FAILED",
+	"INVALID_STT_VERIFICATION_CODE_OPTIONS",
+	"NO_CODE_FOUND",
+	"AMBIGUOUS_CODE",
+	"retry_invalid_policy",
+	"retry_unsafe_method",
+	"stealth_cookie_store_serialize_failed",
+	"response_too_large",
+	"transport_stream_unavailable",
+	"transport_invalid_method",
+	"http_transport_override_unsupported",
+	"http_redirect_policy_invalid",
+	"http_redirect_stopped",
+	"http_redirect_max_hops",
+	"http_redirect_missing_location",
+	"http_redirect_loop",
+	"transport_invalid_url",
+	"retry_exhausted",
+	"auth_abort_unsafe_data",
+	"credentials_auth_missing_credential_keys",
+	"credentials_auth_missing_credential",
+	"credentials_auth_invalid_login_result",
+	"credentials_auth_unknown_challenge",
+	"credentials_auth_unknown_pending_challenge",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_NOT_CONFIGURED",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_SIGNATURE_MISSING",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_NONCE_INVALID",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_TIMESTAMP_INVALID",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_SIGNATURE_INVALID",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_REPLAY_DETECTED",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_ENVELOPE_INVALID",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_PROVIDER_MISMATCH",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_SOURCE_POD_MISMATCH",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_OWNER_FENCE_INVALID",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_REQUEST_FAILED",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_CONTEXT_MISSING",
+	"STATEFUL_FORWARDING_BAD_RESPONSE",
+	"STATEFUL_INTERNAL_EXECUTOR_NOT_CONFIGURED",
+	"STATEFUL_FILE_FORWARDING_UNSUPPORTED",
+	"STATEFUL_CONTROL_PLANE_OPERATION_AMBIGUOUS",
+	"STATEFUL_CONTROL_PLANE_REQUEST_FAILED",
+	"STATEFUL_CONTROL_PLANE_HTTP_ERROR",
+	"STATEFUL_CONTROL_PLANE_INVALID_RESPONSE",
+]);
+
+// Complete code authority for provider-declared runtime resolution. Keep this
+// separate from signal suppression: declarations may document these codes, but
+// their status and retryability can never override the SDK's canonical result.
+export const SDK_RUNTIME_OWNED_ERROR_CODES = new Set([
+	...SDK_OWNED_PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES,
+	"reauth_required",
+	"OCR_UNAVAILABLE",
+	"UNSUPPORTED_OCR_BACKEND",
+	"STT_UNAVAILABLE",
+	"UNSUPPORTED_STT_BACKEND",
+	"OUTPUT_VALIDATION_FAILED",
+	"NOT_FOUND",
+	"not_found",
+]);
+
+// Canonical SDK status mapping for recognized provider-thrown error codes.
+// serve.ts toStatusCode consults this map (after operation-declared overrides
+// for non-SDK-owned codes), and the authoring lint treats these codes as
+// SDK-registered. Add new codes here instead of duplicating literals in
+// either consumer.
+export const SDK_STATUS_MAPPED_PROVIDER_ERROR_CODES: ReadonlyMap<string, ProviderErrorStatus> =
+	new Map<string, ProviderErrorStatus>([
+		["AUTH_REQUIRED", 401],
+		["reauth_required", 401],
+		// Unprovisioned declared secret: a deployment/config defect, never an
+		// upstream failure — explicit 400.
+		["MISSING_SECRET", 400],
+		["NOT_FOUND", 404],
+		["not_found", 404],
+		["NO_DATA", 404],
+		["RATE_LIMITED", 429],
+		["UPSTREAM_RATE_LIMIT", 429],
+		["LIMITED_NUMBER_OF_SERVICE_REQUESTS_EXCEEDS_ERROR", 429],
+		// Deterministic upstream business refusal (honest-provider-error-
+		// contract): the upstream evaluated the request and said no under its
+		// own rules — a conflict with upstream state, never a 5xx.
+		["UPSTREAM_REJECTED", 409],
+		["UPSTREAM_ERROR", 502],
+		["BLOCKED", 502],
+		["OCR_UNAVAILABLE", 503],
+		["UNSUPPORTED_OCR_BACKEND", 503],
+		["STT_UNAVAILABLE", 503],
+		["UNSUPPORTED_STT_BACKEND", 503],
+		["STATEFUL_FORWARDING_REPLAY_CACHE_FULL", 503],
+	]);

package/src/errors.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import type { ProviderErrorCategory } from "./observability.js";
+import type { HttpRedirectFailureReason } from "./types.js";
 
 // Versioned, cross-realm brands. `Symbol.for` resolves to the same symbol in
 // any copy/entrypoint of this SDK major version, so an error created by a
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ const PROVIDER_ERROR_BRAND = Symbol.for("@apifuse/provider-sdk/error-brand@1");
 const PROVIDER_ERROR_BRAND_VALUE = 1;
 const SESSION_EXPIRED_BRAND = Symbol.for("@apifuse/provider-sdk/error-kind/session-expired@1");
 const TRANSPORT_BRAND = Symbol.for("@apifuse/provider-sdk/error-kind/transport@1");
+const VALIDATION_BRAND = Symbol.for("@apifuse/provider-sdk/error-kind/validation@1");
 
 // Defines a non-enumerable, non-writable, non-configurable own data property.
 // Immutable + own means a guard can trust it via a single descriptor read
@@ -79,6 +81,21 @@ export class SDKError extends ProviderError {
 	}
 }
 
+/** Raised when persisted stealth cookies use a store version this SDK cannot read. */
+export class StealthCookieStoreVersionError extends SDKError {
+	constructor(public readonly version: unknown) {
+		const displayedVersion =
+			typeof version === "string" || typeof version === "number"
+				? String(version)
+				: "missing or invalid";
+		super(`Unsupported stealth cookie store version: ${displayedVersion}`, {
+			code: "unsupported_stealth_cookie_store_version",
+			details: { receivedVersion: version, supportedVersions: [1] },
+		});
+		this.name = "StealthCookieStoreVersionError";
+	}
+}
+
 export class AuthError extends ProviderError {
 	constructor(message: string, options?: ProviderErrorOptions) {
 		super(message, options);
@@ -110,6 +127,7 @@ export class ValidationError extends ProviderError {
 		super(message, options);
 		this.name = "ValidationError";
 		this.zodError = options?.zodError;
+		defineErrorBrand(this, VALIDATION_BRAND, true);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -131,6 +149,33 @@ export class TransportError extends ProviderError {
 	}
 }
 
+export type HttpRedirectErrorOptions = TransportErrorOptions & {
+	reason: HttpRedirectFailureReason;
+	/** Redacted redirect target suitable for provider diagnostics. */
+	target?: string;
+};
+
+/** Raised when an opt-in ctx.http redirect policy refuses or cannot resolve a hop. */
+export class HttpRedirectError extends TransportError {
+	readonly reason: HttpRedirectFailureReason;
+	readonly target?: string;
+
+	constructor(message: string, options: HttpRedirectErrorOptions) {
+		const { reason, target, ...transportOptions } = options;
+		super(message, {
+			...transportOptions,
+			code: `http_redirect_${reason}`,
+			details: {
+				reason,
+				...(target ? { target } : {}),
+			},
+		});
+		this.name = "HttpRedirectError";
+		this.reason = reason;
+		this.target = target;
+	}
+}
+
 // Cross-module type guards. Prefer these over `instanceof` at any boundary that
 // may receive an error from a different copy/entrypoint of the SDK (see the HTTP
 // server error boundary). They recognize branded errors regardless of which
@@ -147,6 +192,13 @@ export function isTransportError(value: unknown): value is TransportError {
 	return isProviderError(value) && hasOwnBrand(value, TRANSPORT_BRAND, true);
 }
 
+export function isValidationError(value: unknown): value is ValidationError {
+	return (
+		isProviderError(value) &&
+		(hasOwnBrand(value, VALIDATION_BRAND, true) || value.name === "ValidationError")
+	);
+}
+
 export class ProviderSecretError extends ProviderError {
 	constructor(message: string, options?: ProviderErrorOptions) {
 		super(message, { code: "provider_secret_error", ...options });

package/src/fixture-sanitization.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+import type { JsonValue } from "./contract-json.js";
+
+export const REDACTED_FIXTURE_VALUE = "[REDACTED]";
+
+const OPAQUE_TOKEN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_+/=.:~-]+$/;
+const OPAQUE_TOKEN_RUN = /[A-Za-z0-9_+/=.:~-]{24,}/g;
+const URL_RUN = /https?:\/\/[^\s"'<>]+/gi;
+const PEM_PRIVATE_KEY =
+	/-----BEGIN (?:[A-Z0-9 ]+ )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END (?:[A-Z0-9 ]+ )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g;
+
+/** Matches credential field names without treating benign prefixes such as `author` as `auth`. */
+export function isSensitiveFixtureKey(key: string): boolean {
+	const normalized = key.replace(/[-_\s]/g, "").toLowerCase();
+	const candidates = [normalized, normalized.replace(/(?:value|payload|header)$/, "")];
+	return candidates.some(
+		(candidate) =>
+			/^(?:authorization|authentication|auth|bearer|cookie|credential|password|passwd|privatekey|secret|session|sessionid|token)$/.test(
+				candidate,
+			) ||
+			/^(?:api|client|service|access|consumer)(?:key|secret|token)$/.test(candidate) ||
+			/(?:authorization|credential|password|passwd|privatekey|secret|sessionid|token)$/.test(
+				candidate,
+			),
+	);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns JSON fixture data with credential-bearing keys and heuristic-confirmed string secrets
+ * replaced. Ordinary short prose and identifiers are retained.
+ */
+export function sanitizeFixture(value: JsonValue): JsonValue {
+	if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+		return value.map((item) => sanitizeFixture(item));
+	}
+
+	if (typeof value === "string") return sanitizeFixtureString(value);
+	if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return value;
+
+	return Object.fromEntries(
+		Object.entries(value).map(([key, entryValue]) => [
+			key,
+			isSensitiveFixtureKey(key) ? REDACTED_FIXTURE_VALUE : sanitizeFixture(entryValue),
+		]),
+	);
+}
+
+/** Applies the shared credential-key policy to ordinary JSON fixtures. */
+export function sanitizeOrdinaryFixture(value: JsonValue): JsonValue {
+	if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map((item) => sanitizeOrdinaryFixture(item));
+	if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return value;
+	return Object.fromEntries(
+		Object.entries(value).map(([key, entryValue]) => [
+			key,
+			isSensitiveFixtureKey(key) ? REDACTED_FIXTURE_VALUE : sanitizeOrdinaryFixture(entryValue),
+		]),
+	);
+}
+
+/** Sanitizes a primitive fixture string only when textual-secret heuristics match. */
+export function sanitizeFixtureString(value: string): string {
+	let sanitized = value.replace(PEM_PRIVATE_KEY, REDACTED_FIXTURE_VALUE);
+	const retainedUrls: string[] = [];
+	sanitized = sanitized.replace(URL_RUN, (url) => {
+		const index =
+			retainedUrls.push(isCredentialBearingUrl(url) ? sanitizeUrlForLogs(url) : url) - 1;
+		return `APIFUSEURL${index}X`;
+	});
+	sanitized = redactSensitiveAssignments(sanitized);
+	sanitized = sanitized.replace(OPAQUE_TOKEN_RUN, (candidate) =>
+		isSensitiveFixtureValue(candidate) ? REDACTED_FIXTURE_VALUE : candidate,
+	);
+	sanitized = sanitized.replace(
+		/APIFUSEURL(\d+)X/g,
+		(_match, index: string) => retainedUrls[Number(index)] ?? REDACTED_FIXTURE_VALUE,
+	);
+	return sanitized;
+}
+
+/** True for opaque values that are unsafe to retain in paths or unstructured text. */
+export function isSensitiveFixtureValue(value: string): boolean {
+	const candidate = decodePathSegment(value);
+	if (/^bot(?:\d{6,}:)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}$/i.test(candidate)) return true;
+	if (/^\d{6,}:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}$/.test(candidate)) return true;
+	if (/^(?:gh[opusr]_|sk[-_]|xox[baprs]-)[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}$/i.test(candidate)) return true;
+	if (!OPAQUE_TOKEN.test(candidate) || candidate.length < 24) return false;
+	if (/^[a-f0-9]{32,}$/i.test(candidate)) return true;
+	return shannonEntropy(candidate) >= 3.5;
+}
+
+/** Sanitizes every path segment and values following a credential-like segment name. */
+export function sanitizePathname(pathname: string): string {
+	const segments = pathname.split("/");
+	return segments
+		.map((segment, index) => {
+			if (!segment) return segment;
+			const decoded = decodePathSegment(segment);
+			const previous = index > 0 ? decodePathSegment(segments[index - 1] as string) : "";
+			if (
+				isSensitivePathSegment(decoded) ||
+				isCredentialPathKey(previous) ||
+				isSensitiveFixtureValue(decoded)
+			) {
+				return REDACTED_FIXTURE_VALUE;
+			}
+			return segment;
+		})
+		.join("/");
+}
+
+function isCredentialPathKey(key: string): boolean {
+	const finalPathPart = key.split("/").at(-1) ?? "";
+	const baseSegment = finalPathPart.split(";", 1)[0] ?? "";
+	return isSensitiveFixtureKey(baseSegment.split(/[=:]/, 1)[0] ?? "");
+}
+
+function isSensitivePathSegment(segment: string): boolean {
+	return segment
+		.split(/[;/]/)
+		.some((part) => isSensitiveFixtureKey(part.split(/[=:]/, 1)[0] ?? ""));
+}
+
+/** Removes userinfo, query values, fragments, and credential-like path segments from log URLs. */
+export function sanitizeUrlForLogs(value: string): string {
+	try {
+		const parsed = new URL(value, "https://fixture.invalid");
+		const queryMarker = parsed.search ? `?${REDACTED_FIXTURE_VALUE}` : "";
+		const path = sanitizePathname(parsed.pathname);
+		if (parsed.origin === "https://fixture.invalid" && !hasExplicitOrigin(value)) {
+			return `${path}${queryMarker}`;
+		}
+		return `${parsed.origin}${path}${queryMarker}`;
+	} catch {
+		return sanitizePathname(value.split(/[?#]/, 1)[0]);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns query-free request provenance with each path segment scrubbed for credential-like values.
+ * Origins, URL userinfo, query values, and fragments are never persisted in request provenance.
+ */
+export function requestPathForFixture(value: string): string {
+	try {
+		return sanitizePathname(new URL(value, "https://fixture.invalid").pathname);
+	} catch {
+		const path = value.split(/[?#]/, 1)[0];
+		return sanitizePathname(path.startsWith("/") ? path : `/${path}`);
+	}
+}
+
+/** Scrubs secrets and terminal/log control characters before diagnostic text is emitted. */
+export function sanitizeDiagnosticText(value: string): string {
+	let sanitized = value
+		.replace(URL_RUN, (url) => sanitizeUrlForLogs(url))
+		.replace(/\bBearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+/gi, `Bearer ${REDACTED_FIXTURE_VALUE}`);
+	sanitized = redactSensitiveAssignments(sanitized);
+	sanitized = sanitized.replace(OPAQUE_TOKEN_RUN, (candidate, offset: number, source: string) => {
+		if (/^(?:request|trace|correlation)[-_]?id[:=]/i.test(candidate)) return candidate;
+		const prefix = source.slice(Math.max(0, offset - 32), offset);
+		if (/(?:request|trace|correlation)[-_]?id\s*[:=]\s*$/i.test(prefix)) return candidate;
+		return isSensitiveFixtureValue(candidate) ? REDACTED_FIXTURE_VALUE : candidate;
+	});
+	return encodeDiagnosticControls(sanitized);
+}
+
+function redactSensitiveAssignments(value: string): string {
+	return value.replace(
+		/((["']?)([\w-]+)\2\s*[:=]\s*)("(?:\\.|[^"\\])*"|'(?:\\.|[^'\\])*'|[^\s,;&]+)/gi,
+		(match, prefix: string, _quote: string, key: string, assignmentValue: string) => {
+			if (!isSensitiveFixtureKey(key) && key.toLowerCase() !== "key") return match;
+			const quote = assignmentValue.startsWith('"')
+				? '"'
+				: assignmentValue.startsWith("'")
+					? "'"
+					: "";
+			return `${prefix}${quote}${REDACTED_FIXTURE_VALUE}${quote}`;
+		},
+	);
+}
+
+function isCredentialBearingUrl(value: string): boolean {
+	try {
+		const parsed = new URL(value);
+		return (
+			parsed.username !== "" ||
+			parsed.password !== "" ||
+			parsed.hash !== "" ||
+			parsed.search !== "" ||
+			parsed.pathname.split("/").some((segment, index, segments) => {
+				const decoded = decodePathSegment(segment);
+				const previous = decodePathSegment(segments[index - 1] ?? "");
+				return (
+					isSensitiveFixtureKey(decoded) ||
+					isCredentialPathKey(previous) ||
+					isSensitiveFixtureValue(decoded)
+				);
+			})
+		);
+	} catch {
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+/** Encodes terminal/log control characters without applying value-level secret heuristics. */
+export function encodeDiagnosticControls(value: string): string {
+	let result = "";
+	for (const character of value) {
+		const code = character.codePointAt(0) ?? 0;
+		if (code === 0x0a || code === 0x0d || code === 0x2028 || code === 0x2029) {
+			result += " ";
+		} else if (
+			(code >= 0 && code <= 0x1f) ||
+			(code >= 0x7f && code <= 0x9f) ||
+			code === 0x061c ||
+			code === 0x200e ||
+			code === 0x200f ||
+			(code >= 0x202a && code <= 0x202e) ||
+			(code >= 0x2066 && code <= 0x2069)
+		) {
+			result += `\\u${code.toString(16).padStart(4, "0")}`;
+		} else {
+			result += character;
+		}
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+function decodePathSegment(value: string): string {
+	try {
+		return decodeURIComponent(value);
+	} catch {
+		return value;
+	}
+}
+
+function hasExplicitOrigin(value: string): boolean {
+	return /^[a-z][a-z\d+.-]*:\/\//i.test(value);
+}
+
+function shannonEntropy(value: string): number {
+	const counts = new Map<string, number>();
+	for (const character of value) counts.set(character, (counts.get(character) ?? 0) + 1);
+	let entropy = 0;
+	for (const count of counts.values()) {
+		const probability = count / value.length;
+		entropy -= probability * Math.log2(probability);
+	}
+	return entropy;
+}