@aooth/auth-moost 0.2.0 → 0.2.2

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.mjs CHANGED
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
1
- import { C as RemoveMfaConfirmForm, D as StepUpConfirmForm, E as SignupForm, O as TermsBumpForm, T as SetPasswordForm, _ as PasswordReauthForm, a as ConcurrencyLimitForm, b as ProveControlOtpForm, c as EnrollConfirmForm, d as InviteChooseUsernameForm, f as InviteForm, g as MfaCodeForm, h as ManageMfaForm, i as ChangePasswordForm, l as EnrollPickMethodForm, n as AskPhoneForm, o as EmailIdentifierForm, p as LoginCredentialsForm, r as AuthorizeConsentForm, s as EnrollAddressForm, t as AskEmailForm, u as EnrollTotpQrForm, v as PincodeForm, w as Select2faForm, y as ProveControlForm } from "./forms-C9Wey0e9.mjs";
1
+ import { C as RemoveMfaConfirmForm, D as StepUpConfirmForm, E as SignupForm, O as TermsBumpForm, T as SetPasswordForm, _ as PasswordReauthForm, a as ConcurrencyLimitForm, b as ProveControlOtpForm, c as EnrollConfirmForm, d as InviteChooseUsernameForm, f as InviteForm, g as MfaCodeForm, h as ManageMfaForm, i as ChangePasswordForm, l as EnrollPickMethodForm, n as AskPhoneForm, o as EmailIdentifierForm, p as LoginCredentialsForm, r as AuthorizeConsentForm, s as EnrollAddressForm, t as AskEmailForm, u as EnrollTotpQrForm, v as PincodeForm, w as Select2faForm, y as ProveControlForm } from "./forms-C_VNxSDn.mjs";
2
2
  import { Controller, HandlerPaths, Inherit, Inject, InjectMoostLogger, Injectable, Intercept, MoostInit, Optional, Param, Resolve, TInterceptorPriority, defineAfterInterceptor, defineBeforeInterceptor, getMoostMate, useControllerContext, useLogger } from "moost";
3
3
  import { AuthCredential, AuthError, RateLimitStoreMemory, RateLimitStoreMemory as RateLimitStoreMemory$1, RateLimiter, RateLimiter as RateLimiter$1, generateMagicLinkToken, generateOpaqueToken, parseRateLimitRule, pickGoverning } from "@aooth/auth";
4
4
  import { current, defineWook, eventTypeKey, key } from "@wooksjs/event-core";
5
- import { HttpError, useAuthorization, useCookies, useHeaders, useRequest, useResponse, useUrlParams } from "@wooksjs/event-http";
5
+ import { HttpError, resolveForwarded, useAuthorization, useCookies, useHeaders, useRequest, useResponse, useUrlParams } from "@wooksjs/event-http";
6
6
  import { ArbacAction, ArbacResource, getArbacMate, useArbac } from "@aooth/arbac-moost";
7
7
  import { FederatedIdentityStore, SEEN_DEVICES_DEFAULT_CAP, UserAuthError, UserService, generateMfaCode, generateTotpSecret, generateTotpUri, maskEmail, maskPhone, pickDefinedProfile, verifyTotpCode } from "@aooth/user";
8
8
  import { Body, Delete, Get, HttpError as HttpError$1, Post, Query } from "@moostjs/event-http";
@@ -11,15 +11,14 @@ import { createAsHttpOutlet, finishWf, handleAsOutletRequest, useAtscriptWf } fr
11
11
  import { EncapsulatedStateStrategy, MoostWf, Step, StepRetriableError, StepTTL, Workflow, WorkflowParam, WorkflowSchema, createEmailOutlet, outlet, outletEmail, swapStrategy, useWfFinished, useWfState } from "@moostjs/event-wf";
12
12
  import { FederatedLoginService, OAuthError, OAuthProviderRegistry, generateRandomState, pkceChallengeFor } from "@aooth/idp";
13
13
  import { ClientRegistrationError, DynamicClientRegistration, NoopOidcClaimsResolver, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata as buildAuthorizationServerMetadata$1, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildWwwAuthenticateBearerChallenge, canonicalizeIssuer, canonicalizeIssuer as canonicalizeIssuer$1, tokenPolicyToIssueOptions } from "@aooth/auth/authz";
14
- //#region \0@oxc-project+runtime@0.140.0/helpers/esm/decorate.js
14
+ // \0@oxc-project+runtime@0.155.0/helpers/esm/decorate.js
15
15
  function __decorate(decorators, target, key, desc) {
16
16
  var c = arguments.length, r = c < 3 ? target : desc === null ? desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(target, key) : desc, d;
17
17
  if (typeof Reflect === "object" && typeof Reflect.decorate === "function") r = Reflect.decorate(decorators, target, key, desc);
18
18
  else for (var i = decorators.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) if (d = decorators[i]) r = (c < 3 ? d(r) : c > 3 ? d(target, key, r) : d(target, key)) || r;
19
19
  return c > 3 && r && Object.defineProperty(target, key, r), r;
20
20
  }
21
- //#endregion
22
- //#region src/consent.store.ts
21
+ // src/consent.store.ts
23
22
  let ConsentStore = class ConsentStore {
24
23
  /**
25
24
  * Returns descriptors for general-purpose consents this user still needs to
@@ -60,8 +59,7 @@ let ConsentStore = class ConsentStore {
60
59
  async recordOtpChannelConsent(_username, _channel, _target, _disclosure) {}
61
60
  };
62
61
  ConsentStore = __decorate([Injectable()], ConsentStore);
63
- //#endregion
64
- //#region src/auth.config.ts
62
+ // src/auth.config.ts
65
63
  /**
66
64
  * Resolve `AuthOptions` to its `ResolvedAuthOptions` form, applying the same
67
65
  * defaults the legacy `MoostAuthConfig` constructor did. Pure — call once per
@@ -97,8 +95,7 @@ function resolveAuthOptions(opts = {}) {
97
95
  exposeTokensInBody: opts.exposeTokensInBody ?? !enableCookie
98
96
  };
99
97
  }
100
- //#endregion
101
- //#region src/auth.composables.ts
98
+ // src/auth.composables.ts
102
99
  const authContextKey = key("auth.context");
103
100
  const authCredentialKey = key("auth.credential");
104
101
  /**
@@ -271,8 +268,7 @@ function setAuthContext(ctx, value) {
271
268
  function setAuthCredential(ctx, value) {
272
269
  ctx.set(authCredentialKey, value);
273
270
  }
274
- //#endregion
275
- //#region src/auth.route.ts
271
+ // src/auth.route.ts
276
272
  /**
277
273
  * Normalize a router path into a value usable as a cookie `Path` attribute:
278
274
  * a single leading slash, no doubled slashes, and no trailing slash (except
@@ -286,8 +282,7 @@ let RefreshCookiePathHolder = class RefreshCookiePathHolder {
286
282
  path;
287
283
  };
288
284
  RefreshCookiePathHolder = __decorate([Injectable()], RefreshCookiePathHolder);
289
- //#endregion
290
- //#region src/auth.guard.ts
285
+ // src/auth.guard.ts
291
286
  /**
292
287
  * `GUARD`-priority interceptor factory that authenticates incoming requests.
293
288
  *
@@ -356,13 +351,11 @@ function authGuardInterceptor(opts) {
356
351
  function AuthGuarded(opts) {
357
352
  return Intercept(authGuardInterceptor(opts));
358
353
  }
359
- //#endregion
360
- //#region src/auth.mate.ts
354
+ // src/auth.mate.ts
361
355
  function getAuthMate() {
362
356
  return getMoostMate();
363
357
  }
364
- //#endregion
365
- //#region src/auth.decorator.ts
358
+ // src/auth.decorator.ts
366
359
  /**
367
360
  * Marks a route or controller as fully public — opts out of BOTH
368
361
  * authentication (auth-moost's bearer guard) AND authorization
@@ -392,8 +385,7 @@ const Public = () => {
392
385
  * does not own a user profile type.
393
386
  */
394
387
  const UserId = () => Resolve(() => useAuth().getUserId());
395
- //#endregion
396
- //#region src/rate-limit/composables.ts
388
+ // src/rate-limit/composables.ts
397
389
  /**
398
390
  * Internal: the governing decision for this event (across every policy
399
391
  * evaluated so far), written by `rateLimitInterceptors`.
@@ -431,8 +423,7 @@ function getRateLimitSubject(kind, ctx = current()) {
431
423
  function useRateLimit(ctx = current()) {
432
424
  return { decision: ctx.has(rateLimitDecisionKey) ? ctx.get(rateLimitDecisionKey) : null };
433
425
  }
434
- //#endregion
435
- //#region src/rate-limit/interceptor.ts
426
+ // src/rate-limit/interceptor.ts
436
427
  /**
437
428
  * Global interceptor PAIR enforcing `@RateLimit` metadata (RL.spec.md §5.2)
438
429
  * — register with spread:
@@ -469,7 +460,7 @@ function rateLimitInterceptors(opts) {
469
460
  const defaultRules = opts?.rules?.map((r) => parseRateLimitRule(r));
470
461
  const limiter = opts?.limiter ?? new RateLimiter$1();
471
462
  const emitHeaders = opts?.headers ?? true;
472
- const ipOpts = { trustProxy: opts?.trustProxy ?? false };
463
+ const trustProxy = opts?.trustProxy ?? false;
473
464
  const routeConfigs = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
474
465
  const resolveRouteConfig = (cc) => {
475
466
  const ctor = cc.getController().constructor;
@@ -522,7 +513,7 @@ function rateLimitInterceptors(opts) {
522
513
  const decisions = [];
523
514
  const headers = [];
524
515
  for (const policy of owned) {
525
- const subject = await resolveSubject(policy.keyStrategy, ipOpts, ctx);
516
+ const subject = await resolveSubject(policy.keyStrategy, trustProxy, ctx);
526
517
  if (subject == null) continue;
527
518
  decisions.push(await limiter.check(policy.scope, subject, policy.rules, { ...policy.defaultMessage !== void 0 && { defaultMessage: policy.defaultMessage } }));
528
519
  headers.push(policy.policyHeader);
@@ -547,7 +538,7 @@ function rateLimitInterceptors(opts) {
547
538
  };
548
539
  return [defineBeforeInterceptor(() => evaluate("pre"), TInterceptorPriority.BEFORE_GUARD), defineBeforeInterceptor(() => evaluate("post"), TInterceptorPriority.AFTER_GUARD)];
549
540
  }
550
- async function resolveSubject(strategy, ipOpts, ctx) {
541
+ async function resolveSubject(strategy, trustProxy, ctx) {
551
542
  if (typeof strategy === "function") return await strategy();
552
543
  if (strategy !== "ip") {
553
544
  const subject = getRateLimitSubject(strategy, ctx);
@@ -556,15 +547,24 @@ async function resolveSubject(strategy, ipOpts, ctx) {
556
547
  if (strategy === "user" && auth?.userId !== void 0) return `u:${auth.userId}`;
557
548
  if (strategy === "session" && auth?.sessionId !== void 0) return `s:${auth.sessionId}`;
558
549
  }
559
- return `ip:${useRequest(ctx).getIp(ipOpts)}`;
550
+ return `ip:${clientIp(trustProxy, ctx)}`;
560
551
  }
561
- //#endregion
562
- //#region src/rate-limit/mate.ts
552
+ /** Hop 0 (the socket peer) is the one trusted proxy. */
553
+ const trustOneHop = (_addr, hop) => hop < 1;
554
+ /**
555
+ * `trustProxy: true` resolves like wooks' deprecated `getIp({ trustProxy: true })`
556
+ * (one trusted hop, the right-most forwarded entry; `''` with no known peer)
557
+ * without its deprecation notice; otherwise the app's own `getIp()`.
558
+ */
559
+ function clientIp(trustProxy, ctx) {
560
+ const req = useRequest(ctx);
561
+ return trustProxy ? resolveForwarded(req.raw, trustOneHop).ip : req.getIp();
562
+ }
563
+ // src/rate-limit/mate.ts
563
564
  function getRateLimitMate() {
564
565
  return getMoostMate();
565
566
  }
566
- //#endregion
567
- //#region src/rate-limit/decorator.ts
567
+ // src/rate-limit/decorator.ts
568
568
  function RateLimit(...args) {
569
569
  const mate = getRateLimitMate();
570
570
  if (args.length === 1 && args[0] === false) return mate.decorate("rateLimitDisabled", true);
@@ -599,8 +599,7 @@ function RateLimited(opts) {
599
599
  interceptPost(target, key, descriptor);
600
600
  });
601
601
  }
602
- //#endregion
603
- //#region src/workflow/invite-outlet.ts
602
+ // src/workflow/invite-outlet.ts
604
603
  /** Name of the outlet `AuthWorkflow` pauses on for `inviteDelivery: 'deliver' | 'return-link'`. */
605
604
  const INVITE_OUTLET = "invite";
606
605
  const pendingInviteLinkKey = key("aooth.invite.pendingLink");
@@ -636,13 +635,11 @@ function createInviteOutlet() {
636
635
  }
637
636
  };
638
637
  }
639
- //#endregion
640
- //#region \0@oxc-project+runtime@0.140.0/helpers/esm/decorateMetadata.js
638
+ // \0@oxc-project+runtime@0.155.0/helpers/esm/decorateMetadata.js
641
639
  function __decorateMetadata(k, v) {
642
640
  if (typeof Reflect === "object" && typeof Reflect.metadata === "function") return Reflect.metadata(k, v);
643
641
  }
644
- //#endregion
645
- //#region src/wf-trigger/provider.ts
642
+ // src/wf-trigger/provider.ts
646
643
  /**
647
644
  * Derive the exact 32-byte key the encapsulated wf-state strategy requires from
648
645
  * an arbitrary-length app secret.
@@ -793,8 +790,7 @@ let WfTriggerProvider = class WfTriggerProvider {
793
790
  }
794
791
  };
795
792
  WfTriggerProvider = __decorate([Injectable(), __decorateMetadata("design:paramtypes", [typeof MoostWf === "undefined" ? Object : MoostWf, typeof AuthCredential === "undefined" ? Object : AuthCredential])], WfTriggerProvider);
796
- //#endregion
797
- //#region src/wf-trigger/decorator.ts
793
+ // src/wf-trigger/decorator.ts
798
794
  /**
799
795
  * Method decorator that turns a handler into a workflow trigger.
800
796
  *
@@ -848,8 +844,7 @@ async function buildOAuthAuthorizeRequest(registry, provider, input) {
848
844
  })
849
845
  };
850
846
  }
851
- //#endregion
852
- //#region src/oauth/oauth-csrf.ts
847
+ // src/oauth/oauth-csrf.ts
853
848
  /**
854
849
  * Name of the double-submit anti-CSRF cookie set at `/:provider/start` and
855
850
  * verified in `oauth-exchange`. Holds the signed-state `random`; the callback
@@ -869,7 +864,7 @@ function oauthCsrfCookieAttrs(opts) {
869
864
  secure: opts.secure,
870
865
  sameSite: "Lax",
871
866
  path: opts.path ?? "/",
872
- maxAge: (opts.maxAgeSec ?? 600) * 1e3
867
+ maxAge: `${opts.maxAgeSec ?? 600}s`
873
868
  };
874
869
  }
875
870
  /**
@@ -891,8 +886,7 @@ function safeEqual(a, b) {
891
886
  if (ab.length !== bb.length) return false;
892
887
  return timingSafeEqual(ab, bb);
893
888
  }
894
- //#endregion
895
- //#region src/authz/authz-binding.ts
889
+ // src/authz/authz-binding.ts
896
890
  /**
897
891
  * Name of the double-submit cookie that binds an in-flight authorization
898
892
  * request to the browser that started it. Set at `GET /auth/authorize` (holding
@@ -926,8 +920,7 @@ function authzBindingCookieAttrs(opts) {
926
920
  maxAgeSec: opts.maxAgeSec
927
921
  });
928
922
  }
929
- //#endregion
930
- //#region src/authz/authz-redirect.ts
923
+ // src/authz/authz-redirect.ts
931
924
  /**
932
925
  * Build the client redirect URL for an authorization-server result (RFC 6749
933
926
  * §4.1.2 / §4.1.2.1): append the result params (`code` on success, `error` on
@@ -941,8 +934,7 @@ function authzRedirectUrl(redirectUri, params) {
941
934
  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) if (value !== void 0) url.searchParams.set(key, value);
942
935
  return url.toString();
943
936
  }
944
- //#endregion
945
- //#region src/oauth/oauth-redirect.ts
937
+ // src/oauth/oauth-redirect.ts
946
938
  /**
947
939
  * Open-redirect defense for the post-login `redirect` carried across the OAuth
948
940
  * bounce (RFC IDP.md §7). The provider round-trips whatever target the SPA
@@ -977,8 +969,7 @@ function isSafeRelativeRedirect(target) {
977
969
  function resolveOAuthRedirect(requested, fallback) {
978
970
  return isSafeRelativeRedirect(requested) ? requested : fallback;
979
971
  }
980
- //#endregion
981
- //#region src/authz/authz-tokens.ts
972
+ // src/authz/authz-tokens.ts
982
973
  /**
983
974
  * Explicit string DI tokens for the ABSTRACT authorization-server stores
984
975
  * ({@link import("@aooth/auth/authz").PendingAuthorizationStore},
@@ -1023,15 +1014,13 @@ const CLIENT_REDIRECT_POLICY_TOKEN = "aooth:ClientRedirectPolicy";
1023
1014
  * backs the `DynamicClientPolicy` composed into the redirect policy.
1024
1015
  */
1025
1016
  const DYNAMIC_CLIENT_STORE_TOKEN = "aooth:DynamicClientStore";
1026
- //#endregion
1027
- //#region \0@oxc-project+runtime@0.140.0/helpers/esm/decorateParam.js
1017
+ // \0@oxc-project+runtime@0.155.0/helpers/esm/decorateParam.js
1028
1018
  function __decorateParam(paramIndex, decorator) {
1029
1019
  return function(target, key) {
1030
1020
  decorator(target, key, paramIndex);
1031
1021
  };
1032
1022
  }
1033
- //#endregion
1034
- //#region src/authz/authorize-runtime.ts
1023
+ // src/authz/authorize-runtime.ts
1035
1024
  let AuthorizeRuntime = class AuthorizeRuntime {
1036
1025
  pending;
1037
1026
  codes;
@@ -1046,8 +1035,7 @@ AuthorizeRuntime = __decorate([
1046
1035
  __decorateParam(1, Inject(AUTH_CODE_STORE_TOKEN)),
1047
1036
  __decorateMetadata("design:paramtypes", [Object, Object])
1048
1037
  ], AuthorizeRuntime);
1049
- //#endregion
1050
- //#region src/oauth/oauth-runtime.ts
1038
+ // src/oauth/oauth-runtime.ts
1051
1039
  let OAuthRuntime = class OAuthRuntime {
1052
1040
  registry;
1053
1041
  federated;
@@ -1057,8 +1045,7 @@ let OAuthRuntime = class OAuthRuntime {
1057
1045
  }
1058
1046
  };
1059
1047
  OAuthRuntime = __decorate([Injectable(), __decorateMetadata("design:paramtypes", [typeof OAuthProviderRegistry === "undefined" ? Object : OAuthProviderRegistry, typeof FederatedLoginService === "undefined" ? Object : FederatedLoginService])], OAuthRuntime);
1060
- //#endregion
1061
- //#region src/workflow/auth-messages.ts
1048
+ // src/workflow/auth-messages.ts
1062
1049
  /**
1063
1050
  * Code-keyed catalogue of every user-facing text `AuthWorkflow` produces —
1064
1051
  * form errors, banners, finish envelopes and button labels. Templates are
@@ -1074,6 +1061,7 @@ const AOOTH_MESSAGES = {
1074
1061
  INVALID_PASSWORD: "Invalid password",
1075
1062
  INCORRECT_PASSWORD: "Incorrect password",
1076
1063
  SESSION_LIMIT_REACHED: "Session limit reached",
1064
+ PASSWORD_CHANGED_SIGN_IN_AGAIN: "Your password was changed. Please sign in again.",
1077
1065
  INVALID_CODE: "Invalid code",
1078
1066
  /** Params: `seconds`. */
1079
1067
  RESEND_WAIT: "Please wait {seconds}s before requesting a new code.",
@@ -1129,8 +1117,7 @@ function resolveAoothMessage(code, params = {}, messages) {
1129
1117
  } else if (messages?.[code] !== void 0) return renderAoothMessage(messages[code], params);
1130
1118
  return renderAoothMessage(AOOTH_MESSAGES[code], params);
1131
1119
  }
1132
- //#endregion
1133
- //#region src/workflow/auth-workflow.schemas.ts
1120
+ // src/workflow/auth-workflow.schemas.ts
1134
1121
  /**
1135
1122
  * Canonical OTP send-then-check pair. Used by:
1136
1123
  * - Login's MFA-loop SMS/email challenge sub-branch (the outer MFA while provides iteration)
@@ -1285,6 +1272,9 @@ const mfaLoopSchema = [{ id: "prepare-mfa" }, {
1285
1272
  /**
1286
1273
  * Forced password change — used by login.flow + invite.start (NOT recovery — recovery's
1287
1274
  * gating differs: gated directly on `otp.verified`, NOT `newPasswordRequired`).
1275
+ * login.flow revokes the user's existing sessions after its MFA loop (gated on
1276
+ * `ctx.passwordChanged`), never here: the old password alone must not be
1277
+ * enough to sign the user out everywhere.
1288
1278
  */
1289
1279
  const passwordPhaseSchema = [{
1290
1280
  condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.newPasswordRequired,
@@ -1297,8 +1287,7 @@ const consentsPersistTailSchema = [{
1297
1287
  id: "persist-consents",
1298
1288
  condition: (ctx) => (ctx.consents?.pending?.length ?? 0) > 0 && !!ctx.consents?.decidedAt
1299
1289
  }];
1300
- //#endregion
1301
- //#region src/workflow/auth-workflow.ts
1290
+ // src/workflow/auth-workflow.ts
1302
1291
  /**
1303
1292
  * Unified `AuthWorkflow` — single concrete class with three `@Workflow`
1304
1293
  * methods (`loginFlow`, `inviteFlow`, `recoveryFlow`) replacing the prior
@@ -1368,7 +1357,7 @@ const warnedOnce = {
1368
1357
  crossIssuerReuse: false
1369
1358
  };
1370
1359
  /** Sliding lifetime of a shadow failure counter (and of a shadow "permanent" lock). */
1371
- const SHADOW_TTL_MS = 720 * 60 * 6e4;
1360
+ const SHADOW_TTL_MS = 2592e6;
1372
1361
  /** Key prefix of an active shadow lock (kept longest by the default store). */
1373
1362
  const SHADOW_LOCK_PREFIX = "shadow-lock:";
1374
1363
  /** Cap of the default (process-wide, in-memory) shadow-lockout store. */
@@ -1384,7 +1373,7 @@ function defaultShadowStore() {
1384
1373
  function mergeAuthWorkflowOpts(opts) {
1385
1374
  const deviceTrust = {
1386
1375
  cookieName: "aooth_trusted_device",
1387
- ttlMs: 1440 * 6e4,
1376
+ ttlMs: 864e5,
1388
1377
  bindsTo: "cookie",
1389
1378
  ...opts.deviceTrust
1390
1379
  };
@@ -1401,17 +1390,17 @@ function mergeAuthWorkflowOpts(opts) {
1401
1390
  lockoutShadowStore: opts.lockoutShadowStore ?? defaultShadowStore(),
1402
1391
  mfa: {
1403
1392
  pincodeLength: opts.mfa?.pincodeLength ?? 6,
1404
- pincodeTtlMs: opts.mfa?.pincodeTtlMs ?? 300 * 1e3,
1393
+ pincodeTtlMs: opts.mfa?.pincodeTtlMs ?? 3e5,
1405
1394
  pincodeResendTimeoutMs: opts.mfa?.pincodeResendTimeoutMs ?? 6e4,
1406
1395
  pincodeMaxAttempts: opts.mfa?.pincodeMaxAttempts ?? 5
1407
1396
  },
1408
- recoveryStateTtlMs: opts.recoveryStateTtlMs ?? 3600 * 1e3,
1397
+ recoveryStateTtlMs: opts.recoveryStateTtlMs ?? 36e5,
1409
1398
  loginUrl: opts.loginUrl ?? "/login",
1410
1399
  totpIssuer: opts.totpIssuer ?? "aooth",
1411
1400
  deviceTrust,
1412
1401
  deviceRecognition: {
1413
1402
  cookieName: opts.deviceRecognition?.cookieName ?? `${deviceTrust.cookieName}_seen`,
1414
- ttlMs: opts.deviceRecognition?.ttlMs ?? 4320 * 60 * 6e4,
1403
+ ttlMs: opts.deviceRecognition?.ttlMs ?? 15552e6,
1415
1404
  maxDevices: opts.deviceRecognition?.maxDevices ?? SEEN_DEVICES_DEFAULT_CAP
1416
1405
  },
1417
1406
  forms: {
@@ -1556,7 +1545,7 @@ const ALT_HANDLED = Symbol("ALT_HANDLED");
1556
1545
  * industry-standard invite-link window (Slack/GitHub/Atlassian). Override by
1557
1546
  * re-decorating the step in a subclass.
1558
1547
  */
1559
- const INVITE_LINK_TTL_MS = 10080 * 60 * 1e3;
1548
+ const INVITE_LINK_TTL_MS = 6048e5;
1560
1549
  /** One canonical form of a chosen username: Unicode NFKC, surrounding whitespace trimmed. */
1561
1550
  function normalizeUsername(raw) {
1562
1551
  return String(raw).normalize("NFKC").trim();
@@ -2086,7 +2075,8 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
2086
2075
  * successful change (OWASP Session Management) and applies NO rate limit —
2087
2076
  * current-password re-entry (enforced by `UserService.changePassword`) is the
2088
2077
  * primary protection, not throttling. Customers override to add a min-interval
2089
- * (`rateLimit.minIntervalMs`) or to keep other sessions alive.
2078
+ * (`rateLimit.minIntervalMs`) or to keep other sessions alive. The session the
2079
+ * change was made from is always ended (see `finish-change-password`).
2090
2080
  *
2091
2081
  * Whether the flow may be STARTED at all is governed by arbac on the trigger
2092
2082
  * route (deny the `change-password` action to forbid it for SSO-only orgs) —
@@ -3028,6 +3018,7 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
3028
3018
  try {
3029
3019
  const result = await this.users.login(input.username, input.password, this.lockoutOverride(ctx));
3030
3020
  ctx.subject = result.user.id;
3021
+ ctx.passwordStamp = result.user.password.lastChanged ?? 0;
3031
3022
  ctx.loginRecorded = true;
3032
3023
  swapStrategy("store");
3033
3024
  if (ctx.guards?.passwordInitial && result.user.password.isInitial) ctx.isPasswordInitial = true;
@@ -3096,11 +3087,12 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
3096
3087
  */
3097
3088
  async handleCredentialsAlt(action, typedUsername, alt, authzHandle) {
3098
3089
  if (action === "forgotPassword" && alt.forgotPassword) {
3090
+ const url = this.resolveRecoveryUrl(typedUsername, alt);
3099
3091
  finishWf({ next: {
3100
3092
  trigger: "immediate",
3101
3093
  action: {
3102
3094
  type: "redirect",
3103
- target: this.resolveRecoveryUrl(typedUsername, alt),
3095
+ target: url,
3104
3096
  reason: "forgot-password"
3105
3097
  }
3106
3098
  } });
@@ -3736,6 +3728,7 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
3736
3728
  this.processInlineConsent(ctx, input, wf);
3737
3729
  ctx.isPasswordInitial = false;
3738
3730
  ctx.isPasswordExpired = false;
3731
+ ctx.passwordChanged = true;
3739
3732
  ctx.newPasswordRequired = false;
3740
3733
  delete password.changeReason;
3741
3734
  delete password.heading;
@@ -3801,16 +3794,42 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
3801
3794
  }
3802
3795
  }
3803
3796
  /**
3804
- * Change-password terminal — rotate the acting session's token (so the
3805
- * current device stays signed in on a FRESH credential) and emit a success
3806
- * message. Runs AFTER the optional `revoke-sessions` step, so the net effect
3807
- * is "kill every other session, keep this one on a new token" (OWASP Session
3808
- * Management: no ghost sessions survive a credential change).
3797
+ * Change-password terminal — sign the current device in on a FRESH session
3798
+ * and end the one the change was made from, then emit a success message.
3799
+ * The new pair is minted under a new session id, so the pre-change session
3800
+ * (its access token, refresh token and every rotation) is revoked here —
3801
+ * whatever `revokeOtherSessions` says, since that policy covers only the
3802
+ * user's OTHER sessions. Runs AFTER the optional `revoke-sessions` step, so
3803
+ * the default net effect is "kill every old session, keep this device on a
3804
+ * new one" (OWASP Session Management: no ghost sessions survive a credential
3805
+ * change).
3806
+ *
3807
+ * The pre-change session is revoked BEFORE the issue, so a failed issue
3808
+ * (store error, `maxConcurrent` refusal) leaves the user signed out, never on
3809
+ * the old session. A refresh in flight during the change is covered by
3810
+ * `AuthCredential`'s revocation protocol (it can't leave live credentials in
3811
+ * a revoked session).
3812
+ *
3813
+ * When one session can't be targeted — a stateless store (JWT /
3814
+ * encapsulated), or a legacy credential minted before `sessionId` existed
3815
+ * (its fallback id, the access token's fingerprint, never reaches the refresh
3816
+ * row) — ALL of the user's sessions are revoked (`revokeAllForUser`, also
3817
+ * under `revokeOtherSessions: false`). A stateless store also denylists the
3818
+ * presented access token (best effort): its revocation epoch is process-local.
3809
3819
  */
3810
3820
  async finishChangePassword(ctx) {
3811
3821
  this.requireSubject(ctx);
3812
- const issue = await this.issueForContext(ctx);
3813
3822
  const auth = useAuth();
3823
+ const prior = auth.getAuthContext();
3824
+ const priorSessionId = prior?.sessionId;
3825
+ const stateful = this.auth.canEnumerateSessions;
3826
+ if (stateful && priorSessionId !== void 0 && priorSessionId !== prior?.credentialId) await this.auth.revokeSession(ctx.subject, priorSessionId);
3827
+ else {
3828
+ await this.auth.revokeAllForUser(ctx.subject);
3829
+ const accessToken = stateful ? void 0 : auth.extractToken();
3830
+ if (accessToken) await this.auth.revoke(accessToken).catch(() => void 0);
3831
+ }
3832
+ const issue = await this.issueForContext(ctx);
3814
3833
  const envelope = {
3815
3834
  finished: true,
3816
3835
  data: auth.buildLoginResponse(ctx.subject, issue),
@@ -4880,15 +4899,20 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
4880
4899
  }
4881
4900
  /**
4882
4901
  * Revoke the user's existing sessions. Shared by recovery (gated upstream by
4883
- * `ctx.postReset.revokeAllSessions`) and authenticated change-password (gated
4884
- * by `ctx.changePassword.revokeOtherSessions`).
4902
+ * `ctx.postReset.revokeAllSessions`), authenticated change-password (gated
4903
+ * by `ctx.changePassword.revokeOtherSessions`) and the forced password change
4904
+ * at login / invite (gated by `ctx.passwordChanged`).
4885
4905
  *
4886
4906
  * - Change-password runs in an authenticated context, so we KEEP the caller's
4887
- * current device via `revokeOtherSessions(username, currentSessionId)` —
4907
+ * current session via `revokeOtherSessions(username, currentSessionId)` —
4888
4908
  * OWASP "invalidate other sessions" without logging the user out of the tab
4889
- * they just changed their password in. If the current session can't be
4890
- * resolved (no session id), fall back to revoking everything (fail-secure).
4891
- * - Recovery is anonymous (no current session to keep) → `revokeAllForUser`.
4909
+ * they just changed their password in. `finish-change-password` then moves
4910
+ * that tab onto a fresh session and revokes the kept one (and covers stores
4911
+ * that cannot enumerate, where `revokeOtherSessions` is a no-op). If the
4912
+ * current session can't be resolved (no session id), fall back to revoking
4913
+ * everything (fail-secure).
4914
+ * - Recovery and the forced change are anonymous (no current session to
4915
+ * keep) → `revokeAllForUser`.
4892
4916
  */
4893
4917
  async revokeSessions(ctx) {
4894
4918
  if (!ctx.subject) return void 0;
@@ -4907,6 +4931,25 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
4907
4931
  await this.users.unlockAccount(ctx.subject);
4908
4932
  }
4909
4933
  /**
4934
+ * Login-only guard before the `record-login` funnel (and again before
4935
+ * `mint-authz-code`, past the consent pause): the account's
4936
+ * `password.lastChanged` must still be the one the `credentials` step
4937
+ * verified (`ctx.passwordStamp`). A run paused after the password check (MFA,
4938
+ * enrolment, consents …) and resumed after the password was changed
4939
+ * elsewhere finishes with an error instead of issuing tokens or minting an
4940
+ * authorization code. Skipped when this run changed the password itself.
4941
+ */
4942
+ async checkPasswordUnchanged(ctx) {
4943
+ this.requireSubject(ctx);
4944
+ if (((await this.users.getUser(ctx.subject)).password.lastChanged ?? 0) !== ctx.passwordStamp) {
4945
+ ctx.aborted = true;
4946
+ finishWf({ message: {
4947
+ level: "error",
4948
+ text: this.msg("PASSWORD_CHANGED_SIGN_IN_AGAIN")
4949
+ } });
4950
+ }
4951
+ }
4952
+ /**
4910
4953
  * The SINGLE login-completion funnel. Every flow that establishes an
4911
4954
  * authenticated session routes through here — placed in each login schema
4912
4955
  * right after the guards and BEFORE the delivery terminal (`issue` /
@@ -4991,7 +5034,7 @@ let AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = class AuthWorkflow {
4991
5034
  ...cookies,
4992
5035
  [name]: {
4993
5036
  value,
4994
- options: auth.cookieAttrs({ maxAge: ttlMs })
5037
+ options: auth.cookieAttrs({ maxAge: `${Math.max(0, Math.floor(ttlMs / 1e3))}s` })
4995
5038
  }
4996
5039
  };
4997
5040
  };
@@ -6423,6 +6466,14 @@ __decorate([
6423
6466
  __decorateMetadata("design:paramtypes", [Object]),
6424
6467
  __decorateMetadata("design:returntype", Promise)
6425
6468
  ], AuthWorkflow.prototype, "unlockAccount", null);
6469
+ __decorate([
6470
+ Step("check-password-unchanged"),
6471
+ Public(),
6472
+ __decorateParam(0, WorkflowParam("context")),
6473
+ __decorateMetadata("design:type", Function),
6474
+ __decorateMetadata("design:paramtypes", [Object]),
6475
+ __decorateMetadata("design:returntype", Promise)
6476
+ ], AuthWorkflow.prototype, "checkPasswordUnchanged", null);
6426
6477
  __decorate([
6427
6478
  Step("record-login"),
6428
6479
  Public(),
@@ -6654,6 +6705,10 @@ __decorate([
6654
6705
  condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.enrollment?.ensurePhone && !!ctx.channel?.phone && !ctx.channel?.phoneConfirmed
6655
6706
  },
6656
6707
  ...mfaLoopSchema,
6708
+ {
6709
+ id: "revoke-sessions",
6710
+ condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.passwordChanged && !ctx.aborted
6711
+ },
6657
6712
  {
6658
6713
  id: "device-trust",
6659
6714
  condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.deviceTrust?.enabled && !!ctx.otp?.verified && !!ctx.trust?.newDevice && (!ctx.deviceTrust?.optIn || !!ctx.trust?.rememberDevice)
@@ -6675,6 +6730,11 @@ __decorate([
6675
6730
  }]
6676
6731
  },
6677
6732
  { break: (ctx) => !!ctx.aborted },
6733
+ {
6734
+ id: "check-password-unchanged",
6735
+ condition: (ctx) => ctx.passwordStamp !== void 0 && !ctx.passwordChanged
6736
+ },
6737
+ { break: (ctx) => !!ctx.aborted },
6678
6738
  {
6679
6739
  id: "record-login",
6680
6740
  condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.subject && !ctx.authz?.silent
@@ -6695,6 +6755,11 @@ __decorate([
6695
6755
  id: "authz-consent",
6696
6756
  condition: (ctx) => !!ctx.authz
6697
6757
  },
6758
+ {
6759
+ id: "check-password-unchanged",
6760
+ condition: (ctx) => ctx.authz?.approved === true && ctx.passwordStamp !== void 0 && !ctx.passwordChanged
6761
+ },
6762
+ { break: (ctx) => !!ctx.aborted },
6698
6763
  {
6699
6764
  id: "mint-authz-code",
6700
6765
  condition: (ctx) => ctx.authz?.approved === true
@@ -6944,8 +7009,7 @@ AuthWorkflow = _AuthWorkflow = __decorate([
6944
7009
  typeof ConsentStore === "undefined" ? Object : ConsentStore
6945
7010
  ])
6946
7011
  ], AuthWorkflow);
6947
- //#endregion
6948
- //#region src/auth.controller.ts
7012
+ // src/auth.controller.ts
6949
7013
  /** Workflows allowed by the bundled `/auth/trigger` endpoint. Subclasses override `triggerWf()` to extend. */
6950
7014
  const DEFAULT_AUTH_WORKFLOWS = [
6951
7015
  "auth/login/flow",
@@ -7021,16 +7085,17 @@ let AuthController = class AuthController {
7021
7085
  const auth = useAuth();
7022
7086
  const refreshToken = resolveRefreshToken(auth, body);
7023
7087
  if (!refreshToken) throw new HttpError$1(401, "Missing refresh token");
7088
+ const fromBody = typeof body?.refreshToken === "string";
7024
7089
  let issue;
7025
7090
  try {
7026
7091
  issue = await this.auth.refresh(refreshToken);
7027
7092
  } catch (err) {
7028
- if (err instanceof AuthError) throw new HttpError$1(401, "Invalid refresh token");
7029
- throw err;
7093
+ if (!(err instanceof AuthError)) throw err;
7094
+ if (!fromBody) auth.clearCookies();
7095
+ throw new HttpError$1(401, "Invalid refresh token");
7030
7096
  }
7031
7097
  auth.writeCookies(issue);
7032
7098
  const validated = await this.auth.validate(issue.accessToken);
7033
- const fromBody = typeof body?.refreshToken === "string";
7034
7099
  return auth.buildLoginResponse(validated?.userId ?? "", issue, fromBody ? { exposeTokens: true } : void 0);
7035
7100
  }
7036
7101
  status() {
@@ -7192,8 +7257,7 @@ AuthController = __decorate([
7192
7257
  __decorateParam(1, Optional()),
7193
7258
  __decorateMetadata("design:paramtypes", [typeof AuthCredential === "undefined" ? Object : AuthCredential, typeof UserService === "undefined" ? Object : UserService])
7194
7259
  ], AuthController);
7195
- //#endregion
7196
- //#region src/sessions.controller.ts
7260
+ // src/sessions.controller.ts
7197
7261
  let SessionEnricherProvider = class SessionEnricherProvider {
7198
7262
  enrich(session) {
7199
7263
  return session;
@@ -7284,8 +7348,7 @@ SessionsController = __decorate([
7284
7348
  ArbacResource("auth.sessions"),
7285
7349
  __decorateMetadata("design:paramtypes", [typeof AuthCredential === "undefined" ? Object : AuthCredential, typeof SessionEnricherProvider === "undefined" ? Object : SessionEnricherProvider])
7286
7350
  ], SessionsController);
7287
- //#endregion
7288
- //#region src/oauth/oauth-tokens.ts
7351
+ // src/oauth/oauth-tokens.ts
7289
7352
  /**
7290
7353
  * Explicit string DI token for the ABSTRACT `FederatedIdentityStore`.
7291
7354
  *
@@ -7307,8 +7370,7 @@ SessionsController = __decorate([
7307
7370
  * ```
7308
7371
  */
7309
7372
  const FEDERATED_IDENTITY_STORE_TOKEN = "aooth:FederatedIdentityStore";
7310
- //#endregion
7311
- //#region src/oauth/oauth.controller.ts
7373
+ // src/oauth/oauth.controller.ts
7312
7374
  let OAuthController = class OAuthController {
7313
7375
  registry;
7314
7376
  auth;
@@ -7492,8 +7554,7 @@ function toConnectedAccount(i) {
7492
7554
  ...i.avatarUrl !== void 0 && { avatarUrl: i.avatarUrl }
7493
7555
  };
7494
7556
  }
7495
- //#endregion
7496
- //#region src/authz/authorize.controller.ts
7557
+ // src/authz/authorize.controller.ts
7497
7558
  /** Shared default claims resolver — stateless, so one instance is reused across requests. */
7498
7559
  const NOOP_OIDC_CLAIMS_RESOLVER = new NoopOidcClaimsResolver();
7499
7560
  let AuthorizeController = class AuthorizeController {
@@ -7978,8 +8039,7 @@ AuthorizeController = __decorate([
7978
8039
  function expiresInSeconds(expiresAt) {
7979
8040
  return Math.max(0, Math.floor((expiresAt - Date.now()) / 1e3));
7980
8041
  }
7981
- //#endregion
7982
- //#region src/workflows/auth-email-outlet.ts
8042
+ // src/workflows/auth-email-outlet.ts
7983
8043
  /**
7984
8044
  * Build the email outlet that delivers magic links via the consumer's
7985
8045
  * `EmailSender`. Single-use: pass the same instance into one
@@ -8006,5 +8066,4 @@ function createAuthEmailOutlet(deps) {
8006
8066
  await deps.emailSender.send(event);
8007
8067
  });
8008
8068
  }
8009
- //#endregion
8010
8069
  export { ADD_MFA_WORKFLOW, AOOTH_MESSAGES, AUTHZ_BINDING_COOKIE, AUTH_CODE_STORE_TOKEN, AuthController, AuthGuarded, AuthWorkflow, AuthorizeController, AuthorizeRuntime, CHANGE_PASSWORD_WORKFLOW, CLIENT_REDIRECT_POLICY_TOKEN, ConsentStore, DEFAULT_AUTH_WORKFLOWS, DYNAMIC_CLIENT_STORE_TOKEN, DynamicClientRegistration, FEDERATED_IDENTITY_STORE_TOKEN, INVITE_OUTLET, OAUTH_CSRF_COOKIE, OAuthController, OAuthRuntime, PENDING_AUTHORIZATION_STORE_TOKEN, Public, RESERVED_USER_KEYS, RateLimit, RateLimitStoreMemory, RateLimited, RateLimiter, SessionEnricherProvider, SessionsController, UserId, WfTrigger, WfTriggerProvider, authGuardInterceptor, authzBindingCookieAttrs, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata, buildInviteAlreadyAcceptedEnvelope, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildWwwAuthenticateBearerChallenge, canonicalizeIssuer, createAuthEmailOutlet, createInviteOutlet, deriveWfStateSecret, generateMagicLinkToken, getAuthMate, getRateLimitMate, getRateLimitSubject, haversineKm, humanizeUserAgent, isSafeRelativeRedirect, oauthCsrfCookieAttrs, parseInviteRoles, rateLimitInterceptors, renderAoothMessage, resolveAoothMessage, resolveOAuthRedirect, setRateLimitSubject, stripReservedUserKeys, useAuth, useRateLimit };