@aooth/auth-moost 0.2.0 → 0.2.2

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package/dist/index.d.mts CHANGED
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import { MoostWf, WfOutlet, WfOutletTokenConfig, WfStateStrategy } from "@moostj
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  import { FederatedLoginService, NormalizedProfile, OAuthProviderRegistry } from "@aooth/idp";
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  import { TAtscriptAnnotatedType } from "@atscript/typescript/utils";
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  import { AuthCodeStore, AuthorizationServerMetadata, AuthorizationServerMetadata as AuthorizationServerMetadata$1, BuildAuthorizationServerMetadataOptions, BuildProtectedResourceMetadataOptions, ClientRedirectPolicy, DynamicClientRegistration, DynamicClientRegistration as DynamicClientRegistration$1, DynamicClientRegistrationOptions, IdTokenSigner, OidcClaimsResolver, PendingAuthorizationStore, ProtectedResourceMetadata, WwwAuthenticateBearerChallengeOptions, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildWwwAuthenticateBearerChallenge, canonicalizeIssuer } from "@aooth/auth/authz";
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- //#region src/auth.config.d.ts
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  /** Resolved cookie attributes. Same shape is used for both access + refresh. */
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  interface ResolvedAuthCookieConfig {
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  name: string;
@@ -67,8 +66,6 @@ interface ResolvedAuthOptions {
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  enableBearer: boolean;
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  exposeTokensInBody: boolean;
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  }
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/consent.store.d.ts
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  /**
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  * Consent event emitted to the `ConsentStore.save(username, events)` DI
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  * provider. Storage shape is intentionally the consumer's call — Mongo users
@@ -133,7 +130,7 @@ interface ConsentDescriptor {
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  * no-op defaults — customers extend this class and replace via
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  * `createReplaceRegistry([ConsentStore, MyConsentStore])`.
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  */
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- declare class ConsentStore {
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+ export declare class ConsentStore {
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  /**
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  * Returns descriptors for general-purpose consents this user still needs to
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  * accept on the next prompt boundary — terms / privacy / marketing / age /
@@ -170,8 +167,6 @@ declare class ConsentStore {
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  */
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  recordOtpChannelConsent(_username: string, _channel: "email" | "sms", _target: string, _disclosure: string): Promise<void>;
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  }
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/auth.guard.d.ts
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  /**
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  * `GUARD`-priority interceptor factory that authenticates incoming requests.
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  *
@@ -193,29 +188,25 @@ declare class ConsentStore {
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  * an admin-only invite endpoint protects its outlet HTTP route, not the
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  * step handler).
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  */
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- declare function authGuardInterceptor(opts?: AuthOptions): TInterceptorDef;
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+ export declare function authGuardInterceptor(opts?: AuthOptions): TInterceptorDef;
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  /**
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  * Decorator-factory sugar for attaching `authGuardInterceptor(opts)` to a
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  * specific controller or method instead of globally. Equivalent to
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  * `@Intercept(authGuardInterceptor(opts))`.
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  */
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- declare function AuthGuarded(opts?: AuthOptions): ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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- //#endregion
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- //#region ../../node_modules/.pnpm/@wooksjs+event-wf@0.7.31_@prostojs+logger@0.4.3_@wooksjs+event-core@0.7.31_@wooksjs+eve_e8aba0a16501b60af733b247c57b6e07/node_modules/@wooksjs/event-wf/dist/index.d.ts
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+ export declare function AuthGuarded(opts?: AuthOptions): ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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  interface WfFinishedResponse {
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  type: 'redirect' | 'data';
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  /** Redirect URL or response body */
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  value: unknown;
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  /** HTTP status code (default 200 for data, 302 for redirect) */
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  status?: number;
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- /** Cookies to set */
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+ /** Cookies to set — `options` are `setCookie()` attributes (`maxAge` in **seconds**, `expires` a Date or ms timestamp) */
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  cookies?: Record<string, {
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  value: string;
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  options?: Record<string, unknown>;
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  }>;
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  }
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/auth.dto.d.ts
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  /** POST /auth/refresh request body. Falls back to the refresh cookie when absent. */
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  interface AuthRefreshBody {
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  refreshToken?: string;
@@ -249,8 +240,6 @@ interface AuthLoginResponse {
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  interface AuthOkResponse {
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  ok: true;
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  }
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/auth.composables.d.ts
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  interface AuthBindings {
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  getAuthContext<TPayload extends object = Record<string, unknown>>(): AuthContext$1<TPayload> | null;
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  /** @throws `HttpError(401)` if no `AuthContext` is present in the event. */
@@ -306,9 +295,7 @@ interface AuthBindings {
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  * `HttpError(500)` loudly — that's a configuration error, not a runtime
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  * fallback case.
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  */
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- declare const useAuth: import("@wooksjs/event-core").WookComposable<AuthBindings>;
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/auth.decorator.d.ts
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+ export declare const useAuth: import("@wooksjs/event-core").WookComposable<AuthBindings>;
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  /**
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  * Marks a route or controller as fully public — opts out of BOTH
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  * authentication (auth-moost's bearer guard) AND authorization
@@ -321,7 +308,7 @@ declare const useAuth: import("@wooksjs/event-core").WookComposable<AuthBindings
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  *
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  * Method-level decoration overrides class-level.
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  */
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- declare const Public: () => ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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+ export declare const Public: () => ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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  /**
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  * Resolves the authenticated user's id (string) for a handler parameter.
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  *
@@ -330,9 +317,7 @@ declare const Public: () => ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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  * `AuthContext` is credential context, not user profile data, and this library
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  * does not own a user profile type.
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  */
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- declare const UserId: () => ParameterDecorator & PropertyDecorator;
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/auth.mate.d.ts
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+ export declare const UserId: () => ParameterDecorator & PropertyDecorator;
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  /**
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  * Auth metadata fields written by `@Public()` and read by `authGuardInterceptor`.
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  * Merged into `TMoostMetadata` so other moost-aware tooling sees them.
@@ -348,9 +333,7 @@ type AuthMate = Mate<TMoostMetadata & {
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  }, TMoostMetadata & {
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  params: TMateParamMeta[];
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  }>;
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- declare function getAuthMate(): AuthMate;
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/workflow/auth-messages.d.ts
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+ export declare function getAuthMate(): AuthMate;
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  /**
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  * Code-keyed catalogue of every user-facing text `AuthWorkflow` produces —
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  * form errors, banners, finish envelopes and button labels. Templates are
@@ -360,12 +343,13 @@ declare function getAuthMate(): AuthMate;
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  * function that receives the code and params and returns the text — e.g. a
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  * lookup in your own i18n library), or override `AuthWorkflow.msg()`.
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  */
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- declare const AOOTH_MESSAGES: {
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+ export declare const AOOTH_MESSAGES: {
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  readonly INVALID_CREDENTIALS: "Invalid credentials";
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  readonly ACCOUNT_LOCKED: "Account locked, please try again later";
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  readonly INVALID_PASSWORD: "Invalid password";
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  readonly INCORRECT_PASSWORD: "Incorrect password";
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  readonly SESSION_LIMIT_REACHED: "Session limit reached";
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+ readonly PASSWORD_CHANGED_SIGN_IN_AGAIN: "Your password was changed. Please sign in again.";
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  readonly INVALID_CODE: "Invalid code";
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  /** Params: `seconds`. */
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  readonly RESEND_WAIT: "Please wait {seconds}s before requesting a new code.";
@@ -420,26 +404,24 @@ type AoothMessageParams = Readonly<Record<string, string | number>>;
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  */
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  type AoothMessages = Partial<Record<AoothMessageCode, string>> | ((code: AoothMessageCode, params: AoothMessageParams) => string | undefined);
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  /** Fill `{name}` placeholders from `params`; unknown placeholders are kept. */
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- declare function renderAoothMessage(template: string, params?: AoothMessageParams): string;
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+ export declare function renderAoothMessage(template: string, params?: AoothMessageParams): string;
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  /** Resolve `code` through `messages` (when given), falling back to the English template. */
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- declare function resolveAoothMessage(code: AoothMessageCode, params?: AoothMessageParams, messages?: AoothMessages): string;
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/auth.controller.d.ts
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+ export declare function resolveAoothMessage(code: AoothMessageCode, params?: AoothMessageParams, messages?: AoothMessages): string;
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  /** Workflows allowed by the bundled `/auth/trigger` endpoint. Subclasses override `triggerWf()` to extend. */
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- declare const DEFAULT_AUTH_WORKFLOWS: readonly ["auth/login/flow", "auth/invite/start", "auth/recovery/flow", "auth/signup/flow"];
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+ export declare const DEFAULT_AUTH_WORKFLOWS: readonly ["auth/login/flow", "auth/invite/start", "auth/recovery/flow", "auth/signup/flow"];
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  /**
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  * Workflow id allowed by the GUARDED `/auth/change-password` trigger.
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  * Deliberately NOT in `DEFAULT_AUTH_WORKFLOWS` — the authenticated
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  * change-password flow must never be reachable from the public `/auth/trigger`.
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  */
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- declare const CHANGE_PASSWORD_WORKFLOW = "auth/change-password/flow";
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+ export declare const CHANGE_PASSWORD_WORKFLOW = "auth/change-password/flow";
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  /**
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  * Workflow id allowed by the GUARDED `/auth/add-mfa` trigger — the authenticated
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  * "add a second factor" flow. Like {@link CHANGE_PASSWORD_WORKFLOW}, deliberately
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  * NOT in `DEFAULT_AUTH_WORKFLOWS`: it must never be reachable from the public
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  * `/auth/trigger`.
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  */
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- declare const ADD_MFA_WORKFLOW = "auth/add-mfa/flow";
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+ export declare const ADD_MFA_WORKFLOW = "auth/add-mfa/flow";
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  /**
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  * Public REST endpoints for credential management. Four endpoints total:
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  *
@@ -457,7 +439,7 @@ declare const ADD_MFA_WORKFLOW = "auth/add-mfa/flow";
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  * allow-list (override `triggerWf()` with a different `@WfTrigger({ allow })`)
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  * or to inject custom outlets / state stores by subclassing `WfTriggerProvider`.
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  */
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- declare class AuthController {
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+ export declare class AuthController {
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  protected readonly auth: AuthCredential;
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  protected readonly users?: UserService | undefined;
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  constructor(auth: AuthCredential, users?: UserService | undefined);
@@ -539,8 +521,6 @@ declare class AuthController {
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  messages?: AoothMessages;
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  };
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  }
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/sessions.controller.d.ts
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  /**
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  * Injectable read-time session enricher. Default is identity — aooth ships NO
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  * UA-parser or GeoIP dependency. Consumers who want `device` / `browser` / `os`
@@ -560,7 +540,7 @@ declare class AuthController {
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  *
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  * Singleton scope is required — `@Injectable()` (no scope arg) → SINGLETON.
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  */
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- declare class SessionEnricherProvider {
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+ export declare class SessionEnricherProvider {
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  enrich(session: SessionInfo$1): EnrichedSession$1 | Promise<EnrichedSession$1>;
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  }
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  /**
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  * NOT `@Public()` — the auth guard rejects unauthenticated callers with 401 and
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  * ARBAC gates each action; a customer enables it with `allow("auth.sessions", "*")`.
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  */
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- declare class SessionsController {
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+ export declare class SessionsController {
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  protected readonly auth: AuthCredential;
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  protected readonly enricher: SessionEnricherProvider;
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  constructor(auth: AuthCredential, enricher: SessionEnricherProvider);
@@ -610,8 +590,6 @@ declare class SessionsController {
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  revoked: number;
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  }>;
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  }
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/wf-trigger/decorator.d.ts
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  interface WfTriggerOpts {
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  /**
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  * Workflow ids this trigger may START and RESUME (a leading `/` is ignored).
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  * documented escape hatch: interceptors are functions, not classes, so there's
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  * no ctor to inject into. Every class still uses constructor injection.
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  */
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- declare const WfTrigger: (opts?: WfTriggerOpts) => ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/wf-trigger/provider.d.ts
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+ export declare const WfTrigger: (opts?: WfTriggerOpts) => ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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  /**
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  * DI singleton owning the workflow-trigger wiring: state persistence, outlets,
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  * and token wire. Consumers subclass to swap the durable state strategy, add
@@ -696,8 +672,8 @@ type StateRegistry = {
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  * Deterministic — the same input always yields the same key, so it is stable
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  * across restarts (matching what `deriveStateKey` provided).
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  */
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- declare function deriveWfStateSecret(secret: string): Buffer;
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- declare class WfTriggerProvider {
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+ export declare function deriveWfStateSecret(secret: string): Buffer;
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+ export declare class WfTriggerProvider {
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  protected readonly wf: MoostWf;
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  protected readonly auth: AuthCredential;
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  /**
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  token?: WfOutletTokenConfig;
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  }): Promise<unknown>;
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  }
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/workflow/invite-outlet.d.ts
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  /** Name of the outlet `AuthWorkflow` pauses on for `inviteDelivery: 'deliver' | 'return-link'`. */
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- declare const INVITE_OUTLET = "invite";
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+ export declare const INVITE_OUTLET = "invite";
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  /**
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  * The `invite` outlet (registered by default on `WfTriggerProvider`): hands
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  * the resume token to the callback the `send-email` step registered, which
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  * builds the link and delivers it (`'deliver'`) or returns it to the issuer
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  * (`'return-link'`). The token never rides the response on its own.
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  */
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- declare function createInviteOutlet(): WfOutlet;
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/rate-limit/mate.d.ts
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+ export declare function createInviteOutlet(): WfOutlet;
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  /**
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  * Caller-identity strategy for a rate-limited route (RL.spec.md §5.3):
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  * - `'ip'` — client IP (the public-endpoint mode; honors `trustProxy`).
@@ -809,9 +781,7 @@ type RateLimitMate = Mate<TMoostMetadata & {
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  }, TMoostMetadata & {
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  params: TMateParamMeta[];
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  }>;
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- declare function getRateLimitMate(): RateLimitMate;
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/rate-limit/interceptor.d.ts
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+ export declare function getRateLimitMate(): RateLimitMate;
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  interface RateLimitInterceptorOptions {
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  /**
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  * The shared limiter (wire your `RateLimitStoreRedis` here). When omitted,
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  rules?: RateLimitRuleInput$1[];
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  /** Default key strategy for routes whose `@RateLimit` doesn't set one. Default: `'ip'`. */
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  key?: RateLimitKeyStrategy;
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- /** Trust `x-forwarded-for` for the client IP (behind a proxy). Default: `false`. */
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+ /**
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+ * Trust exactly ONE reverse proxy in front of the app: the client IP is the
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+ * right-most `x-forwarded-for` entry (the one that proxy wrote). Default:
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+ * `false` — the client IP as the HTTP app resolves it (`useRequest().getIp()`:
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+ * the socket peer, unless the wooks HTTP app configures `trustProxy`).
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+ */
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  trustProxy?: boolean;
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  /** Emit draft `RateLimit-*` headers on every response of a limited route. Default: `true`. */
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  headers?: boolean;
@@ -866,9 +841,7 @@ interface RateLimitInterceptorOptions {
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  * the accumulated response (they survive the throw — wooks renders the error
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  * onto the same `HttpResponse`), then `HttpError(429, message)` is thrown.
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  */
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- declare function rateLimitInterceptors(opts?: RateLimitInterceptorOptions): TInterceptorDef[];
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/rate-limit/decorator.d.ts
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+ export declare function rateLimitInterceptors(opts?: RateLimitInterceptorOptions): TInterceptorDef[];
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  /**
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  * Declares rate-limit rules for a controller method (or every method of a
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  * controller, when applied at class level — method-level metadata replaces
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  * Rules are parsed eagerly, so a bad rule string throws at decoration
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  * (boot) time, not per request.
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  */
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- declare function RateLimit(disabled: false): ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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- declare function RateLimit(...rulesAndOpts: [RateLimitRuleInput$1, ...Array<RateLimitRuleInput$1 | RateLimitDecoratorOptions>]): ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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+ export declare function RateLimit(disabled: false): ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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+ export declare function RateLimit(...rulesAndOpts: [RateLimitRuleInput$1, ...Array<RateLimitRuleInput$1 | RateLimitDecoratorOptions>]): ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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  /**
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  * Decorator-factory sugar for attaching the `rateLimitInterceptors(opts)`
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  * PAIR to a specific controller or method instead of globally — the
@@ -899,9 +872,7 @@ declare function RateLimit(...rulesAndOpts: [RateLimitRuleInput$1, ...Array<Rate
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  * dropping the pre-guard def loses flood protection for ip-keyed routes,
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  * dropping the post-guard def silently disables `key: 'user'` routes.
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  */
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- declare function RateLimited(opts?: RateLimitInterceptorOptions): ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/rate-limit/composables.d.ts
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+ export declare function RateLimited(opts?: RateLimitInterceptorOptions): ClassDecorator & MethodDecorator;
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  /**
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  * Supply the rate-limit subject for a named key strategy — the seam for
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  * custom IAMs / tenant resolvers. Call from GUARD-priority (or earlier)
@@ -909,9 +880,9 @@ declare function RateLimited(opts?: RateLimitInterceptorOptions): ClassDecorator
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  * prefix, e.g. `iam:<sub>`) and always wins over the built-in `user` /
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  * `session` derivations. Full contract: docs `/moost/rate-limit`.
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  */
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- declare function setRateLimitSubject(kind: string, subject: string, ctx?: EventContext): void;
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+ export declare function setRateLimitSubject(kind: string, subject: string, ctx?: EventContext): void;
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  /** Read a named rate-limit subject set for this event (or `undefined`). */
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- declare function getRateLimitSubject(kind: string, ctx?: EventContext): string | undefined;
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+ export declare function getRateLimitSubject(kind: string, ctx?: EventContext): string | undefined;
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  interface RateLimitBindings {
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  /**
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  * The decision the interceptor computed for this event, or `null` when the
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  * wook) — it's a single slot read, and workflow child events inherit the
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  * HTTP parent's slot transparently.
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  */
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- declare function useRateLimit(ctx?: EventContext): RateLimitBindings;
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/oauth/oauth.controller.d.ts
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+ export declare function useRateLimit(ctx?: EventContext): RateLimitBindings;
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  /**
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  * REST surface for federated-login ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT (OAuth2 / OIDC), RFC
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  * IDP.md §3.7. Two routes — anonymous LOGIN is NOT here: it lives in the login
@@ -960,7 +929,7 @@ declare function useRateLimit(ctx?: EventContext): RateLimitBindings;
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  * session, never from a parameter. Subclass + add `@ArbacAction(...)` to gate
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  * them further (e.g. an admin cross-user view).
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  */
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- declare class OAuthController {
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+ export declare class OAuthController {
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  protected readonly registry: OAuthProviderRegistry;
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  protected readonly auth: AuthCredential;
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  protected readonly users: UserService;
@@ -1047,29 +1016,25 @@ interface ConnectedAccount {
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  displayName?: string;
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  avatarUrl?: string;
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  }
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/oauth/oauth-csrf.d.ts
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  /**
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  * Name of the double-submit anti-CSRF cookie set at `/:provider/start` and
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  * verified in `oauth-exchange`. Holds the signed-state `random`; the callback
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  * proves it speaks for the same browser that started the flow by matching the
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  * cookie value against the verified `state.random` (RFC IDP.md §7).
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  */
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- declare const OAUTH_CSRF_COOKIE = "aooth_oauth";
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+ export declare const OAUTH_CSRF_COOKIE = "aooth_oauth";
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  /**
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  * Cookie attributes for the CSRF cookie. `SameSite=Lax` (NOT `Strict`) so the
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  * top-level GET navigation BACK from the provider still carries it; `httpOnly`
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  * so script can't read it; short `maxAge` matched to the state TTL. `secure` is
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  * caller-controlled (off for the http test harness, on in production).
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  */
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- declare function oauthCsrfCookieAttrs(opts: {
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+ export declare function oauthCsrfCookieAttrs(opts: {
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  secure: boolean;
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  /** Cookie lifetime in seconds — match the signed-state TTL (default 600). */
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  maxAgeSec?: number;
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  path?: string;
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  }): TCookieAttributesInput;
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- //#endregion
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- //#region src/oauth/oauth-redirect.d.ts
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  /**
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  * Open-redirect defense for the post-login `redirect` carried across the OAuth
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  * bounce (RFC IDP.md §7). The provider round-trips whatever target the SPA
@@ -1084,16 +1049,14 @@ declare function oauthCsrfCookieAttrs(opts: {
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  * carry no control/whitespace characters (which browsers may strip, changing
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  * the parsed target). Everything else falls back to the caller's default.
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  */
1087
- declare function isSafeRelativeRedirect(target: string | undefined): target is string;
1052
+ export declare function isSafeRelativeRedirect(target: string | undefined): target is string;
1088
1053
  /**
1089
1054
  * Return `requested` when it is a safe same-origin relative redirect, else
1090
1055
  * `fallback`. Used at `/start` (before signing) and re-checked in
1091
1056
  * `oauth-exchange` (before honoring) — defense in depth around the signed
1092
1057
  * round-trip.
1093
1058
  */
1094
- declare function resolveOAuthRedirect(requested: string | undefined, fallback: string): string;
1095
- //#endregion
1096
- //#region src/oauth/oauth-runtime.d.ts
1059
+ export declare function resolveOAuthRedirect(requested: string | undefined, fallback: string): string;
1097
1060
  /**
1098
1061
  * DI holder bundling the two app-provided federated-login singletons the
1099
1062
  * `sso-callback` workflow step needs. It exists so the step can resolve them
@@ -1107,13 +1070,11 @@ declare function resolveOAuthRedirect(requested: string | undefined, fallback: s
1107
1070
  * unchanged). NO flow store: the PKCE verifier + OIDC nonce are derived
1108
1071
  * statelessly from the signed-state seed (see `OAuthProviderRegistry.deriveSeededPkce`).
1109
1072
  */
1110
- declare class OAuthRuntime {
1073
+ export declare class OAuthRuntime {
1111
1074
  readonly registry: OAuthProviderRegistry;
1112
1075
  readonly federated: FederatedLoginService;
1113
1076
  constructor(registry: OAuthProviderRegistry, federated: FederatedLoginService);
1114
1077
  }
1115
- //#endregion
1116
- //#region src/oauth/oauth-tokens.d.ts
1117
1078
  /**
1118
1079
  * Explicit string DI token for the ABSTRACT `FederatedIdentityStore`.
1119
1080
  *
@@ -1134,9 +1095,7 @@ declare class OAuthRuntime {
1134
1095
  * )
1135
1096
  * ```
1136
1097
  */
1137
- declare const FEDERATED_IDENTITY_STORE_TOKEN = "aooth:FederatedIdentityStore";
1138
- //#endregion
1139
- //#region src/authz/authorize.controller.d.ts
1098
+ export declare const FEDERATED_IDENTITY_STORE_TOKEN = "aooth:FederatedIdentityStore";
1140
1099
  /** RFC-6749-shaped token-endpoint error response. */
1141
1100
  interface TokenError {
1142
1101
  error: string;
@@ -1220,7 +1179,7 @@ interface ClientRegistrationFailure {
1220
1179
  * intent, audience, scope) is fixed at `/authorize` time and recorded on the
1221
1180
  * pending authorization + the issued code — never inferred at `/token`.
1222
1181
  */
1223
- declare class AuthorizeController {
1182
+ export declare class AuthorizeController {
1224
1183
  protected readonly auth: AuthCredential;
1225
1184
  protected readonly policy: ClientRedirectPolicy;
1226
1185
  protected readonly pending: PendingAuthorizationStore;
@@ -1335,8 +1294,6 @@ declare class AuthorizeController {
1335
1294
  /** Fail soft: 302 the validated client redirect with an `?error=` (+ echoed `state`). */
1336
1295
  protected redirectError(redirectUri: string, error: string, state: string | undefined): string;
1337
1296
  }
1338
- //#endregion
1339
- //#region src/authz/authorize-runtime.d.ts
1340
1297
  /**
1341
1298
  * DI holder bundling the two abstract authorization-server stores the login-wf
1342
1299
  * terminal (`mint-authz-code`) needs. A `@Step` body cannot `@Inject` a string
@@ -1346,13 +1303,11 @@ declare class AuthorizeController {
1346
1303
  * injects `AuthCredential` & friends), keeping `AuthWorkflow`'s documented ctor
1347
1304
  * untouched. Mirrors `OAuthRuntime`.
1348
1305
  */
1349
- declare class AuthorizeRuntime {
1306
+ export declare class AuthorizeRuntime {
1350
1307
  readonly pending: PendingAuthorizationStore;
1351
1308
  readonly codes: AuthCodeStore;
1352
1309
  constructor(pending: PendingAuthorizationStore, codes: AuthCodeStore);
1353
1310
  }
1354
- //#endregion
1355
- //#region src/authz/authz-binding.d.ts
1356
1311
  /**
1357
1312
  * Name of the double-submit cookie that binds an in-flight authorization
1358
1313
  * request to the browser that started it. Set at `GET /auth/authorize` (holding
@@ -1368,7 +1323,7 @@ declare class AuthorizeRuntime {
1368
1323
  * fails the match here, because the victim's browser never holds the secret. So
1369
1324
  * a handle can only be redeemed by the same browser that started the request.
1370
1325
  */
1371
- declare const AUTHZ_BINDING_COOKIE = "aooth_authz";
1326
+ export declare const AUTHZ_BINDING_COOKIE = "aooth_authz";
1372
1327
  /**
1373
1328
  * Cookie attributes for the authorize-binding cookie — the same httpOnly /
1374
1329
  * `SameSite=Lax` shape as the OAuth CSRF cookie (Lax, NOT Strict, so the
@@ -1380,12 +1335,10 @@ declare const AUTHZ_BINDING_COOKIE = "aooth_authz";
1380
1335
  * `ttlMs`. `secure` is caller-controlled (off for the http test harness, on in
1381
1336
  * production).
1382
1337
  */
1383
- declare function authzBindingCookieAttrs(opts: {
1338
+ export declare function authzBindingCookieAttrs(opts: {
1384
1339
  secure: boolean;
1385
1340
  maxAgeSec: number;
1386
1341
  }): TCookieAttributesInput;
1387
- //#endregion
1388
- //#region src/authz/authz-tokens.d.ts
1389
1342
  /**
1390
1343
  * Explicit string DI tokens for the ABSTRACT authorization-server stores
1391
1344
  * ({@link import("@aooth/auth/authz").PendingAuthorizationStore},
@@ -1410,15 +1363,15 @@ declare function authzBindingCookieAttrs(opts: {
1410
1363
  * )
1411
1364
  * ```
1412
1365
  */
1413
- declare const PENDING_AUTHORIZATION_STORE_TOKEN = "aooth:PendingAuthorizationStore";
1414
- declare const AUTH_CODE_STORE_TOKEN = "aooth:AuthCodeStore";
1366
+ export declare const PENDING_AUTHORIZATION_STORE_TOKEN = "aooth:PendingAuthorizationStore";
1367
+ export declare const AUTH_CODE_STORE_TOKEN = "aooth:AuthCodeStore";
1415
1368
  /**
1416
1369
  * DI token for the {@link import("@aooth/auth/authz").ClientRedirectPolicy} — an
1417
1370
  * interface, so it has no class reference to inject by. Provide the concrete
1418
1371
  * policy (e.g. `new LoopbackClientPolicy()`, a `RegisteredClientPolicy`, or a
1419
1372
  * `CompositeClientPolicy` of both) under this string.
1420
1373
  */
1421
- declare const CLIENT_REDIRECT_POLICY_TOKEN = "aooth:ClientRedirectPolicy";
1374
+ export declare const CLIENT_REDIRECT_POLICY_TOKEN = "aooth:ClientRedirectPolicy";
1422
1375
  /**
1423
1376
  * DI token for the {@link import("@aooth/auth/authz").DynamicClientStore}
1424
1377
  * (RFC 7591 dynamic registrations) — an abstract class, same auto-instantiation
@@ -1429,9 +1382,7 @@ declare const CLIENT_REDIRECT_POLICY_TOKEN = "aooth:ClientRedirectPolicy";
1429
1382
  * overrides `getDynamicClientRegistration()`. The same store instance also
1430
1383
  * backs the `DynamicClientPolicy` composed into the redirect policy.
1431
1384
  */
1432
- declare const DYNAMIC_CLIENT_STORE_TOKEN = "aooth:DynamicClientStore";
1433
- //#endregion
1434
- //#region src/workflow/auth-workflow.ctx.d.ts
1385
+ export declare const DYNAMIC_CLIENT_STORE_TOKEN = "aooth:DynamicClientStore";
1435
1386
  type MfaTransport = "sms" | "email" | "totp";
1436
1387
  /** Per-user MFA method summary surfaced to forms via `@wf.context.pass 'mfa'`. */
1437
1388
  interface MfaSummary {
@@ -1720,9 +1671,12 @@ interface AuthWfSessionPolicy {
1720
1671
  * `UserService.changePassword`), NOT rate limiting — so `rateLimit` is
1721
1672
  * optional and off by default.
1722
1673
  *
1723
- * - `revokeOtherSessions` — on success, revoke every session for the user then
1724
- * re-issue the acting session a fresh token (OWASP Session Management: kill
1725
- * ghost sessions after a credential change). Default `true`.
1674
+ * - `revokeOtherSessions` — on success, revoke the user's OTHER sessions (OWASP
1675
+ * Session Management: kill ghost sessions after a credential change). Default
1676
+ * `true`. Either way the acting device moves onto a fresh session and the
1677
+ * session the change was made from is revoked; when that session can't be
1678
+ * targeted (stateless JWT / encapsulated store, legacy pre-sessionId
1679
+ * credential) every session is revoked.
1726
1680
  * - `rateLimit.minIntervalMs` — minimum gap between successive password changes
1727
1681
  * (Okta "minimum password age"). Enforced against `password.lastChanged` with
1728
1682
  * ZERO extra storage. Omit to disable.
@@ -2184,6 +2138,20 @@ interface AuthWfCtx {
2184
2138
  aborted?: boolean;
2185
2139
  isFirstLogin?: boolean;
2186
2140
  newPasswordRequired?: boolean;
2141
+ /**
2142
+ * Set by `create-password-form` once it stored a new password. In login.flow
2143
+ * it gates the `revoke-sessions` step after the MFA loop (sessions opened
2144
+ * with the old password end) and exempts the run from
2145
+ * `check-password-unchanged`. Server-only flow control.
2146
+ */
2147
+ passwordChanged?: boolean;
2148
+ /**
2149
+ * `password.lastChanged` of the account as the `credentials` step verified
2150
+ * it. `check-password-unchanged` compares it before the login is recorded,
2151
+ * so a run paused across a password change can't finish on the replaced
2152
+ * password. Server-only flow control.
2153
+ */
2154
+ passwordStamp?: number;
2187
2155
  /**
2188
2156
  * Idempotency latch for the single `record-login` funnel step. Set true once
2189
2157
  * a login has been stamped this run — by the `credentials` step (the password
@@ -2287,8 +2255,6 @@ interface AuthWfCtx {
2287
2255
  */
2288
2256
  public?: AuthWfPublicState;
2289
2257
  }
2290
- //#endregion
2291
- //#region src/workflow/auth-workflow.opts.d.ts
2292
2258
  interface AuthWorkflowOpts {
2293
2259
  autoLoginOnInvite?: boolean;
2294
2260
  autoLoginOnRecover?: boolean;
@@ -2516,8 +2482,6 @@ interface ResolvedAuthWorkflowOpts {
2516
2482
  authzConsent: TAtscriptAnnotatedType;
2517
2483
  };
2518
2484
  }
2519
- //#endregion
2520
- //#region src/workflow/auth-workflow.d.ts
2521
2485
  /**
2522
2486
  * Unified outbound-dispatch payload. Customers override `deliver(payload)` on
2523
2487
  * the `AuthWorkflow` subclass to route by `kind` (per-purpose templates) and
@@ -2585,12 +2549,12 @@ type AuthDeliveryPayload = {
2585
2549
  * declares one — or an attacker submits one as an extra field — the strip
2586
2550
  * applied at the workflow step blocks shadowing.
2587
2551
  */
2588
- declare const RESERVED_USER_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string>;
2552
+ export declare const RESERVED_USER_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string>;
2589
2553
  /**
2590
2554
  * Return a shallow copy of `profile` with `RESERVED_USER_KEYS` removed.
2591
2555
  * Does not mutate the input.
2592
2556
  */
2593
- declare function stripReservedUserKeys(profile: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>;
2557
+ export declare function stripReservedUserKeys(profile: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>;
2594
2558
  /**
2595
2559
  * Best-effort "Browser on OS" label from a raw User-Agent string — feeds the
2596
2560
  * `name` field of `seenDevices` records so a device list reads "Chrome on
@@ -2599,8 +2563,8 @@ declare function stripReservedUserKeys(profile: Record<string, unknown>): Record
2599
2563
  * Returns just the browser or just the OS when only one side is detected;
2600
2564
  * `undefined` for empty / fully unrecognized input.
2601
2565
  */
2602
- declare function humanizeUserAgent(ua: string | undefined): string | undefined;
2603
- declare function haversineKm(a: {
2566
+ export declare function humanizeUserAgent(ua: string | undefined): string | undefined;
2567
+ export declare function haversineKm(a: {
2604
2568
  lat: number;
2605
2569
  lon: number;
2606
2570
  }, b: {
@@ -2608,7 +2572,7 @@ declare function haversineKm(a: {
2608
2572
  lon: number;
2609
2573
  }): number;
2610
2574
  /** Trim + de-duplicate role identifiers submitted via the admin invite form. */
2611
- declare function parseInviteRoles(input?: string[]): string[];
2575
+ export declare function parseInviteRoles(input?: string[]): string[];
2612
2576
  /**
2613
2577
  * Single source of truth for the "this invite was already accepted" finish
2614
2578
  * envelope. Used by both `idempotent-redirect` (in-workflow) and by
@@ -2619,13 +2583,13 @@ declare function parseInviteRoles(input?: string[]): string[];
2619
2583
  * `alreadyAcceptedRedirectUrl` being non-empty — mirrors how the resolver
2620
2584
  * defaults it, but lets consumers blank it to suppress the secondary button.
2621
2585
  */
2622
- declare function buildInviteAlreadyAcceptedEnvelope(opts: {
2586
+ export declare function buildInviteAlreadyAcceptedEnvelope(opts: {
2623
2587
  loginUrl: string;
2624
2588
  alreadyAcceptedRedirectUrl: string;
2625
2589
  /** Text overrides (see `AuthWorkflowOpts.messages`). */
2626
2590
  messages?: AoothMessages;
2627
2591
  }): FinishWfOpts;
2628
- declare class AuthWorkflow {
2592
+ export declare class AuthWorkflow {
2629
2593
  protected readonly opts: ResolvedAuthWorkflowOpts;
2630
2594
  protected readonly users: UserService;
2631
2595
  protected readonly auth: AuthCredential;
@@ -2973,7 +2937,8 @@ declare class AuthWorkflow {
2973
2937
  * successful change (OWASP Session Management) and applies NO rate limit —
2974
2938
  * current-password re-entry (enforced by `UserService.changePassword`) is the
2975
2939
  * primary protection, not throttling. Customers override to add a min-interval
2976
- * (`rateLimit.minIntervalMs`) or to keep other sessions alive.
2940
+ * (`rateLimit.minIntervalMs`) or to keep other sessions alive. The session the
2941
+ * change was made from is always ended (see `finish-change-password`).
2977
2942
  *
2978
2943
  * Whether the flow may be STARTED at all is governed by arbac on the trigger
2979
2944
  * route (deny the `change-password` action to forbid it for SSO-only orgs) —
@@ -3738,11 +3703,28 @@ declare class AuthWorkflow {
3738
3703
  */
3739
3704
  changePasswordForm(ctx: AuthWfCtx): Promise<unknown>;
3740
3705
  /**
3741
- * Change-password terminal — rotate the acting session's token (so the
3742
- * current device stays signed in on a FRESH credential) and emit a success
3743
- * message. Runs AFTER the optional `revoke-sessions` step, so the net effect
3744
- * is "kill every other session, keep this one on a new token" (OWASP Session
3745
- * Management: no ghost sessions survive a credential change).
3706
+ * Change-password terminal — sign the current device in on a FRESH session
3707
+ * and end the one the change was made from, then emit a success message.
3708
+ * The new pair is minted under a new session id, so the pre-change session
3709
+ * (its access token, refresh token and every rotation) is revoked here —
3710
+ * whatever `revokeOtherSessions` says, since that policy covers only the
3711
+ * user's OTHER sessions. Runs AFTER the optional `revoke-sessions` step, so
3712
+ * the default net effect is "kill every old session, keep this device on a
3713
+ * new one" (OWASP Session Management: no ghost sessions survive a credential
3714
+ * change).
3715
+ *
3716
+ * The pre-change session is revoked BEFORE the issue, so a failed issue
3717
+ * (store error, `maxConcurrent` refusal) leaves the user signed out, never on
3718
+ * the old session. A refresh in flight during the change is covered by
3719
+ * `AuthCredential`'s revocation protocol (it can't leave live credentials in
3720
+ * a revoked session).
3721
+ *
3722
+ * When one session can't be targeted — a stateless store (JWT /
3723
+ * encapsulated), or a legacy credential minted before `sessionId` existed
3724
+ * (its fallback id, the access token's fingerprint, never reaches the refresh
3725
+ * row) — ALL of the user's sessions are revoked (`revokeAllForUser`, also
3726
+ * under `revokeOtherSessions: false`). A stateless store also denylists the
3727
+ * presented access token (best effort): its revocation epoch is process-local.
3746
3728
  */
3747
3729
  finishChangePassword(ctx: AuthWfCtx): Promise<undefined>;
3748
3730
  /**
@@ -4088,15 +4070,20 @@ declare class AuthWorkflow {
4088
4070
  persistConsents(ctx: AuthWfCtx): Promise<undefined>;
4089
4071
  /**
4090
4072
  * Revoke the user's existing sessions. Shared by recovery (gated upstream by
4091
- * `ctx.postReset.revokeAllSessions`) and authenticated change-password (gated
4092
- * by `ctx.changePassword.revokeOtherSessions`).
4073
+ * `ctx.postReset.revokeAllSessions`), authenticated change-password (gated
4074
+ * by `ctx.changePassword.revokeOtherSessions`) and the forced password change
4075
+ * at login / invite (gated by `ctx.passwordChanged`).
4093
4076
  *
4094
4077
  * - Change-password runs in an authenticated context, so we KEEP the caller's
4095
- * current device via `revokeOtherSessions(username, currentSessionId)` —
4078
+ * current session via `revokeOtherSessions(username, currentSessionId)` —
4096
4079
  * OWASP "invalidate other sessions" without logging the user out of the tab
4097
- * they just changed their password in. If the current session can't be
4098
- * resolved (no session id), fall back to revoking everything (fail-secure).
4099
- * - Recovery is anonymous (no current session to keep) → `revokeAllForUser`.
4080
+ * they just changed their password in. `finish-change-password` then moves
4081
+ * that tab onto a fresh session and revokes the kept one (and covers stores
4082
+ * that cannot enumerate, where `revokeOtherSessions` is a no-op). If the
4083
+ * current session can't be resolved (no session id), fall back to revoking
4084
+ * everything (fail-secure).
4085
+ * - Recovery and the forced change are anonymous (no current session to
4086
+ * keep) → `revokeAllForUser`.
4100
4087
  */
4101
4088
  revokeSessions(ctx: AuthWfCtx): Promise<undefined>;
4102
4089
  /**
@@ -4107,6 +4094,16 @@ declare class AuthWorkflow {
4107
4094
  * also zeroes `failedLoginAttempts`, so the next login starts clean.
4108
4095
  */
4109
4096
  unlockAccount(ctx: AuthWfCtx): Promise<undefined>;
4097
+ /**
4098
+ * Login-only guard before the `record-login` funnel (and again before
4099
+ * `mint-authz-code`, past the consent pause): the account's
4100
+ * `password.lastChanged` must still be the one the `credentials` step
4101
+ * verified (`ctx.passwordStamp`). A run paused after the password check (MFA,
4102
+ * enrolment, consents …) and resumed after the password was changed
4103
+ * elsewhere finishes with an error instead of issuing tokens or minting an
4104
+ * authorization code. Skipped when this run changed the password itself.
4105
+ */
4106
+ checkPasswordUnchanged(ctx: AuthWfCtx): Promise<undefined>;
4110
4107
  /**
4111
4108
  * The SINGLE login-completion funnel. Every flow that establishes an
4112
4109
  * authenticated session routes through here — placed in each login schema
@@ -4496,8 +4493,6 @@ declare class AuthWorkflow {
4496
4493
  */
4497
4494
  signupFlow(): void;
4498
4495
  }
4499
- //#endregion
4500
- //#region src/workflows/auth-email-outlet.d.ts
4501
4496
  interface AuthEmailOutletDeps {
4502
4497
  emailSender: EmailSender$1;
4503
4498
  buildMagicLinkUrl: BuildMagicLinkUrl$1;
@@ -4509,9 +4504,7 @@ interface AuthEmailOutletDeps {
4509
4504
  * `EmailSender`. Single-use: pass the same instance into one
4510
4505
  * `handleWfOutletRequest({ outlets })`.
4511
4506
  */
4512
- declare function createAuthEmailOutlet(deps: AuthEmailOutletDeps): WfOutlet;
4513
- //#endregion
4514
- //#region src/audit/index.d.ts
4507
+ export declare function createAuthEmailOutlet(deps: AuthEmailOutletDeps): WfOutlet;
4515
4508
  /**
4516
4509
  * Audit event emitter — used by `AuthWorkflow`'s audit-login step (and
4517
4510
  * future recovery / invite audit steps) to fan out login.success and similar
@@ -4537,5 +4530,4 @@ interface AuditEvent {
4537
4530
  interface AuditEmitter {
4538
4531
  emit(event: AuditEvent): Promise<void> | void;
4539
4532
  }
4540
- //#endregion
4541
- export { ADD_MFA_WORKFLOW, AOOTH_MESSAGES, AUTHZ_BINDING_COOKIE, AUTH_CODE_STORE_TOKEN, type AoothMessageCode, type AoothMessageParams, type AoothMessages, type AuditEmitter, type AuditEvent, type AuthBindings, type AuthContext, AuthController, type AuthDeliveryPayload, type AuthEmailEvent, type AuthEmailKind, type AuthEmailOutletDeps, AuthGuarded, type AuthLoginResponse, type AuthLogoutBody, type AuthOkResponse, type AuthOptions, type AuthRefreshBody, type AuthSmsEvent, type AuthSmsKind, type AuthWfCompletionState, type AuthWfConsentsState, type AuthWfCtx, type AuthWfMfaEnrollState, type AuthWfOAuthState, type AuthWfPasswordUiState, type AuthWfPincodeUiState, AuthWorkflow, type AuthWorkflowOpts, type AuthorizationServerMetadata, AuthorizeController, AuthorizeRuntime, type AuthzReauthPolicy, type BuildAuthorizationServerMetadataOptions, type BuildMagicLinkUrl, type BuildProtectedResourceMetadataOptions, CHANGE_PASSWORD_WORKFLOW, CLIENT_REDIRECT_POLICY_TOKEN, type ConcurrencyLimitOptions, type ConnectedAccount, type ConsentDescriptor, type ConsentDescriptorLike, type ConsentEvent, ConsentStore, DEFAULT_AUTH_WORKFLOWS, DYNAMIC_CLIENT_STORE_TOKEN, DynamicClientRegistration, type DynamicClientRegistrationOptions, type EmailSender, type EnrichedSession, FEDERATED_IDENTITY_STORE_TOKEN, INVITE_OUTLET, type IssueResult, type LoginRedirect, type MfaSummary, type MfaTransport, OAUTH_CSRF_COOKIE, OAuthController, OAuthRuntime, PENDING_AUTHORIZATION_STORE_TOKEN, type ProtectedResourceMetadata, Public, RESERVED_USER_KEYS, RateLimit, type RateLimitBindings, type RateLimitDecision, type RateLimitDecoratorOptions, type RateLimitInterceptorOptions, type RateLimitKeyStrategy, type RateLimitRule, type RateLimitRuleInput, type RateLimitStore, RateLimitStoreMemory, RateLimited, RateLimiter, type RateLimiterOptions, type ResolvedAuthCookieConfig, type ResolvedAuthOptions, type ResolvedAuthWorkflowOpts, type SessionEnricher, SessionEnricherProvider, type SessionInfo, SessionsController, type SmsSender, type SsoProvider, type TAuthMeta, type TRateLimitMeta, UserId, WfTrigger, type WfTriggerOpts, WfTriggerProvider, type WwwAuthenticateBearerChallengeOptions, authGuardInterceptor, authzBindingCookieAttrs, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata, buildInviteAlreadyAcceptedEnvelope, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildWwwAuthenticateBearerChallenge, canonicalizeIssuer, createAuthEmailOutlet, createInviteOutlet, deriveWfStateSecret, generateMagicLinkToken, getAuthMate, getRateLimitMate, getRateLimitSubject, haversineKm, humanizeUserAgent, isSafeRelativeRedirect, oauthCsrfCookieAttrs, parseInviteRoles, rateLimitInterceptors, renderAoothMessage, resolveAoothMessage, resolveOAuthRedirect, setRateLimitSubject, stripReservedUserKeys, useAuth, useRateLimit };
4533
+ export { type AoothMessageCode, type AoothMessageParams, type AoothMessages, type AuditEmitter, type AuditEvent, type AuthBindings, type AuthContext, type AuthDeliveryPayload, type AuthEmailEvent, type AuthEmailKind, type AuthEmailOutletDeps, type AuthLoginResponse, type AuthLogoutBody, type AuthOkResponse, type AuthOptions, type AuthRefreshBody, type AuthSmsEvent, type AuthSmsKind, type AuthWfCompletionState, type AuthWfConsentsState, type AuthWfCtx, type AuthWfMfaEnrollState, type AuthWfOAuthState, type AuthWfPasswordUiState, type AuthWfPincodeUiState, type AuthWorkflowOpts, type AuthorizationServerMetadata, type AuthzReauthPolicy, type BuildAuthorizationServerMetadataOptions, type BuildMagicLinkUrl, type BuildProtectedResourceMetadataOptions, type ConcurrencyLimitOptions, type ConnectedAccount, type ConsentDescriptor, type ConsentDescriptorLike, type ConsentEvent, DynamicClientRegistration, type DynamicClientRegistrationOptions, type EmailSender, type EnrichedSession, type IssueResult, type LoginRedirect, type MfaSummary, type MfaTransport, type ProtectedResourceMetadata, type RateLimitBindings, type RateLimitDecision, type RateLimitDecoratorOptions, type RateLimitInterceptorOptions, type RateLimitKeyStrategy, type RateLimitRule, type RateLimitRuleInput, type RateLimitStore, RateLimitStoreMemory, RateLimiter, type RateLimiterOptions, type ResolvedAuthCookieConfig, type ResolvedAuthOptions, type ResolvedAuthWorkflowOpts, type SessionEnricher, type SessionInfo, type SmsSender, type SsoProvider, type TAuthMeta, type TRateLimitMeta, type WfTriggerOpts, type WwwAuthenticateBearerChallengeOptions, buildAuthorizationServerMetadata, buildProtectedResourceMetadata, buildWwwAuthenticateBearerChallenge, canonicalizeIssuer, generateMagicLinkToken };