@anywalletkit/extension-kit 0.1.3 → 0.1.4

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ declare class Vault {
      * Register a passkey as a second unlock path: the DEK (from the unlocked session)
      * is sealed under HKDF-SHA256(`prf`, salt = credential id). The password stays
      * the recovery path; `prf` is zeroized here. A v1 envelope must be unlocked (and
-     * thereby upgraded) first.
+     * thereby upgraded) first, and the vault must hold a secret (it proves the DEK).
      */
     addPasskey(dek: Uint8Array, passkey: {
         id: string;
@@ -215,7 +215,10 @@ declare class Vault {
     private _random;
     /** A fresh envelope (v2 by default, v1 with `kdf: 'pbkdf2'`) wrapping `dek` under `password`. */
     private _sealEnvelope;
-    /** The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not any 32 bytes. */
+    /**
+     * The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not
+     * any 32 bytes. An empty vault has nothing to prove it with, so it is refused rather than trusted.
+     */
     private _requireDek;
     private _derivePbkdf2;
     private _deriveScrypt;

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ declare class Vault {
      * Register a passkey as a second unlock path: the DEK (from the unlocked session)
      * is sealed under HKDF-SHA256(`prf`, salt = credential id). The password stays
      * the recovery path; `prf` is zeroized here. A v1 envelope must be unlocked (and
-     * thereby upgraded) first.
+     * thereby upgraded) first, and the vault must hold a secret (it proves the DEK).
      */
     addPasskey(dek: Uint8Array, passkey: {
         id: string;
@@ -215,7 +215,10 @@ declare class Vault {
     private _random;
     /** A fresh envelope (v2 by default, v1 with `kdf: 'pbkdf2'`) wrapping `dek` under `password`. */
     private _sealEnvelope;
-    /** The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not any 32 bytes. */
+    /**
+     * The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not
+     * any 32 bytes. An empty vault has nothing to prove it with, so it is refused rather than trusted.
+     */
     private _requireDek;
     private _derivePbkdf2;
     private _deriveScrypt;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ var Vault = class {
    * Register a passkey as a second unlock path: the DEK (from the unlocked session)
    * is sealed under HKDF-SHA256(`prf`, salt = credential id). The password stays
    * the recovery path; `prf` is zeroized here. A v1 envelope must be unlocked (and
-   * thereby upgraded) first.
+   * thereby upgraded) first, and the vault must hold a secret (it proves the DEK).
    */
   async addPasskey(dek, passkey) {
     try {
@@ -287,11 +287,14 @@ var Vault = class {
     const kek = await this._deriveScrypt(password, salt, kdf);
     return { v: 2, kdf, dek: await this._seal(kek, dek, aadDekV2(kdf)), secrets, passkeys, createdAt };
   }
-  /** The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not any 32 bytes. */
+  /**
+   * The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not
+   * any 32 bytes. An empty vault has nothing to prove it with, so it is refused rather than trusted.
+   */
   async _requireDek(dek, envelope) {
     const ids = Object.keys(envelope.secrets);
     const key = await this._importDek(dek);
-    if (ids.length === 0) return;
+    if (ids.length === 0) throw new VaultError("Add a secret to the vault before a passkey: an empty vault cannot prove the key is its own.", "invalid-input");
     const probe = await this._open(key, envelope.secrets[ids[0]], aadSecret(ids[0]), "locked");
     zeroize(probe);
   }