@anywalletkit/extension-kit 0.1.3 → 0.1.4

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ var Vault = class {
    * Register a passkey as a second unlock path: the DEK (from the unlocked session)
    * is sealed under HKDF-SHA256(`prf`, salt = credential id). The password stays
    * the recovery path; `prf` is zeroized here. A v1 envelope must be unlocked (and
-   * thereby upgraded) first.
+   * thereby upgraded) first, and the vault must hold a secret (it proves the DEK).
    */
   async addPasskey(dek, passkey) {
     try {
@@ -433,11 +433,14 @@ var Vault = class {
     const kek = await this._deriveScrypt(password, salt, kdf);
     return { v: 2, kdf, dek: await this._seal(kek, dek, aadDekV2(kdf)), secrets, passkeys, createdAt };
   }
-  /** The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not any 32 bytes. */
+  /**
+   * The caller's DEK must open this envelope's secrets — it is the key the password protects, not
+   * any 32 bytes. An empty vault has nothing to prove it with, so it is refused rather than trusted.
+   */
   async _requireDek(dek, envelope) {
     const ids = Object.keys(envelope.secrets);
     const key = await this._importDek(dek);
-    if (ids.length === 0) return;
+    if (ids.length === 0) throw new VaultError("Add a secret to the vault before a passkey: an empty vault cannot prove the key is its own.", "invalid-input");
     const probe = await this._open(key, envelope.secrets[ids[0]], aadSecret(ids[0]), "locked");
     (0, import_core.zeroize)(probe);
   }