@andrewheberle/serverless-ssh-ca 0.22.0 → 0.24.0

package/src/utils.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import type { SshCaBindings } from "./types.js"
 import { JWKInvalid, JWKSInvalid, JWSInvalid, JWSSignatureVerificationFailed, JWTClaimValidationFailed, JWTExpired, JWTInvalid } from "jose/errors"
-import sshpk from "sshpk"
-import type { Certificate, Key, PrivateKey } from "sshpk"
+import { CertificateParseError, SshCertificate } from "./ssh/certificate.js"
+import { KeyParseError, MinimumRsaKeyBits, parsePrivateKey, PublicKey, rsaKeyBits, UnsupportedKeyError, type PrivateKey } from "./ssh/keys.js"
 import z from "zod"
-import { verifyJWT } from "./verify.js"
+import { MissingAudienceError, verifyJWT } from "./verify.js"
 import { CertificateRequestJWTPayload } from "./types.js"
 import { RenewalProofOfPossession, ProofOfPossession, PossessionParseError } from "./proof.js"
 import type { isRevoked as IsRevokedFn } from "./db/index.js"
@@ -11,8 +11,7 @@ import { logger } from "./logger.js"
 import { ms } from "itty-time"
 import { InternalServerErrorException } from "chanfana"
 
-// sshpk is CommonJS and Node's ESM loader cannot detect most of its named exports, so values are taken from the default import
-const { KeyParseError, CertificateParseError, parseCertificate, parseKey, parsePrivateKey } = sshpk
+export { UnsupportedKeyError }
 
 export const fatalIssue = (ctx: z.RefinementCtx, message: string, val: unknown) => {
 	ctx.issues.push({
@@ -57,6 +56,74 @@ type AccessToken = {
 	sub: string
 }
 
+/**
+ * Thrown when a claim of a verified token is missing or is not of the
+ * expected type.
+ */
+export class TokenClaimError extends Error {
+	constructor(message: string) {
+		super(message)
+		this.name = "TokenClaimError"
+
+		Object.setPrototypeOf(this, TokenClaimError.prototype)
+	}
+}
+
+const SubjectClaimSchema = z.string().min(1)
+
+/**
+ * Returns the subject of a verified token, which is compared between the
+ * access and identity tokens so must always be present.
+ *
+ * @param payload The payload of a verified token
+ * @returns The `sub` claim of the token
+ * @throws {@link TokenClaimError} when the `sub` claim is missing, empty or not a string
+ */
+export const tokenSubject = (payload: { sub?: unknown }): string => {
+	const parsed = SubjectClaimSchema.safeParse(payload.sub)
+	if (!parsed.success) {
+		throw new TokenClaimError("JWT was verified but was missing required sub claim")
+	}
+
+	return parsed.data
+}
+
+/**
+ * The claims of an access token that identify the user's email address.
+ *
+ * `email_verified` is optional as not every IdP includes it, but when it is
+ * included it must be true, as an IdP may otherwise issue a token for an
+ * address the user has not shown they control.
+ */
+const EmailClaimsSchema = z.object({
+	email: z.email(),
+	email_verified: z.boolean().optional(),
+})
+
+/**
+ * Returns the email address of a verified access token, or why it cannot be
+ * used.
+ *
+ * @param payload The payload of a verified access token
+ * @returns The email address, or an error message if the claims are not acceptable
+ */
+export const tokenEmail = (payload: Record<string, unknown>): { ok: true, email: string } | { ok: false, error: string } => {
+	if (payload.email === undefined) {
+		return { ok: false, error: "JWT was verified but was missing required email claim" }
+	}
+
+	const parsed = EmailClaimsSchema.safeParse(payload)
+	if (!parsed.success) {
+		return { ok: false, error: "JWT was verified but the email or email_verified claim was not valid" }
+	}
+
+	if (parsed.data.email_verified === false) {
+		return { ok: false, error: "JWT was verified but the email address has not been verified by the IdP" }
+	}
+
+	return { ok: true, email: parsed.data.email }
+}
+
 export const transformAuthorizationHeader = async (env: SshCaBindings, val: string, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): Promise<AccessToken | never> => {
 	if (!val.startsWith("Bearer ") || val.length <= 7) {
 		return fatalIssue(ctx, "authorization header must be a Bearer token", val)
@@ -70,19 +137,28 @@ export const transformAuthorizationHeader = async (env: SshCaBindings, val: stri
 	}
 
 	try {
-		// verify jwt
-		const { payload } = await verifyJWT(env, jwt)
-
-		if (payload.email === undefined) {
-			return fatalIssue(ctx, "JWT was verified but was missing required email claim", val)
+		// verify jwt, which must be issued for this CA
+		const aud = split(env.JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUD).length > 0 ? env.JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_AUD : env.JWT_AUD
+		const { payload } = await verifyJWT(env, jwt, aud)
+
+		const email = tokenEmail(payload)
+		if (!email.ok) {
+			l.warn(email.error, "in", "transformAuthorizationHeader")
+			return fatalIssue(ctx, email.error, val)
 		}
 
 		return {
-			email: payload.email,
-			sub: payload.sub,
+			email: email.email,
+			sub: tokenSubject(payload),
 		}
 	} catch (err) {
 		switch (true) {
+			case (err instanceof MissingAudienceError):
+				// a misconfigured CA is a server error, not a validation failure
+				l.error(err.message, "in", "transformAuthorizationHeader")
+				throw new InternalServerErrorException(err.message)
+			case (err instanceof TokenClaimError):
+				return fatalIssue(ctx, err.message, val)
 			case (err instanceof JWSInvalid):
 				return fatalIssue(ctx, "the access token was invalid", val)
 			case (err instanceof JWTInvalid):
@@ -104,11 +180,20 @@ export const transformAuthorizationHeader = async (env: SshCaBindings, val: stri
 	}
 }
 
-export const transformPublicKey = (val: string | Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): Key | never => {
-	try {
-		const key = typeof val === "string" ? parseKey(Buffer.from(val, "base64")) : parseKey(val)
+// decodes a value sent as base64, which may already have been decoded by the schema
+const fromBase64 = (val: string | Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>): string => {
+	return (typeof val === "string" ? Buffer.from(val, "base64") : Buffer.from(val)).toString("utf8")
+}
 
-		return key
+/**
+ * Parses a public key in OpenSSH format, `${type} ${base64}[ ${comment}]`
+ *
+ * @param val The public key, either base64 encoded or as bytes
+ * @param ctx The Zod context for any errors
+ */
+export const transformPublicKey = (val: string | Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): PublicKey | never => {
+	try {
+		return PublicKey.parse(fromBase64(val))
 	} catch (err) {
 		switch (true) {
 			case (err instanceof TypeError):
@@ -137,6 +222,36 @@ export const transformPublicKey = (val: string | Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>, ctx: z
 	}
 }
 
+/**
+ * Returns why a public key cannot be issued a certificate, or undefined if it
+ * can be.
+ *
+ * RSA keys must be at least {@link MinimumRsaKeyBits} bits, as smaller keys
+ * can be factored and are refused by current OpenSSH releases.
+ *
+ * @param key The public key a certificate would be issued for
+ * @returns The reason the key cannot be used, or undefined if it can be
+ */
+export const subjectKeyIssue = (key: PublicKey): string | undefined => {
+	const bits = rsaKeyBits(key)
+	if (bits !== undefined && bits < MinimumRsaKeyBits) {
+		return `RSA keys must be at least ${MinimumRsaKeyBits} bits, not ${bits}`
+	}
+
+	return undefined
+}
+
+/**
+ * Refines a public key so only one allowed by {@link subjectKeyIssue} is
+ * accepted for a certificate request.
+ */
+export const refineSubjectKey = (val: PublicKey, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): void => {
+	const issue = subjectKeyIssue(val)
+	if (issue !== undefined) {
+		fatalIssue(ctx, issue, val.toString())
+	}
+}
+
 /**
  * Thrown by {@link identityPrincipals} when the principals claim of an
  * identity token is not a string or an array of strings.
@@ -202,13 +317,13 @@ export const parseIdentity = async (env: SshCaBindings, jwt: string | undefined,
 		throw new Error("missing identity token")
 	}
 
-	const aud = split(env.JWT_AUD)
-	const { payload } = await verifyJWT(env, jwt, { aud: aud.length === 0 ? undefined : aud })
+	const { payload } = await verifyJWT(env, jwt, env.JWT_AUD)
 
+	const sub = tokenSubject(payload)
 	const principals = identityPrincipals(env, payload, claim)
 
 	return {
-		sub: payload.sub,
+		sub: sub,
 		principals: principals,
 	}
 }
@@ -219,9 +334,14 @@ export const transformIdentityToken = async (env: SshCaBindings, val: string, ct
 
 		return identity
 	} catch (err) {
+		// a misconfigured CA is a server error, not a validation failure
+		if (err instanceof MissingAudienceError) {
+			logger(env).error(err.message, "in", "transformIdentityToken")
+			throw new InternalServerErrorException(err.message)
+		}
 		ctx.issues.push({
 			code: "custom",
-			message: err instanceof PrincipalsClaimError ? err.message : "problem parsing identity token",
+			message: err instanceof PrincipalsClaimError || err instanceof TokenClaimError ? err.message : "problem parsing identity token",
 			input: val
 		})
 		return z.NEVER
@@ -234,11 +354,9 @@ export const transformIdentityToken = async (env: SshCaBindings, val: string, ct
  * @param ctx The Zod context for any errors
  * @returns
  */
-export const transformCertificate = (val: string | Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): Certificate | never => {
+export const transformCertificate = (val: string | Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): SshCertificate | never => {
 	try {
-		const cert = typeof val === "string" ? parseCertificate(Buffer.from(val, "base64"), "openssh") : parseCertificate(val, "openssh")
-
-		return cert
+		return SshCertificate.parse(fromBase64(val))
 	} catch (err) {
 		switch (true) {
 			case (err instanceof TypeError):
@@ -269,7 +387,7 @@ export const transformCertificate = (val: string | Buffer<ArrayBufferLike>, ctx:
 
 type ParsedCertificateRequest = {
 	proof: ProofOfPossession
-	public_key: Key
+	public_key: PublicKey
 	lifetime: number
 	identity: IdentityToken
 	extensions: string[]
@@ -311,7 +429,7 @@ export const transformRenewalProofOfPossession = (env: SshCaBindings, val: strin
 }
 
 type HostCertificateRequest = {
-	public_key: Key
+	public_key: PublicKey
 	lifetime: number
 }
 
@@ -327,7 +445,7 @@ export const refineHostCertificateRequest = async (env: SshCaBindings, val: Pars
 
 	try {
 		// check proof of possession fingerprint matches public key
-		l.debug("checking val.proof.matches()", "public_key", val.public_key.toString("ssh"))
+		l.debug("checking val.proof.matches()", "public_key", val.public_key.toString())
 		if (!val.proof.matches(val.public_key)) {
 			l.warn("proof of possession fingerprint did not match public_key")
 			return fatalIssue(ctx, "proof of possession fingerprint did not match public_key", val)
@@ -350,39 +468,149 @@ export const refineHostCertificateRequest = async (env: SshCaBindings, val: Pars
 	}
 }
 
+// characters that OpenSSH treats as pattern syntax when matching host
+// certificate principals, or that separate entries in a pattern list
+const HostPrincipalPatternChars = /[*?!,]/
+// whitespace and control characters, which no host name contains
+const HostPrincipalInvalidChars = /[\s\p{Cc}]/u
+
+/**
+ * Returns why a principal cannot be included on a host certificate, or
+ * undefined if it can be.
+ *
+ * OpenSSH matches the principals of a host certificate as patterns, so a
+ * principal such as `*` would make the certificate valid for every host that
+ * trusts the CA. Principals are otherwise not restricted, as hosts may be
+ * reached by IP address, bare host name or fully qualified domain name.
+ *
+ * @param principal The principal to check
+ * @returns The reason the principal cannot be used, or undefined if it can be
+ */
+export const hostPrincipalIssue = (principal: string): string | undefined => {
+	if (principal === "") {
+		return "host certificate principals must not be empty"
+	}
+
+	if (HostPrincipalPatternChars.test(principal)) {
+		return `host certificate principal ${JSON.stringify(principal)} must not contain wildcard or pattern characters (*, ?, ! or ,)`
+	}
+
+	if (HostPrincipalInvalidChars.test(principal)) {
+		return `host certificate principal ${JSON.stringify(principal)} must not contain whitespace or control characters`
+	}
+
+	return undefined
+}
+
+/**
+ * Refines a host certificate principal so only one allowed by
+ * {@link hostPrincipalIssue} is accepted.
+ */
+export const refineHostPrincipal = (val: string, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): void => {
+	const issue = hostPrincipalIssue(val)
+	if (issue !== undefined) {
+		fatalIssue(ctx, issue, val)
+	}
+}
+
 type ParsedHostCertificateRenewal = {
-	certificate: Certificate
+	certificate: SshCertificate
 	proof: RenewalProofOfPossession
 } & HostCertificateRequest
 
-export const refineHostCertificateRenewal = async (env: SshCaBindings, isRevoked: typeof IsRevokedFn, val: ParsedHostCertificateRenewal, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): Promise<never> => {
+/**
+ * Checks a certificate presented for renewal was issued by this CA, is a host
+ * certificate whose principals are allowed (see {@link hostPrincipalIssue}),
+ * is within its validity period and has not been revoked.
+ *
+ * @param env The CA bindings
+ * @param isRevoked Returns whether a serial has been revoked
+ * @param certificate The certificate presented for renewal
+ * @returns The reason the certificate cannot be renewed, or undefined if it can be
+ * @throws {@link UnsupportedKeyError} when the CA key is not supported
+ */
+export const checkRenewableCertificate = async (env: SshCaBindings, isRevoked: typeof IsRevokedFn, certificate: SshCertificate): Promise<string | undefined> => {
+	// ensure certificate is signed by CA
+	const issuer = await getPublic(env)
+	if (!await certificate.isSignedBy(issuer)) {
+		return "the provided certificate was not signed by this CA"
+	}
+
+	// only host certificates can be renewed, as renewal does not need the
+	// OIDC authentication a user certificate is issued with
+	if (certificate.kind !== "host") {
+		return "the provided certificate is not a host certificate"
+	}
+
+	// a certificate issued before small RSA keys were refused must not be
+	// renewed, as the renewal would keep its key
+	const keyIssue = subjectKeyIssue(certificate.publicKey)
+	if (keyIssue !== undefined) {
+		return `the provided certificate cannot be renewed: ${keyIssue}`
+	}
+
+	// a certificate issued before wildcard principals were refused must not
+	// be renewed, as the renewal would keep its principals
+	for (const principal of certificate.principals) {
+		const issue = hostPrincipalIssue(principal)
+		if (issue !== undefined) {
+			return `the provided certificate cannot be renewed: ${issue}`
+		}
+	}
+
+	// check certificate is within its validity period, allowing for clock
+	// skew at the start as a certificate issued moments ago may have a
+	// validity start up to a second in the future
+	const now = Date.now()
+	if (now >= certificate.validBefore.getTime()) {
+		return "the provided certificate is expired"
+	}
+	if (certificate.validAfter.getTime() > now + ms(env.CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_TIME_SKEW_MAX)) {
+		return "the provided certificate is not yet valid"
+	}
+
+	// ensure certificate presented for renewal is not revoked
+	if (await isRevoked(env, certificate.serial)) {
+		return "the provided certificate is revoked"
+	}
+
+	return undefined
+}
+
+/**
+ * Refines a host certificate renewal so only a certificate that can be
+ * renewed (see {@link checkRenewableCertificate}) is accepted.
+ */
+export const refineRenewableCertificate = async (env: SshCaBindings, isRevoked: typeof IsRevokedFn, val: { certificate: SshCertificate }, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): Promise<never> => {
 	const l = logger(env)
 	try {
-		// ensure certificate is signed by CA
-		const issuer = await getPublic(env)
-		if (!val.certificate.isSignedByKey(issuer)) {
-			return fatalIssue(ctx, "the provided certificate was not signed by this CA", val)
+		const reason = await checkRenewableCertificate(env, isRevoked, val.certificate)
+		if (reason !== undefined) {
+			return fatalIssue(ctx, reason, val)
 		}
 
-		// check certificate is within its validity period, allowing for clock
-		// skew at the start as a certificate issued moments ago may have a
-		// validity start up to a second in the future
-		const now = Date.now()
-		if (now >= val.certificate.validUntil.getTime()) {
-			return fatalIssue(ctx, "the provided certificate is expired", val)
-		}
-		if (val.certificate.validFrom.getTime() > now + ms(env.CERTIFICATE_REQUEST_TIME_SKEW_MAX)) {
-			return fatalIssue(ctx, "the provided certificate is not yet valid", val)
+		return z.NEVER
+	} catch (err) {
+		// a misconfigured CA key is a server error, not a validation failure
+		if (err instanceof UnsupportedKeyError) {
+			l.error(err.message, "in", "refineRenewableCertificate")
+			throw new InternalServerErrorException(err.message)
 		}
+		l.error("certificate renewal check unhandled error", "in", "refineRenewableCertificate", "error", err)
+		return fatalIssue(ctx, "certificate renewal check unhandled error", val)
+	}
+}
 
-		// ensure certificate presented for renewal is not revoked
-		const serial = val.certificate.serial.readBigUInt64BE(0)
-		if (await isRevoked(env, serial)) {
-			return fatalIssue(ctx, "the provided certificate is revoked", val)
+export const refineHostCertificateRenewal = async (env: SshCaBindings, isRevoked: typeof IsRevokedFn, val: ParsedHostCertificateRenewal, ctx: z.RefinementCtx): Promise<never> => {
+	const l = logger(env)
+	try {
+		const reason = await checkRenewableCertificate(env, isRevoked, val.certificate)
+		if (reason !== undefined) {
+			return fatalIssue(ctx, reason, val)
 		}
 
 		// check proof of possession fingerprint matches public key and certificate subject key
-		if (!val.proof.matches(val.public_key, val.certificate.subjectKey)) {
+		if (!val.proof.matches(val.public_key, val.certificate.publicKey)) {
 			return fatalIssue(ctx, "proof of possession fingerprints did not match public_key and/or certificate", val)
 		}
 
@@ -406,7 +634,7 @@ export const refineHostCertificateRenewal = async (env: SshCaBindings, isRevoked
 
 type ParsedRevokeCertificate = {
 	serial: bigint
-	public_key: Key
+	public_key: PublicKey
 	proof: ProofOfPossession
 }
 
@@ -441,53 +669,29 @@ export const split = (v?: string | string[]): string[] => {
 			: v
 }
 
-/**
- * Thrown by {@link getPrivateKey} when the CA private key is of a type that
- * cannot be used.
- */
-export class UnsupportedKeyError extends Error {
-	constructor(message: string) {
-		super(message)
-		this.name = "UnsupportedKeyError"
-
-		Object.setPrototypeOf(this, UnsupportedKeyError.prototype)
-	}
-}
-
 /**
  * Load and parse the CA private key from the `PRIVATE_KEY` secret.
  *
- * Only Ed25519 and ECDSA keys are supported. RSA keys are rejected because
- * sshpk signs RSA certificates with SHA-1 (`ssh-rsa`), which OpenSSH 8.2 and
- * later refuse by default, and because RSA keys in OpenSSH format are
- * converted with invalid CRT parameters that the Workers runtime rejects.
+ * Only Ed25519 and ECDSA keys are supported, as these are the key types that
+ * certificates and KRLs are signed with (see `createSigner` in `ssh/signer.ts`).
  *
- * @throws KeyParseError when the secret cannot be parsed.
+ * @throws {@link KeyParseError} when the secret cannot be parsed.
  * @throws {@link UnsupportedKeyError} when the key is not Ed25519 or ECDSA.
  */
 export const getPrivateKey = async (env: SshCaBindings): Promise<PrivateKey> => {
 	// grab private key from secret store
 	const secret = await env.PRIVATE_KEY.get()
 
-	// parse it
-	const key = parsePrivateKey(secret)
-
-	if (key.type !== "ed25519" && key.type !== "ecdsa") {
-		throw new UnsupportedKeyError(`CA key type ${key.type} is not supported, the CA key must be Ed25519 or ECDSA`)
-	}
-
-	return key
+	return parsePrivateKey(secret)
 }
 
-export const getPublic = async (env: SshCaBindings, key?: PrivateKey): Promise<Key> => {
+/**
+ * Returns the public key of the CA, with `ISSUER_DN` as its comment
+ */
+export const getPublic = async (env: SshCaBindings, key?: PrivateKey): Promise<PublicKey> => {
 	if (key === undefined) {
 		key = await getPrivateKey(env)
 	}
 
-	// convert to a public key and add comment
-	const pub = key.toPublic()
-	pub.comment = env.ISSUER_DN
-
-	// return in ssh format trimmed of any whitespace
-	return pub
+	return key.publicKey.withComment(env.ISSUER_DN)
 }

package/src/verify.ts

@@ -3,23 +3,63 @@ import { CertificateRequestJWTPayload } from "./types.js"
 import type { SshCaBindings } from "./types.js"
 import { split } from "./utils.js"
 
-type VerifyOptions = {
-	aud?: string | string[]
+/**
+ * Thrown when no audience is configured for a token, as a token issued for
+ * any client of the IdP would otherwise be accepted.
+ */
+export class MissingAudienceError extends Error {
+	constructor(message: string) {
+		super(message)
+		this.name = "MissingAudienceError"
+
+		Object.setPrototypeOf(this, MissingAudienceError.prototype)
+	}
 }
 
-export const verifyJWT = async (env: SshCaBindings, jwt: string, opts: VerifyOptions = {}) => {
-    const JWKS = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(env.JWT_JWKS_URL))
+type RemoteJWKSet = ReturnType<typeof createRemoteJWKSet>
+
+// the remote JWKS for each URL, kept between requests so the keys that jose
+// caches are reused rather than fetched again for every token
+const remoteJWKSets = new Map<string, RemoteJWKSet>()
+
+/**
+ * Returns the remote JWKS for a URL, creating it on first use.
+ *
+ * jose caches the keys it fetches for up to 10 minutes and fetches them again
+ * sooner when a token is signed with a key it does not have, so keys rotated
+ * by the IdP are still picked up.
+ *
+ * @param url The URL of the JWKS
+ * @returns The remote JWKS for the URL
+ */
+const remoteJWKSet = (url: string): RemoteJWKSet => {
+	let jwks = remoteJWKSets.get(url)
+	if (jwks === undefined) {
+		jwks = createRemoteJWKSet(new URL(url))
+		remoteJWKSets.set(url, jwks)
+	}
+
+	return jwks
+}
 
-	if (opts.aud !== undefined) {
-		return await jwtVerify<CertificateRequestJWTPayload>(jwt, JWKS, {
-			issuer: env.JWT_ISSUER,
-			algorithms: split(env.JWT_ALGORITHMS),
-			audience: opts.aud
-		})
+/**
+ * Verifies a JWT from the IdP, including that it was issued for one of the
+ * audiences given.
+ *
+ * @param env The CA bindings
+ * @param jwt The JWT to verify
+ * @param aud The audiences the JWT may be issued for, which must not be empty
+ * @throws {@link MissingAudienceError} when no audience is given
+ */
+export const verifyJWT = async (env: SshCaBindings, jwt: string, aud: string | string[] | undefined) => {
+	const audience = split(aud)
+	if (audience.length === 0) {
+		throw new MissingAudienceError("no audience is configured for verifying tokens, set JWT_AUD")
 	}
 
-    return await jwtVerify<CertificateRequestJWTPayload>(jwt, JWKS, {
-        issuer: env.JWT_ISSUER,
-        algorithms: split(env.JWT_ALGORITHMS),
-    })
+	return await jwtVerify<CertificateRequestJWTPayload>(jwt, remoteJWKSet(env.JWT_JWKS_URL), {
+		issuer: env.JWT_ISSUER,
+		algorithms: split(env.JWT_ALGORITHMS),
+		audience: audience,
+	})
 }