@akasecurity/ai-tc-codex 0.9.15 → 0.9.16

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ var __toESM = (mod, isNodeMode, target) => (target = mod != null ? __create(__ge
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  mod
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  ));
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- // ../../node_modules/.pnpm/ignore@7.0.10/node_modules/ignore/index.js
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+ // ../../node_modules/.pnpm/ignore@7.0.11/node_modules/ignore/index.js
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  var require_ignore = __commonJS({
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- "../../node_modules/.pnpm/ignore@7.0.10/node_modules/ignore/index.js"(exports, module) {
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+ "../../node_modules/.pnpm/ignore@7.0.11/node_modules/ignore/index.js"(exports, module) {
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  "use strict";
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  function makeArray(subject) {
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  return Array.isArray(subject) ? subject : [subject];
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ var require_ignore = __commonJS({
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  "g"
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  );
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  var TRAILING_WILDCARD = "\uE000";
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+ var TRAILING_DOUBLESTAR = "\uE001";
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  var extractBrackets = (pattern) => {
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  const sources = [];
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  const hold = (source) => `${PLACEHOLDER}${sources.push(source) - 1}${PLACEHOLDER}`;
@@ -329,7 +330,7 @@ var require_ignore = __commonJS({
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  // Zero, one or several directories
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  // should not use '*', or it will be replaced by the next replacer
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  // Check if it is not the last `'/**'`
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- (_, index, str) => index + 6 < str.length ? str.slice(index + 6) === "\\/" ? "(?:\\/[^\\/]+)+" : "(?:\\/[^\\/]+)*" : "\\/.+",
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+ (_, index, str) => index + 6 < str.length ? str.slice(index + 6) === "\\/" ? "(?:\\/[^\\/]+)+" : "(?:\\/[^\\/]+)*" : `\\/${TRAILING_DOUBLESTAR}`,
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  "*"
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  ],
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  // normal intermediate wildcards
@@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ var require_ignore = __commonJS({
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  // 'js' will match 'a.js' and 'a.js/'
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  (source) => {
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  const last = source[source.length - 1];
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- if (!last || last === TRAILING_WILDCARD) {
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+ if (!last || last === TRAILING_WILDCARD || last === TRAILING_DOUBLESTAR) {
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  return source;
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  }
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  return last === SLASH2 ? `${source}$` : `${source}(?=$|\\/$)`;
@@ -418,16 +419,12 @@ var require_ignore = __commonJS({
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  var MODE_IGNORE = "regex";
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  var MODE_CHECK_IGNORE = "checkRegex";
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  var UNDERSCORE = "_";
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- var TRAILING_WILD_CARD_REPLACERS = {
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- [MODE_IGNORE](_, p1) {
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- const prefix = p1 ? `${p1}[^/]+` : "[^/]*";
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- return `${prefix}(?=$|\\/$)`;
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- },
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- [MODE_CHECK_IGNORE](_, p1) {
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- const prefix = p1 ? `${p1}[^/]*` : "[^/]*";
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- return `${prefix}(?=$|\\/$)`;
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- }
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+ var replaceTrailingWildcard = (_, p1) => {
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+ const prefix = p1 ? `${p1}[^/]+` : "[^/]*";
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+ return `${prefix}(?=$|\\/$)`;
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  };
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+ var REGEX_REPLACE_TRAILING_DOUBLESTAR = /\uE001$/;
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+ var replaceTrailingDoublestar = () => ".+(?=$|\\/$)";
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  var WILDCARD = "[^\\/]*";
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  var separatorAfter = (run, at) => {
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  let separator = EMPTY;
@@ -543,6 +540,14 @@ var require_ignore = __commonJS({
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  (match, index) => sources[index]
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  ) : replaced;
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  };
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+ var checkSourceOf = (body, prefix) => {
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+ if (body[body.length - 1] === SLASH2) {
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+ prefix = makeRegexPrefix(body.slice(0, -1));
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+ }
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+ const head = prefix.slice(0, -1);
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+ const last = prefix[prefix.length - 1];
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+ return last === TRAILING_WILDCARD ? `${head}$` : last === TRAILING_DOUBLESTAR ? `${head}.*$` : NEVER_MATCH;
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+ };
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  var matchesBasename = (body) => {
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  const index = body.indexOf(SLASH2);
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  return index < 0 || index === body.length - 1;
@@ -603,11 +608,9 @@ var require_ignore = __commonJS({
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  return this._make(MODE_CHECK_IGNORE, key);
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  }
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  _make(mode, key) {
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- const str = pinWildcards(this.regexPrefix.replace(
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- REGEX_REPLACE_TRAILING_WILDCARD,
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- // It does not need to bind pattern
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- TRAILING_WILD_CARD_REPLACERS[mode]
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- ));
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+ const str = pinWildcards(
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+ mode === MODE_IGNORE ? this.regexPrefix.replace(REGEX_REPLACE_TRAILING_WILDCARD, replaceTrailingWildcard).replace(REGEX_REPLACE_TRAILING_DOUBLESTAR, replaceTrailingDoublestar) : checkSourceOf(this.body, this.regexPrefix)
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+ );
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  const regex = this.ignoreCase ? new RegExp(str, "i") : new RegExp(str);
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  return define(this, key, regex);
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  }
@@ -666,8 +669,39 @@ var require_ignore = __commonJS({
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  makeArray(
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  isString(pattern) ? splitPattern(pattern) : pattern
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  ).forEach(this._add, this);
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+ if (this._added) {
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+ this._literalRules = UNDEFINED;
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+ }
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  return this._added;
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  }
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+ // Match the literal 'abc/' for `checkIgnore`, last rule wins. Only a rule
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+ // ending in a wildcard can match it (see `checkSourceOf`), so the rest
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+ // are left out once, rather than tested or compiled for every path.
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+ testLiteral(path) {
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+ const rules = this._literalRules || (this._literalRules = this._rules.filter(
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+ ({ body }) => body[body.length - (body[body.length - 1] === SLASH2 ? 2 : 1)] === "*"
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+ ));
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+ let ignored = false;
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+ let unignored = false;
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+ let matchedRule;
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+ for (let index = rules.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {
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+ const rule = rules[index];
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+ if (rule.checkRegex.test(path)) {
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+ ignored = !rule.negative;
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+ unignored = rule.negative;
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+ matchedRule = rule.negative ? UNDEFINED : rule;
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ const ret = {
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+ ignored,
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+ unignored
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+ };
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+ if (matchedRule) {
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+ ret.rule = matchedRule;
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+ }
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+ return ret;
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+ }
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  // Test one single path without recursively checking parent directories
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  //
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  // - checkUnignored `boolean` whether should check if the path is unignored,
@@ -788,14 +822,12 @@ var require_ignore = __commonJS({
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  if (path.charCodeAt(path.length - 1) !== SLASH_CODE) {
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  return this.test(path);
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  }
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- const parentPath = parentOf(path);
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- if (parentPath) {
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- const parent = this._t(parentPath, this._testCache, true);
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- if (parent.ignored) {
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- return parent;
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- }
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+ const dir = this._t(path, this._testCache, true);
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+ if (dir.ignored) {
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+ return dir;
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  }
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- return this._rules.test(path, false, MODE_CHECK_IGNORE);
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+ const literal2 = this._rules.testLiteral(path);
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+ return literal2.ignored || literal2.unignored ? literal2 : dir;
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  }
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  _t(path, cache, checkUnignored) {
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  if (path in cache) {
@@ -21515,11 +21547,33 @@ var ResolutionMethod = external_exports.enum([
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  "false-positive",
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  "redetected"
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  ]).meta({ id: "ResolutionMethod" });
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+ var FindingContextBasis = external_exports.enum(["file", "excerpt"]).meta({ id: "FindingContextBasis" });
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+ var FindingContext = external_exports.object({
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+ basis: FindingContextBasis,
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+ // 1-based line number of `lines[0]`.
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+ firstLine: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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+ lines: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).min(1).max(5),
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+ match: external_exports.object({
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+ // 1-based line number, within [firstLine, firstLine + lines.length).
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+ line: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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+ // Offsets into that entry of `lines`, end exclusive.
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+ start: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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+ end: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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+ }).nullable()
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+ }).meta({ id: "FindingContext" });
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+ var FindingLocation = external_exports.object({
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+ line: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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+ col: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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+ context: FindingContext.nullable()
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+ });
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  var FindingMatch = external_exports.object({
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  // Masked preview of the matched value. Never raw content.
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  maskedValue: external_exports.string(),
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- // Redacted source-line prefix. Currently empty (pending privacy review).
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- contextPrefix: external_exports.string()
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+ // Deprecated: always empty. Superseded by `context`.
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+ contextPrefix: external_exports.string(),
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+ // The masked lines around the match. Absent when the finding predates
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+ // context capture or none could be built safely.
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+ context: FindingContext.optional()
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  }).meta({ id: "FindingMatch" });
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  var FindingDetectionRef = external_exports.object({
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  id: external_exports.string(),
@@ -21539,6 +21593,11 @@ var FindingInstance = external_exports.object({
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  provider: FindingProvider,
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  repo: external_exports.string(),
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  file: external_exports.string(),
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+ // 1-based line and column of the match start in the scanned text (the
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+ // column in UTF-16 code units). Absent for findings that predate location
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+ // capture or have no source text.
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+ line: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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+ col: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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  // Who the capturing event is attributed to. Optional: a single-user store
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  // has no one to attribute a finding to and never sets it.
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  user: FindingUser.optional(),
@@ -21600,6 +21659,13 @@ var FindingStats = external_exports.object({
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  low: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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  })
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  }).meta({ id: "FindingStats" });
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+ var FindingsOverview = external_exports.object({
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+ findings: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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+ open: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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+ handled: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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+ resolved: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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+ dismissed: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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+ }).meta({ id: "FindingsOverview" });
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  var FindingFacetItem = external_exports.object({
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  value: external_exports.string(),
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  count: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
@@ -21717,6 +21783,7 @@ var FindingInstanceDetail = FindingInstance.extend({
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  policy: FindingPolicyRef
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  }).meta({ id: "FindingInstanceDetail" });
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  var MAX_FLAT_FINDINGS_LIMIT = 200;
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+ var FindingContextQuery = external_exports.object({ id: external_exports.string().min(1).max(256) });
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  var ListFindingInstancesQuery = external_exports.object({
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  severity: external_exports.array(Severity).optional(),
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  // Rule ids, the same vocabulary the types list's `subtype` carries. Pinning
@@ -22048,7 +22115,23 @@ var CaptureAttributes = external_exports.object({
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  // capture denied by another finding's own Block policy carries `block`
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  // here too. The full statement is on EventMetadata.redactDegradedTo; it is
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  // repeated rather than referenced because a store reader opens this file.
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- redact_degraded_to: ActionTaken.optional()
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+ redact_degraded_to: ActionTaken.optional(),
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+ // The scope key this capture was stamped with: the canonical repository
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+ // (`host/owner/repo`) of the path the capture names (a relative path is read
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+ // against its working directory), else of its own working directory, or a
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+ // chat account's identity. The store's local `scope_key` column reads it, so
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+ // a scoped attachment has a per-row key to work from. Absent when no key
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+ // could be derived.
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+ //
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+ // LOCAL ONLY. That is the contract for every path that sends a row. Producers
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+ // stamp it in every attachment mode, and the two structural choke points strip
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+ // it: the attached gateway's `reKeyForForward` on the live path, and the
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+ // history drain's `rebuildAuditEvent`, which drops it through `withoutScopeKey`.
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+ // A capture row's bag reaches the wire through `rebuildCapture`, which builds
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+ // the metadata from named keys and never names this one; `toCaptureAttributes`,
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+ // which builds the bag from a wire event, never emits it. What a scoped
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+ // attachment does with the key is not part of this shape's contract.
22134
+ scope_key: external_exports.string().optional()
22052
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  }).catchall(external_exports.unknown());
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  var CaptureStatusAttributes = external_exports.object({
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  source_tool: external_exports.string().optional(),
@@ -22078,6 +22161,12 @@ var ToolCallInspection = external_exports.object({
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  actionTaken: ActionTaken,
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  confidence: external_exports.number().min(0).max(1)
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  });
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+ var findingLocationFields = {
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+ line: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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+ col: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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+ context: FindingContext.nullable().optional()
22168
+ };
22169
+ var ToolCallInspectionInput = ToolCallInspection.extend(findingLocationFields);
22081
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  var ToolCallInput = external_exports.object({
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  sessionId: external_exports.string().min(1),
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  toolUseId: external_exports.string().min(1),
@@ -22087,7 +22176,7 @@ var ToolCallInput = external_exports.object({
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  attributes: ToolCallAttributes,
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  // Secrets detected in the tool's (masked) target — written as linked
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22178
  // `inspection_findings`. Empty for a clean tool call.
22090
- inspections: external_exports.array(ToolCallInspection).default([])
22179
+ inspections: external_exports.array(ToolCallInspectionInput).default([])
22091
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  });
22092
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  var InventoryInput = external_exports.object({
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  objectType: InventoryObjectType,
@@ -22161,7 +22250,8 @@ var InspectionFindingInput = external_exports.object({
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  // same findingKey — mirrors the legacy `findings.first_detected_at`.
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22251
  // Optional: when omitted, the writer derives it from the referenced audit
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22252
  // event's startedAt on first insert (see SqliteInspectionFindingsRepository).
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- firstDetectedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional()
22253
+ firstDetectedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional(),
22254
+ ...findingLocationFields
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22255
  });
22166
22256
  var InventoryContext = external_exports.object({
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  host: InventoryInput.optional(),
@@ -22936,6 +23026,17 @@ var AttachedCredential = external_exports.object({
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  keyPrefix: external_exports.string().min(1).max(16).optional(),
22937
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  mintedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional()
22938
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  });
23029
+ var AttachmentMode = external_exports.enum(["machine", "scoped"]);
23030
+ var ATTACHED_CREDENTIAL_SCOPED_SPEC_VERSION = 2;
23031
+ var AttachedCredentialV1 = AttachedCredential;
23032
+ var AttachedCredentialV2 = AttachedCredential.extend({
23033
+ specVersion: external_exports.literal(ATTACHED_CREDENTIAL_SCOPED_SPEC_VERSION),
23034
+ mode: external_exports.literal("scoped")
23035
+ });
23036
+ var AttachedCredentialAny = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("specVersion", [
23037
+ AttachedCredentialV1,
23038
+ AttachedCredentialV2
23039
+ ]);
22939
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  var MAX_DATE_MS = 253402300799999;
22940
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  var MAX_INT4 = 2147483647;
22941
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  var StorePosturePack = external_exports.object({
@@ -23217,6 +23318,130 @@ var PackId = external_exports.string().regex(/^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$/);
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  var SemVer = external_exports.string().regex(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+(?:-[0-9A-Za-z-.]+)?$/);
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  var PublisherKind = external_exports.enum(["labs", "user", "org"]);
23219
23320
 
23321
+ // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/builtin-policy-id.ts
23322
+ var KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS = ["monitor", "warn", "redact", "vault", "block"];
23323
+ var BuiltinPolicyId = external_exports.enum(KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS).meta({ id: "BuiltinPolicyId" });
23324
+
23325
+ // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/event.ts
23326
+ var EventKind = external_exports.enum(["prompt", "response", "code_change", "tool_use"]).meta({ id: "EventKind" });
23327
+ var CAPTURE_EVENT_TYPES_SQL = EventKind.options.map((k) => `'${k}'`).join(",");
23328
+ var EventMetadata = external_exports.object({
23329
+ sessionId: external_exports.string().optional(),
23330
+ repo: external_exports.string().optional(),
23331
+ filePath: external_exports.string().optional(),
23332
+ // The host tool whose input/output was scanned (e.g. 'Bash', 'WebFetch'),
23333
+ // set by the tool-scanning hooks. The tool NAME only — never the tool's
23334
+ // arguments or output, which can carry the very value a finding masked
23335
+ // (metadata is stored unredacted). Gives findings on non-file captures a
23336
+ // display location ("via Bash") when no filePath exists.
23337
+ toolName: external_exports.string().optional(),
23338
+ // Set (true) by the worktree scanner when the file is excluded by the
23339
+ // repo's .gitignore. Gitignored files ARE still scanned — local scratch and
23340
+ // generated code can leak real secrets — but the provenance is recorded so
23341
+ // policy/dashboards can treat those findings as informational rather than
23342
+ // blocking. Omitted (not false) for tracked files and non-scan events.
23343
+ gitignored: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
23344
+ // Set (true) ONLY when the event's `content` is the COMPLETE file at
23345
+ // capture time (a worktree scan reading from disk). Hook-captured edits
23346
+ // (e.g. an Edit tool's new_string) are partial fragments and MUST NOT set
23347
+ // this. The resolver-on-ingest keys its fixed-at-source dropout
23348
+ // diff on this marker: only a whole-file snapshot can prove a previously
23349
+ // open finding is gone; a fragment's absence proves nothing (the secret
23350
+ // may live outside the hunk). Omitted (not false) for fragments and
23351
+ // non-scan events, so pre-marker clients safely default to the
23352
+ // non-authoritative path.
23353
+ wholeFile: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
23354
+ model: external_exports.string().optional(),
23355
+ turnIndex: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
23356
+ // Distributed-tracing correlation. `correlationId` ties a recorded event back
23357
+ // to the request that captured/ingested it (a UUID, generated independently of
23358
+ // the trace id); `traceId` is the W3C trace id (32 lowercase hex chars) of the
23359
+ // originating span when telemetry is enabled. Both optional + backward
23360
+ // compatible — populated by the plugin (see @akasecurity/plugin-sdk).
23361
+ correlationId: external_exports.uuid().optional(),
23362
+ traceId: external_exports.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/).optional(),
23363
+ // Ids of the detection exceptions that downgraded findings in this capture
23364
+ // to 'allow' — the enforcement audit trail's link back to the grant that
23365
+ // authorized the bypass. Absent on captures where no exception applied.
23366
+ exceptionIds: external_exports.array(external_exports.guid()).optional(),
23367
+ // The assistant message this capture belongs to, and the conversation it sits
23368
+ // in — set by the browser extension's network capture so a stored `response`
23369
+ // row can be joined to the `llm_call` leaf describing the same turn. Absent
23370
+ // on every other capture path, which has no such id.
23371
+ //
23372
+ // Non-empty for the reason WebExchange.messageId is: it is the join key, and
23373
+ // a blank one matches no `llm_call` leaf. That refusal reaches only the
23374
+ // places an event is PARSED; the local write path types the event and parses
23375
+ // nothing, which is why `toCaptureAttributes` omits a blank one separately.
23376
+ messageId: external_exports.string().min(1).optional(),
23377
+ conversationId: external_exports.string().optional(),
23378
+ // How long THIS capture's inspection blocked its caller, in whole
23379
+ // milliseconds — the plugin's own added latency, NOT the LLM call it sat in
23380
+ // front of. Measured inside `capture()` (@akasecurity/plugin-sdk) across
23381
+ // detection + redaction, the work the host session actually waits on.
23382
+ //
23383
+ // Stamped ONLY on live in-flight captures. A capture that carries its own
23384
+ // `occurredAt` is replaying past work (the transcript backfill, the worktree
23385
+ // scan), and its scan duration is not latency any host session experienced,
23386
+ // so those rows leave this ABSENT rather than reporting a misleading number.
23387
+ // Absent is also what every pre-measurement client writes, and what a
23388
+ // clock failure degrades to — a reader must treat absence as "not measured"
23389
+ // and never as a zero, which would read as "inspection is free".
23390
+ inspectionMs: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
23391
+ // What a `redact` this capture COULD NOT CARRY OUT became instead — the
23392
+ // workspace's `redactFallback`, applied because the field could not be
23393
+ // masked in place (a shell command, a URL, or any argument on a host whose
23394
+ // hook contract offers no rewrite channel).
23395
+ //
23396
+ // It exists because the action alone cannot say why. A finding recorded as
23397
+ // `warn` reads identically whether its detection was ASSIGNED Warn or was
23398
+ // assigned Redact on a field that could not take one — and those are
23399
+ // different facts about the same row: the first is a policy the user chose,
23400
+ // the second is a masking the host could not perform. Absent means no
23401
+ // degrade happened, which is every ordinary capture.
23402
+ //
23403
+ // TWO LIMITS a reader of a stored row has to know, because the grain here
23404
+ // is the CAPTURE while `actionTaken` is per FINDING:
23405
+ //
23406
+ // - It does not say WHICH finding degraded. A capture carrying a degraded
23407
+ // `redact` alongside a finding ASSIGNED the same action stores both
23408
+ // identically and one reason for the pair; attributing it to both
23409
+ // describes the assigned one wrongly, and to neither loses the degrade.
23410
+ // - PRESENCE IS NOT CAUSATION. The value is the action the lost redact
23411
+ // became, not the reason the capture ended as it did — a capture denied
23412
+ // by some other finding's own Block policy still carries `block` here,
23413
+ // and clearing the workspace's fallback would not have let it through.
23414
+ // Gate on the value against what a fallback can produce; never read the
23415
+ // field's presence as "this was the fallback's doing".
23416
+ //
23417
+ // Both are pinned as behaviour in @akasecurity/plugin-sdk's runtime suite.
23418
+ // Closing either means moving the reason onto the finding row, which
23419
+ // already carries its own action.
23420
+ redactDegradedTo: ActionTaken.optional()
23421
+ }).meta({ id: "EventMetadata" });
23422
+ var Event = external_exports.object({
23423
+ id: external_exports.guid(),
23424
+ sourceTool: SourceTool,
23425
+ kind: EventKind,
23426
+ occurredAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
23427
+ contentHash: external_exports.string(),
23428
+ content: external_exports.string(),
23429
+ metadata: EventMetadata.optional()
23430
+ }).meta({ id: "Event" });
23431
+ var IngestEvent = Event.meta({ id: "IngestEvent" });
23432
+ var INGEST_BATCH_MAX = 100;
23433
+ var IngestBatch = external_exports.object({
23434
+ events: external_exports.array(IngestEvent).min(1).max(INGEST_BATCH_MAX),
23435
+ // Dedup policy for this batch. Id-dedup ALWAYS applies. 'content-hash'
23436
+ // additionally rejects any event whose contentHash the store has already
23437
+ // recorded — for re-runnable bulk ingest (worktree scan, transcript
23438
+ // backfill), where a re-run mints fresh event ids for identical content and
23439
+ // would otherwise accumulate duplicates. Live hook traffic must NOT set it:
23440
+ // two genuinely separate prompts can be byte-identical and both belong on
23441
+ // the timeline.
23442
+ dedupe: external_exports.literal("content-hash").optional()
23443
+ }).meta({ id: "IngestBatch" });
23444
+
23220
23445
  // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/rule.ts
23221
23446
  var MatcherType = external_exports.enum(["keyword", "regex"]).meta({ id: "MatcherType" });
23222
23447
  var RuleProbeVerdict = external_exports.enum(["safe", "quarantined"]).meta({ id: "RuleProbeVerdict" });
@@ -23285,7 +23510,10 @@ var Matcher = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("type", [KeywordMatcher, Regex
23285
23510
  var MATCHER_TYPES = MatcherType.options;
23286
23511
  var AppliesTo = external_exports.strictObject({
23287
23512
  // Dot-prefixed, e.g. ".py" — matches the scanner's SOURCE_EXTENSIONS shape.
23288
- extensions: external_exports.array(external_exports.string().regex(/^\.[A-Za-z0-9]+$/)).min(1)
23513
+ extensions: external_exports.array(external_exports.string().regex(/^\.[A-Za-z0-9]+$/)).min(1).optional(),
23514
+ eventKinds: external_exports.array(EventKind).min(1).optional()
23515
+ }).refine((v) => v.extensions !== void 0 || v.eventKinds !== void 0, {
23516
+ message: "appliesTo needs extensions, eventKinds, or both"
23289
23517
  }).meta({ id: "AppliesTo" });
23290
23518
  var PostValidatorName = external_exports.enum(["entropy", "luhn"]).meta({ id: "PostValidatorName" });
23291
23519
  var PostValidatorRef = external_exports.union(
@@ -23308,6 +23536,7 @@ var PostValidatorRef = external_exports.union(
23308
23536
  )}) or { "name": ..., "config": { ... } }. An unrecognized name would be a false-positive guard that never runs.`
23309
23537
  }
23310
23538
  ).meta({ id: "PostValidatorRef" });
23539
+ var RuleEvidence = external_exports.enum(["code", "value"]).meta({ id: "RuleEvidence" });
23311
23540
  var RequiresNearby = external_exports.strictObject({
23312
23541
  // Each array, when present, must be non-empty and contain non-empty strings —
23313
23542
  // an empty/blank criterion would either never fire or (for labels) match
@@ -23330,6 +23559,8 @@ var RuleFixture = external_exports.strictObject({
23330
23559
  // Simulated file context for the scan, so fixtures can assert `appliesTo`
23331
23560
  // gating (e.g. a Python-only pattern must NOT fire in a .ts file).
23332
23561
  filePath: external_exports.string().optional(),
23562
+ // Simulated capture kind, so fixtures can assert `appliesTo.eventKinds`.
23563
+ eventKind: EventKind.optional(),
23333
23564
  expectedSpans: external_exports.array(external_exports.strictObject({ start: external_exports.number(), end: external_exports.number() })).optional()
23334
23565
  }).meta({ id: "RuleFixture" });
23335
23566
  var Rule = external_exports.strictObject({
@@ -23355,7 +23586,9 @@ var Rule = external_exports.strictObject({
23355
23586
  appliesTo: AppliesTo.optional(),
23356
23587
  postValidators: external_exports.array(PostValidatorRef).optional(),
23357
23588
  requiresNearby: RequiresNearby.optional(),
23358
- examples: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).optional()
23589
+ examples: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).optional(),
23590
+ // Whether the matched text is itself sensitive. Absent means 'value'.
23591
+ evidence: RuleEvidence.optional()
23359
23592
  }).meta({ id: "Rule" });
23360
23593
  var Author = external_exports.object({
23361
23594
  name: external_exports.string(),
@@ -23372,7 +23605,11 @@ var PackManifest = external_exports.object({
23372
23605
  description: external_exports.string().optional(),
23373
23606
  author: Author.optional(),
23374
23607
  license: external_exports.string().optional(),
23375
- sourceUrl: external_exports.url().optional()
23608
+ sourceUrl: external_exports.url().optional(),
23609
+ // The built-in policy a FIRST install of this pack assigns
23610
+ // (installed_packs.policy_id). Absent leaves the pack unassigned, so its
23611
+ // rules follow the category policies. An existing install never takes it.
23612
+ defaultPolicy: BuiltinPolicyId.optional()
23376
23613
  }).meta({ id: "PackManifest" });
23377
23614
 
23378
23615
  // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/detection.ts
@@ -23400,10 +23637,12 @@ var DetectionListItem = external_exports.object({
23400
23637
  // Per-pack enforcement-policy assignment. Holds a BuiltinPolicyId ARCHETYPE
23401
23638
  // (monitor|warn|redact|block) — NOT a policies-table Policy.id guid; a
23402
23639
  // detection is a PACK, and its policy is the archetype applied to all its
23403
- // rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor everywhere
23404
- // (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID). Every enforcement surface expands it into
23405
- // per-rule policies (see policyIdToAction). Typed z.string() (not
23406
- // the enum) to keep the OpenAPI response tolerant of a future custom id.
23640
+ // rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor by default
23641
+ // (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID); a host may resolve it to a policy of its own
23642
+ // (see the dashboard's `unassignedPolicy`). Every enforcement surface
23643
+ // expands it into per-rule policies (see policyIdToAction). Typed
23644
+ // z.string() (not the enum) to keep the OpenAPI response tolerant of a
23645
+ // future custom id.
23407
23646
  policyId: external_exports.string().optional(),
23408
23647
  // Set ONLY when a newer snapshot is available for this pack (OSS: the
23409
23648
  // bundled inventory recorded in available_packs differs from the installed
@@ -23472,10 +23711,12 @@ var DetectionDetail = external_exports.object({
23472
23711
  // Per-pack enforcement-policy assignment. Holds a BuiltinPolicyId ARCHETYPE
23473
23712
  // (monitor|warn|redact|block) — NOT a policies-table Policy.id guid; a
23474
23713
  // detection is a PACK, and its policy is the archetype applied to all its
23475
- // rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor everywhere
23476
- // (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID). Every enforcement surface expands it into
23477
- // per-rule policies (see policyIdToAction). Typed z.string() (not
23478
- // the enum) to keep the OpenAPI response tolerant of a future custom id.
23714
+ // rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor by default
23715
+ // (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID); a host may resolve it to a policy of its own
23716
+ // (see the dashboard's `unassignedPolicy`). Every enforcement surface
23717
+ // expands it into per-rule policies (see policyIdToAction). Typed
23718
+ // z.string() (not the enum) to keep the OpenAPI response tolerant of a
23719
+ // future custom id.
23479
23720
  policyId: external_exports.string().optional()
23480
23721
  }).meta({ id: "DetectionDetail" });
23481
23722
  var LibraryItem = external_exports.object({
@@ -23505,126 +23746,6 @@ var ImportDetectionRequest = external_exports.object({
23505
23746
  })
23506
23747
  }).meta({ id: "ImportDetectionRequest" });
23507
23748
 
23508
- // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/event.ts
23509
- var EventKind = external_exports.enum(["prompt", "response", "code_change", "tool_use"]).meta({ id: "EventKind" });
23510
- var CAPTURE_EVENT_TYPES_SQL = EventKind.options.map((k) => `'${k}'`).join(",");
23511
- var EventMetadata = external_exports.object({
23512
- sessionId: external_exports.string().optional(),
23513
- repo: external_exports.string().optional(),
23514
- filePath: external_exports.string().optional(),
23515
- // The host tool whose input/output was scanned (e.g. 'Bash', 'WebFetch'),
23516
- // set by the tool-scanning hooks. The tool NAME only — never the tool's
23517
- // arguments or output, which can carry the very value a finding masked
23518
- // (metadata is stored unredacted). Gives findings on non-file captures a
23519
- // display location ("via Bash") when no filePath exists.
23520
- toolName: external_exports.string().optional(),
23521
- // Set (true) by the worktree scanner when the file is excluded by the
23522
- // repo's .gitignore. Gitignored files ARE still scanned — local scratch and
23523
- // generated code can leak real secrets — but the provenance is recorded so
23524
- // policy/dashboards can treat those findings as informational rather than
23525
- // blocking. Omitted (not false) for tracked files and non-scan events.
23526
- gitignored: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
23527
- // Set (true) ONLY when the event's `content` is the COMPLETE file at
23528
- // capture time (a worktree scan reading from disk). Hook-captured edits
23529
- // (e.g. an Edit tool's new_string) are partial fragments and MUST NOT set
23530
- // this. The resolver-on-ingest keys its fixed-at-source dropout
23531
- // diff on this marker: only a whole-file snapshot can prove a previously
23532
- // open finding is gone; a fragment's absence proves nothing (the secret
23533
- // may live outside the hunk). Omitted (not false) for fragments and
23534
- // non-scan events, so pre-marker clients safely default to the
23535
- // non-authoritative path.
23536
- wholeFile: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
23537
- model: external_exports.string().optional(),
23538
- turnIndex: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
23539
- // Distributed-tracing correlation. `correlationId` ties a recorded event back
23540
- // to the request that captured/ingested it (a UUID, generated independently of
23541
- // the trace id); `traceId` is the W3C trace id (32 lowercase hex chars) of the
23542
- // originating span when telemetry is enabled. Both optional + backward
23543
- // compatible — populated by the plugin (see @akasecurity/plugin-sdk).
23544
- correlationId: external_exports.uuid().optional(),
23545
- traceId: external_exports.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/).optional(),
23546
- // Ids of the detection exceptions that downgraded findings in this capture
23547
- // to 'allow' — the enforcement audit trail's link back to the grant that
23548
- // authorized the bypass. Absent on captures where no exception applied.
23549
- exceptionIds: external_exports.array(external_exports.guid()).optional(),
23550
- // The assistant message this capture belongs to, and the conversation it sits
23551
- // in — set by the browser extension's network capture so a stored `response`
23552
- // row can be joined to the `llm_call` leaf describing the same turn. Absent
23553
- // on every other capture path, which has no such id.
23554
- //
23555
- // Non-empty for the reason WebExchange.messageId is: it is the join key, and
23556
- // a blank one matches no `llm_call` leaf. That refusal reaches only the
23557
- // places an event is PARSED; the local write path types the event and parses
23558
- // nothing, which is why `toCaptureAttributes` omits a blank one separately.
23559
- messageId: external_exports.string().min(1).optional(),
23560
- conversationId: external_exports.string().optional(),
23561
- // How long THIS capture's inspection blocked its caller, in whole
23562
- // milliseconds — the plugin's own added latency, NOT the LLM call it sat in
23563
- // front of. Measured inside `capture()` (@akasecurity/plugin-sdk) across
23564
- // detection + redaction, the work the host session actually waits on.
23565
- //
23566
- // Stamped ONLY on live in-flight captures. A capture that carries its own
23567
- // `occurredAt` is replaying past work (the transcript backfill, the worktree
23568
- // scan), and its scan duration is not latency any host session experienced,
23569
- // so those rows leave this ABSENT rather than reporting a misleading number.
23570
- // Absent is also what every pre-measurement client writes, and what a
23571
- // clock failure degrades to — a reader must treat absence as "not measured"
23572
- // and never as a zero, which would read as "inspection is free".
23573
- inspectionMs: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
23574
- // What a `redact` this capture COULD NOT CARRY OUT became instead — the
23575
- // workspace's `redactFallback`, applied because the field could not be
23576
- // masked in place (a shell command, a URL, or any argument on a host whose
23577
- // hook contract offers no rewrite channel).
23578
- //
23579
- // It exists because the action alone cannot say why. A finding recorded as
23580
- // `warn` reads identically whether its detection was ASSIGNED Warn or was
23581
- // assigned Redact on a field that could not take one — and those are
23582
- // different facts about the same row: the first is a policy the user chose,
23583
- // the second is a masking the host could not perform. Absent means no
23584
- // degrade happened, which is every ordinary capture.
23585
- //
23586
- // TWO LIMITS a reader of a stored row has to know, because the grain here
23587
- // is the CAPTURE while `actionTaken` is per FINDING:
23588
- //
23589
- // - It does not say WHICH finding degraded. A capture carrying a degraded
23590
- // `redact` alongside a finding ASSIGNED the same action stores both
23591
- // identically and one reason for the pair; attributing it to both
23592
- // describes the assigned one wrongly, and to neither loses the degrade.
23593
- // - PRESENCE IS NOT CAUSATION. The value is the action the lost redact
23594
- // became, not the reason the capture ended as it did — a capture denied
23595
- // by some other finding's own Block policy still carries `block` here,
23596
- // and clearing the workspace's fallback would not have let it through.
23597
- // Gate on the value against what a fallback can produce; never read the
23598
- // field's presence as "this was the fallback's doing".
23599
- //
23600
- // Both are pinned as behaviour in @akasecurity/plugin-sdk's runtime suite.
23601
- // Closing either means moving the reason onto the finding row, which
23602
- // already carries its own action.
23603
- redactDegradedTo: ActionTaken.optional()
23604
- }).meta({ id: "EventMetadata" });
23605
- var Event = external_exports.object({
23606
- id: external_exports.guid(),
23607
- sourceTool: SourceTool,
23608
- kind: EventKind,
23609
- occurredAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
23610
- contentHash: external_exports.string(),
23611
- content: external_exports.string(),
23612
- metadata: EventMetadata.optional()
23613
- }).meta({ id: "Event" });
23614
- var IngestEvent = Event.meta({ id: "IngestEvent" });
23615
- var INGEST_BATCH_MAX = 100;
23616
- var IngestBatch = external_exports.object({
23617
- events: external_exports.array(IngestEvent).min(1).max(INGEST_BATCH_MAX),
23618
- // Dedup policy for this batch. Id-dedup ALWAYS applies. 'content-hash'
23619
- // additionally rejects any event whose contentHash the store has already
23620
- // recorded — for re-runnable bulk ingest (worktree scan, transcript
23621
- // backfill), where a re-run mints fresh event ids for identical content and
23622
- // would otherwise accumulate duplicates. Live hook traffic must NOT set it:
23623
- // two genuinely separate prompts can be byte-identical and both belong on
23624
- // the timeline.
23625
- dedupe: external_exports.literal("content-hash").optional()
23626
- }).meta({ id: "IngestBatch" });
23627
-
23628
23749
  // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/exception.ts
23629
23750
  var ExceptionScope = external_exports.enum(["once", "temporary", "permanent"]);
23630
23751
  var ExceptionConditions = external_exports.object({
@@ -23785,8 +23906,6 @@ var Policy = external_exports.object({
23785
23906
  // test `prohibitedModels` passes and `reversibleRuleIds` fails.
23786
23907
  provenance: PolicyProvenance.optional()
23787
23908
  }).meta({ id: "Policy" });
23788
- var KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS = ["monitor", "warn", "redact", "vault", "block"];
23789
- var BuiltinPolicyId = external_exports.enum(KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS).meta({ id: "BuiltinPolicyId" });
23790
23909
  var RedactFallback = BuiltinPolicyId.extract(["monitor", "warn", "block"]).meta({
23791
23910
  id: "RedactFallback"
23792
23911
  });
@@ -24147,7 +24266,7 @@ var VaultConsent = external_exports.object({
24147
24266
  });
24148
24267
 
24149
24268
  // ../../packages/schema/src/zod/local.ts
24150
- var WORKSPACE_SETTINGS_SPEC_VERSION = 8;
24269
+ var WORKSPACE_SETTINGS_SPEC_VERSION = 9;
24151
24270
  var RunMode = external_exports.enum(["standalone", "attached"]);
24152
24271
  var ControlPlaneConnection = external_exports.object({
24153
24272
  endpoint: external_exports.string().min(1),
@@ -24166,6 +24285,18 @@ var HistorySyncConsent = external_exports.object({
24166
24285
  payloadVersion: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
24167
24286
  endpoint: external_exports.string()
24168
24287
  });
24288
+ var ATTACHMENT_SCOPE_IDENTITY_MAX_LENGTH = 512;
24289
+ var AttachmentScopeEntry = external_exports.object({
24290
+ kind: external_exports.enum(["repo", "account"]),
24291
+ identity: printable(ATTACHMENT_SCOPE_IDENTITY_MAX_LENGTH).min(1),
24292
+ label: printable(80).optional(),
24293
+ enrolledAt: external_exports.iso.datetime()
24294
+ });
24295
+ var AttachmentScope = external_exports.object({
24296
+ endpoint: external_exports.string().min(1),
24297
+ entries: external_exports.array(AttachmentScopeEntry)
24298
+ });
24299
+ var AttachmentScopeEnvelope = AttachmentScope.extend({ entries: external_exports.array(external_exports.unknown()) });
24169
24300
  var WebChatCaptureConsent = external_exports.object({
24170
24301
  acknowledgedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
24171
24302
  version: external_exports.number().int().positive()
@@ -24236,6 +24367,23 @@ var WorkspaceSettings = external_exports.object({
24236
24367
  // both widenings. Absent until granted, and a grant for a different endpoint
24237
24368
  // or an older payload no longer counts.
24238
24369
  historySyncConsent: HistorySyncConsent.optional(),
24370
+ // The identities a SCOPED attachment forwards and the deployment they were
24371
+ // enrolled for (see AttachmentScope). Absent until something is enrolled.
24372
+ //
24373
+ // `z.unknown()`, NOT `AttachmentScope`, and the difference is this field's
24374
+ // whole failure mode. A settings.json that fails this schema reads as the
24375
+ // unonboarded defaults (readUserSettings in @akasecurity/persistence), and the
24376
+ // next save writes those defaults back over it. Typed, one entry with an
24377
+ // unknown `kind`, a control character or a bad timestamp would cost the
24378
+ // attachment, every consent and onboardedAt, permanently. Untyped, the value
24379
+ // is kept exactly as found and validated where it is used: parseAttachmentScope
24380
+ // drops a bad entry by itself, and on a scoped attachment resolveScope reads a
24381
+ // bad envelope as no entries, which keeps every event local.
24382
+ //
24383
+ // No default: absent must stay absent, so defaultWorkspaceSettings() and a
24384
+ // fresh settings.json do not change. No `.meta({ id })`, like every field
24385
+ // here. Not a ManagedSettingKey.
24386
+ attachmentScope: external_exports.unknown().optional(),
24239
24387
  // What the browser extension may record from a web chat, and the grant that
24240
24388
  // authorizes it. Absent until the user answers: recording something that was
24241
24389
  // never recorded before is never an assumed grant on upgrade, so the whole
@@ -25001,7 +25149,8 @@ var FINDING_ROW_COLUMNS_SQL = `f.id AS id, d.rule_id AS rule_id, d.category AS c
25001
25149
  ${latestResolutionStatusSql("f")} AS latest_status,
25002
25150
  e.synced_at AS synced_at, e.sync_claimed_at AS sync_claimed_at,
25003
25151
  e.sync_failed_at AS sync_failed_at, e.sync_failure AS sync_failure,
25004
- e.outbox_owed AS outbox_owed`;
25152
+ e.outbox_owed AS outbox_owed,
25153
+ f.line AS line, f.col AS col`;
25005
25154
 
25006
25155
  // ../../packages/persistence/src/repositories/installed-packs.ts
25007
25156
  import { createHash as createHash2, randomUUID as randomUUID4 } from "crypto";
@@ -25107,6 +25256,7 @@ var DEFERRED_TAGS = new Set(DEFERRED_MIGRATION_TAGS);
25107
25256
  // ../../packages/persistence/src/egress-wire.ts
25108
25257
  import { createHash as createHash3 } from "crypto";
25109
25258
  var SLASH = "/".charCodeAt(0);
25259
+ var SCOPE_KEY = printable(ATTACHMENT_SCOPE_IDENTITY_MAX_LENGTH);
25110
25260
 
25111
25261
  // ../../packages/persistence/src/finding-key.ts
25112
25262
  import { createHash as createHash4 } from "crypto";
@@ -26019,6 +26169,7 @@ var CORROBORATION_FLOOR_MS = BUDGET_MS * CPU_CORROBORATION_SHARE;
26019
26169
  // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/repo.ts
26020
26170
  import { existsSync as existsSync9, readFileSync as readFileSync10, statSync as statSync6 } from "fs";
26021
26171
  import { basename as basename2, dirname as dirname4, isAbsolute, join as join17, sep as sep2 } from "path";
26172
+ var NO_ATTRIBUTION = Object.freeze({});
26022
26173
 
26023
26174
  // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/events.ts
26024
26175
  import { createHash as createHash5, randomUUID as randomUUID13 } from "crypto";
@@ -26093,6 +26244,9 @@ import { join as join23 } from "path";
26093
26244
  import { readdirSync as readdirSync3, realpathSync as realpathSync3 } from "fs";
26094
26245
  import { basename as basename4, dirname as dirname5, sep as sep3 } from "path";
26095
26246
 
26247
+ // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/policy-resolver.ts
26248
+ import { randomUUID as randomUUID14 } from "crypto";
26249
+
26096
26250
  // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/project-files.ts
26097
26251
  import { existsSync as existsSync11, readdirSync as readdirSync4 } from "fs";
26098
26252
  import { basename as basename5, join as join24 } from "path";
@@ -26124,14 +26278,18 @@ var codexProviderEnvShape = {
26124
26278
  var CodexProviderEnvSchema = external_exports.object(codexProviderEnvShape);
26125
26279
 
26126
26280
  // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/runtime.ts
26127
- import { randomUUID as randomUUID14 } from "crypto";
26281
+ import { randomUUID as randomUUID15 } from "crypto";
26282
+
26283
+ // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/scope-key.ts
26284
+ import { existsSync as existsSync12 } from "fs";
26285
+ import { dirname as dirname6, isAbsolute as isAbsolute2, join as join25, normalize } from "path";
26128
26286
 
26129
26287
  // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/suppressions.ts
26130
26288
  var THIRTY_DAYS_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3;
26131
26289
 
26132
26290
  // ../../packages/plugin-sdk/src/throttle.ts
26133
26291
  import { mkdirSync as mkdirSync4, statSync as statSync8, writeFileSync as writeFileSync7 } from "fs";
26134
- import { join as join25 } from "path";
26292
+ import { join as join26 } from "path";
26135
26293
 
26136
26294
  // ../../packages/setup-wizard/src/onboard-posture.ts
26137
26295
  function parsePosture(json2) {
@@ -26170,7 +26328,7 @@ function parseCurrent(json2) {
26170
26328
 
26171
26329
  // ../../packages/setup-wizard/src/remediation/rotation-checklist.ts
26172
26330
  import { writeFileSync as writeFileSync8 } from "fs";
26173
- import { join as join26 } from "path";
26331
+ import { join as join27 } from "path";
26174
26332
 
26175
26333
  // ../../packages/setup-wizard/src/triage/gate-display.ts
26176
26334
  var ACTION_RANK = {
@@ -26199,7 +26357,7 @@ var RANK = Object.fromEntries(
26199
26357
  // ../../packages/setup-wizard/src/triage/plan-file.ts
26200
26358
  import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync as readFileSync17, rmdirSync, rmSync as rmSync7, writeFileSync as writeFileSync9 } from "fs";
26201
26359
  import { tmpdir } from "os";
26202
- import { basename as basename6, dirname as dirname6, join as join27 } from "path";
26360
+ import { basename as basename6, dirname as dirname7, join as join28 } from "path";
26203
26361
  var SuppressionEntrySchema = external_exports.object({
26204
26362
  ruleId: external_exports.string(),
26205
26363
  category: DetectionCategory,
@@ -26325,7 +26483,7 @@ function show(body) {
26325
26483
 
26326
26484
  // src/skills-registry.ts
26327
26485
  import { readdirSync as readdirSync5, readFileSync as readFileSync18 } from "fs";
26328
- import { join as join28 } from "path";
26486
+ import { join as join29 } from "path";
26329
26487
  import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath2 } from "url";
26330
26488
  var SKILLS_DIR = fileURLToPath2(new URL("../skills", import.meta.url));
26331
26489