@akasecurity/ai-tc-codex 0.9.15 → 0.9.16
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/hooks/hooks.json +1 -1
- package/package.json +5 -5
- package/scripts/apply-suppressions.js +1472 -393
- package/scripts/backfill.js +1963 -424
- package/scripts/content-retention.js +825 -227
- package/scripts/filescan.js +1900 -361
- package/scripts/firstrun.js +1406 -301
- package/scripts/history-sync.js +841 -228
- package/scripts/intro.js +328 -170
- package/scripts/onboard.js +823 -219
- package/scripts/post-tool-use.js +1960 -343
- package/scripts/pre-tool-use.js +1864 -338
- package/scripts/query.js +1405 -300
- package/scripts/reconcile.js +1873 -329
- package/scripts/remediate.js +1838 -350
- package/scripts/scan-worker.js +281 -149
- package/scripts/session-start.js +1821 -331
- package/scripts/start-light.js +328 -170
- package/scripts/stop.js +346 -190
- package/scripts/sync.js +1898 -359
- package/scripts/user-prompt-submit.js +1906 -373
- package/skills/setup/SKILL.md +27 -12
package/scripts/scan-worker.js
CHANGED
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@@ -881,10 +881,10 @@ function isCorroborated(candidate, candidates, text, normalization) {
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}
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return false;
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}
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884
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-
function buildCandidates(matchText, ruleset2, extension) {
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+
function buildCandidates(matchText, ruleset2, extension, eventKind) {
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const candidates = [];
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for (const rule of ruleset2) {
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887
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-
if (!ruleApplies(rule, extension)) continue;
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887
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+
if (!ruleApplies(rule, extension, eventKind)) continue;
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const spans = MATCHERS[rule.matcher.type](matchText, rule);
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for (const span of spans) {
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const rawMatch = matchText.slice(span.start, span.end);
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@@ -994,22 +994,30 @@ function extensionOf(filePath) {
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994
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const dot = base.lastIndexOf(".");
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return dot > 0 ? base.slice(dot).toLowerCase() : void 0;
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}
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-
function ruleApplies(rule, extension) {
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-
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function ruleApplies(rule, extension, eventKind) {
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const scope = rule.appliesTo;
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if (!scope) return true;
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if (scope.eventKinds && (eventKind === void 0 || !scope.eventKinds.some((k) => k === eventKind))) {
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return false;
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}
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if (!scope.extensions || extension === void 0) return true;
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return scope.extensions.some((e) => e.toLowerCase() === extension);
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}
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function scan(text, rules, context) {
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const ruleset2 = rules ?? getLoadedRules();
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const extension = context?.filePath ? extensionOf(context.filePath) : void 0;
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const normalization = normalizeFormatChars(text);
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1005
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-
const originalCandidates = buildCandidates(text, ruleset2, extension);
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const originalCandidates = buildCandidates(text, ruleset2, extension, context?.eventKind);
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if (!normalization) return gate(originalCandidates, text, void 0);
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const pooledOriginal = originalCandidates.map(
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(candidate) => withNormalizedSpan(candidate, normalization)
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);
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const normalizedCandidates = buildCandidates(
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-
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-
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const normalizedCandidates = buildCandidates(
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normalization.normalized,
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ruleset2,
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extension,
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context?.eventKind
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).map((candidate) => mapCandidateToOriginal(candidate, normalization, text));
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const findings = gate([...pooledOriginal, ...normalizedCandidates], text, normalization);
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return mergeOverlappingSameRule(findings, text);
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}
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@@ -21669,11 +21677,33 @@ var ResolutionMethod = external_exports.enum([
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"false-positive",
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"redetected"
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]).meta({ id: "ResolutionMethod" });
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var FindingContextBasis = external_exports.enum(["file", "excerpt"]).meta({ id: "FindingContextBasis" });
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var FindingContext = external_exports.object({
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basis: FindingContextBasis,
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// 1-based line number of `lines[0]`.
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firstLine: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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lines: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).min(1).max(5),
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match: external_exports.object({
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// 1-based line number, within [firstLine, firstLine + lines.length).
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line: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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// Offsets into that entry of `lines`, end exclusive.
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start: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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end: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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}).nullable()
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}).meta({ id: "FindingContext" });
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var FindingLocation = external_exports.object({
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line: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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col: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
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context: FindingContext.nullable()
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});
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var FindingMatch = external_exports.object({
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// Masked preview of the matched value. Never raw content.
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maskedValue: external_exports.string(),
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//
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contextPrefix: external_exports.string()
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// Deprecated: always empty. Superseded by `context`.
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contextPrefix: external_exports.string(),
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// The masked lines around the match. Absent when the finding predates
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// context capture or none could be built safely.
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context: FindingContext.optional()
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}).meta({ id: "FindingMatch" });
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var FindingDetectionRef = external_exports.object({
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id: external_exports.string(),
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@@ -21693,6 +21723,11 @@ var FindingInstance = external_exports.object({
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provider: FindingProvider,
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repo: external_exports.string(),
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file: external_exports.string(),
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// 1-based line and column of the match start in the scanned text (the
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// column in UTF-16 code units). Absent for findings that predate location
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// capture or have no source text.
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line: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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col: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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// Who the capturing event is attributed to. Optional: a single-user store
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// has no one to attribute a finding to and never sets it.
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user: FindingUser.optional(),
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@@ -21754,6 +21789,13 @@ var FindingStats = external_exports.object({
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low: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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})
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}).meta({ id: "FindingStats" });
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var FindingsOverview = external_exports.object({
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findings: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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open: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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handled: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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resolved: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative(),
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dismissed: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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}).meta({ id: "FindingsOverview" });
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var FindingFacetItem = external_exports.object({
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value: external_exports.string(),
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count: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative()
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@@ -21871,6 +21913,7 @@ var FindingInstanceDetail = FindingInstance.extend({
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policy: FindingPolicyRef
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}).meta({ id: "FindingInstanceDetail" });
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var MAX_FLAT_FINDINGS_LIMIT = 200;
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+
var FindingContextQuery = external_exports.object({ id: external_exports.string().min(1).max(256) });
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var ListFindingInstancesQuery = external_exports.object({
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severity: external_exports.array(Severity).optional(),
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// Rule ids, the same vocabulary the types list's `subtype` carries. Pinning
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@@ -22202,7 +22245,23 @@ var CaptureAttributes = external_exports.object({
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// capture denied by another finding's own Block policy carries `block`
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// here too. The full statement is on EventMetadata.redactDegradedTo; it is
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// repeated rather than referenced because a store reader opens this file.
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-
redact_degraded_to: ActionTaken.optional()
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redact_degraded_to: ActionTaken.optional(),
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// The scope key this capture was stamped with: the canonical repository
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// (`host/owner/repo`) of the path the capture names (a relative path is read
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// against its working directory), else of its own working directory, or a
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// chat account's identity. The store's local `scope_key` column reads it, so
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// a scoped attachment has a per-row key to work from. Absent when no key
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// could be derived.
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//
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// LOCAL ONLY. That is the contract for every path that sends a row. Producers
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// stamp it in every attachment mode, and the two structural choke points strip
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// it: the attached gateway's `reKeyForForward` on the live path, and the
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// history drain's `rebuildAuditEvent`, which drops it through `withoutScopeKey`.
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// A capture row's bag reaches the wire through `rebuildCapture`, which builds
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// the metadata from named keys and never names this one; `toCaptureAttributes`,
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// which builds the bag from a wire event, never emits it. What a scoped
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// attachment does with the key is not part of this shape's contract.
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scope_key: external_exports.string().optional()
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}).catchall(external_exports.unknown());
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var CaptureStatusAttributes = external_exports.object({
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source_tool: external_exports.string().optional(),
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@@ -22232,6 +22291,12 @@ var ToolCallInspection = external_exports.object({
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actionTaken: ActionTaken,
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confidence: external_exports.number().min(0).max(1)
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});
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+
var findingLocationFields = {
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line: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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col: external_exports.number().int().positive().optional(),
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context: FindingContext.nullable().optional()
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};
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var ToolCallInspectionInput = ToolCallInspection.extend(findingLocationFields);
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var ToolCallInput = external_exports.object({
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sessionId: external_exports.string().min(1),
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toolUseId: external_exports.string().min(1),
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@@ -22241,7 +22306,7 @@ var ToolCallInput = external_exports.object({
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attributes: ToolCallAttributes,
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// Secrets detected in the tool's (masked) target — written as linked
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// `inspection_findings`. Empty for a clean tool call.
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22244
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-
inspections: external_exports.array(
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inspections: external_exports.array(ToolCallInspectionInput).default([])
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});
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var InventoryInput = external_exports.object({
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objectType: InventoryObjectType,
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@@ -22315,7 +22380,8 @@ var InspectionFindingInput = external_exports.object({
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// same findingKey — mirrors the legacy `findings.first_detected_at`.
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// Optional: when omitted, the writer derives it from the referenced audit
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// event's startedAt on first insert (see SqliteInspectionFindingsRepository).
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22318
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-
firstDetectedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional()
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+
firstDetectedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional(),
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...findingLocationFields
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});
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var InventoryContext = external_exports.object({
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host: InventoryInput.optional(),
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@@ -23090,6 +23156,17 @@ var AttachedCredential = external_exports.object({
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keyPrefix: external_exports.string().min(1).max(16).optional(),
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mintedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime().optional()
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});
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23159
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+
var AttachmentMode = external_exports.enum(["machine", "scoped"]);
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+
var ATTACHED_CREDENTIAL_SCOPED_SPEC_VERSION = 2;
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+
var AttachedCredentialV1 = AttachedCredential;
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var AttachedCredentialV2 = AttachedCredential.extend({
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specVersion: external_exports.literal(ATTACHED_CREDENTIAL_SCOPED_SPEC_VERSION),
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mode: external_exports.literal("scoped")
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});
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var AttachedCredentialAny = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("specVersion", [
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AttachedCredentialV1,
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AttachedCredentialV2
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]);
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var MAX_DATE_MS = 253402300799999;
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var MAX_INT4 = 2147483647;
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var StorePosturePack = external_exports.object({
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@@ -23371,6 +23448,130 @@ var PackId = external_exports.string().regex(/^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$/);
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var SemVer = external_exports.string().regex(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+(?:-[0-9A-Za-z-.]+)?$/);
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var PublisherKind = external_exports.enum(["labs", "user", "org"]);
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+
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/builtin-policy-id.ts
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23452
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+
var KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS = ["monitor", "warn", "redact", "vault", "block"];
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+
var BuiltinPolicyId = external_exports.enum(KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS).meta({ id: "BuiltinPolicyId" });
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+
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// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/event.ts
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var EventKind = external_exports.enum(["prompt", "response", "code_change", "tool_use"]).meta({ id: "EventKind" });
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var CAPTURE_EVENT_TYPES_SQL = EventKind.options.map((k) => `'${k}'`).join(",");
|
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var EventMetadata = external_exports.object({
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sessionId: external_exports.string().optional(),
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repo: external_exports.string().optional(),
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filePath: external_exports.string().optional(),
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// The host tool whose input/output was scanned (e.g. 'Bash', 'WebFetch'),
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+
// set by the tool-scanning hooks. The tool NAME only — never the tool's
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// arguments or output, which can carry the very value a finding masked
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// (metadata is stored unredacted). Gives findings on non-file captures a
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// display location ("via Bash") when no filePath exists.
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toolName: external_exports.string().optional(),
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// Set (true) by the worktree scanner when the file is excluded by the
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// repo's .gitignore. Gitignored files ARE still scanned — local scratch and
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// generated code can leak real secrets — but the provenance is recorded so
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// policy/dashboards can treat those findings as informational rather than
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// blocking. Omitted (not false) for tracked files and non-scan events.
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gitignored: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
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// Set (true) ONLY when the event's `content` is the COMPLETE file at
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// capture time (a worktree scan reading from disk). Hook-captured edits
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// (e.g. an Edit tool's new_string) are partial fragments and MUST NOT set
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// this. The resolver-on-ingest keys its fixed-at-source dropout
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// diff on this marker: only a whole-file snapshot can prove a previously
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// open finding is gone; a fragment's absence proves nothing (the secret
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// may live outside the hunk). Omitted (not false) for fragments and
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// non-scan events, so pre-marker clients safely default to the
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// non-authoritative path.
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+
wholeFile: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
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model: external_exports.string().optional(),
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turnIndex: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
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// Distributed-tracing correlation. `correlationId` ties a recorded event back
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+
// to the request that captured/ingested it (a UUID, generated independently of
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// the trace id); `traceId` is the W3C trace id (32 lowercase hex chars) of the
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// originating span when telemetry is enabled. Both optional + backward
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// compatible — populated by the plugin (see @akasecurity/plugin-sdk).
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23491
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+
correlationId: external_exports.uuid().optional(),
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+
traceId: external_exports.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/).optional(),
|
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+
// Ids of the detection exceptions that downgraded findings in this capture
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23494
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+
// to 'allow' — the enforcement audit trail's link back to the grant that
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23495
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+
// authorized the bypass. Absent on captures where no exception applied.
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+
exceptionIds: external_exports.array(external_exports.guid()).optional(),
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+
// The assistant message this capture belongs to, and the conversation it sits
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23498
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+
// in — set by the browser extension's network capture so a stored `response`
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// row can be joined to the `llm_call` leaf describing the same turn. Absent
|
|
23500
|
+
// on every other capture path, which has no such id.
|
|
23501
|
+
//
|
|
23502
|
+
// Non-empty for the reason WebExchange.messageId is: it is the join key, and
|
|
23503
|
+
// a blank one matches no `llm_call` leaf. That refusal reaches only the
|
|
23504
|
+
// places an event is PARSED; the local write path types the event and parses
|
|
23505
|
+
// nothing, which is why `toCaptureAttributes` omits a blank one separately.
|
|
23506
|
+
messageId: external_exports.string().min(1).optional(),
|
|
23507
|
+
conversationId: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23508
|
+
// How long THIS capture's inspection blocked its caller, in whole
|
|
23509
|
+
// milliseconds — the plugin's own added latency, NOT the LLM call it sat in
|
|
23510
|
+
// front of. Measured inside `capture()` (@akasecurity/plugin-sdk) across
|
|
23511
|
+
// detection + redaction, the work the host session actually waits on.
|
|
23512
|
+
//
|
|
23513
|
+
// Stamped ONLY on live in-flight captures. A capture that carries its own
|
|
23514
|
+
// `occurredAt` is replaying past work (the transcript backfill, the worktree
|
|
23515
|
+
// scan), and its scan duration is not latency any host session experienced,
|
|
23516
|
+
// so those rows leave this ABSENT rather than reporting a misleading number.
|
|
23517
|
+
// Absent is also what every pre-measurement client writes, and what a
|
|
23518
|
+
// clock failure degrades to — a reader must treat absence as "not measured"
|
|
23519
|
+
// and never as a zero, which would read as "inspection is free".
|
|
23520
|
+
inspectionMs: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
|
|
23521
|
+
// What a `redact` this capture COULD NOT CARRY OUT became instead — the
|
|
23522
|
+
// workspace's `redactFallback`, applied because the field could not be
|
|
23523
|
+
// masked in place (a shell command, a URL, or any argument on a host whose
|
|
23524
|
+
// hook contract offers no rewrite channel).
|
|
23525
|
+
//
|
|
23526
|
+
// It exists because the action alone cannot say why. A finding recorded as
|
|
23527
|
+
// `warn` reads identically whether its detection was ASSIGNED Warn or was
|
|
23528
|
+
// assigned Redact on a field that could not take one — and those are
|
|
23529
|
+
// different facts about the same row: the first is a policy the user chose,
|
|
23530
|
+
// the second is a masking the host could not perform. Absent means no
|
|
23531
|
+
// degrade happened, which is every ordinary capture.
|
|
23532
|
+
//
|
|
23533
|
+
// TWO LIMITS a reader of a stored row has to know, because the grain here
|
|
23534
|
+
// is the CAPTURE while `actionTaken` is per FINDING:
|
|
23535
|
+
//
|
|
23536
|
+
// - It does not say WHICH finding degraded. A capture carrying a degraded
|
|
23537
|
+
// `redact` alongside a finding ASSIGNED the same action stores both
|
|
23538
|
+
// identically and one reason for the pair; attributing it to both
|
|
23539
|
+
// describes the assigned one wrongly, and to neither loses the degrade.
|
|
23540
|
+
// - PRESENCE IS NOT CAUSATION. The value is the action the lost redact
|
|
23541
|
+
// became, not the reason the capture ended as it did — a capture denied
|
|
23542
|
+
// by some other finding's own Block policy still carries `block` here,
|
|
23543
|
+
// and clearing the workspace's fallback would not have let it through.
|
|
23544
|
+
// Gate on the value against what a fallback can produce; never read the
|
|
23545
|
+
// field's presence as "this was the fallback's doing".
|
|
23546
|
+
//
|
|
23547
|
+
// Both are pinned as behaviour in @akasecurity/plugin-sdk's runtime suite.
|
|
23548
|
+
// Closing either means moving the reason onto the finding row, which
|
|
23549
|
+
// already carries its own action.
|
|
23550
|
+
redactDegradedTo: ActionTaken.optional()
|
|
23551
|
+
}).meta({ id: "EventMetadata" });
|
|
23552
|
+
var Event = external_exports.object({
|
|
23553
|
+
id: external_exports.guid(),
|
|
23554
|
+
sourceTool: SourceTool,
|
|
23555
|
+
kind: EventKind,
|
|
23556
|
+
occurredAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
|
|
23557
|
+
contentHash: external_exports.string(),
|
|
23558
|
+
content: external_exports.string(),
|
|
23559
|
+
metadata: EventMetadata.optional()
|
|
23560
|
+
}).meta({ id: "Event" });
|
|
23561
|
+
var IngestEvent = Event.meta({ id: "IngestEvent" });
|
|
23562
|
+
var INGEST_BATCH_MAX = 100;
|
|
23563
|
+
var IngestBatch = external_exports.object({
|
|
23564
|
+
events: external_exports.array(IngestEvent).min(1).max(INGEST_BATCH_MAX),
|
|
23565
|
+
// Dedup policy for this batch. Id-dedup ALWAYS applies. 'content-hash'
|
|
23566
|
+
// additionally rejects any event whose contentHash the store has already
|
|
23567
|
+
// recorded — for re-runnable bulk ingest (worktree scan, transcript
|
|
23568
|
+
// backfill), where a re-run mints fresh event ids for identical content and
|
|
23569
|
+
// would otherwise accumulate duplicates. Live hook traffic must NOT set it:
|
|
23570
|
+
// two genuinely separate prompts can be byte-identical and both belong on
|
|
23571
|
+
// the timeline.
|
|
23572
|
+
dedupe: external_exports.literal("content-hash").optional()
|
|
23573
|
+
}).meta({ id: "IngestBatch" });
|
|
23574
|
+
|
|
23374
23575
|
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/rule.ts
|
|
23375
23576
|
var MatcherType = external_exports.enum(["keyword", "regex"]).meta({ id: "MatcherType" });
|
|
23376
23577
|
var RuleProbeVerdict = external_exports.enum(["safe", "quarantined"]).meta({ id: "RuleProbeVerdict" });
|
|
@@ -23439,7 +23640,10 @@ var Matcher = external_exports.discriminatedUnion("type", [KeywordMatcher2, Rege
|
|
|
23439
23640
|
var MATCHER_TYPES = MatcherType.options;
|
|
23440
23641
|
var AppliesTo = external_exports.strictObject({
|
|
23441
23642
|
// Dot-prefixed, e.g. ".py" — matches the scanner's SOURCE_EXTENSIONS shape.
|
|
23442
|
-
extensions: external_exports.array(external_exports.string().regex(/^\.[A-Za-z0-9]+$/)).min(1)
|
|
23643
|
+
extensions: external_exports.array(external_exports.string().regex(/^\.[A-Za-z0-9]+$/)).min(1).optional(),
|
|
23644
|
+
eventKinds: external_exports.array(EventKind).min(1).optional()
|
|
23645
|
+
}).refine((v) => v.extensions !== void 0 || v.eventKinds !== void 0, {
|
|
23646
|
+
message: "appliesTo needs extensions, eventKinds, or both"
|
|
23443
23647
|
}).meta({ id: "AppliesTo" });
|
|
23444
23648
|
var PostValidatorName = external_exports.enum(["entropy", "luhn"]).meta({ id: "PostValidatorName" });
|
|
23445
23649
|
var PostValidatorRef = external_exports.union(
|
|
@@ -23462,6 +23666,7 @@ var PostValidatorRef = external_exports.union(
|
|
|
23462
23666
|
)}) or { "name": ..., "config": { ... } }. An unrecognized name would be a false-positive guard that never runs.`
|
|
23463
23667
|
}
|
|
23464
23668
|
).meta({ id: "PostValidatorRef" });
|
|
23669
|
+
var RuleEvidence = external_exports.enum(["code", "value"]).meta({ id: "RuleEvidence" });
|
|
23465
23670
|
var RequiresNearby = external_exports.strictObject({
|
|
23466
23671
|
// Each array, when present, must be non-empty and contain non-empty strings —
|
|
23467
23672
|
// an empty/blank criterion would either never fire or (for labels) match
|
|
@@ -23484,6 +23689,8 @@ var RuleFixture = external_exports.strictObject({
|
|
|
23484
23689
|
// Simulated file context for the scan, so fixtures can assert `appliesTo`
|
|
23485
23690
|
// gating (e.g. a Python-only pattern must NOT fire in a .ts file).
|
|
23486
23691
|
filePath: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23692
|
+
// Simulated capture kind, so fixtures can assert `appliesTo.eventKinds`.
|
|
23693
|
+
eventKind: EventKind.optional(),
|
|
23487
23694
|
expectedSpans: external_exports.array(external_exports.strictObject({ start: external_exports.number(), end: external_exports.number() })).optional()
|
|
23488
23695
|
}).meta({ id: "RuleFixture" });
|
|
23489
23696
|
var Rule = external_exports.strictObject({
|
|
@@ -23509,7 +23716,9 @@ var Rule = external_exports.strictObject({
|
|
|
23509
23716
|
appliesTo: AppliesTo.optional(),
|
|
23510
23717
|
postValidators: external_exports.array(PostValidatorRef).optional(),
|
|
23511
23718
|
requiresNearby: RequiresNearby.optional(),
|
|
23512
|
-
examples: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).optional()
|
|
23719
|
+
examples: external_exports.array(external_exports.string()).optional(),
|
|
23720
|
+
// Whether the matched text is itself sensitive. Absent means 'value'.
|
|
23721
|
+
evidence: RuleEvidence.optional()
|
|
23513
23722
|
}).meta({ id: "Rule" });
|
|
23514
23723
|
var Author = external_exports.object({
|
|
23515
23724
|
name: external_exports.string(),
|
|
@@ -23526,7 +23735,11 @@ var PackManifest = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
23526
23735
|
description: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23527
23736
|
author: Author.optional(),
|
|
23528
23737
|
license: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23529
|
-
sourceUrl: external_exports.url().optional()
|
|
23738
|
+
sourceUrl: external_exports.url().optional(),
|
|
23739
|
+
// The built-in policy a FIRST install of this pack assigns
|
|
23740
|
+
// (installed_packs.policy_id). Absent leaves the pack unassigned, so its
|
|
23741
|
+
// rules follow the category policies. An existing install never takes it.
|
|
23742
|
+
defaultPolicy: BuiltinPolicyId.optional()
|
|
23530
23743
|
}).meta({ id: "PackManifest" });
|
|
23531
23744
|
|
|
23532
23745
|
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/detection.ts
|
|
@@ -23554,10 +23767,12 @@ var DetectionListItem = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
23554
23767
|
// Per-pack enforcement-policy assignment. Holds a BuiltinPolicyId ARCHETYPE
|
|
23555
23768
|
// (monitor|warn|redact|block) — NOT a policies-table Policy.id guid; a
|
|
23556
23769
|
// detection is a PACK, and its policy is the archetype applied to all its
|
|
23557
|
-
// rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor
|
|
23558
|
-
// (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID)
|
|
23559
|
-
//
|
|
23560
|
-
//
|
|
23770
|
+
// rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor by default
|
|
23771
|
+
// (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID); a host may resolve it to a policy of its own
|
|
23772
|
+
// (see the dashboard's `unassignedPolicy`). Every enforcement surface
|
|
23773
|
+
// expands it into per-rule policies (see policyIdToAction). Typed
|
|
23774
|
+
// z.string() (not the enum) to keep the OpenAPI response tolerant of a
|
|
23775
|
+
// future custom id.
|
|
23561
23776
|
policyId: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23562
23777
|
// Set ONLY when a newer snapshot is available for this pack (OSS: the
|
|
23563
23778
|
// bundled inventory recorded in available_packs differs from the installed
|
|
@@ -23626,10 +23841,12 @@ var DetectionDetail = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
23626
23841
|
// Per-pack enforcement-policy assignment. Holds a BuiltinPolicyId ARCHETYPE
|
|
23627
23842
|
// (monitor|warn|redact|block) — NOT a policies-table Policy.id guid; a
|
|
23628
23843
|
// detection is a PACK, and its policy is the archetype applied to all its
|
|
23629
|
-
// rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor
|
|
23630
|
-
// (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID)
|
|
23631
|
-
//
|
|
23632
|
-
//
|
|
23844
|
+
// rules. Absent == unassigned, which resolves to Monitor by default
|
|
23845
|
+
// (DEFAULT_PACK_POLICY_ID); a host may resolve it to a policy of its own
|
|
23846
|
+
// (see the dashboard's `unassignedPolicy`). Every enforcement surface
|
|
23847
|
+
// expands it into per-rule policies (see policyIdToAction). Typed
|
|
23848
|
+
// z.string() (not the enum) to keep the OpenAPI response tolerant of a
|
|
23849
|
+
// future custom id.
|
|
23633
23850
|
policyId: external_exports.string().optional()
|
|
23634
23851
|
}).meta({ id: "DetectionDetail" });
|
|
23635
23852
|
var LibraryItem = external_exports.object({
|
|
@@ -23659,126 +23876,6 @@ var ImportDetectionRequest = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
23659
23876
|
})
|
|
23660
23877
|
}).meta({ id: "ImportDetectionRequest" });
|
|
23661
23878
|
|
|
23662
|
-
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/event.ts
|
|
23663
|
-
var EventKind = external_exports.enum(["prompt", "response", "code_change", "tool_use"]).meta({ id: "EventKind" });
|
|
23664
|
-
var CAPTURE_EVENT_TYPES_SQL = EventKind.options.map((k) => `'${k}'`).join(",");
|
|
23665
|
-
var EventMetadata = external_exports.object({
|
|
23666
|
-
sessionId: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23667
|
-
repo: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23668
|
-
filePath: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23669
|
-
// The host tool whose input/output was scanned (e.g. 'Bash', 'WebFetch'),
|
|
23670
|
-
// set by the tool-scanning hooks. The tool NAME only — never the tool's
|
|
23671
|
-
// arguments or output, which can carry the very value a finding masked
|
|
23672
|
-
// (metadata is stored unredacted). Gives findings on non-file captures a
|
|
23673
|
-
// display location ("via Bash") when no filePath exists.
|
|
23674
|
-
toolName: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23675
|
-
// Set (true) by the worktree scanner when the file is excluded by the
|
|
23676
|
-
// repo's .gitignore. Gitignored files ARE still scanned — local scratch and
|
|
23677
|
-
// generated code can leak real secrets — but the provenance is recorded so
|
|
23678
|
-
// policy/dashboards can treat those findings as informational rather than
|
|
23679
|
-
// blocking. Omitted (not false) for tracked files and non-scan events.
|
|
23680
|
-
gitignored: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
|
|
23681
|
-
// Set (true) ONLY when the event's `content` is the COMPLETE file at
|
|
23682
|
-
// capture time (a worktree scan reading from disk). Hook-captured edits
|
|
23683
|
-
// (e.g. an Edit tool's new_string) are partial fragments and MUST NOT set
|
|
23684
|
-
// this. The resolver-on-ingest keys its fixed-at-source dropout
|
|
23685
|
-
// diff on this marker: only a whole-file snapshot can prove a previously
|
|
23686
|
-
// open finding is gone; a fragment's absence proves nothing (the secret
|
|
23687
|
-
// may live outside the hunk). Omitted (not false) for fragments and
|
|
23688
|
-
// non-scan events, so pre-marker clients safely default to the
|
|
23689
|
-
// non-authoritative path.
|
|
23690
|
-
wholeFile: external_exports.boolean().optional(),
|
|
23691
|
-
model: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23692
|
-
turnIndex: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
|
|
23693
|
-
// Distributed-tracing correlation. `correlationId` ties a recorded event back
|
|
23694
|
-
// to the request that captured/ingested it (a UUID, generated independently of
|
|
23695
|
-
// the trace id); `traceId` is the W3C trace id (32 lowercase hex chars) of the
|
|
23696
|
-
// originating span when telemetry is enabled. Both optional + backward
|
|
23697
|
-
// compatible — populated by the plugin (see @akasecurity/plugin-sdk).
|
|
23698
|
-
correlationId: external_exports.uuid().optional(),
|
|
23699
|
-
traceId: external_exports.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/).optional(),
|
|
23700
|
-
// Ids of the detection exceptions that downgraded findings in this capture
|
|
23701
|
-
// to 'allow' — the enforcement audit trail's link back to the grant that
|
|
23702
|
-
// authorized the bypass. Absent on captures where no exception applied.
|
|
23703
|
-
exceptionIds: external_exports.array(external_exports.guid()).optional(),
|
|
23704
|
-
// The assistant message this capture belongs to, and the conversation it sits
|
|
23705
|
-
// in — set by the browser extension's network capture so a stored `response`
|
|
23706
|
-
// row can be joined to the `llm_call` leaf describing the same turn. Absent
|
|
23707
|
-
// on every other capture path, which has no such id.
|
|
23708
|
-
//
|
|
23709
|
-
// Non-empty for the reason WebExchange.messageId is: it is the join key, and
|
|
23710
|
-
// a blank one matches no `llm_call` leaf. That refusal reaches only the
|
|
23711
|
-
// places an event is PARSED; the local write path types the event and parses
|
|
23712
|
-
// nothing, which is why `toCaptureAttributes` omits a blank one separately.
|
|
23713
|
-
messageId: external_exports.string().min(1).optional(),
|
|
23714
|
-
conversationId: external_exports.string().optional(),
|
|
23715
|
-
// How long THIS capture's inspection blocked its caller, in whole
|
|
23716
|
-
// milliseconds — the plugin's own added latency, NOT the LLM call it sat in
|
|
23717
|
-
// front of. Measured inside `capture()` (@akasecurity/plugin-sdk) across
|
|
23718
|
-
// detection + redaction, the work the host session actually waits on.
|
|
23719
|
-
//
|
|
23720
|
-
// Stamped ONLY on live in-flight captures. A capture that carries its own
|
|
23721
|
-
// `occurredAt` is replaying past work (the transcript backfill, the worktree
|
|
23722
|
-
// scan), and its scan duration is not latency any host session experienced,
|
|
23723
|
-
// so those rows leave this ABSENT rather than reporting a misleading number.
|
|
23724
|
-
// Absent is also what every pre-measurement client writes, and what a
|
|
23725
|
-
// clock failure degrades to — a reader must treat absence as "not measured"
|
|
23726
|
-
// and never as a zero, which would read as "inspection is free".
|
|
23727
|
-
inspectionMs: external_exports.number().int().nonnegative().optional(),
|
|
23728
|
-
// What a `redact` this capture COULD NOT CARRY OUT became instead — the
|
|
23729
|
-
// workspace's `redactFallback`, applied because the field could not be
|
|
23730
|
-
// masked in place (a shell command, a URL, or any argument on a host whose
|
|
23731
|
-
// hook contract offers no rewrite channel).
|
|
23732
|
-
//
|
|
23733
|
-
// It exists because the action alone cannot say why. A finding recorded as
|
|
23734
|
-
// `warn` reads identically whether its detection was ASSIGNED Warn or was
|
|
23735
|
-
// assigned Redact on a field that could not take one — and those are
|
|
23736
|
-
// different facts about the same row: the first is a policy the user chose,
|
|
23737
|
-
// the second is a masking the host could not perform. Absent means no
|
|
23738
|
-
// degrade happened, which is every ordinary capture.
|
|
23739
|
-
//
|
|
23740
|
-
// TWO LIMITS a reader of a stored row has to know, because the grain here
|
|
23741
|
-
// is the CAPTURE while `actionTaken` is per FINDING:
|
|
23742
|
-
//
|
|
23743
|
-
// - It does not say WHICH finding degraded. A capture carrying a degraded
|
|
23744
|
-
// `redact` alongside a finding ASSIGNED the same action stores both
|
|
23745
|
-
// identically and one reason for the pair; attributing it to both
|
|
23746
|
-
// describes the assigned one wrongly, and to neither loses the degrade.
|
|
23747
|
-
// - PRESENCE IS NOT CAUSATION. The value is the action the lost redact
|
|
23748
|
-
// became, not the reason the capture ended as it did — a capture denied
|
|
23749
|
-
// by some other finding's own Block policy still carries `block` here,
|
|
23750
|
-
// and clearing the workspace's fallback would not have let it through.
|
|
23751
|
-
// Gate on the value against what a fallback can produce; never read the
|
|
23752
|
-
// field's presence as "this was the fallback's doing".
|
|
23753
|
-
//
|
|
23754
|
-
// Both are pinned as behaviour in @akasecurity/plugin-sdk's runtime suite.
|
|
23755
|
-
// Closing either means moving the reason onto the finding row, which
|
|
23756
|
-
// already carries its own action.
|
|
23757
|
-
redactDegradedTo: ActionTaken.optional()
|
|
23758
|
-
}).meta({ id: "EventMetadata" });
|
|
23759
|
-
var Event = external_exports.object({
|
|
23760
|
-
id: external_exports.guid(),
|
|
23761
|
-
sourceTool: SourceTool,
|
|
23762
|
-
kind: EventKind,
|
|
23763
|
-
occurredAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
|
|
23764
|
-
contentHash: external_exports.string(),
|
|
23765
|
-
content: external_exports.string(),
|
|
23766
|
-
metadata: EventMetadata.optional()
|
|
23767
|
-
}).meta({ id: "Event" });
|
|
23768
|
-
var IngestEvent = Event.meta({ id: "IngestEvent" });
|
|
23769
|
-
var INGEST_BATCH_MAX = 100;
|
|
23770
|
-
var IngestBatch = external_exports.object({
|
|
23771
|
-
events: external_exports.array(IngestEvent).min(1).max(INGEST_BATCH_MAX),
|
|
23772
|
-
// Dedup policy for this batch. Id-dedup ALWAYS applies. 'content-hash'
|
|
23773
|
-
// additionally rejects any event whose contentHash the store has already
|
|
23774
|
-
// recorded — for re-runnable bulk ingest (worktree scan, transcript
|
|
23775
|
-
// backfill), where a re-run mints fresh event ids for identical content and
|
|
23776
|
-
// would otherwise accumulate duplicates. Live hook traffic must NOT set it:
|
|
23777
|
-
// two genuinely separate prompts can be byte-identical and both belong on
|
|
23778
|
-
// the timeline.
|
|
23779
|
-
dedupe: external_exports.literal("content-hash").optional()
|
|
23780
|
-
}).meta({ id: "IngestBatch" });
|
|
23781
|
-
|
|
23782
23879
|
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/exception.ts
|
|
23783
23880
|
var ExceptionScope = external_exports.enum(["once", "temporary", "permanent"]);
|
|
23784
23881
|
var ExceptionConditions = external_exports.object({
|
|
@@ -23939,8 +24036,6 @@ var Policy = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
23939
24036
|
// test `prohibitedModels` passes and `reversibleRuleIds` fails.
|
|
23940
24037
|
provenance: PolicyProvenance.optional()
|
|
23941
24038
|
}).meta({ id: "Policy" });
|
|
23942
|
-
var KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS = ["monitor", "warn", "redact", "vault", "block"];
|
|
23943
|
-
var BuiltinPolicyId = external_exports.enum(KNOWN_BUILTIN_IDS).meta({ id: "BuiltinPolicyId" });
|
|
23944
24039
|
var RedactFallback = BuiltinPolicyId.extract(["monitor", "warn", "block"]).meta({
|
|
23945
24040
|
id: "RedactFallback"
|
|
23946
24041
|
});
|
|
@@ -24296,7 +24391,7 @@ var VaultConsent = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
24296
24391
|
});
|
|
24297
24392
|
|
|
24298
24393
|
// ../../packages/schema/src/zod/local.ts
|
|
24299
|
-
var WORKSPACE_SETTINGS_SPEC_VERSION =
|
|
24394
|
+
var WORKSPACE_SETTINGS_SPEC_VERSION = 9;
|
|
24300
24395
|
var RunMode = external_exports.enum(["standalone", "attached"]);
|
|
24301
24396
|
var ControlPlaneConnection = external_exports.object({
|
|
24302
24397
|
endpoint: external_exports.string().min(1),
|
|
@@ -24315,6 +24410,18 @@ var HistorySyncConsent = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
24315
24410
|
payloadVersion: external_exports.number().int().positive(),
|
|
24316
24411
|
endpoint: external_exports.string()
|
|
24317
24412
|
});
|
|
24413
|
+
var ATTACHMENT_SCOPE_IDENTITY_MAX_LENGTH = 512;
|
|
24414
|
+
var AttachmentScopeEntry = external_exports.object({
|
|
24415
|
+
kind: external_exports.enum(["repo", "account"]),
|
|
24416
|
+
identity: printable(ATTACHMENT_SCOPE_IDENTITY_MAX_LENGTH).min(1),
|
|
24417
|
+
label: printable(80).optional(),
|
|
24418
|
+
enrolledAt: external_exports.iso.datetime()
|
|
24419
|
+
});
|
|
24420
|
+
var AttachmentScope = external_exports.object({
|
|
24421
|
+
endpoint: external_exports.string().min(1),
|
|
24422
|
+
entries: external_exports.array(AttachmentScopeEntry)
|
|
24423
|
+
});
|
|
24424
|
+
var AttachmentScopeEnvelope = AttachmentScope.extend({ entries: external_exports.array(external_exports.unknown()) });
|
|
24318
24425
|
var WebChatCaptureConsent = external_exports.object({
|
|
24319
24426
|
acknowledgedAt: external_exports.iso.datetime(),
|
|
24320
24427
|
version: external_exports.number().int().positive()
|
|
@@ -24385,6 +24492,23 @@ var WorkspaceSettings = external_exports.object({
|
|
|
24385
24492
|
// both widenings. Absent until granted, and a grant for a different endpoint
|
|
24386
24493
|
// or an older payload no longer counts.
|
|
24387
24494
|
historySyncConsent: HistorySyncConsent.optional(),
|
|
24495
|
+
// The identities a SCOPED attachment forwards and the deployment they were
|
|
24496
|
+
// enrolled for (see AttachmentScope). Absent until something is enrolled.
|
|
24497
|
+
//
|
|
24498
|
+
// `z.unknown()`, NOT `AttachmentScope`, and the difference is this field's
|
|
24499
|
+
// whole failure mode. A settings.json that fails this schema reads as the
|
|
24500
|
+
// unonboarded defaults (readUserSettings in @akasecurity/persistence), and the
|
|
24501
|
+
// next save writes those defaults back over it. Typed, one entry with an
|
|
24502
|
+
// unknown `kind`, a control character or a bad timestamp would cost the
|
|
24503
|
+
// attachment, every consent and onboardedAt, permanently. Untyped, the value
|
|
24504
|
+
// is kept exactly as found and validated where it is used: parseAttachmentScope
|
|
24505
|
+
// drops a bad entry by itself, and on a scoped attachment resolveScope reads a
|
|
24506
|
+
// bad envelope as no entries, which keeps every event local.
|
|
24507
|
+
//
|
|
24508
|
+
// No default: absent must stay absent, so defaultWorkspaceSettings() and a
|
|
24509
|
+
// fresh settings.json do not change. No `.meta({ id })`, like every field
|
|
24510
|
+
// here. Not a ManagedSettingKey.
|
|
24511
|
+
attachmentScope: external_exports.unknown().optional(),
|
|
24388
24512
|
// What the browser extension may record from a web chat, and the grant that
|
|
24389
24513
|
// authorizes it. Absent until the user answers: recording something that was
|
|
24390
24514
|
// never recorded before is never an assumed grant on upgrade, so the whole
|
|
@@ -25273,7 +25397,15 @@ port.on("message", (job) => {
|
|
|
25273
25397
|
post({ kind: "probed", id: job.id, verdict, worstMs, corroboratedMs });
|
|
25274
25398
|
return;
|
|
25275
25399
|
}
|
|
25276
|
-
|
|
25400
|
+
if (job.eventKind !== void 0 && !EventKind.safeParse(job.eventKind).success) {
|
|
25401
|
+
post({
|
|
25402
|
+
kind: "failed",
|
|
25403
|
+
id: job.id,
|
|
25404
|
+
message: `unknown event kind ${JSON.stringify(job.eventKind)}`
|
|
25405
|
+
});
|
|
25406
|
+
return;
|
|
25407
|
+
}
|
|
25408
|
+
const context = job.filePath === void 0 && job.eventKind === void 0 ? void 0 : { filePath: job.filePath, eventKind: job.eventKind };
|
|
25277
25409
|
if (job.attribute) {
|
|
25278
25410
|
for (const [index, rule] of unverified.entries()) {
|
|
25279
25411
|
post({ kind: "progress", index });
|