@agentic-qe/v3 3.0.0-alpha.6 → 3.0.0-alpha.7

package/src/mcp/security/cve-prevention.ts

@@ -1,742 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Agentic QE v3 - MCP Security: CVE Prevention Utilities
- * Security utilities for preventing common vulnerabilities (ADR-012)
- *
- * Features:
- * - Path traversal protection (no ../ in paths)
- * - ReDoS prevention with regex escaping
- * - Timing-safe authentication comparison
- * - Input sanitization utilities
- * - Command injection prevention
- */
-
-import { createHash, timingSafeEqual, randomBytes } from 'crypto';
-
-// ============================================================================
-// Types and Interfaces
-// ============================================================================
-
-/**
- * Path validation result
- */
-export interface PathValidationResult {
-  valid: boolean;
-  normalizedPath?: string;
-  error?: string;
-  riskLevel: 'none' | 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical';
-}
-
-/**
- * Regex safety result
- */
-export interface RegexSafetyResult {
-  safe: boolean;
-  pattern?: string;
-  escapedPattern?: string;
-  error?: string;
-  riskyPatterns: string[];
-}
-
-/**
- * Command validation result
- */
-export interface CommandValidationResult {
-  valid: boolean;
-  sanitizedCommand?: string;
-  error?: string;
-  blockedPatterns: string[];
-}
-
-/**
- * Input sanitization options
- */
-export interface SanitizationOptions {
-  maxLength?: number;
-  allowedChars?: RegExp;
-  stripHtml?: boolean;
-  stripSql?: boolean;
-  escapeShell?: boolean;
-  trim?: boolean;
-}
-
-/**
- * Path validation options
- */
-export interface PathValidationOptions {
-  basePath?: string;
-  allowAbsolute?: boolean;
-  allowedExtensions?: string[];
-  deniedExtensions?: string[];
-  maxDepth?: number;
-  maxLength?: number;
-}
-
-// ============================================================================
-// Path Traversal Protection
-// ============================================================================
-
-/**
- * Path traversal patterns to detect
- */
-const PATH_TRAVERSAL_PATTERNS = [
-  /\.\./,                    // Basic traversal
-  /%2e%2e/i,                 // URL encoded ..
-  /%252e%252e/i,             // Double URL encoded
-  /\.\.%2f/i,                // Mixed encoding
-  /%2f\.\./i,                // Forward slash + ..
-  /\.\.%5c/i,                // Backslash + ..
-  /\.\.\\/,                  // Windows backslash traversal
-  /%c0%ae/i,                 // UTF-8 overlong encoding
-  /%c0%2f/i,                 // UTF-8 overlong /
-  /%c1%9c/i,                 // UTF-8 overlong \
-  /\0/,                      // Null byte injection
-  /%00/i,                    // URL encoded null
-];
-
-/**
- * Dangerous path components
- */
-const DANGEROUS_PATH_COMPONENTS = [
-  /^\/etc\//i,
-  /^\/proc\//i,
-  /^\/sys\//i,
-  /^\/dev\//i,
-  /^\/root\//i,
-  /^\/home\/.+\/\./i,
-  /^[A-Z]:\\Windows/i,
-  /^[A-Z]:\\System/i,
-  /^[A-Z]:\\Users\\.+\\AppData/i,
-];
-
-/**
- * Validate and sanitize a file path to prevent traversal attacks
- */
-export function validatePath(
-  path: string,
-  options: PathValidationOptions = {}
-): PathValidationResult {
-  const {
-    basePath = '',
-    allowAbsolute = false,
-    allowedExtensions = [],
-    deniedExtensions = ['.exe', '.bat', '.cmd', '.sh', '.ps1', '.dll', '.so'],
-    maxDepth = 10,
-    maxLength = 4096,
-  } = options;
-
-  // Check length
-  if (path.length > maxLength) {
-    return {
-      valid: false,
-      error: `Path exceeds maximum length of ${maxLength}`,
-      riskLevel: 'medium',
-    };
-  }
-
-  // Check for traversal patterns
-  for (const pattern of PATH_TRAVERSAL_PATTERNS) {
-    if (pattern.test(path)) {
-      return {
-        valid: false,
-        error: 'Path traversal attempt detected',
-        riskLevel: 'critical',
-      };
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check for absolute paths
-  if (!allowAbsolute && (path.startsWith('/') || /^[A-Z]:/i.test(path))) {
-    return {
-      valid: false,
-      error: 'Absolute paths are not allowed',
-      riskLevel: 'high',
-    };
-  }
-
-  // Check for dangerous path components
-  for (const pattern of DANGEROUS_PATH_COMPONENTS) {
-    if (pattern.test(path)) {
-      return {
-        valid: false,
-        error: 'Access to system paths is not allowed',
-        riskLevel: 'critical',
-      };
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Normalize the path
-  const normalizedPath = normalizePath(path);
-
-  // Re-check for traversal after normalization
-  if (normalizedPath.includes('..')) {
-    return {
-      valid: false,
-      error: 'Path traversal detected after normalization',
-      riskLevel: 'critical',
-    };
-  }
-
-  // Check depth
-  const depth = normalizedPath.split('/').filter(Boolean).length;
-  if (depth > maxDepth) {
-    return {
-      valid: false,
-      error: `Path depth exceeds maximum of ${maxDepth}`,
-      riskLevel: 'low',
-    };
-  }
-
-  // Check extension
-  const ext = getExtension(normalizedPath);
-  if (ext) {
-    const extWithDot = `.${ext.toLowerCase()}`;
-    const extWithoutDot = ext.toLowerCase();
-
-    // Check denied extensions (support both .exe and exe formats)
-    if (deniedExtensions.length > 0) {
-      const isDenied = deniedExtensions.some(denied =>
-        denied.toLowerCase() === extWithDot || denied.toLowerCase() === extWithoutDot
-      );
-      if (isDenied) {
-        return {
-          valid: false,
-          error: `File extension '${ext}' is not allowed`,
-          riskLevel: 'high',
-        };
-      }
-    }
-
-    // Check allowed extensions (support both .ts and ts formats)
-    if (allowedExtensions.length > 0) {
-      const isAllowed = allowedExtensions.some(allowed =>
-        allowed.toLowerCase() === extWithDot || allowed.toLowerCase() === extWithoutDot
-      );
-      if (!isAllowed) {
-        return {
-          valid: false,
-          error: `File extension '${ext}' is not in allowed list`,
-          riskLevel: 'medium',
-        };
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Combine with base path if provided
-  const finalPath = basePath
-    ? joinPathsAbsolute(basePath, normalizedPath)
-    : normalizedPath;
-
-  // Verify final path doesn't escape base (use normalized base for comparison)
-  const normalizedBase = basePath.startsWith('/')
-    ? `/${normalizePath(basePath)}`
-    : normalizePath(basePath);
-  if (basePath && !finalPath.startsWith(normalizedBase)) {
-    return {
-      valid: false,
-      error: 'Path escapes base directory',
-      riskLevel: 'critical',
-    };
-  }
-
-  return {
-    valid: true,
-    normalizedPath: finalPath,
-    riskLevel: 'none',
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Normalize a path by resolving . and .. components
- */
-export function normalizePath(path: string): string {
-  // Replace backslashes with forward slashes
-  let normalized = path.replace(/\\/g, '/');
-
-  // Remove multiple consecutive slashes
-  normalized = normalized.replace(/\/+/g, '/');
-
-  // Split and resolve
-  const parts = normalized.split('/');
-  const result: string[] = [];
-
-  for (const part of parts) {
-    if (part === '.' || part === '') {
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (part === '..') {
-      // Don't allow going above root
-      if (result.length > 0 && result[result.length - 1] !== '..') {
-        result.pop();
-      }
-    } else {
-      result.push(part);
-    }
-  }
-
-  return result.join('/');
-}
-
-/**
- * Safely join path components (strips leading/trailing slashes from all parts)
- */
-export function joinPaths(...paths: string[]): string {
-  if (paths.length === 0) return '';
-
-  return paths
-    .map(p => p.replace(/^\/+|\/+$/g, ''))
-    .filter(Boolean)
-    .join('/');
-}
-
-/**
- * Join paths preserving absolute path from first component
- */
-export function joinPathsAbsolute(...paths: string[]): string {
-  if (paths.length === 0) return '';
-
-  // Check if the first path is absolute
-  const isAbsolute = paths[0].startsWith('/');
-
-  const result = paths
-    .map(p => p.replace(/^\/+|\/+$/g, ''))
-    .filter(Boolean)
-    .join('/');
-
-  // Preserve leading slash for absolute paths
-  return isAbsolute ? `/${result}` : result;
-}
-
-/**
- * Get file extension
- */
-export function getExtension(path: string): string | null {
-  const match = path.match(/\.([^./\\]+)$/);
-  return match ? match[1] : null;
-}
-
-// ============================================================================
-// ReDoS Prevention
-// ============================================================================
-
-/**
- * Patterns that can cause ReDoS
- */
-const REDOS_PATTERNS = [
-  /\(\.\*\)\+/,              // (.*)+
-  /\(\.\+\)\+/,              // (.+)+
-  /\([^)]*\?\)\+/,           // (...?)+
-  /\([^)]*\*\)\+/,           // (...*)+
-  /\([^)]*\+\)\+/,           // (...+)+
-  /\(\[.*?\]\+\)\+/,         // ([...]+)+
-  /\(\[.*?\]\*\)\+/,         // ([...]*)+
-  /\(\[.*?\]\?\)\+/,         // ([...]?)+
-  /\(\[.*?\]\*\)\*/,         // ([...]*)*
-  /\.\*\.\*/,                // .*.*
-  /\.\+\.\+/,                // .+.+
-  /\(\.\|\.\)/,              // (.|.)
-];
-
-/**
- * Maximum allowed regex complexity (nested quantifiers)
- */
-const MAX_REGEX_COMPLEXITY = 3;
-
-/**
- * Check if a regex pattern is safe from ReDoS
- */
-export function isRegexSafe(pattern: string): RegexSafetyResult {
-  const riskyPatterns: string[] = [];
-
-  // Check for known ReDoS patterns
-  for (const redosPattern of REDOS_PATTERNS) {
-    if (redosPattern.test(pattern)) {
-      riskyPatterns.push(redosPattern.source);
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check nesting depth of quantifiers
-  const quantifierDepth = countQuantifierNesting(pattern);
-  if (quantifierDepth > MAX_REGEX_COMPLEXITY) {
-    riskyPatterns.push(`Quantifier nesting depth: ${quantifierDepth} (max: ${MAX_REGEX_COMPLEXITY})`);
-  }
-
-  // Check for exponential backtracking potential
-  if (hasExponentialBacktracking(pattern)) {
-    riskyPatterns.push('Exponential backtracking potential detected');
-  }
-
-  return {
-    safe: riskyPatterns.length === 0,
-    pattern,
-    escapedPattern: escapeRegex(pattern),
-    riskyPatterns,
-    error: riskyPatterns.length > 0 ? 'Pattern may cause ReDoS' : undefined,
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Count nested quantifier depth
- */
-function countQuantifierNesting(pattern: string): number {
-  let maxDepth = 0;
-  let currentDepth = 0;
-  let inGroup = false;
-  let escaped = false;
-
-  for (let i = 0; i < pattern.length; i++) {
-    const char = pattern[i];
-
-    if (escaped) {
-      escaped = false;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === '\\') {
-      escaped = true;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === '(') {
-      inGroup = true;
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (char === ')') {
-      inGroup = false;
-      // Check if followed by quantifier
-      const next = pattern[i + 1];
-      if (next === '*' || next === '+' || next === '?' || next === '{') {
-        currentDepth++;
-        maxDepth = Math.max(maxDepth, currentDepth);
-      }
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if ((char === '*' || char === '+' || char === '?') && !inGroup) {
-      currentDepth = 1;
-      maxDepth = Math.max(maxDepth, currentDepth);
-    }
-  }
-
-  return maxDepth;
-}
-
-/**
- * Check for exponential backtracking potential
- */
-function hasExponentialBacktracking(pattern: string): boolean {
-  // Simplified check for common exponential patterns
-  const dangerous = [
-    /\(\[^\\]*\]\+\)\+/,     // ([...]+)+
-    /\(\[^\\]*\]\*\)\*/,     // ([...]*)*
-    /\([^)]+\|[^)]+\)\+/,    // (a|b)+
-    /\(\.\*\)[*+]/,          // (.*)+, (.*)*
-    /\(\.\+\)[*+]/,          // (.+)+, (.+)*
-  ];
-
-  return dangerous.some(d => d.test(pattern));
-}
-
-/**
- * Escape special regex characters in a string
- */
-export function escapeRegex(str: string): string {
-  return str.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
-}
-
-/**
- * Create a safe regex with timeout
- */
-export function createSafeRegex(
-  pattern: string,
-  flags?: string,
-  maxLength = 10000
-): RegExp | null {
-  const safety = isRegexSafe(pattern);
-
-  if (!safety.safe) {
-    return null;
-  }
-
-  if (pattern.length > maxLength) {
-    return null;
-  }
-
-  try {
-    return new RegExp(pattern, flags);
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-// ============================================================================
-// Timing-Safe Comparison
-// ============================================================================
-
-/**
- * Perform a timing-safe string comparison
- */
-export function timingSafeCompare(a: string, b: string): boolean {
-  // Pad shorter string to prevent length-based timing attacks
-  const maxLen = Math.max(a.length, b.length);
-  const paddedA = a.padEnd(maxLen, '\0');
-  const paddedB = b.padEnd(maxLen, '\0');
-
-  try {
-    return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(paddedA), Buffer.from(paddedB));
-  } catch {
-    return false;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Timing-safe comparison for hashed values
- */
-export function timingSafeHashCompare(value: string, expectedHash: string): boolean {
-  const hash = createHash('sha256').update(value).digest('hex');
-  return timingSafeCompare(hash, expectedHash);
-}
-
-/**
- * Generate a secure random token
- */
-export function generateSecureToken(length = 32): string {
-  return randomBytes(length)
-    .toString('base64')
-    .replace(/\+/g, '-')
-    .replace(/\//g, '_')
-    .replace(/=/g, '');
-}
-
-/**
- * Hash a value securely
- */
-export function secureHash(value: string, salt?: string): string {
-  const data = salt ? `${salt}:${value}` : value;
-  return createHash('sha256').update(data).digest('hex');
-}
-
-// ============================================================================
-// Input Sanitization
-// ============================================================================
-
-/**
- * HTML escape characters
- */
-const HTML_ESCAPE_MAP: Record<string, string> = {
-  '&': '&amp;',
-  '<': '&lt;',
-  '>': '&gt;',
-  '"': '&quot;',
-  "'": '&#x27;',
-  '/': '&#x2F;',
-  '`': '&#x60;',
-  '=': '&#x3D;',
-};
-
-/**
- * SQL injection patterns
- */
-const SQL_INJECTION_PATTERNS = [
-  /('|")\s*;\s*--/i,
-  /'\s*OR\s+'1'\s*=\s*'1/i,
-  /"\s*OR\s+"1"\s*=\s*"1/i,
-  /UNION\s+SELECT/i,
-  /INSERT\s+INTO/i,
-  /DROP\s+TABLE/i,
-  /DELETE\s+FROM/i,
-  /UPDATE\s+.*\s+SET/i,
-  /EXEC(\s+|\()sp_/i,
-  /xp_cmdshell/i,
-];
-
-/**
- * Shell metacharacters (excludes parentheses which are common in normal text)
- */
-const SHELL_METACHARACTERS = /[|;&$`<>{}[\]!#*?~]/g;
-
-/**
- * Sanitize input string
- */
-export function sanitizeInput(input: string, options: SanitizationOptions = {}): string {
-  const {
-    maxLength = 10000,
-    allowedChars,
-    stripHtml = true,
-    stripSql = true,
-    escapeShell = true,
-    trim = true,
-  } = options;
-
-  let result = input;
-
-  // Trim
-  if (trim) {
-    result = result.trim();
-  }
-
-  // Max length
-  if (result.length > maxLength) {
-    result = result.substring(0, maxLength);
-  }
-
-  // Strip HTML
-  if (stripHtml) {
-    result = stripHtmlTags(result);
-  }
-
-  // Strip SQL injection attempts
-  if (stripSql) {
-    for (const pattern of SQL_INJECTION_PATTERNS) {
-      result = result.replace(pattern, '');
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Escape shell metacharacters
-  if (escapeShell) {
-    result = result.replace(SHELL_METACHARACTERS, '');
-  }
-
-  // Filter to allowed characters
-  if (allowedChars) {
-    // Filter character by character to respect the provided regex
-    result = result.split('').filter(char => allowedChars.test(char)).join('');
-  }
-
-  return result;
-}
-
-/**
- * Escape HTML special characters
- */
-export function escapeHtml(str: string): string {
-  return str.replace(/[&<>"'`=/]/g, char => HTML_ESCAPE_MAP[char] || char);
-}
-
-/**
- * Strip HTML tags from a string
- */
-export function stripHtmlTags(str: string): string {
-  return str.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, '');
-}
-
-// ============================================================================
-// Command Injection Prevention
-// ============================================================================
-
-/**
- * Allowed commands whitelist
- */
-const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_COMMANDS = [
-  'ls', 'cat', 'echo', 'grep', 'find', 'head', 'tail', 'wc',
-  'npm', 'node', 'yarn', 'pnpm',
-  'git', 'jest', 'vitest', 'playwright',
-];
-
-/**
- * Blocked command patterns
- */
-const BLOCKED_COMMAND_PATTERNS = [
-  /;/,                       // Command chaining with semicolon
-  /&&/,                      // Command chaining with AND
-  /\|\|/,                    // Command chaining with OR
-  /\|/,                      // Piping
-  /`.*`/,                    // Backtick command substitution
-  /\$\(.*\)/,                // $() command substitution
-  />\s*\/dev\/sd/i,          // Writing to block devices
-  />\s*\/etc\//i,            // Writing to /etc
-];
-
-/**
- * Validate and sanitize a command
- */
-export function validateCommand(
-  command: string,
-  allowedCommands: string[] = DEFAULT_ALLOWED_COMMANDS
-): CommandValidationResult {
-  const blockedPatterns: string[] = [];
-
-  // Check for blocked patterns
-  for (const pattern of BLOCKED_COMMAND_PATTERNS) {
-    if (pattern.test(command)) {
-      blockedPatterns.push(pattern.source);
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (blockedPatterns.length > 0) {
-    return {
-      valid: false,
-      error: 'Command contains blocked patterns',
-      blockedPatterns,
-    };
-  }
-
-  // Extract base command
-  const parts = command.trim().split(/\s+/);
-  const baseCommand = parts[0].split('/').pop() || '';
-
-  // Check against whitelist
-  if (!allowedCommands.includes(baseCommand)) {
-    return {
-      valid: false,
-      error: `Command '${baseCommand}' is not in the allowed list`,
-      blockedPatterns: [],
-    };
-  }
-
-  // Sanitize arguments
-  const sanitizedParts = parts.map((part, i) => {
-    if (i === 0) return part;
-    // Remove shell metacharacters from arguments
-    return part.replace(SHELL_METACHARACTERS, '');
-  });
-
-  return {
-    valid: true,
-    sanitizedCommand: sanitizedParts.join(' '),
-    blockedPatterns: [],
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Escape a string for safe shell usage
- */
-export function escapeShellArg(arg: string): string {
-  // Wrap in single quotes and escape any internal single quotes
-  return `'${arg.replace(/'/g, "'\\''")}'`;
-}
-
-// ============================================================================
-// Export Utilities Object
-// ============================================================================
-
-export const CVEPrevention = {
-  // Path traversal
-  validatePath,
-  normalizePath,
-  joinPaths,
-  joinPathsAbsolute,
-  getExtension,
-
-  // ReDoS
-  isRegexSafe,
-  escapeRegex,
-  createSafeRegex,
-
-  // Timing-safe
-  timingSafeCompare,
-  timingSafeHashCompare,
-  generateSecureToken,
-  secureHash,
-
-  // Input sanitization
-  sanitizeInput,
-  escapeHtml,
-  stripHtmlTags,
-
-  // Command injection
-  validateCommand,
-  escapeShellArg,
-};
-
-export default CVEPrevention;