@agentic-qe/v3 3.0.0-alpha.3

package/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+{
+  "name": "@agentic-qe/v3",
+  "version": "3.0.0-alpha.3",
+  "description": "Agentic QE v3 - Domain-Driven Design Architecture with 12 Bounded Contexts, O(log n) coverage analysis, ReasoningBank learning, 47 specialized QE agents",
+  "type": "module",
+  "main": "./dist/index.js",
+  "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+  "bin": {
+    "aqe-v3": "./dist/cli/index.js"
+  },
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "access": "public",
+    "registry": "https://registry.npmjs.org/"
+  },
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "git+https://github.com/proffesor-for-testing/agentic-qe.git",
+    "directory": "v3"
+  },
+  "bugs": {
+    "url": "https://github.com/proffesor-for-testing/agentic-qe/issues"
+  },
+  "homepage": "https://github.com/proffesor-for-testing/agentic-qe/tree/main/v3#readme",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": {
+      "import": "./dist/index.js",
+      "types": "./dist/index.d.ts"
+    },
+    "./kernel": {
+      "import": "./dist/kernel/index.js",
+      "types": "./dist/kernel/index.d.ts"
+    },
+    "./shared": {
+      "import": "./dist/shared/index.js",
+      "types": "./dist/shared/index.d.ts"
+    },
+    "./cli": {
+      "import": "./dist/cli/index.js"
+    }
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsc",
+    "cli": "tsx src/cli/index.ts",
+    "aqe": "tsx src/cli/index.ts",
+    "mcp": "tsx src/mcp/entry.ts",
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "test:watch": "vitest",
+    "test:coverage": "vitest run --coverage",
+    "lint": "eslint src tests --ext .ts",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
+    "clean": "rm -rf dist"
+  },
+  "keywords": [
+    "agentic",
+    "quality-engineering",
+    "testing",
+    "ai",
+    "ddd",
+    "domain-driven-design"
+  ],
+  "author": "Agentic QE Team",
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@types/better-sqlite3": "^7.6.13",
+    "@types/node": "^20.10.0",
+    "@types/uuid": "^10.0.0",
+    "@vitest/coverage-v8": "^4.0.16",
+    "tsx": "^4.21.0",
+    "typescript": "^5.9.3",
+    "vitest": "^4.0.16"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@axe-core/playwright": "^4.8.0",
+    "@faker-js/faker": "^10.2.0",
+    "@xenova/transformers": "^2.17.2",
+    "better-sqlite3": "^12.5.0",
+    "chalk": "^5.6.2",
+    "claude-flow": "^2.7.47",
+    "commander": "^12.1.0",
+    "hnswlib-node": "^3.0.0",
+    "lcov-parse": "^1.0.0",
+    "playwright": "^1.40.0",
+    "uuid": "^9.0.0"
+  },
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">=18.0.0"
+  }
+}

package/security-scan-report-2026-01-11.md

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+# Security Scan Report - Agentic QE v3
+
+**Date:** 2026-01-11
+**Scanner:** V3 QE Security Scanner
+**Target:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/`
+**Files Scanned:** 166+ TypeScript files
+
+---
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+| Severity | Count | Status |
+|----------|-------|--------|
+| Critical | 0 | Pass |
+| High | 3 | Action Required |
+| Medium | 5 | Recommended |
+| Low | 7 | Informational |
+| **Total** | **15** | |
+
+**Overall Assessment:** The codebase demonstrates **strong security posture** with comprehensive security controls including path traversal prevention, input validation, rate limiting, OAuth 2.1, and timing-safe authentication. However, several areas require attention.
+
+---
+
+## Vulnerability Findings
+
+### HIGH Severity (3)
+
+#### HIGH-001: Command Injection Risk in Git Analyzer
+**Location:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/shared/git/git-analyzer.ts`
+**Lines:** 96, 122, 156, 204, 212, 266, 299, 309, 319, 331, 359, 401, 428, 455
+**CWE:** CWE-78 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command)
+**OWASP:** A03:2021 - Injection
+
+**Description:**
+The `GitAnalyzer` class uses `execSync()` to execute git commands with file paths that are passed through string interpolation. While the file paths are sanitized via `getRelativePath()`, the bug keywords in `getBugHistory()` are directly interpolated into the command:
+
+```typescript
+// Line 264-271
+const keywords = this.config.bugKeywords.join('|');
+const output = execSync(
+  `git log --oneline --grep="${keywords}" -i -- "${relativePath}" 2>/dev/null | wc -l`,
+  // ...
+);
+```
+
+**Risk:** If `bugKeywords` configuration is externally controllable, an attacker could inject shell commands.
+
+**Remediation:**
+1. Use `execFileSync()` with argument arrays instead of `execSync()` with string interpolation
+2. Validate and sanitize all configuration values before use
+3. Use the existing `validateCommand()` from CVE Prevention utilities
+
+**Fix Example:**
+```typescript
+import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
+
+// Instead of:
+execSync(`git log --oneline -- "${path}"`)
+
+// Use:
+execFileSync('git', ['log', '--oneline', '--', path])
+```
+
+---
+
+#### HIGH-002: Command Injection in Chaos Engineering Service
+**Location:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/chaos-resilience/services/chaos-engineer.ts`
+**Lines:** 567, 995
+**CWE:** CWE-78 (OS Command Injection)
+**OWASP:** A03:2021 - Injection
+
+**Description:**
+The chaos engineer service executes commands via `exec()` with potentially untrusted input:
+
+```typescript
+// Line 567
+exec(probe.target, { timeout }, (error, stdout, _stderr) => {
+```
+
+The `probe.target` value comes from chaos experiment configuration which may be user-controllable.
+
+**Risk:** Arbitrary command execution if experiment configurations are not properly validated.
+
+**Remediation:**
+1. Whitelist allowed commands for probes
+2. Use the `validateCommand()` utility from `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/cve-prevention.ts`
+3. Implement strict input validation for experiment configurations
+
+---
+
+#### HIGH-003: Shell Spawn with shell:true Option
+**Location:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/test-execution/services/test-executor.ts`
+**Line:** 352-353
+**CWE:** CWE-78 (OS Command Injection)
+**OWASP:** A03:2021 - Injection
+
+**Description:**
+The test executor spawns processes with `shell: true`:
+
+```typescript
+const proc: ChildProcess = spawn(command, args, {
+  shell: true,
+  cwd: process.cwd(),
+  // ...
+});
+```
+
+**Risk:** Using `shell: true` enables shell metacharacter interpretation, creating command injection vectors if arguments are not properly sanitized.
+
+**Remediation:**
+1. Remove `shell: true` option where possible
+2. Use argument arrays without shell interpretation
+3. Sanitize all command arguments using `escapeShellArg()` from CVE Prevention
+
+---
+
+### MEDIUM Severity (5)
+
+#### MED-001: SQL Statement Construction via String Concatenation
+**Location:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/learning/sqlite-persistence.ts`
+**Line:** 513
+**CWE:** CWE-89 (SQL Injection)
+
+**Description:**
+Dynamic SQL is constructed using string concatenation:
+
+```typescript
+const sql = `UPDATE qe_patterns SET ${setClauses.join(', ')} WHERE id = ?`;
+this.db.prepare(sql).run(...values);
+```
+
+**Mitigating Factors:**
+- Column names are hardcoded, not user input
+- Values use parameterized queries
+- This is a LOW risk implementation
+
+**Remediation:**
+- Validate column names against a whitelist before concatenation
+- Consider using a query builder library
+
+---
+
+#### MED-002: Extensive Use of console.log for Debugging
+**Location:** 45 files across the codebase
+**CWE:** CWE-532 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File)
+
+**Description:**
+The codebase contains extensive `console.log()` statements that may inadvertently log sensitive information in production:
+
+Key files with logging:
+- `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/learning/sqlite-persistence.ts`
+- `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/kernel/kernel.ts`
+- `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/chaos-resilience/services/chaos-engineer.ts`
+
+**Remediation:**
+1. Implement a structured logging framework with log levels
+2. Add sensitive data filters before logging
+3. Remove debug statements or gate behind DEBUG environment variable
+
+---
+
+#### MED-003: Missing Input Validation on MCP Tool Parameters
+**Location:** Various MCP handler files in `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/handlers/`
+**CWE:** CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation)
+
+**Description:**
+While schema validation exists via `SchemaValidator`, not all MCP tool handlers consistently apply validation before processing.
+
+**Remediation:**
+1. Ensure all handlers use `SchemaValidator.validate()` before processing
+2. Add runtime type guards for complex objects
+3. Implement comprehensive input validation middleware
+
+---
+
+#### MED-004: API Key Exposure via Environment Variables
+**Location:** Multiple files
+**Lines:**
+- `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/shared/llm/providers/claude.ts:332`
+- `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/shared/llm/providers/openai.ts:399`
+
+**Description:**
+API keys are read from environment variables which is correct, but there's no validation that these aren't accidentally logged:
+
+```typescript
+return this.config.apiKey ?? process.env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY;
+```
+
+**Remediation:**
+1. Add redaction filters to logging
+2. Implement secure credential storage patterns
+3. Validate API key formats before use
+
+---
+
+#### MED-005: JSON.parse Without Error Context
+**Location:** 42 files using JSON.parse
+**CWE:** CWE-754 (Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions)
+
+**Description:**
+Many `JSON.parse()` calls are wrapped in try-catch but error handling varies in quality. Some catch blocks swallow errors without proper context.
+
+**Remediation:**
+1. Standardize JSON parsing with a utility function that provides context
+2. Use the existing `readJSON()` from file-reader.ts pattern throughout
+3. Ensure parse errors include file/source context
+
+---
+
+### LOW Severity (7)
+
+#### LOW-001: Missing Content Security Policy Headers
+**Risk:** XSS vectors in any web-facing components
+**Remediation:** Add CSP headers to HTTP responses
+
+#### LOW-002: Regex Complexity in Pattern Matching
+**Location:** Various security scanner files
+**Risk:** Potential ReDoS if patterns become complex
+**Mitigation:** The `createSafeRegex()` function exists but isn't universally applied
+**Remediation:** Use `isRegexSafe()` before compiling user-provided patterns
+
+#### LOW-003: File Path Handling Without Symlink Resolution
+**Location:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/shared/io/file-reader.ts`
+**Risk:** Symlink-based path traversal
+**Remediation:** Add `fs.realpath()` check before file operations
+
+#### LOW-004: Missing Request Timeout Configuration
+**Location:** Some HTTP client usages
+**Risk:** Resource exhaustion via slow loris attacks
+**Mitigation:** Default timeout of 30s exists in HttpClient
+**Remediation:** Ensure all external HTTP calls use explicit timeouts
+
+#### LOW-005: Deprecated Crypto Patterns (SHA-256)
+**Location:** `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/cve-prevention.ts`
+**Risk:** SHA-256 is secure but consider SHA-3 for future-proofing
+**Note:** Current implementation is acceptable
+
+#### LOW-006: Large File Processing Without Size Limits
+**Location:** File reader and coverage parser
+**Risk:** Memory exhaustion with very large files
+**Remediation:** Add configurable file size limits
+
+#### LOW-007: No CSRF Protection in MCP Handlers
+**Risk:** Cross-site request forgery if exposed via HTTP
+**Mitigation:** MCP primarily uses stdio transport
+**Remediation:** Add CSRF tokens if HTTP transport is enabled
+
+---
+
+## Security Controls Assessment
+
+### Implemented Controls (Positive Findings)
+
+| Control | Implementation | Location | Rating |
+|---------|---------------|----------|--------|
+| Path Traversal Prevention | Comprehensive | `cve-prevention.ts` | Excellent |
+| Input Sanitization | HTML, SQL, Shell | `cve-prevention.ts` | Excellent |
+| Rate Limiting | Token bucket, sliding window | `rate-limiter.ts` | Excellent |
+| OAuth 2.1 + PKCE | Full implementation | `oauth21-provider.ts` | Excellent |
+| JSON Schema Validation | Type-safe validation | `schema-validator.ts` | Good |
+| ReDoS Prevention | Pattern safety checks | `cve-prevention.ts` | Good |
+| Timing-Safe Comparison | Crypto-based | `cve-prevention.ts` | Excellent |
+| Command Validation | Whitelist + sanitization | `cve-prevention.ts` | Good |
+| Circuit Breaker | HTTP resilience | `http-client.ts` | Good |
+| Secure Token Generation | crypto.randomBytes | `cve-prevention.ts` | Excellent |
+
+### Missing/Incomplete Controls
+
+| Control | Status | Priority |
+|---------|--------|----------|
+| Structured Logging | Partial | Medium |
+| Request Signing | Not implemented | Low |
+| Audit Logging | Partial | Medium |
+| CORS Configuration | Not validated | Low |
+| Security Headers | Incomplete | Medium |
+
+---
+
+## Dependency Vulnerability Assessment
+
+```
+npm audit results:
+{
+  "vulnerabilities": {},
+  "metadata": {
+    "vulnerabilities": {
+      "info": 0,
+      "low": 0,
+      "moderate": 0,
+      "high": 0,
+      "critical": 0,
+      "total": 0
+    },
+    "dependencies": {
+      "prod": 428,
+      "dev": 113,
+      "total": 577
+    }
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Result:** No known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
+
+### Key Dependencies Reviewed
+
+| Package | Version | Status |
+|---------|---------|--------|
+| better-sqlite3 | ^12.5.0 | Secure |
+| playwright | ^1.40.0 | Secure |
+| commander | ^12.1.0 | Secure |
+| uuid | ^9.0.0 | Secure |
+| chalk | ^5.6.2 | Secure |
+
+---
+
+## OWASP Top 10 (2021) Compliance
+
+| Risk | Status | Notes |
+|------|--------|-------|
+| A01: Broken Access Control | Partial | OAuth implemented, needs consistent enforcement |
+| A02: Cryptographic Failures | Pass | Proper crypto usage, timing-safe comparisons |
+| A03: Injection | Needs Work | Git analyzer and chaos engineer need fixes |
+| A04: Insecure Design | Pass | Good security architecture with ADR documentation |
+| A05: Security Misconfiguration | Pass | Environment-based config, sensible defaults |
+| A06: Vulnerable Components | Pass | No known vulnerabilities in dependencies |
+| A07: Auth Failures | Pass | OAuth 2.1 + PKCE, secure token handling |
+| A08: Integrity Failures | Pass | Schema validation on inputs |
+| A09: Logging Failures | Partial | Logging exists but not structured |
+| A10: SSRF | Pass | URL validation in HTTP client |
+
+---
+
+## Remediation Priority Matrix
+
+| Priority | Finding | Effort | Impact |
+|----------|---------|--------|--------|
+| P0 | HIGH-001: Git Analyzer Command Injection | Medium | High |
+| P0 | HIGH-002: Chaos Engineer Command Injection | Medium | High |
+| P0 | HIGH-003: Shell Spawn with shell:true | Low | High |
+| P1 | MED-001: SQL String Concatenation | Low | Medium |
+| P1 | MED-002: Console.log Sensitive Data | Medium | Medium |
+| P2 | MED-003: MCP Input Validation | Medium | Medium |
+| P2 | MED-004: API Key Logging Risk | Low | Medium |
+| P3 | MED-005: JSON.parse Error Handling | Low | Low |
+
+---
+
+## Recommendations
+
+### Immediate Actions (P0)
+1. Refactor `GitAnalyzer` to use `execFileSync()` with argument arrays
+2. Add command validation to `ChaosEngineer` probe execution
+3. Remove `shell: true` from test executor spawn calls
+4. Apply existing CVE prevention utilities consistently
+
+### Short-Term (P1-P2)
+1. Implement structured logging framework with sensitive data filters
+2. Create middleware for consistent MCP input validation
+3. Add file size limits to file reader operations
+4. Review and standardize error handling patterns
+
+### Long-Term (P3)
+1. Consider migration to SHA-3 for hashing
+2. Implement comprehensive audit logging
+3. Add security headers middleware
+4. Create security testing automation
+
+---
+
+## Appendix A: Files Requiring Review
+
+### Critical Path Files
+1. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/shared/git/git-analyzer.ts`
+2. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/chaos-resilience/services/chaos-engineer.ts`
+3. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/domains/test-execution/services/test-executor.ts`
+
+### Security Control Files (Well Implemented)
+1. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/cve-prevention.ts` - Excellent
+2. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/rate-limiter.ts` - Excellent
+3. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/schema-validator.ts` - Good
+4. `/workspaces/agentic-qe/v3/src/mcp/security/oauth21-provider.ts` - Excellent
+
+---
+
+## Appendix B: Scan Configuration
+
+```yaml
+scan_type: comprehensive
+modules:
+  - sast: enabled
+  - dependency: enabled
+  - secrets: enabled
+  - owasp: enabled
+  - compliance: enabled
+rules:
+  - OWASP Top 10 (2021)
+  - CWE SANS Top 25
+  - Node.js Security Best Practices
+exclusions:
+  - "**/node_modules/**"
+  - "**/dist/**"
+  - "**/*.test.ts"
+```
+
+---
+
+**Report Generated By:** V3 QE Security Scanner
+**Scan Duration:** ~45 seconds
+**Confidence Level:** High