@agent-native/core 0.100.1 → 0.100.2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/corpus/README.md +1 -1
- package/corpus/core/CHANGELOG.md +8 -0
- package/corpus/core/package.json +1 -1
- package/corpus/core/src/client/AssistantChat.tsx +4 -0
- package/corpus/core/src/client/composer/PromptComposer.tsx +4 -0
- package/corpus/core/src/client/composer/TiptapComposer.tsx +30 -3
- package/corpus/core/src/integrations/webhook-handler.ts +4 -2
- package/corpus/core/src/secrets/crypto.ts +98 -47
- package/corpus/core/src/secrets/index.ts +2 -1
- package/corpus/core/src/secrets/schema.ts +3 -0
- package/corpus/core/src/secrets/storage.ts +164 -31
- package/corpus/templates/assets/app/components/layout/Layout.tsx +4 -0
- package/corpus/templates/assets/app/hooks/use-navigation-state.ts +3 -1
- package/corpus/templates/assets/changelog/2026-07-13-assets-keeps-the-right-chat-sidebar-closed-when-the-full-pag.md +6 -0
- package/dist/client/AssistantChat.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/client/AssistantChat.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/AssistantChat.js +2 -2
- package/dist/client/AssistantChat.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/composer/PromptComposer.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/client/composer/PromptComposer.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/composer/PromptComposer.js +2 -2
- package/dist/client/composer/PromptComposer.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/composer/TiptapComposer.d.ts +3 -1
- package/dist/client/composer/TiptapComposer.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/composer/TiptapComposer.js +20 -5
- package/dist/client/composer/TiptapComposer.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/file-upload/actions/upload-image.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/integrations/webhook-handler.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/integrations/webhook-handler.js +3 -2
- package/dist/integrations/webhook-handler.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/secrets/crypto.d.ts +35 -13
- package/dist/secrets/crypto.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/secrets/crypto.js +78 -41
- package/dist/secrets/crypto.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/secrets/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/secrets/index.js +2 -1
- package/dist/secrets/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/secrets/schema.d.ts +20 -1
- package/dist/secrets/schema.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/secrets/schema.js +3 -0
- package/dist/secrets/schema.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/secrets/storage.d.ts +7 -7
- package/dist/secrets/storage.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/secrets/storage.js +121 -30
- package/dist/secrets/storage.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/secrets/storage.js
CHANGED
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@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
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/**
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* Storage layer for the framework secrets registry.
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*
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* Values are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. The
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* derived from `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` (preferred) or the
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* `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` env var (fallback so templates don't need a
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* secret during development).
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*
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*
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* for
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* Values are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. The workspace-shared
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* encryption key is derived from `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` (preferred) or the
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* existing `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` env var (fallback so templates don't need a
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* second secret during development). Deployments that only have the legacy
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* app-scoped key continue to work until shared key material is configured;
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* once configured, new rows use the shared key and reads retain a legacy-key
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* fallback for existing rows.
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*
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* Secret values are NEVER logged and NEVER returned from any route handler.
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*/
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import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
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import { getDbExec, isPostgres } from "../db/client.js";
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import { ensureColumnExists, ensureTableExists } from "../db/ddl-guard.js";
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import { encryptSecretValue as encryptValue,
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import { encryptSecretValue as encryptLegacyValue, encryptSharedSecretValue as encryptValue, decryptSharedSecretValue as decryptValue, decryptSecretValue as decryptLegacyValue, hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial, } from "./crypto.js";
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import { APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL } from "./schema.js";
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Table bootstrap
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@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ async function ensureTable() {
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await ensureTableExists("app_secrets", createSql);
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await ensureColumnExists("app_secrets", "description", `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS description TEXT`);
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await ensureColumnExists("app_secrets", "url_allowlist", `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS url_allowlist TEXT`);
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await ensureColumnExists("app_secrets", "shared_encrypted_value", `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS shared_encrypted_value TEXT`);
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return;
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}
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// SQLite (local dev): no ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock problem, keep the original
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@@ -63,6 +64,14 @@ async function ensureTable() {
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catch {
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// Column already exists — expected
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}
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// Additive migration: workspace-shared ciphertext. Keep the legacy
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// encrypted_value column so older app versions remain readable.
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try {
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await client.execute(`ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN shared_encrypted_value TEXT`);
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}
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catch {
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// Column already exists — expected
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}
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})().catch((err) => {
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_initPromise = undefined;
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throw err;
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@@ -71,7 +80,9 @@ async function ensureTable() {
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return _initPromise;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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-
// Encryption — see ./crypto.ts
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// Encryption — see ./crypto.ts. Keep encrypted_value on the legacy app-key
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// format for mixed-version deployments, and add shared_encrypted_value when a
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// stable workspace key is configured so sibling apps can read the same row.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Return the last 4 characters of a secret, with any leading characters
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@@ -97,7 +108,14 @@ export async function writeAppSecret(args) {
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}
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const client = getDbExec();
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const now = Date.now();
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-
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// Dual-write during rollout: old readers continue using encrypted_value,
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// while new readers prefer the nullable shared ciphertext. An app-only
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// deployment leaves the shared column null; on an update, an existing
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// shared ciphertext is preserved by the upsert below.
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const encrypted = encryptLegacyValue(value);
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const sharedEncrypted = hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial()
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? encryptValue(value)
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: null;
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const id = randomUUID();
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// Atomic upsert by (scope, scope_id, key). Previously this was a
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// SELECT-then-branch (UPDATE if found, else INSERT): under concurrent
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// keeps its original id (any stored references stay stable); only a
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// genuinely new row gets the freshly generated `id`. This syntax is
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// portable across SQLite (UPSERT since 3.24) and Postgres.
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const upsertSql = `INSERT INTO app_secrets (id, scope, scope_id, key, encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at)
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VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
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const upsertSql = `INSERT INTO app_secrets (id, scope, scope_id, key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at)
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VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
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ON CONFLICT (scope, scope_id, key) DO UPDATE SET
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encrypted_value = excluded.encrypted_value,
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shared_encrypted_value = COALESCE(excluded.shared_encrypted_value, app_secrets.shared_encrypted_value),
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description = excluded.description,
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url_allowlist = excluded.url_allowlist,
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updated_at = excluded.updated_at`;
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@@ -123,6 +142,7 @@ export async function writeAppSecret(args) {
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scopeId,
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key,
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encrypted,
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sharedEncrypted,
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description ?? null,
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urlAllowlist ?? null,
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now,
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@@ -147,6 +167,59 @@ export async function writeAppSecret(args) {
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});
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return String(rows[0]?.id ?? id);
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}
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function decryptAppSecretValue(encrypted, sharedEncrypted) {
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if (sharedEncrypted) {
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try {
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return {
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value: decryptValue(sharedEncrypted),
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usedLegacyKey: false,
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needsSharedCiphertext: false,
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};
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}
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catch {
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// Fall through to the legacy column. A partially migrated row may have
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// a stale shared ciphertext while the old app-key value is valid.
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}
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}
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try {
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return {
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value: decryptValue(encrypted),
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usedLegacyKey: false,
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needsSharedCiphertext: true,
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};
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}
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catch {
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return {
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value: decryptLegacyValue(encrypted),
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usedLegacyKey: true,
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needsSharedCiphertext: true,
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};
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}
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}
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/**
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* Populate the shared column without touching encrypted_value. This is
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* intentionally best-effort: a read must still succeed if a deployment's DB
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* role cannot update the row. The NULL predicate prevents a concurrent writer
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* from overwriting newly-populated shared ciphertext, and leaving updated_at
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* untouched preserves the row's user-visible ordering/metadata.
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*/
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async function populateSharedAppSecret(id, value) {
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if (id === undefined ||
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id === null ||
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!hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial()) {
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return;
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}
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try {
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await getDbExec().execute({
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sql: `UPDATE app_secrets SET shared_encrypted_value = ? WHERE id = ? AND shared_encrypted_value IS NULL`,
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args: [encryptValue(value), id],
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});
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}
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catch {
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// Migration is opportunistic. Preserve the successful read if the update
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// is unavailable due to a read-only role, transient DB failure, or race.
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}
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}
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/**
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* True only when the database says the app_secrets table itself is missing.
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* Other query failures must propagate unchanged: attempting schema bootstrap
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@@ -185,16 +258,20 @@ async function executeAppSecretsRead(query) {
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export async function readAppSecret(ref) {
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const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;
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const { rows } = await executeAppSecretsRead({
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sql: `SELECT encrypted_value, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,
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sql: `SELECT encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, updated_at, id FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,
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args: [scope, scopeId, key],
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});
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if (rows.length === 0)
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return null;
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try {
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const
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const encrypted = rows[0].encrypted_value;
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const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(encrypted, rows[0].shared_encrypted_value);
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if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {
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await populateSharedAppSecret(rows[0].id, decrypted.value);
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}
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return {
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value,
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last4: last4(value),
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value: decrypted.value,
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last4: last4(decrypted.value),
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updatedAt: Number(rows[0].updated_at ?? 0),
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};
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}
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@@ -211,7 +288,7 @@ export async function readAppSecrets(args) {
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return new Map();
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const placeholders = keys.map(() => "?").join(", ");
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const { rows } = await executeAppSecretsRead({
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sql: `SELECT key, encrypted_value, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key IN (${placeholders})`,
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sql: `SELECT key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, updated_at, id FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key IN (${placeholders})`,
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args: [args.scope, args.scopeId, ...keys],
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});
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const results = new Map();
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@@ -220,10 +297,14 @@ export async function readAppSecrets(args) {
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if (!key)
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continue;
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try {
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const
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const encrypted = row.encrypted_value;
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const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(encrypted, row.shared_encrypted_value);
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if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {
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await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value);
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}
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results.set(key, {
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value,
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last4: last4(value),
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value: decrypted.value,
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last4: last4(decrypted.value),
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updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),
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});
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}
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@@ -254,7 +335,7 @@ export async function readAppSecretMeta(ref) {
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const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;
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const client = getDbExec();
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const { rows } = await client.execute({
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sql: `SELECT encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,
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sql: `SELECT id, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,
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args: [scope, scopeId, key],
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});
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if (rows.length === 0)
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@@ -262,8 +343,12 @@ export async function readAppSecretMeta(ref) {
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const row = rows[0];
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let last4Value = "";
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try {
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-
const
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-
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const encrypted = row.encrypted_value;
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const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(encrypted, row.shared_encrypted_value);
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if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {
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await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value);
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}
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last4Value = last4(decrypted.value);
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}
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catch {
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last4Value = "";
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@@ -288,19 +373,24 @@ export async function listAppSecretsForScope(scope, scopeId) {
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await ensureTable();
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const client = getDbExec();
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const { rows } = await client.execute({
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sql: `SELECT key, encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? ORDER BY updated_at DESC`,
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sql: `SELECT id, key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? ORDER BY updated_at DESC`,
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args: [scope, scopeId],
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});
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-
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const results = [];
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for (const row of rows) {
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let last4Value = "";
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try {
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-
const
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-
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const encrypted = row.encrypted_value;
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const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(encrypted, row.shared_encrypted_value);
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385
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+
if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {
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await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value);
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}
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last4Value = last4(decrypted.value);
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}
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|
300
390
|
catch {
|
|
301
391
|
last4Value = "";
|
|
302
392
|
}
|
|
303
|
-
|
|
393
|
+
results.push({
|
|
304
394
|
key: row.key,
|
|
305
395
|
scope,
|
|
306
396
|
scopeId,
|
|
@@ -309,8 +399,9 @@ export async function listAppSecretsForScope(scope, scopeId) {
|
|
|
309
399
|
urlAllowlist: parseAllowlist(row.url_allowlist),
|
|
310
400
|
createdAt: Number(row.created_at ?? 0),
|
|
311
401
|
updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),
|
|
312
|
-
};
|
|
313
|
-
}
|
|
402
|
+
});
|
|
403
|
+
}
|
|
404
|
+
return results;
|
|
314
405
|
}
|
|
315
406
|
function parseAllowlist(raw) {
|
|
316
407
|
if (!raw)
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
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* Storage layer for the framework secrets registry.\n *\n * Values are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. The encryption key is\n * derived from `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` (preferred) or the existing\n * `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` env var (fallback so templates don't need a second\n * secret during development). If neither is set in production we fall back\n * to a machine-local key derived from the cwd — the secret is still only\n * readable on this machine, but consider setting `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`\n * for a stable, rotatable key.\n *\n * Secret values are NEVER logged and NEVER returned from any route handler.\n */\n\nimport { randomUUID } from \"node:crypto\";\n\nimport { getDbExec, isPostgres } from \"../db/client.js\";\nimport { ensureColumnExists, ensureTableExists } from \"../db/ddl-guard.js\";\nimport {\n encryptSecretValue as encryptValue,\n decryptSecretValue as decryptValue,\n} from \"./crypto.js\";\nimport type { SecretScope } from \"./register.js\";\nimport { APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL } from \"./schema.js\";\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Table bootstrap\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nlet _initPromise: Promise<void> | undefined;\n\nasync function ensureTable(): Promise<void> {\n if (!_initPromise) {\n _initPromise = (async () => {\n const client = getDbExec();\n // Postgres version of the CREATE TABLE — the generic `INTEGER` maps to\n // BIGINT on Postgres, which we need for millisecond timestamps.\n const createSql = isPostgres()\n ? APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL.replace(/\\bINTEGER\\b/g, \"BIGINT\")\n : APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL;\n\n if (isPostgres()) {\n // Hot path: in production the table and both additive columns are\n // virtually always already present. Issuing `CREATE`/`ALTER` would\n // still take an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock — which, in a fresh background\n // worker process behind a concurrent connection on the shared Neon DB,\n // can block ~indefinitely. `ensureTableExists` / `ensureColumnExists`\n // check `information_schema` first (a plain read, no lock) and run DDL\n // ONLY for what is actually missing, wrapping any DDL that must run in a\n // transaction-scoped `lock_timeout` so a contended lock fails fast. 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Used to show a preview without leaking the value.\n */\nexport function last4(value: string): string {\n if (!value) return \"\";\n if (value.length <= 4) return \"••••\";\n return \"••••\" + value.slice(-4);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// CRUD\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface SecretRef {\n key: string;\n scope: SecretScope;\n scopeId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface WriteSecretArgs extends SecretRef {\n value: string;\n /** Optional human-readable description (used for ad-hoc keys). */\n description?: string;\n /** Optional JSON-stringified array of allowed URL origins. */\n urlAllowlist?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Write (insert or update) a secret. The value is encrypted before being\n * stored — the caller's plaintext is never persisted. Returns the new\n * record's id.\n */\nexport async function writeAppSecret(args: WriteSecretArgs): Promise<string> {\n await ensureTable();\n const { key, value, scope, scopeId, description, urlAllowlist } = args;\n if (!key || !value || !scope || !scopeId) {\n throw new Error(\n \"writeAppSecret: key, value, scope, and scopeId are all required\",\n );\n }\n const client = getDbExec();\n const now = Date.now();\n const encrypted = encryptValue(value);\n const id = randomUUID();\n\n // Atomic upsert by (scope, scope_id, key). Previously this was a\n // SELECT-then-branch (UPDATE if found, else INSERT): under concurrent\n // writers for the same key both could see \"no row\" and both attempt\n // INSERT, and the loser threw a raw UNIQUE(scope, scope_id, key)\n // constraint violation (a user-facing 500) instead of updating. A single\n // `INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE` closes that window — it's one\n // statement, so there's no gap between \"check\" and \"act\". `id` is\n // deliberately left out of the `DO UPDATE SET` list so an existing row\n // keeps its original id (any stored references stay stable); only a\n // genuinely new row gets the freshly generated `id`. This syntax is\n // portable across SQLite (UPSERT since 3.24) and Postgres.\n const upsertSql = `INSERT INTO app_secrets (id, scope, scope_id, key, encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at)\n VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)\n ON CONFLICT (scope, scope_id, key) DO UPDATE SET\n encrypted_value = excluded.encrypted_value,\n description = excluded.description,\n url_allowlist = excluded.url_allowlist,\n updated_at = excluded.updated_at`;\n const upsertArgs = [\n id,\n scope,\n scopeId,\n key,\n encrypted,\n description ?? null,\n urlAllowlist ?? null,\n now,\n now,\n ];\n\n if (isPostgres()) {\n const { rows } = await client.execute({\n sql: `${upsertSql} RETURNING id`,\n args: upsertArgs,\n });\n return String(rows[0]?.id ?? id);\n }\n\n // SQLite: RETURNING support varies across better-sqlite3/libsql builds, so\n // (matching the convention elsewhere in this codebase, e.g.\n // integrations/pending-tasks-store.ts) re-read the id afterward instead of\n // relying on it. The row is guaranteed to exist at this point, so this is\n // a plain lookup rather than a TOCTOU-prone gate on the write itself.\n await client.execute({ sql: upsertSql, args: upsertArgs });\n const { rows } = await client.execute({\n sql: `SELECT id FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,\n args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n });\n return String(rows[0]?.id ?? id);\n}\n\nexport interface ReadSecretResult {\n value: string;\n last4: string;\n updatedAt: number;\n}\n\ntype AppSecretsReadQuery = { sql: string; args: unknown[] };\n\n/**\n * True only when the database says the app_secrets table itself is missing.\n * Other query failures must propagate unchanged: attempting schema bootstrap\n * for connectivity, permission, or syntax errors both hides the real failure\n * and can introduce DDL onto a latency-sensitive read path.\n */\nfunction isMissingAppSecretsTableError(error: unknown): boolean {\n if (!(error instanceof Error)) return false;\n const code = String((error as Error & { code?: unknown }).code ?? \"\");\n const message = error.message.toLowerCase();\n const namesAppSecrets = /(?:app_secrets|\"app_secrets\")/.test(message);\n\n if (code === \"42P01\") return namesAppSecrets;\n return (\n namesAppSecrets &&\n (message.includes(\"no such table\") ||\n (message.includes(\"relation\") && message.includes(\"does not exist\")))\n );\n}\n\n/** Execute a read without schema probes on the normal path. */\nasync function executeAppSecretsRead(query: AppSecretsReadQuery) {\n const client = getDbExec();\n try {\n return await client.execute(query);\n } catch (error) {\n if (!isMissingAppSecretsTableError(error)) throw error;\n await ensureTable();\n return client.execute(query);\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Read a secret's plaintext value. Returns null when not found. The caller\n * is responsible for never logging the returned value.\n */\nexport async function readAppSecret(\n ref: SecretRef,\n): Promise<ReadSecretResult | null> {\n const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;\n const { rows } = await executeAppSecretsRead({\n sql: `SELECT encrypted_value, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,\n args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n });\n if (rows.length === 0) return null;\n try {\n const value = decryptValue(rows[0].encrypted_value as string);\n return {\n value,\n last4: last4(value),\n updatedAt: Number(rows[0].updated_at ?? 0),\n };\n } catch {\n // Decryption failure — key rotated, tampered row, etc. Don't throw up the\n // stack in a way that could leak the ciphertext; just report missing.\n return null;\n }\n}\n\n/** Read several keys from one scope in a single database round trip. */\nexport async function readAppSecrets(args: {\n keys: readonly string[];\n scope: SecretScope;\n scopeId: string;\n}): Promise<Map<string, ReadSecretResult>> {\n const keys = [...new Set(args.keys.filter(Boolean))];\n if (keys.length === 0) return new Map();\n\n const placeholders = keys.map(() => \"?\").join(\", \");\n const { rows } = await executeAppSecretsRead({\n sql: `SELECT key, encrypted_value, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key IN (${placeholders})`,\n args: [args.scope, args.scopeId, ...keys],\n });\n const results = new Map<string, ReadSecretResult>();\n for (const row of rows) {\n const key = String(row.key ?? \"\");\n if (!key) continue;\n try {\n const value = decryptValue(row.encrypted_value as string);\n results.set(key, {\n value,\n last4: last4(value),\n updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),\n });\n } catch {\n // Match readAppSecret: corrupted or stale ciphertext behaves as missing.\n }\n }\n return results;\n}\n\n/**\n * Return just the metadata for a secret (no value). Used by the list route so\n * the UI can show the \"Set\" pill and last-4 without the decrypted value going\n * over the wire.\n */\nexport async function getAppSecretMeta(\n ref: SecretRef,\n): Promise<{ last4: string; updatedAt: number } | null> {\n const result = await readAppSecret(ref);\n if (!result) return null;\n return { last4: result.last4, updatedAt: result.updatedAt };\n}\n\nexport interface SecretMeta {\n key: string;\n scope: SecretScope;\n scopeId: string;\n last4: string;\n description: string | null;\n urlAllowlist: string[] | null;\n createdAt: number;\n updatedAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read a secret's metadata, including ad-hoc fields (description, allowlist),\n * without ever decrypting or returning the plaintext value. Used by the\n * ad-hoc list route and any UI that wants to render a key tile.\n */\nexport async function readAppSecretMeta(\n ref: SecretRef,\n): Promise<SecretMeta | null> {\n await ensureTable();\n const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;\n const client = getDbExec();\n const { rows } = await client.execute({\n sql: `SELECT encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,\n args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n });\n if (rows.length === 0) return null;\n const row = rows[0];\n let last4Value = \"\";\n try {\n const value = decryptValue(row.encrypted_value as string);\n last4Value = last4(value);\n } catch {\n last4Value = \"\";\n }\n return {\n key,\n scope,\n scopeId,\n last4: last4Value,\n description: (row.description as string | null) ?? null,\n urlAllowlist: parseAllowlist(row.url_allowlist as string | null),\n createdAt: Number(row.created_at ?? 0),\n updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * List all secrets for a given scope. Returns metadata only — values are\n * never decrypted or returned. Used by the ad-hoc list route to surface\n * user-created keys.\n */\nexport async function listAppSecretsForScope(\n scope: SecretScope,\n scopeId: string,\n): Promise<SecretMeta[]> {\n await ensureTable();\n const client = getDbExec();\n const { rows } = await client.execute({\n sql: `SELECT key, encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? ORDER BY updated_at DESC`,\n args: [scope, scopeId],\n });\n return rows.map((row) => {\n let last4Value = \"\";\n try {\n const value = decryptValue(row.encrypted_value as string);\n last4Value = last4(value);\n } catch {\n last4Value = \"\";\n }\n return {\n key: row.key as string,\n scope,\n scopeId,\n last4: last4Value,\n description: (row.description as string | null) ?? null,\n urlAllowlist: parseAllowlist(row.url_allowlist as string | null),\n createdAt: Number(row.created_at ?? 0),\n updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),\n };\n });\n}\n\nfunction parseAllowlist(raw: string | null): string[] | null {\n if (!raw) return null;\n try {\n const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);\n if (Array.isArray(parsed) && parsed.every((v) => typeof v === \"string\")) {\n return parsed;\n }\n return null;\n } catch {\n return null;\n }\n}\n\nexport async function deleteAppSecret(ref: SecretRef): Promise<boolean> {\n await ensureTable();\n const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;\n const client = getDbExec();\n const { rowsAffected } = await client.execute({\n sql: `DELETE FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ?`,\n args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n });\n return rowsAffected > 0;\n}\n"]}
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* Storage layer for the framework secrets registry.\n *\n * Values are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. 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Deployments that only have the legacy\n * app-scoped key continue to work until shared key material is configured;\n * once configured, new rows use the shared key and reads retain a legacy-key\n * fallback for existing rows.\n *\n * Secret values are NEVER logged and NEVER returned from any route handler.\n */\n\nimport { randomUUID } from \"node:crypto\";\n\nimport { getDbExec, isPostgres } from \"../db/client.js\";\nimport { ensureColumnExists, ensureTableExists } from \"../db/ddl-guard.js\";\nimport {\n encryptSecretValue as encryptLegacyValue,\n encryptSharedSecretValue as encryptValue,\n decryptSharedSecretValue as decryptValue,\n decryptSecretValue as decryptLegacyValue,\n hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial,\n} from \"./crypto.js\";\nimport type { SecretScope } from \"./register.js\";\nimport { APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL } from \"./schema.js\";\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Table bootstrap\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nlet _initPromise: Promise<void> | undefined;\n\nasync function ensureTable(): Promise<void> {\n if (!_initPromise) {\n _initPromise = (async () => {\n const client = getDbExec();\n // Postgres version of the CREATE TABLE — the generic `INTEGER` maps to\n // BIGINT on Postgres, which we need for millisecond timestamps.\n const createSql = isPostgres()\n ? APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL.replace(/\\bINTEGER\\b/g, \"BIGINT\")\n : APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL;\n\n if (isPostgres()) {\n // Hot path: in production the table and both additive columns are\n // virtually always already present. Issuing `CREATE`/`ALTER` would\n // still take an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock — which, in a fresh background\n // worker process behind a concurrent connection on the shared Neon DB,\n // can block ~indefinitely. `ensureTableExists` / `ensureColumnExists`\n // check `information_schema` first (a plain read, no lock) and run DDL\n // ONLY for what is actually missing, wrapping any DDL that must run in a\n // transaction-scoped `lock_timeout` so a contended lock fails fast. They\n // also re-probe after a swallowed lock-timeout and THROW if the schema\n // is still missing, so a timed-out DDL never poisons this init memo.\n await ensureTableExists(\"app_secrets\", createSql);\n await ensureColumnExists(\n \"app_secrets\",\n \"description\",\n `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS description TEXT`,\n );\n await ensureColumnExists(\n \"app_secrets\",\n \"url_allowlist\",\n `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS url_allowlist TEXT`,\n );\n await ensureColumnExists(\n \"app_secrets\",\n \"shared_encrypted_value\",\n `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS shared_encrypted_value TEXT`,\n );\n return;\n }\n\n // SQLite (local dev): no ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock problem, keep the original\n // create-then-additive-alter behaviour. SQLite has no\n // `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`, so the ALTERs stay wrapped in try/catch.\n await client.execute(createSql);\n\n // Additive migration: description column (for ad-hoc keys)\n try {\n await client.execute(\n `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN description TEXT`,\n );\n } catch {\n // Column already exists — expected\n }\n\n // Additive migration: url_allowlist column\n try {\n await client.execute(\n `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN url_allowlist TEXT`,\n );\n } catch {\n // Column already exists — expected\n }\n\n // Additive migration: workspace-shared ciphertext. Keep the legacy\n // encrypted_value column so older app versions remain readable.\n try {\n await client.execute(\n `ALTER TABLE app_secrets ADD COLUMN shared_encrypted_value TEXT`,\n );\n } catch {\n // Column already exists — expected\n }\n })().catch((err) => {\n _initPromise = undefined;\n throw err;\n });\n }\n return _initPromise;\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Encryption — see ./crypto.ts. Keep encrypted_value on the legacy app-key\n// format for mixed-version deployments, and add shared_encrypted_value when a\n// stable workspace key is configured so sibling apps can read the same row.\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n/**\n * Return the last 4 characters of a secret, with any leading characters\n * masked. Used to show a preview without leaking the value.\n */\nexport function last4(value: string): string {\n if (!value) return \"\";\n if (value.length <= 4) return \"••••\";\n return \"••••\" + value.slice(-4);\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// CRUD\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nexport interface SecretRef {\n key: string;\n scope: SecretScope;\n scopeId: string;\n}\n\nexport interface WriteSecretArgs extends SecretRef {\n value: string;\n /** Optional human-readable description (used for ad-hoc keys). */\n description?: string;\n /** Optional JSON-stringified array of allowed URL origins. */\n urlAllowlist?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Write (insert or update) a secret. The value is encrypted before being\n * stored — the caller's plaintext is never persisted. Returns the new\n * record's id.\n */\nexport async function writeAppSecret(args: WriteSecretArgs): Promise<string> {\n await ensureTable();\n const { key, value, scope, scopeId, description, urlAllowlist } = args;\n if (!key || !value || !scope || !scopeId) {\n throw new Error(\n \"writeAppSecret: key, value, scope, and scopeId are all required\",\n );\n }\n const client = getDbExec();\n const now = Date.now();\n // Dual-write during rollout: old readers continue using encrypted_value,\n // while new readers prefer the nullable shared ciphertext. An app-only\n // deployment leaves the shared column null; on an update, an existing\n // shared ciphertext is preserved by the upsert below.\n const encrypted = encryptLegacyValue(value);\n const sharedEncrypted = hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial()\n ? encryptValue(value)\n : null;\n const id = randomUUID();\n\n // Atomic upsert by (scope, scope_id, key). Previously this was a\n // SELECT-then-branch (UPDATE if found, else INSERT): under concurrent\n // writers for the same key both could see \"no row\" and both attempt\n // INSERT, and the loser threw a raw UNIQUE(scope, scope_id, key)\n // constraint violation (a user-facing 500) instead of updating. A single\n // `INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE` closes that window — it's one\n // statement, so there's no gap between \"check\" and \"act\". `id` is\n // deliberately left out of the `DO UPDATE SET` list so an existing row\n // keeps its original id (any stored references stay stable); only a\n // genuinely new row gets the freshly generated `id`. This syntax is\n // portable across SQLite (UPSERT since 3.24) and Postgres.\n const upsertSql = `INSERT INTO app_secrets (id, scope, scope_id, key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at)\n VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)\n ON CONFLICT (scope, scope_id, key) DO UPDATE SET\n encrypted_value = excluded.encrypted_value,\n shared_encrypted_value = COALESCE(excluded.shared_encrypted_value, app_secrets.shared_encrypted_value),\n description = excluded.description,\n url_allowlist = excluded.url_allowlist,\n updated_at = excluded.updated_at`;\n const upsertArgs = [\n id,\n scope,\n scopeId,\n key,\n encrypted,\n sharedEncrypted,\n description ?? null,\n urlAllowlist ?? null,\n now,\n now,\n ];\n\n if (isPostgres()) {\n const { rows } = await client.execute({\n sql: `${upsertSql} RETURNING id`,\n args: upsertArgs,\n });\n return String(rows[0]?.id ?? id);\n }\n\n // SQLite: RETURNING support varies across better-sqlite3/libsql builds, so\n // (matching the convention elsewhere in this codebase, e.g.\n // integrations/pending-tasks-store.ts) re-read the id afterward instead of\n // relying on it. The row is guaranteed to exist at this point, so this is\n // a plain lookup rather than a TOCTOU-prone gate on the write itself.\n await client.execute({ sql: upsertSql, args: upsertArgs });\n const { rows } = await client.execute({\n sql: `SELECT id FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,\n args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n });\n return String(rows[0]?.id ?? id);\n}\n\nexport interface ReadSecretResult {\n value: string;\n last4: string;\n updatedAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the shared-key format and retain compatibility with rows written before\n * app_secrets moved to its workspace-shared encryption boundary. The legacy\n * fallback is only useful when the current app owns the old row; sibling apps\n * will receive shared-key ciphertext after the next vault sync or update.\n */\ninterface DecryptedAppSecretValue {\n value: string;\n /** True when the app-scoped fallback decrypted encrypted_value. */\n usedLegacyKey: boolean;\n /** True when shared_encrypted_value was not the source of the plaintext. */\n needsSharedCiphertext: boolean;\n}\n\nfunction decryptAppSecretValue(\n encrypted: string,\n sharedEncrypted?: string | null,\n): DecryptedAppSecretValue {\n if (sharedEncrypted) {\n try {\n return {\n value: decryptValue(sharedEncrypted),\n usedLegacyKey: false,\n needsSharedCiphertext: false,\n };\n } catch {\n // Fall through to the legacy column. A partially migrated row may have\n // a stale shared ciphertext while the old app-key value is valid.\n }\n }\n try {\n return {\n value: decryptValue(encrypted),\n usedLegacyKey: false,\n needsSharedCiphertext: true,\n };\n } catch {\n return {\n value: decryptLegacyValue(encrypted),\n usedLegacyKey: true,\n needsSharedCiphertext: true,\n };\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Populate the shared column without touching encrypted_value. This is\n * intentionally best-effort: a read must still succeed if a deployment's DB\n * role cannot update the row. The NULL predicate prevents a concurrent writer\n * from overwriting newly-populated shared ciphertext, and leaving updated_at\n * untouched preserves the row's user-visible ordering/metadata.\n */\nasync function populateSharedAppSecret(\n id: unknown,\n value: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n if (\n id === undefined ||\n id === null ||\n !hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial()\n ) {\n return;\n }\n try {\n await getDbExec().execute({\n sql: `UPDATE app_secrets SET shared_encrypted_value = ? WHERE id = ? AND shared_encrypted_value IS NULL`,\n args: [encryptValue(value), id],\n });\n } catch {\n // Migration is opportunistic. Preserve the successful read if the update\n // is unavailable due to a read-only role, transient DB failure, or race.\n }\n}\n\ntype AppSecretsReadQuery = { sql: string; args: unknown[] };\n\n/**\n * True only when the database says the app_secrets table itself is missing.\n * Other query failures must propagate unchanged: attempting schema bootstrap\n * for connectivity, permission, or syntax errors both hides the real failure\n * and can introduce DDL onto a latency-sensitive read path.\n */\nfunction isMissingAppSecretsTableError(error: unknown): boolean {\n if (!(error instanceof Error)) return false;\n const code = String((error as Error & { code?: unknown }).code ?? \"\");\n const message = error.message.toLowerCase();\n const namesAppSecrets = /(?:app_secrets|\"app_secrets\")/.test(message);\n\n if (code === \"42P01\") return namesAppSecrets;\n return (\n namesAppSecrets &&\n (message.includes(\"no such table\") ||\n (message.includes(\"relation\") && message.includes(\"does not exist\")))\n );\n}\n\n/** Execute a read without schema probes on the normal path. */\nasync function executeAppSecretsRead(query: AppSecretsReadQuery) {\n const client = getDbExec();\n try {\n return await client.execute(query);\n } catch (error) {\n if (!isMissingAppSecretsTableError(error)) throw error;\n await ensureTable();\n return client.execute(query);\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Read a secret's plaintext value. Returns null when not found. The caller\n * is responsible for never logging the returned value.\n */\nexport async function readAppSecret(\n ref: SecretRef,\n): Promise<ReadSecretResult | null> {\n const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;\n const { rows } = await executeAppSecretsRead({\n sql: `SELECT encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, updated_at, id FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,\n args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n });\n if (rows.length === 0) return null;\n try {\n const encrypted = rows[0].encrypted_value as string;\n const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(\n encrypted,\n rows[0].shared_encrypted_value as string | null,\n );\n if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {\n await populateSharedAppSecret(rows[0].id, decrypted.value);\n }\n return {\n value: decrypted.value,\n last4: last4(decrypted.value),\n updatedAt: Number(rows[0].updated_at ?? 0),\n };\n } catch {\n // Decryption failure — key rotated, tampered row, etc. Don't throw up the\n // stack in a way that could leak the ciphertext; just report missing.\n return null;\n }\n}\n\n/** Read several keys from one scope in a single database round trip. */\nexport async function readAppSecrets(args: {\n keys: readonly string[];\n scope: SecretScope;\n scopeId: string;\n}): Promise<Map<string, ReadSecretResult>> {\n const keys = [...new Set(args.keys.filter(Boolean))];\n if (keys.length === 0) return new Map();\n\n const placeholders = keys.map(() => \"?\").join(\", \");\n const { rows } = await executeAppSecretsRead({\n sql: `SELECT key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, updated_at, id FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key IN (${placeholders})`,\n args: [args.scope, args.scopeId, ...keys],\n });\n const results = new Map<string, ReadSecretResult>();\n for (const row of rows) {\n const key = String(row.key ?? \"\");\n if (!key) continue;\n try {\n const encrypted = row.encrypted_value as string;\n const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(\n encrypted,\n row.shared_encrypted_value as string | null,\n );\n if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {\n await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value);\n }\n results.set(key, {\n value: decrypted.value,\n last4: last4(decrypted.value),\n updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),\n });\n } catch {\n // Match readAppSecret: corrupted or stale ciphertext behaves as missing.\n }\n }\n return results;\n}\n\n/**\n * Return just the metadata for a secret (no value). Used by the list route so\n * the UI can show the \"Set\" pill and last-4 without the decrypted value going\n * over the wire.\n */\nexport async function getAppSecretMeta(\n ref: SecretRef,\n): Promise<{ last4: string; updatedAt: number } | null> {\n const result = await readAppSecret(ref);\n if (!result) return null;\n return { last4: result.last4, updatedAt: result.updatedAt };\n}\n\nexport interface SecretMeta {\n key: string;\n scope: SecretScope;\n scopeId: string;\n last4: string;\n description: string | null;\n urlAllowlist: string[] | null;\n createdAt: number;\n updatedAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Read a secret's metadata, including ad-hoc fields (description, allowlist),\n * without ever decrypting or returning the plaintext value. Used by the\n * ad-hoc list route and any UI that wants to render a key tile.\n */\nexport async function readAppSecretMeta(\n ref: SecretRef,\n): Promise<SecretMeta | null> {\n await ensureTable();\n const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;\n const client = getDbExec();\n const { rows } = await client.execute({\n sql: `SELECT id, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ? LIMIT 1`,\n args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n });\n if (rows.length === 0) return null;\n const row = rows[0];\n let last4Value = \"\";\n try {\n const encrypted = row.encrypted_value as string;\n const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(\n encrypted,\n row.shared_encrypted_value as string | null,\n );\n if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {\n await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value);\n }\n last4Value = last4(decrypted.value);\n } catch {\n last4Value = \"\";\n }\n return {\n key,\n scope,\n scopeId,\n last4: last4Value,\n description: (row.description as string | null) ?? null,\n urlAllowlist: parseAllowlist(row.url_allowlist as string | null),\n createdAt: Number(row.created_at ?? 0),\n updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),\n };\n}\n\n/**\n * List all secrets for a given scope. Returns metadata only — values are\n * never decrypted or returned. Used by the ad-hoc list route to surface\n * user-created keys.\n */\nexport async function listAppSecretsForScope(\n scope: SecretScope,\n scopeId: string,\n): Promise<SecretMeta[]> {\n await ensureTable();\n const client = getDbExec();\n const { rows } = await client.execute({\n sql: `SELECT id, key, encrypted_value, shared_encrypted_value, description, url_allowlist, created_at, updated_at FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? ORDER BY updated_at DESC`,\n args: [scope, scopeId],\n });\n const results: SecretMeta[] = [];\n for (const row of rows) {\n let last4Value = \"\";\n try {\n const encrypted = row.encrypted_value as string;\n const decrypted = decryptAppSecretValue(\n encrypted,\n row.shared_encrypted_value as string | null,\n );\n if (decrypted.needsSharedCiphertext) {\n await populateSharedAppSecret(row.id, decrypted.value);\n }\n last4Value = last4(decrypted.value);\n } catch {\n last4Value = \"\";\n }\n results.push({\n key: row.key as string,\n scope,\n scopeId,\n last4: last4Value,\n description: (row.description as string | null) ?? null,\n urlAllowlist: parseAllowlist(row.url_allowlist as string | null),\n createdAt: Number(row.created_at ?? 0),\n updatedAt: Number(row.updated_at ?? 0),\n });\n }\n return results;\n}\n\nfunction parseAllowlist(raw: string | null): string[] | null {\n if (!raw) return null;\n try {\n const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);\n if (Array.isArray(parsed) && parsed.every((v) => typeof v === \"string\")) {\n return parsed;\n }\n return null;\n } catch {\n return null;\n }\n}\n\nexport async function deleteAppSecret(ref: SecretRef): Promise<boolean> {\n await ensureTable();\n const { key, scope, scopeId } = ref;\n const client = getDbExec();\n const { rowsAffected } = await client.execute({\n sql: `DELETE FROM app_secrets WHERE scope = ? AND scope_id = ? AND key = ?`,\n args: [scope, scopeId, key],\n });\n return rowsAffected > 0;\n}\n"]}
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package/package.json
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{
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"name": "@agent-native/core",
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"version": "0.100.
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"version": "0.100.2",
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"description": "Framework for agent-native application development — where AI agents and UI share SQL state, actions, and context",
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"homepage": "https://github.com/BuilderIO/agent-native#readme",
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"bugs": {
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