@agent-native/core 0.100.1 → 0.100.2

package/dist/secrets/crypto.js

@@ -1,17 +1,23 @@
 /**
  * Shared AES-256-GCM encryption for secret values at rest.
  *
- * Used by both the framework secrets vault (`app_secrets`) and per-user/per-org
- * credentials (`resolveCredential` / `saveCredential`, stored in `settings`) so
- * there is a single crypto implementation and a single key story.
+ * Used by the framework secrets vault, per-user/per-org credentials
+ * (`resolveCredential` / `saveCredential`, stored in `settings`), and other
+ * column-level encrypted values. The `app_secrets` storage layer uses the
+ * shared-key variant below because workspace-scoped vault rows are readable by
+ * sibling apps in the same workspace. When a deployment has not been given
+ * shared key material yet, that variant falls back to the app-scoped key so
+ * existing single-app deployments can keep reading and writing secrets while
+ * they migrate to the shared key.
  *
- * The encryption key is derived from `<APP_NAME>_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` when
- * set, then `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`, then `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`. The app-scoped
- * key lets a local multi-app workspace read one app's encrypted production data
- * without replacing the shared local auth secret. In production we refuse to
- * start without configured key material — a CWD-derived fallback would be
- * effectively static (e.g. `/var/task` on Lambda), so anyone with read access
- * to the DB could decrypt every secret.
+ * The default encryption key is derived from
+ * `<APP_NAME>_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` when set, then `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`,
+ * then `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`. The app-scoped key lets a local multi-app
+ * workspace read one app's encrypted production data without replacing the
+ * shared local auth secret. In production we refuse to start without
+ * configured key material — a CWD-derived fallback would be effectively
+ * static (e.g. `/var/task` on Lambda), so anyone with read access to the DB
+ * could decrypt every secret.
  *
  * Encrypted values are tagged `v1:<iv-hex>:<ct-hex>:<tag-hex>`. The `v1:` prefix
  * lets readers distinguish ciphertext from legacy plaintext during migration.
@@ -54,55 +60,71 @@ function appScopedEncryptionKey() {
         ? process.env[`${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`] // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app encryption material, never a user credential.
         : undefined;
 }
-/**
- * Derive a 32-byte AES key from the configured secret material via SHA-256.
- * Re-derived per call (cheap, stateless, and makes rotation easy).
- */
-export function getSecretEncryptionKey() {
+function sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial() {
+    if (typeof process === "undefined")
+        return undefined;
+    return process.env.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY || process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET;
+}
+function deriveSecretEncryptionKey(explicit, errorMessage, warningMessage) {
     const { createHash } = requireNodeCrypto();
-    const explicit = appScopedEncryptionKey() ||
-        (typeof process === "undefined"
-            ? undefined
-            : process.env.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY) ||
-        (typeof process === "undefined"
-            ? undefined
-            : process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET);
     if (!explicit) {
         if (processNodeEnv() === "production") {
-            const appName = typeof process === "undefined"
-                ? undefined
-                : process.env.APP_NAME?.trim() // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app configuration selects the scoped encryption key.
-                    .toUpperCase()
-                    .replace(/[^A-Z0-9]+/g, "_")
-                    .replace(/^_+|_+$/g, "");
-            throw new Error("[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without an encryption key. " +
-                `Set ${appName ? `${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, ` : ""}SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in the deploy environment. ` +
-                "The previous CWD-derived fallback was effectively static (e.g. `/var/task` on Lambda), " +
-                "which means anyone with read access to the secrets table could decrypt every user's secrets.");
+            throw new Error(errorMessage);
         }
         if (!_warnedFallback) {
             _warnedFallback = true;
             // eslint-disable-next-line no-console
-            console.warn("[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using a machine-local fallback. " +
-                "Set an app-scoped *_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET for production. " +
-                "Production deploys without one of these env vars now hard-fail.");
+            console.warn(warningMessage);
         }
     }
     const material = explicit || `agent-native-secrets:${processCwd()}`;
     return createHash("sha256").update(material).digest();
 }
-/** Encrypt a plain-text value. Returns `v1:<iv-hex>:<ct-hex>:<tag-hex>`. */
-export function encryptSecretValue(plaintext) {
+/**
+ * Derive the key used by generic encrypted values such as credentials and
+ * OAuth tokens. App-specific key material is allowed for these app-local
+ * values.
+ */
+export function getSecretEncryptionKey() {
+    const appName = typeof process === "undefined"
+        ? undefined
+        : process.env.APP_NAME?.trim() // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app configuration selects the scoped encryption key.
+            .toUpperCase()
+            .replace(/[^A-Z0-9]+/g, "_")
+            .replace(/^_+|_+$/g, "");
+    return deriveSecretEncryptionKey(appScopedEncryptionKey() || sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial(), "[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without an encryption key. " +
+        `Set ${appName ? `${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, ` : ""}SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in the deploy environment. ` +
+        "The previous CWD-derived fallback was effectively static (e.g. `/var/task` on Lambda), " +
+        "which means anyone with read access to the DB could decrypt every secret.", "[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using a machine-local fallback. " +
+        "Set an app-scoped *_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET for production. " +
+        "Production deploys without one of these env vars now hard-fail.");
+}
+/**
+ * Derive the preferred workspace-shared key used by `app_secrets` rows.
+ * Unlike generic column-level encryption, workspace vault data should decrypt
+ * in sibling apps, so `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` / `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` take
+ * precedence. The app-scoped key remains a compatibility fallback for
+ * deployments that have not configured shared material yet; once the shared
+ * key is configured, writes use it and reads still fall back to old rows.
+ */
+export function getSharedSecretEncryptionKey() {
+    return deriveSecretEncryptionKey(sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial() || appScopedEncryptionKey(), "[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without encryption key material for workspace secrets. " +
+        "Set SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, or the app-scoped *_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY in the deploy environment.", "[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using app-scoped or machine-local fallback for workspace secrets. " +
+        "Set SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in every workspace app so sibling apps share vault rows.");
+}
+/** Whether this deployment has stable workspace-shared key material. */
+export function hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial() {
+    return Boolean(sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial());
+}
+function encryptWithKey(plaintext, key) {
     const { createCipheriv, randomBytes } = requireNodeCrypto();
-    const key = getSecretEncryptionKey();
     const iv = randomBytes(12);
     const cipher = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, iv);
     const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
     const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
     return `v1:${iv.toString("hex")}:${ct.toString("hex")}:${tag.toString("hex")}`;
 }
-/** Decrypt a value produced by `encryptSecretValue`. Throws on tampering. */
-export function decryptSecretValue(encrypted) {
+function decryptWithKey(encrypted, key) {
     const { createDecipheriv } = requireNodeCrypto();
     if (!encrypted.startsWith("v1:")) {
         throw new Error("Unrecognised secret encoding");
@@ -111,7 +133,6 @@ export function decryptSecretValue(encrypted) {
     if (!ivHex || !ctHex || !tagHex) {
         throw new Error("Corrupt secret payload");
     }
-    const key = getSecretEncryptionKey();
     const decipher = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, Buffer.from(ivHex, "hex"));
     decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(tagHex, "hex"));
     const pt = Buffer.concat([
@@ -120,6 +141,22 @@ export function decryptSecretValue(encrypted) {
     ]);
     return pt.toString("utf8");
 }
+/** Encrypt a plain-text value with the generic app-local key. */
+export function encryptSecretValue(plaintext) {
+    return encryptWithKey(plaintext, getSecretEncryptionKey());
+}
+/** Decrypt a value produced by `encryptSecretValue`. Throws on tampering. */
+export function decryptSecretValue(encrypted) {
+    return decryptWithKey(encrypted, getSecretEncryptionKey());
+}
+/** Encrypt a workspace-shared `app_secrets` value. */
+export function encryptSharedSecretValue(plaintext) {
+    return encryptWithKey(plaintext, getSharedSecretEncryptionKey());
+}
+/** Decrypt a workspace-shared `app_secrets` value. */
+export function decryptSharedSecretValue(encrypted) {
+    return decryptWithKey(encrypted, getSharedSecretEncryptionKey());
+}
 /**
  * Strict check for a value produced by `encryptSecretValue`: `v1:` followed by
  * three hex segments. Intentionally strict so a legacy plaintext credential

package/dist/secrets/crypto.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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The app-scoped\n * key lets a local multi-app workspace read one app's encrypted production data\n * without replacing the shared local auth secret. In production we refuse to\n * start without configured key material — a CWD-derived fallback would be\n * effectively static (e.g. `/var/task` on Lambda), so anyone with read access\n * to the DB could decrypt every secret.\n *\n * Encrypted values are tagged `v1:<iv-hex>:<ct-hex>:<tag-hex>`. The `v1:` prefix\n * lets readers distinguish ciphertext from legacy plaintext during migration.\n */\n\ntype NodeCryptoModule = typeof import(\"node:crypto\");\n\nfunction getNodeCrypto(): NodeCryptoModule | undefined {\n  if (\n    typeof window !== \"undefined\" ||\n    typeof process === \"undefined\" ||\n    !process.versions?.node ||\n    typeof process.getBuiltinModule !== \"function\"\n  ) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  return process.getBuiltinModule(\"node:crypto\") as\n    | NodeCryptoModule\n    | undefined;\n}\n\nconst nodeCrypto = getNodeCrypto();\n\nlet _warnedFallback = false;\n\nfunction requireNodeCrypto(): NonNullable<typeof nodeCrypto> {\n  if (!nodeCrypto) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"[agent-native/secrets] Secret encryption is only available in server/runtime code.\",\n    );\n  }\n  return nodeCrypto;\n}\n\nfunction processNodeEnv(): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return undefined;\n  return process.env.NODE_ENV;\n}\n\nfunction processCwd(): string {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return \".\";\n  return process.cwd();\n}\n\nfunction appScopedEncryptionKey(): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return undefined;\n  const appName = process.env.APP_NAME?.trim() // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app configuration selects the scoped encryption key.\n    .toUpperCase()\n    .replace(/[^A-Z0-9]+/g, \"_\")\n    .replace(/^_+|_+$/g, \"\");\n  return appName\n    ? process.env[`${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`] // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app encryption material, never a user credential.\n    : undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a 32-byte AES key from the configured secret material via SHA-256.\n * Re-derived per call (cheap, stateless, and makes rotation easy).\n */\nexport function getSecretEncryptionKey(): Buffer {\n  const { createHash } = requireNodeCrypto();\n  const explicit =\n    appScopedEncryptionKey() ||\n    (typeof process === \"undefined\"\n      ? undefined\n      : process.env.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY) ||\n    (typeof process === \"undefined\"\n      ? undefined\n      : process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET);\n\n  if (!explicit) {\n    if (processNodeEnv() === \"production\") {\n      const appName =\n        typeof process === \"undefined\"\n          ? undefined\n          : process.env.APP_NAME?.trim() // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app configuration selects the scoped encryption key.\n              .toUpperCase()\n              .replace(/[^A-Z0-9]+/g, \"_\")\n              .replace(/^_+|_+$/g, \"\");\n      throw new Error(\n        \"[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without an encryption key. \" +\n          `Set ${appName ? `${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, ` : \"\"}SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in the deploy environment. ` +\n          \"The previous CWD-derived fallback was effectively static (e.g. `/var/task` on Lambda), \" +\n          \"which means anyone with read access to the secrets table could decrypt every user's secrets.\",\n      );\n    }\n    if (!_warnedFallback) {\n      _warnedFallback = true;\n      // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n      console.warn(\n        \"[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using a machine-local fallback. \" +\n          \"Set an app-scoped *_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET for production. \" +\n          \"Production deploys without one of these env vars now hard-fail.\",\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  const material = explicit || `agent-native-secrets:${processCwd()}`;\n  return createHash(\"sha256\").update(material).digest();\n}\n\n/** Encrypt a plain-text value. Returns `v1:<iv-hex>:<ct-hex>:<tag-hex>`. */\nexport function encryptSecretValue(plaintext: string): string {\n  const { createCipheriv, randomBytes } = requireNodeCrypto();\n  const key = getSecretEncryptionKey();\n  const iv = randomBytes(12);\n  const cipher = createCipheriv(\"aes-256-gcm\", key, iv);\n  const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, \"utf8\"), cipher.final()]);\n  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();\n  return `v1:${iv.toString(\"hex\")}:${ct.toString(\"hex\")}:${tag.toString(\"hex\")}`;\n}\n\n/** Decrypt a value produced by `encryptSecretValue`. Throws on tampering. */\nexport function decryptSecretValue(encrypted: string): string {\n  const { createDecipheriv } = requireNodeCrypto();\n  if (!encrypted.startsWith(\"v1:\")) {\n    throw new Error(\"Unrecognised secret encoding\");\n  }\n  const [, ivHex, ctHex, tagHex] = encrypted.split(\":\");\n  if (!ivHex || !ctHex || !tagHex) {\n    throw new Error(\"Corrupt secret payload\");\n  }\n  const key = getSecretEncryptionKey();\n  const decipher = createDecipheriv(\n    \"aes-256-gcm\",\n    key,\n    Buffer.from(ivHex, \"hex\"),\n  );\n  decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(tagHex, \"hex\"));\n  const pt = Buffer.concat([\n    decipher.update(Buffer.from(ctHex, \"hex\")),\n    decipher.final(),\n  ]);\n  return pt.toString(\"utf8\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Strict check for a value produced by `encryptSecretValue`: `v1:` followed by\n * three hex segments. Intentionally strict so a legacy plaintext credential\n * that merely happens to start with `v1:` is treated as plaintext (and read via\n * the legacy fallback) rather than mis-decrypted.\n */\nconst ENCRYPTED_VALUE_RE = /^v1:[0-9a-f]+:[0-9a-f]+:[0-9a-f]+$/;\n\nexport function isEncryptedSecretValue(value: unknown): value is string {\n  return typeof value === \"string\" && ENCRYPTED_VALUE_RE.test(value);\n}\n"]}
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The `app_secrets` storage layer uses the\n * shared-key variant below because workspace-scoped vault rows are readable by\n * sibling apps in the same workspace. When a deployment has not been given\n * shared key material yet, that variant falls back to the app-scoped key so\n * existing single-app deployments can keep reading and writing secrets while\n * they migrate to the shared key.\n *\n * The default encryption key is derived from\n * `<APP_NAME>_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` when set, then `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`,\n * then `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`. The app-scoped key lets a local multi-app\n * workspace read one app's encrypted production data without replacing the\n * shared local auth secret. In production we refuse to start without\n * configured key material — a CWD-derived fallback would be effectively\n * static (e.g. `/var/task` on Lambda), so anyone with read access to the DB\n * could decrypt every secret.\n *\n * Encrypted values are tagged `v1:<iv-hex>:<ct-hex>:<tag-hex>`. The `v1:` prefix\n * lets readers distinguish ciphertext from legacy plaintext during migration.\n */\n\ntype NodeCryptoModule = typeof import(\"node:crypto\");\n\nfunction getNodeCrypto(): NodeCryptoModule | undefined {\n  if (\n    typeof window !== \"undefined\" ||\n    typeof process === \"undefined\" ||\n    !process.versions?.node ||\n    typeof process.getBuiltinModule !== \"function\"\n  ) {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n  return process.getBuiltinModule(\"node:crypto\") as\n    | NodeCryptoModule\n    | undefined;\n}\n\nconst nodeCrypto = getNodeCrypto();\n\nlet _warnedFallback = false;\n\nfunction requireNodeCrypto(): NonNullable<typeof nodeCrypto> {\n  if (!nodeCrypto) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"[agent-native/secrets] Secret encryption is only available in server/runtime code.\",\n    );\n  }\n  return nodeCrypto;\n}\n\nfunction processNodeEnv(): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return undefined;\n  return process.env.NODE_ENV;\n}\n\nfunction processCwd(): string {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return \".\";\n  return process.cwd();\n}\n\nfunction appScopedEncryptionKey(): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return undefined;\n  const appName = process.env.APP_NAME?.trim() // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app configuration selects the scoped encryption key.\n    .toUpperCase()\n    .replace(/[^A-Z0-9]+/g, \"_\")\n    .replace(/^_+|_+$/g, \"\");\n  return appName\n    ? process.env[`${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`] // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app encryption material, never a user credential.\n    : undefined;\n}\n\nfunction sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial(): string | undefined {\n  if (typeof process === \"undefined\") return undefined;\n  return process.env.SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY || process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET;\n}\n\nfunction deriveSecretEncryptionKey(\n  explicit: string | undefined,\n  errorMessage: string,\n  warningMessage: string,\n): Buffer {\n  const { createHash } = requireNodeCrypto();\n\n  if (!explicit) {\n    if (processNodeEnv() === \"production\") {\n      throw new Error(errorMessage);\n    }\n    if (!_warnedFallback) {\n      _warnedFallback = true;\n      // eslint-disable-next-line no-console\n      console.warn(warningMessage);\n    }\n  }\n\n  const material = explicit || `agent-native-secrets:${processCwd()}`;\n  return createHash(\"sha256\").update(material).digest();\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the key used by generic encrypted values such as credentials and\n * OAuth tokens. App-specific key material is allowed for these app-local\n * values.\n */\nexport function getSecretEncryptionKey(): Buffer {\n  const appName =\n    typeof process === \"undefined\"\n      ? undefined\n      : process.env.APP_NAME?.trim() // guard:allow-env-credential — deploy-level app configuration selects the scoped encryption key.\n          .toUpperCase()\n          .replace(/[^A-Z0-9]+/g, \"_\")\n          .replace(/^_+|_+$/g, \"\");\n  return deriveSecretEncryptionKey(\n    appScopedEncryptionKey() || sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial(),\n    \"[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without an encryption key. \" +\n      `Set ${appName ? `${appName}_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, ` : \"\"}SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in the deploy environment. ` +\n      \"The previous CWD-derived fallback was effectively static (e.g. `/var/task` on Lambda), \" +\n      \"which means anyone with read access to the DB could decrypt every secret.\",\n    \"[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using a machine-local fallback. \" +\n      \"Set an app-scoped *_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET for production. \" +\n      \"Production deploys without one of these env vars now hard-fail.\",\n  );\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the preferred workspace-shared key used by `app_secrets` rows.\n * Unlike generic column-level encryption, workspace vault data should decrypt\n * in sibling apps, so `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` / `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` take\n * precedence. The app-scoped key remains a compatibility fallback for\n * deployments that have not configured shared material yet; once the shared\n * key is configured, writes use it and reads still fall back to old rows.\n */\nexport function getSharedSecretEncryptionKey(): Buffer {\n  return deriveSecretEncryptionKey(\n    sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial() || appScopedEncryptionKey(),\n    \"[agent-native/secrets] Refusing to start in production without encryption key material for workspace secrets. \" +\n      \"Set SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY, BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, or the app-scoped *_SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY in the deploy environment.\",\n    \"[agent-native/secrets] SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY not set — using app-scoped or machine-local fallback for workspace secrets. \" +\n      \"Set SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY or BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in every workspace app so sibling apps share vault rows.\",\n  );\n}\n\n/** Whether this deployment has stable workspace-shared key material. */\nexport function hasSharedSecretEncryptionKeyMaterial(): boolean {\n  return Boolean(sharedEncryptionKeyMaterial());\n}\n\nfunction encryptWithKey(plaintext: string, key: Buffer): string {\n  const { createCipheriv, randomBytes } = requireNodeCrypto();\n  const iv = randomBytes(12);\n  const cipher = createCipheriv(\"aes-256-gcm\", key, iv);\n  const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, \"utf8\"), cipher.final()]);\n  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();\n  return `v1:${iv.toString(\"hex\")}:${ct.toString(\"hex\")}:${tag.toString(\"hex\")}`;\n}\n\nfunction decryptWithKey(encrypted: string, key: Buffer): string {\n  const { createDecipheriv } = requireNodeCrypto();\n  if (!encrypted.startsWith(\"v1:\")) {\n    throw new Error(\"Unrecognised secret encoding\");\n  }\n  const [, ivHex, ctHex, tagHex] = encrypted.split(\":\");\n  if (!ivHex || !ctHex || !tagHex) {\n    throw new Error(\"Corrupt secret payload\");\n  }\n  const decipher = createDecipheriv(\n    \"aes-256-gcm\",\n    key,\n    Buffer.from(ivHex, \"hex\"),\n  );\n  decipher.setAuthTag(Buffer.from(tagHex, \"hex\"));\n  const pt = Buffer.concat([\n    decipher.update(Buffer.from(ctHex, \"hex\")),\n    decipher.final(),\n  ]);\n  return pt.toString(\"utf8\");\n}\n\n/** Encrypt a plain-text value with the generic app-local key. */\nexport function encryptSecretValue(plaintext: string): string {\n  return encryptWithKey(plaintext, getSecretEncryptionKey());\n}\n\n/** Decrypt a value produced by `encryptSecretValue`. Throws on tampering. */\nexport function decryptSecretValue(encrypted: string): string {\n  return decryptWithKey(encrypted, getSecretEncryptionKey());\n}\n\n/** Encrypt a workspace-shared `app_secrets` value. */\nexport function encryptSharedSecretValue(plaintext: string): string {\n  return encryptWithKey(plaintext, getSharedSecretEncryptionKey());\n}\n\n/** Decrypt a workspace-shared `app_secrets` value. */\nexport function decryptSharedSecretValue(encrypted: string): string {\n  return decryptWithKey(encrypted, getSharedSecretEncryptionKey());\n}\n\n/**\n * Strict check for a value produced by `encryptSecretValue`: `v1:` followed by\n * three hex segments. Intentionally strict so a legacy plaintext credential\n * that merely happens to start with `v1:` is treated as plaintext (and read via\n * the legacy fallback) rather than mis-decrypted.\n */\nconst ENCRYPTED_VALUE_RE = /^v1:[0-9a-f]+:[0-9a-f]+:[0-9a-f]+$/;\n\nexport function isEncryptedSecretValue(value: unknown): value is string {\n  return typeof value === \"string\" && ENCRYPTED_VALUE_RE.test(value);\n}\n"]}

package/dist/secrets/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/secrets/index.js

@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ export { writeAppSecret, readAppSecret, readAppSecretMeta, deleteAppSecret, getA
 export { APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL, appSecrets } from "./schema.js";
 // AES-256-GCM helpers for column-level encryption of per-row secret values
 // (e.g. a per-record share password) that don't fit the keyed app_secrets /
-// credentials stores. Same key story as the vault.
+// credentials stores. These use the app-local key, unlike the workspace-shared
+// app_secrets storage layer.
 export { encryptSecretValue, decryptSecretValue, isEncryptedSecretValue, } from "./crypto.js";
 export { createListSecretsHandler, createWriteSecretHandler, createTestSecretHandler, createAdHocSecretHandler, } from "./routes.js";
 export { resolveKeyReferences, validateUrlAllowlist, getKeyAllowlist, } from "./substitution.js";

package/dist/secrets/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/secrets/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AAEH,OAAO,EACL,sBAAsB,EACtB,mBAAmB,EACnB,iBAAiB,EACjB,sBAAsB,GAMvB,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAEvB,OAAO,EACL,cAAc,EACd,aAAa,EACb,iBAAiB,EACjB,eAAe,EACf,gBAAgB,EAChB,sBAAsB,EACtB,KAAK,GAKN,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAEtB,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAEjE,2EAA2E;AAC3E,4EAA4E;AAC5E,mDAAmD;AACnD,OAAO,EACL,kBAAkB,EAClB,kBAAkB,EAClB,sBAAsB,GACvB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAErB,OAAO,EACL,wBAAwB,EACxB,wBAAwB,EACxB,uBAAuB,EACvB,wBAAwB,GAGzB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAErB,OAAO,EACL,oBAAoB,EACpB,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,GAEhB,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAE3B,OAAO,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Framework secrets registry.\n *\n * Lets templates declaratively register required API keys / credentials so\n * they appear in the sidebar settings UI and the onboarding checklist, and\n * so actions can read them by a stable key.\n *\n * See `.agents/skills/secrets/SKILL.md` for usage.\n */\n\nexport {\n  registerRequiredSecret,\n  listRequiredSecrets,\n  getRequiredSecret,\n  __resetSecretsRegistry,\n  type RegisteredSecret,\n  type SecretScope,\n  type SecretKind,\n  type SecretValidator,\n  type ValidatorResult,\n} from \"./register.js\";\n\nexport {\n  writeAppSecret,\n  readAppSecret,\n  readAppSecretMeta,\n  deleteAppSecret,\n  getAppSecretMeta,\n  listAppSecretsForScope,\n  last4,\n  type SecretRef,\n  type WriteSecretArgs,\n  type ReadSecretResult,\n  type SecretMeta,\n} from \"./storage.js\";\n\nexport { APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL, appSecrets } from \"./schema.js\";\n\n// AES-256-GCM helpers for column-level encryption of per-row secret values\n// (e.g. a per-record share password) that don't fit the keyed app_secrets /\n// credentials stores. Same key story as the vault.\nexport {\n  encryptSecretValue,\n  decryptSecretValue,\n  isEncryptedSecretValue,\n} from \"./crypto.js\";\n\nexport {\n  createListSecretsHandler,\n  createWriteSecretHandler,\n  createTestSecretHandler,\n  createAdHocSecretHandler,\n  type SecretStatusPayload,\n  type AdHocSecretPayload,\n} from \"./routes.js\";\n\nexport {\n  resolveKeyReferences,\n  validateUrlAllowlist,\n  getKeyAllowlist,\n  type ResolveKeyReferencesResult,\n} from \"./substitution.js\";\n\nexport { maybeRegisterSecretOnboardingStep } from \"./onboarding.js\";\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/secrets/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AAEH,OAAO,EACL,sBAAsB,EACtB,mBAAmB,EACnB,iBAAiB,EACjB,sBAAsB,GAMvB,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAEvB,OAAO,EACL,cAAc,EACd,aAAa,EACb,iBAAiB,EACjB,eAAe,EACf,gBAAgB,EAChB,sBAAsB,EACtB,KAAK,GAKN,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAEtB,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAEjE,2EAA2E;AAC3E,4EAA4E;AAC5E,+EAA+E;AAC/E,6BAA6B;AAC7B,OAAO,EACL,kBAAkB,EAClB,kBAAkB,EAClB,sBAAsB,GACvB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAErB,OAAO,EACL,wBAAwB,EACxB,wBAAwB,EACxB,uBAAuB,EACvB,wBAAwB,GAGzB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAErB,OAAO,EACL,oBAAoB,EACpB,oBAAoB,EACpB,eAAe,GAEhB,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAE3B,OAAO,EAAE,iCAAiC,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Framework secrets registry.\n *\n * Lets templates declaratively register required API keys / credentials so\n * they appear in the sidebar settings UI and the onboarding checklist, and\n * so actions can read them by a stable key.\n *\n * See `.agents/skills/secrets/SKILL.md` for usage.\n */\n\nexport {\n  registerRequiredSecret,\n  listRequiredSecrets,\n  getRequiredSecret,\n  __resetSecretsRegistry,\n  type RegisteredSecret,\n  type SecretScope,\n  type SecretKind,\n  type SecretValidator,\n  type ValidatorResult,\n} from \"./register.js\";\n\nexport {\n  writeAppSecret,\n  readAppSecret,\n  readAppSecretMeta,\n  deleteAppSecret,\n  getAppSecretMeta,\n  listAppSecretsForScope,\n  last4,\n  type SecretRef,\n  type WriteSecretArgs,\n  type ReadSecretResult,\n  type SecretMeta,\n} from \"./storage.js\";\n\nexport { APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL, appSecrets } from \"./schema.js\";\n\n// AES-256-GCM helpers for column-level encryption of per-row secret values\n// (e.g. a per-record share password) that don't fit the keyed app_secrets /\n// credentials stores. These use the app-local key, unlike the workspace-shared\n// app_secrets storage layer.\nexport {\n  encryptSecretValue,\n  decryptSecretValue,\n  isEncryptedSecretValue,\n} from \"./crypto.js\";\n\nexport {\n  createListSecretsHandler,\n  createWriteSecretHandler,\n  createTestSecretHandler,\n  createAdHocSecretHandler,\n  type SecretStatusPayload,\n  type AdHocSecretPayload,\n} from \"./routes.js\";\n\nexport {\n  resolveKeyReferences,\n  validateUrlAllowlist,\n  getKeyAllowlist,\n  type ResolveKeyReferencesResult,\n} from \"./substitution.js\";\n\nexport { maybeRegisterSecretOnboardingStep } from \"./onboarding.js\";\n"]}

package/dist/secrets/schema.d.ts

@@ -108,6 +108,25 @@ export declare const appSecrets: import("drizzle-orm/sqlite-core").SQLiteTableWi
         }, {}, {
             length: number;
         }>;
+        sharedEncryptedValue: import("drizzle-orm/sqlite-core").SQLiteColumn<{
+            name: "shared_encrypted_value";
+            tableName: "app_secrets";
+            dataType: "string";
+            columnType: "SQLiteText";
+            data: string;
+            driverParam: string;
+            notNull: false;
+            hasDefault: false;
+            isPrimaryKey: false;
+            isAutoincrement: false;
+            hasRuntimeDefault: false;
+            enumValues: [string, ...string[]];
+            baseColumn: never;
+            identity: undefined;
+            generated: undefined;
+        }, {}, {
+            length: number;
+        }>;
         description: import("drizzle-orm/sqlite-core").SQLiteColumn<{
             name: "description";
             tableName: "app_secrets";
@@ -188,5 +207,5 @@ export declare const appSecrets: import("drizzle-orm/sqlite-core").SQLiteTableWi
  * `ensureTable()` path in `storage.ts` and by any template-level migration
  * that wants to create the table up-front.
  */
-export declare const APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL = "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS app_secrets (\n  id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n  scope TEXT NOT NULL,\n  scope_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n  key TEXT NOT NULL,\n  encrypted_value TEXT NOT NULL,\n  description TEXT,\n  url_allowlist TEXT,\n  created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,\n  updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL,\n  UNIQUE(scope, scope_id, key)\n)";
+export declare const APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL = "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS app_secrets (\n  id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n  scope TEXT NOT NULL,\n  scope_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n  key TEXT NOT NULL,\n  encrypted_value TEXT NOT NULL,\n  shared_encrypted_value TEXT,\n  description TEXT,\n  url_allowlist TEXT,\n  created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,\n  updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL,\n  UNIQUE(scope, scope_id, key)\n)";
 //# sourceMappingURL=schema.d.ts.map

package/dist/secrets/schema.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"schema.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/secrets/schema.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAIH,eAAO,MAAM,UAAU;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAgBrB,CAAC;AAEH;;;;GAIG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB,+TAWjC,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"schema.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/secrets/schema.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAIH,eAAO,MAAM,UAAU;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;EAkBrB,CAAC;AAEH;;;;GAIG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB,+VAYjC,CAAC"}

package/dist/secrets/schema.js

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ export const appSecrets = table("app_secrets", {
     key: text("key").notNull(),
     /** Encrypted value — never return this through any API. */
     encryptedValue: text("encrypted_value").notNull(),
+    /** Preferred workspace-shared ciphertext; nullable during key migration. */
+    sharedEncryptedValue: text("shared_encrypted_value"),
     /** Optional human-readable description (used for ad-hoc keys). */
     description: text("description"),
     /** JSON array of allowed URL origins. Null = allow all. */
@@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ export const APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL = `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS app_secrets (
   scope_id TEXT NOT NULL,
   key TEXT NOT NULL,
   encrypted_value TEXT NOT NULL,
+  shared_encrypted_value TEXT,
   description TEXT,
   url_allowlist TEXT,
   created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,

package/dist/secrets/schema.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"schema.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/secrets/schema.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAEvD,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE;IAC7C,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE;IAC3B,2DAA2D;IAC3D,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IAC9B,+DAA+D;IAC/D,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IACnC,yDAAyD;IACzD,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IAC1B,2DAA2D;IAC3D,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IACjD,kEAAkE;IAClE,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC;IAChC,2DAA2D;IAC3D,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC;IACnC,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IAC1C,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;CAC3C,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG;;;;;;;;;;;EAWpC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Drizzle schema for the framework secrets registry.\n *\n * The `app_secrets` table stores API keys and service credentials that\n * templates register via `registerRequiredSecret()`. Values are always\n * stored encrypted at rest — see `storage.ts` for the crypto layer.\n *\n * Rows are scoped either to a user (by email) or a workspace / organization\n * (by orgId). OAuth-kind secrets never create a row here — they surface via\n * `@agent-native/core/oauth-tokens` instead.\n */\n\nimport { table, text, integer } from \"../db/schema.js\";\n\nexport const appSecrets = table(\"app_secrets\", {\n  id: text(\"id\").primaryKey(),\n  /** \"user\" or \"workspace\" — who the secret is scoped to. */\n  scope: text(\"scope\").notNull(),\n  /** Session email for user-scope, orgId for workspace-scope. */\n  scopeId: text(\"scope_id\").notNull(),\n  /** The registered secret key (e.g. \"OPENAI_API_KEY\"). */\n  key: text(\"key\").notNull(),\n  /** Encrypted value — never return this through any API. */\n  encryptedValue: text(\"encrypted_value\").notNull(),\n  /** Optional human-readable description (used for ad-hoc keys). */\n  description: text(\"description\"),\n  /** JSON array of allowed URL origins. Null = allow all. */\n  urlAllowlist: text(\"url_allowlist\"),\n  createdAt: integer(\"created_at\").notNull(),\n  updatedAt: integer(\"updated_at\").notNull(),\n});\n\n/**\n * Raw SQL for creating the app_secrets table. Used by the on-demand\n * `ensureTable()` path in `storage.ts` and by any template-level migration\n * that wants to create the table up-front.\n */\nexport const APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL = `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS app_secrets (\n  id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n  scope TEXT NOT NULL,\n  scope_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n  key TEXT NOT NULL,\n  encrypted_value TEXT NOT NULL,\n  description TEXT,\n  url_allowlist TEXT,\n  created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,\n  updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL,\n  UNIQUE(scope, scope_id, key)\n)`;\n"]}
+{"version":3,"file":"schema.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/secrets/schema.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAEvD,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE;IAC7C,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE;IAC3B,2DAA2D;IAC3D,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IAC9B,+DAA+D;IAC/D,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IACnC,yDAAyD;IACzD,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IAC1B,2DAA2D;IAC3D,cAAc,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IACjD,4EAA4E;IAC5E,oBAAoB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC;IACpD,kEAAkE;IAClE,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC;IAChC,2DAA2D;IAC3D,YAAY,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC;IACnC,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;IAC1C,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;CAC3C,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG;;;;;;;;;;;;EAYpC,CAAC","sourcesContent":["/**\n * Drizzle schema for the framework secrets registry.\n *\n * The `app_secrets` table stores API keys and service credentials that\n * templates register via `registerRequiredSecret()`. Values are always\n * stored encrypted at rest — see `storage.ts` for the crypto layer.\n *\n * Rows are scoped either to a user (by email) or a workspace / organization\n * (by orgId). OAuth-kind secrets never create a row here — they surface via\n * `@agent-native/core/oauth-tokens` instead.\n */\n\nimport { table, text, integer } from \"../db/schema.js\";\n\nexport const appSecrets = table(\"app_secrets\", {\n  id: text(\"id\").primaryKey(),\n  /** \"user\" or \"workspace\" — who the secret is scoped to. */\n  scope: text(\"scope\").notNull(),\n  /** Session email for user-scope, orgId for workspace-scope. */\n  scopeId: text(\"scope_id\").notNull(),\n  /** The registered secret key (e.g. \"OPENAI_API_KEY\"). */\n  key: text(\"key\").notNull(),\n  /** Encrypted value — never return this through any API. */\n  encryptedValue: text(\"encrypted_value\").notNull(),\n  /** Preferred workspace-shared ciphertext; nullable during key migration. */\n  sharedEncryptedValue: text(\"shared_encrypted_value\"),\n  /** Optional human-readable description (used for ad-hoc keys). */\n  description: text(\"description\"),\n  /** JSON array of allowed URL origins. Null = allow all. */\n  urlAllowlist: text(\"url_allowlist\"),\n  createdAt: integer(\"created_at\").notNull(),\n  updatedAt: integer(\"updated_at\").notNull(),\n});\n\n/**\n * Raw SQL for creating the app_secrets table. Used by the on-demand\n * `ensureTable()` path in `storage.ts` and by any template-level migration\n * that wants to create the table up-front.\n */\nexport const APP_SECRETS_CREATE_SQL = `CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS app_secrets (\n  id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n  scope TEXT NOT NULL,\n  scope_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n  key TEXT NOT NULL,\n  encrypted_value TEXT NOT NULL,\n  shared_encrypted_value TEXT,\n  description TEXT,\n  url_allowlist TEXT,\n  created_at INTEGER NOT NULL,\n  updated_at INTEGER NOT NULL,\n  UNIQUE(scope, scope_id, key)\n)`;\n"]}

package/dist/secrets/storage.d.ts

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 /**
  * Storage layer for the framework secrets registry.
  *
- * Values are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. The encryption key is
- * derived from `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` (preferred) or the existing
- * `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` env var (fallback so templates don't need a second
- * secret during development). If neither is set in production we fall back
- * to a machine-local key derived from the cwd — the secret is still only
- * readable on this machine, but consider setting `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`
- * for a stable, rotatable key.
+ * Values are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. The workspace-shared
+ * encryption key is derived from `SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY` (preferred) or the
+ * existing `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` env var (fallback so templates don't need a
+ * second secret during development). Deployments that only have the legacy
+ * app-scoped key continue to work until shared key material is configured;
+ * once configured, new rows use the shared key and reads retain a legacy-key
+ * fallback for existing rows.
  *
  * Secret values are NEVER logged and NEVER returned from any route handler.
  */

package/dist/secrets/storage.d.ts.map

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