@adcp/sdk 13.0.4 → 13.1.1

package/dist/lib/signing/verifier.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/verifier.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { parseDictionary } from 'structured-headers';\nimport {\n  buildSignatureBase,\n  canonicalTargetUri,\n  getHeaderValue,\n  rejectNonAsciiHost,\n  type RequestLike,\n} from './canonicalize';\nimport { contentDigestMatches } from './content-digest';\nimport { RequestSignatureError } from './errors';\nimport { parseSignature, parseSignatureInput, type ParsedSignatureInput } from './parser';\nimport { jwkToPublicKey, verifySignature } from './crypto';\nimport type { JwksResolver } from './jwks';\nimport type { ReplayStore } from './replay';\nimport type { RevocationStore } from './revocation';\nimport { containsWebhookAuthentication, WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH } from './webhook-auth-detection';\nimport {\n  ALLOWED_ALGS,\n  CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,\n  MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS,\n  REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG,\n  type VerifierCapability,\n  type VerifyResult,\n} from './types';\n\nexport interface VerifyRequestOptions {\n  capability: VerifierCapability;\n  jwks: JwksResolver;\n  replayStore: ReplayStore;\n  revocationStore: RevocationStore;\n  now?: () => number;\n  /**\n   * The AdCP operation being requested, used to consult\n   * `capability.required_for` when an unsigned request arrives. When omitted,\n   * the verifier treats the operation as \"not in any required_for list\" and\n   * returns an unsigned result rather than rejecting — callers in\n   * always-verify mode (where every request is signed) can leave this blank.\n   */\n  operation?: string;\n  agentUrlForKeyid?: (keyid: string) => string | undefined;\n}\n\nexport async function verifyRequestSignature(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  options: VerifyRequestOptions\n): Promise<VerifyResult> {\n  const now = options.now ? options.now() : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const sigInputHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Signature-Input');\n  const sigHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Signature');\n\n  // Pre-check: both headers present or both absent.\n  if (!sigInputHeader && !sigHeader) {\n    const operation = options.operation;\n    // Precedence is intentionally fail-specific: AdCP tool required_for,\n    // raw JSON-RPC protocol methods, then payload-driven webhook-auth\n    // elevation. The specific signed-only contract should win before the\n    // generic body scan runs.\n    if (operation && options.capability.required_for.includes(operation)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        `Operation \"${operation}\" requires a signed request`\n      );\n    }\n    const protocolMethodsRequiredFor = options.capability.protocol_methods_required_for ?? [];\n    if (protocolMethodsRequiredFor.length > 0 && exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(request.body)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        'Unsigned request body exceeds the protocol method inspection cap while protocol methods require signing'\n      );\n    }\n    const protocolMethods = jsonRpcProtocolMethods(request.body);\n    const requiredProtocolMethod = protocolMethods.find(method => protocolMethodsRequiredFor.includes(method));\n    if (requiredProtocolMethod) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        `Protocol method \"${requiredProtocolMethod}\" requires a signed request`\n      );\n    }\n    // Payload-driven elevation: any request carrying webhook receiver\n    // credentials (task, reporting, artifact, or revocation callbacks) MUST\n    // be RFC 9421 signed, regardless of whether the operation appears in\n    // `required_for`\n    // (#webhook-security downgrade-resistance). A bearer-only channel\n    // would otherwise let an attacker who captured a token register or\n    // update webhook credentials and redirect callbacks to a hostile URL.\n    if (carriesWebhookAuthentication(request)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        'Requests carrying webhook authentication must be RFC 9421 signed'\n      );\n    }\n    return { status: 'unsigned', verified_at: now };\n  }\n  if (!sigInputHeader || !sigHeader) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_header_malformed',\n      1,\n      'Signature and Signature-Input headers must be present as a pair'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 1: parse.\n  const parsedInput = parseSignatureInput(sigInputHeader);\n  const parsedSig = parseSignature(sigHeader, parsedInput.label);\n  rejectNonAsciiHost(request.url);\n  validateSingleValuedCoveredHeaders(parsedInput.components, request);\n\n  // Step 2: required params present.\n  requireParams(parsedInput);\n\n  // Step 3: tag match.\n  if (parsedInput.params.tag !== REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_tag_invalid',\n      3,\n      `Signature tag must be \"${REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG}\"; got \"${parsedInput.params.tag}\"`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 4: alg allowlist.\n  if (!ALLOWED_ALGS.has(parsedInput.params.alg)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_alg_not_allowed',\n      4,\n      `Signature alg \"${parsedInput.params.alg}\" is not in the AdCP allowlist`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 5: window valid.\n  validateWindow(parsedInput.params.created, parsedInput.params.expires, now);\n\n  // Step 6: covered components.\n  validateCoveredComponents(parsedInput.components, options.capability, request);\n\n  // Step 7: resolve keyid.\n  const jwk = await options.jwks.resolve(parsedInput.params.keyid);\n  if (!jwk) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `No JWK found for keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\"`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.kid !== parsedInput.params.keyid) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `JWKS resolver returned a JWK whose kid \"${jwk.kid}\" does not match requested keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\"`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 8: key purpose.\n  if (jwk.adcp_use !== 'request-signing' || !jwk.key_ops?.includes('verify')) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is not scoped for request-signing verification`\n    );\n  }\n  validateJwkParameterConsistency(jwk, parsedInput.params.alg);\n\n  // Step 9: revocation (runs BEFORE crypto to prevent amplification attacks).\n  if (await options.revocationStore.isRevoked(jwk.kid)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_key_revoked', 9, `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is revoked`);\n  }\n\n  // Replay cache is scoped by `(keyid, @target-uri)` per adcp#2460 — a\n  // signature captured on one endpoint (e.g. /create_media_buy) MUST NOT\n  // count against the replay budget for a different endpoint under the\n  // same keyid. Canonicalize once and reuse for both pre-check and commit.\n  const replayScope = canonicalTargetUri(request.url);\n\n  // Step 12 pre-checks (rate-abuse cap + replay hit) run before crypto so a\n  // compromised-key cache cap or a replayed nonce short-circuits an expensive\n  // Ed25519/ECDSA verify. The committing insert happens after step 11.\n  if (await options.replayStore.isCapHit(jwk.kid, replayScope, now)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_rate_abuse',\n      12,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}`\n    );\n  }\n  if (await options.replayStore.has(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, now)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 10: cryptographic verify. Use the received Signature-Input value\n  // verbatim as the @signature-params line so a peer emitting params in a\n  // different legal order still produces a byte-identical base.\n  const base = buildSignatureBase(\n    parsedInput.components,\n    request,\n    parsedInput.params,\n    parsedInput.signatureParamsValue\n  );\n  const publicKey = jwkToPublicKey(jwk);\n  const valid = verifySignature(parsedInput.params.alg, publicKey, Buffer.from(base, 'utf8'), parsedSig.bytes);\n  if (!valid) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_invalid',\n      10,\n      'Cryptographic verification of signature base failed'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 11: content-digest match (only if covered).\n  if (parsedInput.components.includes('content-digest')) {\n    const digestHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n    if (!digestHeader || !contentDigestMatches(digestHeader, request.body ?? '')) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_digest_mismatch',\n        11,\n        'Content-Digest header does not match recomputed body hash'\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Step 12: commit the (keyid, nonce) into the replay cache now that all\n  // prior checks have passed. Floor the TTL at one max-window + skew so a\n  // signer minting tiny validity windows can't replay outside the configured\n  // replay horizon, and so cross-replica eventual consistency has headroom.\n  const remaining = parsedInput.params.expires - now + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS;\n  const ttl = Math.max(remaining, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS);\n  const insertResult = await options.replayStore.insert(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, ttl, now);\n  if (insertResult === 'replayed') {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window`\n    );\n  }\n  if (insertResult === 'rate_abuse') {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_rate_abuse',\n      12,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}`\n    );\n  }\n\n  const agent_url = options.agentUrlForKeyid?.(jwk.kid);\n  return { status: 'verified', keyid: jwk.kid, agent_url, verified_at: now };\n}\n\nfunction jsonRpcProtocolMethods(body: string | undefined): string[] {\n  if (!body) return [];\n  if (exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body)) return [];\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(body) as unknown;\n    const messages = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];\n    return messages.flatMap(message =>\n      message !== null && typeof message === 'object' && typeof (message as { method?: unknown }).method === 'string'\n        ? [(message as { method: string }).method]\n        : []\n    );\n  } catch {\n    return [];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction requireParams(parsed: ParsedSignatureInput): void {\n  const required: Array<keyof ParsedSignatureInput['params']> = ['created', 'expires', 'nonce', 'keyid', 'alg', 'tag'];\n  const missing = required.filter(k => parsed.params[k] === undefined);\n  if (missing.length) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_params_incomplete',\n      2,\n      `Signature-Input missing required parameter(s): ${missing.join(', ')}`\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateWindow(created: number, expires: number, now: number): void {\n  if (expires <= created) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature expires must be strictly greater than created'\n    );\n  }\n  if (expires - created > MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      `Signature window exceeds ${MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS}s maximum`\n    );\n  }\n  if (now > expires + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_window_invalid', 5, 'Signature is expired');\n  }\n  if (now < created - CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature created is in the future beyond skew tolerance'\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reject JWKs whose alg/kty/crv are mutually inconsistent OR don't match\n * the sig-params alg. Three checks in one place:\n *\n * 1. JWK MUST declare `alg`. A missing alg lets a signer substitute one\n *    algorithm family for another (e.g. EdDSA sig-params against a P-256\n *    JWK) and defer failure to step 10's crypto verify — the wrong step\n *    and the wrong error code.\n * 2. JWK `alg` MUST match the sig-params `alg` after AdCP→JOSE mapping\n *    (`ed25519`↔`EdDSA`, `ecdsa-p256-sha256`↔`ES256`). Prevents sig-params\n *    alg-downgrade against a JWK that was published for a stronger alg.\n * 3. JWK kty/crv MUST be consistent with the declared alg per RFC 8037\n *    (EdDSA→OKP/Ed25519|Ed448) and RFC 7518 (ES256→EC/P-256).\n */\nfunction validateJwkParameterConsistency(\n  jwk: { kid: string; kty?: string; crv?: string; alg?: string },\n  sigParamsAlg: string\n): void {\n  if (!jwk.alg) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" does not declare an alg; cannot bind to sig-params alg=\"${sigParamsAlg}\"`\n    );\n  }\n  const expectedJoseAlg = SIG_PARAMS_ALG_TO_JOSE[sigParamsAlg];\n  if (expectedJoseAlg && jwk.alg !== expectedJoseAlg) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=${jwk.alg} but the request is signed with alg=\"${sigParamsAlg}\" (JOSE ${expectedJoseAlg})`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.alg === 'EdDSA') {\n    if (jwk.kty !== 'OKP' || (jwk.crv !== 'Ed25519' && jwk.crv !== 'Ed448')) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n        8,\n        `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=EdDSA but kty/crv (${jwk.kty}/${jwk.crv}) is not a valid Edwards-curve pair`\n      );\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n  if (jwk.alg === 'ES256') {\n    if (jwk.kty !== 'EC' || jwk.crv !== 'P-256') {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n        8,\n        `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=ES256 but kty/crv (${jwk.kty}/${jwk.crv}) is not EC/P-256`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nconst SIG_PARAMS_ALG_TO_JOSE: Record<string, string> = {\n  ed25519: 'EdDSA',\n  'ecdsa-p256-sha256': 'ES256',\n};\n\n/**\n * Covered components referencing single-valued HTTP header fields\n * (Content-Type per RFC 9110, Content-Digest per RFC 9530) MUST NOT arrive\n * as a comma-joined multi-value. A proxy or buggy client emitting the field\n * twice produces a concatenated value whose meaning relative to the\n * signature base is undefined — reject at parse rather than pick one.\n */\nfunction validateSingleValuedCoveredHeaders(components: string[], request: RequestLike): void {\n  if (components.includes('content-type')) {\n    const value = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Type');\n    if (value !== undefined && containsTopLevelComma(value)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_header_malformed',\n        1,\n        'Content-Type header covered by signature must be single-valued; multiple field values are ambiguous'\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  if (components.includes('content-digest')) {\n    const value = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n    if (value !== undefined) {\n      try {\n        const dict = parseDictionary(value);\n        const seen = new Map<string, number>();\n        for (const key of dict.keys()) {\n          seen.set(key, (seen.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);\n        }\n        for (const [key, count] of seen) {\n          if (count > 1) {\n            throw new RequestSignatureError(\n              'request_signature_header_malformed',\n              1,\n              `Content-Digest declares the \"${key}\" algorithm more than once; duplicate members are ambiguous`\n            );\n          }\n        }\n      } catch (e) {\n        if (e instanceof RequestSignatureError) throw e;\n      }\n      // The structured-headers library deduplicates dictionary keys silently.\n      // Detect the multi-value case at the raw-string level too so the\n      // specific \"two sha-256 members\" shape is caught.\n      if (containsDuplicateDictKey(value)) {\n        throw new RequestSignatureError(\n          'request_signature_header_malformed',\n          1,\n          'Content-Digest declares the same algorithm more than once; duplicate members are ambiguous'\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction containsTopLevelComma(value: string): boolean {\n  let inQuoted = false;\n  for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {\n    const ch = value[i]!;\n    if (ch === '\\\\' && i + 1 < value.length && inQuoted) {\n      i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === '\"') {\n      inQuoted = !inQuoted;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ',' && !inQuoted) return true;\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction containsDuplicateDictKey(value: string): boolean {\n  const keys: string[] = [];\n  let i = 0;\n  const len = value.length;\n  let atEntryStart = true;\n  while (i < len) {\n    if (atEntryStart) {\n      while (i < len && (value[i] === ' ' || value[i] === '\\t')) i++;\n      const start = i;\n      while (i < len && /[A-Za-z0-9_*-]/.test(value[i]!)) i++;\n      if (i > start) keys.push(value.slice(start, i).toLowerCase());\n      atEntryStart = false;\n      continue;\n    }\n    const ch = value[i]!;\n    if (ch === '\"') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < len) {\n        if (value[i] === '\\\\' && i + 1 < len) {\n          i += 2;\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (value[i] === '\"') {\n          i++;\n          break;\n        }\n        i++;\n      }\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ':') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < len && value[i] !== ':') i++;\n      if (i < len) i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ',') {\n      atEntryStart = true;\n      i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    i++;\n  }\n  const seen = new Set<string>();\n  for (const key of keys) {\n    if (seen.has(key)) return true;\n    seen.add(key);\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Upper bound on request body size we will JSON.parse and walk on the\n * unsigned branch. Real AdCP `update_media_buy` / `create_media_buy` payloads\n * are O(kilobytes); 1 MB is ~1000x that. Over this, require signing rather\n * than spend unbounded pre-crypto CPU on attacker-shaped input — a 1 MB\n * nested-array body would otherwise let an unauthenticated caller force\n * deep recursion on every request.\n */\nconst MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES = 1_048_576;\n/**\n * Upper bound on recursion depth in `containsWebhookAuthentication`. Real\n * AdCP payloads reach depth ~5-8; 64 is generous without leaving room for\n * a pathological `{\"a\":{\"a\":{...}}}` to burn the stack.\n */\nfunction exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body: string | undefined): boolean {\n  return typeof body === 'string' && body.length > MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES;\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan a JSON request body for a non-empty\n * webhook authentication object — anywhere in the tree, including inside\n * arrays of pending config updates. MCP uses `push_notification_config`;\n * A2A uses `pushNotificationConfig`. Runs only on the\n * unsigned branch; returning `true` triggers the webhook-security downgrade\n * rejection in {@link verifyRequestSignature}.\n *\n * The check is Content-Type independent: an attacker can't evade by\n * labeling a JSON body `text/plain`. A body that fails to parse as JSON\n * returns false so legitimate non-JSON transports (SSE posts, form uploads)\n * aren't blocked; signed-request enforcement for those remains\n * `required_for`-driven. A body over {@link MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES}\n * returns `true` — we can't prove absence of webhook auth within our DoS\n * budget, and oversized unsigned bodies are outside normal AdCP operation.\n */\nfunction carriesWebhookAuthentication(request: RequestLike): boolean {\n  const body = request.body;\n  if (!body) return false;\n  if (exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body)) return true;\n  let parsed: unknown;\n  try {\n    parsed = JSON.parse(body);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return containsWebhookAuthentication(parsed, WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH);\n}\n\nfunction validateCoveredComponents(components: string[], capability: VerifierCapability, request: RequestLike): void {\n  for (const mandatory of MANDATORY_COMPONENTS) {\n    if (!components.includes(mandatory)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n        6,\n        `Covered components must include \"${mandatory}\"`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  const hasBody = (request.body ?? '').length > 0;\n  if (hasBody && !components.includes('content-type')) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n      6,\n      'Covered components must include \"content-type\" when a request body is present'\n    );\n  }\n  const includesDigest = components.includes('content-digest');\n  if (capability.covers_content_digest === 'required' && !includesDigest) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n      6,\n      'Verifier requires content-digest coverage'\n    );\n  }\n  if (capability.covers_content_digest === 'forbidden' && includesDigest) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_unexpected',\n      6,\n      'Verifier forbids content-digest coverage'\n    );\n  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[];\n    if (protocolMethodsRequiredFor.length > 0 && exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(request.body)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        'Unsigned request body exceeds the protocol method inspection cap while protocol methods require signing'\n      );\n    }\n    const protocolMethods = jsonRpcProtocolMethods(request.body);\n    const requiredProtocolMethod = protocolMethods.find(wireMethod =>\n      protocolMethodListIncludes(protocolMethodsRequiredFor, wireMethod)\n    );\n    if (requiredProtocolMethod) {\n      const declaredMethod = canonicalA2AProtocolMethod(requiredProtocolMethod);\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        `Protocol method \"${declaredMethod}\" requires a signed request` +\n          (requiredProtocolMethod === declaredMethod ? '' : ` (wire method \"${requiredProtocolMethod}\")`)\n      );\n    }\n    // Payload-driven elevation: any request carrying webhook receiver\n    // credentials (task, reporting, artifact, or revocation callbacks) MUST\n    // be RFC 9421 signed, regardless of whether the operation appears in\n    // `required_for`\n    // (#webhook-security downgrade-resistance). A bearer-only channel\n    // would otherwise let an attacker who captured a token register or\n    // update webhook credentials and redirect callbacks to a hostile URL.\n    if (carriesWebhookAuthentication(request)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        'Requests carrying webhook authentication must be RFC 9421 signed'\n      );\n    }\n    return { status: 'unsigned', verified_at: now };\n  }\n  if (!sigInputHeader || !sigHeader) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_header_malformed',\n      1,\n      'Signature and Signature-Input headers must be present as a pair'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 1: parse.\n  const parsedInput = parseSignatureInput(sigInputHeader);\n  const parsedSig = parseSignature(sigHeader, parsedInput.label);\n  rejectNonAsciiHost(request.url);\n  validateSingleValuedCoveredHeaders(parsedInput.components, request);\n\n  // Step 2: required params present.\n  requireParams(parsedInput);\n\n  // Step 3: tag match.\n  if (parsedInput.params.tag !== REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_tag_invalid',\n      3,\n      `Signature tag must be \"${REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG}\"; got \"${parsedInput.params.tag}\"`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 4: alg allowlist.\n  if (!ALLOWED_ALGS.has(parsedInput.params.alg)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_alg_not_allowed',\n      4,\n      `Signature alg \"${parsedInput.params.alg}\" is not in the AdCP allowlist`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 5: window valid.\n  validateWindow(parsedInput.params.created, parsedInput.params.expires, now);\n\n  // Step 6: covered components.\n  validateCoveredComponents(parsedInput.components, options.capability, request);\n\n  // Step 7: resolve keyid.\n  const jwk = await options.jwks.resolve(parsedInput.params.keyid);\n  if (!jwk) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `No JWK found for keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\"`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.kid !== parsedInput.params.keyid) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `JWKS resolver returned a JWK whose kid \"${jwk.kid}\" does not match requested keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\"`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 8: key purpose.\n  if (jwk.adcp_use !== 'request-signing' || !jwk.key_ops?.includes('verify')) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is not scoped for request-signing verification`\n    );\n  }\n  validateJwkParameterConsistency(jwk, parsedInput.params.alg);\n\n  // Step 9: revocation (runs BEFORE crypto to prevent amplification attacks).\n  if (await options.revocationStore.isRevoked(jwk.kid)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_key_revoked', 9, `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is revoked`);\n  }\n\n  // Replay cache is scoped by `(keyid, @target-uri)` per adcp#2460 — a\n  // signature captured on one endpoint (e.g. /create_media_buy) MUST NOT\n  // count against the replay budget for a different endpoint under the\n  // same keyid. Canonicalize once and reuse for both pre-check and commit.\n  const replayScope = canonicalTargetUri(request.url);\n\n  // Step 12 pre-checks (rate-abuse cap + replay hit) run before crypto so a\n  // compromised-key cache cap or a replayed nonce short-circuits an expensive\n  // Ed25519/ECDSA verify. The committing insert happens after step 11.\n  if (await options.replayStore.isCapHit(jwk.kid, replayScope, now)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_rate_abuse',\n      12,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}`\n    );\n  }\n  if (await options.replayStore.has(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, now)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 10: cryptographic verify. Use the received Signature-Input value\n  // verbatim as the @signature-params line so a peer emitting params in a\n  // different legal order still produces a byte-identical base.\n  const base = buildSignatureBase(\n    parsedInput.components,\n    request,\n    parsedInput.params,\n    parsedInput.signatureParamsValue\n  );\n  const publicKey = jwkToPublicKey(jwk);\n  const valid = verifySignature(parsedInput.params.alg, publicKey, Buffer.from(base, 'utf8'), parsedSig.bytes);\n  if (!valid) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_invalid',\n      10,\n      'Cryptographic verification of signature base failed'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 11: content-digest match (only if covered).\n  if (parsedInput.components.includes('content-digest')) {\n    const digestHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n    if (!digestHeader || !contentDigestMatches(digestHeader, request.body ?? '')) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_digest_mismatch',\n        11,\n        'Content-Digest header does not match recomputed body hash'\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Step 12: commit the (keyid, nonce) into the replay cache now that all\n  // prior checks have passed. Floor the TTL at one max-window + skew so a\n  // signer minting tiny validity windows can't replay outside the configured\n  // replay horizon, and so cross-replica eventual consistency has headroom.\n  const remaining = parsedInput.params.expires - now + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS;\n  const ttl = Math.max(remaining, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS);\n  const insertResult = await options.replayStore.insert(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, ttl, now);\n  if (insertResult === 'replayed') {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window`\n    );\n  }\n  if (insertResult === 'rate_abuse') {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_rate_abuse',\n      12,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}`\n    );\n  }\n\n  const agent_url = options.agentUrlForKeyid?.(jwk.kid);\n  return { status: 'verified', keyid: jwk.kid, agent_url, verified_at: now };\n}\n\nfunction jsonRpcProtocolMethods(body: string | undefined): string[] {\n  if (!body) return [];\n  if (exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body)) return [];\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(body) as unknown;\n    const messages = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];\n    return messages.flatMap(message =>\n      message !== null && typeof message === 'object' && typeof (message as { method?: unknown }).method === 'string'\n        ? [(message as { method: string }).method]\n        : []\n    );\n  } catch {\n    return [];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction requireParams(parsed: ParsedSignatureInput): void {\n  const required: Array<keyof ParsedSignatureInput['params']> = ['created', 'expires', 'nonce', 'keyid', 'alg', 'tag'];\n  const missing = required.filter(k => parsed.params[k] === undefined);\n  if (missing.length) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_params_incomplete',\n      2,\n      `Signature-Input missing required parameter(s): ${missing.join(', ')}`\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateWindow(created: number, expires: number, now: number): void {\n  if (expires <= created) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature expires must be strictly greater than created'\n    );\n  }\n  if (expires - created > MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      `Signature window exceeds ${MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS}s maximum`\n    );\n  }\n  if (now > expires + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_window_invalid', 5, 'Signature is expired');\n  }\n  if (now < created - CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature created is in the future beyond skew tolerance'\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reject JWKs whose alg/kty/crv are mutually inconsistent OR don't match\n * the sig-params alg. Three checks in one place:\n *\n * 1. JWK MUST declare `alg`. A missing alg lets a signer substitute one\n *    algorithm family for another (e.g. EdDSA sig-params against a P-256\n *    JWK) and defer failure to step 10's crypto verify — the wrong step\n *    and the wrong error code.\n * 2. JWK `alg` MUST match the sig-params `alg` after AdCP→JOSE mapping\n *    (`ed25519`↔`EdDSA`, `ecdsa-p256-sha256`↔`ES256`). Prevents sig-params\n *    alg-downgrade against a JWK that was published for a stronger alg.\n * 3. JWK kty/crv MUST be consistent with the declared alg per RFC 8037\n *    (EdDSA→OKP/Ed25519|Ed448) and RFC 7518 (ES256→EC/P-256).\n */\nfunction validateJwkParameterConsistency(\n  jwk: { kid: string; kty?: string; crv?: string; alg?: string },\n  sigParamsAlg: string\n): void {\n  if (!jwk.alg) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" does not declare an alg; cannot bind to sig-params alg=\"${sigParamsAlg}\"`\n    );\n  }\n  const expectedJoseAlg = SIG_PARAMS_ALG_TO_JOSE[sigParamsAlg];\n  if (expectedJoseAlg && jwk.alg !== expectedJoseAlg) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=${jwk.alg} but the request is signed with alg=\"${sigParamsAlg}\" (JOSE ${expectedJoseAlg})`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.alg === 'EdDSA') {\n    if (jwk.kty !== 'OKP' || (jwk.crv !== 'Ed25519' && jwk.crv !== 'Ed448')) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n        8,\n        `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=EdDSA but kty/crv (${jwk.kty}/${jwk.crv}) is not a valid Edwards-curve pair`\n      );\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n  if (jwk.alg === 'ES256') {\n    if (jwk.kty !== 'EC' || jwk.crv !== 'P-256') {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n        8,\n        `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=ES256 but kty/crv (${jwk.kty}/${jwk.crv}) is not EC/P-256`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nconst SIG_PARAMS_ALG_TO_JOSE: Record<string, string> = {\n  ed25519: 'EdDSA',\n  'ecdsa-p256-sha256': 'ES256',\n};\n\n/**\n * Covered components referencing single-valued HTTP header fields\n * (Content-Type per RFC 9110, Content-Digest per RFC 9530) MUST NOT arrive\n * as a comma-joined multi-value. A proxy or buggy client emitting the field\n * twice produces a concatenated value whose meaning relative to the\n * signature base is undefined — reject at parse rather than pick one.\n */\nfunction validateSingleValuedCoveredHeaders(components: string[], request: RequestLike): void {\n  if (components.includes('content-type')) {\n    const value = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Type');\n    if (value !== undefined && containsTopLevelComma(value)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_header_malformed',\n        1,\n        'Content-Type header covered by signature must be single-valued; multiple field values are ambiguous'\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  if (components.includes('content-digest')) {\n    const value = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n    if (value !== undefined) {\n      try {\n        const dict = parseDictionary(value);\n        const seen = new Map<string, number>();\n        for (const key of dict.keys()) {\n          seen.set(key, (seen.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);\n        }\n        for (const [key, count] of seen) {\n          if (count > 1) {\n            throw new RequestSignatureError(\n              'request_signature_header_malformed',\n              1,\n              `Content-Digest declares the \"${key}\" algorithm more than once; duplicate members are ambiguous`\n            );\n          }\n        }\n      } catch (e) {\n        if (e instanceof RequestSignatureError) throw e;\n      }\n      // The structured-headers library deduplicates dictionary keys silently.\n      // Detect the multi-value case at the raw-string level too so the\n      // specific \"two sha-256 members\" shape is caught.\n      if (containsDuplicateDictKey(value)) {\n        throw new RequestSignatureError(\n          'request_signature_header_malformed',\n          1,\n          'Content-Digest declares the same algorithm more than once; duplicate members are ambiguous'\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction containsTopLevelComma(value: string): boolean {\n  let inQuoted = false;\n  for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {\n    const ch = value[i]!;\n    if (ch === '\\\\' && i + 1 < value.length && inQuoted) {\n      i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === '\"') {\n      inQuoted = !inQuoted;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ',' && !inQuoted) return true;\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction containsDuplicateDictKey(value: string): boolean {\n  const keys: string[] = [];\n  let i = 0;\n  const len = value.length;\n  let atEntryStart = true;\n  while (i < len) {\n    if (atEntryStart) {\n      while (i < len && (value[i] === ' ' || value[i] === '\\t')) i++;\n      const start = i;\n      while (i < len && /[A-Za-z0-9_*-]/.test(value[i]!)) i++;\n      if (i > start) keys.push(value.slice(start, i).toLowerCase());\n      atEntryStart = false;\n      continue;\n    }\n    const ch = value[i]!;\n    if (ch === '\"') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < len) {\n        if (value[i] === '\\\\' && i + 1 < len) {\n          i += 2;\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (value[i] === '\"') {\n          i++;\n          break;\n        }\n        i++;\n      }\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ':') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < len && value[i] !== ':') i++;\n      if (i < len) i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ',') {\n      atEntryStart = true;\n      i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    i++;\n  }\n  const seen = new Set<string>();\n  for (const key of keys) {\n    if (seen.has(key)) return true;\n    seen.add(key);\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Upper bound on request body size we will JSON.parse and walk on the\n * unsigned branch. Real AdCP `update_media_buy` / `create_media_buy` payloads\n * are O(kilobytes); 1 MB is ~1000x that. Over this, require signing rather\n * than spend unbounded pre-crypto CPU on attacker-shaped input — a 1 MB\n * nested-array body would otherwise let an unauthenticated caller force\n * deep recursion on every request.\n */\nconst MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES = 1_048_576;\n/**\n * Upper bound on recursion depth in `containsWebhookAuthentication`. Real\n * AdCP payloads reach depth ~5-8; 64 is generous without leaving room for\n * a pathological `{\"a\":{\"a\":{...}}}` to burn the stack.\n */\nfunction exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body: string | undefined): boolean {\n  return typeof body === 'string' && body.length > MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES;\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan a JSON request body for a non-empty\n * webhook authentication object — anywhere in the tree, including inside\n * arrays of pending config updates. MCP uses `push_notification_config`;\n * A2A uses `pushNotificationConfig`. Runs only on the\n * unsigned branch; returning `true` triggers the webhook-security downgrade\n * rejection in {@link verifyRequestSignature}.\n *\n * The check is Content-Type independent: an attacker can't evade by\n * labeling a JSON body `text/plain`. A body that fails to parse as JSON\n * returns false so legitimate non-JSON transports (SSE posts, form uploads)\n * aren't blocked; signed-request enforcement for those remains\n * `required_for`-driven. A body over {@link MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES}\n * returns `true` — we can't prove absence of webhook auth within our DoS\n * budget, and oversized unsigned bodies are outside normal AdCP operation.\n */\nfunction carriesWebhookAuthentication(request: RequestLike): boolean {\n  const body = request.body;\n  if (!body) return false;\n  if (exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body)) return true;\n  let parsed: unknown;\n  try {\n    parsed = JSON.parse(body);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return containsWebhookAuthentication(parsed, WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH);\n}\n\nfunction validateCoveredComponents(components: string[], capability: VerifierCapability, request: RequestLike): void {\n  for (const mandatory of MANDATORY_COMPONENTS) {\n    if (!components.includes(mandatory)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n        6,\n        `Covered components must include \"${mandatory}\"`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  const hasBody = (request.body ?? '').length > 0;\n  if (hasBody && !components.includes('content-type')) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n      6,\n      'Covered components must include \"content-type\" when a request body is present'\n    );\n  }\n  const includesDigest = components.includes('content-digest');\n  if (capability.covers_content_digest === 'required' && !includesDigest) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n      6,\n      'Verifier requires content-digest coverage'\n    );\n  }\n  if (capability.covers_content_digest === 'forbidden' && includesDigest) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_unexpected',\n      6,\n      'Verifier forbids content-digest coverage'\n    );\n  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package/dist/lib/signing/verifier.mjs

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import { RequestSignatureError } from "./errors.mjs";
 import { parseSignature, parseSignatureInput } from "./parser.mjs";
 import { jwkToPublicKey, verifySignature } from "./crypto.mjs";
 import { containsWebhookAuthentication, WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH } from "./webhook-auth-detection.mjs";
+import { canonicalA2AProtocolMethod, protocolMethodListIncludes } from "./protocol-methods.mjs";
 import {
   ALLOWED_ALGS,
   CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,
@@ -39,12 +40,15 @@ async function verifyRequestSignature(request, options) {
       );
     }
     const protocolMethods = jsonRpcProtocolMethods(request.body);
-    const requiredProtocolMethod = protocolMethods.find((method) => protocolMethodsRequiredFor.includes(method));
+    const requiredProtocolMethod = protocolMethods.find(
+      (wireMethod) => protocolMethodListIncludes(protocolMethodsRequiredFor, wireMethod)
+    );
     if (requiredProtocolMethod) {
+      const declaredMethod = canonicalA2AProtocolMethod(requiredProtocolMethod);
       throw new RequestSignatureError(
         "request_signature_required",
         0,
-        `Protocol method "${requiredProtocolMethod}" requires a signed request`
+        `Protocol method "${declaredMethod}" requires a signed request` + (requiredProtocolMethod === declaredMethod ? "" : ` (wire method "${requiredProtocolMethod}")`)
       );
     }
     if (carriesWebhookAuthentication(request)) {

package/dist/lib/signing/verifier.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/verifier.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { parseDictionary } from 'structured-headers';\nimport {\n  buildSignatureBase,\n  canonicalTargetUri,\n  getHeaderValue,\n  rejectNonAsciiHost,\n  type RequestLike,\n} from './canonicalize';\nimport { contentDigestMatches } from './content-digest';\nimport { RequestSignatureError } from './errors';\nimport { parseSignature, parseSignatureInput, type ParsedSignatureInput } from './parser';\nimport { jwkToPublicKey, verifySignature } from './crypto';\nimport type { JwksResolver } from './jwks';\nimport type { ReplayStore } from './replay';\nimport type { RevocationStore } from './revocation';\nimport { containsWebhookAuthentication, WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH } from './webhook-auth-detection';\nimport {\n  ALLOWED_ALGS,\n  CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,\n  MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS,\n  REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG,\n  type VerifierCapability,\n  type VerifyResult,\n} from './types';\n\nexport interface VerifyRequestOptions {\n  capability: VerifierCapability;\n  jwks: JwksResolver;\n  replayStore: ReplayStore;\n  revocationStore: RevocationStore;\n  now?: () => number;\n  /**\n   * The AdCP operation being requested, used to consult\n   * `capability.required_for` when an unsigned request arrives. When omitted,\n   * the verifier treats the operation as \"not in any required_for list\" and\n   * returns an unsigned result rather than rejecting — callers in\n   * always-verify mode (where every request is signed) can leave this blank.\n   */\n  operation?: string;\n  agentUrlForKeyid?: (keyid: string) => string | undefined;\n}\n\nexport async function verifyRequestSignature(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  options: VerifyRequestOptions\n): Promise<VerifyResult> {\n  const now = options.now ? options.now() : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const sigInputHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Signature-Input');\n  const sigHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Signature');\n\n  // Pre-check: both headers present or both absent.\n  if (!sigInputHeader && !sigHeader) {\n    const operation = options.operation;\n    // Precedence is intentionally fail-specific: AdCP tool required_for,\n    // raw JSON-RPC protocol methods, then payload-driven webhook-auth\n    // elevation. The specific signed-only contract should win before the\n    // generic body scan runs.\n    if (operation && options.capability.required_for.includes(operation)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        `Operation \"${operation}\" requires a signed request`\n      );\n    }\n    const protocolMethodsRequiredFor = options.capability.protocol_methods_required_for ?? [];\n    if (protocolMethodsRequiredFor.length > 0 && exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(request.body)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        'Unsigned request body exceeds the protocol method inspection cap while protocol methods require signing'\n      );\n    }\n    const protocolMethods = jsonRpcProtocolMethods(request.body);\n    const requiredProtocolMethod = protocolMethods.find(method => protocolMethodsRequiredFor.includes(method));\n    if (requiredProtocolMethod) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        `Protocol method \"${requiredProtocolMethod}\" requires a signed request`\n      );\n    }\n    // Payload-driven elevation: any request carrying webhook receiver\n    // credentials (task, reporting, artifact, or revocation callbacks) MUST\n    // be RFC 9421 signed, regardless of whether the operation appears in\n    // `required_for`\n    // (#webhook-security downgrade-resistance). A bearer-only channel\n    // would otherwise let an attacker who captured a token register or\n    // update webhook credentials and redirect callbacks to a hostile URL.\n    if (carriesWebhookAuthentication(request)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        'Requests carrying webhook authentication must be RFC 9421 signed'\n      );\n    }\n    return { status: 'unsigned', verified_at: now };\n  }\n  if (!sigInputHeader || !sigHeader) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_header_malformed',\n      1,\n      'Signature and Signature-Input headers must be present as a pair'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 1: parse.\n  const parsedInput = parseSignatureInput(sigInputHeader);\n  const parsedSig = parseSignature(sigHeader, parsedInput.label);\n  rejectNonAsciiHost(request.url);\n  validateSingleValuedCoveredHeaders(parsedInput.components, request);\n\n  // Step 2: required params present.\n  requireParams(parsedInput);\n\n  // Step 3: tag match.\n  if (parsedInput.params.tag !== REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_tag_invalid',\n      3,\n      `Signature tag must be \"${REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG}\"; got \"${parsedInput.params.tag}\"`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 4: alg allowlist.\n  if (!ALLOWED_ALGS.has(parsedInput.params.alg)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_alg_not_allowed',\n      4,\n      `Signature alg \"${parsedInput.params.alg}\" is not in the AdCP allowlist`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 5: window valid.\n  validateWindow(parsedInput.params.created, parsedInput.params.expires, now);\n\n  // Step 6: covered components.\n  validateCoveredComponents(parsedInput.components, options.capability, request);\n\n  // Step 7: resolve keyid.\n  const jwk = await options.jwks.resolve(parsedInput.params.keyid);\n  if (!jwk) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `No JWK found for keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\"`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.kid !== parsedInput.params.keyid) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `JWKS resolver returned a JWK whose kid \"${jwk.kid}\" does not match requested keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\"`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 8: key purpose.\n  if (jwk.adcp_use !== 'request-signing' || !jwk.key_ops?.includes('verify')) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is not scoped for request-signing verification`\n    );\n  }\n  validateJwkParameterConsistency(jwk, parsedInput.params.alg);\n\n  // Step 9: revocation (runs BEFORE crypto to prevent amplification attacks).\n  if (await options.revocationStore.isRevoked(jwk.kid)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_key_revoked', 9, `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is revoked`);\n  }\n\n  // Replay cache is scoped by `(keyid, @target-uri)` per adcp#2460 — a\n  // signature captured on one endpoint (e.g. /create_media_buy) MUST NOT\n  // count against the replay budget for a different endpoint under the\n  // same keyid. Canonicalize once and reuse for both pre-check and commit.\n  const replayScope = canonicalTargetUri(request.url);\n\n  // Step 12 pre-checks (rate-abuse cap + replay hit) run before crypto so a\n  // compromised-key cache cap or a replayed nonce short-circuits an expensive\n  // Ed25519/ECDSA verify. The committing insert happens after step 11.\n  if (await options.replayStore.isCapHit(jwk.kid, replayScope, now)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_rate_abuse',\n      12,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}`\n    );\n  }\n  if (await options.replayStore.has(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, now)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 10: cryptographic verify. Use the received Signature-Input value\n  // verbatim as the @signature-params line so a peer emitting params in a\n  // different legal order still produces a byte-identical base.\n  const base = buildSignatureBase(\n    parsedInput.components,\n    request,\n    parsedInput.params,\n    parsedInput.signatureParamsValue\n  );\n  const publicKey = jwkToPublicKey(jwk);\n  const valid = verifySignature(parsedInput.params.alg, publicKey, Buffer.from(base, 'utf8'), parsedSig.bytes);\n  if (!valid) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_invalid',\n      10,\n      'Cryptographic verification of signature base failed'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 11: content-digest match (only if covered).\n  if (parsedInput.components.includes('content-digest')) {\n    const digestHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n    if (!digestHeader || !contentDigestMatches(digestHeader, request.body ?? '')) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_digest_mismatch',\n        11,\n        'Content-Digest header does not match recomputed body hash'\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Step 12: commit the (keyid, nonce) into the replay cache now that all\n  // prior checks have passed. Floor the TTL at one max-window + skew so a\n  // signer minting tiny validity windows can't replay outside the configured\n  // replay horizon, and so cross-replica eventual consistency has headroom.\n  const remaining = parsedInput.params.expires - now + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS;\n  const ttl = Math.max(remaining, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS);\n  const insertResult = await options.replayStore.insert(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, ttl, now);\n  if (insertResult === 'replayed') {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window`\n    );\n  }\n  if (insertResult === 'rate_abuse') {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_rate_abuse',\n      12,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}`\n    );\n  }\n\n  const agent_url = options.agentUrlForKeyid?.(jwk.kid);\n  return { status: 'verified', keyid: jwk.kid, agent_url, verified_at: now };\n}\n\nfunction jsonRpcProtocolMethods(body: string | undefined): string[] {\n  if (!body) return [];\n  if (exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body)) return [];\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(body) as unknown;\n    const messages = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];\n    return messages.flatMap(message =>\n      message !== null && typeof message === 'object' && typeof (message as { method?: unknown }).method === 'string'\n        ? [(message as { method: string }).method]\n        : []\n    );\n  } catch {\n    return [];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction requireParams(parsed: ParsedSignatureInput): void {\n  const required: Array<keyof ParsedSignatureInput['params']> = ['created', 'expires', 'nonce', 'keyid', 'alg', 'tag'];\n  const missing = required.filter(k => parsed.params[k] === undefined);\n  if (missing.length) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_params_incomplete',\n      2,\n      `Signature-Input missing required parameter(s): ${missing.join(', ')}`\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateWindow(created: number, expires: number, now: number): void {\n  if (expires <= created) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature expires must be strictly greater than created'\n    );\n  }\n  if (expires - created > MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      `Signature window exceeds ${MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS}s maximum`\n    );\n  }\n  if (now > expires + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_window_invalid', 5, 'Signature is expired');\n  }\n  if (now < created - CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature created is in the future beyond skew tolerance'\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reject JWKs whose alg/kty/crv are mutually inconsistent OR don't match\n * the sig-params alg. Three checks in one place:\n *\n * 1. JWK MUST declare `alg`. A missing alg lets a signer substitute one\n *    algorithm family for another (e.g. EdDSA sig-params against a P-256\n *    JWK) and defer failure to step 10's crypto verify — the wrong step\n *    and the wrong error code.\n * 2. JWK `alg` MUST match the sig-params `alg` after AdCP→JOSE mapping\n *    (`ed25519`↔`EdDSA`, `ecdsa-p256-sha256`↔`ES256`). Prevents sig-params\n *    alg-downgrade against a JWK that was published for a stronger alg.\n * 3. JWK kty/crv MUST be consistent with the declared alg per RFC 8037\n *    (EdDSA→OKP/Ed25519|Ed448) and RFC 7518 (ES256→EC/P-256).\n */\nfunction validateJwkParameterConsistency(\n  jwk: { kid: string; kty?: string; crv?: string; alg?: string },\n  sigParamsAlg: string\n): void {\n  if (!jwk.alg) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" does not declare an alg; cannot bind to sig-params alg=\"${sigParamsAlg}\"`\n    );\n  }\n  const expectedJoseAlg = SIG_PARAMS_ALG_TO_JOSE[sigParamsAlg];\n  if (expectedJoseAlg && jwk.alg !== expectedJoseAlg) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=${jwk.alg} but the request is signed with alg=\"${sigParamsAlg}\" (JOSE ${expectedJoseAlg})`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.alg === 'EdDSA') {\n    if (jwk.kty !== 'OKP' || (jwk.crv !== 'Ed25519' && jwk.crv !== 'Ed448')) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n        8,\n        `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=EdDSA but kty/crv (${jwk.kty}/${jwk.crv}) is not a valid Edwards-curve pair`\n      );\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n  if (jwk.alg === 'ES256') {\n    if (jwk.kty !== 'EC' || jwk.crv !== 'P-256') {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n        8,\n        `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=ES256 but kty/crv (${jwk.kty}/${jwk.crv}) is not EC/P-256`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nconst SIG_PARAMS_ALG_TO_JOSE: Record<string, string> = {\n  ed25519: 'EdDSA',\n  'ecdsa-p256-sha256': 'ES256',\n};\n\n/**\n * Covered components referencing single-valued HTTP header fields\n * (Content-Type per RFC 9110, Content-Digest per RFC 9530) MUST NOT arrive\n * as a comma-joined multi-value. A proxy or buggy client emitting the field\n * twice produces a concatenated value whose meaning relative to the\n * signature base is undefined — reject at parse rather than pick one.\n */\nfunction validateSingleValuedCoveredHeaders(components: string[], request: RequestLike): void {\n  if (components.includes('content-type')) {\n    const value = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Type');\n    if (value !== undefined && containsTopLevelComma(value)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_header_malformed',\n        1,\n        'Content-Type header covered by signature must be single-valued; multiple field values are ambiguous'\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  if (components.includes('content-digest')) {\n    const value = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n    if (value !== undefined) {\n      try {\n        const dict = parseDictionary(value);\n        const seen = new Map<string, number>();\n        for (const key of dict.keys()) {\n          seen.set(key, (seen.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);\n        }\n        for (const [key, count] of seen) {\n          if (count > 1) {\n            throw new RequestSignatureError(\n              'request_signature_header_malformed',\n              1,\n              `Content-Digest declares the \"${key}\" algorithm more than once; duplicate members are ambiguous`\n            );\n          }\n        }\n      } catch (e) {\n        if (e instanceof RequestSignatureError) throw e;\n      }\n      // The structured-headers library deduplicates dictionary keys silently.\n      // Detect the multi-value case at the raw-string level too so the\n      // specific \"two sha-256 members\" shape is caught.\n      if (containsDuplicateDictKey(value)) {\n        throw new RequestSignatureError(\n          'request_signature_header_malformed',\n          1,\n          'Content-Digest declares the same algorithm more than once; duplicate members are ambiguous'\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction containsTopLevelComma(value: string): boolean {\n  let inQuoted = false;\n  for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {\n    const ch = value[i]!;\n    if (ch === '\\\\' && i + 1 < value.length && inQuoted) {\n      i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === '\"') {\n      inQuoted = !inQuoted;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ',' && !inQuoted) return true;\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction containsDuplicateDictKey(value: string): boolean {\n  const keys: string[] = [];\n  let i = 0;\n  const len = value.length;\n  let atEntryStart = true;\n  while (i < len) {\n    if (atEntryStart) {\n      while (i < len && (value[i] === ' ' || value[i] === '\\t')) i++;\n      const start = i;\n      while (i < len && /[A-Za-z0-9_*-]/.test(value[i]!)) i++;\n      if (i > start) keys.push(value.slice(start, i).toLowerCase());\n      atEntryStart = false;\n      continue;\n    }\n    const ch = value[i]!;\n    if (ch === '\"') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < len) {\n        if (value[i] === '\\\\' && i + 1 < len) {\n          i += 2;\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (value[i] === '\"') {\n          i++;\n          break;\n        }\n        i++;\n      }\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ':') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < len && value[i] !== ':') i++;\n      if (i < len) i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ',') {\n      atEntryStart = true;\n      i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    i++;\n  }\n  const seen = new Set<string>();\n  for (const key of keys) {\n    if (seen.has(key)) return true;\n    seen.add(key);\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Upper bound on request body size we will JSON.parse and walk on the\n * unsigned branch. Real AdCP `update_media_buy` / `create_media_buy` payloads\n * are O(kilobytes); 1 MB is ~1000x that. Over this, require signing rather\n * than spend unbounded pre-crypto CPU on attacker-shaped input — a 1 MB\n * nested-array body would otherwise let an unauthenticated caller force\n * deep recursion on every request.\n */\nconst MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES = 1_048_576;\n/**\n * Upper bound on recursion depth in `containsWebhookAuthentication`. Real\n * AdCP payloads reach depth ~5-8; 64 is generous without leaving room for\n * a pathological `{\"a\":{\"a\":{...}}}` to burn the stack.\n */\nfunction exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body: string | undefined): boolean {\n  return typeof body === 'string' && body.length > MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES;\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan a JSON request body for a non-empty\n * webhook authentication object — anywhere in the tree, including inside\n * arrays of pending config updates. MCP uses `push_notification_config`;\n * A2A uses `pushNotificationConfig`. Runs only on the\n * unsigned branch; returning `true` triggers the webhook-security downgrade\n * rejection in {@link verifyRequestSignature}.\n *\n * The check is Content-Type independent: an attacker can't evade by\n * labeling a JSON body `text/plain`. A body that fails to parse as JSON\n * returns false so legitimate non-JSON transports (SSE posts, form uploads)\n * aren't blocked; signed-request enforcement for those remains\n * `required_for`-driven. A body over {@link MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES}\n * returns `true` — we can't prove absence of webhook auth within our DoS\n * budget, and oversized unsigned bodies are outside normal AdCP operation.\n */\nfunction carriesWebhookAuthentication(request: RequestLike): boolean {\n  const body = request.body;\n  if (!body) return false;\n  if (exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body)) return true;\n  let parsed: unknown;\n  try {\n    parsed = JSON.parse(body);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return containsWebhookAuthentication(parsed, WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH);\n}\n\nfunction validateCoveredComponents(components: string[], capability: VerifierCapability, request: RequestLike): void {\n  for (const mandatory of MANDATORY_COMPONENTS) {\n    if (!components.includes(mandatory)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n        6,\n        `Covered components must include \"${mandatory}\"`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  const hasBody = (request.body ?? '').length > 0;\n  if (hasBody && !components.includes('content-type')) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n      6,\n      'Covered components must include \"content-type\" when a request body is present'\n    );\n  }\n  const includesDigest = components.includes('content-digest');\n  if (capability.covers_content_digest === 'required' && !includesDigest) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n      6,\n      'Verifier requires content-digest coverage'\n    );\n  }\n  if (capability.covers_content_digest === 'forbidden' && includesDigest) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_unexpected',\n      6,\n      'Verifier forbids content-digest coverage'\n    );\n  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[];\n    if (protocolMethodsRequiredFor.length > 0 && exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(request.body)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        'Unsigned request body exceeds the protocol method inspection cap while protocol methods require signing'\n      );\n    }\n    const protocolMethods = jsonRpcProtocolMethods(request.body);\n    const requiredProtocolMethod = protocolMethods.find(wireMethod =>\n      protocolMethodListIncludes(protocolMethodsRequiredFor, wireMethod)\n    );\n    if (requiredProtocolMethod) {\n      const declaredMethod = canonicalA2AProtocolMethod(requiredProtocolMethod);\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        `Protocol method \"${declaredMethod}\" requires a signed request` +\n          (requiredProtocolMethod === declaredMethod ? '' : ` (wire method \"${requiredProtocolMethod}\")`)\n      );\n    }\n    // Payload-driven elevation: any request carrying webhook receiver\n    // credentials (task, reporting, artifact, or revocation callbacks) MUST\n    // be RFC 9421 signed, regardless of whether the operation appears in\n    // `required_for`\n    // (#webhook-security downgrade-resistance). A bearer-only channel\n    // would otherwise let an attacker who captured a token register or\n    // update webhook credentials and redirect callbacks to a hostile URL.\n    if (carriesWebhookAuthentication(request)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        'Requests carrying webhook authentication must be RFC 9421 signed'\n      );\n    }\n    return { status: 'unsigned', verified_at: now };\n  }\n  if (!sigInputHeader || !sigHeader) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_header_malformed',\n      1,\n      'Signature and Signature-Input headers must be present as a pair'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 1: parse.\n  const parsedInput = parseSignatureInput(sigInputHeader);\n  const parsedSig = parseSignature(sigHeader, parsedInput.label);\n  rejectNonAsciiHost(request.url);\n  validateSingleValuedCoveredHeaders(parsedInput.components, request);\n\n  // Step 2: required params present.\n  requireParams(parsedInput);\n\n  // Step 3: tag match.\n  if (parsedInput.params.tag !== REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_tag_invalid',\n      3,\n      `Signature tag must be \"${REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG}\"; got \"${parsedInput.params.tag}\"`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 4: alg allowlist.\n  if (!ALLOWED_ALGS.has(parsedInput.params.alg)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_alg_not_allowed',\n      4,\n      `Signature alg \"${parsedInput.params.alg}\" is not in the AdCP allowlist`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 5: window valid.\n  validateWindow(parsedInput.params.created, parsedInput.params.expires, now);\n\n  // Step 6: covered components.\n  validateCoveredComponents(parsedInput.components, options.capability, request);\n\n  // Step 7: resolve keyid.\n  const jwk = await options.jwks.resolve(parsedInput.params.keyid);\n  if (!jwk) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `No JWK found for keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\"`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.kid !== parsedInput.params.keyid) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `JWKS resolver returned a JWK whose kid \"${jwk.kid}\" does not match requested keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\"`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 8: key purpose.\n  if (jwk.adcp_use !== 'request-signing' || !jwk.key_ops?.includes('verify')) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is not scoped for request-signing verification`\n    );\n  }\n  validateJwkParameterConsistency(jwk, parsedInput.params.alg);\n\n  // Step 9: revocation (runs BEFORE crypto to prevent amplification attacks).\n  if (await options.revocationStore.isRevoked(jwk.kid)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_key_revoked', 9, `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is revoked`);\n  }\n\n  // Replay cache is scoped by `(keyid, @target-uri)` per adcp#2460 — a\n  // signature captured on one endpoint (e.g. /create_media_buy) MUST NOT\n  // count against the replay budget for a different endpoint under the\n  // same keyid. Canonicalize once and reuse for both pre-check and commit.\n  const replayScope = canonicalTargetUri(request.url);\n\n  // Step 12 pre-checks (rate-abuse cap + replay hit) run before crypto so a\n  // compromised-key cache cap or a replayed nonce short-circuits an expensive\n  // Ed25519/ECDSA verify. The committing insert happens after step 11.\n  if (await options.replayStore.isCapHit(jwk.kid, replayScope, now)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_rate_abuse',\n      12,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}`\n    );\n  }\n  if (await options.replayStore.has(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, now)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 10: cryptographic verify. Use the received Signature-Input value\n  // verbatim as the @signature-params line so a peer emitting params in a\n  // different legal order still produces a byte-identical base.\n  const base = buildSignatureBase(\n    parsedInput.components,\n    request,\n    parsedInput.params,\n    parsedInput.signatureParamsValue\n  );\n  const publicKey = jwkToPublicKey(jwk);\n  const valid = verifySignature(parsedInput.params.alg, publicKey, Buffer.from(base, 'utf8'), parsedSig.bytes);\n  if (!valid) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_invalid',\n      10,\n      'Cryptographic verification of signature base failed'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 11: content-digest match (only if covered).\n  if (parsedInput.components.includes('content-digest')) {\n    const digestHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n    if (!digestHeader || !contentDigestMatches(digestHeader, request.body ?? '')) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_digest_mismatch',\n        11,\n        'Content-Digest header does not match recomputed body hash'\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Step 12: commit the (keyid, nonce) into the replay cache now that all\n  // prior checks have passed. Floor the TTL at one max-window + skew so a\n  // signer minting tiny validity windows can't replay outside the configured\n  // replay horizon, and so cross-replica eventual consistency has headroom.\n  const remaining = parsedInput.params.expires - now + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS;\n  const ttl = Math.max(remaining, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS);\n  const insertResult = await options.replayStore.insert(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, ttl, now);\n  if (insertResult === 'replayed') {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window`\n    );\n  }\n  if (insertResult === 'rate_abuse') {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_rate_abuse',\n      12,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}`\n    );\n  }\n\n  const agent_url = options.agentUrlForKeyid?.(jwk.kid);\n  return { status: 'verified', keyid: jwk.kid, agent_url, verified_at: now };\n}\n\nfunction jsonRpcProtocolMethods(body: string | undefined): string[] {\n  if (!body) return [];\n  if (exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body)) return [];\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(body) as unknown;\n    const messages = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];\n    return messages.flatMap(message =>\n      message !== null && typeof message === 'object' && typeof (message as { method?: unknown }).method === 'string'\n        ? [(message as { method: string }).method]\n        : []\n    );\n  } catch {\n    return [];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction requireParams(parsed: ParsedSignatureInput): void {\n  const required: Array<keyof ParsedSignatureInput['params']> = ['created', 'expires', 'nonce', 'keyid', 'alg', 'tag'];\n  const missing = required.filter(k => parsed.params[k] === undefined);\n  if (missing.length) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_params_incomplete',\n      2,\n      `Signature-Input missing required parameter(s): ${missing.join(', ')}`\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateWindow(created: number, expires: number, now: number): void {\n  if (expires <= created) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature expires must be strictly greater than created'\n    );\n  }\n  if (expires - created > MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      `Signature window exceeds ${MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS}s maximum`\n    );\n  }\n  if (now > expires + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_window_invalid', 5, 'Signature is expired');\n  }\n  if (now < created - CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature created is in the future beyond skew tolerance'\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reject JWKs whose alg/kty/crv are mutually inconsistent OR don't match\n * the sig-params alg. Three checks in one place:\n *\n * 1. JWK MUST declare `alg`. A missing alg lets a signer substitute one\n *    algorithm family for another (e.g. EdDSA sig-params against a P-256\n *    JWK) and defer failure to step 10's crypto verify — the wrong step\n *    and the wrong error code.\n * 2. JWK `alg` MUST match the sig-params `alg` after AdCP→JOSE mapping\n *    (`ed25519`↔`EdDSA`, `ecdsa-p256-sha256`↔`ES256`). Prevents sig-params\n *    alg-downgrade against a JWK that was published for a stronger alg.\n * 3. JWK kty/crv MUST be consistent with the declared alg per RFC 8037\n *    (EdDSA→OKP/Ed25519|Ed448) and RFC 7518 (ES256→EC/P-256).\n */\nfunction validateJwkParameterConsistency(\n  jwk: { kid: string; kty?: string; crv?: string; alg?: string },\n  sigParamsAlg: string\n): void {\n  if (!jwk.alg) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" does not declare an alg; cannot bind to sig-params alg=\"${sigParamsAlg}\"`\n    );\n  }\n  const expectedJoseAlg = SIG_PARAMS_ALG_TO_JOSE[sigParamsAlg];\n  if (expectedJoseAlg && jwk.alg !== expectedJoseAlg) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=${jwk.alg} but the request is signed with alg=\"${sigParamsAlg}\" (JOSE ${expectedJoseAlg})`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.alg === 'EdDSA') {\n    if (jwk.kty !== 'OKP' || (jwk.crv !== 'Ed25519' && jwk.crv !== 'Ed448')) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n        8,\n        `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=EdDSA but kty/crv (${jwk.kty}/${jwk.crv}) is not a valid Edwards-curve pair`\n      );\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n  if (jwk.alg === 'ES256') {\n    if (jwk.kty !== 'EC' || jwk.crv !== 'P-256') {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n        8,\n        `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=ES256 but kty/crv (${jwk.kty}/${jwk.crv}) is not EC/P-256`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nconst SIG_PARAMS_ALG_TO_JOSE: Record<string, string> = {\n  ed25519: 'EdDSA',\n  'ecdsa-p256-sha256': 'ES256',\n};\n\n/**\n * Covered components referencing single-valued HTTP header fields\n * (Content-Type per RFC 9110, Content-Digest per RFC 9530) MUST NOT arrive\n * as a comma-joined multi-value. A proxy or buggy client emitting the field\n * twice produces a concatenated value whose meaning relative to the\n * signature base is undefined — reject at parse rather than pick one.\n */\nfunction validateSingleValuedCoveredHeaders(components: string[], request: RequestLike): void {\n  if (components.includes('content-type')) {\n    const value = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Type');\n    if (value !== undefined && containsTopLevelComma(value)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_header_malformed',\n        1,\n        'Content-Type header covered by signature must be single-valued; multiple field values are ambiguous'\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  if (components.includes('content-digest')) {\n    const value = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n    if (value !== undefined) {\n      try {\n        const dict = parseDictionary(value);\n        const seen = new Map<string, number>();\n        for (const key of dict.keys()) {\n          seen.set(key, (seen.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);\n        }\n        for (const [key, count] of seen) {\n          if (count > 1) {\n            throw new RequestSignatureError(\n              'request_signature_header_malformed',\n              1,\n              `Content-Digest declares the \"${key}\" algorithm more than once; duplicate members are ambiguous`\n            );\n          }\n        }\n      } catch (e) {\n        if (e instanceof RequestSignatureError) throw e;\n      }\n      // The structured-headers library deduplicates dictionary keys silently.\n      // Detect the multi-value case at the raw-string level too so the\n      // specific \"two sha-256 members\" shape is caught.\n      if (containsDuplicateDictKey(value)) {\n        throw new RequestSignatureError(\n          'request_signature_header_malformed',\n          1,\n          'Content-Digest declares the same algorithm more than once; duplicate members are ambiguous'\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction containsTopLevelComma(value: string): boolean {\n  let inQuoted = false;\n  for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {\n    const ch = value[i]!;\n    if (ch === '\\\\' && i + 1 < value.length && inQuoted) {\n      i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === '\"') {\n      inQuoted = !inQuoted;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ',' && !inQuoted) return true;\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction containsDuplicateDictKey(value: string): boolean {\n  const keys: string[] = [];\n  let i = 0;\n  const len = value.length;\n  let atEntryStart = true;\n  while (i < len) {\n    if (atEntryStart) {\n      while (i < len && (value[i] === ' ' || value[i] === '\\t')) i++;\n      const start = i;\n      while (i < len && /[A-Za-z0-9_*-]/.test(value[i]!)) i++;\n      if (i > start) keys.push(value.slice(start, i).toLowerCase());\n      atEntryStart = false;\n      continue;\n    }\n    const ch = value[i]!;\n    if (ch === '\"') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < len) {\n        if (value[i] === '\\\\' && i + 1 < len) {\n          i += 2;\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (value[i] === '\"') {\n          i++;\n          break;\n        }\n        i++;\n      }\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ':') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < len && value[i] !== ':') i++;\n      if (i < len) i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ',') {\n      atEntryStart = true;\n      i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    i++;\n  }\n  const seen = new Set<string>();\n  for (const key of keys) {\n    if (seen.has(key)) return true;\n    seen.add(key);\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Upper bound on request body size we will JSON.parse and walk on the\n * unsigned branch. Real AdCP `update_media_buy` / `create_media_buy` payloads\n * are O(kilobytes); 1 MB is ~1000x that. Over this, require signing rather\n * than spend unbounded pre-crypto CPU on attacker-shaped input — a 1 MB\n * nested-array body would otherwise let an unauthenticated caller force\n * deep recursion on every request.\n */\nconst MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES = 1_048_576;\n/**\n * Upper bound on recursion depth in `containsWebhookAuthentication`. Real\n * AdCP payloads reach depth ~5-8; 64 is generous without leaving room for\n * a pathological `{\"a\":{\"a\":{...}}}` to burn the stack.\n */\nfunction exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body: string | undefined): boolean {\n  return typeof body === 'string' && body.length > MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES;\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan a JSON request body for a non-empty\n * webhook authentication object — anywhere in the tree, including inside\n * arrays of pending config updates. MCP uses `push_notification_config`;\n * A2A uses `pushNotificationConfig`. Runs only on the\n * unsigned branch; returning `true` triggers the webhook-security downgrade\n * rejection in {@link verifyRequestSignature}.\n *\n * The check is Content-Type independent: an attacker can't evade by\n * labeling a JSON body `text/plain`. A body that fails to parse as JSON\n * returns false so legitimate non-JSON transports (SSE posts, form uploads)\n * aren't blocked; signed-request enforcement for those remains\n * `required_for`-driven. A body over {@link MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES}\n * returns `true` — we can't prove absence of webhook auth within our DoS\n * budget, and oversized unsigned bodies are outside normal AdCP operation.\n */\nfunction carriesWebhookAuthentication(request: RequestLike): boolean {\n  const body = request.body;\n  if (!body) return false;\n  if (exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body)) return true;\n  let parsed: unknown;\n  try {\n    parsed = JSON.parse(body);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return containsWebhookAuthentication(parsed, WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH);\n}\n\nfunction validateCoveredComponents(components: string[], capability: VerifierCapability, request: RequestLike): void {\n  for (const mandatory of MANDATORY_COMPONENTS) {\n    if (!components.includes(mandatory)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n        6,\n        `Covered components must include \"${mandatory}\"`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  const hasBody = (request.body ?? '').length > 0;\n  if (hasBody && !components.includes('content-type')) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n      6,\n      'Covered components must include \"content-type\" when a request body is present'\n    );\n  }\n  const includesDigest = components.includes('content-digest');\n  if (capability.covers_content_digest === 'required' && !includesDigest) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n      6,\n      'Verifier requires content-digest coverage'\n    );\n  }\n  if (capability.covers_content_digest === 'forbidden' && includesDigest) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_unexpected',\n      6,\n      'Verifier forbids content-digest coverage'\n    );\n  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package/dist/lib/testing/client.js

@@ -150,6 +150,9 @@ function createTestClient(agentUrl, protocol = "mcp", options = {}) {
       },
       ...options.transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== void 0 && {
         requestTimeoutMs: options.transport.requestTimeoutMs
+      },
+      ...options.transport?.legacyCompat?.enabled !== void 0 && {
+        legacyCompatEnabled: options.transport.legacyCompat.enabled
       }
     },
     enumerable: false
@@ -182,7 +185,7 @@ function testClientMatchesVersionOptions(client, options) {
   const expectedAdcpVersion = effectiveOptions.adcpVersion ?? import_version.ADCP_VERSION;
   const expectedWireAdcpVersion = effectiveOptions.wireAdcpVersion;
   const expectedVersionEnvelope = effectiveOptions.versionEnvelope ?? "auto";
-  return meta.adcpVersion === expectedAdcpVersion && meta.wireAdcpVersion === expectedWireAdcpVersion && meta.versionEnvelope === expectedVersionEnvelope && meta.strictResponseSchemaValidation === (effectiveOptions.strictResponseSchemaValidation !== false) && meta.authMode === expectedAuthMode && meta.fetchFn === effectiveOptions.transport?.trustedFetchFn && meta.maxResponseBytes === effectiveOptions.transport?.maxResponseBytes && meta.requestTimeoutMs === effectiveOptions.transport?.requestTimeoutMs;
+  return meta.adcpVersion === expectedAdcpVersion && meta.wireAdcpVersion === expectedWireAdcpVersion && meta.versionEnvelope === expectedVersionEnvelope && meta.strictResponseSchemaValidation === (effectiveOptions.strictResponseSchemaValidation !== false) && meta.authMode === expectedAuthMode && meta.fetchFn === effectiveOptions.transport?.trustedFetchFn && meta.maxResponseBytes === effectiveOptions.transport?.maxResponseBytes && meta.requestTimeoutMs === effectiveOptions.transport?.requestTimeoutMs && meta.legacyCompatEnabled === effectiveOptions.transport?.legacyCompat?.enabled;
 }
 function withTestKitAuthDefaults(options) {
   if (options.auth) return options;