@adcp/sdk 13.0.4 → 13.1.1

package/dist/lib/protocols/index.d.ts

@@ -108,6 +108,8 @@ export interface TransportOptions {
      * Set to `0` to disable the SDK-imposed discovery timeout.
      */
     requestTimeoutMs?: number;
+    /** A2A-only compatibility policy. Compliance uses `{ enabled: false }` for native 1.0 grading. */
+    legacyCompat?: import('./a2a').A2ALegacyCompatOptions;
 }
 /**
  * Options for {@link ProtocolClient.callTool}. All fields are optional.
@@ -207,4 +209,5 @@ export declare const createMCPClient: (agentUrl: string, authToken?: string, hea
 export declare const createA2AClient: (agentUrl: string, authToken?: string, headers?: Record<string, string>, serverVersion?: "v2" | "v3", adcpVersion?: string, transport?: TransportOptions, versionEnvelopeMode?: VersionEnvelopeMode) => {
     callTool: (toolName: string, parameters: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) => Promise<unknown>;
 };
+export type { A2ALegacyCompatOptions } from './a2a';
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/lib/protocols/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/lib/protocols/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AACA,OAAO,EACL,WAAW,EACX,oBAAoB,EACpB,UAAU,EACV,mBAAmB,EACnB,qBAAqB,EACrB,iBAAiB,GAClB,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;AAGf,OAAO,EAAkC,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAGrF;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAsB,gBAAgB,CAAC,QAAQ,GAAE,KAAK,GAAG,KAAa,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAMrF;AAED,qFAAqF;AACrF,wBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAAC,QAAQ,GAAE,KAAK,GAAG,KAAa,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAM3F;AAED,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,CAAC;AAClC,YAAY,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;AACjE,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC;AACpC,OAAO,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AACrD,OAAO,EACL,oBAAoB,EACpB,gBAAgB,EAChB,gBAAgB,EAChB,YAAY,EACZ,aAAa,EACb,gBAAgB,EAChB,mBAAmB,GACpB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAKrB,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC;AAmB3D,OAAO,EAEL,KAAK,wBAAwB,IAAI,0BAA0B,EAC5D,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAEhC,OAAO,EACL,wBAAwB,EACxB,oBAAoB,EACpB,wBAAwB,EACxB,iCAAiC,GAClC,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAChC,YAAY,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAEpH,MAAM,MAAM,mBAAmB,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC;AAyBjE;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,8BAA8B,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAWzE;AA6FD;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAuCG;IACH,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAcG;IACH,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IAC9B;;;OAGG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACvB;;;;OAIG;IACH,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACzB;;;;;OAKG;IACH,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1B,kGAAkG;IAClG,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB,CAAC;CACvD;AAoBD;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;IAC9B,+DAA+D;IAC/D,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;IAC5B,+CAA+C;IAC/C,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB,sEAAsE;IACtE,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,4DAA4D;IAC5D,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB,2EAA2E;IAC3E,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC5B,sFAAsF;IACtF,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE;QAAE,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;KAAE,CAAC;IAClD;;;;;;;;OAQG;IACH,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACrB;;;;OAIG;IACH,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB;;;;;;;OAOG;IACH,eAAe,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC;IACtC;;;OAGG;IACH,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC;IAC7B,wEAAwE;IACxE,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;IACrB,uEAAuE;IACvE,mBAAmB,CAAC,EAAE,0BAA0B,CAAC;IACjD;;;OAGG;IACH,wBAAwB,CAAC,EAAE;QACzB,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QACrB,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAChB,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QACnB,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;KACzB,CAAC;CACH;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,qBAAa,cAAc;IACzB;;;;;;;OAOG;WACU,QAAQ,CACnB,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAClB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAChB,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,EAC7B,OAAO,GAAE,eAAoB,GAC5B,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC;CAwYpB;AAoCD;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,eAAe,GAC1B,UAAU,MAAM,EAChB,YAAY,MAAM,EAClB,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,EAChC,gBAAgB,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,EAC3B,cAAc,MAAM,EACpB,YAAY,gBAAgB,EAC5B,sBAAqB,mBAA4B;yBAQ1B,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,aAAa,EAAE;CAiB1F,CAAC;AAEF,eAAO,MAAM,eAAe,GAC1B,UAAU,MAAM,EAChB,YAAY,MAAM,EAClB,UAAU,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,EAChC,gBAAgB,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,EAC3B,cAAc,MAAM,EACpB,YAAY,gBAAgB,EAC5B,sBAAqB,mBAA4B;yBAK1B,MAAM,cAAc,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,aAAa,EAAE;CAoBhG,CAAC;AAEF,YAAY,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC"}

package/dist/lib/protocols/index.js

@@ -236,11 +236,14 @@ class ProtocolClient {
               );
             }
             const argsWithVersion = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);
-            const pushNotificationConfig = (() => {
+            const generatedPushNotificationConfig = (() => {
               if (!webhookUrl) return void 0;
               if (webhookSecret) {
                 return {
                   url: webhookUrl,
+                  ...transportActivityContext?.operationId && {
+                    operation_id: transportActivityContext.operationId
+                  },
                   ...webhookToken && { token: webhookToken },
                   authentication: {
                     schemes: ["HMAC-SHA256"],
@@ -254,9 +257,14 @@ class ProtocolClient {
               }
               return {
                 url: webhookUrl,
+                ...transportActivityContext?.operationId && {
+                  operation_id: transportActivityContext.operationId
+                },
                 ...webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }
               };
             })();
+            const explicitNativePushNotificationConfig = transport?.legacyCompat?.enabled === false && argsWithVersion.push_notification_config !== null && typeof argsWithVersion.push_notification_config === "object" && !Array.isArray(argsWithVersion.push_notification_config) ? argsWithVersion.push_notification_config : void 0;
+            const pushNotificationConfig = generatedPushNotificationConfig ?? explicitNativePushNotificationConfig;
             if (agent.protocol === "mcp") {
               const argsWithWebhook = pushNotificationConfig ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig } : argsWithVersion;
               if (agent.oauth_tokens && !agent.oauth_client_credentials) {
@@ -361,11 +369,12 @@ class ProtocolClient {
                 throw err;
               }
             } else if (agent.protocol === "a2a") {
+              const a2aParameters = transport?.legacyCompat?.enabled === false && pushNotificationConfig ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig } : argsWithVersion;
               try {
                 return await (0, import_a2a3.callA2ATool)(
                   agent.agent_uri,
                   toolName,
-                  argsWithVersion,
+                  a2aParameters,
                   authToken,
                   debugLogs,
                   pushNotificationConfig,
@@ -375,7 +384,8 @@ class ProtocolClient {
                   signal,
                   transport?.requestTimeoutMs,
                   transport?.trustedFetchFn,
-                  transport?.allowPrivateIp
+                  transport?.allowPrivateIp,
+                  transport?.legacyCompat
                 );
               } catch (err) {
                 if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && (0, import_errors.is401Error)(err)) {
@@ -393,7 +403,7 @@ class ProtocolClient {
                     return await (0, import_a2a3.callA2ATool)(
                       agent.agent_uri,
                       toolName,
-                      argsWithVersion,
+                      a2aParameters,
                       retryAuthToken,
                       debugLogs,
                       pushNotificationConfig,
@@ -403,7 +413,8 @@ class ProtocolClient {
                       signal,
                       transport?.requestTimeoutMs,
                       transport?.trustedFetchFn,
-                      transport?.allowPrivateIp
+                      transport?.allowPrivateIp,
+                      transport?.legacyCompat
                     );
                   } catch (retryErr) {
                     await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(
@@ -484,7 +495,8 @@ const createA2AClient = (agentUrl, authToken, headers, serverVersion, adcpVersio
         void 0,
         transport?.requestTimeoutMs,
         transport?.trustedFetchFn,
-        transport?.allowPrivateIp
+        transport?.allowPrivateIp,
+        transport?.legacyCompat
       )
     )
   };

package/dist/lib/protocols/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/protocols/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// Unified Protocol Interface for AdCP\nexport {\n  callMCPTool,\n  callMCPToolWithOAuth,\n  connectMCP,\n  closeMCPConnections,\n  closeOAuthConnections,\n  UnauthorizedError,\n} from './mcp';\n\nimport { closeMCPConnections } from './mcp';\nimport { closeCurrentMCPConnectionScope, withMCPConnectionScope } from './mcp-scope';\nimport { closeA2AConnections } from './a2a';\n\n/**\n * Close protocol connections for the given protocol.\n * MCP closes persistent HTTP transports; A2A clears the agent-card client cache.\n */\nexport async function closeConnections(protocol: 'mcp' | 'a2a' = 'mcp'): Promise<void> {\n  if (protocol === 'mcp') {\n    await closeMCPConnections();\n  } else {\n    closeA2AConnections();\n  }\n}\n\n/** Close only the current runner's MCP scope; fall back to legacy global cleanup. */\nexport async function closeScopedConnections(protocol: 'mcp' | 'a2a' = 'mcp'): Promise<void> {\n  if (protocol === 'mcp') {\n    if (!(await closeCurrentMCPConnectionScope())) await closeMCPConnections();\n  } else {\n    closeA2AConnections();\n  }\n}\n\nexport { withMCPConnectionScope };\nexport type { MCPCallOptions, MCPConnectionResult } from './mcp';\nexport { callA2ATool } from './a2a';\nexport { DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS } from './abort';\nexport {\n  callMCPToolWithTasks,\n  getMCPTaskStatus,\n  getMCPTaskResult,\n  listMCPTasks,\n  cancelMCPTask,\n  mapMCPTaskStatus,\n  serverSupportsTasks,\n} from './mcp-tasks';\n\nimport { callMCPToolWithTasks, callMCPToolWithClient } from './mcp-tasks';\nimport { callMCPToolWithOAuth } from './mcp';\nimport { callA2ATool } from './a2a';\nimport type { AgentConfig, DebugLogEntry } from '../types';\nimport type { PushNotificationConfig } from '../types/tools.generated';\nimport { getAuthToken } from '../auth';\nimport {\n  discoverAuthorizationRequirements,\n  NeedsAuthorizationError,\n  getAgentStorage,\n  ensureClientCredentialsTokens,\n} from '../auth/oauth';\nimport { getNonInteractiveOAuthProvider } from '../auth/oauth/provider-cache';\nimport { is401Error } from '../errors';\nimport { isLikelyPrivateUrl } from '../net';\nimport { validateAgentUrl } from '../validation';\nimport { withSpan } from '../observability/tracing';\nimport { ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION, ADCP_VERSION, parseAdcpMajorVersion } from '../version';\nimport { ConfigurationError } from '../errors';\nimport { resolveBundleKey, toReleasePrecisionWire, validateAdcpVersionWire } from '../validation/schema-loader';\nimport { buildAgentSigningContext, CAPABILITY_OP, ensureCapabilityLoaded } from '../signing/client';\nimport { withResponseSizeLimit } from './responseSizeLimit';\nimport {\n  withTransportDiagnostics,\n  type TransportActivityHandler as TransportActivityHandlerFn,\n} from './transportDiagnostics';\n\nexport {\n  sanitizeTransportHeaders,\n  sanitizeTransportUrl,\n  withTransportDiagnostics,\n  wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics,\n} from './transportDiagnostics';\nexport type { TransportActivity, TransportActivityContext, TransportActivityHandler } from './transportDiagnostics';\n\nexport type VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto' | 'none' | 'major-only';\n\n/**\n * Derive the wire-level `adcp_major_version` integer from a caller-supplied\n * pin. Returns the SDK default when no pin is provided; throws on a pin\n * that doesn't parse so misuse surfaces at the factory boundary instead\n * of silently emitting the SDK's major.\n *\n * Throws `ConfigurationError` (not a plain `Error`) so a typo'd pin\n * surfaces with the same error class as the construction-time gate in\n * `resolveAdcpVersion` — one shape for all pin-misuse paths.\n */\nfunction resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion: string | undefined): number {\n  if (adcpVersion === undefined) return ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION;\n  const parsed = parseAdcpMajorVersion(adcpVersion);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(parsed)) {\n    throw new ConfigurationError(\n      `adcpVersion ${JSON.stringify(adcpVersion)} is not a valid AdCP version. ` +\n        `Expected a semver string (e.g. '3.0.1', '3.1.0-beta.1') or a legacy alias (e.g. 'v3').`,\n      'adcpVersion'\n    );\n  }\n  return parsed;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when the AdCP release that `bundleKey` identifies declares the\n * top-level `adcp_version` envelope field. The field landed in AdCP 3.1 per\n * spec PR `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493` — 3.0 (any patch / prerelease) does\n * not carry it; 3.1+ does. Used to gate dual-emit on the wire so a 3.0-pinned\n * client doesn't emit a field its target schema doesn't define.\n */\nexport function bundleSupportsAdcpVersionField(bundleKey: string): boolean {\n  const major = parseAdcpMajorVersion(bundleKey);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(major)) return false;\n  if (major < 3) return false;\n  if (major > 3) return true;\n  // Major 3 — only 3.1+ has the field. Bundle key shape is normalized by\n  // `resolveBundleKey`: `'3.0'` / `'3.1'` for stable; `'3.0.0-beta.1'` /\n  // `'3.1.0-beta.1'` for prereleases. Match the minor.\n  const minorMatch = bundleKey.match(/^\\d+\\.(\\d+)/);\n  if (!minorMatch) return false;\n  return parseInt(minorMatch[1]!, 10) >= 1;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the wire-level version envelope to merge into outgoing request args.\n *\n * Per AdCP 3.1 (spec PR `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`), 3.1+ requests carry\n * BOTH the integer `adcp_major_version` (deprecated through 3.x, removed in\n * 4.0) AND the release-precision string `adcp_version`. 3.0 schemas don't\n * define the string field, so a 3.0-pinned client emits the integer only —\n * matches the 3.0 spec exactly.\n *\n * Wire string is release-precision (MAJOR.MINOR with optional prerelease tag),\n * per `core/version-envelope.json`'s pattern `^\\d+\\.\\d+(-[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)?$`.\n * Full-semver bundle keys (`'3.1.0-beta.1'`) are collapsed via\n * `toReleasePrecisionWire` to `'3.1-beta.1'` before emit — meta-field shapes\n * are explicitly NOT valid wire values per the envelope schema's own\n * normalization rule.\n *\n * Returns `{}` for v2 callers (predates the major-version field entirely).\n */\nfunction buildVersionEnvelope(\n  adcpVersion: string | undefined,\n  serverVersion: 'v2' | 'v3' | undefined\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  if (serverVersion === 'v2') return {};\n  const wireMajor = resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion);\n  const bundleKey = resolveBundleKey(adcpVersion ?? ADCP_VERSION);\n  if (!bundleSupportsAdcpVersionField(bundleKey)) {\n    return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor };\n  }\n  const wireValue = toReleasePrecisionWire(bundleKey);\n  // Defensive postcondition — should never throw in well-formed code, but\n  // if a future refactor breaks the normalization the error message tells\n  // the developer to call `toReleasePrecisionWire` instead of silently\n  // emitting a non-spec wire string.\n  validateAdcpVersionWire(wireValue);\n  return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor, adcp_version: wireValue };\n}\n\nlet hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret = false;\n\n/**\n * Warn once when an async webhook registration is suppressed for a v2 seller.\n *\n * v2.5's `push-notification-config.json` requires `authentication`, and unlike\n * 3.x it has no RFC 9421 selector semantics — so omitting the block produces a\n * schema-invalid request rather than choosing a signing mode. Without a\n * configured secret there is no honest value to send, and the previous\n * behaviour (a hardcoded placeholder credential) told the seller the channel\n * was authenticated by a constant published in this package.\n */\nfunction warnV2PushNotificationNeedsSecret(): void {\n  if (hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret) return;\n  hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret = true;\n  console.warn(\n    '[adcp] Suppressing push_notification_config for a v2 seller: AdCP 2.5 requires an ' +\n      '`authentication` block and no `webhookSecret` is configured. Set `webhookSecret` to register ' +\n      'async task-status webhooks with this agent, or move the agent to an AdCP 3.x pin, where the ' +\n      'RFC 9421 webhook profile needs no shared secret.'\n  );\n}\n\nfunction buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(\n  mode: VersionEnvelopeMode,\n  adcpVersion: string | undefined,\n  serverVersion: 'v2' | 'v3' | undefined\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  if (mode === 'none' || serverVersion === 'v2') return {};\n  if (mode === 'major-only') return { adcp_major_version: resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion) };\n  return buildVersionEnvelope(adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n}\n\n/**\n * Merge the wire-level version envelope into a caller-supplied args object.\n * Caller args win: an explicit `adcp_major_version` / `adcp_version` in\n * `args` (e.g. a conformance harness probing `VERSION_UNSUPPORTED`) passes\n * through unchanged. The envelope only fills fields the caller didn't set.\n *\n * Single chokepoint for all four wire-injection sites so a future refactor\n * can't silently flip the spread order on one branch and leave the others\n * intact. Stale dual-field drift is caught at the server boundary by\n * `createAdcpServer`'s field-disagreement check (spec PR\n * `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function applyVersionEnvelope(\n  args: Record<string, unknown>,\n  envelope: Record<string, unknown>\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return { ...envelope, ...args };\n}\n\n/**\n * Transport-level safeguards applied to a call.\n *\n * Wired into the SDK's internal fetch chain via AsyncLocalStorage, so the\n * cap takes effect even when the underlying transport's connection cache\n * reuses a fetch that was created on an earlier call with different limits.\n */\nexport interface TransportOptions {\n  /**\n   * Maximum response body size (in octets) the SDK will read before aborting\n   * with `ResponseTooLargeError`. When unset, the SDK does not impose a cap —\n   * matches the underlying MCP / A2A transport defaults.\n   *\n   * Set this when crawling **untrusted** agents (registries, federated\n   * discovery layers, monitoring tools) to prevent a hostile vendor from\n   * buffering a large reply before any application-layer schema validation\n   * runs. Counted across response chunks; pre-cancels when `Content-Length`\n   * exceeds the cap. Applies to A2A agent-card discovery\n   * (`/.well-known/agent.json`) on the same call as well.\n   *\n   * Per-call override (`TaskOptions.transport.maxResponseBytes`) beats the\n   * value set on the client constructor (`SingleAgentClientConfig.transport`).\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Safe to set on all calls.** SSE responses (`text/event-stream`) are\n   * passed through unchanged — a single tool call legitimately emits N status\n   * frames + a final result, bounded by protocol-level framing rather than\n   * cumulative byte counts. The cap applies to one-shot JSON responses\n   * (`get_adcp_capabilities`, agent-card lookup, tool result payloads on\n   * non-streaming transports) where the body is bounded by definition.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Hostile-peer note:** A peer can opt itself out of this cap by responding\n   * with `Content-Type: text/event-stream`. SSE is bypassed because cumulative\n   * event-frame bytes are unbounded by spec — MCP and A2A both stream tool\n   * responses this way. The MCP/A2A SDKs consume SSE incrementally and frame\n   * termination bounds memory in practice, so this is not a memory-bomb risk\n   * for well-formed transports. Adopters relying on `maxResponseBytes` as a\n   * hostile-server defense should treat it as best-effort for non-SSE\n   * responses only.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * Future hardening knobs (DNS-rebind defense, scheme allow-list, request\n   * timeout overrides) will land here as additional fields. When `trustedFetchFn`\n   * is supplied, the SDK composes it inside its signing, capture, size-limit,\n   * timeout, and diagnostics wrappers so callers do not have to reproduce\n   * that non-obvious ordering themselves.\n   */\n  maxResponseBytes?: number;\n  /**\n   * Scoped fetch implementation for all outbound HTTP performed on behalf of\n   * this client or call, including endpoint/card discovery, tool listing,\n   * OAuth discovery and token refresh, and MCP/A2A tool requests.\n   *\n   * The function is runtime-only configuration and is never serialized into\n   * agent records, storyboard artifacts, or compliance output. When unset,\n   * the SDK uses the global `fetch` implementation.\n   *\n   * Supplying this function makes it the trusted network boundary: the SDK\n   * still validates URL schemes, redirect behavior, timeouts, and body limits,\n   * but delegates DNS resolution and address policy to the implementation.\n   * It must prevent DNS rebinding and unsafe private-address access itself (for\n   * example with an egress proxy or its own DNS pinning).\n   */\n  trustedFetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * @deprecated Rename to `trustedFetchFn`. Supplying this legacy alias is\n   * treated as an explicit assertion that the implementation pins DNS.\n   */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * Permit this client to connect to private DNS answers. Localhost and an\n   * initial private IP literal are allowed automatically only on their exact\n   * origin; use this for private-DNS enterprise agents.\n   */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Timeout in milliseconds for bounded one-shot transport requests such as\n   * A2A agent-card discovery and MCP read-path probes. Defaults to 60 seconds\n   * for A2A discovery so an unresponsive card endpoint cannot hang forever.\n   * Set to `0` to disable the SDK-imposed discovery timeout.\n   */\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\nlet warnedLegacyTransportFetch = false;\n\n/** @internal Normalize the pre-GA fetch hook rename without silently dropping JS callers. */\nexport function normalizeTransportOptions(transport?: TransportOptions): TransportOptions | undefined {\n  if (!transport?.fetchFn) return transport;\n  if (transport.trustedFetchFn && transport.trustedFetchFn !== transport.fetchFn) {\n    throw new TypeError('TransportOptions cannot set different fetchFn and trustedFetchFn implementations');\n  }\n  if (!warnedLegacyTransportFetch) {\n    warnedLegacyTransportFetch = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[adcp] TransportOptions.fetchFn is deprecated; rename it to trustedFetchFn. ' +\n        'Custom fetch implementations must provide connect-time DNS pinning.'\n    );\n  }\n  return { ...transport, trustedFetchFn: transport.trustedFetchFn ?? transport.fetchFn };\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link ProtocolClient.callTool}. All fields are optional.\n *\n * `webhookUrl` / `webhookSecret` / `webhookToken` are for ASYNC TASK STATUS\n * notifications (push_notification_config). For reporting webhooks\n * (reporting_webhook), include them directly in `args` — they stay in skill\n * parameters and are sent verbatim to the agent.\n */\nexport interface CallToolOptions {\n  /** Debug log array. Mutated in place by the protocol layer. */\n  debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[];\n  /** URL for async task status notifications. */\n  webhookUrl?: string;\n  /** HMAC-SHA256 secret for push_notification_config authentication. */\n  webhookSecret?: string;\n  /** Bearer token for push_notification_config validation. */\n  webhookToken?: string;\n  /** Pinned protocol generation when the agent advertises both v2 and v3. */\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3';\n  /** A2A session continuity (contextId carries conversation, taskId resumes a task). */\n  session?: { contextId?: string; taskId?: string };\n  /**\n   * AdCP version pin from the calling client/server instance. Sets the\n   * wire-level `adcp_major_version` field per-call instead of from the\n   * SDK-pinned `ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION` constant. Default falls back to the\n   * constant so call sites that don't plumb a per-instance version keep\n   * their existing behavior. An explicit `adcp_major_version` /\n   * `adcp_version` in `args` overrides this — conformance harnesses use\n   * that path to probe seller version negotiation.\n   */\n  adcpVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional wire-only version override. Schema selection and client\n   * construction can remain pinned to `adcpVersion`; the request envelope is\n   * emitted for this release-precision line.\n   */\n  wireAdcpVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Controls whether the SDK injects AdCP version envelope fields into the\n   * outgoing request. Defaults to `auto`. 3.0 pins emit only the legacy\n   * `adcp_major_version`; 3.1+ pins emit both the legacy major and exact\n   * `adcp_version` marker. `major-only` forces the legacy integer marker\n   * without the 3.1 string marker for strict pre-3.1 peers discovered at\n   * runtime.\n   */\n  versionEnvelope?: VersionEnvelopeMode;\n  /**\n   * Transport-level safeguards (size caps, etc.). Per-call override of any\n   * matching field on the client constructor's `transport` option.\n   */\n  transport?: TransportOptions;\n  /** Caller-owned cancellation signal for the in-flight protocol call. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  /** Transport-level diagnostics callback for outbound HTTP requests. */\n  onTransportActivity?: TransportActivityHandlerFn;\n  /**\n   * Correlation metadata attached to transport diagnostics events emitted\n   * while this protocol call is active.\n   */\n  transportActivityContext?: {\n    operationId?: string;\n    taskId?: string;\n    contextId?: string;\n    idempotencyKey?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Universal protocol client - automatically routes to the correct protocol implementation\n */\nexport class ProtocolClient {\n  /**\n   * Call a tool on an agent using the appropriate protocol.\n   *\n   * @param agent - Agent configuration\n   * @param toolName - Name of the tool/skill to call\n   * @param args - Tool arguments (includes reporting_webhook if needed - NOT removed)\n   * @param options - Optional call-level configuration. See {@link CallToolOptions}.\n   */\n  static async callTool(\n    agent: AgentConfig,\n    toolName: string,\n    args: Record<string, unknown>,\n    options: CallToolOptions = {}\n  ): Promise<unknown> {\n    const {\n      debugLogs = [],\n      webhookUrl,\n      webhookSecret,\n      webhookToken,\n      serverVersion,\n      session,\n      adcpVersion,\n      wireAdcpVersion,\n      versionEnvelope: versionEnvelopeMode = 'auto',\n      transport: requestedTransport,\n      signal,\n      onTransportActivity,\n      transportActivityContext,\n    } = options;\n    const transport = normalizeTransportOptions(requestedTransport);\n    // Per-instance version envelope. Throws on unparseable pins via\n    // `resolveWireMajor`; construction-time `resolveAdcpVersion` is the\n    // primary gate but this is the failsafe for callers reaching\n    // `ProtocolClient.callTool` directly (test harnesses, the in-process\n    // MCP path). Returns `{ adcp_major_version }` for 3.0 pins and\n    // `{ adcp_major_version, adcp_version }` for 3.1+ pins.\n    const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(\n      versionEnvelopeMode,\n      wireAdcpVersion ?? adcpVersion,\n      serverVersion\n    );\n    // Enter the response-size-limit ALS slot once for this call. The slot is\n    // read by `wrapFetchWithSizeLimit` in both protocol transports, so the\n    // cap applies regardless of which path (MCP / A2A / OAuth refresh) the\n    // call ends up taking. No-op when the cap is unset or non-positive.\n    return withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n      withTransportDiagnostics(\n        {\n          agentId: agent.id,\n          protocol: agent.protocol,\n          tool: toolName,\n          taskType: toolName,\n          ...transportActivityContext,\n          onTransportActivity,\n        },\n        () =>\n          withSpan(\n            `adcp.${agent.protocol}.call_tool`,\n            {\n              'adcp.agent_id': agent.id,\n              'adcp.protocol': agent.protocol,\n              'adcp.tool': toolName,\n              'http.url': agent.agent_uri,\n            },\n            async () => {\n              // In-process MCP path: pre-connected client, no HTTP transport.\n              // Idempotency injection, schema validation, and governance middleware all\n              // still apply (they run in SingleAgentClient above this call). We skip\n              // URL validation, OAuth refresh, and signing — none apply in-process.\n              if (agent.protocol === 'mcp' && agent._inProcessMcpClient) {\n                const inProcArgs = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);\n                return callMCPToolWithClient(agent._inProcessMcpClient, toolName, inProcArgs, debugLogs, {\n                  ...(signal && { signal }),\n                  ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n                });\n              }\n\n              validateAgentUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n\n              // OAuth 2.0 client credentials (RFC 6749 §4.4): re-exchange the\n              // secret for a fresh access token whenever the cached one is within\n              // its expiration skew. Runs before every call so mid-session expiry\n              // can't leave the caller with a stale bearer. No-op if the agent\n              // doesn't declare client credentials. Cheap on warm cache (single\n              // `Date.now()` compare); a single POST to the token endpoint on miss.\n              //\n              // `allowPrivateIp` inherits the trust the caller already placed in\n              // `agent.agent_uri` — if they're making a call to a private-IP agent,\n              // they've authorized this process to talk to private-IP hosts, so\n              // the token endpoint on the same network is reachable too. Public\n              // agent URLs with private-IP token endpoints still require an\n              // explicit opt-in via the library API.\n              if (agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n                const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                const allowPrivateIp = transport?.allowPrivateIp ?? isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                  storage: ccStorage,\n                  allowPrivateIp,\n                  fetch: transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                  signal,\n                });\n              }\n\n              const authToken = getAuthToken(agent);\n\n              // RFC 9421 signing context. Built once per call and passed through\n              // to each protocol-layer entry (`callMCPToolWithTasks`, `callA2ATool`,\n              // `callMCPToolWithOAuth`) — those entries seed `signingContextStorage`\n              // (AsyncLocalStorage) so the internal transport helpers read it\n              // without an explicit parameter. Keep the explicit arg here: it's the\n              // ALS seed, not incidental plumbing. `get_adcp_capabilities` is\n              // exempt from signing (it's the discovery call itself) and also\n              // triggers cache priming for any other op on agents with\n              // `request_signing` configured.\n              const signingContext = buildAgentSigningContext(agent);\n              if (signingContext && toolName !== CAPABILITY_OP) {\n                await ensureCapabilityLoaded(agent, signingContext, primeArgs =>\n                  ProtocolClient.callTool(agent, CAPABILITY_OP, primeArgs, {\n                    debugLogs,\n                    serverVersion,\n                    adcpVersion,\n                    ...(versionEnvelopeMode !== 'auto' && { versionEnvelope: versionEnvelopeMode }),\n                    transport,\n                    signal,\n                    ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n                    onTransportActivity,\n                    transportActivityContext,\n                  })\n                );\n              }\n\n              // Inject the version envelope on every request so sellers can validate\n              // compatibility. Skip for v2 servers — they don't recognise the\n              // version fields and strict-schema agents reject them. The envelope\n              // shape is per-pin: 3.0 pins get the integer `adcp_major_version`\n              // alone; 3.1+ pins get both that and the release-precision string\n              // `adcp_version` (`'3.1'` / `'3.1.0-beta.1'`) per spec PR\n              // `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`.\n              const argsWithVersion = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);\n\n              // Build push_notification_config for ASYNC TASK STATUS notifications\n              // (NOT for reporting_webhook - that stays in args)\n              // Schema: https://adcontextprotocol.org/schemas/v1/core/push-notification-config.json\n              // `authentication` is a scheme SELECTOR, not a fallback: from AdCP\n              // 3.0 on, push-notification-config.json makes its presence opt the\n              // seller into legacy HMAC-SHA256 and its absence select the RFC\n              // 9421 webhook profile, with `required: [\"url\"]` only. Emitting it\n              // with a placeholder credential would therefore downgrade every\n              // webhook to legacy HMAC keyed by a constant that ships in this\n              // file, so the block is omitted unless a real secret backs it.\n              //\n              // v2.5 predates the selector: there `required` is\n              // `[\"url\", \"authentication\"]` and there is no 9421 path, so an\n              // omitted block is schema-invalid rather than a mode selection.\n              // With no secret there is nothing honest to send a v2 seller, so\n              // suppress the registration instead of fabricating a credential.\n              const pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig | undefined = (():\n                | PushNotificationConfig\n                | undefined => {\n                if (!webhookUrl) return undefined;\n                if (webhookSecret) {\n                  return {\n                    url: webhookUrl,\n                    ...(webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }),\n                    authentication: {\n                      schemes: ['HMAC-SHA256' as const],\n                      credentials: webhookSecret,\n                    },\n                  };\n                }\n                if (serverVersion === 'v2') {\n                  warnV2PushNotificationNeedsSecret();\n                  return undefined;\n                }\n                return {\n                  url: webhookUrl,\n                  ...(webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }),\n                };\n              })();\n\n              if (agent.protocol === 'mcp') {\n                // For MCP, include push_notification_config in tool arguments (MCP spec)\n                const argsWithWebhook = pushNotificationConfig\n                  ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig }\n                  : argsWithVersion;\n\n                // If the agent config carries authorization-code OAuth tokens,\n                // route through the OAuth provider path so the MCP SDK can refresh\n                // on 401 instead of hard-failing. Excludes client-credentials\n                // agents: they have a cached access token but no refresh_token,\n                // and their refresh path is a secret re-exchange (handled above),\n                // not the SDK's refresh_token grant.\n                if (agent.oauth_tokens && !agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n                  const authProvider = getNonInteractiveOAuthProvider(agent, {\n                    agentHint: agent.id,\n                    storage: getAgentStorage(agent),\n                    allowHttp: isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri),\n                  });\n                  try {\n                    return await callMCPToolWithOAuth({\n                      agentUrl: agent.agent_uri,\n                      toolName,\n                      args: argsWithWebhook,\n                      authProvider,\n                      debugLogs,\n                      customHeaders: agent.headers,\n                      signingContext,\n                      signal,\n                      requestTimeoutMs: transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                      fetchFn: transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                      allowPrivateIp: transport?.allowPrivateIp,\n                    });\n                  } catch (err) {\n                    // Refresh failed or server rejected the refreshed token — walk the\n                    // discovery chain so the caller can distinguish \"re-auth needed\"\n                    // from other failure modes.\n                    await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(\n                      err,\n                      agent.agent_uri,\n                      transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                      signal,\n                      transport?.allowPrivateIp\n                    );\n                    throw err;\n                  }\n                }\n\n                // Use callMCPToolWithTasks which auto-detects server tasks capability\n                // and falls back to standard callTool when tasks are not supported\n                try {\n                  return await callMCPToolWithTasks(\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    toolName,\n                    argsWithWebhook,\n                    authToken,\n                    debugLogs,\n                    agent.headers,\n                    {\n                      ...(signingContext && { signingContext }),\n                      ...(signal && { signal }),\n                      ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && {\n                        requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs,\n                      }),\n                      ...(transport?.trustedFetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.trustedFetchFn }),\n                      ...(transport?.allowPrivateIp !== undefined && { allowPrivateIp: transport.allowPrivateIp }),\n                    }\n                  );\n                } catch (err) {\n                  // Client-credentials agents: on 401, the AS may have rotated\n                  // something out-of-band. Force a fresh exchange and retry once\n                  // before surfacing the error. Bounded (single retry) so we don't\n                  // loop if the credentials are genuinely wrong.\n                  if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {\n                    const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                    const allowPrivateIp = transport?.allowPrivateIp ?? isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                    await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                      storage: ccStorage,\n                      force: true,\n                      allowPrivateIp,\n                      fetch: transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                      signal,\n                    });\n                    const retryAuthToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token ?? authToken;\n                    try {\n                      return await callMCPToolWithTasks(\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        toolName,\n                        argsWithWebhook,\n                        retryAuthToken,\n                        debugLogs,\n                        agent.headers,\n                        {\n                          ...(signingContext && { signingContext }),\n                          ...(signal && { signal }),\n                          ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && {\n                            requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs,\n                          }),\n                          ...(transport?.trustedFetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.trustedFetchFn }),\n                          ...(transport?.allowPrivateIp !== undefined && {\n                            allowPrivateIp: transport.allowPrivateIp,\n                          }),\n                        }\n                      );\n                    } catch (retryErr) {\n                      await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(\n                        retryErr,\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                        signal,\n                        transport?.allowPrivateIp\n                      );\n                      throw retryErr;\n                    }\n                  }\n                  await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(\n                    err,\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                    signal,\n                    transport?.allowPrivateIp\n                  );\n                  throw err;\n                }\n              } else if (agent.protocol === 'a2a') {\n                // For A2A, pass pushNotificationConfig separately (not in skill parameters)\n                try {\n                  return await callA2ATool(\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    toolName,\n                    argsWithVersion,\n                    authToken,\n                    debugLogs,\n                    pushNotificationConfig,\n                    agent.headers,\n                    signingContext,\n                    session,\n                    signal,\n                    transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                    transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                    transport?.allowPrivateIp\n                  );\n                } catch (err) {\n                  // Same single-retry-on-401 for client-credentials agents as the\n                  // MCP path above. Kept symmetric so A2A CC agents aren't a\n                  // second-class experience — including the NeedsAuthorizationError\n                  // rewrap on a retry that still 401s.\n                  if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {\n                    const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                    const allowPrivateIp = transport?.allowPrivateIp ?? isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                    await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                      storage: ccStorage,\n                      force: true,\n                      allowPrivateIp,\n                      fetch: transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                      signal,\n                    });\n                    const retryAuthToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token ?? authToken;\n                    try {\n                      return await callA2ATool(\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        toolName,\n                        argsWithVersion,\n                        retryAuthToken,\n                        debugLogs,\n                        pushNotificationConfig,\n                        agent.headers,\n                        signingContext,\n                        session,\n                        signal,\n                        transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                        transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                        transport?.allowPrivateIp\n                      );\n                    } catch (retryErr) {\n                      await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(\n                        retryErr,\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                        signal,\n                        transport?.allowPrivateIp\n                      );\n                      throw retryErr;\n                    }\n                  }\n                  await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(\n                    err,\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                    signal,\n                    transport?.allowPrivateIp\n                  );\n                  throw err;\n                }\n              } else {\n                throw new Error(`Unsupported protocol: ${agent.protocol}`);\n              }\n            }\n          )\n      )\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * If `err` looks like a 401 from the MCP transport, probe the agent for a\n * Bearer challenge and throw a {@link NeedsAuthorizationError} carrying\n * walked discovery metadata. If the error isn't a 401 or we can't build a\n * requirements record, return silently so the caller re-throws the original.\n *\n * Keeping this off the hot path: we only probe on error, and the probe is\n * a single unauthenticated `tools/list` POST — no retries, no DNS rebind.\n */\nasync function rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(\n  err: unknown,\n  agentUrl: string,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch,\n  signal?: AbortSignal,\n  configuredAllowPrivateIp?: boolean\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (err instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError) throw err;\n  if (!is401Error(err)) return;\n\n  // If the caller has already connected to the agent URL, they've implicitly\n  // trusted it — inherit that trust for the discovery probe so loopback /\n  // private-IP development agents work the same way as public ones.\n  const allowPrivateIp = configuredAllowPrivateIp ?? isLikelyPrivateUrl(agentUrl);\n\n  // discoverAuthorizationRequirements internally catches network failures and\n  // returns null rather than throwing — anything that escapes is a genuine\n  // bug we want to surface rather than mask the 401 with.\n  const requirements = await discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, { allowPrivateIp, fetchFn, signal });\n  if (requirements) {\n    throw new NeedsAuthorizationError(requirements);\n  }\n  // No requirements walked; let the caller re-throw the original error.\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple factory functions for protocol-specific clients.\n *\n * Both factories accept a `transport` argument that flows through to the\n * size-cap surface so callers reaching the factory exports honor the same\n * `maxResponseBytes` contract as `ProtocolClient.callTool`. Without it,\n * the factories would silently bypass the cap, which the public API\n * (`TransportOptions`) implies they honor.\n */\nexport const createMCPClient = (\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3',\n  adcpVersion?: string,\n  transport?: TransportOptions,\n  versionEnvelopeMode: VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto'\n) => {\n  transport = normalizeTransportOptions(transport);\n  // Validate the pin at factory time so a typo surfaces here rather than at\n  // first call. `buildVersionEnvelope` throws via `resolveWireMajor` on bad\n  // input — call it once to surface, then close over the envelope.\n  const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(versionEnvelopeMode, adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n  return {\n    callTool: (toolName: string, args: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) =>\n      withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n        callMCPToolWithTasks(\n          agentUrl,\n          toolName,\n          applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope),\n          authToken,\n          debugLogs,\n          headers,\n          {\n            ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n            ...(transport?.trustedFetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.trustedFetchFn }),\n            ...(transport?.allowPrivateIp !== undefined && { allowPrivateIp: transport.allowPrivateIp }),\n          }\n        )\n      ),\n  };\n};\n\nexport const createA2AClient = (\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3',\n  adcpVersion?: string,\n  transport?: TransportOptions,\n  versionEnvelopeMode: VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto'\n) => {\n  transport = normalizeTransportOptions(transport);\n  const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(versionEnvelopeMode, adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n  return {\n    callTool: (toolName: string, parameters: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) =>\n      withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n        callA2ATool(\n          agentUrl,\n          toolName,\n          applyVersionEnvelope(parameters, versionEnvelope),\n          authToken,\n          debugLogs,\n          undefined,\n          headers,\n          undefined,\n          undefined,\n          undefined,\n          transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n          transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n          transport?.allowPrivateIp\n        )\n      ),\n  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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/protocols/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// Unified Protocol Interface for AdCP\nexport {\n  callMCPTool,\n  callMCPToolWithOAuth,\n  connectMCP,\n  closeMCPConnections,\n  closeOAuthConnections,\n  UnauthorizedError,\n} from './mcp';\n\nimport { closeMCPConnections } from './mcp';\nimport { closeCurrentMCPConnectionScope, withMCPConnectionScope } from './mcp-scope';\nimport { closeA2AConnections } from './a2a';\n\n/**\n * Close protocol connections for the given protocol.\n * MCP closes persistent HTTP transports; A2A clears the agent-card client cache.\n */\nexport async function closeConnections(protocol: 'mcp' | 'a2a' = 'mcp'): Promise<void> {\n  if (protocol === 'mcp') {\n    await closeMCPConnections();\n  } else {\n    closeA2AConnections();\n  }\n}\n\n/** Close only the current runner's MCP scope; fall back to legacy global cleanup. */\nexport async function closeScopedConnections(protocol: 'mcp' | 'a2a' = 'mcp'): Promise<void> {\n  if (protocol === 'mcp') {\n    if (!(await closeCurrentMCPConnectionScope())) await closeMCPConnections();\n  } else {\n    closeA2AConnections();\n  }\n}\n\nexport { withMCPConnectionScope };\nexport type { MCPCallOptions, MCPConnectionResult } from './mcp';\nexport { callA2ATool } from './a2a';\nexport { DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS } from './abort';\nexport {\n  callMCPToolWithTasks,\n  getMCPTaskStatus,\n  getMCPTaskResult,\n  listMCPTasks,\n  cancelMCPTask,\n  mapMCPTaskStatus,\n  serverSupportsTasks,\n} from './mcp-tasks';\n\nimport { callMCPToolWithTasks, callMCPToolWithClient } from './mcp-tasks';\nimport { callMCPToolWithOAuth } from './mcp';\nimport { callA2ATool } from './a2a';\nimport type { AgentConfig, DebugLogEntry } from '../types';\nimport type { PushNotificationConfig } from '../types/tools.generated';\nimport { getAuthToken } from '../auth';\nimport {\n  discoverAuthorizationRequirements,\n  NeedsAuthorizationError,\n  getAgentStorage,\n  ensureClientCredentialsTokens,\n} from '../auth/oauth';\nimport { getNonInteractiveOAuthProvider } from '../auth/oauth/provider-cache';\nimport { is401Error } from '../errors';\nimport { isLikelyPrivateUrl } from '../net';\nimport { validateAgentUrl } from '../validation';\nimport { withSpan } from '../observability/tracing';\nimport { ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION, ADCP_VERSION, parseAdcpMajorVersion } from '../version';\nimport { ConfigurationError } from '../errors';\nimport { resolveBundleKey, toReleasePrecisionWire, validateAdcpVersionWire } from '../validation/schema-loader';\nimport { buildAgentSigningContext, CAPABILITY_OP, ensureCapabilityLoaded } from '../signing/client';\nimport { withResponseSizeLimit } from './responseSizeLimit';\nimport {\n  withTransportDiagnostics,\n  type TransportActivityHandler as TransportActivityHandlerFn,\n} from './transportDiagnostics';\n\nexport {\n  sanitizeTransportHeaders,\n  sanitizeTransportUrl,\n  withTransportDiagnostics,\n  wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics,\n} from './transportDiagnostics';\nexport type { TransportActivity, TransportActivityContext, TransportActivityHandler } from './transportDiagnostics';\n\nexport type VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto' | 'none' | 'major-only';\n\n/**\n * Derive the wire-level `adcp_major_version` integer from a caller-supplied\n * pin. 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The field landed in AdCP 3.1 per\n * spec PR `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493` — 3.0 (any patch / prerelease) does\n * not carry it; 3.1+ does. Used to gate dual-emit on the wire so a 3.0-pinned\n * client doesn't emit a field its target schema doesn't define.\n */\nexport function bundleSupportsAdcpVersionField(bundleKey: string): boolean {\n  const major = parseAdcpMajorVersion(bundleKey);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(major)) return false;\n  if (major < 3) return false;\n  if (major > 3) return true;\n  // Major 3 — only 3.1+ has the field. Bundle key shape is normalized by\n  // `resolveBundleKey`: `'3.0'` / `'3.1'` for stable; `'3.0.0-beta.1'` /\n  // `'3.1.0-beta.1'` for prereleases. Match the minor.\n  const minorMatch = bundleKey.match(/^\\d+\\.(\\d+)/);\n  if (!minorMatch) return false;\n  return parseInt(minorMatch[1]!, 10) >= 1;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the wire-level version envelope to merge into outgoing request args.\n *\n * Per AdCP 3.1 (spec PR `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`), 3.1+ requests carry\n * BOTH the integer `adcp_major_version` (deprecated through 3.x, removed in\n * 4.0) AND the release-precision string `adcp_version`. 3.0 schemas don't\n * define the string field, so a 3.0-pinned client emits the integer only —\n * matches the 3.0 spec exactly.\n *\n * Wire string is release-precision (MAJOR.MINOR with optional prerelease tag),\n * per `core/version-envelope.json`'s pattern `^\\d+\\.\\d+(-[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)?$`.\n * Full-semver bundle keys (`'3.1.0-beta.1'`) are collapsed via\n * `toReleasePrecisionWire` to `'3.1-beta.1'` before emit — meta-field shapes\n * are explicitly NOT valid wire values per the envelope schema's own\n * normalization rule.\n *\n * Returns `{}` for v2 callers (predates the major-version field entirely).\n */\nfunction buildVersionEnvelope(\n  adcpVersion: string | undefined,\n  serverVersion: 'v2' | 'v3' | undefined\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  if (serverVersion === 'v2') return {};\n  const wireMajor = resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion);\n  const bundleKey = resolveBundleKey(adcpVersion ?? ADCP_VERSION);\n  if (!bundleSupportsAdcpVersionField(bundleKey)) {\n    return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor };\n  }\n  const wireValue = toReleasePrecisionWire(bundleKey);\n  // Defensive postcondition — should never throw in well-formed code, but\n  // if a future refactor breaks the normalization the error message tells\n  // the developer to call `toReleasePrecisionWire` instead of silently\n  // emitting a non-spec wire string.\n  validateAdcpVersionWire(wireValue);\n  return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor, adcp_version: wireValue };\n}\n\nlet hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret = false;\n\n/**\n * Warn once when an async webhook registration is suppressed for a v2 seller.\n *\n * v2.5's `push-notification-config.json` requires `authentication`, and unlike\n * 3.x it has no RFC 9421 selector semantics — so omitting the block produces a\n * schema-invalid request rather than choosing a signing mode. Without a\n * configured secret there is no honest value to send, and the previous\n * behaviour (a hardcoded placeholder credential) told the seller the channel\n * was authenticated by a constant published in this package.\n */\nfunction warnV2PushNotificationNeedsSecret(): void {\n  if (hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret) return;\n  hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret = true;\n  console.warn(\n    '[adcp] Suppressing push_notification_config for a v2 seller: AdCP 2.5 requires an ' +\n      '`authentication` block and no `webhookSecret` is configured. Set `webhookSecret` to register ' +\n      'async task-status webhooks with this agent, or move the agent to an AdCP 3.x pin, where the ' +\n      'RFC 9421 webhook profile needs no shared secret.'\n  );\n}\n\nfunction buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(\n  mode: VersionEnvelopeMode,\n  adcpVersion: string | undefined,\n  serverVersion: 'v2' | 'v3' | undefined\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  if (mode === 'none' || serverVersion === 'v2') return {};\n  if (mode === 'major-only') return { adcp_major_version: resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion) };\n  return buildVersionEnvelope(adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n}\n\n/**\n * Merge the wire-level version envelope into a caller-supplied args object.\n * Caller args win: an explicit `adcp_major_version` / `adcp_version` in\n * `args` (e.g. a conformance harness probing `VERSION_UNSUPPORTED`) passes\n * through unchanged. The envelope only fills fields the caller didn't set.\n *\n * Single chokepoint for all four wire-injection sites so a future refactor\n * can't silently flip the spread order on one branch and leave the others\n * intact. Stale dual-field drift is caught at the server boundary by\n * `createAdcpServer`'s field-disagreement check (spec PR\n * `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function applyVersionEnvelope(\n  args: Record<string, unknown>,\n  envelope: Record<string, unknown>\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return { ...envelope, ...args };\n}\n\n/**\n * Transport-level safeguards applied to a call.\n *\n * Wired into the SDK's internal fetch chain via AsyncLocalStorage, so the\n * cap takes effect even when the underlying transport's connection cache\n * reuses a fetch that was created on an earlier call with different limits.\n */\nexport interface TransportOptions {\n  /**\n   * Maximum response body size (in octets) the SDK will read before aborting\n   * with `ResponseTooLargeError`. When unset, the SDK does not impose a cap —\n   * matches the underlying MCP / A2A transport defaults.\n   *\n   * Set this when crawling **untrusted** agents (registries, federated\n   * discovery layers, monitoring tools) to prevent a hostile vendor from\n   * buffering a large reply before any application-layer schema validation\n   * runs. Counted across response chunks; pre-cancels when `Content-Length`\n   * exceeds the cap. Applies to A2A agent-card discovery\n   * (`/.well-known/agent.json`) on the same call as well.\n   *\n   * Per-call override (`TaskOptions.transport.maxResponseBytes`) beats the\n   * value set on the client constructor (`SingleAgentClientConfig.transport`).\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Safe to set on all calls.** SSE responses (`text/event-stream`) are\n   * passed through unchanged — a single tool call legitimately emits N status\n   * frames + a final result, bounded by protocol-level framing rather than\n   * cumulative byte counts. The cap applies to one-shot JSON responses\n   * (`get_adcp_capabilities`, agent-card lookup, tool result payloads on\n   * non-streaming transports) where the body is bounded by definition.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Hostile-peer note:** A peer can opt itself out of this cap by responding\n   * with `Content-Type: text/event-stream`. SSE is bypassed because cumulative\n   * event-frame bytes are unbounded by spec — MCP and A2A both stream tool\n   * responses this way. The MCP/A2A SDKs consume SSE incrementally and frame\n   * termination bounds memory in practice, so this is not a memory-bomb risk\n   * for well-formed transports. Adopters relying on `maxResponseBytes` as a\n   * hostile-server defense should treat it as best-effort for non-SSE\n   * responses only.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * Future hardening knobs (DNS-rebind defense, scheme allow-list, request\n   * timeout overrides) will land here as additional fields. When `trustedFetchFn`\n   * is supplied, the SDK composes it inside its signing, capture, size-limit,\n   * timeout, and diagnostics wrappers so callers do not have to reproduce\n   * that non-obvious ordering themselves.\n   */\n  maxResponseBytes?: number;\n  /**\n   * Scoped fetch implementation for all outbound HTTP performed on behalf of\n   * this client or call, including endpoint/card discovery, tool listing,\n   * OAuth discovery and token refresh, and MCP/A2A tool requests.\n   *\n   * The function is runtime-only configuration and is never serialized into\n   * agent records, storyboard artifacts, or compliance output. When unset,\n   * the SDK uses the global `fetch` implementation.\n   *\n   * Supplying this function makes it the trusted network boundary: the SDK\n   * still validates URL schemes, redirect behavior, timeouts, and body limits,\n   * but delegates DNS resolution and address policy to the implementation.\n   * It must prevent DNS rebinding and unsafe private-address access itself (for\n   * example with an egress proxy or its own DNS pinning).\n   */\n  trustedFetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * @deprecated Rename to `trustedFetchFn`. Supplying this legacy alias is\n   * treated as an explicit assertion that the implementation pins DNS.\n   */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * Permit this client to connect to private DNS answers. Localhost and an\n   * initial private IP literal are allowed automatically only on their exact\n   * origin; use this for private-DNS enterprise agents.\n   */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Timeout in milliseconds for bounded one-shot transport requests such as\n   * A2A agent-card discovery and MCP read-path probes. Defaults to 60 seconds\n   * for A2A discovery so an unresponsive card endpoint cannot hang forever.\n   * Set to `0` to disable the SDK-imposed discovery timeout.\n   */\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number;\n  /** A2A-only compatibility policy. Compliance uses `{ enabled: false }` for native 1.0 grading. */\n  legacyCompat?: import('./a2a').A2ALegacyCompatOptions;\n}\n\nlet warnedLegacyTransportFetch = false;\n\n/** @internal Normalize the pre-GA fetch hook rename without silently dropping JS callers. */\nexport function normalizeTransportOptions(transport?: TransportOptions): TransportOptions | undefined {\n  if (!transport?.fetchFn) return transport;\n  if (transport.trustedFetchFn && transport.trustedFetchFn !== transport.fetchFn) {\n    throw new TypeError('TransportOptions cannot set different fetchFn and trustedFetchFn implementations');\n  }\n  if (!warnedLegacyTransportFetch) {\n    warnedLegacyTransportFetch = true;\n    console.warn(\n      '[adcp] TransportOptions.fetchFn is deprecated; rename it to trustedFetchFn. ' +\n        'Custom fetch implementations must provide connect-time DNS pinning.'\n    );\n  }\n  return { ...transport, trustedFetchFn: transport.trustedFetchFn ?? transport.fetchFn };\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link ProtocolClient.callTool}. All fields are optional.\n *\n * `webhookUrl` / `webhookSecret` / `webhookToken` are for ASYNC TASK STATUS\n * notifications (push_notification_config). For reporting webhooks\n * (reporting_webhook), include them directly in `args` — they stay in skill\n * parameters and are sent verbatim to the agent.\n */\nexport interface CallToolOptions {\n  /** Debug log array. Mutated in place by the protocol layer. */\n  debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[];\n  /** URL for async task status notifications. */\n  webhookUrl?: string;\n  /** HMAC-SHA256 secret for push_notification_config authentication. */\n  webhookSecret?: string;\n  /** Bearer token for push_notification_config validation. */\n  webhookToken?: string;\n  /** Pinned protocol generation when the agent advertises both v2 and v3. */\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3';\n  /** A2A session continuity (contextId carries conversation, taskId resumes a task). */\n  session?: { contextId?: string; taskId?: string };\n  /**\n   * AdCP version pin from the calling client/server instance. Sets the\n   * wire-level `adcp_major_version` field per-call instead of from the\n   * SDK-pinned `ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION` constant. Default falls back to the\n   * constant so call sites that don't plumb a per-instance version keep\n   * their existing behavior. An explicit `adcp_major_version` /\n   * `adcp_version` in `args` overrides this — conformance harnesses use\n   * that path to probe seller version negotiation.\n   */\n  adcpVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional wire-only version override. Schema selection and client\n   * construction can remain pinned to `adcpVersion`; the request envelope is\n   * emitted for this release-precision line.\n   */\n  wireAdcpVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Controls whether the SDK injects AdCP version envelope fields into the\n   * outgoing request. Defaults to `auto`. 3.0 pins emit only the legacy\n   * `adcp_major_version`; 3.1+ pins emit both the legacy major and exact\n   * `adcp_version` marker. `major-only` forces the legacy integer marker\n   * without the 3.1 string marker for strict pre-3.1 peers discovered at\n   * runtime.\n   */\n  versionEnvelope?: VersionEnvelopeMode;\n  /**\n   * Transport-level safeguards (size caps, etc.). Per-call override of any\n   * matching field on the client constructor's `transport` option.\n   */\n  transport?: TransportOptions;\n  /** Caller-owned cancellation signal for the in-flight protocol call. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  /** Transport-level diagnostics callback for outbound HTTP requests. */\n  onTransportActivity?: TransportActivityHandlerFn;\n  /**\n   * Correlation metadata attached to transport diagnostics events emitted\n   * while this protocol call is active.\n   */\n  transportActivityContext?: {\n    operationId?: string;\n    taskId?: string;\n    contextId?: string;\n    idempotencyKey?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Universal protocol client - automatically routes to the correct protocol implementation\n */\nexport class ProtocolClient {\n  /**\n   * Call a tool on an agent using the appropriate protocol.\n   *\n   * @param agent - Agent configuration\n   * @param toolName - Name of the tool/skill to call\n   * @param args - Tool arguments (includes reporting_webhook if needed - NOT removed)\n   * @param options - Optional call-level configuration. See {@link CallToolOptions}.\n   */\n  static async callTool(\n    agent: AgentConfig,\n    toolName: string,\n    args: Record<string, unknown>,\n    options: CallToolOptions = {}\n  ): Promise<unknown> {\n    const {\n      debugLogs = [],\n      webhookUrl,\n      webhookSecret,\n      webhookToken,\n      serverVersion,\n      session,\n      adcpVersion,\n      wireAdcpVersion,\n      versionEnvelope: versionEnvelopeMode = 'auto',\n      transport: requestedTransport,\n      signal,\n      onTransportActivity,\n      transportActivityContext,\n    } = options;\n    const transport = normalizeTransportOptions(requestedTransport);\n    // Per-instance version envelope. Throws on unparseable pins via\n    // `resolveWireMajor`; construction-time `resolveAdcpVersion` is the\n    // primary gate but this is the failsafe for callers reaching\n    // `ProtocolClient.callTool` directly (test harnesses, the in-process\n    // MCP path). Returns `{ adcp_major_version }` for 3.0 pins and\n    // `{ adcp_major_version, adcp_version }` for 3.1+ pins.\n    const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(\n      versionEnvelopeMode,\n      wireAdcpVersion ?? adcpVersion,\n      serverVersion\n    );\n    // Enter the response-size-limit ALS slot once for this call. The slot is\n    // read by `wrapFetchWithSizeLimit` in both protocol transports, so the\n    // cap applies regardless of which path (MCP / A2A / OAuth refresh) the\n    // call ends up taking. No-op when the cap is unset or non-positive.\n    return withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n      withTransportDiagnostics(\n        {\n          agentId: agent.id,\n          protocol: agent.protocol,\n          tool: toolName,\n          taskType: toolName,\n          ...transportActivityContext,\n          onTransportActivity,\n        },\n        () =>\n          withSpan(\n            `adcp.${agent.protocol}.call_tool`,\n            {\n              'adcp.agent_id': agent.id,\n              'adcp.protocol': agent.protocol,\n              'adcp.tool': toolName,\n              'http.url': agent.agent_uri,\n            },\n            async () => {\n              // In-process MCP path: pre-connected client, no HTTP transport.\n              // Idempotency injection, schema validation, and governance middleware all\n              // still apply (they run in SingleAgentClient above this call). We skip\n              // URL validation, OAuth refresh, and signing — none apply in-process.\n              if (agent.protocol === 'mcp' && agent._inProcessMcpClient) {\n                const inProcArgs = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);\n                return callMCPToolWithClient(agent._inProcessMcpClient, toolName, inProcArgs, debugLogs, {\n                  ...(signal && { signal }),\n                  ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n                });\n              }\n\n              validateAgentUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n\n              // OAuth 2.0 client credentials (RFC 6749 §4.4): re-exchange the\n              // secret for a fresh access token whenever the cached one is within\n              // its expiration skew. Runs before every call so mid-session expiry\n              // can't leave the caller with a stale bearer. No-op if the agent\n              // doesn't declare client credentials. Cheap on warm cache (single\n              // `Date.now()` compare); a single POST to the token endpoint on miss.\n              //\n              // `allowPrivateIp` inherits the trust the caller already placed in\n              // `agent.agent_uri` — if they're making a call to a private-IP agent,\n              // they've authorized this process to talk to private-IP hosts, so\n              // the token endpoint on the same network is reachable too. Public\n              // agent URLs with private-IP token endpoints still require an\n              // explicit opt-in via the library API.\n              if (agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n                const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                const allowPrivateIp = transport?.allowPrivateIp ?? isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                  storage: ccStorage,\n                  allowPrivateIp,\n                  fetch: transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                  signal,\n                });\n              }\n\n              const authToken = getAuthToken(agent);\n\n              // RFC 9421 signing context. Built once per call and passed through\n              // to each protocol-layer entry (`callMCPToolWithTasks`, `callA2ATool`,\n              // `callMCPToolWithOAuth`) — those entries seed `signingContextStorage`\n              // (AsyncLocalStorage) so the internal transport helpers read it\n              // without an explicit parameter. Keep the explicit arg here: it's the\n              // ALS seed, not incidental plumbing. `get_adcp_capabilities` is\n              // exempt from signing (it's the discovery call itself) and also\n              // triggers cache priming for any other op on agents with\n              // `request_signing` configured.\n              const signingContext = buildAgentSigningContext(agent);\n              if (signingContext && toolName !== CAPABILITY_OP) {\n                await ensureCapabilityLoaded(agent, signingContext, primeArgs =>\n                  ProtocolClient.callTool(agent, CAPABILITY_OP, primeArgs, {\n                    debugLogs,\n                    serverVersion,\n                    adcpVersion,\n                    ...(versionEnvelopeMode !== 'auto' && { versionEnvelope: versionEnvelopeMode }),\n                    transport,\n                    signal,\n                    ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n                    onTransportActivity,\n                    transportActivityContext,\n                  })\n                );\n              }\n\n              // Inject the version envelope on every request so sellers can validate\n              // compatibility. Skip for v2 servers — they don't recognise the\n              // version fields and strict-schema agents reject them. The envelope\n              // shape is per-pin: 3.0 pins get the integer `adcp_major_version`\n              // alone; 3.1+ pins get both that and the release-precision string\n              // `adcp_version` (`'3.1'` / `'3.1.0-beta.1'`) per spec PR\n              // `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`.\n              const argsWithVersion = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);\n\n              // Build push_notification_config for ASYNC TASK STATUS notifications\n              // (NOT for reporting_webhook - that stays in args)\n              // Schema: https://adcontextprotocol.org/schemas/v1/core/push-notification-config.json\n              // `authentication` is a scheme SELECTOR, not a fallback: from AdCP\n              // 3.0 on, push-notification-config.json makes its presence opt the\n              // seller into legacy HMAC-SHA256 and its absence select the RFC\n              // 9421 webhook profile, with `required: [\"url\"]` only. Emitting it\n              // with a placeholder credential would therefore downgrade every\n              // webhook to legacy HMAC keyed by a constant that ships in this\n              // file, so the block is omitted unless a real secret backs it.\n              //\n              // v2.5 predates the selector: there `required` is\n              // `[\"url\", \"authentication\"]` and there is no 9421 path, so an\n              // omitted block is schema-invalid rather than a mode selection.\n              // With no secret there is nothing honest to send a v2 seller, so\n              // suppress the registration instead of fabricating a credential.\n              const generatedPushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig | undefined = (():\n                | PushNotificationConfig\n                | undefined => {\n                if (!webhookUrl) return undefined;\n                if (webhookSecret) {\n                  return {\n                    url: webhookUrl,\n                    ...(transportActivityContext?.operationId && {\n                      operation_id: transportActivityContext.operationId,\n                    }),\n                    ...(webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }),\n                    authentication: {\n                      schemes: ['HMAC-SHA256' as const],\n                      credentials: webhookSecret,\n                    },\n                  };\n                }\n                if (serverVersion === 'v2') {\n                  warnV2PushNotificationNeedsSecret();\n                  return undefined;\n                }\n                return {\n                  url: webhookUrl,\n                  ...(transportActivityContext?.operationId && {\n                    operation_id: transportActivityContext.operationId,\n                  }),\n                  ...(webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }),\n                };\n              })();\n              const explicitNativePushNotificationConfig =\n                transport?.legacyCompat?.enabled === false &&\n                argsWithVersion.push_notification_config !== null &&\n                typeof argsWithVersion.push_notification_config === 'object' &&\n                !Array.isArray(argsWithVersion.push_notification_config)\n                  ? (argsWithVersion.push_notification_config as PushNotificationConfig)\n                  : undefined;\n              const pushNotificationConfig = generatedPushNotificationConfig ?? explicitNativePushNotificationConfig;\n\n              if (agent.protocol === 'mcp') {\n                // For MCP, include push_notification_config in tool arguments (MCP spec)\n                const argsWithWebhook = pushNotificationConfig\n                  ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig }\n                  : argsWithVersion;\n\n                // If the agent config carries authorization-code OAuth tokens,\n                // route through the OAuth provider path so the MCP SDK can refresh\n                // on 401 instead of hard-failing. Excludes client-credentials\n                // agents: they have a cached access token but no refresh_token,\n                // and their refresh path is a secret re-exchange (handled above),\n                // not the SDK's refresh_token grant.\n                if (agent.oauth_tokens && !agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n                  const authProvider = getNonInteractiveOAuthProvider(agent, {\n                    agentHint: agent.id,\n                    storage: getAgentStorage(agent),\n                    allowHttp: isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri),\n                  });\n                  try {\n                    return await callMCPToolWithOAuth({\n                      agentUrl: agent.agent_uri,\n                      toolName,\n                      args: argsWithWebhook,\n                      authProvider,\n                      debugLogs,\n                      customHeaders: agent.headers,\n                      signingContext,\n                      signal,\n                      requestTimeoutMs: transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                      fetchFn: transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                      allowPrivateIp: transport?.allowPrivateIp,\n                    });\n                  } catch (err) {\n                    // Refresh failed or server rejected the refreshed token — walk the\n                    // discovery chain so the caller can distinguish \"re-auth needed\"\n                    // from other failure modes.\n                    await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(\n                      err,\n                      agent.agent_uri,\n                      transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                      signal,\n                      transport?.allowPrivateIp\n                    );\n                    throw err;\n                  }\n                }\n\n                // Use callMCPToolWithTasks which auto-detects server tasks capability\n                // and falls back to standard callTool when tasks are not supported\n                try {\n                  return await callMCPToolWithTasks(\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    toolName,\n                    argsWithWebhook,\n                    authToken,\n                    debugLogs,\n                    agent.headers,\n                    {\n                      ...(signingContext && { signingContext }),\n                      ...(signal && { signal }),\n                      ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && {\n                        requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs,\n                      }),\n                      ...(transport?.trustedFetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.trustedFetchFn }),\n                      ...(transport?.allowPrivateIp !== undefined && { allowPrivateIp: transport.allowPrivateIp }),\n                    }\n                  );\n                } catch (err) {\n                  // Client-credentials agents: on 401, the AS may have rotated\n                  // something out-of-band. Force a fresh exchange and retry once\n                  // before surfacing the error. Bounded (single retry) so we don't\n                  // loop if the credentials are genuinely wrong.\n                  if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {\n                    const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                    const allowPrivateIp = transport?.allowPrivateIp ?? isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                    await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                      storage: ccStorage,\n                      force: true,\n                      allowPrivateIp,\n                      fetch: transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                      signal,\n                    });\n                    const retryAuthToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token ?? authToken;\n                    try {\n                      return await callMCPToolWithTasks(\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        toolName,\n                        argsWithWebhook,\n                        retryAuthToken,\n                        debugLogs,\n                        agent.headers,\n                        {\n                          ...(signingContext && { signingContext }),\n                          ...(signal && { signal }),\n                          ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && {\n                            requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs,\n                          }),\n                          ...(transport?.trustedFetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.trustedFetchFn }),\n                          ...(transport?.allowPrivateIp !== undefined && {\n                            allowPrivateIp: transport.allowPrivateIp,\n                          }),\n                        }\n                      );\n                    } catch (retryErr) {\n                      await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(\n                        retryErr,\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                        signal,\n                        transport?.allowPrivateIp\n                      );\n                      throw retryErr;\n                    }\n                  }\n                  await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(\n                    err,\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                    signal,\n                    transport?.allowPrivateIp\n                  );\n                  throw err;\n                }\n              } else if (agent.protocol === 'a2a') {\n                // Native A2A has two distinct registration surfaces. The\n                // official protocol configuration gets the representable\n                // transport fields, while the complete AdCP application\n                // object (including operation_id) remains in skill input.\n                // Preserve the stable 0.3 wire shape outside native mode.\n                const a2aParameters =\n                  transport?.legacyCompat?.enabled === false && pushNotificationConfig\n                    ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig }\n                    : argsWithVersion;\n                try {\n                  return await callA2ATool(\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    toolName,\n                    a2aParameters,\n                    authToken,\n                    debugLogs,\n                    pushNotificationConfig,\n                    agent.headers,\n                    signingContext,\n                    session,\n                    signal,\n                    transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                    transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                    transport?.allowPrivateIp,\n                    transport?.legacyCompat\n                  );\n                } catch (err) {\n                  // Same single-retry-on-401 for client-credentials agents as the\n                  // MCP path above. Kept symmetric so A2A CC agents aren't a\n                  // second-class experience — including the NeedsAuthorizationError\n                  // rewrap on a retry that still 401s.\n                  if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {\n                    const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                    const allowPrivateIp = transport?.allowPrivateIp ?? isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                    await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                      storage: ccStorage,\n                      force: true,\n                      allowPrivateIp,\n                      fetch: transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                      signal,\n                    });\n                    const retryAuthToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token ?? authToken;\n                    try {\n                      return await callA2ATool(\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        toolName,\n                        a2aParameters,\n                        retryAuthToken,\n                        debugLogs,\n                        pushNotificationConfig,\n                        agent.headers,\n                        signingContext,\n                        session,\n                        signal,\n                        transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                        transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                        transport?.allowPrivateIp,\n                        transport?.legacyCompat\n                      );\n                    } catch (retryErr) {\n                      await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(\n                        retryErr,\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                        signal,\n                        transport?.allowPrivateIp\n                      );\n                      throw retryErr;\n                    }\n                  }\n                  await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(\n                    err,\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n                    signal,\n                    transport?.allowPrivateIp\n                  );\n                  throw err;\n                }\n              } else {\n                throw new Error(`Unsupported protocol: ${agent.protocol}`);\n              }\n            }\n          )\n      )\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * If `err` looks like a 401 from the MCP transport, probe the agent for a\n * Bearer challenge and throw a {@link NeedsAuthorizationError} carrying\n * walked discovery metadata. If the error isn't a 401 or we can't build a\n * requirements record, return silently so the caller re-throws the original.\n *\n * Keeping this off the hot path: we only probe on error, and the probe is\n * a single unauthenticated `tools/list` POST — no retries, no DNS rebind.\n */\nasync function rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(\n  err: unknown,\n  agentUrl: string,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch,\n  signal?: AbortSignal,\n  configuredAllowPrivateIp?: boolean\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (err instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError) throw err;\n  if (!is401Error(err)) return;\n\n  // If the caller has already connected to the agent URL, they've implicitly\n  // trusted it — inherit that trust for the discovery probe so loopback /\n  // private-IP development agents work the same way as public ones.\n  const allowPrivateIp = configuredAllowPrivateIp ?? isLikelyPrivateUrl(agentUrl);\n\n  // discoverAuthorizationRequirements internally catches network failures and\n  // returns null rather than throwing — anything that escapes is a genuine\n  // bug we want to surface rather than mask the 401 with.\n  const requirements = await discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, { allowPrivateIp, fetchFn, signal });\n  if (requirements) {\n    throw new NeedsAuthorizationError(requirements);\n  }\n  // No requirements walked; let the caller re-throw the original error.\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple factory functions for protocol-specific clients.\n *\n * Both factories accept a `transport` argument that flows through to the\n * size-cap surface so callers reaching the factory exports honor the same\n * `maxResponseBytes` contract as `ProtocolClient.callTool`. Without it,\n * the factories would silently bypass the cap, which the public API\n * (`TransportOptions`) implies they honor.\n */\nexport const createMCPClient = (\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3',\n  adcpVersion?: string,\n  transport?: TransportOptions,\n  versionEnvelopeMode: VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto'\n) => {\n  transport = normalizeTransportOptions(transport);\n  // Validate the pin at factory time so a typo surfaces here rather than at\n  // first call. `buildVersionEnvelope` throws via `resolveWireMajor` on bad\n  // input — call it once to surface, then close over the envelope.\n  const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(versionEnvelopeMode, adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n  return {\n    callTool: (toolName: string, args: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) =>\n      withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n        callMCPToolWithTasks(\n          agentUrl,\n          toolName,\n          applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope),\n          authToken,\n          debugLogs,\n          headers,\n          {\n            ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n            ...(transport?.trustedFetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.trustedFetchFn }),\n            ...(transport?.allowPrivateIp !== undefined && { allowPrivateIp: transport.allowPrivateIp }),\n          }\n        )\n      ),\n  };\n};\n\nexport const createA2AClient = (\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3',\n  adcpVersion?: string,\n  transport?: TransportOptions,\n  versionEnvelopeMode: VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto'\n) => {\n  transport = normalizeTransportOptions(transport);\n  const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(versionEnvelopeMode, adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n  return {\n    callTool: (toolName: string, parameters: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) =>\n      withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n        callA2ATool(\n          agentUrl,\n          toolName,\n          applyVersionEnvelope(parameters, versionEnvelope),\n          authToken,\n          debugLogs,\n          undefined,\n          headers,\n          undefined,\n          undefined,\n          undefined,\n          transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n          transport?.trustedFetchFn,\n          transport?.allowPrivateIp,\n          transport?.legacyCompat\n        )\n      ),\n  };\n};\n\nexport type { A2ALegacyCompatOptions } from 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package/dist/lib/protocols/index.mjs

@@ -218,11 +218,14 @@ class ProtocolClient {
               );
             }
             const argsWithVersion = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);
-            const pushNotificationConfig = (() => {
+            const generatedPushNotificationConfig = (() => {
               if (!webhookUrl) return void 0;
               if (webhookSecret) {
                 return {
                   url: webhookUrl,
+                  ...transportActivityContext?.operationId && {
+                    operation_id: transportActivityContext.operationId
+                  },
                   ...webhookToken && { token: webhookToken },
                   authentication: {
                     schemes: ["HMAC-SHA256"],
@@ -236,9 +239,14 @@ class ProtocolClient {
               }
               return {
                 url: webhookUrl,
+                ...transportActivityContext?.operationId && {
+                  operation_id: transportActivityContext.operationId
+                },
                 ...webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }
               };
             })();
+            const explicitNativePushNotificationConfig = transport?.legacyCompat?.enabled === false && argsWithVersion.push_notification_config !== null && typeof argsWithVersion.push_notification_config === "object" && !Array.isArray(argsWithVersion.push_notification_config) ? argsWithVersion.push_notification_config : void 0;
+            const pushNotificationConfig = generatedPushNotificationConfig ?? explicitNativePushNotificationConfig;
             if (agent.protocol === "mcp") {
               const argsWithWebhook = pushNotificationConfig ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig } : argsWithVersion;
               if (agent.oauth_tokens && !agent.oauth_client_credentials) {
@@ -343,11 +351,12 @@ class ProtocolClient {
                 throw err;
               }
             } else if (agent.protocol === "a2a") {
+              const a2aParameters = transport?.legacyCompat?.enabled === false && pushNotificationConfig ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig } : argsWithVersion;
               try {
                 return await callA2ATool2(
                   agent.agent_uri,
                   toolName,
-                  argsWithVersion,
+                  a2aParameters,
                   authToken,
                   debugLogs,
                   pushNotificationConfig,
@@ -357,7 +366,8 @@ class ProtocolClient {
                   signal,
                   transport?.requestTimeoutMs,
                   transport?.trustedFetchFn,
-                  transport?.allowPrivateIp
+                  transport?.allowPrivateIp,
+                  transport?.legacyCompat
                 );
               } catch (err) {
                 if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {
@@ -375,7 +385,7 @@ class ProtocolClient {
                     return await callA2ATool2(
                       agent.agent_uri,
                       toolName,
-                      argsWithVersion,
+                      a2aParameters,
                       retryAuthToken,
                       debugLogs,
                       pushNotificationConfig,
@@ -385,7 +395,8 @@ class ProtocolClient {
                       signal,
                       transport?.requestTimeoutMs,
                       transport?.trustedFetchFn,
-                      transport?.allowPrivateIp
+                      transport?.allowPrivateIp,
+                      transport?.legacyCompat
                     );
                   } catch (retryErr) {
                     await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(
@@ -466,7 +477,8 @@ const createA2AClient = (agentUrl, authToken, headers, serverVersion, adcpVersio
         void 0,
         transport?.requestTimeoutMs,
         transport?.trustedFetchFn,
-        transport?.allowPrivateIp
+        transport?.allowPrivateIp,
+        transport?.legacyCompat
       )
     )
   };