@adcp/sdk 13.0.0-rc.4 → 13.0.0-rc.6

package/dist/lib/protocols/index.js

@@ -106,6 +106,14 @@ function buildVersionEnvelope(adcpVersion, serverVersion) {
   (0, import_schema_loader.validateAdcpVersionWire)(wireValue);
   return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor, adcp_version: wireValue };
 }
+let hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret = false;
+function warnV2PushNotificationNeedsSecret() {
+  if (hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret) return;
+  hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret = true;
+  console.warn(
+    "[adcp] Suppressing push_notification_config for a v2 seller: AdCP 2.5 requires an `authentication` block and no `webhookSecret` is configured. Set `webhookSecret` to register async task-status webhooks with this agent, or move the agent to an AdCP 3.x pin, where the RFC 9421 webhook profile needs no shared secret."
+  );
+}
 function buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(mode, adcpVersion, serverVersion) {
   if (mode === "none" || serverVersion === "v2") return {};
   if (mode === "major-only") return { adcp_major_version: resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion) };
@@ -201,14 +209,27 @@ class ProtocolClient {
               );
             }
             const argsWithVersion = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);
-            const pushNotificationConfig = webhookUrl ? {
-              url: webhookUrl,
-              ...webhookToken && { token: webhookToken },
-              authentication: {
-                schemes: ["HMAC-SHA256"],
-                credentials: webhookSecret || "placeholder_secret_min_32_characters_required"
+            const pushNotificationConfig = (() => {
+              if (!webhookUrl) return void 0;
+              if (webhookSecret) {
+                return {
+                  url: webhookUrl,
+                  ...webhookToken && { token: webhookToken },
+                  authentication: {
+                    schemes: ["HMAC-SHA256"],
+                    credentials: webhookSecret
+                  }
+                };
+              }
+              if (serverVersion === "v2") {
+                warnV2PushNotificationNeedsSecret();
+                return void 0;
               }
-            } : void 0;
+              return {
+                url: webhookUrl,
+                ...webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }
+              };
+            })();
             if (agent.protocol === "mcp") {
               const argsWithWebhook = pushNotificationConfig ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig } : argsWithVersion;
               if (agent.oauth_tokens && !agent.oauth_client_credentials) {

package/dist/lib/protocols/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/protocols/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// Unified Protocol Interface for AdCP\nexport {\n  callMCPTool,\n  callMCPToolWithOAuth,\n  connectMCP,\n  closeMCPConnections,\n  closeOAuthConnections,\n  UnauthorizedError,\n} from './mcp';\n\nimport { closeMCPConnections } from './mcp';\nimport { closeA2AConnections } from './a2a';\n\n/**\n * Close protocol connections for the given protocol.\n * MCP closes persistent HTTP transports; A2A clears the agent-card client cache.\n */\nexport async function closeConnections(protocol: 'mcp' | 'a2a' = 'mcp'): Promise<void> {\n  if (protocol === 'mcp') {\n    await closeMCPConnections();\n  } else {\n    closeA2AConnections();\n  }\n}\nexport type { MCPCallOptions, MCPConnectionResult } from './mcp';\nexport { callA2ATool } from './a2a';\nexport { DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS } from './abort';\nexport {\n  callMCPToolWithTasks,\n  getMCPTaskStatus,\n  getMCPTaskResult,\n  listMCPTasks,\n  cancelMCPTask,\n  mapMCPTaskStatus,\n  serverSupportsTasks,\n} from './mcp-tasks';\n\nimport { callMCPToolWithTasks, callMCPToolWithClient } from './mcp-tasks';\nimport { callMCPToolWithOAuth } from './mcp';\nimport { callA2ATool } from './a2a';\nimport type { AgentConfig, DebugLogEntry } from '../types';\nimport type { PushNotificationConfig } from '../types/tools.generated';\nimport { getAuthToken } from '../auth';\nimport {\n  discoverAuthorizationRequirements,\n  NeedsAuthorizationError,\n  getAgentStorage,\n  ensureClientCredentialsTokens,\n} from '../auth/oauth';\nimport { getNonInteractiveOAuthProvider } from '../auth/oauth/provider-cache';\nimport { is401Error } from '../errors';\nimport { isLikelyPrivateUrl } from '../net';\nimport { validateAgentUrl } from '../validation';\nimport { withSpan } from '../observability/tracing';\nimport { ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION, ADCP_VERSION, parseAdcpMajorVersion } from '../version';\nimport { ConfigurationError } from '../errors';\nimport { resolveBundleKey, toReleasePrecisionWire, validateAdcpVersionWire } from '../validation/schema-loader';\nimport { buildAgentSigningContext, CAPABILITY_OP, ensureCapabilityLoaded } from '../signing/client';\nimport { withResponseSizeLimit } from './responseSizeLimit';\nimport {\n  withTransportDiagnostics,\n  type TransportActivityHandler as TransportActivityHandlerFn,\n} from './transportDiagnostics';\n\nexport {\n  sanitizeTransportHeaders,\n  sanitizeTransportUrl,\n  withTransportDiagnostics,\n  wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics,\n} from './transportDiagnostics';\nexport type { TransportActivity, TransportActivityContext, TransportActivityHandler } from './transportDiagnostics';\n\nexport type VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto' | 'none' | 'major-only';\n\n/**\n * Derive the wire-level `adcp_major_version` integer from a caller-supplied\n * pin. Returns the SDK default when no pin is provided; throws on a pin\n * that doesn't parse so misuse surfaces at the factory boundary instead\n * of silently emitting the SDK's major.\n *\n * Throws `ConfigurationError` (not a plain `Error`) so a typo'd pin\n * surfaces with the same error class as the construction-time gate in\n * `resolveAdcpVersion` — one shape for all pin-misuse paths.\n */\nfunction resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion: string | undefined): number {\n  if (adcpVersion === undefined) return ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION;\n  const parsed = parseAdcpMajorVersion(adcpVersion);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(parsed)) {\n    throw new ConfigurationError(\n      `adcpVersion ${JSON.stringify(adcpVersion)} is not a valid AdCP version. ` +\n        `Expected a semver string (e.g. '3.0.1', '3.1.0-beta.1') or a legacy alias (e.g. 'v3').`,\n      'adcpVersion'\n    );\n  }\n  return parsed;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when the AdCP release that `bundleKey` identifies declares the\n * top-level `adcp_version` envelope field. The field landed in AdCP 3.1 per\n * spec PR `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493` — 3.0 (any patch / prerelease) does\n * not carry it; 3.1+ does. Used to gate dual-emit on the wire so a 3.0-pinned\n * client doesn't emit a field its target schema doesn't define.\n */\nexport function bundleSupportsAdcpVersionField(bundleKey: string): boolean {\n  const major = parseAdcpMajorVersion(bundleKey);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(major)) return false;\n  if (major < 3) return false;\n  if (major > 3) return true;\n  // Major 3 — only 3.1+ has the field. Bundle key shape is normalized by\n  // `resolveBundleKey`: `'3.0'` / `'3.1'` for stable; `'3.0.0-beta.1'` /\n  // `'3.1.0-beta.1'` for prereleases. Match the minor.\n  const minorMatch = bundleKey.match(/^\\d+\\.(\\d+)/);\n  if (!minorMatch) return false;\n  return parseInt(minorMatch[1]!, 10) >= 1;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the wire-level version envelope to merge into outgoing request args.\n *\n * Per AdCP 3.1 (spec PR `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`), 3.1+ requests carry\n * BOTH the integer `adcp_major_version` (deprecated through 3.x, removed in\n * 4.0) AND the release-precision string `adcp_version`. 3.0 schemas don't\n * define the string field, so a 3.0-pinned client emits the integer only —\n * matches the 3.0 spec exactly.\n *\n * Wire string is release-precision (MAJOR.MINOR with optional prerelease tag),\n * per `core/version-envelope.json`'s pattern `^\\d+\\.\\d+(-[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)?$`.\n * Full-semver bundle keys (`'3.1.0-beta.1'`) are collapsed via\n * `toReleasePrecisionWire` to `'3.1-beta.1'` before emit — meta-field shapes\n * are explicitly NOT valid wire values per the envelope schema's own\n * normalization rule.\n *\n * Returns `{}` for v2 callers (predates the major-version field entirely).\n */\nfunction buildVersionEnvelope(\n  adcpVersion: string | undefined,\n  serverVersion: 'v2' | 'v3' | undefined\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  if (serverVersion === 'v2') return {};\n  const wireMajor = resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion);\n  const bundleKey = resolveBundleKey(adcpVersion ?? ADCP_VERSION);\n  if (!bundleSupportsAdcpVersionField(bundleKey)) {\n    return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor };\n  }\n  const wireValue = toReleasePrecisionWire(bundleKey);\n  // Defensive postcondition — should never throw in well-formed code, but\n  // if a future refactor breaks the normalization the error message tells\n  // the developer to call `toReleasePrecisionWire` instead of silently\n  // emitting a non-spec wire string.\n  validateAdcpVersionWire(wireValue);\n  return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor, adcp_version: wireValue };\n}\n\nfunction buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(\n  mode: VersionEnvelopeMode,\n  adcpVersion: string | undefined,\n  serverVersion: 'v2' | 'v3' | undefined\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  if (mode === 'none' || serverVersion === 'v2') return {};\n  if (mode === 'major-only') return { adcp_major_version: resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion) };\n  return buildVersionEnvelope(adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n}\n\n/**\n * Merge the wire-level version envelope into a caller-supplied args object.\n * Caller args win: an explicit `adcp_major_version` / `adcp_version` in\n * `args` (e.g. a conformance harness probing `VERSION_UNSUPPORTED`) passes\n * through unchanged. The envelope only fills fields the caller didn't set.\n *\n * Single chokepoint for all four wire-injection sites so a future refactor\n * can't silently flip the spread order on one branch and leave the others\n * intact. Stale dual-field drift is caught at the server boundary by\n * `createAdcpServer`'s field-disagreement check (spec PR\n * `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function applyVersionEnvelope(\n  args: Record<string, unknown>,\n  envelope: Record<string, unknown>\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return { ...envelope, ...args };\n}\n\n/**\n * Transport-level safeguards applied to a call.\n *\n * Wired into the SDK's internal fetch chain via AsyncLocalStorage, so the\n * cap takes effect even when the underlying transport's connection cache\n * reuses a fetch that was created on an earlier call with different limits.\n */\nexport interface TransportOptions {\n  /**\n   * Maximum response body size (in octets) the SDK will read before aborting\n   * with `ResponseTooLargeError`. When unset, the SDK does not impose a cap —\n   * matches the underlying MCP / A2A transport defaults.\n   *\n   * Set this when crawling **untrusted** agents (registries, federated\n   * discovery layers, monitoring tools) to prevent a hostile vendor from\n   * buffering a large reply before any application-layer schema validation\n   * runs. Counted across response chunks; pre-cancels when `Content-Length`\n   * exceeds the cap. Applies to A2A agent-card discovery\n   * (`/.well-known/agent.json`) on the same call as well.\n   *\n   * Per-call override (`TaskOptions.transport.maxResponseBytes`) beats the\n   * value set on the client constructor (`SingleAgentClientConfig.transport`).\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Safe to set on all calls.** SSE responses (`text/event-stream`) are\n   * passed through unchanged — a single tool call legitimately emits N status\n   * frames + a final result, bounded by protocol-level framing rather than\n   * cumulative byte counts. The cap applies to one-shot JSON responses\n   * (`get_adcp_capabilities`, agent-card lookup, tool result payloads on\n   * non-streaming transports) where the body is bounded by definition.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Hostile-peer note:** A peer can opt itself out of this cap by responding\n   * with `Content-Type: text/event-stream`. SSE is bypassed because cumulative\n   * event-frame bytes are unbounded by spec — MCP and A2A both stream tool\n   * responses this way. The MCP/A2A SDKs consume SSE incrementally and frame\n   * termination bounds memory in practice, so this is not a memory-bomb risk\n   * for well-formed transports. Adopters relying on `maxResponseBytes` as a\n   * hostile-server defense should treat it as best-effort for non-SSE\n   * responses only.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * Future hardening knobs (DNS-rebind defense, scheme allow-list, request\n   * timeout overrides) will land here as additional fields. When `fetchFn`\n   * is supplied, the SDK composes it inside its signing, capture, size-limit,\n   * timeout, and diagnostics wrappers so callers do not have to reproduce\n   * that non-obvious ordering themselves.\n   */\n  maxResponseBytes?: number;\n  /**\n   * Scoped fetch implementation for all outbound HTTP performed on behalf of\n   * this client or call, including endpoint/card discovery, tool listing,\n   * OAuth discovery and token refresh, and MCP/A2A tool requests.\n   *\n   * The function is runtime-only configuration and is never serialized into\n   * agent records, storyboard artifacts, or compliance output. When unset,\n   * the SDK uses the global `fetch` implementation.\n   *\n   * For SSRF-sensitive metadata probes, supplying this function makes it the\n   * trusted network boundary: the SDK still validates schemes and resolved\n   * addresses, but a custom fetch API cannot accept the SDK's pinned undici\n   * dispatcher. The implementation must therefore prevent DNS rebinding (for\n   * example with an egress proxy or its own DNS pinning).\n   */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * Timeout in milliseconds for bounded one-shot transport requests such as\n   * A2A agent-card discovery and MCP read-path probes. Defaults to 60 seconds\n   * for A2A discovery so an unresponsive card endpoint cannot hang forever.\n   * Set to `0` to disable the SDK-imposed discovery timeout.\n   */\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link ProtocolClient.callTool}. All fields are optional.\n *\n * `webhookUrl` / `webhookSecret` / `webhookToken` are for ASYNC TASK STATUS\n * notifications (push_notification_config). For reporting webhooks\n * (reporting_webhook), include them directly in `args` — they stay in skill\n * parameters and are sent verbatim to the agent.\n */\nexport interface CallToolOptions {\n  /** Debug log array. Mutated in place by the protocol layer. */\n  debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[];\n  /** URL for async task status notifications. */\n  webhookUrl?: string;\n  /** HMAC-SHA256 secret for push_notification_config authentication. */\n  webhookSecret?: string;\n  /** Bearer token for push_notification_config validation. */\n  webhookToken?: string;\n  /** Pinned protocol generation when the agent advertises both v2 and v3. */\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3';\n  /** A2A session continuity (contextId carries conversation, taskId resumes a task). */\n  session?: { contextId?: string; taskId?: string };\n  /**\n   * AdCP version pin from the calling client/server instance. Sets the\n   * wire-level `adcp_major_version` field per-call instead of from the\n   * SDK-pinned `ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION` constant. Default falls back to the\n   * constant so call sites that don't plumb a per-instance version keep\n   * their existing behavior. An explicit `adcp_major_version` /\n   * `adcp_version` in `args` overrides this — conformance harnesses use\n   * that path to probe seller version negotiation.\n   */\n  adcpVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional wire-only version override. Schema selection and client\n   * construction can remain pinned to `adcpVersion`; the request envelope is\n   * emitted for this release-precision line.\n   */\n  wireAdcpVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Controls whether the SDK injects AdCP version envelope fields into the\n   * outgoing request. Defaults to `auto`. 3.0 pins emit only the legacy\n   * `adcp_major_version`; 3.1+ pins emit both the legacy major and exact\n   * `adcp_version` marker. `major-only` forces the legacy integer marker\n   * without the 3.1 string marker for strict pre-3.1 peers discovered at\n   * runtime.\n   */\n  versionEnvelope?: VersionEnvelopeMode;\n  /**\n   * Transport-level safeguards (size caps, etc.). Per-call override of any\n   * matching field on the client constructor's `transport` option.\n   */\n  transport?: TransportOptions;\n  /** Caller-owned cancellation signal for the in-flight protocol call. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  /** Transport-level diagnostics callback for outbound HTTP requests. */\n  onTransportActivity?: TransportActivityHandlerFn;\n  /**\n   * Correlation metadata attached to transport diagnostics events emitted\n   * while this protocol call is active.\n   */\n  transportActivityContext?: {\n    operationId?: string;\n    taskId?: string;\n    contextId?: string;\n    idempotencyKey?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Universal protocol client - automatically routes to the correct protocol implementation\n */\nexport class ProtocolClient {\n  /**\n   * Call a tool on an agent using the appropriate protocol.\n   *\n   * @param agent - Agent configuration\n   * @param toolName - Name of the tool/skill to call\n   * @param args - Tool arguments (includes reporting_webhook if needed - NOT removed)\n   * @param options - Optional call-level configuration. See {@link CallToolOptions}.\n   */\n  static async callTool(\n    agent: AgentConfig,\n    toolName: string,\n    args: Record<string, unknown>,\n    options: CallToolOptions = {}\n  ): Promise<unknown> {\n    const {\n      debugLogs = [],\n      webhookUrl,\n      webhookSecret,\n      webhookToken,\n      serverVersion,\n      session,\n      adcpVersion,\n      wireAdcpVersion,\n      versionEnvelope: versionEnvelopeMode = 'auto',\n      transport,\n      signal,\n      onTransportActivity,\n      transportActivityContext,\n    } = options;\n    // Per-instance version envelope. Throws on unparseable pins via\n    // `resolveWireMajor`; construction-time `resolveAdcpVersion` is the\n    // primary gate but this is the failsafe for callers reaching\n    // `ProtocolClient.callTool` directly (test harnesses, the in-process\n    // MCP path). Returns `{ adcp_major_version }` for 3.0 pins and\n    // `{ adcp_major_version, adcp_version }` for 3.1+ pins.\n    const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(\n      versionEnvelopeMode,\n      wireAdcpVersion ?? adcpVersion,\n      serverVersion\n    );\n    // Enter the response-size-limit ALS slot once for this call. The slot is\n    // read by `wrapFetchWithSizeLimit` in both protocol transports, so the\n    // cap applies regardless of which path (MCP / A2A / OAuth refresh) the\n    // call ends up taking. No-op when the cap is unset or non-positive.\n    return withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n      withTransportDiagnostics(\n        {\n          agentId: agent.id,\n          protocol: agent.protocol,\n          tool: toolName,\n          taskType: toolName,\n          ...transportActivityContext,\n          onTransportActivity,\n        },\n        () =>\n          withSpan(\n            `adcp.${agent.protocol}.call_tool`,\n            {\n              'adcp.agent_id': agent.id,\n              'adcp.protocol': agent.protocol,\n              'adcp.tool': toolName,\n              'http.url': agent.agent_uri,\n            },\n            async () => {\n              // In-process MCP path: pre-connected client, no HTTP transport.\n              // Idempotency injection, schema validation, and governance middleware all\n              // still apply (they run in SingleAgentClient above this call). We skip\n              // URL validation, OAuth refresh, and signing — none apply in-process.\n              if (agent.protocol === 'mcp' && agent._inProcessMcpClient) {\n                const inProcArgs = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);\n                return callMCPToolWithClient(agent._inProcessMcpClient, toolName, inProcArgs, debugLogs, {\n                  ...(signal && { signal }),\n                  ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n                });\n              }\n\n              validateAgentUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n\n              // OAuth 2.0 client credentials (RFC 6749 §4.4): re-exchange the\n              // secret for a fresh access token whenever the cached one is within\n              // its expiration skew. Runs before every call so mid-session expiry\n              // can't leave the caller with a stale bearer. No-op if the agent\n              // doesn't declare client credentials. Cheap on warm cache (single\n              // `Date.now()` compare); a single POST to the token endpoint on miss.\n              //\n              // `allowPrivateIp` inherits the trust the caller already placed in\n              // `agent.agent_uri` — if they're making a call to a private-IP agent,\n              // they've authorized this process to talk to private-IP hosts, so\n              // the token endpoint on the same network is reachable too. Public\n              // agent URLs with private-IP token endpoints still require an\n              // explicit opt-in via the library API.\n              if (agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n                const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                  storage: ccStorage,\n                  allowPrivateIp,\n                  fetch: transport?.fetchFn,\n                });\n              }\n\n              const authToken = getAuthToken(agent);\n\n              // RFC 9421 signing context. Built once per call and passed through\n              // to each protocol-layer entry (`callMCPToolWithTasks`, `callA2ATool`,\n              // `callMCPToolWithOAuth`) — those entries seed `signingContextStorage`\n              // (AsyncLocalStorage) so the internal transport helpers read it\n              // without an explicit parameter. Keep the explicit arg here: it's the\n              // ALS seed, not incidental plumbing. `get_adcp_capabilities` is\n              // exempt from signing (it's the discovery call itself) and also\n              // triggers cache priming for any other op on agents with\n              // `request_signing` configured.\n              const signingContext = buildAgentSigningContext(agent);\n              if (signingContext && toolName !== CAPABILITY_OP) {\n                await ensureCapabilityLoaded(agent, signingContext, primeArgs =>\n                  ProtocolClient.callTool(agent, CAPABILITY_OP, primeArgs, {\n                    debugLogs,\n                    serverVersion,\n                    adcpVersion,\n                    ...(versionEnvelopeMode !== 'auto' && { versionEnvelope: versionEnvelopeMode }),\n                    transport,\n                    signal,\n                    ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n                    onTransportActivity,\n                    transportActivityContext,\n                  })\n                );\n              }\n\n              // Inject the version envelope on every request so sellers can validate\n              // compatibility. Skip for v2 servers — they don't recognise the\n              // version fields and strict-schema agents reject them. The envelope\n              // shape is per-pin: 3.0 pins get the integer `adcp_major_version`\n              // alone; 3.1+ pins get both that and the release-precision string\n              // `adcp_version` (`'3.1'` / `'3.1.0-beta.1'`) per spec PR\n              // `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`.\n              const argsWithVersion = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);\n\n              // Build push_notification_config for ASYNC TASK STATUS notifications\n              // (NOT for reporting_webhook - that stays in args)\n              // Schema: https://adcontextprotocol.org/schemas/v1/core/push-notification-config.json\n              const pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig | undefined = webhookUrl\n                ? {\n                    url: webhookUrl,\n                    ...(webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }),\n                    authentication: {\n                      schemes: ['HMAC-SHA256'],\n                      credentials: webhookSecret || 'placeholder_secret_min_32_characters_required',\n                    },\n                  }\n                : undefined;\n\n              if (agent.protocol === 'mcp') {\n                // For MCP, include push_notification_config in tool arguments (MCP spec)\n                const argsWithWebhook = pushNotificationConfig\n                  ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig }\n                  : argsWithVersion;\n\n                // If the agent config carries authorization-code OAuth tokens,\n                // route through the OAuth provider path so the MCP SDK can refresh\n                // on 401 instead of hard-failing. Excludes client-credentials\n                // agents: they have a cached access token but no refresh_token,\n                // and their refresh path is a secret re-exchange (handled above),\n                // not the SDK's refresh_token grant.\n                if (agent.oauth_tokens && !agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n                  const authProvider = getNonInteractiveOAuthProvider(agent, {\n                    agentHint: agent.id,\n                    storage: getAgentStorage(agent),\n                    allowHttp: isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri),\n                  });\n                  try {\n                    return await callMCPToolWithOAuth({\n                      agentUrl: agent.agent_uri,\n                      toolName,\n                      args: argsWithWebhook,\n                      authProvider,\n                      debugLogs,\n                      customHeaders: agent.headers,\n                      signingContext,\n                      signal,\n                      requestTimeoutMs: transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                      fetchFn: transport?.fetchFn,\n                    });\n                  } catch (err) {\n                    // Refresh failed or server rejected the refreshed token — walk the\n                    // discovery chain so the caller can distinguish \"re-auth needed\"\n                    // from other failure modes.\n                    await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                    throw err;\n                  }\n                }\n\n                // Use callMCPToolWithTasks which auto-detects server tasks capability\n                // and falls back to standard callTool when tasks are not supported\n                try {\n                  return await callMCPToolWithTasks(\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    toolName,\n                    argsWithWebhook,\n                    authToken,\n                    debugLogs,\n                    agent.headers,\n                    {\n                      ...(signingContext && { signingContext }),\n                      ...(signal && { signal }),\n                      ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && {\n                        requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs,\n                      }),\n                      ...(transport?.fetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.fetchFn }),\n                    }\n                  );\n                } catch (err) {\n                  // Client-credentials agents: on 401, the AS may have rotated\n                  // something out-of-band. Force a fresh exchange and retry once\n                  // before surfacing the error. Bounded (single retry) so we don't\n                  // loop if the credentials are genuinely wrong.\n                  if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {\n                    const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                    const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                    await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                      storage: ccStorage,\n                      force: true,\n                      allowPrivateIp,\n                      fetch: transport?.fetchFn,\n                    });\n                    const retryAuthToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token ?? authToken;\n                    try {\n                      return await callMCPToolWithTasks(\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        toolName,\n                        argsWithWebhook,\n                        retryAuthToken,\n                        debugLogs,\n                        agent.headers,\n                        {\n                          ...(signingContext && { signingContext }),\n                          ...(signal && { signal }),\n                          ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && {\n                            requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs,\n                          }),\n                          ...(transport?.fetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.fetchFn }),\n                        }\n                      );\n                    } catch (retryErr) {\n                      await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(retryErr, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                      throw retryErr;\n                    }\n                  }\n                  await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                  throw err;\n                }\n              } else if (agent.protocol === 'a2a') {\n                // For A2A, pass pushNotificationConfig separately (not in skill parameters)\n                try {\n                  return await callA2ATool(\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    toolName,\n                    argsWithVersion,\n                    authToken,\n                    debugLogs,\n                    pushNotificationConfig,\n                    agent.headers,\n                    signingContext,\n                    session,\n                    signal,\n                    transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                    transport?.fetchFn\n                  );\n                } catch (err) {\n                  // Same single-retry-on-401 for client-credentials agents as the\n                  // MCP path above. Kept symmetric so A2A CC agents aren't a\n                  // second-class experience — including the NeedsAuthorizationError\n                  // rewrap on a retry that still 401s.\n                  if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {\n                    const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                    const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                    await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                      storage: ccStorage,\n                      force: true,\n                      allowPrivateIp,\n                      fetch: transport?.fetchFn,\n                    });\n                    const retryAuthToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token ?? authToken;\n                    try {\n                      return await callA2ATool(\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        toolName,\n                        argsWithVersion,\n                        retryAuthToken,\n                        debugLogs,\n                        pushNotificationConfig,\n                        agent.headers,\n                        signingContext,\n                        session,\n                        signal,\n                        transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                        transport?.fetchFn\n                      );\n                    } catch (retryErr) {\n                      await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(retryErr, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                      throw retryErr;\n                    }\n                  }\n                  await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                  throw err;\n                }\n              } else {\n                throw new Error(`Unsupported protocol: ${agent.protocol}`);\n              }\n            }\n          )\n      )\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * If `err` looks like a 401 from the MCP transport, probe the agent for a\n * Bearer challenge and throw a {@link NeedsAuthorizationError} carrying\n * walked discovery metadata. If the error isn't a 401 or we can't build a\n * requirements record, return silently so the caller re-throws the original.\n *\n * Keeping this off the hot path: we only probe on error, and the probe is\n * a single unauthenticated `tools/list` POST — no retries, no DNS rebind.\n */\nasync function rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err: unknown, agentUrl: string, fetchFn?: typeof fetch): Promise<void> {\n  if (err instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError) throw err;\n  if (!is401Error(err)) return;\n\n  // If the caller has already connected to the agent URL, they've implicitly\n  // trusted it — inherit that trust for the discovery probe so loopback /\n  // private-IP development agents work the same way as public ones.\n  const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agentUrl);\n\n  // discoverAuthorizationRequirements internally catches network failures and\n  // returns null rather than throwing — anything that escapes is a genuine\n  // bug we want to surface rather than mask the 401 with.\n  const requirements = await discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, { allowPrivateIp, fetchFn });\n  if (requirements) {\n    throw new NeedsAuthorizationError(requirements);\n  }\n  // No requirements walked; let the caller re-throw the original error.\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple factory functions for protocol-specific clients.\n *\n * Both factories accept a `transport` argument that flows through to the\n * size-cap surface so callers reaching the factory exports honor the same\n * `maxResponseBytes` contract as `ProtocolClient.callTool`. Without it,\n * the factories would silently bypass the cap, which the public API\n * (`TransportOptions`) implies they honor.\n */\nexport const createMCPClient = (\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3',\n  adcpVersion?: string,\n  transport?: TransportOptions,\n  versionEnvelopeMode: VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto'\n) => {\n  // Validate the pin at factory time so a typo surfaces here rather than at\n  // first call. `buildVersionEnvelope` throws via `resolveWireMajor` on bad\n  // input — call it once to surface, then close over the envelope.\n  const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(versionEnvelopeMode, adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n  return {\n    callTool: (toolName: string, args: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) =>\n      withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n        callMCPToolWithTasks(\n          agentUrl,\n          toolName,\n          applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope),\n          authToken,\n          debugLogs,\n          headers,\n          {\n            ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n            ...(transport?.fetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.fetchFn }),\n          }\n        )\n      ),\n  };\n};\n\nexport const createA2AClient = (\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3',\n  adcpVersion?: string,\n  transport?: TransportOptions,\n  versionEnvelopeMode: VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto'\n) => {\n  const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(versionEnvelopeMode, adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n  return {\n    callTool: (toolName: string, parameters: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) =>\n      withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n        callA2ATool(\n          agentUrl,\n          toolName,\n          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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/protocols/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// Unified Protocol Interface for AdCP\nexport {\n  callMCPTool,\n  callMCPToolWithOAuth,\n  connectMCP,\n  closeMCPConnections,\n  closeOAuthConnections,\n  UnauthorizedError,\n} from './mcp';\n\nimport { closeMCPConnections } from './mcp';\nimport { closeA2AConnections } from './a2a';\n\n/**\n * Close protocol connections for the given protocol.\n * MCP closes persistent HTTP transports; A2A clears the agent-card client cache.\n */\nexport async function closeConnections(protocol: 'mcp' | 'a2a' = 'mcp'): Promise<void> {\n  if (protocol === 'mcp') {\n    await closeMCPConnections();\n  } else {\n    closeA2AConnections();\n  }\n}\nexport type { MCPCallOptions, MCPConnectionResult } from './mcp';\nexport { callA2ATool } from './a2a';\nexport { DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS } from './abort';\nexport {\n  callMCPToolWithTasks,\n  getMCPTaskStatus,\n  getMCPTaskResult,\n  listMCPTasks,\n  cancelMCPTask,\n  mapMCPTaskStatus,\n  serverSupportsTasks,\n} from './mcp-tasks';\n\nimport { callMCPToolWithTasks, callMCPToolWithClient } from './mcp-tasks';\nimport { callMCPToolWithOAuth } from './mcp';\nimport { callA2ATool } from './a2a';\nimport type { AgentConfig, DebugLogEntry } from '../types';\nimport type { PushNotificationConfig } from '../types/tools.generated';\nimport { getAuthToken } from '../auth';\nimport {\n  discoverAuthorizationRequirements,\n  NeedsAuthorizationError,\n  getAgentStorage,\n  ensureClientCredentialsTokens,\n} from '../auth/oauth';\nimport { getNonInteractiveOAuthProvider } from '../auth/oauth/provider-cache';\nimport { is401Error } from '../errors';\nimport { isLikelyPrivateUrl } from '../net';\nimport { validateAgentUrl } from '../validation';\nimport { withSpan } from '../observability/tracing';\nimport { ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION, ADCP_VERSION, parseAdcpMajorVersion } from '../version';\nimport { ConfigurationError } from '../errors';\nimport { resolveBundleKey, toReleasePrecisionWire, validateAdcpVersionWire } from '../validation/schema-loader';\nimport { buildAgentSigningContext, CAPABILITY_OP, ensureCapabilityLoaded } from '../signing/client';\nimport { withResponseSizeLimit } from './responseSizeLimit';\nimport {\n  withTransportDiagnostics,\n  type TransportActivityHandler as TransportActivityHandlerFn,\n} from './transportDiagnostics';\n\nexport {\n  sanitizeTransportHeaders,\n  sanitizeTransportUrl,\n  withTransportDiagnostics,\n  wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics,\n} from './transportDiagnostics';\nexport type { TransportActivity, TransportActivityContext, TransportActivityHandler } from './transportDiagnostics';\n\nexport type VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto' | 'none' | 'major-only';\n\n/**\n * Derive the wire-level `adcp_major_version` integer from a caller-supplied\n * pin. Returns the SDK default when no pin is provided; throws on a pin\n * that doesn't parse so misuse surfaces at the factory boundary instead\n * of silently emitting the SDK's major.\n *\n * Throws `ConfigurationError` (not a plain `Error`) so a typo'd pin\n * surfaces with the same error class as the construction-time gate in\n * `resolveAdcpVersion` — one shape for all pin-misuse paths.\n */\nfunction resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion: string | undefined): number {\n  if (adcpVersion === undefined) return ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION;\n  const parsed = parseAdcpMajorVersion(adcpVersion);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(parsed)) {\n    throw new ConfigurationError(\n      `adcpVersion ${JSON.stringify(adcpVersion)} is not a valid AdCP version. ` +\n        `Expected a semver string (e.g. '3.0.1', '3.1.0-beta.1') or a legacy alias (e.g. 'v3').`,\n      'adcpVersion'\n    );\n  }\n  return parsed;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when the AdCP release that `bundleKey` identifies declares the\n * top-level `adcp_version` envelope field. The field landed in AdCP 3.1 per\n * spec PR `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493` — 3.0 (any patch / prerelease) does\n * not carry it; 3.1+ does. Used to gate dual-emit on the wire so a 3.0-pinned\n * client doesn't emit a field its target schema doesn't define.\n */\nexport function bundleSupportsAdcpVersionField(bundleKey: string): boolean {\n  const major = parseAdcpMajorVersion(bundleKey);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(major)) return false;\n  if (major < 3) return false;\n  if (major > 3) return true;\n  // Major 3 — only 3.1+ has the field. Bundle key shape is normalized by\n  // `resolveBundleKey`: `'3.0'` / `'3.1'` for stable; `'3.0.0-beta.1'` /\n  // `'3.1.0-beta.1'` for prereleases. Match the minor.\n  const minorMatch = bundleKey.match(/^\\d+\\.(\\d+)/);\n  if (!minorMatch) return false;\n  return parseInt(minorMatch[1]!, 10) >= 1;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the wire-level version envelope to merge into outgoing request args.\n *\n * Per AdCP 3.1 (spec PR `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`), 3.1+ requests carry\n * BOTH the integer `adcp_major_version` (deprecated through 3.x, removed in\n * 4.0) AND the release-precision string `adcp_version`. 3.0 schemas don't\n * define the string field, so a 3.0-pinned client emits the integer only —\n * matches the 3.0 spec exactly.\n *\n * Wire string is release-precision (MAJOR.MINOR with optional prerelease tag),\n * per `core/version-envelope.json`'s pattern `^\\d+\\.\\d+(-[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)?$`.\n * Full-semver bundle keys (`'3.1.0-beta.1'`) are collapsed via\n * `toReleasePrecisionWire` to `'3.1-beta.1'` before emit — meta-field shapes\n * are explicitly NOT valid wire values per the envelope schema's own\n * normalization rule.\n *\n * Returns `{}` for v2 callers (predates the major-version field entirely).\n */\nfunction buildVersionEnvelope(\n  adcpVersion: string | undefined,\n  serverVersion: 'v2' | 'v3' | undefined\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  if (serverVersion === 'v2') return {};\n  const wireMajor = resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion);\n  const bundleKey = resolveBundleKey(adcpVersion ?? ADCP_VERSION);\n  if (!bundleSupportsAdcpVersionField(bundleKey)) {\n    return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor };\n  }\n  const wireValue = toReleasePrecisionWire(bundleKey);\n  // Defensive postcondition — should never throw in well-formed code, but\n  // if a future refactor breaks the normalization the error message tells\n  // the developer to call `toReleasePrecisionWire` instead of silently\n  // emitting a non-spec wire string.\n  validateAdcpVersionWire(wireValue);\n  return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor, adcp_version: wireValue };\n}\n\nlet hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret = false;\n\n/**\n * Warn once when an async webhook registration is suppressed for a v2 seller.\n *\n * v2.5's `push-notification-config.json` requires `authentication`, and unlike\n * 3.x it has no RFC 9421 selector semantics — so omitting the block produces a\n * schema-invalid request rather than choosing a signing mode. Without a\n * configured secret there is no honest value to send, and the previous\n * behaviour (a hardcoded placeholder credential) told the seller the channel\n * was authenticated by a constant published in this package.\n */\nfunction warnV2PushNotificationNeedsSecret(): void {\n  if (hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret) return;\n  hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret = true;\n  console.warn(\n    '[adcp] Suppressing push_notification_config for a v2 seller: AdCP 2.5 requires an ' +\n      '`authentication` block and no `webhookSecret` is configured. Set `webhookSecret` to register ' +\n      'async task-status webhooks with this agent, or move the agent to an AdCP 3.x pin, where the ' +\n      'RFC 9421 webhook profile needs no shared secret.'\n  );\n}\n\nfunction buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(\n  mode: VersionEnvelopeMode,\n  adcpVersion: string | undefined,\n  serverVersion: 'v2' | 'v3' | undefined\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  if (mode === 'none' || serverVersion === 'v2') return {};\n  if (mode === 'major-only') return { adcp_major_version: resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion) };\n  return buildVersionEnvelope(adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n}\n\n/**\n * Merge the wire-level version envelope into a caller-supplied args object.\n * Caller args win: an explicit `adcp_major_version` / `adcp_version` in\n * `args` (e.g. a conformance harness probing `VERSION_UNSUPPORTED`) passes\n * through unchanged. The envelope only fills fields the caller didn't set.\n *\n * Single chokepoint for all four wire-injection sites so a future refactor\n * can't silently flip the spread order on one branch and leave the others\n * intact. Stale dual-field drift is caught at the server boundary by\n * `createAdcpServer`'s field-disagreement check (spec PR\n * `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function applyVersionEnvelope(\n  args: Record<string, unknown>,\n  envelope: Record<string, unknown>\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return { ...envelope, ...args };\n}\n\n/**\n * Transport-level safeguards applied to a call.\n *\n * Wired into the SDK's internal fetch chain via AsyncLocalStorage, so the\n * cap takes effect even when the underlying transport's connection cache\n * reuses a fetch that was created on an earlier call with different limits.\n */\nexport interface TransportOptions {\n  /**\n   * Maximum response body size (in octets) the SDK will read before aborting\n   * with `ResponseTooLargeError`. When unset, the SDK does not impose a cap —\n   * matches the underlying MCP / A2A transport defaults.\n   *\n   * Set this when crawling **untrusted** agents (registries, federated\n   * discovery layers, monitoring tools) to prevent a hostile vendor from\n   * buffering a large reply before any application-layer schema validation\n   * runs. Counted across response chunks; pre-cancels when `Content-Length`\n   * exceeds the cap. Applies to A2A agent-card discovery\n   * (`/.well-known/agent.json`) on the same call as well.\n   *\n   * Per-call override (`TaskOptions.transport.maxResponseBytes`) beats the\n   * value set on the client constructor (`SingleAgentClientConfig.transport`).\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Safe to set on all calls.** SSE responses (`text/event-stream`) are\n   * passed through unchanged — a single tool call legitimately emits N status\n   * frames + a final result, bounded by protocol-level framing rather than\n   * cumulative byte counts. The cap applies to one-shot JSON responses\n   * (`get_adcp_capabilities`, agent-card lookup, tool result payloads on\n   * non-streaming transports) where the body is bounded by definition.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Hostile-peer note:** A peer can opt itself out of this cap by responding\n   * with `Content-Type: text/event-stream`. SSE is bypassed because cumulative\n   * event-frame bytes are unbounded by spec — MCP and A2A both stream tool\n   * responses this way. The MCP/A2A SDKs consume SSE incrementally and frame\n   * termination bounds memory in practice, so this is not a memory-bomb risk\n   * for well-formed transports. Adopters relying on `maxResponseBytes` as a\n   * hostile-server defense should treat it as best-effort for non-SSE\n   * responses only.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * Future hardening knobs (DNS-rebind defense, scheme allow-list, request\n   * timeout overrides) will land here as additional fields. When `fetchFn`\n   * is supplied, the SDK composes it inside its signing, capture, size-limit,\n   * timeout, and diagnostics wrappers so callers do not have to reproduce\n   * that non-obvious ordering themselves.\n   */\n  maxResponseBytes?: number;\n  /**\n   * Scoped fetch implementation for all outbound HTTP performed on behalf of\n   * this client or call, including endpoint/card discovery, tool listing,\n   * OAuth discovery and token refresh, and MCP/A2A tool requests.\n   *\n   * The function is runtime-only configuration and is never serialized into\n   * agent records, storyboard artifacts, or compliance output. When unset,\n   * the SDK uses the global `fetch` implementation.\n   *\n   * For SSRF-sensitive metadata probes, supplying this function makes it the\n   * trusted network boundary: the SDK still validates schemes and resolved\n   * addresses, but a custom fetch API cannot accept the SDK's pinned undici\n   * dispatcher. The implementation must therefore prevent DNS rebinding (for\n   * example with an egress proxy or its own DNS pinning).\n   */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * Timeout in milliseconds for bounded one-shot transport requests such as\n   * A2A agent-card discovery and MCP read-path probes. Defaults to 60 seconds\n   * for A2A discovery so an unresponsive card endpoint cannot hang forever.\n   * Set to `0` to disable the SDK-imposed discovery timeout.\n   */\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link ProtocolClient.callTool}. All fields are optional.\n *\n * `webhookUrl` / `webhookSecret` / `webhookToken` are for ASYNC TASK STATUS\n * notifications (push_notification_config). For reporting webhooks\n * (reporting_webhook), include them directly in `args` — they stay in skill\n * parameters and are sent verbatim to the agent.\n */\nexport interface CallToolOptions {\n  /** Debug log array. Mutated in place by the protocol layer. */\n  debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[];\n  /** URL for async task status notifications. */\n  webhookUrl?: string;\n  /** HMAC-SHA256 secret for push_notification_config authentication. */\n  webhookSecret?: string;\n  /** Bearer token for push_notification_config validation. */\n  webhookToken?: string;\n  /** Pinned protocol generation when the agent advertises both v2 and v3. */\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3';\n  /** A2A session continuity (contextId carries conversation, taskId resumes a task). */\n  session?: { contextId?: string; taskId?: string };\n  /**\n   * AdCP version pin from the calling client/server instance. Sets the\n   * wire-level `adcp_major_version` field per-call instead of from the\n   * SDK-pinned `ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION` constant. Default falls back to the\n   * constant so call sites that don't plumb a per-instance version keep\n   * their existing behavior. An explicit `adcp_major_version` /\n   * `adcp_version` in `args` overrides this — conformance harnesses use\n   * that path to probe seller version negotiation.\n   */\n  adcpVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional wire-only version override. Schema selection and client\n   * construction can remain pinned to `adcpVersion`; the request envelope is\n   * emitted for this release-precision line.\n   */\n  wireAdcpVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Controls whether the SDK injects AdCP version envelope fields into the\n   * outgoing request. Defaults to `auto`. 3.0 pins emit only the legacy\n   * `adcp_major_version`; 3.1+ pins emit both the legacy major and exact\n   * `adcp_version` marker. `major-only` forces the legacy integer marker\n   * without the 3.1 string marker for strict pre-3.1 peers discovered at\n   * runtime.\n   */\n  versionEnvelope?: VersionEnvelopeMode;\n  /**\n   * Transport-level safeguards (size caps, etc.). Per-call override of any\n   * matching field on the client constructor's `transport` option.\n   */\n  transport?: TransportOptions;\n  /** Caller-owned cancellation signal for the in-flight protocol call. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  /** Transport-level diagnostics callback for outbound HTTP requests. */\n  onTransportActivity?: TransportActivityHandlerFn;\n  /**\n   * Correlation metadata attached to transport diagnostics events emitted\n   * while this protocol call is active.\n   */\n  transportActivityContext?: {\n    operationId?: string;\n    taskId?: string;\n    contextId?: string;\n    idempotencyKey?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Universal protocol client - automatically routes to the correct protocol implementation\n */\nexport class ProtocolClient {\n  /**\n   * Call a tool on an agent using the appropriate protocol.\n   *\n   * @param agent - Agent configuration\n   * @param toolName - Name of the tool/skill to call\n   * @param args - Tool arguments (includes reporting_webhook if needed - NOT removed)\n   * @param options - Optional call-level configuration. See {@link CallToolOptions}.\n   */\n  static async callTool(\n    agent: AgentConfig,\n    toolName: string,\n    args: Record<string, unknown>,\n    options: CallToolOptions = {}\n  ): Promise<unknown> {\n    const {\n      debugLogs = [],\n      webhookUrl,\n      webhookSecret,\n      webhookToken,\n      serverVersion,\n      session,\n      adcpVersion,\n      wireAdcpVersion,\n      versionEnvelope: versionEnvelopeMode = 'auto',\n      transport,\n      signal,\n      onTransportActivity,\n      transportActivityContext,\n    } = options;\n    // Per-instance version envelope. Throws on unparseable pins via\n    // `resolveWireMajor`; construction-time `resolveAdcpVersion` is the\n    // primary gate but this is the failsafe for callers reaching\n    // `ProtocolClient.callTool` directly (test harnesses, the in-process\n    // MCP path). Returns `{ adcp_major_version }` for 3.0 pins and\n    // `{ adcp_major_version, adcp_version }` for 3.1+ pins.\n    const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(\n      versionEnvelopeMode,\n      wireAdcpVersion ?? adcpVersion,\n      serverVersion\n    );\n    // Enter the response-size-limit ALS slot once for this call. The slot is\n    // read by `wrapFetchWithSizeLimit` in both protocol transports, so the\n    // cap applies regardless of which path (MCP / A2A / OAuth refresh) the\n    // call ends up taking. No-op when the cap is unset or non-positive.\n    return withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n      withTransportDiagnostics(\n        {\n          agentId: agent.id,\n          protocol: agent.protocol,\n          tool: toolName,\n          taskType: toolName,\n          ...transportActivityContext,\n          onTransportActivity,\n        },\n        () =>\n          withSpan(\n            `adcp.${agent.protocol}.call_tool`,\n            {\n              'adcp.agent_id': agent.id,\n              'adcp.protocol': agent.protocol,\n              'adcp.tool': toolName,\n              'http.url': agent.agent_uri,\n            },\n            async () => {\n              // In-process MCP path: pre-connected client, no HTTP transport.\n              // Idempotency injection, schema validation, and governance middleware all\n              // still apply (they run in SingleAgentClient above this call). We skip\n              // URL validation, OAuth refresh, and signing — none apply in-process.\n              if (agent.protocol === 'mcp' && agent._inProcessMcpClient) {\n                const inProcArgs = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);\n                return callMCPToolWithClient(agent._inProcessMcpClient, toolName, inProcArgs, debugLogs, {\n                  ...(signal && { signal }),\n                  ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n                });\n              }\n\n              validateAgentUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n\n              // OAuth 2.0 client credentials (RFC 6749 §4.4): re-exchange the\n              // secret for a fresh access token whenever the cached one is within\n              // its expiration skew. Runs before every call so mid-session expiry\n              // can't leave the caller with a stale bearer. No-op if the agent\n              // doesn't declare client credentials. Cheap on warm cache (single\n              // `Date.now()` compare); a single POST to the token endpoint on miss.\n              //\n              // `allowPrivateIp` inherits the trust the caller already placed in\n              // `agent.agent_uri` — if they're making a call to a private-IP agent,\n              // they've authorized this process to talk to private-IP hosts, so\n              // the token endpoint on the same network is reachable too. Public\n              // agent URLs with private-IP token endpoints still require an\n              // explicit opt-in via the library API.\n              if (agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n                const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                  storage: ccStorage,\n                  allowPrivateIp,\n                  fetch: transport?.fetchFn,\n                });\n              }\n\n              const authToken = getAuthToken(agent);\n\n              // RFC 9421 signing context. Built once per call and passed through\n              // to each protocol-layer entry (`callMCPToolWithTasks`, `callA2ATool`,\n              // `callMCPToolWithOAuth`) — those entries seed `signingContextStorage`\n              // (AsyncLocalStorage) so the internal transport helpers read it\n              // without an explicit parameter. Keep the explicit arg here: it's the\n              // ALS seed, not incidental plumbing. `get_adcp_capabilities` is\n              // exempt from signing (it's the discovery call itself) and also\n              // triggers cache priming for any other op on agents with\n              // `request_signing` configured.\n              const signingContext = buildAgentSigningContext(agent);\n              if (signingContext && toolName !== CAPABILITY_OP) {\n                await ensureCapabilityLoaded(agent, signingContext, primeArgs =>\n                  ProtocolClient.callTool(agent, CAPABILITY_OP, primeArgs, {\n                    debugLogs,\n                    serverVersion,\n                    adcpVersion,\n                    ...(versionEnvelopeMode !== 'auto' && { versionEnvelope: versionEnvelopeMode }),\n                    transport,\n                    signal,\n                    ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n                    onTransportActivity,\n                    transportActivityContext,\n                  })\n                );\n              }\n\n              // Inject the version envelope on every request so sellers can validate\n              // compatibility. Skip for v2 servers — they don't recognise the\n              // version fields and strict-schema agents reject them. The envelope\n              // shape is per-pin: 3.0 pins get the integer `adcp_major_version`\n              // alone; 3.1+ pins get both that and the release-precision string\n              // `adcp_version` (`'3.1'` / `'3.1.0-beta.1'`) per spec PR\n              // `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`.\n              const argsWithVersion = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);\n\n              // Build push_notification_config for ASYNC TASK STATUS notifications\n              // (NOT for reporting_webhook - that stays in args)\n              // Schema: https://adcontextprotocol.org/schemas/v1/core/push-notification-config.json\n              // `authentication` is a scheme SELECTOR, not a fallback: from AdCP\n              // 3.0 on, push-notification-config.json makes its presence opt the\n              // seller into legacy HMAC-SHA256 and its absence select the RFC\n              // 9421 webhook profile, with `required: [\"url\"]` only. Emitting it\n              // with a placeholder credential would therefore downgrade every\n              // webhook to legacy HMAC keyed by a constant that ships in this\n              // file, so the block is omitted unless a real secret backs it.\n              //\n              // v2.5 predates the selector: there `required` is\n              // `[\"url\", \"authentication\"]` and there is no 9421 path, so an\n              // omitted block is schema-invalid rather than a mode selection.\n              // With no secret there is nothing honest to send a v2 seller, so\n              // suppress the registration instead of fabricating a credential.\n              const pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig | undefined = (():\n                | PushNotificationConfig\n                | undefined => {\n                if (!webhookUrl) return undefined;\n                if (webhookSecret) {\n                  return {\n                    url: webhookUrl,\n                    ...(webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }),\n                    authentication: {\n                      schemes: ['HMAC-SHA256' as const],\n                      credentials: webhookSecret,\n                    },\n                  };\n                }\n                if (serverVersion === 'v2') {\n                  warnV2PushNotificationNeedsSecret();\n                  return undefined;\n                }\n                return {\n                  url: webhookUrl,\n                  ...(webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }),\n                };\n              })();\n\n              if (agent.protocol === 'mcp') {\n                // For MCP, include push_notification_config in tool arguments (MCP spec)\n                const argsWithWebhook = pushNotificationConfig\n                  ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig }\n                  : argsWithVersion;\n\n                // If the agent config carries authorization-code OAuth tokens,\n                // route through the OAuth provider path so the MCP SDK can refresh\n                // on 401 instead of hard-failing. Excludes client-credentials\n                // agents: they have a cached access token but no refresh_token,\n                // and their refresh path is a secret re-exchange (handled above),\n                // not the SDK's refresh_token grant.\n                if (agent.oauth_tokens && !agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n                  const authProvider = getNonInteractiveOAuthProvider(agent, {\n                    agentHint: agent.id,\n                    storage: getAgentStorage(agent),\n                    allowHttp: isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri),\n                  });\n                  try {\n                    return await callMCPToolWithOAuth({\n                      agentUrl: agent.agent_uri,\n                      toolName,\n                      args: argsWithWebhook,\n                      authProvider,\n                      debugLogs,\n                      customHeaders: agent.headers,\n                      signingContext,\n                      signal,\n                      requestTimeoutMs: transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                      fetchFn: transport?.fetchFn,\n                    });\n                  } catch (err) {\n                    // Refresh failed or server rejected the refreshed token — walk the\n                    // discovery chain so the caller can distinguish \"re-auth needed\"\n                    // from other failure modes.\n                    await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                    throw err;\n                  }\n                }\n\n                // Use callMCPToolWithTasks which auto-detects server tasks capability\n                // and falls back to standard callTool when tasks are not supported\n                try {\n                  return await callMCPToolWithTasks(\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    toolName,\n                    argsWithWebhook,\n                    authToken,\n                    debugLogs,\n                    agent.headers,\n                    {\n                      ...(signingContext && { signingContext }),\n                      ...(signal && { signal }),\n                      ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && {\n                        requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs,\n                      }),\n                      ...(transport?.fetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.fetchFn }),\n                    }\n                  );\n                } catch (err) {\n                  // Client-credentials agents: on 401, the AS may have rotated\n                  // something out-of-band. Force a fresh exchange and retry once\n                  // before surfacing the error. Bounded (single retry) so we don't\n                  // loop if the credentials are genuinely wrong.\n                  if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {\n                    const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                    const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                    await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                      storage: ccStorage,\n                      force: true,\n                      allowPrivateIp,\n                      fetch: transport?.fetchFn,\n                    });\n                    const retryAuthToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token ?? authToken;\n                    try {\n                      return await callMCPToolWithTasks(\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        toolName,\n                        argsWithWebhook,\n                        retryAuthToken,\n                        debugLogs,\n                        agent.headers,\n                        {\n                          ...(signingContext && { signingContext }),\n                          ...(signal && { signal }),\n                          ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && {\n                            requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs,\n                          }),\n                          ...(transport?.fetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.fetchFn }),\n                        }\n                      );\n                    } catch (retryErr) {\n                      await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(retryErr, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                      throw retryErr;\n                    }\n                  }\n                  await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                  throw err;\n                }\n              } else if (agent.protocol === 'a2a') {\n                // For A2A, pass pushNotificationConfig separately (not in skill parameters)\n                try {\n                  return await callA2ATool(\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    toolName,\n                    argsWithVersion,\n                    authToken,\n                    debugLogs,\n                    pushNotificationConfig,\n                    agent.headers,\n                    signingContext,\n                    session,\n                    signal,\n                    transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                    transport?.fetchFn\n                  );\n                } catch (err) {\n                  // Same single-retry-on-401 for client-credentials agents as the\n                  // MCP path above. Kept symmetric so A2A CC agents aren't a\n                  // second-class experience — including the NeedsAuthorizationError\n                  // rewrap on a retry that still 401s.\n                  if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {\n                    const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                    const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                    await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                      storage: ccStorage,\n                      force: true,\n                      allowPrivateIp,\n                      fetch: transport?.fetchFn,\n                    });\n                    const retryAuthToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token ?? authToken;\n                    try {\n                      return await callA2ATool(\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        toolName,\n                        argsWithVersion,\n                        retryAuthToken,\n                        debugLogs,\n                        pushNotificationConfig,\n                        agent.headers,\n                        signingContext,\n                        session,\n                        signal,\n                        transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                        transport?.fetchFn\n                      );\n                    } catch (retryErr) {\n                      await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(retryErr, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                      throw retryErr;\n                    }\n                  }\n                  await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                  throw err;\n                }\n              } else {\n                throw new Error(`Unsupported protocol: ${agent.protocol}`);\n              }\n            }\n          )\n      )\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * If `err` looks like a 401 from the MCP transport, probe the agent for a\n * Bearer challenge and throw a {@link NeedsAuthorizationError} carrying\n * walked discovery metadata. If the error isn't a 401 or we can't build a\n * requirements record, return silently so the caller re-throws the original.\n *\n * Keeping this off the hot path: we only probe on error, and the probe is\n * a single unauthenticated `tools/list` POST — no retries, no DNS rebind.\n */\nasync function rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err: unknown, agentUrl: string, fetchFn?: typeof fetch): Promise<void> {\n  if (err instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError) throw err;\n  if (!is401Error(err)) return;\n\n  // If the caller has already connected to the agent URL, they've implicitly\n  // trusted it — inherit that trust for the discovery probe so loopback /\n  // private-IP development agents work the same way as public ones.\n  const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agentUrl);\n\n  // discoverAuthorizationRequirements internally catches network failures and\n  // returns null rather than throwing — anything that escapes is a genuine\n  // bug we want to surface rather than mask the 401 with.\n  const requirements = await discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, { allowPrivateIp, fetchFn });\n  if (requirements) {\n    throw new NeedsAuthorizationError(requirements);\n  }\n  // No requirements walked; let the caller re-throw the original error.\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple factory functions for protocol-specific clients.\n *\n * Both factories accept a `transport` argument that flows through to the\n * size-cap surface so callers reaching the factory exports honor the same\n * `maxResponseBytes` contract as `ProtocolClient.callTool`. Without it,\n * the factories would silently bypass the cap, which the public API\n * (`TransportOptions`) implies they honor.\n */\nexport const createMCPClient = (\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3',\n  adcpVersion?: string,\n  transport?: TransportOptions,\n  versionEnvelopeMode: VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto'\n) => {\n  // Validate the pin at factory time so a typo surfaces here rather than at\n  // first call. `buildVersionEnvelope` throws via `resolveWireMajor` on bad\n  // input — call it once to surface, then close over the envelope.\n  const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(versionEnvelopeMode, adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n  return {\n    callTool: (toolName: string, args: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) =>\n      withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n        callMCPToolWithTasks(\n          agentUrl,\n          toolName,\n          applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope),\n          authToken,\n          debugLogs,\n          headers,\n          {\n            ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n            ...(transport?.fetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.fetchFn }),\n          }\n        )\n      ),\n  };\n};\n\nexport const createA2AClient = (\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3',\n  adcpVersion?: string,\n  transport?: TransportOptions,\n  versionEnvelopeMode: VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto'\n) => {\n  const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(versionEnvelopeMode, adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n  return {\n    callTool: (toolName: string, parameters: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) =>\n      withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n        callA2ATool(\n          agentUrl,\n          toolName,\n          applyVersionEnvelope(parameters, versionEnvelope),\n          authToken,\n          debugLogs,\n          undefined,\n          headers,\n          undefined,\n          undefined,\n          undefined,\n          transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n          transport?.fetchFn\n        )\n      ),\n  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package/dist/lib/protocols/index.mjs

@@ -91,6 +91,14 @@ function buildVersionEnvelope(adcpVersion, serverVersion) {
   validateAdcpVersionWire(wireValue);
   return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor, adcp_version: wireValue };
 }
+let hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret = false;
+function warnV2PushNotificationNeedsSecret() {
+  if (hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret) return;
+  hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret = true;
+  console.warn(
+    "[adcp] Suppressing push_notification_config for a v2 seller: AdCP 2.5 requires an `authentication` block and no `webhookSecret` is configured. Set `webhookSecret` to register async task-status webhooks with this agent, or move the agent to an AdCP 3.x pin, where the RFC 9421 webhook profile needs no shared secret."
+  );
+}
 function buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(mode, adcpVersion, serverVersion) {
   if (mode === "none" || serverVersion === "v2") return {};
   if (mode === "major-only") return { adcp_major_version: resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion) };
@@ -186,14 +194,27 @@ class ProtocolClient {
               );
             }
             const argsWithVersion = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);
-            const pushNotificationConfig = webhookUrl ? {
-              url: webhookUrl,
-              ...webhookToken && { token: webhookToken },
-              authentication: {
-                schemes: ["HMAC-SHA256"],
-                credentials: webhookSecret || "placeholder_secret_min_32_characters_required"
+            const pushNotificationConfig = (() => {
+              if (!webhookUrl) return void 0;
+              if (webhookSecret) {
+                return {
+                  url: webhookUrl,
+                  ...webhookToken && { token: webhookToken },
+                  authentication: {
+                    schemes: ["HMAC-SHA256"],
+                    credentials: webhookSecret
+                  }
+                };
+              }
+              if (serverVersion === "v2") {
+                warnV2PushNotificationNeedsSecret();
+                return void 0;
               }
-            } : void 0;
+              return {
+                url: webhookUrl,
+                ...webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }
+              };
+            })();
             if (agent.protocol === "mcp") {
               const argsWithWebhook = pushNotificationConfig ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig } : argsWithVersion;
               if (agent.oauth_tokens && !agent.oauth_client_credentials) {

package/dist/lib/protocols/index.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/protocols/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';\nimport { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';\nimport { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';\nconst __dirname = __adcpDirname(__adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url));\nconst require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);\n// Unified Protocol Interface for AdCP\nexport {\n  callMCPTool,\n  callMCPToolWithOAuth,\n  connectMCP,\n  closeMCPConnections,\n  closeOAuthConnections,\n  UnauthorizedError,\n} from './mcp';\n\nimport { closeMCPConnections } from './mcp';\nimport { closeA2AConnections } from './a2a';\n\n/**\n * Close protocol connections for the given protocol.\n * MCP closes persistent HTTP transports; A2A clears the agent-card client cache.\n */\nexport async function closeConnections(protocol: 'mcp' | 'a2a' = 'mcp'): Promise<void> {\n  if (protocol === 'mcp') {\n    await closeMCPConnections();\n  } else {\n    closeA2AConnections();\n  }\n}\nexport type { MCPCallOptions, MCPConnectionResult } from './mcp';\nexport { callA2ATool } from './a2a';\nexport { DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS } from './abort';\nexport {\n  callMCPToolWithTasks,\n  getMCPTaskStatus,\n  getMCPTaskResult,\n  listMCPTasks,\n  cancelMCPTask,\n  mapMCPTaskStatus,\n  serverSupportsTasks,\n} from './mcp-tasks';\n\nimport { callMCPToolWithTasks, callMCPToolWithClient } from './mcp-tasks';\nimport { callMCPToolWithOAuth } from './mcp';\nimport { callA2ATool } from './a2a';\nimport type { AgentConfig, DebugLogEntry } from '../types';\nimport type { PushNotificationConfig } from '../types/tools.generated';\nimport { getAuthToken } from '../auth';\nimport {\n  discoverAuthorizationRequirements,\n  NeedsAuthorizationError,\n  getAgentStorage,\n  ensureClientCredentialsTokens,\n} from '../auth/oauth';\nimport { getNonInteractiveOAuthProvider } from '../auth/oauth/provider-cache';\nimport { is401Error } from '../errors';\nimport { isLikelyPrivateUrl } from '../net';\nimport { validateAgentUrl } from '../validation';\nimport { withSpan } from '../observability/tracing';\nimport { ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION, ADCP_VERSION, parseAdcpMajorVersion } from '../version';\nimport { ConfigurationError } from '../errors';\nimport { resolveBundleKey, toReleasePrecisionWire, validateAdcpVersionWire } from '../validation/schema-loader';\nimport { buildAgentSigningContext, CAPABILITY_OP, ensureCapabilityLoaded } from '../signing/client';\nimport { withResponseSizeLimit } from './responseSizeLimit';\nimport {\n  withTransportDiagnostics,\n  type TransportActivityHandler as TransportActivityHandlerFn,\n} from './transportDiagnostics';\n\nexport {\n  sanitizeTransportHeaders,\n  sanitizeTransportUrl,\n  withTransportDiagnostics,\n  wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics,\n} from './transportDiagnostics';\nexport type { TransportActivity, TransportActivityContext, TransportActivityHandler } from './transportDiagnostics';\n\nexport type VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto' | 'none' | 'major-only';\n\n/**\n * Derive the wire-level `adcp_major_version` integer from a caller-supplied\n * pin. Returns the SDK default when no pin is provided; throws on a pin\n * that doesn't parse so misuse surfaces at the factory boundary instead\n * of silently emitting the SDK's major.\n *\n * Throws `ConfigurationError` (not a plain `Error`) so a typo'd pin\n * surfaces with the same error class as the construction-time gate in\n * `resolveAdcpVersion` — one shape for all pin-misuse paths.\n */\nfunction resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion: string | undefined): number {\n  if (adcpVersion === undefined) return ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION;\n  const parsed = parseAdcpMajorVersion(adcpVersion);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(parsed)) {\n    throw new ConfigurationError(\n      `adcpVersion ${JSON.stringify(adcpVersion)} is not a valid AdCP version. ` +\n        `Expected a semver string (e.g. '3.0.1', '3.1.0-beta.1') or a legacy alias (e.g. 'v3').`,\n      'adcpVersion'\n    );\n  }\n  return parsed;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when the AdCP release that `bundleKey` identifies declares the\n * top-level `adcp_version` envelope field. The field landed in AdCP 3.1 per\n * spec PR `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493` — 3.0 (any patch / prerelease) does\n * not carry it; 3.1+ does. Used to gate dual-emit on the wire so a 3.0-pinned\n * client doesn't emit a field its target schema doesn't define.\n */\nexport function bundleSupportsAdcpVersionField(bundleKey: string): boolean {\n  const major = parseAdcpMajorVersion(bundleKey);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(major)) return false;\n  if (major < 3) return false;\n  if (major > 3) return true;\n  // Major 3 — only 3.1+ has the field. Bundle key shape is normalized by\n  // `resolveBundleKey`: `'3.0'` / `'3.1'` for stable; `'3.0.0-beta.1'` /\n  // `'3.1.0-beta.1'` for prereleases. Match the minor.\n  const minorMatch = bundleKey.match(/^\\d+\\.(\\d+)/);\n  if (!minorMatch) return false;\n  return parseInt(minorMatch[1]!, 10) >= 1;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the wire-level version envelope to merge into outgoing request args.\n *\n * Per AdCP 3.1 (spec PR `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`), 3.1+ requests carry\n * BOTH the integer `adcp_major_version` (deprecated through 3.x, removed in\n * 4.0) AND the release-precision string `adcp_version`. 3.0 schemas don't\n * define the string field, so a 3.0-pinned client emits the integer only —\n * matches the 3.0 spec exactly.\n *\n * Wire string is release-precision (MAJOR.MINOR with optional prerelease tag),\n * per `core/version-envelope.json`'s pattern `^\\d+\\.\\d+(-[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)?$`.\n * Full-semver bundle keys (`'3.1.0-beta.1'`) are collapsed via\n * `toReleasePrecisionWire` to `'3.1-beta.1'` before emit — meta-field shapes\n * are explicitly NOT valid wire values per the envelope schema's own\n * normalization rule.\n *\n * Returns `{}` for v2 callers (predates the major-version field entirely).\n */\nfunction buildVersionEnvelope(\n  adcpVersion: string | undefined,\n  serverVersion: 'v2' | 'v3' | undefined\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  if (serverVersion === 'v2') return {};\n  const wireMajor = resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion);\n  const bundleKey = resolveBundleKey(adcpVersion ?? ADCP_VERSION);\n  if (!bundleSupportsAdcpVersionField(bundleKey)) {\n    return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor };\n  }\n  const wireValue = toReleasePrecisionWire(bundleKey);\n  // Defensive postcondition — should never throw in well-formed code, but\n  // if a future refactor breaks the normalization the error message tells\n  // the developer to call `toReleasePrecisionWire` instead of silently\n  // emitting a non-spec wire string.\n  validateAdcpVersionWire(wireValue);\n  return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor, adcp_version: wireValue };\n}\n\nfunction buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(\n  mode: VersionEnvelopeMode,\n  adcpVersion: string | undefined,\n  serverVersion: 'v2' | 'v3' | undefined\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  if (mode === 'none' || serverVersion === 'v2') return {};\n  if (mode === 'major-only') return { adcp_major_version: resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion) };\n  return buildVersionEnvelope(adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n}\n\n/**\n * Merge the wire-level version envelope into a caller-supplied args object.\n * Caller args win: an explicit `adcp_major_version` / `adcp_version` in\n * `args` (e.g. a conformance harness probing `VERSION_UNSUPPORTED`) passes\n * through unchanged. The envelope only fills fields the caller didn't set.\n *\n * Single chokepoint for all four wire-injection sites so a future refactor\n * can't silently flip the spread order on one branch and leave the others\n * intact. Stale dual-field drift is caught at the server boundary by\n * `createAdcpServer`'s field-disagreement check (spec PR\n * `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function applyVersionEnvelope(\n  args: Record<string, unknown>,\n  envelope: Record<string, unknown>\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return { ...envelope, ...args };\n}\n\n/**\n * Transport-level safeguards applied to a call.\n *\n * Wired into the SDK's internal fetch chain via AsyncLocalStorage, so the\n * cap takes effect even when the underlying transport's connection cache\n * reuses a fetch that was created on an earlier call with different limits.\n */\nexport interface TransportOptions {\n  /**\n   * Maximum response body size (in octets) the SDK will read before aborting\n   * with `ResponseTooLargeError`. When unset, the SDK does not impose a cap —\n   * matches the underlying MCP / A2A transport defaults.\n   *\n   * Set this when crawling **untrusted** agents (registries, federated\n   * discovery layers, monitoring tools) to prevent a hostile vendor from\n   * buffering a large reply before any application-layer schema validation\n   * runs. Counted across response chunks; pre-cancels when `Content-Length`\n   * exceeds the cap. Applies to A2A agent-card discovery\n   * (`/.well-known/agent.json`) on the same call as well.\n   *\n   * Per-call override (`TaskOptions.transport.maxResponseBytes`) beats the\n   * value set on the client constructor (`SingleAgentClientConfig.transport`).\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Safe to set on all calls.** SSE responses (`text/event-stream`) are\n   * passed through unchanged — a single tool call legitimately emits N status\n   * frames + a final result, bounded by protocol-level framing rather than\n   * cumulative byte counts. The cap applies to one-shot JSON responses\n   * (`get_adcp_capabilities`, agent-card lookup, tool result payloads on\n   * non-streaming transports) where the body is bounded by definition.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Hostile-peer note:** A peer can opt itself out of this cap by responding\n   * with `Content-Type: text/event-stream`. SSE is bypassed because cumulative\n   * event-frame bytes are unbounded by spec — MCP and A2A both stream tool\n   * responses this way. The MCP/A2A SDKs consume SSE incrementally and frame\n   * termination bounds memory in practice, so this is not a memory-bomb risk\n   * for well-formed transports. Adopters relying on `maxResponseBytes` as a\n   * hostile-server defense should treat it as best-effort for non-SSE\n   * responses only.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * Future hardening knobs (DNS-rebind defense, scheme allow-list, request\n   * timeout overrides) will land here as additional fields. When `fetchFn`\n   * is supplied, the SDK composes it inside its signing, capture, size-limit,\n   * timeout, and diagnostics wrappers so callers do not have to reproduce\n   * that non-obvious ordering themselves.\n   */\n  maxResponseBytes?: number;\n  /**\n   * Scoped fetch implementation for all outbound HTTP performed on behalf of\n   * this client or call, including endpoint/card discovery, tool listing,\n   * OAuth discovery and token refresh, and MCP/A2A tool requests.\n   *\n   * The function is runtime-only configuration and is never serialized into\n   * agent records, storyboard artifacts, or compliance output. When unset,\n   * the SDK uses the global `fetch` implementation.\n   *\n   * For SSRF-sensitive metadata probes, supplying this function makes it the\n   * trusted network boundary: the SDK still validates schemes and resolved\n   * addresses, but a custom fetch API cannot accept the SDK's pinned undici\n   * dispatcher. The implementation must therefore prevent DNS rebinding (for\n   * example with an egress proxy or its own DNS pinning).\n   */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * Timeout in milliseconds for bounded one-shot transport requests such as\n   * A2A agent-card discovery and MCP read-path probes. Defaults to 60 seconds\n   * for A2A discovery so an unresponsive card endpoint cannot hang forever.\n   * Set to `0` to disable the SDK-imposed discovery timeout.\n   */\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link ProtocolClient.callTool}. All fields are optional.\n *\n * `webhookUrl` / `webhookSecret` / `webhookToken` are for ASYNC TASK STATUS\n * notifications (push_notification_config). For reporting webhooks\n * (reporting_webhook), include them directly in `args` — they stay in skill\n * parameters and are sent verbatim to the agent.\n */\nexport interface CallToolOptions {\n  /** Debug log array. Mutated in place by the protocol layer. */\n  debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[];\n  /** URL for async task status notifications. */\n  webhookUrl?: string;\n  /** HMAC-SHA256 secret for push_notification_config authentication. */\n  webhookSecret?: string;\n  /** Bearer token for push_notification_config validation. */\n  webhookToken?: string;\n  /** Pinned protocol generation when the agent advertises both v2 and v3. */\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3';\n  /** A2A session continuity (contextId carries conversation, taskId resumes a task). */\n  session?: { contextId?: string; taskId?: string };\n  /**\n   * AdCP version pin from the calling client/server instance. Sets the\n   * wire-level `adcp_major_version` field per-call instead of from the\n   * SDK-pinned `ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION` constant. Default falls back to the\n   * constant so call sites that don't plumb a per-instance version keep\n   * their existing behavior. An explicit `adcp_major_version` /\n   * `adcp_version` in `args` overrides this — conformance harnesses use\n   * that path to probe seller version negotiation.\n   */\n  adcpVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional wire-only version override. Schema selection and client\n   * construction can remain pinned to `adcpVersion`; the request envelope is\n   * emitted for this release-precision line.\n   */\n  wireAdcpVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Controls whether the SDK injects AdCP version envelope fields into the\n   * outgoing request. Defaults to `auto`. 3.0 pins emit only the legacy\n   * `adcp_major_version`; 3.1+ pins emit both the legacy major and exact\n   * `adcp_version` marker. `major-only` forces the legacy integer marker\n   * without the 3.1 string marker for strict pre-3.1 peers discovered at\n   * runtime.\n   */\n  versionEnvelope?: VersionEnvelopeMode;\n  /**\n   * Transport-level safeguards (size caps, etc.). Per-call override of any\n   * matching field on the client constructor's `transport` option.\n   */\n  transport?: TransportOptions;\n  /** Caller-owned cancellation signal for the in-flight protocol call. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  /** Transport-level diagnostics callback for outbound HTTP requests. */\n  onTransportActivity?: TransportActivityHandlerFn;\n  /**\n   * Correlation metadata attached to transport diagnostics events emitted\n   * while this protocol call is active.\n   */\n  transportActivityContext?: {\n    operationId?: string;\n    taskId?: string;\n    contextId?: string;\n    idempotencyKey?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Universal protocol client - automatically routes to the correct protocol implementation\n */\nexport class ProtocolClient {\n  /**\n   * Call a tool on an agent using the appropriate protocol.\n   *\n   * @param agent - Agent configuration\n   * @param toolName - Name of the tool/skill to call\n   * @param args - Tool arguments (includes reporting_webhook if needed - NOT removed)\n   * @param options - Optional call-level configuration. See {@link CallToolOptions}.\n   */\n  static async callTool(\n    agent: AgentConfig,\n    toolName: string,\n    args: Record<string, unknown>,\n    options: CallToolOptions = {}\n  ): Promise<unknown> {\n    const {\n      debugLogs = [],\n      webhookUrl,\n      webhookSecret,\n      webhookToken,\n      serverVersion,\n      session,\n      adcpVersion,\n      wireAdcpVersion,\n      versionEnvelope: versionEnvelopeMode = 'auto',\n      transport,\n      signal,\n      onTransportActivity,\n      transportActivityContext,\n    } = options;\n    // Per-instance version envelope. Throws on unparseable pins via\n    // `resolveWireMajor`; construction-time `resolveAdcpVersion` is the\n    // primary gate but this is the failsafe for callers reaching\n    // `ProtocolClient.callTool` directly (test harnesses, the in-process\n    // MCP path). Returns `{ adcp_major_version }` for 3.0 pins and\n    // `{ adcp_major_version, adcp_version }` for 3.1+ pins.\n    const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(\n      versionEnvelopeMode,\n      wireAdcpVersion ?? adcpVersion,\n      serverVersion\n    );\n    // Enter the response-size-limit ALS slot once for this call. The slot is\n    // read by `wrapFetchWithSizeLimit` in both protocol transports, so the\n    // cap applies regardless of which path (MCP / A2A / OAuth refresh) the\n    // call ends up taking. No-op when the cap is unset or non-positive.\n    return withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n      withTransportDiagnostics(\n        {\n          agentId: agent.id,\n          protocol: agent.protocol,\n          tool: toolName,\n          taskType: toolName,\n          ...transportActivityContext,\n          onTransportActivity,\n        },\n        () =>\n          withSpan(\n            `adcp.${agent.protocol}.call_tool`,\n            {\n              'adcp.agent_id': agent.id,\n              'adcp.protocol': agent.protocol,\n              'adcp.tool': toolName,\n              'http.url': agent.agent_uri,\n            },\n            async () => {\n              // In-process MCP path: pre-connected client, no HTTP transport.\n              // Idempotency injection, schema validation, and governance middleware all\n              // still apply (they run in SingleAgentClient above this call). We skip\n              // URL validation, OAuth refresh, and signing — none apply in-process.\n              if (agent.protocol === 'mcp' && agent._inProcessMcpClient) {\n                const inProcArgs = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);\n                return callMCPToolWithClient(agent._inProcessMcpClient, toolName, inProcArgs, debugLogs, {\n                  ...(signal && { signal }),\n                  ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n                });\n              }\n\n              validateAgentUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n\n              // OAuth 2.0 client credentials (RFC 6749 §4.4): re-exchange the\n              // secret for a fresh access token whenever the cached one is within\n              // its expiration skew. Runs before every call so mid-session expiry\n              // can't leave the caller with a stale bearer. No-op if the agent\n              // doesn't declare client credentials. Cheap on warm cache (single\n              // `Date.now()` compare); a single POST to the token endpoint on miss.\n              //\n              // `allowPrivateIp` inherits the trust the caller already placed in\n              // `agent.agent_uri` — if they're making a call to a private-IP agent,\n              // they've authorized this process to talk to private-IP hosts, so\n              // the token endpoint on the same network is reachable too. Public\n              // agent URLs with private-IP token endpoints still require an\n              // explicit opt-in via the library API.\n              if (agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n                const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                  storage: ccStorage,\n                  allowPrivateIp,\n                  fetch: transport?.fetchFn,\n                });\n              }\n\n              const authToken = getAuthToken(agent);\n\n              // RFC 9421 signing context. Built once per call and passed through\n              // to each protocol-layer entry (`callMCPToolWithTasks`, `callA2ATool`,\n              // `callMCPToolWithOAuth`) — those entries seed `signingContextStorage`\n              // (AsyncLocalStorage) so the internal transport helpers read it\n              // without an explicit parameter. Keep the explicit arg here: it's the\n              // ALS seed, not incidental plumbing. `get_adcp_capabilities` is\n              // exempt from signing (it's the discovery call itself) and also\n              // triggers cache priming for any other op on agents with\n              // `request_signing` configured.\n              const signingContext = buildAgentSigningContext(agent);\n              if (signingContext && toolName !== CAPABILITY_OP) {\n                await ensureCapabilityLoaded(agent, signingContext, primeArgs =>\n                  ProtocolClient.callTool(agent, CAPABILITY_OP, primeArgs, {\n                    debugLogs,\n                    serverVersion,\n                    adcpVersion,\n                    ...(versionEnvelopeMode !== 'auto' && { versionEnvelope: versionEnvelopeMode }),\n                    transport,\n                    signal,\n                    ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n                    onTransportActivity,\n                    transportActivityContext,\n                  })\n                );\n              }\n\n              // Inject the version envelope on every request so sellers can validate\n              // compatibility. Skip for v2 servers — they don't recognise the\n              // version fields and strict-schema agents reject them. The envelope\n              // shape is per-pin: 3.0 pins get the integer `adcp_major_version`\n              // alone; 3.1+ pins get both that and the release-precision string\n              // `adcp_version` (`'3.1'` / `'3.1.0-beta.1'`) per spec PR\n              // `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`.\n              const argsWithVersion = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);\n\n              // Build push_notification_config for ASYNC TASK STATUS notifications\n              // (NOT for reporting_webhook - that stays in args)\n              // Schema: https://adcontextprotocol.org/schemas/v1/core/push-notification-config.json\n              const pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig | undefined = webhookUrl\n                ? {\n                    url: webhookUrl,\n                    ...(webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }),\n                    authentication: {\n                      schemes: ['HMAC-SHA256'],\n                      credentials: webhookSecret || 'placeholder_secret_min_32_characters_required',\n                    },\n                  }\n                : undefined;\n\n              if (agent.protocol === 'mcp') {\n                // For MCP, include push_notification_config in tool arguments (MCP spec)\n                const argsWithWebhook = pushNotificationConfig\n                  ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig }\n                  : argsWithVersion;\n\n                // If the agent config carries authorization-code OAuth tokens,\n                // route through the OAuth provider path so the MCP SDK can refresh\n                // on 401 instead of hard-failing. Excludes client-credentials\n                // agents: they have a cached access token but no refresh_token,\n                // and their refresh path is a secret re-exchange (handled above),\n                // not the SDK's refresh_token grant.\n                if (agent.oauth_tokens && !agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n                  const authProvider = getNonInteractiveOAuthProvider(agent, {\n                    agentHint: agent.id,\n                    storage: getAgentStorage(agent),\n                    allowHttp: isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri),\n                  });\n                  try {\n                    return await callMCPToolWithOAuth({\n                      agentUrl: agent.agent_uri,\n                      toolName,\n                      args: argsWithWebhook,\n                      authProvider,\n                      debugLogs,\n                      customHeaders: agent.headers,\n                      signingContext,\n                      signal,\n                      requestTimeoutMs: transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                      fetchFn: transport?.fetchFn,\n                    });\n                  } catch (err) {\n                    // Refresh failed or server rejected the refreshed token — walk the\n                    // discovery chain so the caller can distinguish \"re-auth needed\"\n                    // from other failure modes.\n                    await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                    throw err;\n                  }\n                }\n\n                // Use callMCPToolWithTasks which auto-detects server tasks capability\n                // and falls back to standard callTool when tasks are not supported\n                try {\n                  return await callMCPToolWithTasks(\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    toolName,\n                    argsWithWebhook,\n                    authToken,\n                    debugLogs,\n                    agent.headers,\n                    {\n                      ...(signingContext && { signingContext }),\n                      ...(signal && { signal }),\n                      ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && {\n                        requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs,\n                      }),\n                      ...(transport?.fetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.fetchFn }),\n                    }\n                  );\n                } catch (err) {\n                  // Client-credentials agents: on 401, the AS may have rotated\n                  // something out-of-band. Force a fresh exchange and retry once\n                  // before surfacing the error. Bounded (single retry) so we don't\n                  // loop if the credentials are genuinely wrong.\n                  if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {\n                    const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                    const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                    await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                      storage: ccStorage,\n                      force: true,\n                      allowPrivateIp,\n                      fetch: transport?.fetchFn,\n                    });\n                    const retryAuthToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token ?? authToken;\n                    try {\n                      return await callMCPToolWithTasks(\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        toolName,\n                        argsWithWebhook,\n                        retryAuthToken,\n                        debugLogs,\n                        agent.headers,\n                        {\n                          ...(signingContext && { signingContext }),\n                          ...(signal && { signal }),\n                          ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && {\n                            requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs,\n                          }),\n                          ...(transport?.fetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.fetchFn }),\n                        }\n                      );\n                    } catch (retryErr) {\n                      await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(retryErr, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                      throw retryErr;\n                    }\n                  }\n                  await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                  throw err;\n                }\n              } else if (agent.protocol === 'a2a') {\n                // For A2A, pass pushNotificationConfig separately (not in skill parameters)\n                try {\n                  return await callA2ATool(\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    toolName,\n                    argsWithVersion,\n                    authToken,\n                    debugLogs,\n                    pushNotificationConfig,\n                    agent.headers,\n                    signingContext,\n                    session,\n                    signal,\n                    transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                    transport?.fetchFn\n                  );\n                } catch (err) {\n                  // Same single-retry-on-401 for client-credentials agents as the\n                  // MCP path above. Kept symmetric so A2A CC agents aren't a\n                  // second-class experience — including the NeedsAuthorizationError\n                  // rewrap on a retry that still 401s.\n                  if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {\n                    const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                    const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                    await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                      storage: ccStorage,\n                      force: true,\n                      allowPrivateIp,\n                      fetch: transport?.fetchFn,\n                    });\n                    const retryAuthToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token ?? authToken;\n                    try {\n                      return await callA2ATool(\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        toolName,\n                        argsWithVersion,\n                        retryAuthToken,\n                        debugLogs,\n                        pushNotificationConfig,\n                        agent.headers,\n                        signingContext,\n                        session,\n                        signal,\n                        transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                        transport?.fetchFn\n                      );\n                    } catch (retryErr) {\n                      await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(retryErr, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                      throw retryErr;\n                    }\n                  }\n                  await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                  throw err;\n                }\n              } else {\n                throw new Error(`Unsupported protocol: ${agent.protocol}`);\n              }\n            }\n          )\n      )\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * If `err` looks like a 401 from the MCP transport, probe the agent for a\n * Bearer challenge and throw a {@link NeedsAuthorizationError} carrying\n * walked discovery metadata. If the error isn't a 401 or we can't build a\n * requirements record, return silently so the caller re-throws the original.\n *\n * Keeping this off the hot path: we only probe on error, and the probe is\n * a single unauthenticated `tools/list` POST — no retries, no DNS rebind.\n */\nasync function rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err: unknown, agentUrl: string, fetchFn?: typeof fetch): Promise<void> {\n  if (err instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError) throw err;\n  if (!is401Error(err)) return;\n\n  // If the caller has already connected to the agent URL, they've implicitly\n  // trusted it — inherit that trust for the discovery probe so loopback /\n  // private-IP development agents work the same way as public ones.\n  const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agentUrl);\n\n  // discoverAuthorizationRequirements internally catches network failures and\n  // returns null rather than throwing — anything that escapes is a genuine\n  // bug we want to surface rather than mask the 401 with.\n  const requirements = await discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, { allowPrivateIp, fetchFn });\n  if (requirements) {\n    throw new NeedsAuthorizationError(requirements);\n  }\n  // No requirements walked; let the caller re-throw the original error.\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple factory functions for protocol-specific clients.\n *\n * Both factories accept a `transport` argument that flows through to the\n * size-cap surface so callers reaching the factory exports honor the same\n * `maxResponseBytes` contract as `ProtocolClient.callTool`. Without it,\n * the factories would silently bypass the cap, which the public API\n * (`TransportOptions`) implies they honor.\n */\nexport const createMCPClient = (\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3',\n  adcpVersion?: string,\n  transport?: TransportOptions,\n  versionEnvelopeMode: VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto'\n) => {\n  // Validate the pin at factory time so a typo surfaces here rather than at\n  // first call. `buildVersionEnvelope` throws via `resolveWireMajor` on bad\n  // input — call it once to surface, then close over the envelope.\n  const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(versionEnvelopeMode, adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n  return {\n    callTool: (toolName: string, args: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) =>\n      withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n        callMCPToolWithTasks(\n          agentUrl,\n          toolName,\n          applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope),\n          authToken,\n          debugLogs,\n          headers,\n          {\n            ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n            ...(transport?.fetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.fetchFn }),\n          }\n        )\n      ),\n  };\n};\n\nexport const createA2AClient = (\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3',\n  adcpVersion?: string,\n  transport?: TransportOptions,\n  versionEnvelopeMode: VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto'\n) => {\n  const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(versionEnvelopeMode, adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n  return {\n    callTool: (toolName: string, parameters: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) =>\n      withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n        callA2ATool(\n          agentUrl,\n          toolName,\n          applyVersionEnvelope(parameters, versionEnvelope),\n          authToken,\n          debugLogs,\n          undefined,\n          headers,\n          undefined,\n          undefined,\n          undefined,\n          transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n          transport?.fetchFn\n        )\n      ),\n  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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/protocols/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';\nimport { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';\nimport { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';\nconst __dirname = __adcpDirname(__adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url));\nconst require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);\n// Unified Protocol Interface for AdCP\nexport {\n  callMCPTool,\n  callMCPToolWithOAuth,\n  connectMCP,\n  closeMCPConnections,\n  closeOAuthConnections,\n  UnauthorizedError,\n} from './mcp';\n\nimport { closeMCPConnections } from './mcp';\nimport { closeA2AConnections } from './a2a';\n\n/**\n * Close protocol connections for the given protocol.\n * MCP closes persistent HTTP transports; A2A clears the agent-card client cache.\n */\nexport async function closeConnections(protocol: 'mcp' | 'a2a' = 'mcp'): Promise<void> {\n  if (protocol === 'mcp') {\n    await closeMCPConnections();\n  } else {\n    closeA2AConnections();\n  }\n}\nexport type { MCPCallOptions, MCPConnectionResult } from './mcp';\nexport { callA2ATool } from './a2a';\nexport { DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS } from './abort';\nexport {\n  callMCPToolWithTasks,\n  getMCPTaskStatus,\n  getMCPTaskResult,\n  listMCPTasks,\n  cancelMCPTask,\n  mapMCPTaskStatus,\n  serverSupportsTasks,\n} from './mcp-tasks';\n\nimport { callMCPToolWithTasks, callMCPToolWithClient } from './mcp-tasks';\nimport { callMCPToolWithOAuth } from './mcp';\nimport { callA2ATool } from './a2a';\nimport type { AgentConfig, DebugLogEntry } from '../types';\nimport type { PushNotificationConfig } from '../types/tools.generated';\nimport { getAuthToken } from '../auth';\nimport {\n  discoverAuthorizationRequirements,\n  NeedsAuthorizationError,\n  getAgentStorage,\n  ensureClientCredentialsTokens,\n} from '../auth/oauth';\nimport { getNonInteractiveOAuthProvider } from '../auth/oauth/provider-cache';\nimport { is401Error } from '../errors';\nimport { isLikelyPrivateUrl } from '../net';\nimport { validateAgentUrl } from '../validation';\nimport { withSpan } from '../observability/tracing';\nimport { ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION, ADCP_VERSION, parseAdcpMajorVersion } from '../version';\nimport { ConfigurationError } from '../errors';\nimport { resolveBundleKey, toReleasePrecisionWire, validateAdcpVersionWire } from '../validation/schema-loader';\nimport { buildAgentSigningContext, CAPABILITY_OP, ensureCapabilityLoaded } from '../signing/client';\nimport { withResponseSizeLimit } from './responseSizeLimit';\nimport {\n  withTransportDiagnostics,\n  type TransportActivityHandler as TransportActivityHandlerFn,\n} from './transportDiagnostics';\n\nexport {\n  sanitizeTransportHeaders,\n  sanitizeTransportUrl,\n  withTransportDiagnostics,\n  wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics,\n} from './transportDiagnostics';\nexport type { TransportActivity, TransportActivityContext, TransportActivityHandler } from './transportDiagnostics';\n\nexport type VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto' | 'none' | 'major-only';\n\n/**\n * Derive the wire-level `adcp_major_version` integer from a caller-supplied\n * pin. Returns the SDK default when no pin is provided; throws on a pin\n * that doesn't parse so misuse surfaces at the factory boundary instead\n * of silently emitting the SDK's major.\n *\n * Throws `ConfigurationError` (not a plain `Error`) so a typo'd pin\n * surfaces with the same error class as the construction-time gate in\n * `resolveAdcpVersion` — one shape for all pin-misuse paths.\n */\nfunction resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion: string | undefined): number {\n  if (adcpVersion === undefined) return ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION;\n  const parsed = parseAdcpMajorVersion(adcpVersion);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(parsed)) {\n    throw new ConfigurationError(\n      `adcpVersion ${JSON.stringify(adcpVersion)} is not a valid AdCP version. ` +\n        `Expected a semver string (e.g. '3.0.1', '3.1.0-beta.1') or a legacy alias (e.g. 'v3').`,\n      'adcpVersion'\n    );\n  }\n  return parsed;\n}\n\n/**\n * Returns true when the AdCP release that `bundleKey` identifies declares the\n * top-level `adcp_version` envelope field. The field landed in AdCP 3.1 per\n * spec PR `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493` — 3.0 (any patch / prerelease) does\n * not carry it; 3.1+ does. Used to gate dual-emit on the wire so a 3.0-pinned\n * client doesn't emit a field its target schema doesn't define.\n */\nexport function bundleSupportsAdcpVersionField(bundleKey: string): boolean {\n  const major = parseAdcpMajorVersion(bundleKey);\n  if (!Number.isFinite(major)) return false;\n  if (major < 3) return false;\n  if (major > 3) return true;\n  // Major 3 — only 3.1+ has the field. Bundle key shape is normalized by\n  // `resolveBundleKey`: `'3.0'` / `'3.1'` for stable; `'3.0.0-beta.1'` /\n  // `'3.1.0-beta.1'` for prereleases. Match the minor.\n  const minorMatch = bundleKey.match(/^\\d+\\.(\\d+)/);\n  if (!minorMatch) return false;\n  return parseInt(minorMatch[1]!, 10) >= 1;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the wire-level version envelope to merge into outgoing request args.\n *\n * Per AdCP 3.1 (spec PR `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`), 3.1+ requests carry\n * BOTH the integer `adcp_major_version` (deprecated through 3.x, removed in\n * 4.0) AND the release-precision string `adcp_version`. 3.0 schemas don't\n * define the string field, so a 3.0-pinned client emits the integer only —\n * matches the 3.0 spec exactly.\n *\n * Wire string is release-precision (MAJOR.MINOR with optional prerelease tag),\n * per `core/version-envelope.json`'s pattern `^\\d+\\.\\d+(-[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+)?$`.\n * Full-semver bundle keys (`'3.1.0-beta.1'`) are collapsed via\n * `toReleasePrecisionWire` to `'3.1-beta.1'` before emit — meta-field shapes\n * are explicitly NOT valid wire values per the envelope schema's own\n * normalization rule.\n *\n * Returns `{}` for v2 callers (predates the major-version field entirely).\n */\nfunction buildVersionEnvelope(\n  adcpVersion: string | undefined,\n  serverVersion: 'v2' | 'v3' | undefined\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  if (serverVersion === 'v2') return {};\n  const wireMajor = resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion);\n  const bundleKey = resolveBundleKey(adcpVersion ?? ADCP_VERSION);\n  if (!bundleSupportsAdcpVersionField(bundleKey)) {\n    return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor };\n  }\n  const wireValue = toReleasePrecisionWire(bundleKey);\n  // Defensive postcondition — should never throw in well-formed code, but\n  // if a future refactor breaks the normalization the error message tells\n  // the developer to call `toReleasePrecisionWire` instead of silently\n  // emitting a non-spec wire string.\n  validateAdcpVersionWire(wireValue);\n  return { adcp_major_version: wireMajor, adcp_version: wireValue };\n}\n\nlet hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret = false;\n\n/**\n * Warn once when an async webhook registration is suppressed for a v2 seller.\n *\n * v2.5's `push-notification-config.json` requires `authentication`, and unlike\n * 3.x it has no RFC 9421 selector semantics — so omitting the block produces a\n * schema-invalid request rather than choosing a signing mode. Without a\n * configured secret there is no honest value to send, and the previous\n * behaviour (a hardcoded placeholder credential) told the seller the channel\n * was authenticated by a constant published in this package.\n */\nfunction warnV2PushNotificationNeedsSecret(): void {\n  if (hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret) return;\n  hasWarnedAboutV2PushNotificationSecret = true;\n  console.warn(\n    '[adcp] Suppressing push_notification_config for a v2 seller: AdCP 2.5 requires an ' +\n      '`authentication` block and no `webhookSecret` is configured. Set `webhookSecret` to register ' +\n      'async task-status webhooks with this agent, or move the agent to an AdCP 3.x pin, where the ' +\n      'RFC 9421 webhook profile needs no shared secret.'\n  );\n}\n\nfunction buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(\n  mode: VersionEnvelopeMode,\n  adcpVersion: string | undefined,\n  serverVersion: 'v2' | 'v3' | undefined\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  if (mode === 'none' || serverVersion === 'v2') return {};\n  if (mode === 'major-only') return { adcp_major_version: resolveWireMajor(adcpVersion) };\n  return buildVersionEnvelope(adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n}\n\n/**\n * Merge the wire-level version envelope into a caller-supplied args object.\n * Caller args win: an explicit `adcp_major_version` / `adcp_version` in\n * `args` (e.g. a conformance harness probing `VERSION_UNSUPPORTED`) passes\n * through unchanged. The envelope only fills fields the caller didn't set.\n *\n * Single chokepoint for all four wire-injection sites so a future refactor\n * can't silently flip the spread order on one branch and leave the others\n * intact. Stale dual-field drift is caught at the server boundary by\n * `createAdcpServer`'s field-disagreement check (spec PR\n * `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function applyVersionEnvelope(\n  args: Record<string, unknown>,\n  envelope: Record<string, unknown>\n): Record<string, unknown> {\n  return { ...envelope, ...args };\n}\n\n/**\n * Transport-level safeguards applied to a call.\n *\n * Wired into the SDK's internal fetch chain via AsyncLocalStorage, so the\n * cap takes effect even when the underlying transport's connection cache\n * reuses a fetch that was created on an earlier call with different limits.\n */\nexport interface TransportOptions {\n  /**\n   * Maximum response body size (in octets) the SDK will read before aborting\n   * with `ResponseTooLargeError`. When unset, the SDK does not impose a cap —\n   * matches the underlying MCP / A2A transport defaults.\n   *\n   * Set this when crawling **untrusted** agents (registries, federated\n   * discovery layers, monitoring tools) to prevent a hostile vendor from\n   * buffering a large reply before any application-layer schema validation\n   * runs. Counted across response chunks; pre-cancels when `Content-Length`\n   * exceeds the cap. Applies to A2A agent-card discovery\n   * (`/.well-known/agent.json`) on the same call as well.\n   *\n   * Per-call override (`TaskOptions.transport.maxResponseBytes`) beats the\n   * value set on the client constructor (`SingleAgentClientConfig.transport`).\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Safe to set on all calls.** SSE responses (`text/event-stream`) are\n   * passed through unchanged — a single tool call legitimately emits N status\n   * frames + a final result, bounded by protocol-level framing rather than\n   * cumulative byte counts. The cap applies to one-shot JSON responses\n   * (`get_adcp_capabilities`, agent-card lookup, tool result payloads on\n   * non-streaming transports) where the body is bounded by definition.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * **Hostile-peer note:** A peer can opt itself out of this cap by responding\n   * with `Content-Type: text/event-stream`. SSE is bypassed because cumulative\n   * event-frame bytes are unbounded by spec — MCP and A2A both stream tool\n   * responses this way. The MCP/A2A SDKs consume SSE incrementally and frame\n   * termination bounds memory in practice, so this is not a memory-bomb risk\n   * for well-formed transports. Adopters relying on `maxResponseBytes` as a\n   * hostile-server defense should treat it as best-effort for non-SSE\n   * responses only.\n   *\n   * @remarks\n   * Future hardening knobs (DNS-rebind defense, scheme allow-list, request\n   * timeout overrides) will land here as additional fields. When `fetchFn`\n   * is supplied, the SDK composes it inside its signing, capture, size-limit,\n   * timeout, and diagnostics wrappers so callers do not have to reproduce\n   * that non-obvious ordering themselves.\n   */\n  maxResponseBytes?: number;\n  /**\n   * Scoped fetch implementation for all outbound HTTP performed on behalf of\n   * this client or call, including endpoint/card discovery, tool listing,\n   * OAuth discovery and token refresh, and MCP/A2A tool requests.\n   *\n   * The function is runtime-only configuration and is never serialized into\n   * agent records, storyboard artifacts, or compliance output. When unset,\n   * the SDK uses the global `fetch` implementation.\n   *\n   * For SSRF-sensitive metadata probes, supplying this function makes it the\n   * trusted network boundary: the SDK still validates schemes and resolved\n   * addresses, but a custom fetch API cannot accept the SDK's pinned undici\n   * dispatcher. The implementation must therefore prevent DNS rebinding (for\n   * example with an egress proxy or its own DNS pinning).\n   */\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n  /**\n   * Timeout in milliseconds for bounded one-shot transport requests such as\n   * A2A agent-card discovery and MCP read-path probes. Defaults to 60 seconds\n   * for A2A discovery so an unresponsive card endpoint cannot hang forever.\n   * Set to `0` to disable the SDK-imposed discovery timeout.\n   */\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link ProtocolClient.callTool}. All fields are optional.\n *\n * `webhookUrl` / `webhookSecret` / `webhookToken` are for ASYNC TASK STATUS\n * notifications (push_notification_config). For reporting webhooks\n * (reporting_webhook), include them directly in `args` — they stay in skill\n * parameters and are sent verbatim to the agent.\n */\nexport interface CallToolOptions {\n  /** Debug log array. Mutated in place by the protocol layer. */\n  debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[];\n  /** URL for async task status notifications. */\n  webhookUrl?: string;\n  /** HMAC-SHA256 secret for push_notification_config authentication. */\n  webhookSecret?: string;\n  /** Bearer token for push_notification_config validation. */\n  webhookToken?: string;\n  /** Pinned protocol generation when the agent advertises both v2 and v3. */\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3';\n  /** A2A session continuity (contextId carries conversation, taskId resumes a task). */\n  session?: { contextId?: string; taskId?: string };\n  /**\n   * AdCP version pin from the calling client/server instance. Sets the\n   * wire-level `adcp_major_version` field per-call instead of from the\n   * SDK-pinned `ADCP_MAJOR_VERSION` constant. Default falls back to the\n   * constant so call sites that don't plumb a per-instance version keep\n   * their existing behavior. An explicit `adcp_major_version` /\n   * `adcp_version` in `args` overrides this — conformance harnesses use\n   * that path to probe seller version negotiation.\n   */\n  adcpVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Optional wire-only version override. Schema selection and client\n   * construction can remain pinned to `adcpVersion`; the request envelope is\n   * emitted for this release-precision line.\n   */\n  wireAdcpVersion?: string;\n  /**\n   * Controls whether the SDK injects AdCP version envelope fields into the\n   * outgoing request. Defaults to `auto`. 3.0 pins emit only the legacy\n   * `adcp_major_version`; 3.1+ pins emit both the legacy major and exact\n   * `adcp_version` marker. `major-only` forces the legacy integer marker\n   * without the 3.1 string marker for strict pre-3.1 peers discovered at\n   * runtime.\n   */\n  versionEnvelope?: VersionEnvelopeMode;\n  /**\n   * Transport-level safeguards (size caps, etc.). Per-call override of any\n   * matching field on the client constructor's `transport` option.\n   */\n  transport?: TransportOptions;\n  /** Caller-owned cancellation signal for the in-flight protocol call. */\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  /** Transport-level diagnostics callback for outbound HTTP requests. */\n  onTransportActivity?: TransportActivityHandlerFn;\n  /**\n   * Correlation metadata attached to transport diagnostics events emitted\n   * while this protocol call is active.\n   */\n  transportActivityContext?: {\n    operationId?: string;\n    taskId?: string;\n    contextId?: string;\n    idempotencyKey?: string;\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Universal protocol client - automatically routes to the correct protocol implementation\n */\nexport class ProtocolClient {\n  /**\n   * Call a tool on an agent using the appropriate protocol.\n   *\n   * @param agent - Agent configuration\n   * @param toolName - Name of the tool/skill to call\n   * @param args - Tool arguments (includes reporting_webhook if needed - NOT removed)\n   * @param options - Optional call-level configuration. See {@link CallToolOptions}.\n   */\n  static async callTool(\n    agent: AgentConfig,\n    toolName: string,\n    args: Record<string, unknown>,\n    options: CallToolOptions = {}\n  ): Promise<unknown> {\n    const {\n      debugLogs = [],\n      webhookUrl,\n      webhookSecret,\n      webhookToken,\n      serverVersion,\n      session,\n      adcpVersion,\n      wireAdcpVersion,\n      versionEnvelope: versionEnvelopeMode = 'auto',\n      transport,\n      signal,\n      onTransportActivity,\n      transportActivityContext,\n    } = options;\n    // Per-instance version envelope. Throws on unparseable pins via\n    // `resolveWireMajor`; construction-time `resolveAdcpVersion` is the\n    // primary gate but this is the failsafe for callers reaching\n    // `ProtocolClient.callTool` directly (test harnesses, the in-process\n    // MCP path). Returns `{ adcp_major_version }` for 3.0 pins and\n    // `{ adcp_major_version, adcp_version }` for 3.1+ pins.\n    const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(\n      versionEnvelopeMode,\n      wireAdcpVersion ?? adcpVersion,\n      serverVersion\n    );\n    // Enter the response-size-limit ALS slot once for this call. The slot is\n    // read by `wrapFetchWithSizeLimit` in both protocol transports, so the\n    // cap applies regardless of which path (MCP / A2A / OAuth refresh) the\n    // call ends up taking. No-op when the cap is unset or non-positive.\n    return withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n      withTransportDiagnostics(\n        {\n          agentId: agent.id,\n          protocol: agent.protocol,\n          tool: toolName,\n          taskType: toolName,\n          ...transportActivityContext,\n          onTransportActivity,\n        },\n        () =>\n          withSpan(\n            `adcp.${agent.protocol}.call_tool`,\n            {\n              'adcp.agent_id': agent.id,\n              'adcp.protocol': agent.protocol,\n              'adcp.tool': toolName,\n              'http.url': agent.agent_uri,\n            },\n            async () => {\n              // In-process MCP path: pre-connected client, no HTTP transport.\n              // Idempotency injection, schema validation, and governance middleware all\n              // still apply (they run in SingleAgentClient above this call). We skip\n              // URL validation, OAuth refresh, and signing — none apply in-process.\n              if (agent.protocol === 'mcp' && agent._inProcessMcpClient) {\n                const inProcArgs = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);\n                return callMCPToolWithClient(agent._inProcessMcpClient, toolName, inProcArgs, debugLogs, {\n                  ...(signal && { signal }),\n                  ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n                });\n              }\n\n              validateAgentUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n\n              // OAuth 2.0 client credentials (RFC 6749 §4.4): re-exchange the\n              // secret for a fresh access token whenever the cached one is within\n              // its expiration skew. Runs before every call so mid-session expiry\n              // can't leave the caller with a stale bearer. No-op if the agent\n              // doesn't declare client credentials. Cheap on warm cache (single\n              // `Date.now()` compare); a single POST to the token endpoint on miss.\n              //\n              // `allowPrivateIp` inherits the trust the caller already placed in\n              // `agent.agent_uri` — if they're making a call to a private-IP agent,\n              // they've authorized this process to talk to private-IP hosts, so\n              // the token endpoint on the same network is reachable too. Public\n              // agent URLs with private-IP token endpoints still require an\n              // explicit opt-in via the library API.\n              if (agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n                const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                  storage: ccStorage,\n                  allowPrivateIp,\n                  fetch: transport?.fetchFn,\n                });\n              }\n\n              const authToken = getAuthToken(agent);\n\n              // RFC 9421 signing context. Built once per call and passed through\n              // to each protocol-layer entry (`callMCPToolWithTasks`, `callA2ATool`,\n              // `callMCPToolWithOAuth`) — those entries seed `signingContextStorage`\n              // (AsyncLocalStorage) so the internal transport helpers read it\n              // without an explicit parameter. Keep the explicit arg here: it's the\n              // ALS seed, not incidental plumbing. `get_adcp_capabilities` is\n              // exempt from signing (it's the discovery call itself) and also\n              // triggers cache priming for any other op on agents with\n              // `request_signing` configured.\n              const signingContext = buildAgentSigningContext(agent);\n              if (signingContext && toolName !== CAPABILITY_OP) {\n                await ensureCapabilityLoaded(agent, signingContext, primeArgs =>\n                  ProtocolClient.callTool(agent, CAPABILITY_OP, primeArgs, {\n                    debugLogs,\n                    serverVersion,\n                    adcpVersion,\n                    ...(versionEnvelopeMode !== 'auto' && { versionEnvelope: versionEnvelopeMode }),\n                    transport,\n                    signal,\n                    ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n                    onTransportActivity,\n                    transportActivityContext,\n                  })\n                );\n              }\n\n              // Inject the version envelope on every request so sellers can validate\n              // compatibility. Skip for v2 servers — they don't recognise the\n              // version fields and strict-schema agents reject them. The envelope\n              // shape is per-pin: 3.0 pins get the integer `adcp_major_version`\n              // alone; 3.1+ pins get both that and the release-precision string\n              // `adcp_version` (`'3.1'` / `'3.1.0-beta.1'`) per spec PR\n              // `adcontextprotocol/adcp#3493`.\n              const argsWithVersion = applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope);\n\n              // Build push_notification_config for ASYNC TASK STATUS notifications\n              // (NOT for reporting_webhook - that stays in args)\n              // Schema: https://adcontextprotocol.org/schemas/v1/core/push-notification-config.json\n              // `authentication` is a scheme SELECTOR, not a fallback: from AdCP\n              // 3.0 on, push-notification-config.json makes its presence opt the\n              // seller into legacy HMAC-SHA256 and its absence select the RFC\n              // 9421 webhook profile, with `required: [\"url\"]` only. Emitting it\n              // with a placeholder credential would therefore downgrade every\n              // webhook to legacy HMAC keyed by a constant that ships in this\n              // file, so the block is omitted unless a real secret backs it.\n              //\n              // v2.5 predates the selector: there `required` is\n              // `[\"url\", \"authentication\"]` and there is no 9421 path, so an\n              // omitted block is schema-invalid rather than a mode selection.\n              // With no secret there is nothing honest to send a v2 seller, so\n              // suppress the registration instead of fabricating a credential.\n              const pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig | undefined = (():\n                | PushNotificationConfig\n                | undefined => {\n                if (!webhookUrl) return undefined;\n                if (webhookSecret) {\n                  return {\n                    url: webhookUrl,\n                    ...(webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }),\n                    authentication: {\n                      schemes: ['HMAC-SHA256' as const],\n                      credentials: webhookSecret,\n                    },\n                  };\n                }\n                if (serverVersion === 'v2') {\n                  warnV2PushNotificationNeedsSecret();\n                  return undefined;\n                }\n                return {\n                  url: webhookUrl,\n                  ...(webhookToken && { token: webhookToken }),\n                };\n              })();\n\n              if (agent.protocol === 'mcp') {\n                // For MCP, include push_notification_config in tool arguments (MCP spec)\n                const argsWithWebhook = pushNotificationConfig\n                  ? { ...argsWithVersion, push_notification_config: pushNotificationConfig }\n                  : argsWithVersion;\n\n                // If the agent config carries authorization-code OAuth tokens,\n                // route through the OAuth provider path so the MCP SDK can refresh\n                // on 401 instead of hard-failing. Excludes client-credentials\n                // agents: they have a cached access token but no refresh_token,\n                // and their refresh path is a secret re-exchange (handled above),\n                // not the SDK's refresh_token grant.\n                if (agent.oauth_tokens && !agent.oauth_client_credentials) {\n                  const authProvider = getNonInteractiveOAuthProvider(agent, {\n                    agentHint: agent.id,\n                    storage: getAgentStorage(agent),\n                    allowHttp: isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri),\n                  });\n                  try {\n                    return await callMCPToolWithOAuth({\n                      agentUrl: agent.agent_uri,\n                      toolName,\n                      args: argsWithWebhook,\n                      authProvider,\n                      debugLogs,\n                      customHeaders: agent.headers,\n                      signingContext,\n                      signal,\n                      requestTimeoutMs: transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                      fetchFn: transport?.fetchFn,\n                    });\n                  } catch (err) {\n                    // Refresh failed or server rejected the refreshed token — walk the\n                    // discovery chain so the caller can distinguish \"re-auth needed\"\n                    // from other failure modes.\n                    await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                    throw err;\n                  }\n                }\n\n                // Use callMCPToolWithTasks which auto-detects server tasks capability\n                // and falls back to standard callTool when tasks are not supported\n                try {\n                  return await callMCPToolWithTasks(\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    toolName,\n                    argsWithWebhook,\n                    authToken,\n                    debugLogs,\n                    agent.headers,\n                    {\n                      ...(signingContext && { signingContext }),\n                      ...(signal && { signal }),\n                      ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && {\n                        requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs,\n                      }),\n                      ...(transport?.fetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.fetchFn }),\n                    }\n                  );\n                } catch (err) {\n                  // Client-credentials agents: on 401, the AS may have rotated\n                  // something out-of-band. Force a fresh exchange and retry once\n                  // before surfacing the error. Bounded (single retry) so we don't\n                  // loop if the credentials are genuinely wrong.\n                  if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {\n                    const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                    const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                    await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                      storage: ccStorage,\n                      force: true,\n                      allowPrivateIp,\n                      fetch: transport?.fetchFn,\n                    });\n                    const retryAuthToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token ?? authToken;\n                    try {\n                      return await callMCPToolWithTasks(\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        toolName,\n                        argsWithWebhook,\n                        retryAuthToken,\n                        debugLogs,\n                        agent.headers,\n                        {\n                          ...(signingContext && { signingContext }),\n                          ...(signal && { signal }),\n                          ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && {\n                            requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs,\n                          }),\n                          ...(transport?.fetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.fetchFn }),\n                        }\n                      );\n                    } catch (retryErr) {\n                      await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(retryErr, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                      throw retryErr;\n                    }\n                  }\n                  await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                  throw err;\n                }\n              } else if (agent.protocol === 'a2a') {\n                // For A2A, pass pushNotificationConfig separately (not in skill parameters)\n                try {\n                  return await callA2ATool(\n                    agent.agent_uri,\n                    toolName,\n                    argsWithVersion,\n                    authToken,\n                    debugLogs,\n                    pushNotificationConfig,\n                    agent.headers,\n                    signingContext,\n                    session,\n                    signal,\n                    transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                    transport?.fetchFn\n                  );\n                } catch (err) {\n                  // Same single-retry-on-401 for client-credentials agents as the\n                  // MCP path above. Kept symmetric so A2A CC agents aren't a\n                  // second-class experience — including the NeedsAuthorizationError\n                  // rewrap on a retry that still 401s.\n                  if (agent.oauth_client_credentials && is401Error(err)) {\n                    const ccStorage = getAgentStorage(agent);\n                    const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agent.agent_uri);\n                    await ensureClientCredentialsTokens(agent, {\n                      storage: ccStorage,\n                      force: true,\n                      allowPrivateIp,\n                      fetch: transport?.fetchFn,\n                    });\n                    const retryAuthToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token ?? authToken;\n                    try {\n                      return await callA2ATool(\n                        agent.agent_uri,\n                        toolName,\n                        argsWithVersion,\n                        retryAuthToken,\n                        debugLogs,\n                        pushNotificationConfig,\n                        agent.headers,\n                        signingContext,\n                        session,\n                        signal,\n                        transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n                        transport?.fetchFn\n                      );\n                    } catch (retryErr) {\n                      await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(retryErr, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                      throw retryErr;\n                    }\n                  }\n                  await rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err, agent.agent_uri, transport?.fetchFn);\n                  throw err;\n                }\n              } else {\n                throw new Error(`Unsupported protocol: ${agent.protocol}`);\n              }\n            }\n          )\n      )\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * If `err` looks like a 401 from the MCP transport, probe the agent for a\n * Bearer challenge and throw a {@link NeedsAuthorizationError} carrying\n * walked discovery metadata. If the error isn't a 401 or we can't build a\n * requirements record, return silently so the caller re-throws the original.\n *\n * Keeping this off the hot path: we only probe on error, and the probe is\n * a single unauthenticated `tools/list` POST — no retries, no DNS rebind.\n */\nasync function rethrowAsNeedsAuthorization(err: unknown, agentUrl: string, fetchFn?: typeof fetch): Promise<void> {\n  if (err instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError) throw err;\n  if (!is401Error(err)) return;\n\n  // If the caller has already connected to the agent URL, they've implicitly\n  // trusted it — inherit that trust for the discovery probe so loopback /\n  // private-IP development agents work the same way as public ones.\n  const allowPrivateIp = isLikelyPrivateUrl(agentUrl);\n\n  // discoverAuthorizationRequirements internally catches network failures and\n  // returns null rather than throwing — anything that escapes is a genuine\n  // bug we want to surface rather than mask the 401 with.\n  const requirements = await discoverAuthorizationRequirements(agentUrl, { allowPrivateIp, fetchFn });\n  if (requirements) {\n    throw new NeedsAuthorizationError(requirements);\n  }\n  // No requirements walked; let the caller re-throw the original error.\n}\n\n/**\n * Simple factory functions for protocol-specific clients.\n *\n * Both factories accept a `transport` argument that flows through to the\n * size-cap surface so callers reaching the factory exports honor the same\n * `maxResponseBytes` contract as `ProtocolClient.callTool`. Without it,\n * the factories would silently bypass the cap, which the public API\n * (`TransportOptions`) implies they honor.\n */\nexport const createMCPClient = (\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3',\n  adcpVersion?: string,\n  transport?: TransportOptions,\n  versionEnvelopeMode: VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto'\n) => {\n  // Validate the pin at factory time so a typo surfaces here rather than at\n  // first call. `buildVersionEnvelope` throws via `resolveWireMajor` on bad\n  // input — call it once to surface, then close over the envelope.\n  const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(versionEnvelopeMode, adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n  return {\n    callTool: (toolName: string, args: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) =>\n      withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n        callMCPToolWithTasks(\n          agentUrl,\n          toolName,\n          applyVersionEnvelope(args, versionEnvelope),\n          authToken,\n          debugLogs,\n          headers,\n          {\n            ...(transport?.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined && { requestTimeoutMs: transport.requestTimeoutMs }),\n            ...(transport?.fetchFn && { fetchFn: transport.fetchFn }),\n          }\n        )\n      ),\n  };\n};\n\nexport const createA2AClient = (\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  headers?: Record<string, string>,\n  serverVersion?: 'v2' | 'v3',\n  adcpVersion?: string,\n  transport?: TransportOptions,\n  versionEnvelopeMode: VersionEnvelopeMode = 'auto'\n) => {\n  const versionEnvelope = buildVersionEnvelopeForMode(versionEnvelopeMode, adcpVersion, serverVersion);\n  return {\n    callTool: (toolName: string, parameters: Record<string, unknown>, debugLogs?: DebugLogEntry[]) =>\n      withResponseSizeLimit(transport?.maxResponseBytes, () =>\n        callA2ATool(\n          agentUrl,\n          toolName,\n          applyVersionEnvelope(parameters, versionEnvelope),\n          authToken,\n          debugLogs,\n          undefined,\n          headers,\n          undefined,\n          undefined,\n          undefined,\n          transport?.requestTimeoutMs,\n          transport?.fetchFn\n        )\n      ),\n  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package/dist/lib/protocols/mcp-modern.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/lib/protocols/mcp-modern.js

@@ -180,7 +180,17 @@ function evictLeastRecentlyUsed() {
   void client?.close().catch(() => {
   });
 }
-async function createNegotiatedClient(cacheKey, options, authHeaders, useCachedDiscovery = true) {
+function isNegotiationAuthFailure(error) {
+  return (0, import_errors.is401Error)(error) || httpStatusOf(error) === 403;
+}
+function presentedStaticCredential(authHeaders, authProvider) {
+  if (authProvider) return false;
+  return Object.keys(authHeaders).some((key) => {
+    const lower = key.toLowerCase();
+    return lower === "authorization" || lower === "x-adcp-auth";
+  });
+}
+async function createNegotiatedClient(cacheKey, options, authHeaders, useCachedDiscovery = true, skipProbe = false) {
   const generation = connectionGeneration;
   const requestTimeoutMs = (0, import_abort.resolveRequestTimeoutMs)(options.requestTimeoutMs);
   const clientRequestTimeoutMs = (0, import_abort.resolveClientRequestTimeoutMs)(options.requestTimeoutMs);
@@ -212,14 +222,14 @@ async function createNegotiatedClient(cacheKey, options, authHeaders, useCachedD
       }
     }
   );
-  const prior = useCachedDiscovery ? getCachedModernDiscovery(cacheKey) : void 0;
+  const prior = skipProbe ? { kind: "legacy" } : useCachedDiscovery ? getCachedModernDiscovery(cacheKey) : void 0;
   try {
     await client.connect(transport, {
       ...options.signal && { signal: options.signal },
       ...clientRequestTimeoutMs !== void 0 && { timeout: clientRequestTimeoutMs },
       ...prior && { prior }
     });
-    if (prior) clientsUsingCachedDiscovery.add(client);
+    if (prior && !skipProbe) clientsUsingCachedDiscovery.add(client);
     if (!prior) {
       const discover = client.getDiscoverResult();
       if (generation === connectionGeneration) {
@@ -229,14 +239,17 @@ async function createNegotiatedClient(cacheKey, options, authHeaders, useCachedD
     }
     return client;
   } catch (error) {
-    if (prior) modernDiscoveries.delete(cacheKey);
+    if (prior && !skipProbe) modernDiscoveries.delete(cacheKey);
     try {
       await client.close();
     } catch {
     }
-    if (prior && import_client.SdkError.isInstance(error) && error.code === import_client.SdkErrorCode.EraNegotiationFailed) {
+    if (prior && !skipProbe && import_client.SdkError.isInstance(error) && error.code === import_client.SdkErrorCode.EraNegotiationFailed) {
       return createNegotiatedClient(cacheKey, options, authHeaders, false);
     }
+    if (isNegotiationAuthFailure(error) && !skipProbe && presentedStaticCredential(authHeaders, options.authProvider)) {
+      return createNegotiatedClient(cacheKey, options, authHeaders, useCachedDiscovery, true);
+    }
     throw error;
   }
 }