@adcp/sdk 13.0.0-rc.4 → 13.0.0-rc.6

package/dist/lib/net/address-guards.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"address-guards.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/lib/net/address-guards.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAwEA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAIxD;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,WAAW,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAIpD;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CASvD"}
+{"version":3,"file":"address-guards.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/lib/net/address-guards.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AA+EA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAIxD;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,WAAW,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAIpD;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CASvD"}

package/dist/lib/net/address-guards.js

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ function normalize(address) {
 const alwaysBlocked = new import_net.BlockList();
 alwaysBlocked.addSubnet("169.254.0.0", 16, "ipv4");
 alwaysBlocked.addSubnet("fe80::", 10, "ipv6");
+alwaysBlocked.addAddress("192.0.0.192", "ipv4");
 const privateIp = new import_net.BlockList();
 privateIp.addSubnet("0.0.0.0", 8, "ipv4");
 privateIp.addSubnet("10.0.0.0", 8, "ipv4");
@@ -46,6 +47,9 @@ privateIp.addSubnet("169.254.0.0", 16, "ipv4");
 privateIp.addSubnet("172.16.0.0", 12, "ipv4");
 privateIp.addSubnet("192.168.0.0", 16, "ipv4");
 privateIp.addSubnet("224.0.0.0", 4, "ipv4");
+privateIp.addSubnet("192.0.0.0", 24, "ipv4");
+privateIp.addSubnet("192.88.99.0", 24, "ipv4");
+privateIp.addSubnet("240.0.0.0", 4, "ipv4");
 privateIp.addAddress("255.255.255.255", "ipv4");
 privateIp.addAddress("::", "ipv6");
 privateIp.addAddress("::1", "ipv6");

package/dist/lib/net/address-guards.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/net/address-guards.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * IP address classification for SSRF defense.\n *\n * Two tiers of blocking:\n *   - {@link isAlwaysBlocked}: link-local + cloud metadata endpoints (IMDS).\n *     Refused even when the caller opts into private networks (dev loops).\n *   - {@link isPrivateIp}: RFC 1918, loopback, CGNAT, IPv6 ULA/link-local,\n *     multicast, broadcast, unspecified, plus defense-in-depth on IPv6\n *     wrappers (NAT64 well-known prefix, 6to4) so a v4-in-v6 address can't\n *     sneak a private target past the classifier. Refused by default; allowed\n *     when the caller passes `allowPrivateIp: true` (storyboard runner's\n *     `--allow-http`).\n *\n * Classifiers normalize before matching:\n *   - Zone IDs (`%eth0`) are stripped — they're a host-local concept, not part\n *     of the address, and Node's IP parsers don't accept them.\n *   - Surrounding URL brackets (`[::1]`) are stripped — `URL.hostname` returns\n *     bracketed form for IPv6 literals; classifiers need bare input.\n *   - IPv4-mapped IPv6 is resolved natively by `BlockList` — `::ffff:10.0.0.1`\n *     matches the `10.0.0.0/8` subnet regardless of textual form\n *     (`0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a.b.c.d` works too).\n */\nimport { BlockList, isIP } from 'net';\n\nfunction normalize(address: string): { addr: string; family: 'ipv4' | 'ipv6' } | null {\n  // Strip surrounding brackets (URL-hostname form) and zone ID.\n  let bare = address;\n  if (bare.startsWith('[') && bare.endsWith(']')) bare = bare.slice(1, -1);\n  const pctIdx = bare.indexOf('%');\n  if (pctIdx >= 0) bare = bare.slice(0, pctIdx);\n  const family = isIP(bare);\n  if (family === 4) return { addr: bare, family: 'ipv4' };\n  if (family === 6) return { addr: bare, family: 'ipv6' };\n  return null;\n}\n\n// Addresses blocked even when the dev opt-in `allowPrivateIp` is set. Cloud\n// metadata services live at 169.254.169.254 and leak credentials if reached;\n// IPv6 link-local (`fe80::/10`) is the v6 equivalent reach into the host's\n// local segment.\nconst alwaysBlocked = new BlockList();\nalwaysBlocked.addSubnet('169.254.0.0', 16, 'ipv4');\nalwaysBlocked.addSubnet('fe80::', 10, 'ipv6');\n\n// Private, loopback, multicast, and reserved ranges. Defense-in-depth adds the\n// NAT64 well-known prefix (`64:ff9b::/96`) and 6to4 (`2002::/16`) so a\n// wrapped-v4 address can't bypass the classifier by choosing a representation\n// BlockList doesn't natively canonicalize.\nconst privateIp = new BlockList();\n// v4 — BlockList handles IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) against these\n// subnets automatically per Node's check semantics.\nprivateIp.addSubnet('0.0.0.0', 8, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('10.0.0.0', 8, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('127.0.0.0', 8, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('100.64.0.0', 10, 'ipv4'); // RFC 6598 CGNAT\nprivateIp.addSubnet('169.254.0.0', 16, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('172.16.0.0', 12, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('192.168.0.0', 16, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('224.0.0.0', 4, 'ipv4'); // multicast\nprivateIp.addAddress('255.255.255.255', 'ipv4'); // limited broadcast\n// v6\nprivateIp.addAddress('::', 'ipv6'); // unspecified\nprivateIp.addAddress('::1', 'ipv6'); // loopback\nprivateIp.addSubnet('fe80::', 10, 'ipv6'); // link-local\nprivateIp.addSubnet('fc00::', 7, 'ipv6'); // ULA\nprivateIp.addSubnet('ff00::', 8, 'ipv6'); // multicast\n// Wrapper prefixes — refuse unconditionally. Tunnels at the caller's edge can\n// translate these into private targets we can't see; safer to refuse than to\n// hope the gateway is configured the way we expect.\nprivateIp.addSubnet('64:ff9b::', 96, 'ipv6'); // NAT64 well-known\nprivateIp.addSubnet('2002::', 16, 'ipv6'); // 6to4\n\n/**\n * Addresses blocked even when `allowPrivateIp` is on. Cloud metadata services\n * (AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS) live at 169.254.169.254 and would exfiltrate\n * credentials if a CI runner or long-lived server followed an attacker URL to\n * them. IPv6 link-local (`fe80::/10`) is the v6 equivalent reach into the\n * host's local segment.\n *\n * Returns `false` for non-IP inputs (hostnames).\n */\nexport function isAlwaysBlocked(address: string): boolean {\n  const n = normalize(address);\n  if (!n) return false;\n  return alwaysBlocked.check(n.addr, n.family);\n}\n\n/**\n * Reject loopback, link-local, RFC 1918 private ranges, CGNAT (RFC 6598),\n * broadcast, multicast, the unspecified address, NAT64/6to4 wrapper prefixes,\n * and IPv6 equivalents. BlockList handles IPv4-mapped IPv6 canonicalization\n * natively so `::ffff:10.0.0.1` is matched against the v4 rule set.\n *\n * Returns `false` for non-IP inputs (hostnames).\n */\nexport function isPrivateIp(address: string): boolean {\n  const n = normalize(address);\n  if (!n) return false;\n  return privateIp.check(n.addr, n.family);\n}\n\n/**\n * Best-effort check that a URL targets a development/private host, without\n * doing a DNS lookup. Matches loopback hostnames (`localhost`) and any IP\n * literal that {@link isPrivateIp} would reject. Public domain names always\n * return `false`.\n *\n * Used by higher layers that need to inherit the operator's \"private is OK\"\n * trust from a primary probe and propagate it to same-origin chain hops —\n * callers that pass this flag into `ssrfSafeFetch` should do so only when\n * they've already decided the target origin is trusted.\n *\n * Returns `false` on unparseable inputs.\n */\nexport function isLikelyPrivateUrl(url: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(url);\n    const host = u.hostname.replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, '').toLowerCase();\n    if (host === 'localhost') return true;\n    return isPrivateIp(host);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAsBA,iBAAgC;AAEhC,SAAS,UAAU,SAAmE;AAEpF,MAAI,OAAO;AACX,MAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE;AACvE,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC/B,MAAI,UAAU,EAAG,QAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM;AAC5C,QAAM,aAAS,iBAAK,IAAI;AACxB,MAAI,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO;AACtD,MAAI,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO;AACtD,SAAO;AACT;AAMA,MAAM,gBAAgB,IAAI,qBAAU;AACpC,cAAc,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AACjD,cAAc,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AAM5C,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,qBAAU;AAGhC,UAAU,UAAU,WAAW,GAAG,MAAM;AACxC,UAAU,UAAU,YAAY,GAAG,MAAM;AACzC,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM;AAC1C,UAAU,UAAU,cAAc,IAAI,MAAM;AAC5C,UAAU,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AAC7C,UAAU,UAAU,cAAc,IAAI,MAAM;AAC5C,UAAU,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AAC7C,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM;AAC1C,UAAU,WAAW,mBAAmB,MAAM;AAE9C,UAAU,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM;AACjC,UAAU,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AAClC,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AACxC,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM;AACvC,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM;AAIvC,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,IAAI,MAAM;AAC3C,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AAWjC,SAAS,gBAAgB,SAA0B;AACxD,QAAM,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AACf,SAAO,cAAc,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM;AAC7C;AAUO,SAAS,YAAY,SAA0B;AACpD,QAAM,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AACf,SAAO,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM;AACzC;AAeO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAAsB;AACvD,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG;AACrB,UAAM,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY;AAC5D,QAAI,SAAS,YAAa,QAAO;AACjC,WAAO,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,EACzB,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/net/address-guards.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * IP address classification for SSRF defense.\n *\n * Two tiers of blocking:\n *   - {@link isAlwaysBlocked}: link-local + cloud metadata endpoints (IMDS).\n *     Refused even when the caller opts into private networks (dev loops).\n *   - {@link isPrivateIp}: RFC 1918, loopback, CGNAT, IPv6 ULA/link-local,\n *     multicast, broadcast, unspecified, plus defense-in-depth on IPv6\n *     wrappers (NAT64 well-known prefix, 6to4) so a v4-in-v6 address can't\n *     sneak a private target past the classifier. Refused by default; allowed\n *     when the caller passes `allowPrivateIp: true` (storyboard runner's\n *     `--allow-http`).\n *\n * Classifiers normalize before matching:\n *   - Zone IDs (`%eth0`) are stripped — they're a host-local concept, not part\n *     of the address, and Node's IP parsers don't accept them.\n *   - Surrounding URL brackets (`[::1]`) are stripped — `URL.hostname` returns\n *     bracketed form for IPv6 literals; classifiers need bare input.\n *   - IPv4-mapped IPv6 is resolved natively by `BlockList` — `::ffff:10.0.0.1`\n *     matches the `10.0.0.0/8` subnet regardless of textual form\n *     (`0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a.b.c.d` works too).\n */\nimport { BlockList, isIP } from 'net';\n\nfunction normalize(address: string): { addr: string; family: 'ipv4' | 'ipv6' } | null {\n  // Strip surrounding brackets (URL-hostname form) and zone ID.\n  let bare = address;\n  if (bare.startsWith('[') && bare.endsWith(']')) bare = bare.slice(1, -1);\n  const pctIdx = bare.indexOf('%');\n  if (pctIdx >= 0) bare = bare.slice(0, pctIdx);\n  const family = isIP(bare);\n  if (family === 4) return { addr: bare, family: 'ipv4' };\n  if (family === 6) return { addr: bare, family: 'ipv6' };\n  return null;\n}\n\n// Addresses blocked even when the dev opt-in `allowPrivateIp` is set. Cloud\n// metadata services live at 169.254.169.254 and leak credentials if reached;\n// IPv6 link-local (`fe80::/10`) is the v6 equivalent reach into the host's\n// local segment.\nconst alwaysBlocked = new BlockList();\nalwaysBlocked.addSubnet('169.254.0.0', 16, 'ipv4');\nalwaysBlocked.addSubnet('fe80::', 10, 'ipv6');\n// Oracle Cloud IMDS lives at 192.0.0.192 (inside RFC 6890's 192.0.0.0/24\n// IETF-protocol assignments) rather than the 169.254.0.0/16 everyone else\n// uses, so it needs its own entry to be refused even under the private opt-in.\nalwaysBlocked.addAddress('192.0.0.192', 'ipv4');\n\n// Private, loopback, multicast, and reserved ranges. Defense-in-depth adds the\n// NAT64 well-known prefix (`64:ff9b::/96`) and 6to4 (`2002::/16`) so a\n// wrapped-v4 address can't bypass the classifier by choosing a representation\n// BlockList doesn't natively canonicalize.\nconst privateIp = new BlockList();\n// v4 — BlockList handles IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) against these\n// subnets automatically per Node's check semantics.\nprivateIp.addSubnet('0.0.0.0', 8, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('10.0.0.0', 8, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('127.0.0.0', 8, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('100.64.0.0', 10, 'ipv4'); // RFC 6598 CGNAT\nprivateIp.addSubnet('169.254.0.0', 16, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('172.16.0.0', 12, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('192.168.0.0', 16, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('224.0.0.0', 4, 'ipv4'); // multicast\nprivateIp.addSubnet('192.0.0.0', 24, 'ipv4'); // RFC 6890 IETF protocol assignments (incl. Oracle IMDS)\nprivateIp.addSubnet('192.88.99.0', 24, 'ipv4'); // 6to4 relay anycast (RFC 7526, deprecated)\nprivateIp.addSubnet('240.0.0.0', 4, 'ipv4'); // reserved for future use\nprivateIp.addAddress('255.255.255.255', 'ipv4'); // limited broadcast\n// v6\nprivateIp.addAddress('::', 'ipv6'); // unspecified\nprivateIp.addAddress('::1', 'ipv6'); // loopback\nprivateIp.addSubnet('fe80::', 10, 'ipv6'); // link-local\nprivateIp.addSubnet('fc00::', 7, 'ipv6'); // ULA\nprivateIp.addSubnet('ff00::', 8, 'ipv6'); // multicast\n// Wrapper prefixes — refuse unconditionally. Tunnels at the caller's edge can\n// translate these into private targets we can't see; safer to refuse than to\n// hope the gateway is configured the way we expect.\nprivateIp.addSubnet('64:ff9b::', 96, 'ipv6'); // NAT64 well-known\nprivateIp.addSubnet('2002::', 16, 'ipv6'); // 6to4\n\n/**\n * Addresses blocked even when `allowPrivateIp` is on. Cloud metadata services\n * (AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS) live at 169.254.169.254 and would exfiltrate\n * credentials if a CI runner or long-lived server followed an attacker URL to\n * them. IPv6 link-local (`fe80::/10`) is the v6 equivalent reach into the\n * host's local segment.\n *\n * Returns `false` for non-IP inputs (hostnames).\n */\nexport function isAlwaysBlocked(address: string): boolean {\n  const n = normalize(address);\n  if (!n) return false;\n  return alwaysBlocked.check(n.addr, n.family);\n}\n\n/**\n * Reject loopback, link-local, RFC 1918 private ranges, CGNAT (RFC 6598),\n * broadcast, multicast, the unspecified address, NAT64/6to4 wrapper prefixes,\n * and IPv6 equivalents. BlockList handles IPv4-mapped IPv6 canonicalization\n * natively so `::ffff:10.0.0.1` is matched against the v4 rule set.\n *\n * Returns `false` for non-IP inputs (hostnames).\n */\nexport function isPrivateIp(address: string): boolean {\n  const n = normalize(address);\n  if (!n) return false;\n  return privateIp.check(n.addr, n.family);\n}\n\n/**\n * Best-effort check that a URL targets a development/private host, without\n * doing a DNS lookup. Matches loopback hostnames (`localhost`) and any IP\n * literal that {@link isPrivateIp} would reject. Public domain names always\n * return `false`.\n *\n * Used by higher layers that need to inherit the operator's \"private is OK\"\n * trust from a primary probe and propagate it to same-origin chain hops —\n * callers that pass this flag into `ssrfSafeFetch` should do so only when\n * they've already decided the target origin is trusted.\n *\n * Returns `false` on unparseable inputs.\n */\nexport function isLikelyPrivateUrl(url: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(url);\n    const host = u.hostname.replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, '').toLowerCase();\n    if (host === 'localhost') return true;\n    return isPrivateIp(host);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAsBA,iBAAgC;AAEhC,SAAS,UAAU,SAAmE;AAEpF,MAAI,OAAO;AACX,MAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE;AACvE,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC/B,MAAI,UAAU,EAAG,QAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM;AAC5C,QAAM,aAAS,iBAAK,IAAI;AACxB,MAAI,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO;AACtD,MAAI,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO;AACtD,SAAO;AACT;AAMA,MAAM,gBAAgB,IAAI,qBAAU;AACpC,cAAc,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AACjD,cAAc,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AAI5C,cAAc,WAAW,eAAe,MAAM;AAM9C,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,qBAAU;AAGhC,UAAU,UAAU,WAAW,GAAG,MAAM;AACxC,UAAU,UAAU,YAAY,GAAG,MAAM;AACzC,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM;AAC1C,UAAU,UAAU,cAAc,IAAI,MAAM;AAC5C,UAAU,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AAC7C,UAAU,UAAU,cAAc,IAAI,MAAM;AAC5C,UAAU,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AAC7C,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM;AAC1C,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,IAAI,MAAM;AAC3C,UAAU,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AAC7C,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM;AAC1C,UAAU,WAAW,mBAAmB,MAAM;AAE9C,UAAU,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM;AACjC,UAAU,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AAClC,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AACxC,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM;AACvC,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM;AAIvC,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,IAAI,MAAM;AAC3C,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AAWjC,SAAS,gBAAgB,SAA0B;AACxD,QAAM,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AACf,SAAO,cAAc,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM;AAC7C;AAUO,SAAS,YAAY,SAA0B;AACpD,QAAM,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AACf,SAAO,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM;AACzC;AAeO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAAsB;AACvD,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG;AACrB,UAAM,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY;AAC5D,QAAI,SAAS,YAAa,QAAO;AACjC,WAAO,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,EACzB,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/net/address-guards.mjs

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ function normalize(address) {
 const alwaysBlocked = new BlockList();
 alwaysBlocked.addSubnet("169.254.0.0", 16, "ipv4");
 alwaysBlocked.addSubnet("fe80::", 10, "ipv6");
+alwaysBlocked.addAddress("192.0.0.192", "ipv4");
 const privateIp = new BlockList();
 privateIp.addSubnet("0.0.0.0", 8, "ipv4");
 privateIp.addSubnet("10.0.0.0", 8, "ipv4");
@@ -21,6 +22,9 @@ privateIp.addSubnet("169.254.0.0", 16, "ipv4");
 privateIp.addSubnet("172.16.0.0", 12, "ipv4");
 privateIp.addSubnet("192.168.0.0", 16, "ipv4");
 privateIp.addSubnet("224.0.0.0", 4, "ipv4");
+privateIp.addSubnet("192.0.0.0", 24, "ipv4");
+privateIp.addSubnet("192.88.99.0", 24, "ipv4");
+privateIp.addSubnet("240.0.0.0", 4, "ipv4");
 privateIp.addAddress("255.255.255.255", "ipv4");
 privateIp.addAddress("::", "ipv6");
 privateIp.addAddress("::1", "ipv6");

package/dist/lib/net/address-guards.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/net/address-guards.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * IP address classification for SSRF defense.\n *\n * Two tiers of blocking:\n *   - {@link isAlwaysBlocked}: link-local + cloud metadata endpoints (IMDS).\n *     Refused even when the caller opts into private networks (dev loops).\n *   - {@link isPrivateIp}: RFC 1918, loopback, CGNAT, IPv6 ULA/link-local,\n *     multicast, broadcast, unspecified, plus defense-in-depth on IPv6\n *     wrappers (NAT64 well-known prefix, 6to4) so a v4-in-v6 address can't\n *     sneak a private target past the classifier. Refused by default; allowed\n *     when the caller passes `allowPrivateIp: true` (storyboard runner's\n *     `--allow-http`).\n *\n * Classifiers normalize before matching:\n *   - Zone IDs (`%eth0`) are stripped — they're a host-local concept, not part\n *     of the address, and Node's IP parsers don't accept them.\n *   - Surrounding URL brackets (`[::1]`) are stripped — `URL.hostname` returns\n *     bracketed form for IPv6 literals; classifiers need bare input.\n *   - IPv4-mapped IPv6 is resolved natively by `BlockList` — `::ffff:10.0.0.1`\n *     matches the `10.0.0.0/8` subnet regardless of textual form\n *     (`0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a.b.c.d` works too).\n */\nimport { BlockList, isIP } from 'net';\n\nfunction normalize(address: string): { addr: string; family: 'ipv4' | 'ipv6' } | null {\n  // Strip surrounding brackets (URL-hostname form) and zone ID.\n  let bare = address;\n  if (bare.startsWith('[') && bare.endsWith(']')) bare = bare.slice(1, -1);\n  const pctIdx = bare.indexOf('%');\n  if (pctIdx >= 0) bare = bare.slice(0, pctIdx);\n  const family = isIP(bare);\n  if (family === 4) return { addr: bare, family: 'ipv4' };\n  if (family === 6) return { addr: bare, family: 'ipv6' };\n  return null;\n}\n\n// Addresses blocked even when the dev opt-in `allowPrivateIp` is set. Cloud\n// metadata services live at 169.254.169.254 and leak credentials if reached;\n// IPv6 link-local (`fe80::/10`) is the v6 equivalent reach into the host's\n// local segment.\nconst alwaysBlocked = new BlockList();\nalwaysBlocked.addSubnet('169.254.0.0', 16, 'ipv4');\nalwaysBlocked.addSubnet('fe80::', 10, 'ipv6');\n\n// Private, loopback, multicast, and reserved ranges. Defense-in-depth adds the\n// NAT64 well-known prefix (`64:ff9b::/96`) and 6to4 (`2002::/16`) so a\n// wrapped-v4 address can't bypass the classifier by choosing a representation\n// BlockList doesn't natively canonicalize.\nconst privateIp = new BlockList();\n// v4 — BlockList handles IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) against these\n// subnets automatically per Node's check semantics.\nprivateIp.addSubnet('0.0.0.0', 8, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('10.0.0.0', 8, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('127.0.0.0', 8, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('100.64.0.0', 10, 'ipv4'); // RFC 6598 CGNAT\nprivateIp.addSubnet('169.254.0.0', 16, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('172.16.0.0', 12, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('192.168.0.0', 16, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('224.0.0.0', 4, 'ipv4'); // multicast\nprivateIp.addAddress('255.255.255.255', 'ipv4'); // limited broadcast\n// v6\nprivateIp.addAddress('::', 'ipv6'); // unspecified\nprivateIp.addAddress('::1', 'ipv6'); // loopback\nprivateIp.addSubnet('fe80::', 10, 'ipv6'); // link-local\nprivateIp.addSubnet('fc00::', 7, 'ipv6'); // ULA\nprivateIp.addSubnet('ff00::', 8, 'ipv6'); // multicast\n// Wrapper prefixes — refuse unconditionally. Tunnels at the caller's edge can\n// translate these into private targets we can't see; safer to refuse than to\n// hope the gateway is configured the way we expect.\nprivateIp.addSubnet('64:ff9b::', 96, 'ipv6'); // NAT64 well-known\nprivateIp.addSubnet('2002::', 16, 'ipv6'); // 6to4\n\n/**\n * Addresses blocked even when `allowPrivateIp` is on. Cloud metadata services\n * (AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS) live at 169.254.169.254 and would exfiltrate\n * credentials if a CI runner or long-lived server followed an attacker URL to\n * them. IPv6 link-local (`fe80::/10`) is the v6 equivalent reach into the\n * host's local segment.\n *\n * Returns `false` for non-IP inputs (hostnames).\n */\nexport function isAlwaysBlocked(address: string): boolean {\n  const n = normalize(address);\n  if (!n) return false;\n  return alwaysBlocked.check(n.addr, n.family);\n}\n\n/**\n * Reject loopback, link-local, RFC 1918 private ranges, CGNAT (RFC 6598),\n * broadcast, multicast, the unspecified address, NAT64/6to4 wrapper prefixes,\n * and IPv6 equivalents. BlockList handles IPv4-mapped IPv6 canonicalization\n * natively so `::ffff:10.0.0.1` is matched against the v4 rule set.\n *\n * Returns `false` for non-IP inputs (hostnames).\n */\nexport function isPrivateIp(address: string): boolean {\n  const n = normalize(address);\n  if (!n) return false;\n  return privateIp.check(n.addr, n.family);\n}\n\n/**\n * Best-effort check that a URL targets a development/private host, without\n * doing a DNS lookup. Matches loopback hostnames (`localhost`) and any IP\n * literal that {@link isPrivateIp} would reject. Public domain names always\n * return `false`.\n *\n * Used by higher layers that need to inherit the operator's \"private is OK\"\n * trust from a primary probe and propagate it to same-origin chain hops —\n * callers that pass this flag into `ssrfSafeFetch` should do so only when\n * they've already decided the target origin is trusted.\n *\n * Returns `false` on unparseable inputs.\n */\nexport function isLikelyPrivateUrl(url: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(url);\n    const host = u.hostname.replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, '').toLowerCase();\n    if (host === 'localhost') return true;\n    return isPrivateIp(host);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAsBA,SAAS,WAAW,YAAY;AAEhC,SAAS,UAAU,SAAmE;AAEpF,MAAI,OAAO;AACX,MAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE;AACvE,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC/B,MAAI,UAAU,EAAG,QAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM;AAC5C,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI;AACxB,MAAI,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO;AACtD,MAAI,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO;AACtD,SAAO;AACT;AAMA,MAAM,gBAAgB,IAAI,UAAU;AACpC,cAAc,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AACjD,cAAc,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AAM5C,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,UAAU;AAGhC,UAAU,UAAU,WAAW,GAAG,MAAM;AACxC,UAAU,UAAU,YAAY,GAAG,MAAM;AACzC,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM;AAC1C,UAAU,UAAU,cAAc,IAAI,MAAM;AAC5C,UAAU,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AAC7C,UAAU,UAAU,cAAc,IAAI,MAAM;AAC5C,UAAU,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AAC7C,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM;AAC1C,UAAU,WAAW,mBAAmB,MAAM;AAE9C,UAAU,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM;AACjC,UAAU,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AAClC,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AACxC,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM;AACvC,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM;AAIvC,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,IAAI,MAAM;AAC3C,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AAWjC,SAAS,gBAAgB,SAA0B;AACxD,QAAM,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AACf,SAAO,cAAc,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM;AAC7C;AAUO,SAAS,YAAY,SAA0B;AACpD,QAAM,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AACf,SAAO,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM;AACzC;AAeO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAAsB;AACvD,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG;AACrB,UAAM,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY;AAC5D,QAAI,SAAS,YAAa,QAAO;AACjC,WAAO,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,EACzB,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/net/address-guards.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * IP address classification for SSRF defense.\n *\n * Two tiers of blocking:\n *   - {@link isAlwaysBlocked}: link-local + cloud metadata endpoints (IMDS).\n *     Refused even when the caller opts into private networks (dev loops).\n *   - {@link isPrivateIp}: RFC 1918, loopback, CGNAT, IPv6 ULA/link-local,\n *     multicast, broadcast, unspecified, plus defense-in-depth on IPv6\n *     wrappers (NAT64 well-known prefix, 6to4) so a v4-in-v6 address can't\n *     sneak a private target past the classifier. Refused by default; allowed\n *     when the caller passes `allowPrivateIp: true` (storyboard runner's\n *     `--allow-http`).\n *\n * Classifiers normalize before matching:\n *   - Zone IDs (`%eth0`) are stripped — they're a host-local concept, not part\n *     of the address, and Node's IP parsers don't accept them.\n *   - Surrounding URL brackets (`[::1]`) are stripped — `URL.hostname` returns\n *     bracketed form for IPv6 literals; classifiers need bare input.\n *   - IPv4-mapped IPv6 is resolved natively by `BlockList` — `::ffff:10.0.0.1`\n *     matches the `10.0.0.0/8` subnet regardless of textual form\n *     (`0:0:0:0:0:ffff:a.b.c.d` works too).\n */\nimport { BlockList, isIP } from 'net';\n\nfunction normalize(address: string): { addr: string; family: 'ipv4' | 'ipv6' } | null {\n  // Strip surrounding brackets (URL-hostname form) and zone ID.\n  let bare = address;\n  if (bare.startsWith('[') && bare.endsWith(']')) bare = bare.slice(1, -1);\n  const pctIdx = bare.indexOf('%');\n  if (pctIdx >= 0) bare = bare.slice(0, pctIdx);\n  const family = isIP(bare);\n  if (family === 4) return { addr: bare, family: 'ipv4' };\n  if (family === 6) return { addr: bare, family: 'ipv6' };\n  return null;\n}\n\n// Addresses blocked even when the dev opt-in `allowPrivateIp` is set. Cloud\n// metadata services live at 169.254.169.254 and leak credentials if reached;\n// IPv6 link-local (`fe80::/10`) is the v6 equivalent reach into the host's\n// local segment.\nconst alwaysBlocked = new BlockList();\nalwaysBlocked.addSubnet('169.254.0.0', 16, 'ipv4');\nalwaysBlocked.addSubnet('fe80::', 10, 'ipv6');\n// Oracle Cloud IMDS lives at 192.0.0.192 (inside RFC 6890's 192.0.0.0/24\n// IETF-protocol assignments) rather than the 169.254.0.0/16 everyone else\n// uses, so it needs its own entry to be refused even under the private opt-in.\nalwaysBlocked.addAddress('192.0.0.192', 'ipv4');\n\n// Private, loopback, multicast, and reserved ranges. Defense-in-depth adds the\n// NAT64 well-known prefix (`64:ff9b::/96`) and 6to4 (`2002::/16`) so a\n// wrapped-v4 address can't bypass the classifier by choosing a representation\n// BlockList doesn't natively canonicalize.\nconst privateIp = new BlockList();\n// v4 — BlockList handles IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) against these\n// subnets automatically per Node's check semantics.\nprivateIp.addSubnet('0.0.0.0', 8, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('10.0.0.0', 8, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('127.0.0.0', 8, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('100.64.0.0', 10, 'ipv4'); // RFC 6598 CGNAT\nprivateIp.addSubnet('169.254.0.0', 16, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('172.16.0.0', 12, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('192.168.0.0', 16, 'ipv4');\nprivateIp.addSubnet('224.0.0.0', 4, 'ipv4'); // multicast\nprivateIp.addSubnet('192.0.0.0', 24, 'ipv4'); // RFC 6890 IETF protocol assignments (incl. Oracle IMDS)\nprivateIp.addSubnet('192.88.99.0', 24, 'ipv4'); // 6to4 relay anycast (RFC 7526, deprecated)\nprivateIp.addSubnet('240.0.0.0', 4, 'ipv4'); // reserved for future use\nprivateIp.addAddress('255.255.255.255', 'ipv4'); // limited broadcast\n// v6\nprivateIp.addAddress('::', 'ipv6'); // unspecified\nprivateIp.addAddress('::1', 'ipv6'); // loopback\nprivateIp.addSubnet('fe80::', 10, 'ipv6'); // link-local\nprivateIp.addSubnet('fc00::', 7, 'ipv6'); // ULA\nprivateIp.addSubnet('ff00::', 8, 'ipv6'); // multicast\n// Wrapper prefixes — refuse unconditionally. Tunnels at the caller's edge can\n// translate these into private targets we can't see; safer to refuse than to\n// hope the gateway is configured the way we expect.\nprivateIp.addSubnet('64:ff9b::', 96, 'ipv6'); // NAT64 well-known\nprivateIp.addSubnet('2002::', 16, 'ipv6'); // 6to4\n\n/**\n * Addresses blocked even when `allowPrivateIp` is on. Cloud metadata services\n * (AWS/GCP/Azure IMDS) live at 169.254.169.254 and would exfiltrate\n * credentials if a CI runner or long-lived server followed an attacker URL to\n * them. IPv6 link-local (`fe80::/10`) is the v6 equivalent reach into the\n * host's local segment.\n *\n * Returns `false` for non-IP inputs (hostnames).\n */\nexport function isAlwaysBlocked(address: string): boolean {\n  const n = normalize(address);\n  if (!n) return false;\n  return alwaysBlocked.check(n.addr, n.family);\n}\n\n/**\n * Reject loopback, link-local, RFC 1918 private ranges, CGNAT (RFC 6598),\n * broadcast, multicast, the unspecified address, NAT64/6to4 wrapper prefixes,\n * and IPv6 equivalents. BlockList handles IPv4-mapped IPv6 canonicalization\n * natively so `::ffff:10.0.0.1` is matched against the v4 rule set.\n *\n * Returns `false` for non-IP inputs (hostnames).\n */\nexport function isPrivateIp(address: string): boolean {\n  const n = normalize(address);\n  if (!n) return false;\n  return privateIp.check(n.addr, n.family);\n}\n\n/**\n * Best-effort check that a URL targets a development/private host, without\n * doing a DNS lookup. Matches loopback hostnames (`localhost`) and any IP\n * literal that {@link isPrivateIp} would reject. Public domain names always\n * return `false`.\n *\n * Used by higher layers that need to inherit the operator's \"private is OK\"\n * trust from a primary probe and propagate it to same-origin chain hops —\n * callers that pass this flag into `ssrfSafeFetch` should do so only when\n * they've already decided the target origin is trusted.\n *\n * Returns `false` on unparseable inputs.\n */\nexport function isLikelyPrivateUrl(url: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(url);\n    const host = u.hostname.replace(/^\\[|\\]$/g, '').toLowerCase();\n    if (host === 'localhost') return true;\n    return isPrivateIp(host);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAsBA,SAAS,WAAW,YAAY;AAEhC,SAAS,UAAU,SAAmE;AAEpF,MAAI,OAAO;AACX,MAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE;AACvE,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC/B,MAAI,UAAU,EAAG,QAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM;AAC5C,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI;AACxB,MAAI,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO;AACtD,MAAI,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO;AACtD,SAAO;AACT;AAMA,MAAM,gBAAgB,IAAI,UAAU;AACpC,cAAc,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AACjD,cAAc,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AAI5C,cAAc,WAAW,eAAe,MAAM;AAM9C,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI,UAAU;AAGhC,UAAU,UAAU,WAAW,GAAG,MAAM;AACxC,UAAU,UAAU,YAAY,GAAG,MAAM;AACzC,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM;AAC1C,UAAU,UAAU,cAAc,IAAI,MAAM;AAC5C,UAAU,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AAC7C,UAAU,UAAU,cAAc,IAAI,MAAM;AAC5C,UAAU,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AAC7C,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM;AAC1C,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,IAAI,MAAM;AAC3C,UAAU,UAAU,eAAe,IAAI,MAAM;AAC7C,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM;AAC1C,UAAU,WAAW,mBAAmB,MAAM;AAE9C,UAAU,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM;AACjC,UAAU,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AAClC,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AACxC,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM;AACvC,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM;AAIvC,UAAU,UAAU,aAAa,IAAI,MAAM;AAC3C,UAAU,UAAU,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AAWjC,SAAS,gBAAgB,SAA0B;AACxD,QAAM,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AACf,SAAO,cAAc,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM;AAC7C;AAUO,SAAS,YAAY,SAA0B;AACpD,QAAM,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AACf,SAAO,UAAU,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM;AACzC;AAeO,SAAS,mBAAmB,KAAsB;AACvD,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG;AACrB,UAAM,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,YAAY,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY;AAC5D,QAAI,SAAS,YAAa,QAAO;AACjC,WAAO,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,EACzB,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/protocols/a2a.js

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ var import_client2 = require('../signing/client.js');
 var import_agent_fetch = require('../signing/agent-fetch.js');
 var import_fetch = require('../signing/fetch.js');
 var import_fetch_async = require('../signing/fetch-async.js');
-var import_idempotency = require('../utils/idempotency.js');
+var import_redact_args = require('../utils/redact-args.js');
 var import_rawResponseCapture = require('./rawResponseCapture.js');
 var import_responseSizeLimit = require('./responseSizeLimit.js');
 var import_transportDiagnostics = require('./transportDiagnostics.js');
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ async function callA2AToolImpl(agentUrl, toolName, parameters, authToken, debugL
       };
     }
     const payloadSize = JSON.stringify(requestPayload).length;
-    const redactedParameters = (0, import_idempotency.redactIdempotencyKeyInArgs)(parameters);
+    const redactedParameters = (0, import_redact_args.redactArgsForLog)(parameters);
     const redactedPayload = {
       ...requestPayload,
       message: {

package/dist/lib/protocols/a2a.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/protocols/a2a.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// Official A2A client implementation - NO FALLBACKS\nimport { A2AClient as A2AClientImpl } from '@a2a-js/sdk/client';\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from 'node:async_hooks';\nimport { createHmac, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';\nimport type { PushNotificationConfig } from '../types/tools.generated';\nimport type { DebugLogEntry } from '../types/adcp';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, is401Error } from '../errors';\nimport { discoverOAuthMetadata } from '../auth/oauth/discovery';\nimport { probeAuthChallenge } from '../auth/oauth/authorization-required';\nimport { withSpan, injectTraceHeaders } from '../observability/tracing';\nimport { isAgentCardPath, buildCardUrls } from '../utils/a2a-discovery';\nimport { buildAgentSigningFetch, signingContextStorage, type AgentSigningContext } from '../signing/client';\nimport { toSignerKey, isInlineSigningConfig, isProviderSigningConfig } from '../signing/agent-fetch';\nimport { createSigningFetch, type FetchLike } from '../signing/fetch';\nimport { createSigningFetchAsync } from '../signing/fetch-async';\nimport type { AgentConfig } from '../types/adcp';\nimport { redactIdempotencyKeyInArgs } from '../utils/idempotency';\nimport { wrapFetchWithCapture } from './rawResponseCapture';\nimport { wrapFetchWithSizeLimit } from './responseSizeLimit';\nimport { wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics } from './transportDiagnostics';\nimport { DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS, resolveRequestTimeoutMs, withAbortSignal } from './abort';\nimport { getLatestA2ADataPartFromResponse } from '../utils/a2a-artifacts';\n\n// The A2A SDK client is used untyped: request/response shapes are validated at\n// runtime against the AdCP wire contract, not against the SDK's exported\n// types. Preserves the prior behaviour of the CommonJS `require` form.\nconst A2AClient: any = A2AClientImpl;\n\nif (!A2AClient) {\n  throw new Error('A2A SDK client is required. Please install @a2a-js/sdk');\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-call state flowed through AsyncLocalStorage so concurrent callers\n * that share a cached A2AClient don't clobber each other's debugLogs,\n * customHeaders, or 401 flag.\n */\ninterface A2ACallContext {\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  debugLogs: DebugLogEntry[];\n  got401Ref: { value: boolean };\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number;\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n}\n\nconst callContextStorage = new AsyncLocalStorage<A2ACallContext>();\n\n/**\n * Cached A2AClient keyed by (agentUrl, authToken hash). Avoids re-fetching\n * /.well-known/agent.json on every tool call. The cached client's fetchImpl\n * reads per-call state from callContextStorage, so concurrent calls to the\n * same cache entry are safe.\n *\n * Process-global singleton — not suitable for multi-tenant servers that\n * want per-tenant isolation (use separate processes or explicit cache keys).\n */\nconst a2aClientCache = new Map<string, InstanceType<typeof A2AClient>>();\nconst pendingA2AClients = new Map<string, Promise<InstanceType<typeof A2AClient>>>();\n\n/**\n * Build the A2A connection-cache key. Mirrors the rationale in\n * `src/lib/protocols/mcp.ts:connectionCacheKey`: when the caller is using a\n * non-bearer scheme (RFC 7617 Basic from the CLI's `--auth-scheme basic`\n * shape, or any future caller-injected `Authorization` header), `authToken`\n * is undefined and the credential rides on the customHeaders bag. Hashing\n * only `authToken` would let two callers with different `user:pass`\n * credentials share a single cached A2AClient — single-CLI-process safe,\n * multi-tenant SDK consumer not safe.\n *\n * `customHeaders` also feed the key so tenant/routing headers cannot reuse a\n * card/client discovered for another caller. Scoped fetch calls bypass this\n * cache entirely (see `getOrCreateA2AClient`).\n */\nfunction a2aCacheKey(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  signingCacheKey?: string,\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>\n): string {\n  // 64-bit Map-key disambiguator — NOT a password hash. The cached client\n  // closes over the full credential, so a hypothetical hash collision still\n  // sends the original credential on the wire, just possibly cache-miss\n  // and reconnect. Routed via `cacheDisambiguator` (HMAC-SHA256 with empty\n  // key) instead of bare `createHash` so CodeQL's\n  // `js/insufficient-password-hash` heuristic doesn't misclassify the\n  // dataflow — see the helper docstring for the full rationale.\n  const fingerprint = authToken ?? extractA2AAuthHeader(customHeaders);\n  const tokenSuffix = fingerprint ? `::${cacheDisambiguator(fingerprint)}` : '';\n  const headersKey = headersCacheDisambiguator(customHeaders);\n  const headersSuffix = headersKey ? `::headers:${headersKey}` : '';\n  const signingSuffix = signingCacheKey ? `::${signingCacheKey}` : '';\n  return `${agentUrl}${tokenSuffix}${headersSuffix}${signingSuffix}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Produce a stable 64-bit Map-key disambiguator from credential material.\n * Mirrors the helper in `src/lib/protocols/mcp.ts` — the two protocol\n * modules intentionally don't share runtime imports, so each carries its\n * own copy. See the MCP-side docstring for the full rationale.\n */\nfunction cacheDisambiguator(value: string): string {\n  return createHmac('sha256', '').update(value).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);\n}\n\n/**\n * Case-insensitive lookup of `Authorization` on a header bag. Mirrors the\n * MCP-side helper; A2A keeps its own copy because the two protocol modules\n * intentionally don't share runtime imports.\n */\nfunction extractA2AAuthHeader(headers: Record<string, string> | undefined): string | undefined {\n  if (!headers) return undefined;\n  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (key.toLowerCase() === 'authorization' && value) return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction headersCacheDisambiguator(headers?: Record<string, string>): string | undefined {\n  const entries = Object.entries(headers ?? {})\n    .filter(([key]) => {\n      const lower = key.toLowerCase();\n      return lower !== 'traceparent' && lower !== 'tracestate' && lower !== 'baggage';\n    })\n    .map(([key, value]) => [key.toLowerCase(), value] as const)\n    .sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b));\n  return entries.length > 0 ? cacheDisambiguator(JSON.stringify(entries)) : undefined;\n}\n\nfunction redactHeadersForDebug(headers: Record<string, string>): Record<string, string> {\n  return Object.fromEntries(Object.keys(headers).map(key => [key, '***']));\n}\n\nfunction redactPushNotificationConfigForDebug(\n  config: PushNotificationConfig | undefined\n): PushNotificationConfig | undefined {\n  if (!config) return undefined;\n  return {\n    ...config,\n    ...(config.token && { token: '***' }),\n    ...(config.authentication && {\n      authentication: {\n        ...config.authentication,\n        ...(config.authentication.credentials && { credentials: '***' }),\n      },\n    }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear all cached A2A clients. Called by closeConnections('a2a').\n * A2A clients hold no persistent network resources (unlike MCP), so this\n * is just cache eviction.\n */\nexport function closeA2AConnections(): void {\n  a2aClientCache.clear();\n  pendingA2AClients.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Wall-clock cap on a fire-and-forget cancel. A2A sellers that accept the\n * TCP connect but never respond would otherwise pin the event loop past the\n * buyer's abort, which defeats the whole point of fire-and-forget.\n */\nconst CANCEL_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;\n\n/**\n * Fire-and-forget A2A tasks/cancel for an in-flight task (A2A 0.3.0 §7.4).\n *\n * Sends a raw JSON-RPC 2.0 POST directly to the agent endpoint with the same\n * auth header shape as `callA2AToolImpl` (Bearer + x-adcp-auth). Does NOT\n * enter `callContextStorage` — debug-log capture and 401-cache-eviction are\n * intentionally skipped for best-effort cancellation.\n *\n * **Auth-code OAuth gap:** `authToken` is resolved by `getAuthToken(agent)`,\n * which returns `undefined` for authorization-code-flow sellers (those tokens\n * are managed by the OAuth provider path in `ProtocolClient.callTool`, not\n * accessible here). Cancel calls to those sellers go out unauthenticated and\n * will likely 401 non-fatally.\n *\n * **Phase 2 (adcp-client#1617 follow-up):** when `agent.request_signing` is\n * configured, the cancel POST is signed with the agent's signer key. The\n * `signingContextStorage` ALS scope around `callA2AToolImpl` does NOT extend\n * into `pollTaskCompletion` (sibling promise trees), so we can't replay the\n * captured ALS context — instead we rebuild a one-shot signer fetch from\n * `agent.request_signing` directly and use it for this single POST. Inline\n * keys go through `createSigningFetch` (sync); provider-backed configs use\n * `createSigningFetchAsync`. A `signed-requests` seller that requires\n * signing on `tasks/cancel` (or applies a uniform \"all mutating POSTs must\n * be signed\" policy) now accepts the cancel; one without signing config on\n * the agent gets the Phase 1 unsigned path.\n *\n * The caller is responsible for swallowing errors: cancel failure\n * (TaskNotCancelable, network error, auth rejection, network timeout) is\n * non-fatal because the buyer is already abandoning the task.\n *\n * @param agent     The agent config (used for URL, auth token, signing).\n * @param taskId    The server-assigned A2A Task.id to cancel.\n */\nexport async function cancelA2ATask(agent: AgentConfig, taskId: string, fetchFn?: typeof fetch): Promise<void> {\n  // Defense-in-depth (ad-tech-protocol-expert review of #1640): the cancel\n  // POST is JSON-RPC at the bare A2A endpoint. Calling this on an MCP agent\n  // would POST `tasks/cancel` JSON-RPC at an MCP endpoint and 404. The\n  // single call site (`pollTaskCompletion`) already gates on\n  // `agent.protocol === 'a2a'`; this assertion catches future call sites\n  // that forget the gate.\n  if (agent.protocol !== 'a2a') {\n    return;\n  }\n  const agentUrl = agent.agent_uri;\n  const authToken = agent.auth_token;\n\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'content-type': 'application/json',\n    accept: 'application/json',\n  };\n  if (authToken) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${authToken}`;\n    headers['x-adcp-auth'] = authToken;\n  }\n  // JSON-RPC 2.0 §4.1.3: `id: null` flags the request as a *notification*,\n  // and the server MUST NOT respond. A2A 0.3.0 §7.4 defines `tasks/cancel`\n  // as a request/response method (returns the canceled `Task` or\n  // `TaskNotCancelableError`), so a strict A2A server can legitimately\n  // reject `id: null` as a protocol violation. Use a real id and just drop\n  // the response on the floor — fire-and-forget is the caller's discipline,\n  // not a wire-protocol claim.\n  const body = JSON.stringify({\n    jsonrpc: '2.0',\n    id: randomUUID(),\n    method: 'tasks/cancel',\n    params: { id: taskId },\n  });\n  // Bound the cancel: a hung fetch would orphan-pin the event loop past the\n  // buyer's abort, defeating fire-and-forget. AbortSignal.timeout() is the\n  // standard primitive; the caller's `.catch()` swallows the AbortError.\n  const init: RequestInit = {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body,\n    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(CANCEL_TIMEOUT_MS),\n  };\n\n  // adcp-client#1617 Phase 2: sign the cancel POST when the agent has a\n  // signer configured. We bypass the `buildAgentSigningFetch` capability-\n  // gate path because `tasks/cancel` is an A2A protocol method, not an\n  // AdCP tool — the seller's `request_signing.supported_for` typically\n  // lists AdCP tool names, not protocol-level methods. The right model\n  // here: if the agent claims signing AT ALL, sign every mutating POST\n  // we send to it on the cancel path. Sellers with uniform \"must be\n  // signed\" policies accept this; sellers that only check signing on\n  // specific AdCP tools simply ignore the extra signature.\n  //\n  // TODO(adcp#4318, adcp-client#1617): when the AdCP spec adds explicit\n  // verifier coverage for A2A protocol methods (likely in 3.1 as a new\n  // `protocol_methods_supported_for` / `protocol_methods_required_for`\n  // field on `request_signing`), narrow this default by reading the\n  // seller's advertised coverage from `getCapability()` and gating on\n  // the `tasks/cancel` membership. The over-sign default stays as the\n  // fallback for spec-silent sellers (3.0.x and earlier).\n  if (agent.request_signing) {\n    const upstream: FetchLike = (input, ini) =>\n      fetchFn ? fetchFn(input as RequestInfo | URL, ini) : fetch(input as RequestInfo, ini);\n    if (isInlineSigningConfig(agent.request_signing)) {\n      const signed = createSigningFetch(upstream, toSignerKey(agent.request_signing));\n      await signed(agentUrl, init);\n      return;\n    }\n    if (isProviderSigningConfig(agent.request_signing)) {\n      const signed = createSigningFetchAsync(upstream, agent.request_signing.provider);\n      await signed(agentUrl, init);\n      return;\n    }\n  }\n\n  await (fetchFn ?? fetch)(agentUrl, init);\n}\n\nasync function getOrCreateA2AClient(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken: string | undefined,\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n  bypassCache = false\n): Promise<InstanceType<typeof A2AClient>> {\n  const signingContext = signingContextStorage.getStore();\n  const fetchFn = callContextStorage.getStore()?.fetchFn;\n  const cacheKey = a2aCacheKey(agentUrl, authToken, signingContext?.cacheKey, customHeaders);\n  // Scoped fetchers often carry request/tenant-specific egress policy. Keep\n  // those calls one-shot so neither agent-card discovery nor a client created\n  // under one policy can be reused by another caller, and so short-lived\n  // closure identities do not grow the global cache without bound.\n  if (bypassCache || fetchFn) {\n    return createA2AClient(agentUrl, authToken);\n  }\n  const cached = a2aClientCache.get(cacheKey);\n  if (cached) return cached;\n\n  const pending = pendingA2AClients.get(cacheKey);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  const promise = createA2AClient(agentUrl, authToken)\n    .then(client => {\n      a2aClientCache.set(cacheKey, client);\n      return client;\n    })\n    .finally(() => {\n      pendingA2AClients.delete(cacheKey);\n    });\n\n  pendingA2AClients.set(cacheKey, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\nasync function createA2AClient(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken: string | undefined\n): Promise<InstanceType<typeof A2AClient>> {\n  const fetchImpl = buildFetchImpl(authToken);\n  const cardUrls = buildCardUrls(agentUrl);\n\n  const context = callContextStorage.getStore();\n  context?.debugLogs.push({\n    type: 'info',\n    message: `A2A: Discovering agent card at ${cardUrls.join(', ')}`,\n    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n  });\n\n  let client: InstanceType<typeof A2AClient> | undefined;\n  let lastError: Error = new Error(`A2A agent card not found at ${cardUrls.join(', ')}`);\n  for (const cardUrl of cardUrls) {\n    try {\n      client = await A2AClient.fromCardUrl(cardUrl, { fetchImpl });\n      break;\n    } catch (err: unknown) {\n      lastError = err as Error;\n      if (context?.got401Ref.value) break;\n    }\n  }\n  if (!client) throw lastError;\n\n  return client;\n}\n\nfunction buildFetchImpl(authToken: string | undefined) {\n  // The A2A client is cached per (url, authToken, signingCacheKey). We capture\n  // the signing context at client-creation time so all subsequent calls that\n  // share this cached client use the same signing identity — changing identity\n  // requires a different cache entry, built on a separate call that enters ALS\n  // with a different context.\n  const signingContext = signingContextStorage.getStore();\n\n  // Innermost wrapper: enforce response body size cap from the active\n  // `responseSizeLimitStorage` slot. Pass-through when no slot is set.\n  const networkFetch = wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics(\n    wrapFetchWithSizeLimit((input, init) => {\n      const scopedFetch = callContextStorage.getStore()?.fetchFn;\n      return scopedFetch ? scopedFetch(input, init) : fetch(input as any, init);\n    })\n  );\n\n  // Inner fetch handles auth/header injection and 401 detection. If the\n  // agent has request-signing configured, we wrap it with the AdCP signing\n  // fetch so the signature covers the exact bytes we're about to send (auth\n  // headers included, since the signer re-reads the final header record).\n  const baseFetch = async (url: string | URL | Request, options?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> => {\n    const context = callContextStorage.getStore();\n\n    const existingHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};\n    if (options?.headers) {\n      if (options.headers instanceof Headers) {\n        options.headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n          existingHeaders[key] = value;\n        });\n      } else if (Array.isArray(options.headers)) {\n        for (const [key, value] of options.headers) {\n          existingHeaders[key] = value;\n        }\n      } else {\n        Object.assign(existingHeaders, options.headers);\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Only inject trace context headers for actual tool requests, not discovery.\n    // The agent card endpoint is external/untrusted — don't leak trace IDs to it.\n    const urlString = typeof url === 'string' ? url : url.toString();\n    const isDiscoveryRequest = isAgentCardPath(urlString);\n    const traceHeaders = isDiscoveryRequest ? {} : injectTraceHeaders();\n    const requestTimeoutMs = isDiscoveryRequest\n      ? resolveRequestTimeoutMs(context?.requestTimeoutMs, DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS)\n      : resolveRequestTimeoutMs(context?.requestTimeoutMs);\n\n    // Merge: existing < trace < custom < auth (auth always wins)\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      ...existingHeaders,\n      ...traceHeaders,\n      ...context?.customHeaders,\n      ...(authToken && {\n        Authorization: `Bearer ${authToken}`,\n        'x-adcp-auth': authToken,\n      }),\n    };\n\n    context?.debugLogs.push({\n      type: 'info',\n      message: `A2A: Fetch to ${urlString}`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      hasAuth: !!authToken,\n      headers: redactHeadersForDebug(headers),\n    });\n\n    const response = await withAbortSignal<Response>([context?.signal, options?.signal], requestTimeoutMs, signal =>\n      networkFetch(url as any, { ...options, headers, signal })\n    );\n\n    if (response.status === 401 && context) {\n      context.got401Ref.value = true;\n    }\n\n    return response;\n  };\n\n  if (!signingContext) return wrapFetchWithCapture(baseFetch);\n\n  // The signing wrapper assembles headers into the signature base. We invoke\n  // it first so the signer sees the caller-supplied headers; baseFetch then\n  // overlays auth/trace headers afterwards — A2A's auth scheme (bearer) is\n  // not among the MANDATORY_COMPONENTS and is injected by the counterparty's\n  // transport layer, not signed.\n  const signingFetch = buildAgentSigningFetch({\n    upstream: (input, init) => baseFetch(input as any, init),\n    signing: signingContext.signing,\n    getCapability: signingContext.getCapability,\n  });\n  return wrapFetchWithCapture(signingFetch as typeof fetch);\n}\n\n/**\n * Terminal A2A task states per A2A 0.3.0 §3.4. Only these can carry the\n * AdCP-mandated artifact + DataPart envelope (per transport-errors §A2A\n * Binding); intermediate states (`working`, `submitted`, `input-required`,\n * `auth-required`) carry no completion artifact.\n */\nconst TERMINAL_A2A_STATES = new Set(['completed', 'failed', 'rejected', 'canceled']);\n\n/**\n * Detect whether a JSON-RPC response carries a spec-compliant terminal-state\n * Task with at least one artifact containing a structured DataPart payload.\n * Per AdCP transport-errors §A2A Binding, the artifact's DataPart is the\n * canonical envelope for both the success arm (`completed`) and the error\n * arms (`failed` / `rejected` / `canceled`). The criterion intentionally\n * matches the unwrapper's terminal-state extraction in\n * `unwrapA2AResponse` — keeping protocol layer and unwrapper in lockstep\n * across all terminal states, not just the error arms.\n *\n * Used to short-circuit the generic \"A2A agent returned error\" throw when\n * a non-conformant seller surfaces both a transport-level `result.error`\n * hint and the canonical artifact envelope side-by-side. The DataPart is\n * authoritative; the throw would otherwise swallow it.\n */\nfunction hasTerminalTaskWithDataArtifact(response: unknown): boolean {\n  if (!response || typeof response !== 'object') return false;\n  const result = (response as { result?: unknown }).result;\n  if (!result || typeof result !== 'object') return false;\n  const r = result as { kind?: unknown; status?: unknown; artifacts?: unknown };\n  if (r.kind !== 'task') return false;\n  const status = r.status as { state?: unknown } | undefined;\n  if (typeof status?.state !== 'string' || !TERMINAL_A2A_STATES.has(status.state)) return false;\n  return getLatestA2ADataPartFromResponse(response) !== undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Protocol-level session identifiers that ride on the A2A Message envelope\n * (not in the skill parameters). `contextId` binds sends to a server-side\n * conversation; `taskId` resumes an existing non-terminal task.\n *\n * Callers (buyers) typically retain these across calls on a per-conversation\n * AgentClient; see AgentClient.getContextId() / getPendingTaskId().\n */\nexport interface A2ASessionIds {\n  contextId?: string;\n  taskId?: string;\n}\n\nexport async function callA2ATool(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  toolName: string,\n  parameters: Record<string, unknown>,\n  authToken?: string,\n  debugLogs: DebugLogEntry[] = [],\n  pushNotificationConfig?: PushNotificationConfig,\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n  signingContext?: AgentSigningContext,\n  session?: A2ASessionIds,\n  signal?: AbortSignal,\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  return withSpan(\n    'adcp.a2a.call_tool',\n    {\n      'adcp.tool': toolName,\n      'http.url': agentUrl,\n    },\n    async () => {\n      const context: A2ACallContext = {\n        customHeaders,\n        debugLogs,\n        got401Ref: { value: false },\n        signal,\n        requestTimeoutMs,\n        fetchFn,\n      };\n      return signingContextStorage.run(signingContext, () =>\n        callContextStorage.run(context, () =>\n          callA2AToolImpl(\n            agentUrl,\n            toolName,\n            parameters,\n            authToken,\n            debugLogs,\n            pushNotificationConfig,\n            context,\n            session\n          )\n        )\n      );\n    }\n  );\n}\n\nasync function callA2AToolImpl(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  toolName: string,\n  parameters: Record<string, unknown>,\n  authToken: string | undefined,\n  debugLogs: DebugLogEntry[],\n  pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig | undefined,\n  context: A2ACallContext,\n  session: A2ASessionIds | undefined\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const client = await getOrCreateA2AClient(\n      agentUrl,\n      authToken,\n      context.customHeaders,\n      !!context.signal || context.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined\n    );\n\n    const requestPayload: {\n      message: {\n        messageId: string;\n        role: string;\n        kind: string;\n        parts: Array<{ kind: string; data: { skill: string; parameters: Record<string, unknown> } }>;\n        contextId?: string;\n        taskId?: string;\n      };\n      configuration?: { pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig };\n    } = {\n      message: {\n        messageId: `msg_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).substr(2, 9)}`,\n        role: 'user',\n        kind: 'message',\n        parts: [\n          {\n            kind: 'data',\n            data: {\n              skill: toolName,\n              parameters: parameters,\n            },\n          },\n        ],\n        ...(session?.contextId && { contextId: session.contextId }),\n        ...(session?.taskId && { taskId: session.taskId }),\n      },\n    };\n\n    if (pushNotificationConfig) {\n      requestPayload.configuration = {\n        pushNotificationConfig: pushNotificationConfig,\n      };\n    }\n\n    const payloadSize = JSON.stringify(requestPayload).length;\n    const redactedParameters = redactIdempotencyKeyInArgs(parameters);\n    const redactedPayload = {\n      ...requestPayload,\n      message: {\n        ...requestPayload.message,\n        parts: [\n          {\n            kind: 'data',\n            data: { skill: toolName, parameters: redactedParameters },\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n      ...(requestPayload.configuration && {\n        configuration: {\n          pushNotificationConfig: redactPushNotificationConfigForDebug(\n            requestPayload.configuration.pushNotificationConfig\n          )!,\n        },\n      }),\n    };\n    debugLogs.push({\n      type: 'info',\n      message: `A2A: Calling skill ${toolName} with parameters: ${JSON.stringify(\n        redactedParameters\n      )}. Payload size: ${payloadSize} bytes`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      payloadSize,\n      actualPayload: redactedPayload,\n    });\n\n    debugLogs.push({\n      type: 'info',\n      message: `A2A: Sending message via sendMessage()`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      skill: toolName,\n    });\n\n    const messageResponse = await client.sendMessage(requestPayload);\n\n    debugLogs.push({\n      type: messageResponse?.error ? 'error' : 'success',\n      message: `A2A: Response received (${messageResponse?.error ? 'error' : 'success'})`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      response: messageResponse,\n      skill: toolName,\n    });\n\n    if (messageResponse?.error || messageResponse?.result?.error) {\n      // adcp-client#1575: when the seller emits a spec-compliant terminal-state\n      // Task carrying an `adcp_error` DataPart (per AdCP transport-errors §A2A\n      // Binding), the structured artifact is canonical — even if the seller\n      // also surfaced a transport-level error string. Pass the response\n      // through so the upstream unwrapper extracts `adcp_error.code` instead\n      // of throwing a generic message that loses the AdCP error envelope.\n      if (!hasTerminalTaskWithDataArtifact(messageResponse)) {\n        const errorObj = messageResponse.error || messageResponse.result?.error;\n        const errorMessage = errorObj.message || JSON.stringify(errorObj);\n        throw new Error(`A2A agent returned error: ${errorMessage}`);\n      }\n    }\n\n    return messageResponse;\n  } catch (error: unknown) {\n    if (is401Error(error, context.got401Ref.value)) {\n      // Evict this cache entry — credential may have expired or been\n      // revoked. Same disambiguator as the original `getOrCreateA2AClient`\n      // call: when the credential rode on customHeaders.Authorization (Basic\n      // case) rather than authToken, the cache key must reflect that or we\n      // evict the wrong entry.\n      const signingContext = signingContextStorage.getStore();\n      a2aClientCache.delete(a2aCacheKey(agentUrl, authToken, signingContext?.cacheKey, context.customHeaders));\n\n      debugLogs.push({\n        type: 'error',\n        message: `A2A: Authentication required for ${agentUrl}`,\n        timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      });\n\n      // Re-probe to surface the WWW-Authenticate scheme on the error envelope.\n      // Basic-fronted agents (Apigee/Kong/AWS API GW with a BasicAuthentication\n      // policy) would otherwise leave consumers chasing OAuth metadata that\n      // doesn't exist. Matches the MCP discovery throw site in\n      // `SingleAgentClient.discoverMCPEndpoint`.\n      const challenge = await probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl, { fetchFn: context.fetchFn });\n      const oauthMetadata = await discoverOAuthMetadata(agentUrl, { fetch: context.fetchFn });\n      throw new AuthenticationRequiredError(agentUrl, oauthMetadata || undefined, undefined, challenge ?? undefined);\n    }\n\n    throw error;\n  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Hashing\n * only `authToken` would let two callers with different `user:pass`\n * credentials share a single cached A2AClient — single-CLI-process safe,\n * multi-tenant SDK consumer not safe.\n *\n * `customHeaders` also feed the key so tenant/routing headers cannot reuse a\n * card/client discovered for another caller. Scoped fetch calls bypass this\n * cache entirely (see `getOrCreateA2AClient`).\n */\nfunction a2aCacheKey(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  signingCacheKey?: string,\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>\n): string {\n  // 64-bit Map-key disambiguator — NOT a password hash. The cached client\n  // closes over the full credential, so a hypothetical hash collision still\n  // sends the original credential on the wire, just possibly cache-miss\n  // and reconnect. Routed via `cacheDisambiguator` (HMAC-SHA256 with empty\n  // key) instead of bare `createHash` so CodeQL's\n  // `js/insufficient-password-hash` heuristic doesn't misclassify the\n  // dataflow — see the helper docstring for the full rationale.\n  const fingerprint = authToken ?? extractA2AAuthHeader(customHeaders);\n  const tokenSuffix = fingerprint ? `::${cacheDisambiguator(fingerprint)}` : '';\n  const headersKey = headersCacheDisambiguator(customHeaders);\n  const headersSuffix = headersKey ? `::headers:${headersKey}` : '';\n  const signingSuffix = signingCacheKey ? `::${signingCacheKey}` : '';\n  return `${agentUrl}${tokenSuffix}${headersSuffix}${signingSuffix}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Produce a stable 64-bit Map-key disambiguator from credential material.\n * Mirrors the helper in `src/lib/protocols/mcp.ts` — the two protocol\n * modules intentionally don't share runtime imports, so each carries its\n * own copy. See the MCP-side docstring for the full rationale.\n */\nfunction cacheDisambiguator(value: string): string {\n  return createHmac('sha256', '').update(value).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);\n}\n\n/**\n * Case-insensitive lookup of `Authorization` on a header bag. Mirrors the\n * MCP-side helper; A2A keeps its own copy because the two protocol modules\n * intentionally don't share runtime imports.\n */\nfunction extractA2AAuthHeader(headers: Record<string, string> | undefined): string | undefined {\n  if (!headers) return undefined;\n  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (key.toLowerCase() === 'authorization' && value) return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction headersCacheDisambiguator(headers?: Record<string, string>): string | undefined {\n  const entries = Object.entries(headers ?? {})\n    .filter(([key]) => {\n      const lower = key.toLowerCase();\n      return lower !== 'traceparent' && lower !== 'tracestate' && lower !== 'baggage';\n    })\n    .map(([key, value]) => [key.toLowerCase(), value] as const)\n    .sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b));\n  return entries.length > 0 ? cacheDisambiguator(JSON.stringify(entries)) : undefined;\n}\n\nfunction redactHeadersForDebug(headers: Record<string, string>): Record<string, string> {\n  return Object.fromEntries(Object.keys(headers).map(key => [key, '***']));\n}\n\nfunction redactPushNotificationConfigForDebug(\n  config: PushNotificationConfig | undefined\n): PushNotificationConfig | undefined {\n  if (!config) return undefined;\n  return {\n    ...config,\n    ...(config.token && { token: '***' }),\n    ...(config.authentication && {\n      authentication: {\n        ...config.authentication,\n        ...(config.authentication.credentials && { credentials: '***' }),\n      },\n    }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear all cached A2A clients. Called by closeConnections('a2a').\n * A2A clients hold no persistent network resources (unlike MCP), so this\n * is just cache eviction.\n */\nexport function closeA2AConnections(): void {\n  a2aClientCache.clear();\n  pendingA2AClients.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Wall-clock cap on a fire-and-forget cancel. A2A sellers that accept the\n * TCP connect but never respond would otherwise pin the event loop past the\n * buyer's abort, which defeats the whole point of fire-and-forget.\n */\nconst CANCEL_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;\n\n/**\n * Fire-and-forget A2A tasks/cancel for an in-flight task (A2A 0.3.0 §7.4).\n *\n * Sends a raw JSON-RPC 2.0 POST directly to the agent endpoint with the same\n * auth header shape as `callA2AToolImpl` (Bearer + x-adcp-auth). Does NOT\n * enter `callContextStorage` — debug-log capture and 401-cache-eviction are\n * intentionally skipped for best-effort cancellation.\n *\n * **Auth-code OAuth gap:** `authToken` is resolved by `getAuthToken(agent)`,\n * which returns `undefined` for authorization-code-flow sellers (those tokens\n * are managed by the OAuth provider path in `ProtocolClient.callTool`, not\n * accessible here). Cancel calls to those sellers go out unauthenticated and\n * will likely 401 non-fatally.\n *\n * **Phase 2 (adcp-client#1617 follow-up):** when `agent.request_signing` is\n * configured, the cancel POST is signed with the agent's signer key. The\n * `signingContextStorage` ALS scope around `callA2AToolImpl` does NOT extend\n * into `pollTaskCompletion` (sibling promise trees), so we can't replay the\n * captured ALS context — instead we rebuild a one-shot signer fetch from\n * `agent.request_signing` directly and use it for this single POST. Inline\n * keys go through `createSigningFetch` (sync); provider-backed configs use\n * `createSigningFetchAsync`. A `signed-requests` seller that requires\n * signing on `tasks/cancel` (or applies a uniform \"all mutating POSTs must\n * be signed\" policy) now accepts the cancel; one without signing config on\n * the agent gets the Phase 1 unsigned path.\n *\n * The caller is responsible for swallowing errors: cancel failure\n * (TaskNotCancelable, network error, auth rejection, network timeout) is\n * non-fatal because the buyer is already abandoning the task.\n *\n * @param agent     The agent config (used for URL, auth token, signing).\n * @param taskId    The server-assigned A2A Task.id to cancel.\n */\nexport async function cancelA2ATask(agent: AgentConfig, taskId: string, fetchFn?: typeof fetch): Promise<void> {\n  // Defense-in-depth (ad-tech-protocol-expert review of #1640): the cancel\n  // POST is JSON-RPC at the bare A2A endpoint. Calling this on an MCP agent\n  // would POST `tasks/cancel` JSON-RPC at an MCP endpoint and 404. The\n  // single call site (`pollTaskCompletion`) already gates on\n  // `agent.protocol === 'a2a'`; this assertion catches future call sites\n  // that forget the gate.\n  if (agent.protocol !== 'a2a') {\n    return;\n  }\n  const agentUrl = agent.agent_uri;\n  const authToken = agent.auth_token;\n\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'content-type': 'application/json',\n    accept: 'application/json',\n  };\n  if (authToken) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${authToken}`;\n    headers['x-adcp-auth'] = authToken;\n  }\n  // JSON-RPC 2.0 §4.1.3: `id: null` flags the request as a *notification*,\n  // and the server MUST NOT respond. A2A 0.3.0 §7.4 defines `tasks/cancel`\n  // as a request/response method (returns the canceled `Task` or\n  // `TaskNotCancelableError`), so a strict A2A server can legitimately\n  // reject `id: null` as a protocol violation. Use a real id and just drop\n  // the response on the floor — fire-and-forget is the caller's discipline,\n  // not a wire-protocol claim.\n  const body = JSON.stringify({\n    jsonrpc: '2.0',\n    id: randomUUID(),\n    method: 'tasks/cancel',\n    params: { id: taskId },\n  });\n  // Bound the cancel: a hung fetch would orphan-pin the event loop past the\n  // buyer's abort, defeating fire-and-forget. AbortSignal.timeout() is the\n  // standard primitive; the caller's `.catch()` swallows the AbortError.\n  const init: RequestInit = {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body,\n    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(CANCEL_TIMEOUT_MS),\n  };\n\n  // adcp-client#1617 Phase 2: sign the cancel POST when the agent has a\n  // signer configured. We bypass the `buildAgentSigningFetch` capability-\n  // gate path because `tasks/cancel` is an A2A protocol method, not an\n  // AdCP tool — the seller's `request_signing.supported_for` typically\n  // lists AdCP tool names, not protocol-level methods. The right model\n  // here: if the agent claims signing AT ALL, sign every mutating POST\n  // we send to it on the cancel path. Sellers with uniform \"must be\n  // signed\" policies accept this; sellers that only check signing on\n  // specific AdCP tools simply ignore the extra signature.\n  //\n  // TODO(adcp#4318, adcp-client#1617): when the AdCP spec adds explicit\n  // verifier coverage for A2A protocol methods (likely in 3.1 as a new\n  // `protocol_methods_supported_for` / `protocol_methods_required_for`\n  // field on `request_signing`), narrow this default by reading the\n  // seller's advertised coverage from `getCapability()` and gating on\n  // the `tasks/cancel` membership. The over-sign default stays as the\n  // fallback for spec-silent sellers (3.0.x and earlier).\n  if (agent.request_signing) {\n    const upstream: FetchLike = (input, ini) =>\n      fetchFn ? fetchFn(input as RequestInfo | URL, ini) : fetch(input as RequestInfo, ini);\n    if (isInlineSigningConfig(agent.request_signing)) {\n      const signed = createSigningFetch(upstream, toSignerKey(agent.request_signing));\n      await signed(agentUrl, init);\n      return;\n    }\n    if (isProviderSigningConfig(agent.request_signing)) {\n      const signed = createSigningFetchAsync(upstream, agent.request_signing.provider);\n      await signed(agentUrl, init);\n      return;\n    }\n  }\n\n  await (fetchFn ?? fetch)(agentUrl, init);\n}\n\nasync function getOrCreateA2AClient(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken: string | undefined,\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n  bypassCache = false\n): Promise<InstanceType<typeof A2AClient>> {\n  const signingContext = signingContextStorage.getStore();\n  const fetchFn = callContextStorage.getStore()?.fetchFn;\n  const cacheKey = a2aCacheKey(agentUrl, authToken, signingContext?.cacheKey, customHeaders);\n  // Scoped fetchers often carry request/tenant-specific egress policy. Keep\n  // those calls one-shot so neither agent-card discovery nor a client created\n  // under one policy can be reused by another caller, and so short-lived\n  // closure identities do not grow the global cache without bound.\n  if (bypassCache || fetchFn) {\n    return createA2AClient(agentUrl, authToken);\n  }\n  const cached = a2aClientCache.get(cacheKey);\n  if (cached) return cached;\n\n  const pending = pendingA2AClients.get(cacheKey);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  const promise = createA2AClient(agentUrl, authToken)\n    .then(client => {\n      a2aClientCache.set(cacheKey, client);\n      return client;\n    })\n    .finally(() => {\n      pendingA2AClients.delete(cacheKey);\n    });\n\n  pendingA2AClients.set(cacheKey, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\nasync function createA2AClient(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken: string | undefined\n): Promise<InstanceType<typeof A2AClient>> {\n  const fetchImpl = buildFetchImpl(authToken);\n  const cardUrls = buildCardUrls(agentUrl);\n\n  const context = callContextStorage.getStore();\n  context?.debugLogs.push({\n    type: 'info',\n    message: `A2A: Discovering agent card at ${cardUrls.join(', ')}`,\n    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n  });\n\n  let client: InstanceType<typeof A2AClient> | undefined;\n  let lastError: Error = new Error(`A2A agent card not found at ${cardUrls.join(', ')}`);\n  for (const cardUrl of cardUrls) {\n    try {\n      client = await A2AClient.fromCardUrl(cardUrl, { fetchImpl });\n      break;\n    } catch (err: unknown) {\n      lastError = err as Error;\n      if (context?.got401Ref.value) break;\n    }\n  }\n  if (!client) throw lastError;\n\n  return client;\n}\n\nfunction buildFetchImpl(authToken: string | undefined) {\n  // The A2A client is cached per (url, authToken, signingCacheKey). We capture\n  // the signing context at client-creation time so all subsequent calls that\n  // share this cached client use the same signing identity — changing identity\n  // requires a different cache entry, built on a separate call that enters ALS\n  // with a different context.\n  const signingContext = signingContextStorage.getStore();\n\n  // Innermost wrapper: enforce response body size cap from the active\n  // `responseSizeLimitStorage` slot. Pass-through when no slot is set.\n  const networkFetch = wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics(\n    wrapFetchWithSizeLimit((input, init) => {\n      const scopedFetch = callContextStorage.getStore()?.fetchFn;\n      return scopedFetch ? scopedFetch(input, init) : fetch(input as any, init);\n    })\n  );\n\n  // Inner fetch handles auth/header injection and 401 detection. If the\n  // agent has request-signing configured, we wrap it with the AdCP signing\n  // fetch so the signature covers the exact bytes we're about to send (auth\n  // headers included, since the signer re-reads the final header record).\n  const baseFetch = async (url: string | URL | Request, options?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> => {\n    const context = callContextStorage.getStore();\n\n    const existingHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};\n    if (options?.headers) {\n      if (options.headers instanceof Headers) {\n        options.headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n          existingHeaders[key] = value;\n        });\n      } else if (Array.isArray(options.headers)) {\n        for (const [key, value] of options.headers) {\n          existingHeaders[key] = value;\n        }\n      } else {\n        Object.assign(existingHeaders, options.headers);\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Only inject trace context headers for actual tool requests, not discovery.\n    // The agent card endpoint is external/untrusted — don't leak trace IDs to it.\n    const urlString = typeof url === 'string' ? url : url.toString();\n    const isDiscoveryRequest = isAgentCardPath(urlString);\n    const traceHeaders = isDiscoveryRequest ? {} : injectTraceHeaders();\n    const requestTimeoutMs = isDiscoveryRequest\n      ? resolveRequestTimeoutMs(context?.requestTimeoutMs, DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS)\n      : resolveRequestTimeoutMs(context?.requestTimeoutMs);\n\n    // Merge: existing < trace < custom < auth (auth always wins)\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      ...existingHeaders,\n      ...traceHeaders,\n      ...context?.customHeaders,\n      ...(authToken && {\n        Authorization: `Bearer ${authToken}`,\n        'x-adcp-auth': authToken,\n      }),\n    };\n\n    context?.debugLogs.push({\n      type: 'info',\n      message: `A2A: Fetch to ${urlString}`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      hasAuth: !!authToken,\n      headers: redactHeadersForDebug(headers),\n    });\n\n    const response = await withAbortSignal<Response>([context?.signal, options?.signal], requestTimeoutMs, signal =>\n      networkFetch(url as any, { ...options, headers, signal })\n    );\n\n    if (response.status === 401 && context) {\n      context.got401Ref.value = true;\n    }\n\n    return response;\n  };\n\n  if (!signingContext) return wrapFetchWithCapture(baseFetch);\n\n  // The signing wrapper assembles headers into the signature base. We invoke\n  // it first so the signer sees the caller-supplied headers; baseFetch then\n  // overlays auth/trace headers afterwards — A2A's auth scheme (bearer) is\n  // not among the MANDATORY_COMPONENTS and is injected by the counterparty's\n  // transport layer, not signed.\n  const signingFetch = buildAgentSigningFetch({\n    upstream: (input, init) => baseFetch(input as any, init),\n    signing: signingContext.signing,\n    getCapability: signingContext.getCapability,\n  });\n  return wrapFetchWithCapture(signingFetch as typeof fetch);\n}\n\n/**\n * Terminal A2A task states per A2A 0.3.0 §3.4. Only these can carry the\n * AdCP-mandated artifact + DataPart envelope (per transport-errors §A2A\n * Binding); intermediate states (`working`, `submitted`, `input-required`,\n * `auth-required`) carry no completion artifact.\n */\nconst TERMINAL_A2A_STATES = new Set(['completed', 'failed', 'rejected', 'canceled']);\n\n/**\n * Detect whether a JSON-RPC response carries a spec-compliant terminal-state\n * Task with at least one artifact containing a structured DataPart payload.\n * Per AdCP transport-errors §A2A Binding, the artifact's DataPart is the\n * canonical envelope for both the success arm (`completed`) and the error\n * arms (`failed` / `rejected` / `canceled`). The criterion intentionally\n * matches the unwrapper's terminal-state extraction in\n * `unwrapA2AResponse` — keeping protocol layer and unwrapper in lockstep\n * across all terminal states, not just the error arms.\n *\n * Used to short-circuit the generic \"A2A agent returned error\" throw when\n * a non-conformant seller surfaces both a transport-level `result.error`\n * hint and the canonical artifact envelope side-by-side. The DataPart is\n * authoritative; the throw would otherwise swallow it.\n */\nfunction hasTerminalTaskWithDataArtifact(response: unknown): boolean {\n  if (!response || typeof response !== 'object') return false;\n  const result = (response as { result?: unknown }).result;\n  if (!result || typeof result !== 'object') return false;\n  const r = result as { kind?: unknown; status?: unknown; artifacts?: unknown };\n  if (r.kind !== 'task') return false;\n  const status = r.status as { state?: unknown } | undefined;\n  if (typeof status?.state !== 'string' || !TERMINAL_A2A_STATES.has(status.state)) return false;\n  return getLatestA2ADataPartFromResponse(response) !== undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Protocol-level session identifiers that ride on the A2A Message envelope\n * (not in the skill parameters). `contextId` binds sends to a server-side\n * conversation; `taskId` resumes an existing non-terminal task.\n *\n * Callers (buyers) typically retain these across calls on a per-conversation\n * AgentClient; see AgentClient.getContextId() / getPendingTaskId().\n */\nexport interface A2ASessionIds {\n  contextId?: string;\n  taskId?: string;\n}\n\nexport async function callA2ATool(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  toolName: string,\n  parameters: Record<string, unknown>,\n  authToken?: string,\n  debugLogs: DebugLogEntry[] = [],\n  pushNotificationConfig?: PushNotificationConfig,\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n  signingContext?: AgentSigningContext,\n  session?: A2ASessionIds,\n  signal?: AbortSignal,\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  return withSpan(\n    'adcp.a2a.call_tool',\n    {\n      'adcp.tool': toolName,\n      'http.url': agentUrl,\n    },\n    async () => {\n      const context: A2ACallContext = {\n        customHeaders,\n        debugLogs,\n        got401Ref: { value: false },\n        signal,\n        requestTimeoutMs,\n        fetchFn,\n      };\n      return signingContextStorage.run(signingContext, () =>\n        callContextStorage.run(context, () =>\n          callA2AToolImpl(\n            agentUrl,\n            toolName,\n            parameters,\n            authToken,\n            debugLogs,\n            pushNotificationConfig,\n            context,\n            session\n          )\n        )\n      );\n    }\n  );\n}\n\nasync function callA2AToolImpl(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  toolName: string,\n  parameters: Record<string, unknown>,\n  authToken: string | undefined,\n  debugLogs: DebugLogEntry[],\n  pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig | undefined,\n  context: A2ACallContext,\n  session: A2ASessionIds | undefined\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const client = await getOrCreateA2AClient(\n      agentUrl,\n      authToken,\n      context.customHeaders,\n      !!context.signal || context.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined\n    );\n\n    const requestPayload: {\n      message: {\n        messageId: string;\n        role: string;\n        kind: string;\n        parts: Array<{ kind: string; data: { skill: string; parameters: Record<string, unknown> } }>;\n        contextId?: string;\n        taskId?: string;\n      };\n      configuration?: { pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig };\n    } = {\n      message: {\n        messageId: `msg_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).substr(2, 9)}`,\n        role: 'user',\n        kind: 'message',\n        parts: [\n          {\n            kind: 'data',\n            data: {\n              skill: toolName,\n              parameters: parameters,\n            },\n          },\n        ],\n        ...(session?.contextId && { contextId: session.contextId }),\n        ...(session?.taskId && { taskId: session.taskId }),\n      },\n    };\n\n    if (pushNotificationConfig) {\n      requestPayload.configuration = {\n        pushNotificationConfig: pushNotificationConfig,\n      };\n    }\n\n    const payloadSize = JSON.stringify(requestPayload).length;\n    const redactedParameters = redactArgsForLog(parameters);\n    const redactedPayload = {\n      ...requestPayload,\n      message: {\n        ...requestPayload.message,\n        parts: [\n          {\n            kind: 'data',\n            data: { skill: toolName, parameters: redactedParameters },\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n      ...(requestPayload.configuration && {\n        configuration: {\n          pushNotificationConfig: redactPushNotificationConfigForDebug(\n            requestPayload.configuration.pushNotificationConfig\n          )!,\n        },\n      }),\n    };\n    debugLogs.push({\n      type: 'info',\n      message: `A2A: Calling skill ${toolName} with parameters: ${JSON.stringify(\n        redactedParameters\n      )}. Payload size: ${payloadSize} bytes`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      payloadSize,\n      actualPayload: redactedPayload,\n    });\n\n    debugLogs.push({\n      type: 'info',\n      message: `A2A: Sending message via sendMessage()`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      skill: toolName,\n    });\n\n    const messageResponse = await client.sendMessage(requestPayload);\n\n    debugLogs.push({\n      type: messageResponse?.error ? 'error' : 'success',\n      message: `A2A: Response received (${messageResponse?.error ? 'error' : 'success'})`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      response: messageResponse,\n      skill: toolName,\n    });\n\n    if (messageResponse?.error || messageResponse?.result?.error) {\n      // adcp-client#1575: when the seller emits a spec-compliant terminal-state\n      // Task carrying an `adcp_error` DataPart (per AdCP transport-errors §A2A\n      // Binding), the structured artifact is canonical — even if the seller\n      // also surfaced a transport-level error string. Pass the response\n      // through so the upstream unwrapper extracts `adcp_error.code` instead\n      // of throwing a generic message that loses the AdCP error envelope.\n      if (!hasTerminalTaskWithDataArtifact(messageResponse)) {\n        const errorObj = messageResponse.error || messageResponse.result?.error;\n        const errorMessage = errorObj.message || JSON.stringify(errorObj);\n        throw new Error(`A2A agent returned error: ${errorMessage}`);\n      }\n    }\n\n    return messageResponse;\n  } catch (error: unknown) {\n    if (is401Error(error, context.got401Ref.value)) {\n      // Evict this cache entry — credential may have expired or been\n      // revoked. Same disambiguator as the original `getOrCreateA2AClient`\n      // call: when the credential rode on customHeaders.Authorization (Basic\n      // case) rather than authToken, the cache key must reflect that or we\n      // evict the wrong entry.\n      const signingContext = signingContextStorage.getStore();\n      a2aClientCache.delete(a2aCacheKey(agentUrl, authToken, signingContext?.cacheKey, context.customHeaders));\n\n      debugLogs.push({\n        type: 'error',\n        message: `A2A: Authentication required for ${agentUrl}`,\n        timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      });\n\n      // Re-probe to surface the WWW-Authenticate scheme on the error envelope.\n      // Basic-fronted agents (Apigee/Kong/AWS API GW with a BasicAuthentication\n      // policy) would otherwise leave consumers chasing OAuth metadata that\n      // doesn't exist. Matches the MCP discovery throw site in\n      // `SingleAgentClient.discoverMCPEndpoint`.\n      const challenge = await probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl, { fetchFn: context.fetchFn });\n      const oauthMetadata = await discoverOAuthMetadata(agentUrl, { fetch: context.fetchFn });\n      throw new AuthenticationRequiredError(agentUrl, oauthMetadata || undefined, undefined, challenge ?? undefined);\n    }\n\n    throw error;\n  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package/dist/lib/protocols/a2a.mjs

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import { buildAgentSigningFetch, signingContextStorage } from "../signing/client
 import { toSignerKey, isInlineSigningConfig, isProviderSigningConfig } from "../signing/agent-fetch.mjs";
 import { createSigningFetch } from "../signing/fetch.mjs";
 import { createSigningFetchAsync } from "../signing/fetch-async.mjs";
-import { redactIdempotencyKeyInArgs } from "../utils/idempotency.mjs";
+import { redactArgsForLog } from "../utils/redact-args.mjs";
 import { wrapFetchWithCapture } from "./rawResponseCapture.mjs";
 import { wrapFetchWithSizeLimit } from "./responseSizeLimit.mjs";
 import { wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics } from "./transportDiagnostics.mjs";
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ async function callA2AToolImpl(agentUrl, toolName, parameters, authToken, debugL
       };
     }
     const payloadSize = JSON.stringify(requestPayload).length;
-    const redactedParameters = redactIdempotencyKeyInArgs(parameters);
+    const redactedParameters = redactArgsForLog(parameters);
     const redactedPayload = {
       ...requestPayload,
       message: {

package/dist/lib/protocols/a2a.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/protocols/a2a.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';\nimport { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';\nimport { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';\nconst __dirname = __adcpDirname(__adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url));\nconst require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);\n// Official A2A client implementation - NO FALLBACKS\nimport { A2AClient as A2AClientImpl } from '@a2a-js/sdk/client';\nimport { AsyncLocalStorage } from 'node:async_hooks';\nimport { createHmac, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';\nimport type { PushNotificationConfig } from '../types/tools.generated';\nimport type { DebugLogEntry } from '../types/adcp';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, is401Error } from '../errors';\nimport { discoverOAuthMetadata } from '../auth/oauth/discovery';\nimport { probeAuthChallenge } from '../auth/oauth/authorization-required';\nimport { withSpan, injectTraceHeaders } from '../observability/tracing';\nimport { isAgentCardPath, buildCardUrls } from '../utils/a2a-discovery';\nimport { buildAgentSigningFetch, signingContextStorage, type AgentSigningContext } from '../signing/client';\nimport { toSignerKey, isInlineSigningConfig, isProviderSigningConfig } from '../signing/agent-fetch';\nimport { createSigningFetch, type FetchLike } from '../signing/fetch';\nimport { createSigningFetchAsync } from '../signing/fetch-async';\nimport type { AgentConfig } from '../types/adcp';\nimport { redactIdempotencyKeyInArgs } from '../utils/idempotency';\nimport { wrapFetchWithCapture } from './rawResponseCapture';\nimport { wrapFetchWithSizeLimit } from './responseSizeLimit';\nimport { wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics } from './transportDiagnostics';\nimport { DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS, resolveRequestTimeoutMs, withAbortSignal } from './abort';\nimport { getLatestA2ADataPartFromResponse } from '../utils/a2a-artifacts';\n\n// The A2A SDK client is used untyped: request/response shapes are validated at\n// runtime against the AdCP wire contract, not against the SDK's exported\n// types. Preserves the prior behaviour of the CommonJS `require` form.\nconst A2AClient: any = A2AClientImpl;\n\nif (!A2AClient) {\n  throw new Error('A2A SDK client is required. Please install @a2a-js/sdk');\n}\n\n/**\n * Per-call state flowed through AsyncLocalStorage so concurrent callers\n * that share a cached A2AClient don't clobber each other's debugLogs,\n * customHeaders, or 401 flag.\n */\ninterface A2ACallContext {\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>;\n  debugLogs: DebugLogEntry[];\n  got401Ref: { value: boolean };\n  signal?: AbortSignal;\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number;\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch;\n}\n\nconst callContextStorage = new AsyncLocalStorage<A2ACallContext>();\n\n/**\n * Cached A2AClient keyed by (agentUrl, authToken hash). Avoids re-fetching\n * /.well-known/agent.json on every tool call. The cached client's fetchImpl\n * reads per-call state from callContextStorage, so concurrent calls to the\n * same cache entry are safe.\n *\n * Process-global singleton — not suitable for multi-tenant servers that\n * want per-tenant isolation (use separate processes or explicit cache keys).\n */\nconst a2aClientCache = new Map<string, InstanceType<typeof A2AClient>>();\nconst pendingA2AClients = new Map<string, Promise<InstanceType<typeof A2AClient>>>();\n\n/**\n * Build the A2A connection-cache key. Mirrors the rationale in\n * `src/lib/protocols/mcp.ts:connectionCacheKey`: when the caller is using a\n * non-bearer scheme (RFC 7617 Basic from the CLI's `--auth-scheme basic`\n * shape, or any future caller-injected `Authorization` header), `authToken`\n * is undefined and the credential rides on the customHeaders bag. Hashing\n * only `authToken` would let two callers with different `user:pass`\n * credentials share a single cached A2AClient — single-CLI-process safe,\n * multi-tenant SDK consumer not safe.\n *\n * `customHeaders` also feed the key so tenant/routing headers cannot reuse a\n * card/client discovered for another caller. Scoped fetch calls bypass this\n * cache entirely (see `getOrCreateA2AClient`).\n */\nfunction a2aCacheKey(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken?: string,\n  signingCacheKey?: string,\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>\n): string {\n  // 64-bit Map-key disambiguator — NOT a password hash. The cached client\n  // closes over the full credential, so a hypothetical hash collision still\n  // sends the original credential on the wire, just possibly cache-miss\n  // and reconnect. Routed via `cacheDisambiguator` (HMAC-SHA256 with empty\n  // key) instead of bare `createHash` so CodeQL's\n  // `js/insufficient-password-hash` heuristic doesn't misclassify the\n  // dataflow — see the helper docstring for the full rationale.\n  const fingerprint = authToken ?? extractA2AAuthHeader(customHeaders);\n  const tokenSuffix = fingerprint ? `::${cacheDisambiguator(fingerprint)}` : '';\n  const headersKey = headersCacheDisambiguator(customHeaders);\n  const headersSuffix = headersKey ? `::headers:${headersKey}` : '';\n  const signingSuffix = signingCacheKey ? `::${signingCacheKey}` : '';\n  return `${agentUrl}${tokenSuffix}${headersSuffix}${signingSuffix}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Produce a stable 64-bit Map-key disambiguator from credential material.\n * Mirrors the helper in `src/lib/protocols/mcp.ts` — the two protocol\n * modules intentionally don't share runtime imports, so each carries its\n * own copy. See the MCP-side docstring for the full rationale.\n */\nfunction cacheDisambiguator(value: string): string {\n  return createHmac('sha256', '').update(value).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);\n}\n\n/**\n * Case-insensitive lookup of `Authorization` on a header bag. Mirrors the\n * MCP-side helper; A2A keeps its own copy because the two protocol modules\n * intentionally don't share runtime imports.\n */\nfunction extractA2AAuthHeader(headers: Record<string, string> | undefined): string | undefined {\n  if (!headers) return undefined;\n  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (key.toLowerCase() === 'authorization' && value) return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction headersCacheDisambiguator(headers?: Record<string, string>): string | undefined {\n  const entries = Object.entries(headers ?? {})\n    .filter(([key]) => {\n      const lower = key.toLowerCase();\n      return lower !== 'traceparent' && lower !== 'tracestate' && lower !== 'baggage';\n    })\n    .map(([key, value]) => [key.toLowerCase(), value] as const)\n    .sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b));\n  return entries.length > 0 ? cacheDisambiguator(JSON.stringify(entries)) : undefined;\n}\n\nfunction redactHeadersForDebug(headers: Record<string, string>): Record<string, string> {\n  return Object.fromEntries(Object.keys(headers).map(key => [key, '***']));\n}\n\nfunction redactPushNotificationConfigForDebug(\n  config: PushNotificationConfig | undefined\n): PushNotificationConfig | undefined {\n  if (!config) return undefined;\n  return {\n    ...config,\n    ...(config.token && { token: '***' }),\n    ...(config.authentication && {\n      authentication: {\n        ...config.authentication,\n        ...(config.authentication.credentials && { credentials: '***' }),\n      },\n    }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear all cached A2A clients. Called by closeConnections('a2a').\n * A2A clients hold no persistent network resources (unlike MCP), so this\n * is just cache eviction.\n */\nexport function closeA2AConnections(): void {\n  a2aClientCache.clear();\n  pendingA2AClients.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Wall-clock cap on a fire-and-forget cancel. A2A sellers that accept the\n * TCP connect but never respond would otherwise pin the event loop past the\n * buyer's abort, which defeats the whole point of fire-and-forget.\n */\nconst CANCEL_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;\n\n/**\n * Fire-and-forget A2A tasks/cancel for an in-flight task (A2A 0.3.0 §7.4).\n *\n * Sends a raw JSON-RPC 2.0 POST directly to the agent endpoint with the same\n * auth header shape as `callA2AToolImpl` (Bearer + x-adcp-auth). Does NOT\n * enter `callContextStorage` — debug-log capture and 401-cache-eviction are\n * intentionally skipped for best-effort cancellation.\n *\n * **Auth-code OAuth gap:** `authToken` is resolved by `getAuthToken(agent)`,\n * which returns `undefined` for authorization-code-flow sellers (those tokens\n * are managed by the OAuth provider path in `ProtocolClient.callTool`, not\n * accessible here). Cancel calls to those sellers go out unauthenticated and\n * will likely 401 non-fatally.\n *\n * **Phase 2 (adcp-client#1617 follow-up):** when `agent.request_signing` is\n * configured, the cancel POST is signed with the agent's signer key. The\n * `signingContextStorage` ALS scope around `callA2AToolImpl` does NOT extend\n * into `pollTaskCompletion` (sibling promise trees), so we can't replay the\n * captured ALS context — instead we rebuild a one-shot signer fetch from\n * `agent.request_signing` directly and use it for this single POST. Inline\n * keys go through `createSigningFetch` (sync); provider-backed configs use\n * `createSigningFetchAsync`. A `signed-requests` seller that requires\n * signing on `tasks/cancel` (or applies a uniform \"all mutating POSTs must\n * be signed\" policy) now accepts the cancel; one without signing config on\n * the agent gets the Phase 1 unsigned path.\n *\n * The caller is responsible for swallowing errors: cancel failure\n * (TaskNotCancelable, network error, auth rejection, network timeout) is\n * non-fatal because the buyer is already abandoning the task.\n *\n * @param agent     The agent config (used for URL, auth token, signing).\n * @param taskId    The server-assigned A2A Task.id to cancel.\n */\nexport async function cancelA2ATask(agent: AgentConfig, taskId: string, fetchFn?: typeof fetch): Promise<void> {\n  // Defense-in-depth (ad-tech-protocol-expert review of #1640): the cancel\n  // POST is JSON-RPC at the bare A2A endpoint. Calling this on an MCP agent\n  // would POST `tasks/cancel` JSON-RPC at an MCP endpoint and 404. The\n  // single call site (`pollTaskCompletion`) already gates on\n  // `agent.protocol === 'a2a'`; this assertion catches future call sites\n  // that forget the gate.\n  if (agent.protocol !== 'a2a') {\n    return;\n  }\n  const agentUrl = agent.agent_uri;\n  const authToken = agent.auth_token;\n\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'content-type': 'application/json',\n    accept: 'application/json',\n  };\n  if (authToken) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${authToken}`;\n    headers['x-adcp-auth'] = authToken;\n  }\n  // JSON-RPC 2.0 §4.1.3: `id: null` flags the request as a *notification*,\n  // and the server MUST NOT respond. A2A 0.3.0 §7.4 defines `tasks/cancel`\n  // as a request/response method (returns the canceled `Task` or\n  // `TaskNotCancelableError`), so a strict A2A server can legitimately\n  // reject `id: null` as a protocol violation. Use a real id and just drop\n  // the response on the floor — fire-and-forget is the caller's discipline,\n  // not a wire-protocol claim.\n  const body = JSON.stringify({\n    jsonrpc: '2.0',\n    id: randomUUID(),\n    method: 'tasks/cancel',\n    params: { id: taskId },\n  });\n  // Bound the cancel: a hung fetch would orphan-pin the event loop past the\n  // buyer's abort, defeating fire-and-forget. AbortSignal.timeout() is the\n  // standard primitive; the caller's `.catch()` swallows the AbortError.\n  const init: RequestInit = {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body,\n    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(CANCEL_TIMEOUT_MS),\n  };\n\n  // adcp-client#1617 Phase 2: sign the cancel POST when the agent has a\n  // signer configured. We bypass the `buildAgentSigningFetch` capability-\n  // gate path because `tasks/cancel` is an A2A protocol method, not an\n  // AdCP tool — the seller's `request_signing.supported_for` typically\n  // lists AdCP tool names, not protocol-level methods. The right model\n  // here: if the agent claims signing AT ALL, sign every mutating POST\n  // we send to it on the cancel path. Sellers with uniform \"must be\n  // signed\" policies accept this; sellers that only check signing on\n  // specific AdCP tools simply ignore the extra signature.\n  //\n  // TODO(adcp#4318, adcp-client#1617): when the AdCP spec adds explicit\n  // verifier coverage for A2A protocol methods (likely in 3.1 as a new\n  // `protocol_methods_supported_for` / `protocol_methods_required_for`\n  // field on `request_signing`), narrow this default by reading the\n  // seller's advertised coverage from `getCapability()` and gating on\n  // the `tasks/cancel` membership. The over-sign default stays as the\n  // fallback for spec-silent sellers (3.0.x and earlier).\n  if (agent.request_signing) {\n    const upstream: FetchLike = (input, ini) =>\n      fetchFn ? fetchFn(input as RequestInfo | URL, ini) : fetch(input as RequestInfo, ini);\n    if (isInlineSigningConfig(agent.request_signing)) {\n      const signed = createSigningFetch(upstream, toSignerKey(agent.request_signing));\n      await signed(agentUrl, init);\n      return;\n    }\n    if (isProviderSigningConfig(agent.request_signing)) {\n      const signed = createSigningFetchAsync(upstream, agent.request_signing.provider);\n      await signed(agentUrl, init);\n      return;\n    }\n  }\n\n  await (fetchFn ?? fetch)(agentUrl, init);\n}\n\nasync function getOrCreateA2AClient(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken: string | undefined,\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n  bypassCache = false\n): Promise<InstanceType<typeof A2AClient>> {\n  const signingContext = signingContextStorage.getStore();\n  const fetchFn = callContextStorage.getStore()?.fetchFn;\n  const cacheKey = a2aCacheKey(agentUrl, authToken, signingContext?.cacheKey, customHeaders);\n  // Scoped fetchers often carry request/tenant-specific egress policy. Keep\n  // those calls one-shot so neither agent-card discovery nor a client created\n  // under one policy can be reused by another caller, and so short-lived\n  // closure identities do not grow the global cache without bound.\n  if (bypassCache || fetchFn) {\n    return createA2AClient(agentUrl, authToken);\n  }\n  const cached = a2aClientCache.get(cacheKey);\n  if (cached) return cached;\n\n  const pending = pendingA2AClients.get(cacheKey);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  const promise = createA2AClient(agentUrl, authToken)\n    .then(client => {\n      a2aClientCache.set(cacheKey, client);\n      return client;\n    })\n    .finally(() => {\n      pendingA2AClients.delete(cacheKey);\n    });\n\n  pendingA2AClients.set(cacheKey, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\nasync function createA2AClient(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken: string | undefined\n): Promise<InstanceType<typeof A2AClient>> {\n  const fetchImpl = buildFetchImpl(authToken);\n  const cardUrls = buildCardUrls(agentUrl);\n\n  const context = callContextStorage.getStore();\n  context?.debugLogs.push({\n    type: 'info',\n    message: `A2A: Discovering agent card at ${cardUrls.join(', ')}`,\n    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n  });\n\n  let client: InstanceType<typeof A2AClient> | undefined;\n  let lastError: Error = new Error(`A2A agent card not found at ${cardUrls.join(', ')}`);\n  for (const cardUrl of cardUrls) {\n    try {\n      client = await A2AClient.fromCardUrl(cardUrl, { fetchImpl });\n      break;\n    } catch (err: unknown) {\n      lastError = err as Error;\n      if (context?.got401Ref.value) break;\n    }\n  }\n  if (!client) throw lastError;\n\n  return client;\n}\n\nfunction buildFetchImpl(authToken: string | undefined) {\n  // The A2A client is cached per (url, authToken, signingCacheKey). We capture\n  // the signing context at client-creation time so all subsequent calls that\n  // share this cached client use the same signing identity — changing identity\n  // requires a different cache entry, built on a separate call that enters ALS\n  // with a different context.\n  const signingContext = signingContextStorage.getStore();\n\n  // Innermost wrapper: enforce response body size cap from the active\n  // `responseSizeLimitStorage` slot. Pass-through when no slot is set.\n  const networkFetch = wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics(\n    wrapFetchWithSizeLimit((input, init) => {\n      const scopedFetch = callContextStorage.getStore()?.fetchFn;\n      return scopedFetch ? scopedFetch(input, init) : fetch(input as any, init);\n    })\n  );\n\n  // Inner fetch handles auth/header injection and 401 detection. If the\n  // agent has request-signing configured, we wrap it with the AdCP signing\n  // fetch so the signature covers the exact bytes we're about to send (auth\n  // headers included, since the signer re-reads the final header record).\n  const baseFetch = async (url: string | URL | Request, options?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> => {\n    const context = callContextStorage.getStore();\n\n    const existingHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};\n    if (options?.headers) {\n      if (options.headers instanceof Headers) {\n        options.headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n          existingHeaders[key] = value;\n        });\n      } else if (Array.isArray(options.headers)) {\n        for (const [key, value] of options.headers) {\n          existingHeaders[key] = value;\n        }\n      } else {\n        Object.assign(existingHeaders, options.headers);\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Only inject trace context headers for actual tool requests, not discovery.\n    // The agent card endpoint is external/untrusted — don't leak trace IDs to it.\n    const urlString = typeof url === 'string' ? url : url.toString();\n    const isDiscoveryRequest = isAgentCardPath(urlString);\n    const traceHeaders = isDiscoveryRequest ? {} : injectTraceHeaders();\n    const requestTimeoutMs = isDiscoveryRequest\n      ? resolveRequestTimeoutMs(context?.requestTimeoutMs, DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS)\n      : resolveRequestTimeoutMs(context?.requestTimeoutMs);\n\n    // Merge: existing < trace < custom < auth (auth always wins)\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      ...existingHeaders,\n      ...traceHeaders,\n      ...context?.customHeaders,\n      ...(authToken && {\n        Authorization: `Bearer ${authToken}`,\n        'x-adcp-auth': authToken,\n      }),\n    };\n\n    context?.debugLogs.push({\n      type: 'info',\n      message: `A2A: Fetch to ${urlString}`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      hasAuth: !!authToken,\n      headers: redactHeadersForDebug(headers),\n    });\n\n    const response = await withAbortSignal<Response>([context?.signal, options?.signal], requestTimeoutMs, signal =>\n      networkFetch(url as any, { ...options, headers, signal })\n    );\n\n    if (response.status === 401 && context) {\n      context.got401Ref.value = true;\n    }\n\n    return response;\n  };\n\n  if (!signingContext) return wrapFetchWithCapture(baseFetch);\n\n  // The signing wrapper assembles headers into the signature base. We invoke\n  // it first so the signer sees the caller-supplied headers; baseFetch then\n  // overlays auth/trace headers afterwards — A2A's auth scheme (bearer) is\n  // not among the MANDATORY_COMPONENTS and is injected by the counterparty's\n  // transport layer, not signed.\n  const signingFetch = buildAgentSigningFetch({\n    upstream: (input, init) => baseFetch(input as any, init),\n    signing: signingContext.signing,\n    getCapability: signingContext.getCapability,\n  });\n  return wrapFetchWithCapture(signingFetch as typeof fetch);\n}\n\n/**\n * Terminal A2A task states per A2A 0.3.0 §3.4. Only these can carry the\n * AdCP-mandated artifact + DataPart envelope (per transport-errors §A2A\n * Binding); intermediate states (`working`, `submitted`, `input-required`,\n * `auth-required`) carry no completion artifact.\n */\nconst TERMINAL_A2A_STATES = new Set(['completed', 'failed', 'rejected', 'canceled']);\n\n/**\n * Detect whether a JSON-RPC response carries a spec-compliant terminal-state\n * Task with at least one artifact containing a structured DataPart payload.\n * Per AdCP transport-errors §A2A Binding, the artifact's DataPart is the\n * canonical envelope for both the success arm (`completed`) and the error\n * arms (`failed` / `rejected` / `canceled`). The criterion intentionally\n * matches the unwrapper's terminal-state extraction in\n * `unwrapA2AResponse` — keeping protocol layer and unwrapper in lockstep\n * across all terminal states, not just the error arms.\n *\n * Used to short-circuit the generic \"A2A agent returned error\" throw when\n * a non-conformant seller surfaces both a transport-level `result.error`\n * hint and the canonical artifact envelope side-by-side. The DataPart is\n * authoritative; the throw would otherwise swallow it.\n */\nfunction hasTerminalTaskWithDataArtifact(response: unknown): boolean {\n  if (!response || typeof response !== 'object') return false;\n  const result = (response as { result?: unknown }).result;\n  if (!result || typeof result !== 'object') return false;\n  const r = result as { kind?: unknown; status?: unknown; artifacts?: unknown };\n  if (r.kind !== 'task') return false;\n  const status = r.status as { state?: unknown } | undefined;\n  if (typeof status?.state !== 'string' || !TERMINAL_A2A_STATES.has(status.state)) return false;\n  return getLatestA2ADataPartFromResponse(response) !== undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Protocol-level session identifiers that ride on the A2A Message envelope\n * (not in the skill parameters). `contextId` binds sends to a server-side\n * conversation; `taskId` resumes an existing non-terminal task.\n *\n * Callers (buyers) typically retain these across calls on a per-conversation\n * AgentClient; see AgentClient.getContextId() / getPendingTaskId().\n */\nexport interface A2ASessionIds {\n  contextId?: string;\n  taskId?: string;\n}\n\nexport async function callA2ATool(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  toolName: string,\n  parameters: Record<string, unknown>,\n  authToken?: string,\n  debugLogs: DebugLogEntry[] = [],\n  pushNotificationConfig?: PushNotificationConfig,\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n  signingContext?: AgentSigningContext,\n  session?: A2ASessionIds,\n  signal?: AbortSignal,\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  return withSpan(\n    'adcp.a2a.call_tool',\n    {\n      'adcp.tool': toolName,\n      'http.url': agentUrl,\n    },\n    async () => {\n      const context: A2ACallContext = {\n        customHeaders,\n        debugLogs,\n        got401Ref: { value: false },\n        signal,\n        requestTimeoutMs,\n        fetchFn,\n      };\n      return signingContextStorage.run(signingContext, () =>\n        callContextStorage.run(context, () =>\n          callA2AToolImpl(\n            agentUrl,\n            toolName,\n            parameters,\n            authToken,\n            debugLogs,\n            pushNotificationConfig,\n            context,\n            session\n          )\n        )\n      );\n    }\n  );\n}\n\nasync function callA2AToolImpl(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  toolName: string,\n  parameters: Record<string, unknown>,\n  authToken: string | undefined,\n  debugLogs: DebugLogEntry[],\n  pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig | undefined,\n  context: A2ACallContext,\n  session: A2ASessionIds | undefined\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const client = await getOrCreateA2AClient(\n      agentUrl,\n      authToken,\n      context.customHeaders,\n      !!context.signal || context.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined\n    );\n\n    const requestPayload: {\n      message: {\n        messageId: string;\n        role: string;\n        kind: string;\n        parts: Array<{ kind: string; data: { skill: string; parameters: Record<string, unknown> } }>;\n        contextId?: string;\n        taskId?: string;\n      };\n      configuration?: { pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig };\n    } = {\n      message: {\n        messageId: `msg_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).substr(2, 9)}`,\n        role: 'user',\n        kind: 'message',\n        parts: [\n          {\n            kind: 'data',\n            data: {\n              skill: toolName,\n              parameters: parameters,\n            },\n          },\n        ],\n        ...(session?.contextId && { contextId: session.contextId }),\n        ...(session?.taskId && { taskId: session.taskId }),\n      },\n    };\n\n    if (pushNotificationConfig) {\n      requestPayload.configuration = {\n        pushNotificationConfig: pushNotificationConfig,\n      };\n    }\n\n    const payloadSize = JSON.stringify(requestPayload).length;\n    const redactedParameters = redactIdempotencyKeyInArgs(parameters);\n    const redactedPayload = {\n      ...requestPayload,\n      message: {\n        ...requestPayload.message,\n        parts: [\n          {\n            kind: 'data',\n            data: { skill: toolName, parameters: redactedParameters },\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n      ...(requestPayload.configuration && {\n        configuration: {\n          pushNotificationConfig: redactPushNotificationConfigForDebug(\n            requestPayload.configuration.pushNotificationConfig\n          )!,\n        },\n      }),\n    };\n    debugLogs.push({\n      type: 'info',\n      message: `A2A: Calling skill ${toolName} with parameters: ${JSON.stringify(\n        redactedParameters\n      )}. Payload size: ${payloadSize} bytes`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      payloadSize,\n      actualPayload: redactedPayload,\n    });\n\n    debugLogs.push({\n      type: 'info',\n      message: `A2A: Sending message via sendMessage()`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      skill: toolName,\n    });\n\n    const messageResponse = await client.sendMessage(requestPayload);\n\n    debugLogs.push({\n      type: messageResponse?.error ? 'error' : 'success',\n      message: `A2A: Response received (${messageResponse?.error ? 'error' : 'success'})`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      response: messageResponse,\n      skill: toolName,\n    });\n\n    if (messageResponse?.error || messageResponse?.result?.error) {\n      // adcp-client#1575: when the seller emits a spec-compliant terminal-state\n      // Task carrying an `adcp_error` DataPart (per AdCP transport-errors §A2A\n      // Binding), the structured artifact is canonical — even if the seller\n      // also surfaced a transport-level error string. Pass the response\n      // through so the upstream unwrapper extracts `adcp_error.code` instead\n      // of throwing a generic message that loses the AdCP error envelope.\n      if (!hasTerminalTaskWithDataArtifact(messageResponse)) {\n        const errorObj = messageResponse.error || messageResponse.result?.error;\n        const errorMessage = errorObj.message || JSON.stringify(errorObj);\n        throw new Error(`A2A agent returned error: ${errorMessage}`);\n      }\n    }\n\n    return messageResponse;\n  } catch (error: unknown) {\n    if (is401Error(error, context.got401Ref.value)) {\n      // Evict this cache entry — credential may have expired or been\n      // revoked. Same disambiguator as the original `getOrCreateA2AClient`\n      // call: when the credential rode on customHeaders.Authorization (Basic\n      // case) rather than authToken, the cache key must reflect that or we\n      // evict the wrong entry.\n      const signingContext = signingContextStorage.getStore();\n      a2aClientCache.delete(a2aCacheKey(agentUrl, authToken, signingContext?.cacheKey, context.customHeaders));\n\n      debugLogs.push({\n        type: 'error',\n        message: `A2A: Authentication required for ${agentUrl}`,\n        timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      });\n\n      // Re-probe to surface the WWW-Authenticate scheme on the error envelope.\n      // Basic-fronted agents (Apigee/Kong/AWS API GW with a BasicAuthentication\n      // policy) would otherwise leave consumers chasing OAuth metadata that\n      // doesn't exist. Matches the MCP discovery throw site in\n      // `SingleAgentClient.discoverMCPEndpoint`.\n      const challenge = await probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl, { fetchFn: context.fetchFn });\n      const oauthMetadata = await discoverOAuthMetadata(agentUrl, { fetch: context.fetchFn });\n      throw new AuthenticationRequiredError(agentUrl, oauthMetadata || undefined, undefined, challenge ?? undefined);\n    }\n\n    throw error;\n  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Routed via `cacheDisambiguator` (HMAC-SHA256 with empty\n  // key) instead of bare `createHash` so CodeQL's\n  // `js/insufficient-password-hash` heuristic doesn't misclassify the\n  // dataflow — see the helper docstring for the full rationale.\n  const fingerprint = authToken ?? extractA2AAuthHeader(customHeaders);\n  const tokenSuffix = fingerprint ? `::${cacheDisambiguator(fingerprint)}` : '';\n  const headersKey = headersCacheDisambiguator(customHeaders);\n  const headersSuffix = headersKey ? `::headers:${headersKey}` : '';\n  const signingSuffix = signingCacheKey ? `::${signingCacheKey}` : '';\n  return `${agentUrl}${tokenSuffix}${headersSuffix}${signingSuffix}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Produce a stable 64-bit Map-key disambiguator from credential material.\n * Mirrors the helper in `src/lib/protocols/mcp.ts` — the two protocol\n * modules intentionally don't share runtime imports, so each carries its\n * own copy. See the MCP-side docstring for the full rationale.\n */\nfunction cacheDisambiguator(value: string): string {\n  return createHmac('sha256', '').update(value).digest('hex').slice(0, 16);\n}\n\n/**\n * Case-insensitive lookup of `Authorization` on a header bag. Mirrors the\n * MCP-side helper; A2A keeps its own copy because the two protocol modules\n * intentionally don't share runtime imports.\n */\nfunction extractA2AAuthHeader(headers: Record<string, string> | undefined): string | undefined {\n  if (!headers) return undefined;\n  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {\n    if (key.toLowerCase() === 'authorization' && value) return value;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction headersCacheDisambiguator(headers?: Record<string, string>): string | undefined {\n  const entries = Object.entries(headers ?? {})\n    .filter(([key]) => {\n      const lower = key.toLowerCase();\n      return lower !== 'traceparent' && lower !== 'tracestate' && lower !== 'baggage';\n    })\n    .map(([key, value]) => [key.toLowerCase(), value] as const)\n    .sort(([a], [b]) => a.localeCompare(b));\n  return entries.length > 0 ? cacheDisambiguator(JSON.stringify(entries)) : undefined;\n}\n\nfunction redactHeadersForDebug(headers: Record<string, string>): Record<string, string> {\n  return Object.fromEntries(Object.keys(headers).map(key => [key, '***']));\n}\n\nfunction redactPushNotificationConfigForDebug(\n  config: PushNotificationConfig | undefined\n): PushNotificationConfig | undefined {\n  if (!config) return undefined;\n  return {\n    ...config,\n    ...(config.token && { token: '***' }),\n    ...(config.authentication && {\n      authentication: {\n        ...config.authentication,\n        ...(config.authentication.credentials && { credentials: '***' }),\n      },\n    }),\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Clear all cached A2A clients. Called by closeConnections('a2a').\n * A2A clients hold no persistent network resources (unlike MCP), so this\n * is just cache eviction.\n */\nexport function closeA2AConnections(): void {\n  a2aClientCache.clear();\n  pendingA2AClients.clear();\n}\n\n/**\n * Wall-clock cap on a fire-and-forget cancel. A2A sellers that accept the\n * TCP connect but never respond would otherwise pin the event loop past the\n * buyer's abort, which defeats the whole point of fire-and-forget.\n */\nconst CANCEL_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;\n\n/**\n * Fire-and-forget A2A tasks/cancel for an in-flight task (A2A 0.3.0 §7.4).\n *\n * Sends a raw JSON-RPC 2.0 POST directly to the agent endpoint with the same\n * auth header shape as `callA2AToolImpl` (Bearer + x-adcp-auth). Does NOT\n * enter `callContextStorage` — debug-log capture and 401-cache-eviction are\n * intentionally skipped for best-effort cancellation.\n *\n * **Auth-code OAuth gap:** `authToken` is resolved by `getAuthToken(agent)`,\n * which returns `undefined` for authorization-code-flow sellers (those tokens\n * are managed by the OAuth provider path in `ProtocolClient.callTool`, not\n * accessible here). Cancel calls to those sellers go out unauthenticated and\n * will likely 401 non-fatally.\n *\n * **Phase 2 (adcp-client#1617 follow-up):** when `agent.request_signing` is\n * configured, the cancel POST is signed with the agent's signer key. The\n * `signingContextStorage` ALS scope around `callA2AToolImpl` does NOT extend\n * into `pollTaskCompletion` (sibling promise trees), so we can't replay the\n * captured ALS context — instead we rebuild a one-shot signer fetch from\n * `agent.request_signing` directly and use it for this single POST. Inline\n * keys go through `createSigningFetch` (sync); provider-backed configs use\n * `createSigningFetchAsync`. A `signed-requests` seller that requires\n * signing on `tasks/cancel` (or applies a uniform \"all mutating POSTs must\n * be signed\" policy) now accepts the cancel; one without signing config on\n * the agent gets the Phase 1 unsigned path.\n *\n * The caller is responsible for swallowing errors: cancel failure\n * (TaskNotCancelable, network error, auth rejection, network timeout) is\n * non-fatal because the buyer is already abandoning the task.\n *\n * @param agent     The agent config (used for URL, auth token, signing).\n * @param taskId    The server-assigned A2A Task.id to cancel.\n */\nexport async function cancelA2ATask(agent: AgentConfig, taskId: string, fetchFn?: typeof fetch): Promise<void> {\n  // Defense-in-depth (ad-tech-protocol-expert review of #1640): the cancel\n  // POST is JSON-RPC at the bare A2A endpoint. Calling this on an MCP agent\n  // would POST `tasks/cancel` JSON-RPC at an MCP endpoint and 404. The\n  // single call site (`pollTaskCompletion`) already gates on\n  // `agent.protocol === 'a2a'`; this assertion catches future call sites\n  // that forget the gate.\n  if (agent.protocol !== 'a2a') {\n    return;\n  }\n  const agentUrl = agent.agent_uri;\n  const authToken = agent.auth_token;\n\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'content-type': 'application/json',\n    accept: 'application/json',\n  };\n  if (authToken) {\n    headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${authToken}`;\n    headers['x-adcp-auth'] = authToken;\n  }\n  // JSON-RPC 2.0 §4.1.3: `id: null` flags the request as a *notification*,\n  // and the server MUST NOT respond. A2A 0.3.0 §7.4 defines `tasks/cancel`\n  // as a request/response method (returns the canceled `Task` or\n  // `TaskNotCancelableError`), so a strict A2A server can legitimately\n  // reject `id: null` as a protocol violation. Use a real id and just drop\n  // the response on the floor — fire-and-forget is the caller's discipline,\n  // not a wire-protocol claim.\n  const body = JSON.stringify({\n    jsonrpc: '2.0',\n    id: randomUUID(),\n    method: 'tasks/cancel',\n    params: { id: taskId },\n  });\n  // Bound the cancel: a hung fetch would orphan-pin the event loop past the\n  // buyer's abort, defeating fire-and-forget. AbortSignal.timeout() is the\n  // standard primitive; the caller's `.catch()` swallows the AbortError.\n  const init: RequestInit = {\n    method: 'POST',\n    headers,\n    body,\n    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(CANCEL_TIMEOUT_MS),\n  };\n\n  // adcp-client#1617 Phase 2: sign the cancel POST when the agent has a\n  // signer configured. We bypass the `buildAgentSigningFetch` capability-\n  // gate path because `tasks/cancel` is an A2A protocol method, not an\n  // AdCP tool — the seller's `request_signing.supported_for` typically\n  // lists AdCP tool names, not protocol-level methods. The right model\n  // here: if the agent claims signing AT ALL, sign every mutating POST\n  // we send to it on the cancel path. Sellers with uniform \"must be\n  // signed\" policies accept this; sellers that only check signing on\n  // specific AdCP tools simply ignore the extra signature.\n  //\n  // TODO(adcp#4318, adcp-client#1617): when the AdCP spec adds explicit\n  // verifier coverage for A2A protocol methods (likely in 3.1 as a new\n  // `protocol_methods_supported_for` / `protocol_methods_required_for`\n  // field on `request_signing`), narrow this default by reading the\n  // seller's advertised coverage from `getCapability()` and gating on\n  // the `tasks/cancel` membership. The over-sign default stays as the\n  // fallback for spec-silent sellers (3.0.x and earlier).\n  if (agent.request_signing) {\n    const upstream: FetchLike = (input, ini) =>\n      fetchFn ? fetchFn(input as RequestInfo | URL, ini) : fetch(input as RequestInfo, ini);\n    if (isInlineSigningConfig(agent.request_signing)) {\n      const signed = createSigningFetch(upstream, toSignerKey(agent.request_signing));\n      await signed(agentUrl, init);\n      return;\n    }\n    if (isProviderSigningConfig(agent.request_signing)) {\n      const signed = createSigningFetchAsync(upstream, agent.request_signing.provider);\n      await signed(agentUrl, init);\n      return;\n    }\n  }\n\n  await (fetchFn ?? fetch)(agentUrl, init);\n}\n\nasync function getOrCreateA2AClient(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken: string | undefined,\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n  bypassCache = false\n): Promise<InstanceType<typeof A2AClient>> {\n  const signingContext = signingContextStorage.getStore();\n  const fetchFn = callContextStorage.getStore()?.fetchFn;\n  const cacheKey = a2aCacheKey(agentUrl, authToken, signingContext?.cacheKey, customHeaders);\n  // Scoped fetchers often carry request/tenant-specific egress policy. Keep\n  // those calls one-shot so neither agent-card discovery nor a client created\n  // under one policy can be reused by another caller, and so short-lived\n  // closure identities do not grow the global cache without bound.\n  if (bypassCache || fetchFn) {\n    return createA2AClient(agentUrl, authToken);\n  }\n  const cached = a2aClientCache.get(cacheKey);\n  if (cached) return cached;\n\n  const pending = pendingA2AClients.get(cacheKey);\n  if (pending) return pending;\n\n  const promise = createA2AClient(agentUrl, authToken)\n    .then(client => {\n      a2aClientCache.set(cacheKey, client);\n      return client;\n    })\n    .finally(() => {\n      pendingA2AClients.delete(cacheKey);\n    });\n\n  pendingA2AClients.set(cacheKey, promise);\n  return promise;\n}\n\nasync function createA2AClient(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  authToken: string | undefined\n): Promise<InstanceType<typeof A2AClient>> {\n  const fetchImpl = buildFetchImpl(authToken);\n  const cardUrls = buildCardUrls(agentUrl);\n\n  const context = callContextStorage.getStore();\n  context?.debugLogs.push({\n    type: 'info',\n    message: `A2A: Discovering agent card at ${cardUrls.join(', ')}`,\n    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n  });\n\n  let client: InstanceType<typeof A2AClient> | undefined;\n  let lastError: Error = new Error(`A2A agent card not found at ${cardUrls.join(', ')}`);\n  for (const cardUrl of cardUrls) {\n    try {\n      client = await A2AClient.fromCardUrl(cardUrl, { fetchImpl });\n      break;\n    } catch (err: unknown) {\n      lastError = err as Error;\n      if (context?.got401Ref.value) break;\n    }\n  }\n  if (!client) throw lastError;\n\n  return client;\n}\n\nfunction buildFetchImpl(authToken: string | undefined) {\n  // The A2A client is cached per (url, authToken, signingCacheKey). We capture\n  // the signing context at client-creation time so all subsequent calls that\n  // share this cached client use the same signing identity — changing identity\n  // requires a different cache entry, built on a separate call that enters ALS\n  // with a different context.\n  const signingContext = signingContextStorage.getStore();\n\n  // Innermost wrapper: enforce response body size cap from the active\n  // `responseSizeLimitStorage` slot. Pass-through when no slot is set.\n  const networkFetch = wrapFetchWithTransportDiagnostics(\n    wrapFetchWithSizeLimit((input, init) => {\n      const scopedFetch = callContextStorage.getStore()?.fetchFn;\n      return scopedFetch ? scopedFetch(input, init) : fetch(input as any, init);\n    })\n  );\n\n  // Inner fetch handles auth/header injection and 401 detection. If the\n  // agent has request-signing configured, we wrap it with the AdCP signing\n  // fetch so the signature covers the exact bytes we're about to send (auth\n  // headers included, since the signer re-reads the final header record).\n  const baseFetch = async (url: string | URL | Request, options?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> => {\n    const context = callContextStorage.getStore();\n\n    const existingHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};\n    if (options?.headers) {\n      if (options.headers instanceof Headers) {\n        options.headers.forEach((value, key) => {\n          existingHeaders[key] = value;\n        });\n      } else if (Array.isArray(options.headers)) {\n        for (const [key, value] of options.headers) {\n          existingHeaders[key] = value;\n        }\n      } else {\n        Object.assign(existingHeaders, options.headers);\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Only inject trace context headers for actual tool requests, not discovery.\n    // The agent card endpoint is external/untrusted — don't leak trace IDs to it.\n    const urlString = typeof url === 'string' ? url : url.toString();\n    const isDiscoveryRequest = isAgentCardPath(urlString);\n    const traceHeaders = isDiscoveryRequest ? {} : injectTraceHeaders();\n    const requestTimeoutMs = isDiscoveryRequest\n      ? resolveRequestTimeoutMs(context?.requestTimeoutMs, DEFAULT_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS)\n      : resolveRequestTimeoutMs(context?.requestTimeoutMs);\n\n    // Merge: existing < trace < custom < auth (auth always wins)\n    const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n      ...existingHeaders,\n      ...traceHeaders,\n      ...context?.customHeaders,\n      ...(authToken && {\n        Authorization: `Bearer ${authToken}`,\n        'x-adcp-auth': authToken,\n      }),\n    };\n\n    context?.debugLogs.push({\n      type: 'info',\n      message: `A2A: Fetch to ${urlString}`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      hasAuth: !!authToken,\n      headers: redactHeadersForDebug(headers),\n    });\n\n    const response = await withAbortSignal<Response>([context?.signal, options?.signal], requestTimeoutMs, signal =>\n      networkFetch(url as any, { ...options, headers, signal })\n    );\n\n    if (response.status === 401 && context) {\n      context.got401Ref.value = true;\n    }\n\n    return response;\n  };\n\n  if (!signingContext) return wrapFetchWithCapture(baseFetch);\n\n  // The signing wrapper assembles headers into the signature base. We invoke\n  // it first so the signer sees the caller-supplied headers; baseFetch then\n  // overlays auth/trace headers afterwards — A2A's auth scheme (bearer) is\n  // not among the MANDATORY_COMPONENTS and is injected by the counterparty's\n  // transport layer, not signed.\n  const signingFetch = buildAgentSigningFetch({\n    upstream: (input, init) => baseFetch(input as any, init),\n    signing: signingContext.signing,\n    getCapability: signingContext.getCapability,\n  });\n  return wrapFetchWithCapture(signingFetch as typeof fetch);\n}\n\n/**\n * Terminal A2A task states per A2A 0.3.0 §3.4. Only these can carry the\n * AdCP-mandated artifact + DataPart envelope (per transport-errors §A2A\n * Binding); intermediate states (`working`, `submitted`, `input-required`,\n * `auth-required`) carry no completion artifact.\n */\nconst TERMINAL_A2A_STATES = new Set(['completed', 'failed', 'rejected', 'canceled']);\n\n/**\n * Detect whether a JSON-RPC response carries a spec-compliant terminal-state\n * Task with at least one artifact containing a structured DataPart payload.\n * Per AdCP transport-errors §A2A Binding, the artifact's DataPart is the\n * canonical envelope for both the success arm (`completed`) and the error\n * arms (`failed` / `rejected` / `canceled`). The criterion intentionally\n * matches the unwrapper's terminal-state extraction in\n * `unwrapA2AResponse` — keeping protocol layer and unwrapper in lockstep\n * across all terminal states, not just the error arms.\n *\n * Used to short-circuit the generic \"A2A agent returned error\" throw when\n * a non-conformant seller surfaces both a transport-level `result.error`\n * hint and the canonical artifact envelope side-by-side. The DataPart is\n * authoritative; the throw would otherwise swallow it.\n */\nfunction hasTerminalTaskWithDataArtifact(response: unknown): boolean {\n  if (!response || typeof response !== 'object') return false;\n  const result = (response as { result?: unknown }).result;\n  if (!result || typeof result !== 'object') return false;\n  const r = result as { kind?: unknown; status?: unknown; artifacts?: unknown };\n  if (r.kind !== 'task') return false;\n  const status = r.status as { state?: unknown } | undefined;\n  if (typeof status?.state !== 'string' || !TERMINAL_A2A_STATES.has(status.state)) return false;\n  return getLatestA2ADataPartFromResponse(response) !== undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Protocol-level session identifiers that ride on the A2A Message envelope\n * (not in the skill parameters). `contextId` binds sends to a server-side\n * conversation; `taskId` resumes an existing non-terminal task.\n *\n * Callers (buyers) typically retain these across calls on a per-conversation\n * AgentClient; see AgentClient.getContextId() / getPendingTaskId().\n */\nexport interface A2ASessionIds {\n  contextId?: string;\n  taskId?: string;\n}\n\nexport async function callA2ATool(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  toolName: string,\n  parameters: Record<string, unknown>,\n  authToken?: string,\n  debugLogs: DebugLogEntry[] = [],\n  pushNotificationConfig?: PushNotificationConfig,\n  customHeaders?: Record<string, string>,\n  signingContext?: AgentSigningContext,\n  session?: A2ASessionIds,\n  signal?: AbortSignal,\n  requestTimeoutMs?: number,\n  fetchFn?: typeof fetch\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  return withSpan(\n    'adcp.a2a.call_tool',\n    {\n      'adcp.tool': toolName,\n      'http.url': agentUrl,\n    },\n    async () => {\n      const context: A2ACallContext = {\n        customHeaders,\n        debugLogs,\n        got401Ref: { value: false },\n        signal,\n        requestTimeoutMs,\n        fetchFn,\n      };\n      return signingContextStorage.run(signingContext, () =>\n        callContextStorage.run(context, () =>\n          callA2AToolImpl(\n            agentUrl,\n            toolName,\n            parameters,\n            authToken,\n            debugLogs,\n            pushNotificationConfig,\n            context,\n            session\n          )\n        )\n      );\n    }\n  );\n}\n\nasync function callA2AToolImpl(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  toolName: string,\n  parameters: Record<string, unknown>,\n  authToken: string | undefined,\n  debugLogs: DebugLogEntry[],\n  pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig | undefined,\n  context: A2ACallContext,\n  session: A2ASessionIds | undefined\n): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const client = await getOrCreateA2AClient(\n      agentUrl,\n      authToken,\n      context.customHeaders,\n      !!context.signal || context.requestTimeoutMs !== undefined\n    );\n\n    const requestPayload: {\n      message: {\n        messageId: string;\n        role: string;\n        kind: string;\n        parts: Array<{ kind: string; data: { skill: string; parameters: Record<string, unknown> } }>;\n        contextId?: string;\n        taskId?: string;\n      };\n      configuration?: { pushNotificationConfig: PushNotificationConfig };\n    } = {\n      message: {\n        messageId: `msg_${Date.now()}_${Math.random().toString(36).substr(2, 9)}`,\n        role: 'user',\n        kind: 'message',\n        parts: [\n          {\n            kind: 'data',\n            data: {\n              skill: toolName,\n              parameters: parameters,\n            },\n          },\n        ],\n        ...(session?.contextId && { contextId: session.contextId }),\n        ...(session?.taskId && { taskId: session.taskId }),\n      },\n    };\n\n    if (pushNotificationConfig) {\n      requestPayload.configuration = {\n        pushNotificationConfig: pushNotificationConfig,\n      };\n    }\n\n    const payloadSize = JSON.stringify(requestPayload).length;\n    const redactedParameters = redactArgsForLog(parameters);\n    const redactedPayload = {\n      ...requestPayload,\n      message: {\n        ...requestPayload.message,\n        parts: [\n          {\n            kind: 'data',\n            data: { skill: toolName, parameters: redactedParameters },\n          },\n        ],\n      },\n      ...(requestPayload.configuration && {\n        configuration: {\n          pushNotificationConfig: redactPushNotificationConfigForDebug(\n            requestPayload.configuration.pushNotificationConfig\n          )!,\n        },\n      }),\n    };\n    debugLogs.push({\n      type: 'info',\n      message: `A2A: Calling skill ${toolName} with parameters: ${JSON.stringify(\n        redactedParameters\n      )}. Payload size: ${payloadSize} bytes`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      payloadSize,\n      actualPayload: redactedPayload,\n    });\n\n    debugLogs.push({\n      type: 'info',\n      message: `A2A: Sending message via sendMessage()`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      skill: toolName,\n    });\n\n    const messageResponse = await client.sendMessage(requestPayload);\n\n    debugLogs.push({\n      type: messageResponse?.error ? 'error' : 'success',\n      message: `A2A: Response received (${messageResponse?.error ? 'error' : 'success'})`,\n      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      response: messageResponse,\n      skill: toolName,\n    });\n\n    if (messageResponse?.error || messageResponse?.result?.error) {\n      // adcp-client#1575: when the seller emits a spec-compliant terminal-state\n      // Task carrying an `adcp_error` DataPart (per AdCP transport-errors §A2A\n      // Binding), the structured artifact is canonical — even if the seller\n      // also surfaced a transport-level error string. Pass the response\n      // through so the upstream unwrapper extracts `adcp_error.code` instead\n      // of throwing a generic message that loses the AdCP error envelope.\n      if (!hasTerminalTaskWithDataArtifact(messageResponse)) {\n        const errorObj = messageResponse.error || messageResponse.result?.error;\n        const errorMessage = errorObj.message || JSON.stringify(errorObj);\n        throw new Error(`A2A agent returned error: ${errorMessage}`);\n      }\n    }\n\n    return messageResponse;\n  } catch (error: unknown) {\n    if (is401Error(error, context.got401Ref.value)) {\n      // Evict this cache entry — credential may have expired or been\n      // revoked. Same disambiguator as the original `getOrCreateA2AClient`\n      // call: when the credential rode on customHeaders.Authorization (Basic\n      // case) rather than authToken, the cache key must reflect that or we\n      // evict the wrong entry.\n      const signingContext = signingContextStorage.getStore();\n      a2aClientCache.delete(a2aCacheKey(agentUrl, authToken, signingContext?.cacheKey, context.customHeaders));\n\n      debugLogs.push({\n        type: 'error',\n        message: `A2A: Authentication required for ${agentUrl}`,\n        timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),\n      });\n\n      // Re-probe to surface the WWW-Authenticate scheme on the error envelope.\n      // Basic-fronted agents (Apigee/Kong/AWS API GW with a BasicAuthentication\n      // policy) would otherwise leave consumers chasing OAuth metadata that\n      // doesn't exist. Matches the MCP discovery throw site in\n      // `SingleAgentClient.discoverMCPEndpoint`.\n      const challenge = await probeAuthChallenge(agentUrl, { fetchFn: context.fetchFn });\n      const oauthMetadata = await discoverOAuthMetadata(agentUrl, { fetch: context.fetchFn });\n      throw new AuthenticationRequiredError(agentUrl, oauthMetadata || undefined, undefined, challenge ?? undefined);\n    }\n\n    throw error;\n  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package/dist/lib/protocols/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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