@adcp/sdk 12.0.0 → 12.0.1

package/dist/lib/signing/verifier.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/verifier.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { parseDictionary } from 'structured-headers';\nimport {\n  buildSignatureBase,\n  canonicalTargetUri,\n  getHeaderValue,\n  rejectNonAsciiHost,\n  type RequestLike,\n} from './canonicalize';\nimport { contentDigestMatches } from './content-digest';\nimport { RequestSignatureError } from './errors';\nimport { parseSignature, parseSignatureInput, type ParsedSignatureInput } from './parser';\nimport { jwkToPublicKey, verifySignature } from './crypto';\nimport type { JwksResolver } from './jwks';\nimport type { ReplayStore } from './replay';\nimport type { RevocationStore } from './revocation';\nimport { containsWebhookAuthentication, WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH } from './webhook-auth-detection';\nimport {\n  ALLOWED_ALGS,\n  CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,\n  MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS,\n  REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG,\n  type VerifierCapability,\n  type VerifyResult,\n} from './types';\n\nexport interface VerifyRequestOptions {\n  capability: VerifierCapability;\n  jwks: JwksResolver;\n  replayStore: ReplayStore;\n  revocationStore: RevocationStore;\n  now?: () => number;\n  /**\n   * The AdCP operation being requested, used to consult\n   * `capability.required_for` when an unsigned request arrives. When omitted,\n   * the verifier treats the operation as \"not in any required_for list\" and\n   * returns an unsigned result rather than rejecting — callers in\n   * always-verify mode (where every request is signed) can leave this blank.\n   */\n  operation?: string;\n  agentUrlForKeyid?: (keyid: string) => string | undefined;\n}\n\nexport async function verifyRequestSignature(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  options: VerifyRequestOptions\n): Promise<VerifyResult> {\n  const now = options.now ? options.now() : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const sigInputHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Signature-Input');\n  const sigHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Signature');\n\n  // Pre-check: both headers present or both absent.\n  if (!sigInputHeader && !sigHeader) {\n    const operation = options.operation;\n    // Precedence is intentionally fail-specific: AdCP tool required_for,\n    // raw JSON-RPC protocol methods, then payload-driven webhook-auth\n    // elevation. The specific signed-only contract should win before the\n    // generic body scan runs.\n    if (operation && options.capability.required_for.includes(operation)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        `Operation \"${operation}\" requires a signed request`\n      );\n    }\n    const protocolMethodsRequiredFor = options.capability.protocol_methods_required_for ?? [];\n    if (protocolMethodsRequiredFor.length > 0 && exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(request.body)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        'Unsigned request body exceeds the protocol method inspection cap while protocol methods require signing'\n      );\n    }\n    const protocolMethods = jsonRpcProtocolMethods(request.body);\n    const requiredProtocolMethod = protocolMethods.find(method => protocolMethodsRequiredFor.includes(method));\n    if (requiredProtocolMethod) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        `Protocol method \"${requiredProtocolMethod}\" requires a signed request`\n      );\n    }\n    // Payload-driven elevation: any request carrying webhook receiver\n    // credentials (task, reporting, artifact, or revocation callbacks) MUST\n    // be RFC 9421 signed, regardless of whether the operation appears in\n    // `required_for`\n    // (#webhook-security downgrade-resistance). A bearer-only channel\n    // would otherwise let an attacker who captured a token register or\n    // update webhook credentials and redirect callbacks to a hostile URL.\n    if (carriesWebhookAuthentication(request)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        'Requests carrying webhook authentication must be RFC 9421 signed'\n      );\n    }\n    return { status: 'unsigned', verified_at: now };\n  }\n  if (!sigInputHeader || !sigHeader) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_header_malformed',\n      1,\n      'Signature and Signature-Input headers must be present as a pair'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 1: parse.\n  const parsedInput = parseSignatureInput(sigInputHeader);\n  const parsedSig = parseSignature(sigHeader, parsedInput.label);\n  rejectNonAsciiHost(request.url);\n  validateSingleValuedCoveredHeaders(parsedInput.components, request);\n\n  // Step 2: required params present.\n  requireParams(parsedInput);\n\n  // Step 3: tag match.\n  if (parsedInput.params.tag !== REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_tag_invalid',\n      3,\n      `Signature tag must be \"${REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG}\"; got \"${parsedInput.params.tag}\"`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 4: alg allowlist.\n  if (!ALLOWED_ALGS.has(parsedInput.params.alg)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_alg_not_allowed',\n      4,\n      `Signature alg \"${parsedInput.params.alg}\" is not in the AdCP allowlist`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 5: window valid.\n  validateWindow(parsedInput.params.created, parsedInput.params.expires, now);\n\n  // Step 6: covered components.\n  validateCoveredComponents(parsedInput.components, options.capability, request);\n\n  // Step 7: resolve keyid.\n  const jwk = await options.jwks.resolve(parsedInput.params.keyid);\n  if (!jwk) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `No JWK found for keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\"`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.kid !== parsedInput.params.keyid) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `JWKS resolver returned a JWK whose kid \"${jwk.kid}\" does not match requested keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\"`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 8: key purpose.\n  if (jwk.adcp_use !== 'request-signing' || !jwk.key_ops?.includes('verify')) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is not scoped for request-signing verification`\n    );\n  }\n  validateJwkParameterConsistency(jwk, parsedInput.params.alg);\n\n  // Step 9: revocation (runs BEFORE crypto to prevent amplification attacks).\n  if (await options.revocationStore.isRevoked(jwk.kid)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_key_revoked', 9, `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is revoked`);\n  }\n\n  // Replay cache is scoped by `(keyid, @target-uri)` per adcp#2460 — a\n  // signature captured on one endpoint (e.g. /create_media_buy) MUST NOT\n  // count against the replay budget for a different endpoint under the\n  // same keyid. Canonicalize once and reuse for both pre-check and commit.\n  const replayScope = canonicalTargetUri(request.url);\n\n  // Step 12 pre-checks (rate-abuse cap + replay hit) run before crypto so a\n  // compromised-key cache cap or a replayed nonce short-circuits an expensive\n  // Ed25519/ECDSA verify. The committing insert happens after step 11.\n  if (await options.replayStore.isCapHit(jwk.kid, replayScope, now)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_rate_abuse',\n      12,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}`\n    );\n  }\n  if (await options.replayStore.has(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, now)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 10: cryptographic verify. Use the received Signature-Input value\n  // verbatim as the @signature-params line so a peer emitting params in a\n  // different legal order still produces a byte-identical base.\n  const base = buildSignatureBase(\n    parsedInput.components,\n    request,\n    parsedInput.params,\n    parsedInput.signatureParamsValue\n  );\n  const publicKey = jwkToPublicKey(jwk);\n  const valid = verifySignature(parsedInput.params.alg, publicKey, Buffer.from(base, 'utf8'), parsedSig.bytes);\n  if (!valid) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_invalid',\n      10,\n      'Cryptographic verification of signature base failed'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 11: content-digest match (only if covered).\n  if (parsedInput.components.includes('content-digest')) {\n    const digestHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n    if (!digestHeader || !contentDigestMatches(digestHeader, request.body ?? '')) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_digest_mismatch',\n        11,\n        'Content-Digest header does not match recomputed body hash'\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Step 12: commit the (keyid, nonce) into the replay cache now that all\n  // prior checks have passed. Floor the TTL at one max-window + skew so a\n  // signer minting tiny validity windows can't replay outside the configured\n  // replay horizon, and so cross-replica eventual consistency has headroom.\n  const remaining = parsedInput.params.expires - now + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS;\n  const ttl = Math.max(remaining, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS);\n  const insertResult = await options.replayStore.insert(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, ttl, now);\n  if (insertResult === 'replayed') {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window`\n    );\n  }\n  if (insertResult === 'rate_abuse') {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_rate_abuse',\n      12,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}`\n    );\n  }\n\n  const agent_url = options.agentUrlForKeyid?.(jwk.kid);\n  return { status: 'verified', keyid: jwk.kid, agent_url, verified_at: now };\n}\n\nfunction jsonRpcProtocolMethods(body: string | undefined): string[] {\n  if (!body) return [];\n  if (exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body)) return [];\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(body) as unknown;\n    const messages = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];\n    return messages.flatMap(message =>\n      message !== null && typeof message === 'object' && typeof (message as { method?: unknown }).method === 'string'\n        ? [(message as { method: string }).method]\n        : []\n    );\n  } catch {\n    return [];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction requireParams(parsed: ParsedSignatureInput): void {\n  const required: Array<keyof ParsedSignatureInput['params']> = ['created', 'expires', 'nonce', 'keyid', 'alg', 'tag'];\n  const missing = required.filter(k => parsed.params[k] === undefined);\n  if (missing.length) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_params_incomplete',\n      2,\n      `Signature-Input missing required parameter(s): ${missing.join(', ')}`\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateWindow(created: number, expires: number, now: number): void {\n  if (expires <= created) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature expires must be strictly greater than created'\n    );\n  }\n  if (expires - created > MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      `Signature window exceeds ${MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS}s maximum`\n    );\n  }\n  if (now > expires + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_window_invalid', 5, 'Signature is expired');\n  }\n  if (now < created - CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature created is in the future beyond skew tolerance'\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reject JWKs whose alg/kty/crv are mutually inconsistent OR don't match\n * the sig-params alg. Three checks in one place:\n *\n * 1. JWK MUST declare `alg`. A missing alg lets a signer substitute one\n *    algorithm family for another (e.g. EdDSA sig-params against a P-256\n *    JWK) and defer failure to step 10's crypto verify — the wrong step\n *    and the wrong error code.\n * 2. JWK `alg` MUST match the sig-params `alg` after AdCP→JOSE mapping\n *    (`ed25519`↔`EdDSA`, `ecdsa-p256-sha256`↔`ES256`). Prevents sig-params\n *    alg-downgrade against a JWK that was published for a stronger alg.\n * 3. JWK kty/crv MUST be consistent with the declared alg per RFC 8037\n *    (EdDSA→OKP/Ed25519|Ed448) and RFC 7518 (ES256→EC/P-256).\n */\nfunction validateJwkParameterConsistency(\n  jwk: { kid: string; kty?: string; crv?: string; alg?: string },\n  sigParamsAlg: string\n): void {\n  if (!jwk.alg) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" does not declare an alg; cannot bind to sig-params alg=\"${sigParamsAlg}\"`\n    );\n  }\n  const expectedJoseAlg = SIG_PARAMS_ALG_TO_JOSE[sigParamsAlg];\n  if (expectedJoseAlg && jwk.alg !== expectedJoseAlg) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=${jwk.alg} but the request is signed with alg=\"${sigParamsAlg}\" (JOSE ${expectedJoseAlg})`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.alg === 'EdDSA') {\n    if (jwk.kty !== 'OKP' || (jwk.crv !== 'Ed25519' && jwk.crv !== 'Ed448')) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n        8,\n        `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=EdDSA but kty/crv (${jwk.kty}/${jwk.crv}) is not a valid Edwards-curve pair`\n      );\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n  if (jwk.alg === 'ES256') {\n    if (jwk.kty !== 'EC' || jwk.crv !== 'P-256') {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n        8,\n        `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=ES256 but kty/crv (${jwk.kty}/${jwk.crv}) is not EC/P-256`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nconst SIG_PARAMS_ALG_TO_JOSE: Record<string, string> = {\n  ed25519: 'EdDSA',\n  'ecdsa-p256-sha256': 'ES256',\n};\n\n/**\n * Covered components referencing single-valued HTTP header fields\n * (Content-Type per RFC 9110, Content-Digest per RFC 9530) MUST NOT arrive\n * as a comma-joined multi-value. A proxy or buggy client emitting the field\n * twice produces a concatenated value whose meaning relative to the\n * signature base is undefined — reject at parse rather than pick one.\n */\nfunction validateSingleValuedCoveredHeaders(components: string[], request: RequestLike): void {\n  if (components.includes('content-type')) {\n    const value = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Type');\n    if (value !== undefined && containsTopLevelComma(value)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_header_malformed',\n        1,\n        'Content-Type header covered by signature must be single-valued; multiple field values are ambiguous'\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  if (components.includes('content-digest')) {\n    const value = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n    if (value !== undefined) {\n      try {\n        const dict = parseDictionary(value);\n        const seen = new Map<string, number>();\n        for (const key of dict.keys()) {\n          seen.set(key, (seen.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);\n        }\n        for (const [key, count] of seen) {\n          if (count > 1) {\n            throw new RequestSignatureError(\n              'request_signature_header_malformed',\n              1,\n              `Content-Digest declares the \"${key}\" algorithm more than once; duplicate members are ambiguous`\n            );\n          }\n        }\n      } catch (e) {\n        if (e instanceof RequestSignatureError) throw e;\n      }\n      // The structured-headers library deduplicates dictionary keys silently.\n      // Detect the multi-value case at the raw-string level too so the\n      // specific \"two sha-256 members\" shape is caught.\n      if (containsDuplicateDictKey(value)) {\n        throw new RequestSignatureError(\n          'request_signature_header_malformed',\n          1,\n          'Content-Digest declares the same algorithm more than once; duplicate members are ambiguous'\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction containsTopLevelComma(value: string): boolean {\n  let inQuoted = false;\n  for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {\n    const ch = value[i]!;\n    if (ch === '\\\\' && i + 1 < value.length && inQuoted) {\n      i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === '\"') {\n      inQuoted = !inQuoted;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ',' && !inQuoted) return true;\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction containsDuplicateDictKey(value: string): boolean {\n  const keys: string[] = [];\n  let i = 0;\n  const len = value.length;\n  let atEntryStart = true;\n  while (i < len) {\n    if (atEntryStart) {\n      while (i < len && (value[i] === ' ' || value[i] === '\\t')) i++;\n      const start = i;\n      while (i < len && /[A-Za-z0-9_*-]/.test(value[i]!)) i++;\n      if (i > start) keys.push(value.slice(start, i).toLowerCase());\n      atEntryStart = false;\n      continue;\n    }\n    const ch = value[i]!;\n    if (ch === '\"') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < len) {\n        if (value[i] === '\\\\' && i + 1 < len) {\n          i += 2;\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (value[i] === '\"') {\n          i++;\n          break;\n        }\n        i++;\n      }\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ':') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < len && value[i] !== ':') i++;\n      if (i < len) i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ',') {\n      atEntryStart = true;\n      i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    i++;\n  }\n  const seen = new Set<string>();\n  for (const key of keys) {\n    if (seen.has(key)) return true;\n    seen.add(key);\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Upper bound on request body size we will JSON.parse and walk on the\n * unsigned branch. Real AdCP `update_media_buy` / `create_media_buy` payloads\n * are O(kilobytes); 1 MB is ~1000x that. Over this, require signing rather\n * than spend unbounded pre-crypto CPU on attacker-shaped input — a 1 MB\n * nested-array body would otherwise let an unauthenticated caller force\n * deep recursion on every request.\n */\nconst MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES = 1_048_576;\n/**\n * Upper bound on recursion depth in `containsWebhookAuthentication`. Real\n * AdCP payloads reach depth ~5-8; 64 is generous without leaving room for\n * a pathological `{\"a\":{\"a\":{...}}}` to burn the stack.\n */\nfunction exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body: string | undefined): boolean {\n  return typeof body === 'string' && body.length > MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES;\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan a JSON request body for a non-empty\n * webhook authentication object — anywhere in the tree, including inside\n * arrays of pending config updates. MCP uses `push_notification_config`;\n * A2A uses `pushNotificationConfig`. Runs only on the\n * unsigned branch; returning `true` triggers the webhook-security downgrade\n * rejection in {@link verifyRequestSignature}.\n *\n * The check is Content-Type independent: an attacker can't evade by\n * labeling a JSON body `text/plain`. A body that fails to parse as JSON\n * returns false so legitimate non-JSON transports (SSE posts, form uploads)\n * aren't blocked; signed-request enforcement for those remains\n * `required_for`-driven. A body over {@link MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES}\n * returns `true` — we can't prove absence of webhook auth within our DoS\n * budget, and oversized unsigned bodies are outside normal AdCP operation.\n */\nfunction carriesWebhookAuthentication(request: RequestLike): boolean {\n  const body = request.body;\n  if (!body) return false;\n  if (exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body)) return true;\n  let parsed: unknown;\n  try {\n    parsed = JSON.parse(body);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return containsWebhookAuthentication(parsed, WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH);\n}\n\nfunction validateCoveredComponents(components: string[], capability: VerifierCapability, request: RequestLike): void {\n  for (const mandatory of MANDATORY_COMPONENTS) {\n    if (!components.includes(mandatory)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n        6,\n        `Covered components must include \"${mandatory}\"`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  const hasBody = (request.body ?? '').length > 0;\n  if (hasBody && !components.includes('content-type')) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n      6,\n      'Covered components must include \"content-type\" when a request body is present'\n    );\n  }\n  const includesDigest = components.includes('content-digest');\n  if (capability.covers_content_digest === 'required' && !includesDigest) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n      6,\n      'Verifier requires content-digest coverage'\n    );\n  }\n  if (capability.covers_content_digest === 'forbidden' && includesDigest) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_unexpected',\n      6,\n      'Verifier forbids content-digest coverage'\n    );\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAAA,SAAS,uBAAuB;AAChC;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAEK;AACP,SAAS,4BAA4B;AACrC,SAAS,6BAA6B;AACtC,SAAS,gBAAgB,2BAAsD;AAC/E,SAAS,gBAAgB,uBAAuB;AAIhD,SAAS,+BAA+B,oCAAoC;AAC5E;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAGK;AAmBP,eAAsB,uBACpB,SACA,SACuB;AACvB,QAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AACtE,QAAM,iBAAiB,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,iBAAiB;AACxE,QAAM,YAAY,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,WAAW;AAG7D,MAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,WAAW;AACjC,UAAM,YAAY,QAAQ;AAK1B,QAAI,aAAa,QAAQ,WAAW,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACpE,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,cAAc,SAAS;AAAA,MACzB;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,6BAA6B,QAAQ,WAAW,iCAAiC,CAAC;AACxF,QAAI,2BAA2B,SAAS,KAAK,iCAAiC,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG;AAC3F,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,kBAAkB,uBAAuB,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC3D,UAAM,yBAAyB,gBAAgB,KAAK,YAAU,2BAA2B,SAAS,MAAM,CAAC;AACzG,QAAI,wBAAwB;AAC1B,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,oBAAoB,sBAAsB;AAAA,MAC5C;AAAA,IACF;AAQA,QAAI,6BAA6B,OAAO,GAAG;AACzC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,YAAY,aAAa,IAAI;AAAA,EAChD;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,WAAW;AACjC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,QAAM,cAAc,oBAAoB,cAAc;AACtD,QAAM,YAAY,eAAe,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK;AAC7D,qBAAmB,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC9B,qCAAmC,YAAY,YAAY,OAAO;AAGlE,gBAAc,WAAW;AAGzB,MAAI,YAAY,OAAO,QAAQ,qBAAqB;AAClD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,0BAA0B,mBAAmB,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IAChF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG;AAC7C,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,kBAAkB,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IAC1C;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,iBAAe,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG;AAG1E,4BAA0B,YAAY,YAAY,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO;AAG7E,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAC/D,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AACR,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,2BAA2B,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACrD;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO;AACxC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,2CAA2C,IAAI,GAAG,qCAAqC,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACjH;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,IAAI,aAAa,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC1E,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,kCAAgC,KAAK,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG;AAG3D,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB,UAAU,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG;AACpD,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,iCAAiC,GAAG,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,cAAc;AAAA,EACnG;AAMA,QAAM,cAAc,mBAAmB,QAAQ,GAAG;AAKlD,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,GAAG,GAAG;AACjE,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,iDAAiD,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG;AACtF,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,oBAAoB,IAAI,GAAG,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IAChE;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACX,YAAY;AAAA,IACZ;AAAA,IACA,YAAY;AAAA,IACZ,YAAY;AAAA,EACd;AACA,QAAM,YAAY,eAAe,GAAG;AACpC,QAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,KAAK;AAC3G,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,YAAY,WAAW,SAAS,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACrD,UAAM,eAAe,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,gBAAgB;AACrE,QAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,qBAAqB,cAAc,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG;AAC5E,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAMA,QAAM,YAAY,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU,MAAM;AACrD,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,+BAA+B,4BAA4B;AAC3F,QAAM,eAAe,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG;AAC9G,MAAI,iBAAiB,YAAY;AAC/B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,oBAAoB,IAAI,GAAG,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IAChE;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,iBAAiB,cAAc;AACjC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,iDAAiD,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,mBAAmB,IAAI,GAAG;AACpD,SAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,WAAW,aAAa,IAAI;AAC3E;AAEA,SAAS,uBAAuB,MAAoC;AAClE,MAAI,CAAC,KAAM,QAAO,CAAC;AACnB,MAAI,iCAAiC,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO,CAAC;AACpD,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAC9B,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM;AACzD,WAAO,SAAS;AAAA,MAAQ,aACtB,YAAY,QAAQ,OAAO,YAAY,YAAY,OAAQ,QAAiC,WAAW,WACnG,CAAE,QAA+B,MAAM,IACvC,CAAC;AAAA,IACP;AAAA,EACF,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EACV;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,QAAoC;AACzD,QAAM,WAAwD,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK;AACnH,QAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,OAAK,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,MAAS;AACnE,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAClB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,kDAAkD,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACtE;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,SAAiB,SAAiB,KAAmB;AAC3E,MAAI,WAAW,SAAS;AACtB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,UAAU,UAAU,8BAA8B;AACpD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,4BAA4B,4BAA4B;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,UAAU,8BAA8B;AAChD,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,oCAAoC,GAAG,sBAAsB;AAAA,EAC/F;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,UAAU,8BAA8B;AAChD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAgBA,SAAS,gCACP,KACA,cACM;AACN,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,6DAA6D,YAAY;AAAA,IAC1F;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,kBAAkB,uBAAuB,YAAY;AAC3D,MAAI,mBAAmB,IAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAClD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,kBAAkB,IAAI,GAAG,wCAAwC,YAAY,WAAW,eAAe;AAAA,IACxH;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS;AACvB,QAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAU,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAU;AACvE,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,qCAAqC,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,MACxE;AAAA,IACF;AACA;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS;AACvB,QAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS;AAC3C,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,qCAAqC,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,MACxE;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEA,MAAM,yBAAiD;AAAA,EACrD,SAAS;AAAA,EACT,qBAAqB;AACvB;AASA,SAAS,mCAAmC,YAAsB,SAA4B;AAC5F,MAAI,WAAW,SAAS,cAAc,GAAG;AACvC,UAAM,QAAQ,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,cAAc;AAC5D,QAAI,UAAU,UAAa,sBAAsB,KAAK,GAAG;AACvD,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,WAAW,SAAS,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACzC,UAAM,QAAQ,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAC9D,QAAI,UAAU,QAAW;AACvB,UAAI;AACF,cAAM,OAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAClC,cAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAoB;AACrC,mBAAW,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG;AAC7B,eAAK,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,QACxC;AACA,mBAAW,CAAC,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM;AAC/B,cAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AACb,kBAAM,IAAI;AAAA,cACR;AAAA,cACA;AAAA,cACA,gCAAgC,GAAG;AAAA,YACrC;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF;AAAA,MACF,SAAS,GAAG;AACV,YAAI,aAAa,sBAAuB,OAAM;AAAA,MAChD;AAIA,UAAI,yBAAyB,KAAK,GAAG;AACnC,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR;AAAA,UACA;AAAA,UACA;AAAA,QACF;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,sBAAsB,OAAwB;AACrD,MAAI,WAAW;AACf,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK;AACrC,UAAM,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;AAClB,QAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,UAAU,UAAU;AACnD;AACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AACd,iBAAW,CAAC;AACZ;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AAAA,EACtC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,yBAAyB,OAAwB;AACxD,QAAM,OAAiB,CAAC;AACxB,MAAI,IAAI;AACR,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAClB,MAAI,eAAe;AACnB,SAAO,IAAI,KAAK;AACd,QAAI,cAAc;AAChB,aAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,KAAO;AAC3D,YAAM,QAAQ;AACd,aAAO,IAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAAE,EAAG;AACpD,UAAI,IAAI,MAAO,MAAK,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC;AAC5D,qBAAe;AACf;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;AAClB,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AACd;AACA,aAAO,IAAI,KAAK;AACd,YAAI,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AACpC,eAAK;AACL;AAAA,QACF;AACA,YAAI,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK;AACpB;AACA;AAAA,QACF;AACA;AAAA,MACF;AACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AACd;AACA,aAAO,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,IAAK;AACpC,UAAI,IAAI,IAAK;AACb;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AACd,qBAAe;AACf;AACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAY;AAC7B,aAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AACtB,QAAI,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO;AAC1B,SAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,EACd;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAUA,MAAM,qCAAqC;AAM3C,SAAS,iCAAiC,MAAmC;AAC3E,SAAO,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,KAAK,SAAS;AACnD;AAkBA,SAAS,6BAA6B,SAA+B;AACnE,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;AACrB,MAAI,CAAC,KAAM,QAAO;AAClB,MAAI,iCAAiC,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AACnD,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,aAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,EAC1B,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO,8BAA8B,QAAQ,4BAA4B;AAC3E;AAEA,SAAS,0BAA0B,YAAsB,YAAgC,SAA4B;AACnH,aAAW,aAAa,sBAAsB;AAC5C,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACnC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,oCAAoC,SAAS;AAAA,MAC/C;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI,SAAS;AAC9C,MAAI,WAAW,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS,cAAc,GAAG;AACnD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,iBAAiB,WAAW,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAC3D,MAAI,WAAW,0BAA0B,cAAc,CAAC,gBAAgB;AACtE,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,WAAW,0BAA0B,eAAe,gBAAgB;AACtE,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/verifier.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { parseDictionary } from 'structured-headers';\nimport {\n  buildSignatureBase,\n  canonicalTargetUri,\n  getHeaderValue,\n  rejectNonAsciiHost,\n  type RequestLike,\n} from './canonicalize';\nimport { contentDigestMatches } from './content-digest';\nimport { RequestSignatureError } from './errors';\nimport { parseSignature, parseSignatureInput, type ParsedSignatureInput } from './parser';\nimport { jwkToPublicKey, verifySignature } from './crypto';\nimport type { JwksResolver } from './jwks';\nimport type { ReplayStore } from './replay';\nimport type { RevocationStore } from './revocation';\nimport { containsWebhookAuthentication, WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH } from './webhook-auth-detection';\nimport {\n  ALLOWED_ALGS,\n  CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS,\n  MANDATORY_COMPONENTS,\n  MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS,\n  REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG,\n  type VerifierCapability,\n  type VerifyResult,\n} from './types';\n\nexport interface VerifyRequestOptions {\n  capability: VerifierCapability;\n  jwks: JwksResolver;\n  replayStore: ReplayStore;\n  revocationStore: RevocationStore;\n  now?: () => number;\n  /**\n   * The AdCP operation being requested, used to consult\n   * `capability.required_for` when an unsigned request arrives. When omitted,\n   * the verifier treats the operation as \"not in any required_for list\" and\n   * returns an unsigned result rather than rejecting — callers in\n   * always-verify mode (where every request is signed) can leave this blank.\n   */\n  operation?: string;\n  agentUrlForKeyid?: (keyid: string) => string | undefined;\n}\n\nexport async function verifyRequestSignature(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  options: VerifyRequestOptions\n): Promise<VerifyResult> {\n  const now = options.now ? options.now() : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const sigInputHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Signature-Input');\n  const sigHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Signature');\n\n  // Pre-check: both headers present or both absent.\n  if (!sigInputHeader && !sigHeader) {\n    const operation = options.operation;\n    // Precedence is intentionally fail-specific: AdCP tool required_for,\n    // raw JSON-RPC protocol methods, then payload-driven webhook-auth\n    // elevation. The specific signed-only contract should win before the\n    // generic body scan runs.\n    if (operation && options.capability.required_for.includes(operation)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        `Operation \"${operation}\" requires a signed request`\n      );\n    }\n    const protocolMethodsRequiredFor = options.capability.protocol_methods_required_for ?? [];\n    if (protocolMethodsRequiredFor.length > 0 && exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(request.body)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        'Unsigned request body exceeds the protocol method inspection cap while protocol methods require signing'\n      );\n    }\n    const protocolMethods = jsonRpcProtocolMethods(request.body);\n    const requiredProtocolMethod = protocolMethods.find(method => protocolMethodsRequiredFor.includes(method));\n    if (requiredProtocolMethod) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        `Protocol method \"${requiredProtocolMethod}\" requires a signed request`\n      );\n    }\n    // Payload-driven elevation: any request carrying webhook receiver\n    // credentials (task, reporting, artifact, or revocation callbacks) MUST\n    // be RFC 9421 signed, regardless of whether the operation appears in\n    // `required_for`\n    // (#webhook-security downgrade-resistance). A bearer-only channel\n    // would otherwise let an attacker who captured a token register or\n    // update webhook credentials and redirect callbacks to a hostile URL.\n    if (carriesWebhookAuthentication(request)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_required',\n        0,\n        'Requests carrying webhook authentication must be RFC 9421 signed'\n      );\n    }\n    return { status: 'unsigned', verified_at: now };\n  }\n  if (!sigInputHeader || !sigHeader) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_header_malformed',\n      1,\n      'Signature and Signature-Input headers must be present as a pair'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 1: parse.\n  const parsedInput = parseSignatureInput(sigInputHeader);\n  const parsedSig = parseSignature(sigHeader, parsedInput.label);\n  rejectNonAsciiHost(request.url);\n  validateSingleValuedCoveredHeaders(parsedInput.components, request);\n\n  // Step 2: required params present.\n  requireParams(parsedInput);\n\n  // Step 3: tag match.\n  if (parsedInput.params.tag !== REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_tag_invalid',\n      3,\n      `Signature tag must be \"${REQUEST_SIGNING_TAG}\"; got \"${parsedInput.params.tag}\"`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 4: alg allowlist.\n  if (!ALLOWED_ALGS.has(parsedInput.params.alg)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_alg_not_allowed',\n      4,\n      `Signature alg \"${parsedInput.params.alg}\" is not in the AdCP allowlist`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 5: window valid.\n  validateWindow(parsedInput.params.created, parsedInput.params.expires, now);\n\n  // Step 6: covered components.\n  validateCoveredComponents(parsedInput.components, options.capability, request);\n\n  // Step 7: resolve keyid.\n  const jwk = await options.jwks.resolve(parsedInput.params.keyid);\n  if (!jwk) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `No JWK found for keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\"`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.kid !== parsedInput.params.keyid) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `JWKS resolver returned a JWK whose kid \"${jwk.kid}\" does not match requested keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\"`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 8: key purpose.\n  if (jwk.adcp_use !== 'request-signing' || !jwk.key_ops?.includes('verify')) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is not scoped for request-signing verification`\n    );\n  }\n  validateJwkParameterConsistency(jwk, parsedInput.params.alg);\n\n  // Step 9: revocation (runs BEFORE crypto to prevent amplification attacks).\n  if (await options.revocationStore.isRevoked(jwk.kid)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_key_revoked', 9, `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is revoked`);\n  }\n\n  // Replay cache is scoped by `(keyid, @target-uri)` per adcp#2460 — a\n  // signature captured on one endpoint (e.g. /create_media_buy) MUST NOT\n  // count against the replay budget for a different endpoint under the\n  // same keyid. Canonicalize once and reuse for both pre-check and commit.\n  const replayScope = canonicalTargetUri(request.url);\n\n  // Step 12 pre-checks (rate-abuse cap + replay hit) run before crypto so a\n  // compromised-key cache cap or a replayed nonce short-circuits an expensive\n  // Ed25519/ECDSA verify. The committing insert happens after step 11.\n  if (await options.replayStore.isCapHit(jwk.kid, replayScope, now)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_rate_abuse',\n      12,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}`\n    );\n  }\n  if (await options.replayStore.has(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, now)) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 10: cryptographic verify. Use the received Signature-Input value\n  // verbatim as the @signature-params line so a peer emitting params in a\n  // different legal order still produces a byte-identical base.\n  const base = buildSignatureBase(\n    parsedInput.components,\n    request,\n    parsedInput.params,\n    parsedInput.signatureParamsValue\n  );\n  const publicKey = jwkToPublicKey(jwk);\n  const valid = verifySignature(parsedInput.params.alg, publicKey, Buffer.from(base, 'utf8'), parsedSig.bytes);\n  if (!valid) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_invalid',\n      10,\n      'Cryptographic verification of signature base failed'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 11: content-digest match (only if covered).\n  if (parsedInput.components.includes('content-digest')) {\n    const digestHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n    if (!digestHeader || !contentDigestMatches(digestHeader, request.body ?? '')) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_digest_mismatch',\n        11,\n        'Content-Digest header does not match recomputed body hash'\n      );\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Step 12: commit the (keyid, nonce) into the replay cache now that all\n  // prior checks have passed. Floor the TTL at one max-window + skew so a\n  // signer minting tiny validity windows can't replay outside the configured\n  // replay horizon, and so cross-replica eventual consistency has headroom.\n  const remaining = parsedInput.params.expires - now + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS;\n  const ttl = Math.max(remaining, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS);\n  const insertResult = await options.replayStore.insert(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, ttl, now);\n  if (insertResult === 'replayed') {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window`\n    );\n  }\n  if (insertResult === 'rate_abuse') {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_rate_abuse',\n      12,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}`\n    );\n  }\n\n  const agent_url = options.agentUrlForKeyid?.(jwk.kid);\n  return { status: 'verified', keyid: jwk.kid, agent_url, verified_at: now };\n}\n\nfunction jsonRpcProtocolMethods(body: string | undefined): string[] {\n  if (!body) return [];\n  if (exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body)) return [];\n  try {\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(body) as unknown;\n    const messages = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];\n    return messages.flatMap(message =>\n      message !== null && typeof message === 'object' && typeof (message as { method?: unknown }).method === 'string'\n        ? [(message as { method: string }).method]\n        : []\n    );\n  } catch {\n    return [];\n  }\n}\n\nfunction requireParams(parsed: ParsedSignatureInput): void {\n  const required: Array<keyof ParsedSignatureInput['params']> = ['created', 'expires', 'nonce', 'keyid', 'alg', 'tag'];\n  const missing = required.filter(k => parsed.params[k] === undefined);\n  if (missing.length) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_params_incomplete',\n      2,\n      `Signature-Input missing required parameter(s): ${missing.join(', ')}`\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateWindow(created: number, expires: number, now: number): void {\n  if (expires <= created) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature expires must be strictly greater than created'\n    );\n  }\n  if (expires - created > MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      `Signature window exceeds ${MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS}s maximum`\n    );\n  }\n  if (now > expires + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError('request_signature_window_invalid', 5, 'Signature is expired');\n  }\n  if (now < created - CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature created is in the future beyond skew tolerance'\n    );\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reject JWKs whose alg/kty/crv are mutually inconsistent OR don't match\n * the sig-params alg. Three checks in one place:\n *\n * 1. JWK MUST declare `alg`. A missing alg lets a signer substitute one\n *    algorithm family for another (e.g. EdDSA sig-params against a P-256\n *    JWK) and defer failure to step 10's crypto verify — the wrong step\n *    and the wrong error code.\n * 2. JWK `alg` MUST match the sig-params `alg` after AdCP→JOSE mapping\n *    (`ed25519`↔`EdDSA`, `ecdsa-p256-sha256`↔`ES256`). Prevents sig-params\n *    alg-downgrade against a JWK that was published for a stronger alg.\n * 3. JWK kty/crv MUST be consistent with the declared alg per RFC 8037\n *    (EdDSA→OKP/Ed25519|Ed448) and RFC 7518 (ES256→EC/P-256).\n */\nfunction validateJwkParameterConsistency(\n  jwk: { kid: string; kty?: string; crv?: string; alg?: string },\n  sigParamsAlg: string\n): void {\n  if (!jwk.alg) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" does not declare an alg; cannot bind to sig-params alg=\"${sigParamsAlg}\"`\n    );\n  }\n  const expectedJoseAlg = SIG_PARAMS_ALG_TO_JOSE[sigParamsAlg];\n  if (expectedJoseAlg && jwk.alg !== expectedJoseAlg) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=${jwk.alg} but the request is signed with alg=\"${sigParamsAlg}\" (JOSE ${expectedJoseAlg})`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.alg === 'EdDSA') {\n    if (jwk.kty !== 'OKP' || (jwk.crv !== 'Ed25519' && jwk.crv !== 'Ed448')) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n        8,\n        `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=EdDSA but kty/crv (${jwk.kty}/${jwk.crv}) is not a valid Edwards-curve pair`\n      );\n    }\n    return;\n  }\n  if (jwk.alg === 'ES256') {\n    if (jwk.kty !== 'EC' || jwk.crv !== 'P-256') {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n        8,\n        `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" declares alg=ES256 but kty/crv (${jwk.kty}/${jwk.crv}) is not EC/P-256`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nconst SIG_PARAMS_ALG_TO_JOSE: Record<string, string> = {\n  ed25519: 'EdDSA',\n  'ecdsa-p256-sha256': 'ES256',\n};\n\n/**\n * Covered components referencing single-valued HTTP header fields\n * (Content-Type per RFC 9110, Content-Digest per RFC 9530) MUST NOT arrive\n * as a comma-joined multi-value. A proxy or buggy client emitting the field\n * twice produces a concatenated value whose meaning relative to the\n * signature base is undefined — reject at parse rather than pick one.\n */\nfunction validateSingleValuedCoveredHeaders(components: string[], request: RequestLike): void {\n  if (components.includes('content-type')) {\n    const value = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Type');\n    if (value !== undefined && containsTopLevelComma(value)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_header_malformed',\n        1,\n        'Content-Type header covered by signature must be single-valued; multiple field values are ambiguous'\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  if (components.includes('content-digest')) {\n    const value = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n    if (value !== undefined) {\n      try {\n        const dict = parseDictionary(value);\n        const seen = new Map<string, number>();\n        for (const key of dict.keys()) {\n          seen.set(key, (seen.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);\n        }\n        for (const [key, count] of seen) {\n          if (count > 1) {\n            throw new RequestSignatureError(\n              'request_signature_header_malformed',\n              1,\n              `Content-Digest declares the \"${key}\" algorithm more than once; duplicate members are ambiguous`\n            );\n          }\n        }\n      } catch (e) {\n        if (e instanceof RequestSignatureError) throw e;\n      }\n      // The structured-headers library deduplicates dictionary keys silently.\n      // Detect the multi-value case at the raw-string level too so the\n      // specific \"two sha-256 members\" shape is caught.\n      if (containsDuplicateDictKey(value)) {\n        throw new RequestSignatureError(\n          'request_signature_header_malformed',\n          1,\n          'Content-Digest declares the same algorithm more than once; duplicate members are ambiguous'\n        );\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction containsTopLevelComma(value: string): boolean {\n  let inQuoted = false;\n  for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {\n    const ch = value[i]!;\n    if (ch === '\\\\' && i + 1 < value.length && inQuoted) {\n      i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === '\"') {\n      inQuoted = !inQuoted;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ',' && !inQuoted) return true;\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction containsDuplicateDictKey(value: string): boolean {\n  const keys: string[] = [];\n  let i = 0;\n  const len = value.length;\n  let atEntryStart = true;\n  while (i < len) {\n    if (atEntryStart) {\n      while (i < len && (value[i] === ' ' || value[i] === '\\t')) i++;\n      const start = i;\n      while (i < len && /[A-Za-z0-9_*-]/.test(value[i]!)) i++;\n      if (i > start) keys.push(value.slice(start, i).toLowerCase());\n      atEntryStart = false;\n      continue;\n    }\n    const ch = value[i]!;\n    if (ch === '\"') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < len) {\n        if (value[i] === '\\\\' && i + 1 < len) {\n          i += 2;\n          continue;\n        }\n        if (value[i] === '\"') {\n          i++;\n          break;\n        }\n        i++;\n      }\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ':') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < len && value[i] !== ':') i++;\n      if (i < len) i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (ch === ',') {\n      atEntryStart = true;\n      i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    i++;\n  }\n  const seen = new Set<string>();\n  for (const key of keys) {\n    if (seen.has(key)) return true;\n    seen.add(key);\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\n/**\n * Upper bound on request body size we will JSON.parse and walk on the\n * unsigned branch. Real AdCP `update_media_buy` / `create_media_buy` payloads\n * are O(kilobytes); 1 MB is ~1000x that. Over this, require signing rather\n * than spend unbounded pre-crypto CPU on attacker-shaped input — a 1 MB\n * nested-array body would otherwise let an unauthenticated caller force\n * deep recursion on every request.\n */\nconst MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES = 1_048_576;\n/**\n * Upper bound on recursion depth in `containsWebhookAuthentication`. Real\n * AdCP payloads reach depth ~5-8; 64 is generous without leaving room for\n * a pathological `{\"a\":{\"a\":{...}}}` to burn the stack.\n */\nfunction exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body: string | undefined): boolean {\n  return typeof body === 'string' && body.length > MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES;\n}\n\n/**\n * Scan a JSON request body for a non-empty\n * webhook authentication object — anywhere in the tree, including inside\n * arrays of pending config updates. MCP uses `push_notification_config`;\n * A2A uses `pushNotificationConfig`. Runs only on the\n * unsigned branch; returning `true` triggers the webhook-security downgrade\n * rejection in {@link verifyRequestSignature}.\n *\n * The check is Content-Type independent: an attacker can't evade by\n * labeling a JSON body `text/plain`. A body that fails to parse as JSON\n * returns false so legitimate non-JSON transports (SSE posts, form uploads)\n * aren't blocked; signed-request enforcement for those remains\n * `required_for`-driven. A body over {@link MAX_UNSIGNED_BODY_INSPECTION_BYTES}\n * returns `true` — we can't prove absence of webhook auth within our DoS\n * budget, and oversized unsigned bodies are outside normal AdCP operation.\n */\nfunction carriesWebhookAuthentication(request: RequestLike): boolean {\n  const body = request.body;\n  if (!body) return false;\n  if (exceedsUnsignedBodyInspectionCap(body)) return true;\n  let parsed: unknown;\n  try {\n    parsed = JSON.parse(body);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return containsWebhookAuthentication(parsed, WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH);\n}\n\nfunction validateCoveredComponents(components: string[], capability: VerifierCapability, request: RequestLike): void {\n  for (const mandatory of MANDATORY_COMPONENTS) {\n    if (!components.includes(mandatory)) {\n      throw new RequestSignatureError(\n        'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n        6,\n        `Covered components must include \"${mandatory}\"`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n  const hasBody = (request.body ?? '').length > 0;\n  if (hasBody && !components.includes('content-type')) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n      6,\n      'Covered components must include \"content-type\" when a request body is present'\n    );\n  }\n  const includesDigest = components.includes('content-digest');\n  if (capability.covers_content_digest === 'required' && !includesDigest) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_incomplete',\n      6,\n      'Verifier requires content-digest coverage'\n    );\n  }\n  if (capability.covers_content_digest === 'forbidden' && includesDigest) {\n    throw new RequestSignatureError(\n      'request_signature_components_unexpected',\n      6,\n      'Verifier forbids content-digest coverage'\n    );\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAAA,SAAS,uBAAuB;AAChC;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAEK;AACP,SAAS,4BAA4B;AACrC,SAAS,6BAA6B;AACtC,SAAS,gBAAgB,2BAAsD;AAC/E,SAAS,gBAAgB,uBAAuB;AAIhD,SAAS,+BAA+B,oCAAoC;AAC5E;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAGK;AAmBP,eAAsB,uBACpB,SACA,SACuB;AACvB,QAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AACtE,QAAM,iBAAiB,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,iBAAiB;AACxE,QAAM,YAAY,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,WAAW;AAG7D,MAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,WAAW;AACjC,UAAM,YAAY,QAAQ;AAK1B,QAAI,aAAa,QAAQ,WAAW,aAAa,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACpE,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,cAAc,SAAS;AAAA,MACzB;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,6BAA6B,QAAQ,WAAW,iCAAiC,CAAC;AACxF,QAAI,2BAA2B,SAAS,KAAK,iCAAiC,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG;AAC3F,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,kBAAkB,uBAAuB,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC3D,UAAM,yBAAyB,gBAAgB,KAAK,YAAU,2BAA2B,SAAS,MAAM,CAAC;AACzG,QAAI,wBAAwB;AAC1B,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,oBAAoB,sBAAsB;AAAA,MAC5C;AAAA,IACF;AAQA,QAAI,6BAA6B,OAAO,GAAG;AACzC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,YAAY,aAAa,IAAI;AAAA,EAChD;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,WAAW;AACjC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,QAAM,cAAc,oBAAoB,cAAc;AACtD,QAAM,YAAY,eAAe,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK;AAC7D,qBAAmB,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC9B,qCAAmC,YAAY,YAAY,OAAO;AAGlE,gBAAc,WAAW;AAGzB,MAAI,YAAY,OAAO,QAAQ,qBAAqB;AAClD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,0BAA0B,mBAAmB,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IAChF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG;AAC7C,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,kBAAkB,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IAC1C;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,iBAAe,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG;AAG1E,4BAA0B,YAAY,YAAY,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO;AAG7E,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAC/D,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AACR,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,2BAA2B,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACrD;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO;AACxC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,2CAA2C,IAAI,GAAG,qCAAqC,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACjH;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,IAAI,aAAa,qBAAqB,CAAC,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC1E,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,kCAAgC,KAAK,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG;AAG3D,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB,UAAU,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG;AACpD,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,iCAAiC,GAAG,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,cAAc;AAAA,EACnG;AAMA,QAAM,cAAc,mBAAmB,QAAQ,GAAG;AAKlD,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,GAAG,GAAG;AACjE,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,iDAAiD,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG;AACtF,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,oBAAoB,IAAI,GAAG,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IAChE;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACX,YAAY;AAAA,IACZ;AAAA,IACA,YAAY;AAAA,IACZ,YAAY;AAAA,EACd;AACA,QAAM,YAAY,eAAe,GAAG;AACpC,QAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,KAAK;AAC3G,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,YAAY,WAAW,SAAS,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACrD,UAAM,eAAe,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,gBAAgB;AACrE,QAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,qBAAqB,cAAc,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG;AAC5E,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAMA,QAAM,YAAY,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU,MAAM;AACrD,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,+BAA+B,4BAA4B;AAC3F,QAAM,eAAe,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG;AAC9G,MAAI,iBAAiB,YAAY;AAC/B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,oBAAoB,IAAI,GAAG,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IAChE;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,iBAAiB,cAAc;AACjC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,iDAAiD,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,mBAAmB,IAAI,GAAG;AACpD,SAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,WAAW,aAAa,IAAI;AAC3E;AAEA,SAAS,uBAAuB,MAAoC;AAClE,MAAI,CAAC,KAAM,QAAO,CAAC;AACnB,MAAI,iCAAiC,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO,CAAC;AACpD,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAC9B,UAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM;AACzD,WAAO,SAAS;AAAA,MAAQ,aACtB,YAAY,QAAQ,OAAO,YAAY,YAAY,OAAQ,QAAiC,WAAW,WACnG,CAAE,QAA+B,MAAM,IACvC,CAAC;AAAA,IACP;AAAA,EACF,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO,CAAC;AAAA,EACV;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,QAAoC;AACzD,QAAM,WAAwD,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK;AACnH,QAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,OAAK,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,MAAS;AACnE,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAClB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,kDAAkD,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACtE;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,SAAiB,SAAiB,KAAmB;AAC3E,MAAI,WAAW,SAAS;AACtB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,UAAU,UAAU,8BAA8B;AACpD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,4BAA4B,4BAA4B;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,UAAU,8BAA8B;AAChD,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,oCAAoC,GAAG,sBAAsB;AAAA,EAC/F;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,UAAU,8BAA8B;AAChD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAgBA,SAAS,gCACP,KACA,cACM;AACN,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,6DAA6D,YAAY;AAAA,IAC1F;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,kBAAkB,uBAAuB,YAAY;AAC3D,MAAI,mBAAmB,IAAI,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAClD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,kBAAkB,IAAI,GAAG,wCAAwC,YAAY,WAAW,eAAe;AAAA,IACxH;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS;AACvB,QAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAU,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAU;AACvE,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,qCAAqC,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,MACxE;AAAA,IACF;AACA;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS;AACvB,QAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS;AAC3C,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,qCAAqC,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,MACxE;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEA,MAAM,yBAAiD;AAAA,EACrD,SAAS;AAAA,EACT,qBAAqB;AACvB;AASA,SAAS,mCAAmC,YAAsB,SAA4B;AAC5F,MAAI,WAAW,SAAS,cAAc,GAAG;AACvC,UAAM,QAAQ,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,cAAc;AAC5D,QAAI,UAAU,UAAa,sBAAsB,KAAK,GAAG;AACvD,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,WAAW,SAAS,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACzC,UAAM,QAAQ,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAC9D,QAAI,UAAU,QAAW;AACvB,UAAI;AACF,cAAM,OAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAClC,cAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAoB;AACrC,mBAAW,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,GAAG;AAC7B,eAAK,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,QACxC;AACA,mBAAW,CAAC,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM;AAC/B,cAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AACb,kBAAM,IAAI;AAAA,cACR;AAAA,cACA;AAAA,cACA,gCAAgC,GAAG;AAAA,YACrC;AAAA,UACF;AAAA,QACF;AAAA,MACF,SAAS,GAAG;AACV,YAAI,aAAa,sBAAuB,OAAM;AAAA,MAChD;AAIA,UAAI,yBAAyB,KAAK,GAAG;AACnC,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR;AAAA,UACA;AAAA,UACA;AAAA,QACF;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,sBAAsB,OAAwB;AACrD,MAAI,WAAW;AACf,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK;AACrC,UAAM,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;AAClB,QAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,UAAU,UAAU;AACnD;AACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AACd,iBAAW,CAAC;AACZ;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AAAA,EACtC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,yBAAyB,OAAwB;AACxD,QAAM,OAAiB,CAAC;AACxB,MAAI,IAAI;AACR,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAClB,MAAI,eAAe;AACnB,SAAO,IAAI,KAAK;AACd,QAAI,cAAc;AAChB,aAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,KAAO;AAC3D,YAAM,QAAQ;AACd,aAAO,IAAI,OAAO,iBAAiB,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,CAAE,EAAG;AACpD,UAAI,IAAI,MAAO,MAAK,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,YAAY,CAAC;AAC5D,qBAAe;AACf;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;AAClB,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AACd;AACA,aAAO,IAAI,KAAK;AACd,YAAI,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK;AACpC,eAAK;AACL;AAAA,QACF;AACA,YAAI,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK;AACpB;AACA;AAAA,QACF;AACA;AAAA,MACF;AACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AACd;AACA,aAAO,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,IAAK;AACpC,UAAI,IAAI,IAAK;AACb;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AACd,qBAAe;AACf;AACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAY;AAC7B,aAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AACtB,QAAI,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO;AAC1B,SAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,EACd;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAUA,MAAM,qCAAqC;AAM3C,SAAS,iCAAiC,MAAmC;AAC3E,SAAO,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,KAAK,SAAS;AACnD;AAkBA,SAAS,6BAA6B,SAA+B;AACnE,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;AACrB,MAAI,CAAC,KAAM,QAAO;AAClB,MAAI,iCAAiC,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AACnD,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,aAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAAA,EAC1B,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,SAAO,8BAA8B,QAAQ,4BAA4B;AAC3E;AAEA,SAAS,0BAA0B,YAAsB,YAAgC,SAA4B;AACnH,aAAW,aAAa,sBAAsB;AAC5C,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACnC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,oCAAoC,SAAS;AAAA,MAC/C;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,QAAQ,IAAI,SAAS;AAC9C,MAAI,WAAW,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS,cAAc,GAAG;AACnD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,iBAAiB,WAAW,SAAS,gBAAgB;AAC3D,MAAI,WAAW,0BAA0B,cAAc,CAAC,gBAAgB;AACtE,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,WAAW,0BAA0B,eAAe,gBAAgB;AACtE,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/signing/webhook-auth-detection.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 const WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH = 64;
 function containsWebhookAuthentication(value, depthRemaining = WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH) {
   if (depthRemaining <= 0) return true;

package/dist/lib/signing/webhook-auth-detection.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/webhook-auth-detection.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export const WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH = 64;\n\n/**\n * Scan a parsed JSON value for a non-empty authentication object. The false\n * positive cost is over-signing; the false negative cost is an unsigned\n * webhook-credential registration.\n *\n * Inspection-budget exhaustion fails closed by returning true.\n */\nexport function containsWebhookAuthentication(value: unknown, depthRemaining = WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH): boolean {\n  if (depthRemaining <= 0) return true;\n  if (!value || typeof value !== 'object') return false;\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n    return value.some(item => containsWebhookAuthentication(item, depthRemaining - 1));\n  }\n\n  const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (hasNonEmptyAuthenticationObject(obj.authentication)) return true;\n\n  for (const [key, nested] of Object.entries(obj)) {\n    if (key === 'authentication') continue;\n    if (containsWebhookAuthentication(nested, depthRemaining - 1)) return true;\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction hasNonEmptyAuthenticationObject(value: unknown): boolean {\n  if (!value || typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value)) return false;\n  return Object.keys(value).length > 0;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B;AASrC,SAAS,8BAA8B,OAAgB,iBAAiB,8BAAuC;AACpH,MAAI,kBAAkB,EAAG,QAAO;AAChC,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AAChD,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AACxB,WAAO,MAAM,KAAK,UAAQ,8BAA8B,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,EACnF;AAEA,QAAM,MAAM;AACZ,MAAI,gCAAgC,IAAI,cAAc,EAAG,QAAO;AAEhE,aAAW,CAAC,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,GAAG,GAAG;AAC/C,QAAI,QAAQ,iBAAkB;AAC9B,QAAI,8BAA8B,QAAQ,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AAAA,EACxE;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,gCAAgC,OAAyB;AAChE,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG,QAAO;AACxE,SAAO,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS;AACrC;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/webhook-auth-detection.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export const WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH = 64;\n\n/**\n * Scan a parsed JSON value for a non-empty authentication object. The false\n * positive cost is over-signing; the false negative cost is an unsigned\n * webhook-credential registration.\n *\n * Inspection-budget exhaustion fails closed by returning true.\n */\nexport function containsWebhookAuthentication(value: unknown, depthRemaining = WEBHOOK_AUTH_TRAVERSAL_DEPTH): boolean {\n  if (depthRemaining <= 0) return true;\n  if (!value || typeof value !== 'object') return false;\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n    return value.some(item => containsWebhookAuthentication(item, depthRemaining - 1));\n  }\n\n  const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>;\n  if (hasNonEmptyAuthenticationObject(obj.authentication)) return true;\n\n  for (const [key, nested] of Object.entries(obj)) {\n    if (key === 'authentication') continue;\n    if (containsWebhookAuthentication(nested, depthRemaining - 1)) return true;\n  }\n  return false;\n}\n\nfunction hasNonEmptyAuthenticationObject(value: unknown): boolean {\n  if (!value || typeof value !== 'object' || Array.isArray(value)) return false;\n  return Object.keys(value).length > 0;\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAAO,MAAM,+BAA+B;AASrC,SAAS,8BAA8B,OAAgB,iBAAiB,8BAAuC;AACpH,MAAI,kBAAkB,EAAG,QAAO;AAChC,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AAChD,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AACxB,WAAO,MAAM,KAAK,UAAQ,8BAA8B,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,EACnF;AAEA,QAAM,MAAM;AACZ,MAAI,gCAAgC,IAAI,cAAc,EAAG,QAAO;AAEhE,aAAW,CAAC,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,GAAG,GAAG;AAC/C,QAAI,QAAQ,iBAAkB;AAC9B,QAAI,8BAA8B,QAAQ,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AAAA,EACxE;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,gCAAgC,OAAyB;AAChE,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAG,QAAO;AACxE,SAAO,OAAO,KAAK,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS;AACrC;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/signing/webhook-verifier.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { buildSignatureBase, canonicalTargetUri, getHeaderValue } from "./canonicalize.mjs";
 import { contentDigestMatches } from "./content-digest.mjs";
 import { RequestSignatureError, WebhookSignatureError } from "./errors.mjs";

package/dist/lib/signing/webhook-verifier.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/webhook-verifier.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 9421 webhook-signing verifier (AdCP 3.0 webhook profile).\n *\n * Companion to `verifier.ts`, which verifies outbound request signatures.\n * This verifier runs on the receiving side of a publisher webhook: the\n * storyboard runner's receiver captures a POST and hands the request (headers\n * + raw body) here for signature validation.\n *\n * Distinct from request-signing:\n *   - Tag: `adcp/webhook-signing/v1` (vs `adcp/request-signing/v1`).\n *   - Key purpose: `adcp_use: \"webhook-signing\"` OR `\"request-signing\"` — a\n *     signer may reuse its request-signing key for webhooks (see step 8).\n *   - Covered components MUST include `@method`, `@target-uri`, `@authority`,\n *     `content-type`, and `content-digest` — `content-digest` is unconditional\n *     for webhooks (vs policy-driven on requests) because every webhook\n *     carries a JSON body.\n *   - JWKS resolved via the publisher's `brand.json` `agents[]` `jwks_uri`,\n *     not the request-path capability document.\n *\n * Checklist steps below mirror the 14-step shape in\n * `docs/building/implementation/security.mdx#verifier-checklist-for-webhooks`\n * so failures can point at a specific spec clause. Numbers are 1-based to\n * match the security doc.\n */\n\nimport { buildSignatureBase, canonicalTargetUri, getHeaderValue, type RequestLike } from './canonicalize';\nimport { contentDigestMatches } from './content-digest';\nimport { RequestSignatureError, WebhookSignatureError } from './errors';\nimport { parseSignature, parseSignatureInput, type ParsedSignatureInput } from './parser';\nimport { jwkToPublicKey, verifySignature } from './crypto';\nimport type { JwksResolver } from './jwks';\nimport { InMemoryReplayStore, type ReplayStore } from './replay';\nimport { InMemoryRevocationStore, type RevocationStore } from './revocation';\nimport { ALLOWED_ALGS, CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS } from './types';\n\nexport const WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG = 'adcp/webhook-signing/v1';\n\n/**\n * Covered-component minimum for webhooks. Unlike request-signing, every\n * webhook carries a body so `content-type` and `content-digest` are\n * unconditional — a webhook without `content-digest` coverage can't be\n * verified because the body has no anchor.\n */\nexport const WEBHOOK_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [\n  '@method',\n  '@target-uri',\n  '@authority',\n  'content-type',\n  'content-digest',\n];\n\nexport interface VerifyWebhookOptions {\n  jwks: JwksResolver;\n  replayStore: ReplayStore;\n  revocationStore: RevocationStore;\n  /** Now in seconds since epoch. Defaults to `Date.now() / 1000`. */\n  now?: () => number;\n  /**\n   * Optional tag override — spec currently defines exactly\n   * `adcp/webhook-signing/v1`; the override lets test vectors pin a version.\n   */\n  requiredTag?: string;\n  /** Optional reverse-lookup (kid → publisher URL) for result attribution. */\n  agentUrlForKeyid?: (keyid: string) => string | undefined;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyWebhookResult {\n  status: 'verified';\n  keyid: string;\n  agent_url?: string;\n  verified_at: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's RFC 9421 signature.\n *\n * Checklist steps 1–13 plus sub-step 9a, matching the canonical numbering\n * in `security.mdx#verifier-checklist-for-webhooks` (and the `failed_step`\n * values on the conformance vectors at\n * `test-vectors/webhook-signing/negative/`). Throws\n * `WebhookSignatureError` on the first failed step.\n *\n * Ordering invariant: cheap invariant checks (tag, alg, window, components)\n * run before JWKS resolution (step 7); revocation (9) and rate-abuse (9a)\n * run before cryptographic verify (10) so an attacker can't amplify\n * Ed25519/ECDSA work. Replay insert (13) commits only after every earlier\n * step has passed — any signature failing at step 10 never consumes a cap\n * entry, so external traffic can't grow the per-keyid cache.\n */\nexport async function verifyWebhookSignature(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  options: VerifyWebhookOptions\n): Promise<VerifyWebhookResult> {\n  const now = options.now ? options.now() : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const requiredTag = options.requiredTag ?? WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG;\n\n  // Step 1: both signature headers present AND parseable. The bound-pair\n  // rule (`Signature` without `Signature-Input` or vice versa) rejects here.\n  const sigInputHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Signature-Input');\n  const sigHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Signature');\n  if (!sigInputHeader || !sigHeader) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_header_malformed',\n      1,\n      'Webhook is missing Signature or Signature-Input headers.'\n    );\n  }\n  let parsedInput: ParsedSignatureInput;\n  let parsedSig: ReturnType<typeof parseSignature>;\n  try {\n    parsedInput = parseSignatureInput(sigInputHeader);\n    parsedSig = parseSignature(sigHeader, parsedInput.label);\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_header_malformed',\n      1,\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 2: required params present.\n  requireParams(parsedInput);\n\n  // Step 3: tag match.\n  if (parsedInput.params.tag !== requiredTag) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_tag_invalid',\n      3,\n      `Signature tag must be \"${requiredTag}\"; got \"${parsedInput.params.tag}\".`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 4: alg allowlist.\n  if (!ALLOWED_ALGS.has(parsedInput.params.alg)) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_alg_not_allowed',\n      4,\n      `Signature alg \"${parsedInput.params.alg}\" is not in the AdCP allowlist.`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 5: window valid.\n  validateWindow(parsedInput.params.created, parsedInput.params.expires, now);\n\n  // Step 6: covered components.\n  validateCoveredComponents(parsedInput.components);\n\n  // Step 6a: `@target-uri` syntactic validation. Runs before JWKS resolution\n  // and crypto verify so a malformed URI short-circuits without JWKS\n  // side-effects. Distinct from `header_malformed` (the Signature /\n  // Signature-Input headers themselves) — this flags the covered URI value\n  // that will be fed into the signature base. Non-parseable URLs, non-https\n  // schemes, embedded userinfo, and fragments are all rejected.\n  validateTargetUri(request.url);\n\n  // Step 7: resolve keyid.\n  const jwk = await options.jwks.resolve(parsedInput.params.keyid);\n  if (!jwk) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `No JWK found for keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\".`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.kid !== parsedInput.params.keyid) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `JWKS resolver returned a JWK whose kid \"${jwk.kid}\" does not match requested keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\".`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 8: key purpose — webhooks are signed with a `request-signing` key.\n  //\n  // Webhooks carry no separate key purpose: the signer uses its\n  // `adcp_use: \"request-signing\"` key (the deprecated `\"webhook-signing\"`\n  // value is still accepted here for backward compatibility, pending removal — adcontextprotocol/adcp#5555).\n  // This is safe because cross-protocol confusion is prevented by the\n  // signature `tag` (step 3, `adcp/webhook-signing/v1`, part of the signed\n  // base) and mandatory `content-digest` coverage (step 6) — not by the\n  // key-purpose discriminator. A captured request signature\n  // (`tag=adcp/request-signing/v1`) can never be replayed against this\n  // verifier because step 3 rejects it. Webhook key isolation, when wanted, is\n  // a second `request-signing` key under a distinct `kid` — not a distinct\n  // `adcp_use`.\n  //\n  // All key-purpose failures use `webhook_signature_key_purpose_invalid`:\n  // absent `adcp_use`, a missing `verify` key_op, or an `adcp_use` outside the\n  // accepted set (e.g. `response-signing`, `governance-signing`). We do NOT\n  // reuse `webhook_mode_mismatch` here — that code is reserved for the\n  // HMAC-vs-9421 auth-mode selector mismatch, and overloading it would collapse\n  // two distinct failure classes onto one stable code receivers branch on.\n  if (\n    jwk.adcp_use === undefined ||\n    !jwk.key_ops?.includes('verify') ||\n    (jwk.adcp_use !== 'request-signing' && jwk.adcp_use !== 'webhook-signing')\n  ) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is not scoped for webhook delivery: adcp_use must be \"request-signing\" (or the deprecated \"webhook-signing\") with a \"verify\" key_op (got adcp_use=\"${jwk.adcp_use}\").`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 9: revocation. Shared store throws `request_signature_revocation_stale`\n  // when its cached snapshot is past grace — re-map to the webhook taxonomy\n  // so callers see a consistent error surface.\n  try {\n    if (await options.revocationStore.isRevoked(jwk.kid)) {\n      throw new WebhookSignatureError('webhook_signature_key_revoked', 9, `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is revoked.`);\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof RequestSignatureError && err.code === 'request_signature_revocation_stale') {\n      throw new WebhookSignatureError('webhook_signature_revocation_stale', 9, err.message);\n    }\n    throw err;\n  }\n\n  // Replay cache is scoped by `(keyid, @target-uri)` per adcp#2460 — a\n  // webhook captured on one receiver path MUST NOT count against the replay\n  // budget for a different path under the same keyid. Canonicalize once and\n  // reuse for both pre-check and commit.\n  const replayScope = canonicalTargetUri(request.url);\n\n  // Step 9a: per-keyid rate abuse. Distinct code from step 12's replay —\n  // cap exhaustion is a compromised-key / misconfig signal that SHOULD\n  // alert operators, not \"same nonce twice.\"\n  if (await options.replayStore.isCapHit(jwk.kid, replayScope, now)) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_rate_abuse',\n      9,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}.`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Pre-check step 12's replay before crypto so a replayed nonce short-\n  // circuits an expensive Ed25519/ECDSA verify.\n  if (await options.replayStore.has(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, now)) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window.`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 10: cryptographic verify.\n  const base = buildSignatureBase(\n    parsedInput.components,\n    request,\n    parsedInput.params,\n    parsedInput.signatureParamsValue\n  );\n  const publicKey = jwkToPublicKey(jwk);\n  const valid = verifySignature(parsedInput.params.alg, publicKey, Buffer.from(base, 'utf8'), parsedSig.bytes);\n  if (!valid) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_invalid',\n      10,\n      'Cryptographic verification of webhook signature base failed.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 11: content-digest match.\n  const digestHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n  if (!digestHeader || !contentDigestMatches(digestHeader, request.body ?? '')) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_digest_mismatch',\n      11,\n      'Content-Digest header does not match recomputed body hash.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 13: commit nonce. Insert AFTER every prior check passes — this is\n  // the load-bearing invariant that keeps external traffic from growing the\n  // cap (any signature failing at step 10 never consumes an entry).\n  const remaining = parsedInput.params.expires - now + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS;\n  const ttl = Math.max(remaining, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS);\n  const insertResult = await options.replayStore.insert(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, ttl, now);\n  if (insertResult === 'replayed') {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_replayed',\n      13,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window.`\n    );\n  }\n  if (insertResult === 'rate_abuse') {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_rate_abuse',\n      13,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded on commit for keyid=${jwk.kid}.`\n    );\n  }\n\n  const agent_url = options.agentUrlForKeyid?.(jwk.kid);\n  return { status: 'verified', keyid: jwk.kid, ...(agent_url !== undefined && { agent_url }), verified_at: now };\n}\n\nfunction requireParams(parsed: ParsedSignatureInput): void {\n  const required: Array<keyof ParsedSignatureInput['params']> = ['created', 'expires', 'nonce', 'keyid', 'alg', 'tag'];\n  const missing = required.filter(k => parsed.params[k] === undefined);\n  if (missing.length) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_params_incomplete',\n      2,\n      `Signature-Input missing required parameter(s): ${missing.join(', ')}.`\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateWindow(created: number, expires: number, now: number): void {\n  // Spec folds every window-level failure — expired, negative window,\n  // over-long window, created-in-future — into webhook_signature_window_invalid.\n  // The error message carries the specific subtype for diagnostics.\n  if (expires <= created) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature expires must be strictly greater than created.'\n    );\n  }\n  if (expires - created > MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      `Signature window exceeds ${MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS}s maximum.`\n    );\n  }\n  if (now < created - CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature created is in the future beyond skew tolerance.'\n    );\n  }\n  if (now > expires + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError('webhook_signature_window_invalid', 5, 'Signature is expired.');\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateCoveredComponents(components: string[]): void {\n  for (const mandatory of WEBHOOK_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS) {\n    if (!components.includes(mandatory)) {\n      throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n        'webhook_signature_components_incomplete',\n        6,\n        `Covered components must include \"${mandatory}\".`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Syntactic validation of the `@target-uri` value before signature\n * computation. Four failure modes:\n *   - URL doesn't parse at all.\n *   - Scheme is not https (webhooks MUST be TLS-terminated; loopback\n *     addresses are exempt so `loopback_mock` test receivers — the\n *     storyboard runner's default — can operate over plain http).\n *   - Authority contains userinfo — credentials don't belong in a signed URI.\n *   - URL carries a fragment — fragments are client-side and never transmitted.\n *\n * Each throws `webhook_target_uri_malformed` with the failure reason in the\n * message. Distinct from `webhook_signature_header_malformed`, which flags\n * the Signature / Signature-Input headers themselves.\n */\nfunction validateTargetUri(rawUrl: string): void {\n  let url: URL;\n  try {\n    url = new URL(rawUrl);\n  } catch {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_target_uri_malformed',\n      6,\n      `@target-uri \"${rawUrl}\" is not a parseable URL.`\n    );\n  }\n  if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && !isLoopbackHost(url.hostname)) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_target_uri_malformed',\n      6,\n      `@target-uri must use https; got \"${url.protocol}\" in \"${rawUrl}\".`\n    );\n  }\n  if (url.username || url.password) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError('webhook_target_uri_malformed', 6, '@target-uri must not embed userinfo.');\n  }\n  if (url.hash) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError('webhook_target_uri_malformed', 6, '@target-uri must not carry a fragment.');\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Loopback host exemption for the https-only rule. The storyboard runner's\n * `loopback_mock` webhook receiver binds to 127.0.0.1 (or the IPv6 [::1])\n * and publishers emit `http://127.0.0.1:<port>/…` URLs for delivery; the\n * signature covers `@target-uri` byte-for-byte, so the verifier sees the\n * http scheme. Production traffic never reaches loopback, so this exemption\n * can't be used to bypass TLS for real webhooks.\n */\nfunction isLoopbackHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  if (!hostname) return false;\n  const normalized = hostname.toLowerCase();\n  return normalized === 'localhost' || normalized === '::1' || normalized.startsWith('127.');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link createWebhookVerifier}. Identical to\n * {@link VerifyWebhookOptions} except `replayStore` and `revocationStore` are\n * optional — the factory defaults them once at creation time so replay state\n * is shared across every request the returned verifier handles.\n */\nexport interface CreateWebhookVerifierOptions extends Omit<VerifyWebhookOptions, 'replayStore' | 'revocationStore'> {\n  /**\n   * Stores `(keyid, scope, nonce)` tuples for replay detection.\n   * Defaults to a fresh {@link InMemoryReplayStore} — suitable for single-process\n   * deployments only. **Multi-replica deployments MUST pass an explicit shared\n   * store** (Redis, Postgres, etc.) — the default in-memory store does not\n   * survive process boundaries, so a signature accepted on replica A is\n   * invisible to replica B and can be replayed there within the signature window.\n   */\n  replayStore?: ReplayStore;\n  /**\n   * Consulted for revoked `kid` before accepting a signature.\n   * Defaults to a fresh {@link InMemoryRevocationStore}, which starts empty\n   * and does not poll for updates. The default is sufficient when you don't\n   * revoke keys at runtime; when you do, pass a store backed by your secrets\n   * manager or admin tooling so revocations take effect without redeployment.\n   */\n  revocationStore?: RevocationStore;\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a bound webhook-signature verifier with shared replay and revocation\n * stores. Mirrors {@link createExpressVerifier} for the webhook profile.\n *\n * The returned function is the per-request entry point: call it with each\n * inbound webhook's {@link RequestLike} representation.\n *\n * **Why a factory?** Replay detection requires the same store instance to be\n * consulted across every request. Constructing stores inside a per-request\n * call would silently defeat replay dedup — each call would start with an\n * empty store and always accept the nonce. The factory pattern captures the\n * store instances in closure scope at wire-up time, guaranteeing they are\n * shared across calls for the lifetime of the verifier.\n *\n * **Multi-replica deployments MUST pass an explicit `replayStore`** backed by\n * a shared persistence layer (Redis, Postgres, etc.) — the default\n * `InMemoryReplayStore` does not survive process boundaries. A nonce accepted\n * on replica A is invisible to replica B; replaying the webhook to B succeeds\n * silently within the signature window.\n */\nexport function createWebhookVerifier(\n  options: CreateWebhookVerifierOptions\n): (request: RequestLike) => Promise<VerifyWebhookResult> {\n  // Instantiate defaults once at creation time so every request handled by\n  // this verifier shares the same replay / revocation state. Per-request\n  // construction would defeat replay detection entirely.\n  const replayStore = options.replayStore ?? new InMemoryReplayStore();\n  const revocationStore = options.revocationStore ?? new InMemoryRevocationStore();\n  return (request: RequestLike) => verifyWebhookSignature(request, { ...options, replayStore, revocationStore });\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAyBA,SAAS,oBAAoB,oBAAoB,sBAAwC;AACzF,SAAS,4BAA4B;AACrC,SAAS,uBAAuB,6BAA6B;AAC7D,SAAS,gBAAgB,2BAAsD;AAC/E,SAAS,gBAAgB,uBAAuB;AAEhD,SAAS,2BAA6C;AACtD,SAAS,+BAAqD;AAC9D,SAAS,cAAc,8BAA8B,oCAAoC;AAElF,MAAM,sBAAsB;AAQ5B,MAAM,+BAAsD;AAAA,EACjE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAwCA,eAAsB,uBACpB,SACA,SAC8B;AAC9B,QAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AACtE,QAAM,cAAc,QAAQ,eAAe;AAI3C,QAAM,iBAAiB,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,iBAAiB;AACxE,QAAM,YAAY,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,WAAW;AAC7D,MAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,WAAW;AACjC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,kBAAc,oBAAoB,cAAc;AAChD,gBAAY,eAAe,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,EACzD,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IACjD;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,gBAAc,WAAW;AAGzB,MAAI,YAAY,OAAO,QAAQ,aAAa;AAC1C,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,0BAA0B,WAAW,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IACxE;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG;AAC7C,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,kBAAkB,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IAC1C;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,iBAAe,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG;AAG1E,4BAA0B,YAAY,UAAU;AAQhD,oBAAkB,QAAQ,GAAG;AAG7B,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAC/D,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AACR,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,2BAA2B,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACrD;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO;AACxC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,2CAA2C,IAAI,GAAG,qCAAqC,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACjH;AAAA,EACF;AAsBA,MACE,IAAI,aAAa,UACjB,CAAC,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ,KAC9B,IAAI,aAAa,qBAAqB,IAAI,aAAa,mBACxD;AACA,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,wJAAwJ,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,IACrL;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,MAAI;AACF,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB,UAAU,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG;AACpD,YAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,iCAAiC,GAAG,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,eAAe;AAAA,IACpG;AAAA,EACF,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,QAAI,eAAe,yBAAyB,IAAI,SAAS,sCAAsC;AAC7F,YAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,sCAAsC,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,IACtF;AACA,UAAM;AAAA,EACR;AAMA,QAAM,cAAc,mBAAmB,QAAQ,GAAG;AAKlD,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,GAAG,GAAG;AACjE,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,iDAAiD,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,EACF;AAIA,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG;AACtF,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,oBAAoB,IAAI,GAAG,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IAChE;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,QAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACX,YAAY;AAAA,IACZ;AAAA,IACA,YAAY;AAAA,IACZ,YAAY;AAAA,EACd;AACA,QAAM,YAAY,eAAe,GAAG;AACpC,QAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,KAAK;AAC3G,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,QAAM,eAAe,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,gBAAgB;AACrE,MAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,qBAAqB,cAAc,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG;AAC5E,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,YAAY,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU,MAAM;AACrD,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,+BAA+B,4BAA4B;AAC3F,QAAM,eAAe,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG;AAC9G,MAAI,iBAAiB,YAAY;AAC/B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,oBAAoB,IAAI,GAAG,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IAChE;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,iBAAiB,cAAc;AACjC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,2DAA2D,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IACpE;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,mBAAmB,IAAI,GAAG;AACpD,SAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,GAAI,cAAc,UAAa,EAAE,UAAU,GAAI,aAAa,IAAI;AAC/G;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,QAAoC;AACzD,QAAM,WAAwD,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK;AACnH,QAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,OAAK,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,MAAS;AACnE,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAClB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,kDAAkD,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACtE;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,SAAiB,SAAiB,KAAmB;AAI3E,MAAI,WAAW,SAAS;AACtB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,UAAU,UAAU,8BAA8B;AACpD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,4BAA4B,4BAA4B;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,UAAU,8BAA8B;AAChD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,UAAU,8BAA8B;AAChD,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,oCAAoC,GAAG,uBAAuB;AAAA,EAChG;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,0BAA0B,YAA4B;AAC7D,aAAW,aAAa,8BAA8B;AACpD,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACnC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,oCAAoC,SAAS;AAAA,MAC/C;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAgBA,SAAS,kBAAkB,QAAsB;AAC/C,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,EACtB,QAAQ;AACN,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAAA,IACxB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,aAAa,YAAY,CAAC,eAAe,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC9D,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,oCAAoC,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,IACjE;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,YAAY,IAAI,UAAU;AAChC,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,gCAAgC,GAAG,sCAAsC;AAAA,EAC3G;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,gCAAgC,GAAG,wCAAwC;AAAA,EAC7G;AACF;AAUA,SAAS,eAAe,UAA2B;AACjD,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,QAAM,aAAa,SAAS,YAAY;AACxC,SAAO,eAAe,eAAe,eAAe,SAAS,WAAW,WAAW,MAAM;AAC3F;AAgDO,SAAS,sBACd,SACwD;AAIxD,QAAM,cAAc,QAAQ,eAAe,IAAI,oBAAoB;AACnE,QAAM,kBAAkB,QAAQ,mBAAmB,IAAI,wBAAwB;AAC/E,SAAO,CAAC,YAAyB,uBAAuB,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,SAAS,aAAa,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAC/G;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/signing/webhook-verifier.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * RFC 9421 webhook-signing verifier (AdCP 3.0 webhook profile).\n *\n * Companion to `verifier.ts`, which verifies outbound request signatures.\n * This verifier runs on the receiving side of a publisher webhook: the\n * storyboard runner's receiver captures a POST and hands the request (headers\n * + raw body) here for signature validation.\n *\n * Distinct from request-signing:\n *   - Tag: `adcp/webhook-signing/v1` (vs `adcp/request-signing/v1`).\n *   - Key purpose: `adcp_use: \"webhook-signing\"` OR `\"request-signing\"` — a\n *     signer may reuse its request-signing key for webhooks (see step 8).\n *   - Covered components MUST include `@method`, `@target-uri`, `@authority`,\n *     `content-type`, and `content-digest` — `content-digest` is unconditional\n *     for webhooks (vs policy-driven on requests) because every webhook\n *     carries a JSON body.\n *   - JWKS resolved via the publisher's `brand.json` `agents[]` `jwks_uri`,\n *     not the request-path capability document.\n *\n * Checklist steps below mirror the 14-step shape in\n * `docs/building/implementation/security.mdx#verifier-checklist-for-webhooks`\n * so failures can point at a specific spec clause. Numbers are 1-based to\n * match the security doc.\n */\n\nimport { buildSignatureBase, canonicalTargetUri, getHeaderValue, type RequestLike } from './canonicalize';\nimport { contentDigestMatches } from './content-digest';\nimport { RequestSignatureError, WebhookSignatureError } from './errors';\nimport { parseSignature, parseSignatureInput, type ParsedSignatureInput } from './parser';\nimport { jwkToPublicKey, verifySignature } from './crypto';\nimport type { JwksResolver } from './jwks';\nimport { InMemoryReplayStore, type ReplayStore } from './replay';\nimport { InMemoryRevocationStore, type RevocationStore } from './revocation';\nimport { ALLOWED_ALGS, CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS } from './types';\n\nexport const WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG = 'adcp/webhook-signing/v1';\n\n/**\n * Covered-component minimum for webhooks. Unlike request-signing, every\n * webhook carries a body so `content-type` and `content-digest` are\n * unconditional — a webhook without `content-digest` coverage can't be\n * verified because the body has no anchor.\n */\nexport const WEBHOOK_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [\n  '@method',\n  '@target-uri',\n  '@authority',\n  'content-type',\n  'content-digest',\n];\n\nexport interface VerifyWebhookOptions {\n  jwks: JwksResolver;\n  replayStore: ReplayStore;\n  revocationStore: RevocationStore;\n  /** Now in seconds since epoch. Defaults to `Date.now() / 1000`. */\n  now?: () => number;\n  /**\n   * Optional tag override — spec currently defines exactly\n   * `adcp/webhook-signing/v1`; the override lets test vectors pin a version.\n   */\n  requiredTag?: string;\n  /** Optional reverse-lookup (kid → publisher URL) for result attribution. */\n  agentUrlForKeyid?: (keyid: string) => string | undefined;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyWebhookResult {\n  status: 'verified';\n  keyid: string;\n  agent_url?: string;\n  verified_at: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify an inbound webhook's RFC 9421 signature.\n *\n * Checklist steps 1–13 plus sub-step 9a, matching the canonical numbering\n * in `security.mdx#verifier-checklist-for-webhooks` (and the `failed_step`\n * values on the conformance vectors at\n * `test-vectors/webhook-signing/negative/`). Throws\n * `WebhookSignatureError` on the first failed step.\n *\n * Ordering invariant: cheap invariant checks (tag, alg, window, components)\n * run before JWKS resolution (step 7); revocation (9) and rate-abuse (9a)\n * run before cryptographic verify (10) so an attacker can't amplify\n * Ed25519/ECDSA work. Replay insert (13) commits only after every earlier\n * step has passed — any signature failing at step 10 never consumes a cap\n * entry, so external traffic can't grow the per-keyid cache.\n */\nexport async function verifyWebhookSignature(\n  request: RequestLike,\n  options: VerifyWebhookOptions\n): Promise<VerifyWebhookResult> {\n  const now = options.now ? options.now() : Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);\n  const requiredTag = options.requiredTag ?? WEBHOOK_SIGNING_TAG;\n\n  // Step 1: both signature headers present AND parseable. The bound-pair\n  // rule (`Signature` without `Signature-Input` or vice versa) rejects here.\n  const sigInputHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Signature-Input');\n  const sigHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Signature');\n  if (!sigInputHeader || !sigHeader) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_header_malformed',\n      1,\n      'Webhook is missing Signature or Signature-Input headers.'\n    );\n  }\n  let parsedInput: ParsedSignatureInput;\n  let parsedSig: ReturnType<typeof parseSignature>;\n  try {\n    parsedInput = parseSignatureInput(sigInputHeader);\n    parsedSig = parseSignature(sigHeader, parsedInput.label);\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_header_malformed',\n      1,\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 2: required params present.\n  requireParams(parsedInput);\n\n  // Step 3: tag match.\n  if (parsedInput.params.tag !== requiredTag) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_tag_invalid',\n      3,\n      `Signature tag must be \"${requiredTag}\"; got \"${parsedInput.params.tag}\".`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 4: alg allowlist.\n  if (!ALLOWED_ALGS.has(parsedInput.params.alg)) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_alg_not_allowed',\n      4,\n      `Signature alg \"${parsedInput.params.alg}\" is not in the AdCP allowlist.`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 5: window valid.\n  validateWindow(parsedInput.params.created, parsedInput.params.expires, now);\n\n  // Step 6: covered components.\n  validateCoveredComponents(parsedInput.components);\n\n  // Step 6a: `@target-uri` syntactic validation. Runs before JWKS resolution\n  // and crypto verify so a malformed URI short-circuits without JWKS\n  // side-effects. Distinct from `header_malformed` (the Signature /\n  // Signature-Input headers themselves) — this flags the covered URI value\n  // that will be fed into the signature base. Non-parseable URLs, non-https\n  // schemes, embedded userinfo, and fragments are all rejected.\n  validateTargetUri(request.url);\n\n  // Step 7: resolve keyid.\n  const jwk = await options.jwks.resolve(parsedInput.params.keyid);\n  if (!jwk) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `No JWK found for keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\".`\n    );\n  }\n  if (jwk.kid !== parsedInput.params.keyid) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_key_unknown',\n      7,\n      `JWKS resolver returned a JWK whose kid \"${jwk.kid}\" does not match requested keyid \"${parsedInput.params.keyid}\".`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 8: key purpose — webhooks are signed with a `request-signing` key.\n  //\n  // Webhooks carry no separate key purpose: the signer uses its\n  // `adcp_use: \"request-signing\"` key (the deprecated `\"webhook-signing\"`\n  // value is still accepted here for backward compatibility, pending removal — adcontextprotocol/adcp#5555).\n  // This is safe because cross-protocol confusion is prevented by the\n  // signature `tag` (step 3, `adcp/webhook-signing/v1`, part of the signed\n  // base) and mandatory `content-digest` coverage (step 6) — not by the\n  // key-purpose discriminator. A captured request signature\n  // (`tag=adcp/request-signing/v1`) can never be replayed against this\n  // verifier because step 3 rejects it. Webhook key isolation, when wanted, is\n  // a second `request-signing` key under a distinct `kid` — not a distinct\n  // `adcp_use`.\n  //\n  // All key-purpose failures use `webhook_signature_key_purpose_invalid`:\n  // absent `adcp_use`, a missing `verify` key_op, or an `adcp_use` outside the\n  // accepted set (e.g. `response-signing`, `governance-signing`). We do NOT\n  // reuse `webhook_mode_mismatch` here — that code is reserved for the\n  // HMAC-vs-9421 auth-mode selector mismatch, and overloading it would collapse\n  // two distinct failure classes onto one stable code receivers branch on.\n  if (\n    jwk.adcp_use === undefined ||\n    !jwk.key_ops?.includes('verify') ||\n    (jwk.adcp_use !== 'request-signing' && jwk.adcp_use !== 'webhook-signing')\n  ) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_key_purpose_invalid',\n      8,\n      `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is not scoped for webhook delivery: adcp_use must be \"request-signing\" (or the deprecated \"webhook-signing\") with a \"verify\" key_op (got adcp_use=\"${jwk.adcp_use}\").`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 9: revocation. Shared store throws `request_signature_revocation_stale`\n  // when its cached snapshot is past grace — re-map to the webhook taxonomy\n  // so callers see a consistent error surface.\n  try {\n    if (await options.revocationStore.isRevoked(jwk.kid)) {\n      throw new WebhookSignatureError('webhook_signature_key_revoked', 9, `JWK \"${jwk.kid}\" is revoked.`);\n    }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof RequestSignatureError && err.code === 'request_signature_revocation_stale') {\n      throw new WebhookSignatureError('webhook_signature_revocation_stale', 9, err.message);\n    }\n    throw err;\n  }\n\n  // Replay cache is scoped by `(keyid, @target-uri)` per adcp#2460 — a\n  // webhook captured on one receiver path MUST NOT count against the replay\n  // budget for a different path under the same keyid. Canonicalize once and\n  // reuse for both pre-check and commit.\n  const replayScope = canonicalTargetUri(request.url);\n\n  // Step 9a: per-keyid rate abuse. Distinct code from step 12's replay —\n  // cap exhaustion is a compromised-key / misconfig signal that SHOULD\n  // alert operators, not \"same nonce twice.\"\n  if (await options.replayStore.isCapHit(jwk.kid, replayScope, now)) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_rate_abuse',\n      9,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded for keyid=${jwk.kid}.`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Pre-check step 12's replay before crypto so a replayed nonce short-\n  // circuits an expensive Ed25519/ECDSA verify.\n  if (await options.replayStore.has(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, now)) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_replayed',\n      12,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window.`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 10: cryptographic verify.\n  const base = buildSignatureBase(\n    parsedInput.components,\n    request,\n    parsedInput.params,\n    parsedInput.signatureParamsValue\n  );\n  const publicKey = jwkToPublicKey(jwk);\n  const valid = verifySignature(parsedInput.params.alg, publicKey, Buffer.from(base, 'utf8'), parsedSig.bytes);\n  if (!valid) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_invalid',\n      10,\n      'Cryptographic verification of webhook signature base failed.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 11: content-digest match.\n  const digestHeader = getHeaderValue(request.headers, 'Content-Digest');\n  if (!digestHeader || !contentDigestMatches(digestHeader, request.body ?? '')) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_digest_mismatch',\n      11,\n      'Content-Digest header does not match recomputed body hash.'\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Step 13: commit nonce. Insert AFTER every prior check passes — this is\n  // the load-bearing invariant that keeps external traffic from growing the\n  // cap (any signature failing at step 10 never consumes an entry).\n  const remaining = parsedInput.params.expires - now + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS;\n  const ttl = Math.max(remaining, MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS);\n  const insertResult = await options.replayStore.insert(jwk.kid, replayScope, parsedInput.params.nonce, ttl, now);\n  if (insertResult === 'replayed') {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_replayed',\n      13,\n      `Replay of (keyid=${jwk.kid}, nonce=${parsedInput.params.nonce}) within signature window.`\n    );\n  }\n  if (insertResult === 'rate_abuse') {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_rate_abuse',\n      13,\n      `Per-keyid replay cache cap exceeded on commit for keyid=${jwk.kid}.`\n    );\n  }\n\n  const agent_url = options.agentUrlForKeyid?.(jwk.kid);\n  return { status: 'verified', keyid: jwk.kid, ...(agent_url !== undefined && { agent_url }), verified_at: now };\n}\n\nfunction requireParams(parsed: ParsedSignatureInput): void {\n  const required: Array<keyof ParsedSignatureInput['params']> = ['created', 'expires', 'nonce', 'keyid', 'alg', 'tag'];\n  const missing = required.filter(k => parsed.params[k] === undefined);\n  if (missing.length) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_params_incomplete',\n      2,\n      `Signature-Input missing required parameter(s): ${missing.join(', ')}.`\n    );\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateWindow(created: number, expires: number, now: number): void {\n  // Spec folds every window-level failure — expired, negative window,\n  // over-long window, created-in-future — into webhook_signature_window_invalid.\n  // The error message carries the specific subtype for diagnostics.\n  if (expires <= created) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature expires must be strictly greater than created.'\n    );\n  }\n  if (expires - created > MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      `Signature window exceeds ${MAX_SIGNATURE_WINDOW_SECONDS}s maximum.`\n    );\n  }\n  if (now < created - CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_signature_window_invalid',\n      5,\n      'Signature created is in the future beyond skew tolerance.'\n    );\n  }\n  if (now > expires + CLOCK_SKEW_TOLERANCE_SECONDS) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError('webhook_signature_window_invalid', 5, 'Signature is expired.');\n  }\n}\n\nfunction validateCoveredComponents(components: string[]): void {\n  for (const mandatory of WEBHOOK_MANDATORY_COMPONENTS) {\n    if (!components.includes(mandatory)) {\n      throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n        'webhook_signature_components_incomplete',\n        6,\n        `Covered components must include \"${mandatory}\".`\n      );\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Syntactic validation of the `@target-uri` value before signature\n * computation. Four failure modes:\n *   - URL doesn't parse at all.\n *   - Scheme is not https (webhooks MUST be TLS-terminated; loopback\n *     addresses are exempt so `loopback_mock` test receivers — the\n *     storyboard runner's default — can operate over plain http).\n *   - Authority contains userinfo — credentials don't belong in a signed URI.\n *   - URL carries a fragment — fragments are client-side and never transmitted.\n *\n * Each throws `webhook_target_uri_malformed` with the failure reason in the\n * message. Distinct from `webhook_signature_header_malformed`, which flags\n * the Signature / Signature-Input headers themselves.\n */\nfunction validateTargetUri(rawUrl: string): void {\n  let url: URL;\n  try {\n    url = new URL(rawUrl);\n  } catch {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_target_uri_malformed',\n      6,\n      `@target-uri \"${rawUrl}\" is not a parseable URL.`\n    );\n  }\n  if (url.protocol !== 'https:' && !isLoopbackHost(url.hostname)) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError(\n      'webhook_target_uri_malformed',\n      6,\n      `@target-uri must use https; got \"${url.protocol}\" in \"${rawUrl}\".`\n    );\n  }\n  if (url.username || url.password) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError('webhook_target_uri_malformed', 6, '@target-uri must not embed userinfo.');\n  }\n  if (url.hash) {\n    throw new WebhookSignatureError('webhook_target_uri_malformed', 6, '@target-uri must not carry a fragment.');\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Loopback host exemption for the https-only rule. The storyboard runner's\n * `loopback_mock` webhook receiver binds to 127.0.0.1 (or the IPv6 [::1])\n * and publishers emit `http://127.0.0.1:<port>/…` URLs for delivery; the\n * signature covers `@target-uri` byte-for-byte, so the verifier sees the\n * http scheme. Production traffic never reaches loopback, so this exemption\n * can't be used to bypass TLS for real webhooks.\n */\nfunction isLoopbackHost(hostname: string): boolean {\n  if (!hostname) return false;\n  const normalized = hostname.toLowerCase();\n  return normalized === 'localhost' || normalized === '::1' || normalized.startsWith('127.');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link createWebhookVerifier}. Identical to\n * {@link VerifyWebhookOptions} except `replayStore` and `revocationStore` are\n * optional — the factory defaults them once at creation time so replay state\n * is shared across every request the returned verifier handles.\n */\nexport interface CreateWebhookVerifierOptions extends Omit<VerifyWebhookOptions, 'replayStore' | 'revocationStore'> {\n  /**\n   * Stores `(keyid, scope, nonce)` tuples for replay detection.\n   * Defaults to a fresh {@link InMemoryReplayStore} — suitable for single-process\n   * deployments only. **Multi-replica deployments MUST pass an explicit shared\n   * store** (Redis, Postgres, etc.) — the default in-memory store does not\n   * survive process boundaries, so a signature accepted on replica A is\n   * invisible to replica B and can be replayed there within the signature window.\n   */\n  replayStore?: ReplayStore;\n  /**\n   * Consulted for revoked `kid` before accepting a signature.\n   * Defaults to a fresh {@link InMemoryRevocationStore}, which starts empty\n   * and does not poll for updates. The default is sufficient when you don't\n   * revoke keys at runtime; when you do, pass a store backed by your secrets\n   * manager or admin tooling so revocations take effect without redeployment.\n   */\n  revocationStore?: RevocationStore;\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a bound webhook-signature verifier with shared replay and revocation\n * stores. Mirrors {@link createExpressVerifier} for the webhook profile.\n *\n * The returned function is the per-request entry point: call it with each\n * inbound webhook's {@link RequestLike} representation.\n *\n * **Why a factory?** Replay detection requires the same store instance to be\n * consulted across every request. Constructing stores inside a per-request\n * call would silently defeat replay dedup — each call would start with an\n * empty store and always accept the nonce. The factory pattern captures the\n * store instances in closure scope at wire-up time, guaranteeing they are\n * shared across calls for the lifetime of the verifier.\n *\n * **Multi-replica deployments MUST pass an explicit `replayStore`** backed by\n * a shared persistence layer (Redis, Postgres, etc.) — the default\n * `InMemoryReplayStore` does not survive process boundaries. A nonce accepted\n * on replica A is invisible to replica B; replaying the webhook to B succeeds\n * silently within the signature window.\n */\nexport function createWebhookVerifier(\n  options: CreateWebhookVerifierOptions\n): (request: RequestLike) => Promise<VerifyWebhookResult> {\n  // Instantiate defaults once at creation time so every request handled by\n  // this verifier shares the same replay / revocation state. Per-request\n  // construction would defeat replay detection entirely.\n  const replayStore = options.replayStore ?? new InMemoryReplayStore();\n  const revocationStore = options.revocationStore ?? new InMemoryRevocationStore();\n  return (request: RequestLike) => verifyWebhookSignature(request, { ...options, replayStore, revocationStore });\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAyBA,SAAS,oBAAoB,oBAAoB,sBAAwC;AACzF,SAAS,4BAA4B;AACrC,SAAS,uBAAuB,6BAA6B;AAC7D,SAAS,gBAAgB,2BAAsD;AAC/E,SAAS,gBAAgB,uBAAuB;AAEhD,SAAS,2BAA6C;AACtD,SAAS,+BAAqD;AAC9D,SAAS,cAAc,8BAA8B,oCAAoC;AAElF,MAAM,sBAAsB;AAQ5B,MAAM,+BAAsD;AAAA,EACjE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AACF;AAwCA,eAAsB,uBACpB,SACA,SAC8B;AAC9B,QAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AACtE,QAAM,cAAc,QAAQ,eAAe;AAI3C,QAAM,iBAAiB,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,iBAAiB;AACxE,QAAM,YAAY,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,WAAW;AAC7D,MAAI,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,WAAW;AACjC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,kBAAc,oBAAoB,cAAc;AAChD,gBAAY,eAAe,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,EACzD,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IACjD;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,gBAAc,WAAW;AAGzB,MAAI,YAAY,OAAO,QAAQ,aAAa;AAC1C,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,0BAA0B,WAAW,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IACxE;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG;AAC7C,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,kBAAkB,YAAY,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,IAC1C;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,iBAAe,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,YAAY,OAAO,SAAS,GAAG;AAG1E,4BAA0B,YAAY,UAAU;AAQhD,oBAAkB,QAAQ,GAAG;AAG7B,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAC/D,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AACR,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,2BAA2B,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACrD;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO;AACxC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,2CAA2C,IAAI,GAAG,qCAAqC,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACjH;AAAA,EACF;AAsBA,MACE,IAAI,aAAa,UACjB,CAAC,IAAI,SAAS,SAAS,QAAQ,KAC9B,IAAI,aAAa,qBAAqB,IAAI,aAAa,mBACxD;AACA,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,wJAAwJ,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,IACrL;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,MAAI;AACF,QAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB,UAAU,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG;AACpD,YAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,iCAAiC,GAAG,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,eAAe;AAAA,IACpG;AAAA,EACF,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,QAAI,eAAe,yBAAyB,IAAI,SAAS,sCAAsC;AAC7F,YAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,sCAAsC,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO;AAAA,IACtF;AACA,UAAM;AAAA,EACR;AAMA,QAAM,cAAc,mBAAmB,QAAQ,GAAG;AAKlD,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,GAAG,GAAG;AACjE,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,iDAAiD,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,EACF;AAIA,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG;AACtF,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,oBAAoB,IAAI,GAAG,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IAChE;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,QAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACX,YAAY;AAAA,IACZ;AAAA,IACA,YAAY;AAAA,IACZ,YAAY;AAAA,EACd;AACA,QAAM,YAAY,eAAe,GAAG;AACpC,QAAM,QAAQ,gBAAgB,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,KAAK;AAC3G,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAGA,QAAM,eAAe,eAAe,QAAQ,SAAS,gBAAgB;AACrE,MAAI,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,qBAAqB,cAAc,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG;AAC5E,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,YAAY,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU,MAAM;AACrD,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,+BAA+B,4BAA4B;AAC3F,QAAM,eAAe,MAAM,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,aAAa,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG;AAC9G,MAAI,iBAAiB,YAAY;AAC/B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,oBAAoB,IAAI,GAAG,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IAChE;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,iBAAiB,cAAc;AACjC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,2DAA2D,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,IACpE;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,mBAAmB,IAAI,GAAG;AACpD,SAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,YAAY,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,GAAI,cAAc,UAAa,EAAE,UAAU,GAAI,aAAa,IAAI;AAC/G;AAEA,SAAS,cAAc,QAAoC;AACzD,QAAM,WAAwD,CAAC,WAAW,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK;AACnH,QAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,OAAK,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,MAAS;AACnE,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAClB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,kDAAkD,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACtE;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,eAAe,SAAiB,SAAiB,KAAmB;AAI3E,MAAI,WAAW,SAAS;AACtB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,UAAU,UAAU,8BAA8B;AACpD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,4BAA4B,4BAA4B;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,UAAU,8BAA8B;AAChD,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,UAAU,8BAA8B;AAChD,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,oCAAoC,GAAG,uBAAuB;AAAA,EAChG;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,0BAA0B,YAA4B;AAC7D,aAAW,aAAa,8BAA8B;AACpD,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS,SAAS,GAAG;AACnC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA;AAAA,QACA,oCAAoC,SAAS;AAAA,MAC/C;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAgBA,SAAS,kBAAkB,QAAsB;AAC/C,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,EACtB,QAAQ;AACN,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,gBAAgB,MAAM;AAAA,IACxB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,aAAa,YAAY,CAAC,eAAe,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC9D,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,oCAAoC,IAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,IACjE;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,YAAY,IAAI,UAAU;AAChC,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,gCAAgC,GAAG,sCAAsC;AAAA,EAC3G;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,MAAM;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,gCAAgC,GAAG,wCAAwC;AAAA,EAC7G;AACF;AAUA,SAAS,eAAe,UAA2B;AACjD,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,QAAM,aAAa,SAAS,YAAY;AACxC,SAAO,eAAe,eAAe,eAAe,SAAS,WAAW,WAAW,MAAM;AAC3F;AAgDO,SAAS,sBACd,SACwD;AAIxD,QAAM,cAAc,QAAQ,eAAe,IAAI,oBAAoB;AACnE,QAAM,kBAAkB,QAAQ,mBAAmB,IAAI,wBAAwB;AAC/E,SAAO,CAAC,YAAyB,uBAAuB,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,SAAS,aAAa,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAC/G;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/storage/MemoryStorage.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 class MemoryStorage {
   constructor(options = {}) {
     this.options = options;

package/dist/lib/storage/MemoryStorage.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/storage/MemoryStorage.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// Default in-memory storage implementation\n// Works out of the box without any external dependencies\n\nimport type { Storage, BatchStorage, PatternStorage } from './interfaces';\n\n/**\n * Stored item with optional expiration\n */\ninterface StoredItem<T> {\n  value: T;\n  expiresAt?: number;\n  createdAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * In-memory storage implementation with TTL support\n *\n * This is the default storage used when no external storage is configured.\n * Features:\n * - TTL support with automatic cleanup\n * - Pattern matching\n * - Batch operations\n * - Memory-efficient (garbage collection of expired items)\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const storage = new MemoryStorage<string>();\n * await storage.set('key', 'value', 60); // TTL of 60 seconds\n * const value = await storage.get('key');\n * ```\n */\nexport class MemoryStorage<T> implements Storage<T>, BatchStorage<T>, PatternStorage<T> {\n  private store = new Map<string, StoredItem<T>>();\n  private cleanupInterval?: NodeJS.Timeout;\n  private lastCleanup = 0;\n\n  constructor(\n    private options: {\n      /** How often to clean up expired items (ms), default 5 minutes */\n      cleanupIntervalMs?: number;\n      /** Maximum items to store before forcing cleanup, default 10000 */\n      maxItems?: number;\n      /** Whether to enable automatic cleanup, default true */\n      autoCleanup?: boolean;\n    } = {}\n  ) {\n    const {\n      cleanupIntervalMs = 5 * 60 * 1000, // 5 minutes\n      autoCleanup = true,\n    } = options;\n\n    if (autoCleanup) {\n      this.cleanupInterval = setInterval(() => {\n        this.cleanupExpired();\n      }, cleanupIntervalMs);\n    }\n  }\n\n  async get(key: string): Promise<T | undefined> {\n    const item = this.store.get(key);\n\n    if (!item) {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n\n    // Check if expired\n    if (item.expiresAt && Date.now() > item.expiresAt) {\n      this.store.delete(key);\n      return undefined;\n    }\n\n    return item.value;\n  }\n\n  async set(key: string, value: T, ttl?: number): Promise<void> {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    const expiresAt = ttl ? now + ttl * 1000 : undefined;\n\n    this.store.set(key, {\n      value,\n      expiresAt,\n      createdAt: now,\n    });\n\n    // Force cleanup if we're approaching max items\n    const maxItems = this.options.maxItems || 10000;\n    if (this.store.size > maxItems) {\n      this.cleanupExpired();\n    }\n  }\n\n  async delete(key: string): Promise<void> {\n    this.store.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  async has(key: string): Promise<boolean> {\n    const value = await this.get(key);\n    return value !== undefined;\n  }\n\n  async clear(): Promise<void> {\n    this.store.clear();\n  }\n\n  async keys(): Promise<string[]> {\n    // Return only non-expired keys\n    const keys: string[] = [];\n    const now = Date.now();\n\n    for (const [key, item] of this.store) {\n      if (!item.expiresAt || now <= item.expiresAt) {\n        keys.push(key);\n      }\n    }\n\n    return keys;\n  }\n\n  async size(): Promise<number> {\n    // Count only non-expired items\n    const keys = await this.keys();\n    return keys.length;\n  }\n\n  // ====== BATCH OPERATIONS ======\n\n  async mget(keys: string[]): Promise<(T | undefined)[]> {\n    const promises = keys.map(key => this.get(key));\n    return Promise.all(promises);\n  }\n\n  async mset(entries: Array<{ key: string; value: T; ttl?: number }>): Promise<void> {\n    const promises = entries.map(({ key, value, ttl }) => this.set(key, value, ttl));\n    await Promise.all(promises);\n  }\n\n  async mdel(keys: string[]): Promise<number> {\n    let deleted = 0;\n    for (const key of keys) {\n      if (this.store.has(key)) {\n        this.store.delete(key);\n        deleted++;\n      }\n    }\n    return deleted;\n  }\n\n  // ====== PATTERN OPERATIONS ======\n\n  async scan(pattern: string): Promise<string[]> {\n    const regex = this.patternToRegex(pattern);\n    const allKeys = await this.keys();\n    return allKeys.filter(key => regex.test(key));\n  }\n\n  async deletePattern(pattern: string): Promise<number> {\n    const keys = await this.scan(pattern);\n    return this.mdel(keys);\n  }\n\n  // ====== UTILITY METHODS ======\n\n  /**\n   * Manually trigger cleanup of expired items\n   */\n  cleanupExpired(): number {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    let cleaned = 0;\n\n    for (const [key, item] of this.store) {\n      if (item.expiresAt && now > item.expiresAt) {\n        this.store.delete(key);\n        cleaned++;\n      }\n    }\n\n    this.lastCleanup = now;\n    return cleaned;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get storage statistics\n   */\n  getStats(): {\n    totalItems: number;\n    expiredItems: number;\n    memoryUsage: number;\n    lastCleanup: number;\n    oldestItem?: number;\n    newestItem?: number;\n  } {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    let expiredItems = 0;\n    let oldestItem: number | undefined;\n    let newestItem: number | undefined;\n\n    for (const [, item] of this.store) {\n      if (item.expiresAt && now > item.expiresAt) {\n        expiredItems++;\n      }\n\n      if (!oldestItem || item.createdAt < oldestItem) {\n        oldestItem = item.createdAt;\n      }\n\n      if (!newestItem || item.createdAt > newestItem) {\n        newestItem = item.createdAt;\n      }\n    }\n\n    return {\n      totalItems: this.store.size,\n      expiredItems,\n      memoryUsage: this.estimateMemoryUsage(),\n      lastCleanup: this.lastCleanup,\n      oldestItem,\n      newestItem,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Estimate memory usage (rough approximation)\n   */\n  private estimateMemoryUsage(): number {\n    let bytes = 0;\n\n    for (const [key, item] of this.store) {\n      // Rough estimate: string length * 2 (UTF-16) + object overhead\n      bytes += key.length * 2;\n      bytes += JSON.stringify(item.value).length * 2;\n      bytes += 64; // Overhead for object and metadata\n    }\n\n    return bytes;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Convert glob-style pattern to regex\n   */\n  private patternToRegex(pattern: string): RegExp {\n    // Escape special regex characters except * and ?\n    const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.+^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&');\n\n    // Convert glob wildcards to regex\n    const regexPattern = escaped\n      .replace(/\\*/g, '.*') // * matches any sequence\n      .replace(/\\?/g, '.'); // ? matches any single character\n\n    return new RegExp(`^${regexPattern}$`);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Destroy the storage and cleanup resources\n   */\n  destroy(): void {\n    if (this.cleanupInterval) {\n      clearInterval(this.cleanupInterval);\n      this.cleanupInterval = undefined;\n    }\n    this.store.clear();\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Factory function to create a memory storage instance\n */\nexport function createMemoryStorage<T>(options?: {\n  cleanupIntervalMs?: number;\n  maxItems?: number;\n  autoCleanup?: boolean;\n}): MemoryStorage<T> {\n  return new MemoryStorage<T>(options);\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a complete storage configuration using memory storage\n */\nexport function createMemoryStorageConfig(): {\n  capabilities: MemoryStorage<any>;\n  conversations: MemoryStorage<any>;\n  tokens: MemoryStorage<any>;\n  debugLogs: MemoryStorage<any>;\n} {\n  return {\n    capabilities: createMemoryStorage({ maxItems: 1000 }),\n    conversations: createMemoryStorage({ maxItems: 5000 }),\n    tokens: createMemoryStorage({ maxItems: 10000 }),\n    debugLogs: createMemoryStorage({ maxItems: 50000 }),\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AA+BO,MAAM,cAA2E;AAAA,EAKtF,YACU,UAOJ,CAAC,GACL;AARQ;AASR,UAAM;AAAA,MACJ,oBAAoB,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA;AAAA,MAC7B,cAAc;AAAA,IAChB,IAAI;AAEJ,QAAI,aAAa;AACf,WAAK,kBAAkB,YAAY,MAAM;AACvC,aAAK,eAAe;AAAA,MACtB,GAAG,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACtB;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAnBU;AAAA,EALF,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAA2B;AAAA,EACvC;AAAA,EACA,cAAc;AAAA,EAwBtB,MAAM,IAAI,KAAqC;AAC7C,UAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;AAE/B,QAAI,CAAC,MAAM;AACT,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAGA,QAAI,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,WAAW;AACjD,WAAK,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AACrB,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAEA,WAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACd;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,IAAI,KAAa,OAAU,KAA6B;AAC5D,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACrB,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,MAAO;AAE3C,SAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA,MAClB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,WAAW;AAAA,IACb,CAAC;AAGD,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,YAAY;AAC1C,QAAI,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU;AAC9B,WAAK,eAAe;AAAA,IACtB;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,OAAO,KAA4B;AACvC,SAAK,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,EACvB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,IAAI,KAA+B;AACvC,UAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AAChC,WAAO,UAAU;AAAA,EACnB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,QAAuB;AAC3B,SAAK,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,EACnB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,OAA0B;AAE9B,UAAM,OAAiB,CAAC;AACxB,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AAErB,eAAW,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AACpC,UAAI,CAAC,KAAK,aAAa,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW;AAC5C,aAAK,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,OAAwB;AAE5B,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK;AAC7B,WAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACd;AAAA;AAAA,EAIA,MAAM,KAAK,MAA4C;AACrD,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,SAAO,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC;AAC9C,WAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC7B;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,KAAK,SAAwE;AACjF,UAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC;AAC/E,UAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC5B;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,KAAK,MAAiC;AAC1C,QAAI,UAAU;AACd,eAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AACtB,UAAI,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG;AACvB,aAAK,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AACrB;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA,EAIA,MAAM,KAAK,SAAoC;AAC7C,UAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,eAAe,OAAO;AACzC,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK;AAChC,WAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAO,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC;AAAA,EAC9C;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,cAAc,SAAkC;AACpD,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AACpC,WAAO,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,EACvB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,iBAAyB;AACvB,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACrB,QAAI,UAAU;AAEd,eAAW,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AACpC,UAAI,KAAK,aAAa,MAAM,KAAK,WAAW;AAC1C,aAAK,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AACrB;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,SAAK,cAAc;AACnB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,WAOE;AACA,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACrB,QAAI,eAAe;AACnB,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI;AAEJ,eAAW,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AACjC,UAAI,KAAK,aAAa,MAAM,KAAK,WAAW;AAC1C;AAAA,MACF;AAEA,UAAI,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK,YAAY,YAAY;AAC9C,qBAAa,KAAK;AAAA,MACpB;AAEA,UAAI,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK,YAAY,YAAY;AAC9C,qBAAa,KAAK;AAAA,MACpB;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,YAAY,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,MACvB;AAAA,MACA,aAAa,KAAK,oBAAoB;AAAA,MACtC,aAAa,KAAK;AAAA,MAClB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKQ,sBAA8B;AACpC,QAAI,QAAQ;AAEZ,eAAW,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AAEpC,eAAS,IAAI,SAAS;AACtB,eAAS,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS;AAC7C,eAAS;AAAA,IACX;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKQ,eAAe,SAAyB;AAE9C,UAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,QAAQ,qBAAqB,MAAM;AAG3D,UAAM,eAAe,QAClB,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,EACnB,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AAErB,WAAO,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,GAAG;AAAA,EACvC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,UAAgB;AACd,QAAI,KAAK,iBAAiB;AACxB,oBAAc,KAAK,eAAe;AAClC,WAAK,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACzB;AACA,SAAK,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,EACnB;AACF;AAKO,SAAS,oBAAuB,SAIlB;AACnB,SAAO,IAAI,cAAiB,OAAO;AACrC;AAKO,SAAS,4BAKd;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,cAAc,oBAAoB,EAAE,UAAU,IAAK,CAAC;AAAA,IACpD,eAAe,oBAAoB,EAAE,UAAU,IAAK,CAAC;AAAA,IACrD,QAAQ,oBAAoB,EAAE,UAAU,IAAM,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/C,WAAW,oBAAoB,EAAE,UAAU,IAAM,CAAC;AAAA,EACpD;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/storage/MemoryStorage.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// Default in-memory storage implementation\n// Works out of the box without any external dependencies\n\nimport type { Storage, BatchStorage, PatternStorage } from './interfaces';\n\n/**\n * Stored item with optional expiration\n */\ninterface StoredItem<T> {\n  value: T;\n  expiresAt?: number;\n  createdAt: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * In-memory storage implementation with TTL support\n *\n * This is the default storage used when no external storage is configured.\n * Features:\n * - TTL support with automatic cleanup\n * - Pattern matching\n * - Batch operations\n * - Memory-efficient (garbage collection of expired items)\n *\n * @example\n * ```typescript\n * const storage = new MemoryStorage<string>();\n * await storage.set('key', 'value', 60); // TTL of 60 seconds\n * const value = await storage.get('key');\n * ```\n */\nexport class MemoryStorage<T> implements Storage<T>, BatchStorage<T>, PatternStorage<T> {\n  private store = new Map<string, StoredItem<T>>();\n  private cleanupInterval?: NodeJS.Timeout;\n  private lastCleanup = 0;\n\n  constructor(\n    private options: {\n      /** How often to clean up expired items (ms), default 5 minutes */\n      cleanupIntervalMs?: number;\n      /** Maximum items to store before forcing cleanup, default 10000 */\n      maxItems?: number;\n      /** Whether to enable automatic cleanup, default true */\n      autoCleanup?: boolean;\n    } = {}\n  ) {\n    const {\n      cleanupIntervalMs = 5 * 60 * 1000, // 5 minutes\n      autoCleanup = true,\n    } = options;\n\n    if (autoCleanup) {\n      this.cleanupInterval = setInterval(() => {\n        this.cleanupExpired();\n      }, cleanupIntervalMs);\n    }\n  }\n\n  async get(key: string): Promise<T | undefined> {\n    const item = this.store.get(key);\n\n    if (!item) {\n      return undefined;\n    }\n\n    // Check if expired\n    if (item.expiresAt && Date.now() > item.expiresAt) {\n      this.store.delete(key);\n      return undefined;\n    }\n\n    return item.value;\n  }\n\n  async set(key: string, value: T, ttl?: number): Promise<void> {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    const expiresAt = ttl ? now + ttl * 1000 : undefined;\n\n    this.store.set(key, {\n      value,\n      expiresAt,\n      createdAt: now,\n    });\n\n    // Force cleanup if we're approaching max items\n    const maxItems = this.options.maxItems || 10000;\n    if (this.store.size > maxItems) {\n      this.cleanupExpired();\n    }\n  }\n\n  async delete(key: string): Promise<void> {\n    this.store.delete(key);\n  }\n\n  async has(key: string): Promise<boolean> {\n    const value = await this.get(key);\n    return value !== undefined;\n  }\n\n  async clear(): Promise<void> {\n    this.store.clear();\n  }\n\n  async keys(): Promise<string[]> {\n    // Return only non-expired keys\n    const keys: string[] = [];\n    const now = Date.now();\n\n    for (const [key, item] of this.store) {\n      if (!item.expiresAt || now <= item.expiresAt) {\n        keys.push(key);\n      }\n    }\n\n    return keys;\n  }\n\n  async size(): Promise<number> {\n    // Count only non-expired items\n    const keys = await this.keys();\n    return keys.length;\n  }\n\n  // ====== BATCH OPERATIONS ======\n\n  async mget(keys: string[]): Promise<(T | undefined)[]> {\n    const promises = keys.map(key => this.get(key));\n    return Promise.all(promises);\n  }\n\n  async mset(entries: Array<{ key: string; value: T; ttl?: number }>): Promise<void> {\n    const promises = entries.map(({ key, value, ttl }) => this.set(key, value, ttl));\n    await Promise.all(promises);\n  }\n\n  async mdel(keys: string[]): Promise<number> {\n    let deleted = 0;\n    for (const key of keys) {\n      if (this.store.has(key)) {\n        this.store.delete(key);\n        deleted++;\n      }\n    }\n    return deleted;\n  }\n\n  // ====== PATTERN OPERATIONS ======\n\n  async scan(pattern: string): Promise<string[]> {\n    const regex = this.patternToRegex(pattern);\n    const allKeys = await this.keys();\n    return allKeys.filter(key => regex.test(key));\n  }\n\n  async deletePattern(pattern: string): Promise<number> {\n    const keys = await this.scan(pattern);\n    return this.mdel(keys);\n  }\n\n  // ====== UTILITY METHODS ======\n\n  /**\n   * Manually trigger cleanup of expired items\n   */\n  cleanupExpired(): number {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    let cleaned = 0;\n\n    for (const [key, item] of this.store) {\n      if (item.expiresAt && now > item.expiresAt) {\n        this.store.delete(key);\n        cleaned++;\n      }\n    }\n\n    this.lastCleanup = now;\n    return cleaned;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Get storage statistics\n   */\n  getStats(): {\n    totalItems: number;\n    expiredItems: number;\n    memoryUsage: number;\n    lastCleanup: number;\n    oldestItem?: number;\n    newestItem?: number;\n  } {\n    const now = Date.now();\n    let expiredItems = 0;\n    let oldestItem: number | undefined;\n    let newestItem: number | undefined;\n\n    for (const [, item] of this.store) {\n      if (item.expiresAt && now > item.expiresAt) {\n        expiredItems++;\n      }\n\n      if (!oldestItem || item.createdAt < oldestItem) {\n        oldestItem = item.createdAt;\n      }\n\n      if (!newestItem || item.createdAt > newestItem) {\n        newestItem = item.createdAt;\n      }\n    }\n\n    return {\n      totalItems: this.store.size,\n      expiredItems,\n      memoryUsage: this.estimateMemoryUsage(),\n      lastCleanup: this.lastCleanup,\n      oldestItem,\n      newestItem,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Estimate memory usage (rough approximation)\n   */\n  private estimateMemoryUsage(): number {\n    let bytes = 0;\n\n    for (const [key, item] of this.store) {\n      // Rough estimate: string length * 2 (UTF-16) + object overhead\n      bytes += key.length * 2;\n      bytes += JSON.stringify(item.value).length * 2;\n      bytes += 64; // Overhead for object and metadata\n    }\n\n    return bytes;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Convert glob-style pattern to regex\n   */\n  private patternToRegex(pattern: string): RegExp {\n    // Escape special regex characters except * and ?\n    const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.+^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\$&');\n\n    // Convert glob wildcards to regex\n    const regexPattern = escaped\n      .replace(/\\*/g, '.*') // * matches any sequence\n      .replace(/\\?/g, '.'); // ? matches any single character\n\n    return new RegExp(`^${regexPattern}$`);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Destroy the storage and cleanup resources\n   */\n  destroy(): void {\n    if (this.cleanupInterval) {\n      clearInterval(this.cleanupInterval);\n      this.cleanupInterval = undefined;\n    }\n    this.store.clear();\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Factory function to create a memory storage instance\n */\nexport function createMemoryStorage<T>(options?: {\n  cleanupIntervalMs?: number;\n  maxItems?: number;\n  autoCleanup?: boolean;\n}): MemoryStorage<T> {\n  return new MemoryStorage<T>(options);\n}\n\n/**\n * Create a complete storage configuration using memory storage\n */\nexport function createMemoryStorageConfig(): {\n  capabilities: MemoryStorage<any>;\n  conversations: MemoryStorage<any>;\n  tokens: MemoryStorage<any>;\n  debugLogs: MemoryStorage<any>;\n} {\n  return {\n    capabilities: createMemoryStorage({ maxItems: 1000 }),\n    conversations: createMemoryStorage({ maxItems: 5000 }),\n    tokens: createMemoryStorage({ maxItems: 10000 }),\n    debugLogs: createMemoryStorage({ maxItems: 50000 }),\n  };\n}\n"],"mappings":"AA+BO,MAAM,cAA2E;AAAA,EAKtF,YACU,UAOJ,CAAC,GACL;AARQ;AASR,UAAM;AAAA,MACJ,oBAAoB,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA;AAAA,MAC7B,cAAc;AAAA,IAChB,IAAI;AAEJ,QAAI,aAAa;AACf,WAAK,kBAAkB,YAAY,MAAM;AACvC,aAAK,eAAe;AAAA,MACtB,GAAG,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACtB;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAnBU;AAAA,EALF,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAA2B;AAAA,EACvC;AAAA,EACA,cAAc;AAAA,EAwBtB,MAAM,IAAI,KAAqC;AAC7C,UAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;AAE/B,QAAI,CAAC,MAAM;AACT,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAGA,QAAI,KAAK,aAAa,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,WAAW;AACjD,WAAK,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AACrB,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAEA,WAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACd;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,IAAI,KAAa,OAAU,KAA6B;AAC5D,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACrB,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,MAAO;AAE3C,SAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA,MAClB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,WAAW;AAAA,IACb,CAAC;AAGD,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,YAAY;AAC1C,QAAI,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU;AAC9B,WAAK,eAAe;AAAA,IACtB;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,OAAO,KAA4B;AACvC,SAAK,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AAAA,EACvB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,IAAI,KAA+B;AACvC,UAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AAChC,WAAO,UAAU;AAAA,EACnB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,QAAuB;AAC3B,SAAK,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,EACnB;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,OAA0B;AAE9B,UAAM,OAAiB,CAAC;AACxB,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AAErB,eAAW,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AACpC,UAAI,CAAC,KAAK,aAAa,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW;AAC5C,aAAK,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,MACf;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,OAAwB;AAE5B,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK;AAC7B,WAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACd;AAAA;AAAA,EAIA,MAAM,KAAK,MAA4C;AACrD,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI,SAAO,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC;AAC9C,WAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC7B;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,KAAK,SAAwE;AACjF,UAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC;AAC/E,UAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC5B;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,KAAK,MAAiC;AAC1C,QAAI,UAAU;AACd,eAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AACtB,UAAI,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG;AACvB,aAAK,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AACrB;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA,EAIA,MAAM,KAAK,SAAoC;AAC7C,UAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,eAAe,OAAO;AACzC,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK;AAChC,WAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,SAAO,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC;AAAA,EAC9C;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,cAAc,SAAkC;AACpD,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AACpC,WAAO,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,EACvB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOA,iBAAyB;AACvB,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACrB,QAAI,UAAU;AAEd,eAAW,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AACpC,UAAI,KAAK,aAAa,MAAM,KAAK,WAAW;AAC1C,aAAK,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AACrB;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,SAAK,cAAc;AACnB,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,WAOE;AACA,UAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACrB,QAAI,eAAe;AACnB,QAAI;AACJ,QAAI;AAEJ,eAAW,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AACjC,UAAI,KAAK,aAAa,MAAM,KAAK,WAAW;AAC1C;AAAA,MACF;AAEA,UAAI,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK,YAAY,YAAY;AAC9C,qBAAa,KAAK;AAAA,MACpB;AAEA,UAAI,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK,YAAY,YAAY;AAC9C,qBAAa,KAAK;AAAA,MACpB;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,YAAY,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,MACvB;AAAA,MACA,aAAa,KAAK,oBAAoB;AAAA,MACtC,aAAa,KAAK;AAAA,MAClB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKQ,sBAA8B;AACpC,QAAI,QAAQ;AAEZ,eAAW,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AAEpC,eAAS,IAAI,SAAS;AACtB,eAAS,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS;AAC7C,eAAS;AAAA,IACX;AAEA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKQ,eAAe,SAAyB;AAE9C,UAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,QAAQ,qBAAqB,MAAM;AAG3D,UAAM,eAAe,QAClB,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,EACnB,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG;AAErB,WAAO,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,GAAG;AAAA,EACvC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAKA,UAAgB;AACd,QAAI,KAAK,iBAAiB;AACxB,oBAAc,KAAK,eAAe;AAClC,WAAK,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACzB;AACA,SAAK,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,EACnB;AACF;AAKO,SAAS,oBAAuB,SAIlB;AACnB,SAAO,IAAI,cAAiB,OAAO;AACrC;AAKO,SAAS,4BAKd;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,cAAc,oBAAoB,EAAE,UAAU,IAAK,CAAC;AAAA,IACpD,eAAe,oBAAoB,EAAE,UAAU,IAAK,CAAC;AAAA,IACrD,QAAQ,oBAAoB,EAAE,UAAU,IAAM,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/C,WAAW,oBAAoB,EAAE,UAAU,IAAM,CAAC;AAAA,EACpD;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/storage/interfaces.mjs

@@ -1,7 +1 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 //# sourceMappingURL=interfaces.mjs.map

package/dist/lib/substitution/encoder/SubstitutionEncoder.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { encodeUnreserved } from "../rfc3986.mjs";
 const ADCP_MACRO_PATTERN = /\{[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*\}/;
 class MacroInRawValueError extends Error {

package/dist/lib/substitution/encoder/SubstitutionEncoder.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/substitution/encoder/SubstitutionEncoder.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Seller-side primitives for producing catalog-item macro substitution\n * output that satisfies the #2620 rule. The runtime counterpart of\n * {@link SubstitutionObserver} — both share the RFC 3986 implementation\n * in `../rfc3986.ts` so a single bug-fix path covers producer and verifier.\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { SubstitutionEncoder } from '@adcp/sdk/substitution';\n *\n * const encoder = new SubstitutionEncoder();\n * encoder.reject_if_contains_macro(rawValue); // optional input guard\n * const safe = encoder.encode_for_url_context(rawValue);\n * const url = template.replace('{SKU}', safe);\n * ```\n */\n\nimport { encodeUnreserved } from '../rfc3986';\n\n/**\n * Regex that matches any AdCP macro token (braces included). Catalog\n * sellers use this to refuse catalog values that would trigger a\n * second-round expansion if the downstream renderer re-scanned its\n * output. The check is a belt-and-suspenders guard; the encoder itself\n * already percent-encodes braces so a post-encoded value CAN NOT\n * re-expand.\n */\nconst ADCP_MACRO_PATTERN = /\\{[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*\\}/;\n\nexport class MacroInRawValueError extends Error {\n  readonly raw_value: string;\n  readonly matched_macro: string;\n  constructor(raw_value: string, matched_macro: string) {\n    super(\n      `Raw catalog value contains AdCP macro token ${matched_macro} — ` +\n        `reject at ingest or accept the risk of second-round expansion in consumers that re-scan rendered output.`\n    );\n    this.name = 'MacroInRawValueError';\n    this.raw_value = raw_value;\n    this.matched_macro = matched_macro;\n  }\n}\n\nexport class SubstitutionEncoder {\n  /**\n   * Strict RFC 3986 unreserved-whitelist percent-encoder. Only\n   * `ALPHA / DIGIT / \"-\" / \".\" / \"_\" / \"~\"` pass through; every other\n   * byte is UTF-8 + percent-encoded with uppercase hex digits.\n   *\n   * The behavior intentionally differs from `encodeURIComponent`, which\n   * leaves `( ) * !` unescaped — those are sub-delims, not unreserved,\n   * and leaving them raw fails the `url-scheme-injection-neutralized`\n   * vector when a value like `javascript:alert(0)` substitutes into an\n   * `href`-whole-value position.\n   */\n  encode_for_url_context(raw_value: string): string {\n    return encodeUnreserved(raw_value);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Throw if `raw_value` contains an AdCP macro token. The encoder\n   * output is already safe from second-round expansion (braces become\n   * `%7B` / `%7D`), so this is a defensive check for sellers who want\n   * to fail-fast at catalog ingest rather than let suspicious values\n   * propagate. Opt-in; callers that omit it accept the canonical\n   * encode-and-move-on behavior shown by\n   * `nested-expansion-preserved-as-literal`.\n   */\n  reject_if_contains_macro(raw_value: string): void {\n    const match = raw_value.match(ADCP_MACRO_PATTERN);\n    if (match) {\n      throw new MacroInRawValueError(raw_value, match[0]);\n    }\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAgBA,SAAS,wBAAwB;AAUjC,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAEpB,MAAM,6BAA6B,MAAM;AAAA,EACrC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACT,YAAY,WAAmB,eAAuB;AACpD;AAAA,MACE,+CAA+C,aAAa;AAAA,IAE9D;AACA,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,YAAY;AACjB,SAAK,gBAAgB;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAEO,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAY/B,uBAAuB,WAA2B;AAChD,WAAO,iBAAiB,SAAS;AAAA,EACnC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAWA,yBAAyB,WAAyB;AAChD,UAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,MAAM,kBAAkB;AAChD,QAAI,OAAO;AACT,YAAM,IAAI,qBAAqB,WAAW,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/substitution/encoder/SubstitutionEncoder.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Seller-side primitives for producing catalog-item macro substitution\n * output that satisfies the #2620 rule. The runtime counterpart of\n * {@link SubstitutionObserver} — both share the RFC 3986 implementation\n * in `../rfc3986.ts` so a single bug-fix path covers producer and verifier.\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { SubstitutionEncoder } from '@adcp/sdk/substitution';\n *\n * const encoder = new SubstitutionEncoder();\n * encoder.reject_if_contains_macro(rawValue); // optional input guard\n * const safe = encoder.encode_for_url_context(rawValue);\n * const url = template.replace('{SKU}', safe);\n * ```\n */\n\nimport { encodeUnreserved } from '../rfc3986';\n\n/**\n * Regex that matches any AdCP macro token (braces included). Catalog\n * sellers use this to refuse catalog values that would trigger a\n * second-round expansion if the downstream renderer re-scanned its\n * output. The check is a belt-and-suspenders guard; the encoder itself\n * already percent-encodes braces so a post-encoded value CAN NOT\n * re-expand.\n */\nconst ADCP_MACRO_PATTERN = /\\{[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*\\}/;\n\nexport class MacroInRawValueError extends Error {\n  readonly raw_value: string;\n  readonly matched_macro: string;\n  constructor(raw_value: string, matched_macro: string) {\n    super(\n      `Raw catalog value contains AdCP macro token ${matched_macro} — ` +\n        `reject at ingest or accept the risk of second-round expansion in consumers that re-scan rendered output.`\n    );\n    this.name = 'MacroInRawValueError';\n    this.raw_value = raw_value;\n    this.matched_macro = matched_macro;\n  }\n}\n\nexport class SubstitutionEncoder {\n  /**\n   * Strict RFC 3986 unreserved-whitelist percent-encoder. Only\n   * `ALPHA / DIGIT / \"-\" / \".\" / \"_\" / \"~\"` pass through; every other\n   * byte is UTF-8 + percent-encoded with uppercase hex digits.\n   *\n   * The behavior intentionally differs from `encodeURIComponent`, which\n   * leaves `( ) * !` unescaped — those are sub-delims, not unreserved,\n   * and leaving them raw fails the `url-scheme-injection-neutralized`\n   * vector when a value like `javascript:alert(0)` substitutes into an\n   * `href`-whole-value position.\n   */\n  encode_for_url_context(raw_value: string): string {\n    return encodeUnreserved(raw_value);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Throw if `raw_value` contains an AdCP macro token. The encoder\n   * output is already safe from second-round expansion (braces become\n   * `%7B` / `%7D`), so this is a defensive check for sellers who want\n   * to fail-fast at catalog ingest rather than let suspicious values\n   * propagate. Opt-in; callers that omit it accept the canonical\n   * encode-and-move-on behavior shown by\n   * `nested-expansion-preserved-as-literal`.\n   */\n  reject_if_contains_macro(raw_value: string): void {\n    const match = raw_value.match(ADCP_MACRO_PATTERN);\n    if (match) {\n      throw new MacroInRawValueError(raw_value, match[0]);\n    }\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAgBA,SAAS,wBAAwB;AAUjC,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAEpB,MAAM,6BAA6B,MAAM;AAAA,EACrC;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACT,YAAY,WAAmB,eAAuB;AACpD;AAAA,MACE,+CAA+C,aAAa;AAAA,IAE9D;AACA,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,YAAY;AACjB,SAAK,gBAAgB;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAEO,MAAM,oBAAoB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAY/B,uBAAuB,WAA2B;AAChD,WAAO,iBAAiB,SAAS;AAAA,EACnC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAWA,yBAAyB,WAAyB;AAChD,UAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,MAAM,kBAAkB;AAChD,QAAI,OAAO;AACT,YAAM,IAAI,qBAAqB,WAAW,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/substitution/encoder/index.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { SubstitutionEncoder, MacroInRawValueError } from "./SubstitutionEncoder.mjs";
 export {
   MacroInRawValueError,

package/dist/lib/substitution/encoder/index.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/substitution/encoder/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export { SubstitutionEncoder, MacroInRawValueError } from './SubstitutionEncoder';\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAAA,SAAS,qBAAqB,4BAA4B;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/substitution/encoder/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["export { SubstitutionEncoder, MacroInRawValueError } from './SubstitutionEncoder';\n"],"mappings":"AAAA,SAAS,qBAAqB,4BAA4B;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/substitution/index.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { SubstitutionObserver, PreviewFetchError } from "./observer/SubstitutionObserver.mjs";
 import { SubstitutionEncoder, MacroInRawValueError } from "./encoder/SubstitutionEncoder.mjs";
 import { CATALOG_MACRO_VECTORS, getCatalogMacroVector } from "./vectors.mjs";

package/dist/lib/substitution/index.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/substitution/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Catalog-item macro substitution primitives — paired observer and\n * encoder surfaces implementing the `substitution-observer-runner`\n * test-kit contract and the #2620 encoding rule.\n *\n * Two disjoint consumer classes:\n *\n *   - Runners grading conformance import from `./observer` (or the\n *     re-exports here) for `parse_html`, `fetch_and_parse`,\n *     `match_bindings`, and the assertion helpers.\n *\n *   - Sales/retail-media agents implementing the #2620 rule import\n *     `SubstitutionEncoder` from `./encoder`. It produces the exact\n *     bytes the observer expects — one shared RFC 3986 implementation\n *     means one bug-fix path for both directions.\n *\n * ```ts\n * // Seller-side\n * import { SubstitutionEncoder } from '@adcp/sdk/substitution';\n * const safe = new SubstitutionEncoder().encode_for_url_context(raw);\n *\n * // Runner-side\n * import { SubstitutionObserver, CATALOG_MACRO_VECTORS } from '@adcp/sdk/substitution';\n * const observer = new SubstitutionObserver();\n * const matches = observer.match_bindings(observer.parse_html(html), template, bindings);\n * ```\n */\n\nexport { SubstitutionObserver, PreviewFetchError } from './observer/SubstitutionObserver';\nexport type { ObserverFetchOptions, ObserverDispatcher } from './observer/SubstitutionObserver';\n\nexport { SubstitutionEncoder, MacroInRawValueError } from './encoder/SubstitutionEncoder';\n\nexport { CATALOG_MACRO_VECTORS, getCatalogMacroVector } from './vectors';\nexport type { CatalogMacroVectorName } from './vectors';\n\nexport {\n  extractTrackerUrls,\n  matchBindings,\n  assertNoNestedExpansion,\n  assertRfc3986Safe,\n  assertSchemePreserved,\n  assertUnreservedOnly,\n  DEFAULT_MACRO_PROHIBITED_PATTERN,\n  enforceSsrfPolicy,\n  enforceSsrfPolicyResolved,\n  DEFAULT_SSRF_POLICY,\n} from './observer';\n\nexport { encodeUnreserved, equalUnderHexCasePolicy, isUnreservedOnly, divergenceOffset } from './rfc3986';\n\nexport type {\n  AssertionOptions,\n  AssertionResult,\n  BindingMatch,\n  CatalogBinding,\n  CatalogMacroVector,\n  PolicyResult,\n  SsrfPolicy,\n  TrackerUrlRecord,\n} from './types';\n\nexport { translateUniversalMacros } from './translate';\nexport type { MacroMapping, TranslateResult } from './translate';\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AA4BA,SAAS,sBAAsB,yBAAyB;AAGxD,SAAS,qBAAqB,4BAA4B;AAE1D,SAAS,uBAAuB,6BAA6B;AAG7D;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OACK;AAEP,SAAS,kBAAkB,yBAAyB,kBAAkB,wBAAwB;AAa9F,SAAS,gCAAgC;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../src/lib/substitution/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Catalog-item macro substitution primitives — paired observer and\n * encoder surfaces implementing the `substitution-observer-runner`\n * test-kit contract and the #2620 encoding rule.\n *\n * Two disjoint consumer classes:\n *\n *   - Runners grading conformance import from `./observer` (or the\n *     re-exports here) for `parse_html`, `fetch_and_parse`,\n *     `match_bindings`, and the assertion helpers.\n *\n *   - Sales/retail-media agents implementing the #2620 rule import\n *     `SubstitutionEncoder` from `./encoder`. It produces the exact\n *     bytes the observer expects — one shared RFC 3986 implementation\n *     means one bug-fix path for both directions.\n *\n * ```ts\n * // Seller-side\n * import { SubstitutionEncoder } from '@adcp/sdk/substitution';\n * const safe = new SubstitutionEncoder().encode_for_url_context(raw);\n *\n * // Runner-side\n * import { SubstitutionObserver, CATALOG_MACRO_VECTORS } from '@adcp/sdk/substitution';\n * const observer = new SubstitutionObserver();\n * const matches = observer.match_bindings(observer.parse_html(html), template, bindings);\n * ```\n */\n\nexport { SubstitutionObserver, PreviewFetchError } from './observer/SubstitutionObserver';\nexport type { ObserverFetchOptions, ObserverDispatcher } from './observer/SubstitutionObserver';\n\nexport { SubstitutionEncoder, MacroInRawValueError } from './encoder/SubstitutionEncoder';\n\nexport { CATALOG_MACRO_VECTORS, getCatalogMacroVector } from './vectors';\nexport type { CatalogMacroVectorName } from './vectors';\n\nexport {\n  extractTrackerUrls,\n  matchBindings,\n  assertNoNestedExpansion,\n  assertRfc3986Safe,\n  assertSchemePreserved,\n  assertUnreservedOnly,\n  DEFAULT_MACRO_PROHIBITED_PATTERN,\n  enforceSsrfPolicy,\n  enforceSsrfPolicyResolved,\n  DEFAULT_SSRF_POLICY,\n} from './observer';\n\nexport { encodeUnreserved, equalUnderHexCasePolicy, isUnreservedOnly, divergenceOffset } from './rfc3986';\n\nexport type {\n  AssertionOptions,\n  AssertionResult,\n  BindingMatch,\n  CatalogBinding,\n  CatalogMacroVector,\n  PolicyResult,\n  SsrfPolicy,\n  TrackerUrlRecord,\n} from './types';\n\nexport { translateUniversalMacros } from './translate';\nexport type { MacroMapping, TranslateResult } from './translate';\n"],"mappings":"AA4BA,SAAS,sBAAsB,yBAAyB;AAGxD,SAAS,qBAAqB,4BAA4B;AAE1D,SAAS,uBAAuB,6BAA6B;AAG7D;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OACK;AAEP,SAAS,kBAAkB,yBAAyB,kBAAkB,wBAAwB;AAa9F,SAAS,gCAAgC;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/substitution/observer/SubstitutionObserver.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import dns from "node:dns/promises";
 import { isIP, isIPv6 } from "node:net";
 import { extractTrackerUrls } from "./html-parser.mjs";

package/dist/lib/substitution/observer/SubstitutionObserver.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/substitution/observer/SubstitutionObserver.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Runner-side primitives for observing catalog-item macro substitution\n * in creative previews. Consumed by conformance runners grading the\n * `substitution-observer-runner` test-kit contract.\n *\n * Usage — inline HTML observation:\n * ```ts\n * const observer = new SubstitutionObserver();\n * const records = observer.parse_html(preview_html);\n * const matches = observer.match_bindings(records, template, bindings);\n * for (const m of matches) {\n *   const r = observer.assert_rfc3986_safe(m);\n *   if (!r.ok) report(r);\n * }\n * ```\n *\n * Usage — preview URL fetch (applies SSRF policy):\n * ```ts\n * const records = await observer.fetch_and_parse(new URL(preview_url));\n * ```\n */\n\nimport dns from 'node:dns/promises';\nimport { isIP, isIPv6 } from 'node:net';\n\nimport type {\n  AssertionOptions,\n  AssertionResult,\n  BindingMatch,\n  CatalogBinding,\n  PolicyResult,\n  SsrfPolicy,\n  TrackerUrlRecord,\n} from '../types';\nimport { extractTrackerUrls } from './html-parser';\nimport { matchBindings } from './alignment';\nimport {\n  DEFAULT_MACRO_PROHIBITED_PATTERN,\n  assertNoNestedExpansion,\n  assertRfc3986Safe,\n  assertSchemePreserved,\n  assertUnreservedOnly,\n} from './assertions';\nimport { DEFAULT_SSRF_POLICY, enforceSsrfPolicy, enforceSsrfPolicyResolved } from './ssrf';\n\n/**\n * Opaque dispatcher type — keeps `undici`'s type out of the public\n * surface. Callers constructing a dispatcher hand us the instance; we\n * pass it through to `undici.request` untouched.\n */\nexport type ObserverDispatcher = object;\n\n/**\n * Fetch knobs mirror the contract's `url_fetch.runner_config.fetch` block.\n * Callers SHOULD keep the defaults for AdCP Verified grading.\n */\nexport interface ObserverFetchOptions {\n  /** Max body bytes to read before aborting. Default 262144 (256 KiB). */\n  max_body_bytes?: number;\n  /** Connect-timeout in seconds. Default 3. */\n  max_connect_seconds?: number;\n  /** Overall request timeout in seconds. Default 10. */\n  timeout_seconds?: number;\n  /** Acceptable response content-types. Default: `text/html`, `application/xhtml+xml`. */\n  required_content_types?: readonly string[];\n  /** SSRF policy to enforce. Default: {@link DEFAULT_SSRF_POLICY}. */\n  ssrf_policy?: SsrfPolicy;\n  /**\n   * Custom undici dispatcher. Advanced callers inject here to plug in\n   * a mock or a pre-pinned Agent. When omitted, the observer\n   * constructs an `Agent` with `connect.lookup` pinned to the first\n   * policy-allowed DNS address — this is the defense the contract's\n   * `dns_revalidation: required` clause mandates.\n   */\n  dispatcher?: ObserverDispatcher;\n}\n\nexport class PreviewFetchError extends Error {\n  readonly sub_reason:\n    | 'http_status'\n    | 'content_type'\n    | 'size_exceeded'\n    | 'redirect_returned'\n    | 'ssrf_blocked'\n    | 'fetch_timeout';\n  readonly detail: string;\n  constructor(sub_reason: PreviewFetchError['sub_reason'], detail: string) {\n    super(`preview_url_unusable:${sub_reason} — ${detail}`);\n    this.name = 'PreviewFetchError';\n    this.sub_reason = sub_reason;\n    this.detail = detail;\n  }\n}\n\nexport class SubstitutionObserver {\n  /**\n   * Parse inline preview HTML and return tracker URLs from the\n   * contract's normative tag/attribute set. URLs that fail WHATWG URL\n   * parsing are skipped silently — a downstream binding that expected\n   * them surfaces as `substitution_binding_missing`.\n   */\n  parse_html(html: string): TrackerUrlRecord[] {\n    return extractTrackerUrls(html);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Fetch `preview_url` under the SSRF policy, validate response\n   * shape, and parse the body. Redirects are treated as failure\n   * (policy: `follow_redirects: false`). The body is capped at\n   * `max_body_bytes` bytes — exceeding the cap yields a\n   * `size_exceeded` failure rather than a truncated parse.\n   *\n   * Throws {@link PreviewFetchError} on any fetch-layer failure so the\n   * runner can map the sub-reason to the contract's\n   * `preview_url_unusable_sub_reasons` vocabulary.\n   */\n  async fetch_and_parse(url: URL, options: ObserverFetchOptions = {}): Promise<TrackerUrlRecord[]> {\n    const policy = options.ssrf_policy ?? DEFAULT_SSRF_POLICY;\n    const maxBodyBytes = options.max_body_bytes ?? 262_144;\n    const connectTimeoutMs = (options.max_connect_seconds ?? 3) * 1000;\n    const timeoutMs = (options.timeout_seconds ?? 10) * 1000;\n    const allowedContentTypes = options.required_content_types ?? ['text/html', 'application/xhtml+xml'];\n\n    const presync = enforceSsrfPolicy(url, policy);\n    if (!presync.allowed) {\n      throw new PreviewFetchError('ssrf_blocked', presync.rule ?? 'unknown_rule');\n    }\n\n    // Every non-IP host path requires DNS revalidation — never pass a\n    // hostname to the HTTP client without re-checking resolved addresses.\n    const bareHost = unwrapHost(url.hostname);\n    const isBareIp = isIP(bareHost) !== 0;\n    let pinnedAddress: string | null = isBareIp ? bareHost : null;\n\n    if (!isBareIp) {\n      let addresses: string[] = [];\n      try {\n        const lookup = await dns.lookup(url.hostname, { all: true, verbatim: true });\n        addresses = lookup.map(entry => entry.address);\n      } catch (e) {\n        throw new PreviewFetchError('fetch_timeout', `DNS lookup failed: ${(e as Error).message}`);\n      }\n      const resolvedCheck = enforceSsrfPolicyResolved(url, addresses, policy);\n      if (!resolvedCheck.allowed) {\n        throw new PreviewFetchError('ssrf_blocked', resolvedCheck.rule ?? 'unknown_rule');\n      }\n      pinnedAddress = addresses[0] ?? null;\n    }\n\n    const { request, Agent } = await loadUndici();\n\n    // Pin to the already-policy-checked address. Providing `connect.lookup`\n    // makes undici resolve through our callback instead of invoking the OS\n    // resolver a second time — closes the DNS-rebinding window between\n    // our `dns.lookup` above and the TCP connect below. If the caller\n    // injected a dispatcher, trust their pinning.\n    const ownsDispatcher = !options.dispatcher;\n    const dispatcher: ObserverDispatcher =\n      options.dispatcher ??\n      new Agent({\n        connect: {\n          timeout: connectTimeoutMs,\n          ...(pinnedAddress\n            ? {\n                lookup: (\n                  _host: string,\n                  _opts: unknown,\n                  cb: (err: Error | null, address: string, family: number) => void\n                ) => cb(null, pinnedAddress, isIPv6(pinnedAddress) ? 6 : 4),\n              }\n            : {}),\n        },\n        bodyTimeout: timeoutMs,\n        headersTimeout: timeoutMs,\n      });\n\n    const abortCtrl = new AbortController();\n    const timerHandle = setTimeout(() => {\n      abortCtrl.abort(new Error('preview fetch timeout'));\n    }, timeoutMs);\n    // Allow Node to exit even if the timer is still scheduled — a\n    // stranded observer shouldn't keep the process alive.\n    timerHandle.unref?.();\n\n    try {\n      const res = await request(url.href, {\n        method: 'GET',\n        dispatcher: dispatcher as import('undici').Dispatcher,\n        maxRedirections: 0,\n        signal: abortCtrl.signal,\n        headers: { accept: allowedContentTypes.join(', ') },\n      });\n\n      if (res.statusCode >= 300 && res.statusCode < 400) {\n        throw new PreviewFetchError('redirect_returned', `status=${res.statusCode}`);\n      }\n      if (res.statusCode < 200 || res.statusCode >= 300) {\n        throw new PreviewFetchError('http_status', `status=${res.statusCode}`);\n      }\n      const contentType = (String(res.headers['content-type'] ?? '').split(';')[0] ?? '').trim().toLowerCase();\n      if (!allowedContentTypes.includes(contentType)) {\n        throw new PreviewFetchError('content_type', `content-type=${contentType || 'missing'}`);\n      }\n\n      const body = await readCapped(res.body, maxBodyBytes);\n      return extractTrackerUrls(body);\n    } catch (e) {\n      if (e instanceof PreviewFetchError) throw e;\n      if ((e as Error).name === 'AbortError') {\n        throw new PreviewFetchError('fetch_timeout', `exceeded ${timeoutMs}ms`);\n      }\n      throw new PreviewFetchError('fetch_timeout', (e as Error).message);\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(timerHandle);\n      abortCtrl.abort();\n      if (ownsDispatcher) {\n        const closable = dispatcher as { close?: () => Promise<void> };\n        try {\n          await closable.close?.();\n        } catch {\n          // Ignore — best-effort cleanup.\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** See {@link matchBindings}. */\n  match_bindings(\n    records: readonly TrackerUrlRecord[],\n    template: URL | string,\n    bindings: readonly CatalogBinding[]\n  ): BindingMatch[] {\n    return matchBindings(records, template, bindings);\n  }\n\n  /** See {@link assertRfc3986Safe}. */\n  assert_rfc3986_safe(match: BindingMatch, options: AssertionOptions = {}): AssertionResult {\n    return assertRfc3986Safe(match, options);\n  }\n\n  /** See {@link assertUnreservedOnly}. */\n  assert_unreserved_only(match: BindingMatch, options: AssertionOptions = {}): AssertionResult {\n    return assertUnreservedOnly(match, options);\n  }\n\n  /** See {@link assertNoNestedExpansion}. */\n  assert_no_nested_expansion(\n    match: BindingMatch,\n    prohibited_pattern: RegExp = DEFAULT_MACRO_PROHIBITED_PATTERN,\n    options: AssertionOptions = {}\n  ): AssertionResult {\n    return assertNoNestedExpansion(match, prohibited_pattern, options);\n  }\n\n  /** See {@link assertSchemePreserved}. */\n  assert_scheme_preserved(match: BindingMatch, template_scheme: string): AssertionResult {\n    return assertSchemePreserved(match, template_scheme);\n  }\n\n  /** See {@link enforceSsrfPolicy}. */\n  enforce_ssrf_policy(url: URL, policy: SsrfPolicy = DEFAULT_SSRF_POLICY): PolicyResult {\n    return enforceSsrfPolicy(url, policy);\n  }\n}\n\nfunction unwrapHost(host: string): string {\n  return host.startsWith('[') && host.endsWith(']') ? host.slice(1, -1) : host;\n}\n\nasync function readCapped(body: NodeJS.ReadableStream, capBytes: number): Promise<string> {\n  const chunks: Buffer[] = [];\n  let total = 0;\n  for await (const chunk of body as AsyncIterable<Buffer | string>) {\n    const buf = typeof chunk === 'string' ? Buffer.from(chunk, 'utf8') : chunk;\n    total += buf.length;\n    if (total > capBytes) {\n      throw new PreviewFetchError('size_exceeded', `>${capBytes} bytes`);\n    }\n    chunks.push(buf);\n  }\n  return Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8');\n}\n\nlet undiciModule: typeof import('undici') | undefined;\nasync function loadUndici(): Promise<typeof import('undici')> {\n  if (!undiciModule) {\n    undiciModule = await import('undici');\n  }\n  return undiciModule;\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;AAsBA,OAAO,SAAS;AAChB,SAAS,MAAM,cAAc;AAW7B,SAAS,0BAA0B;AACnC,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAC9B;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OACK;AACP,SAAS,qBAAqB,mBAAmB,iCAAiC;AAkC3E,MAAM,0BAA0B,MAAM;AAAA,EAClC;AAAA,EAOA;AAAA,EACT,YAAY,YAA6C,QAAgB;AACvE,UAAM,wBAAwB,UAAU,WAAM,MAAM,EAAE;AACtD,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,aAAa;AAClB,SAAK,SAAS;AAAA,EAChB;AACF;AAEO,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOhC,WAAW,MAAkC;AAC3C,WAAO,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAAA,EAChC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAaA,MAAM,gBAAgB,KAAU,UAAgC,CAAC,GAAgC;AAC/F,UAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,eAAe;AACtC,UAAM,eAAe,QAAQ,kBAAkB;AAC/C,UAAM,oBAAoB,QAAQ,uBAAuB,KAAK;AAC9D,UAAM,aAAa,QAAQ,mBAAmB,MAAM;AACpD,UAAM,sBAAsB,QAAQ,0BAA0B,CAAC,aAAa,uBAAuB;AAEnG,UAAM,UAAU,kBAAkB,KAAK,MAAM;AAC7C,QAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS;AACpB,YAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,gBAAgB,QAAQ,QAAQ,cAAc;AAAA,IAC5E;AAIA,UAAM,WAAW,WAAW,IAAI,QAAQ;AACxC,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM;AACpC,QAAI,gBAA+B,WAAW,WAAW;AAEzD,QAAI,CAAC,UAAU;AACb,UAAI,YAAsB,CAAC;AAC3B,UAAI;AACF,cAAM,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,CAAC;AAC3E,oBAAY,OAAO,IAAI,WAAS,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MAC/C,SAAS,GAAG;AACV,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,iBAAiB,sBAAuB,EAAY,OAAO,EAAE;AAAA,MAC3F;AACA,YAAM,gBAAgB,0BAA0B,KAAK,WAAW,MAAM;AACtE,UAAI,CAAC,cAAc,SAAS;AAC1B,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,gBAAgB,cAAc,QAAQ,cAAc;AAAA,MAClF;AACA,sBAAgB,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;AAAA,IAClC;AAEA,UAAM,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,WAAW;AAO5C,UAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC,QAAQ;AAChC,UAAM,aACJ,QAAQ,cACR,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,MACR,SAAS;AAAA,QACP,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,GAAI,gBACA;AAAA,UACE,QAAQ,CACN,OACA,OACA,OACG,GAAG,MAAM,eAAe,OAAO,aAAa,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,QAC5D,IACA,CAAC;AAAA,MACP;AAAA,MACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACb,gBAAgB;AAAA,IAClB,CAAC;AAEH,UAAM,YAAY,IAAI,gBAAgB;AACtC,UAAM,cAAc,WAAW,MAAM;AACnC,gBAAU,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAAA,IACpD,GAAG,SAAS;AAGZ,gBAAY,QAAQ;AAEpB,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,QAClC,QAAQ;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA,iBAAiB;AAAA,QACjB,QAAQ,UAAU;AAAA,QAClB,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,oBAAoB,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,MACpD,CAAC;AAED,UAAI,IAAI,cAAc,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,KAAK;AACjD,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,qBAAqB,UAAU,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,MAC7E;AACA,UAAI,IAAI,aAAa,OAAO,IAAI,cAAc,KAAK;AACjD,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,eAAe,UAAU,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,MACvE;AACA,YAAM,eAAe,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,cAAc,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY;AACvG,UAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,SAAS,WAAW,GAAG;AAC9C,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,eAAe,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,MACxF;AAEA,YAAM,OAAO,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,YAAY;AACpD,aAAO,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAAA,IAChC,SAAS,GAAG;AACV,UAAI,aAAa,kBAAmB,OAAM;AAC1C,UAAK,EAAY,SAAS,cAAc;AACtC,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,iBAAiB,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,MACxE;AACA,YAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,iBAAkB,EAAY,OAAO;AAAA,IACnE,UAAE;AACA,mBAAa,WAAW;AACxB,gBAAU,MAAM;AAChB,UAAI,gBAAgB;AAClB,cAAM,WAAW;AACjB,YAAI;AACF,gBAAM,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,QACzB,QAAQ;AAAA,QAER;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,eACE,SACA,UACA,UACgB;AAChB,WAAO,cAAc,SAAS,UAAU,QAAQ;AAAA,EAClD;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,oBAAoB,OAAqB,UAA4B,CAAC,GAAoB;AACxF,WAAO,kBAAkB,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,EACzC;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,uBAAuB,OAAqB,UAA4B,CAAC,GAAoB;AAC3F,WAAO,qBAAqB,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,EAC5C;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,2BACE,OACA,qBAA6B,kCAC7B,UAA4B,CAAC,GACZ;AACjB,WAAO,wBAAwB,OAAO,oBAAoB,OAAO;AAAA,EACnE;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,wBAAwB,OAAqB,iBAA0C;AACrF,WAAO,sBAAsB,OAAO,eAAe;AAAA,EACrD;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,oBAAoB,KAAU,SAAqB,qBAAmC;AACpF,WAAO,kBAAkB,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,EACtC;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,WAAW,MAAsB;AACxC,SAAO,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI;AAC1E;AAEA,eAAe,WAAW,MAA6B,UAAmC;AACxF,QAAM,SAAmB,CAAC;AAC1B,MAAI,QAAQ;AACZ,mBAAiB,SAAS,MAAwC;AAChE,UAAM,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;AACrE,aAAS,IAAI;AACb,QAAI,QAAQ,UAAU;AACpB,YAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,IACnE;AACA,WAAO,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,EACjB;AACA,SAAO,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM;AAC9C;AAEA,IAAI;AACJ,eAAe,aAA+C;AAC5D,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc;AACjB,mBAAe,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;AAAA,EACtC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/substitution/observer/SubstitutionObserver.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Runner-side primitives for observing catalog-item macro substitution\n * in creative previews. Consumed by conformance runners grading the\n * `substitution-observer-runner` test-kit contract.\n *\n * Usage — inline HTML observation:\n * ```ts\n * const observer = new SubstitutionObserver();\n * const records = observer.parse_html(preview_html);\n * const matches = observer.match_bindings(records, template, bindings);\n * for (const m of matches) {\n *   const r = observer.assert_rfc3986_safe(m);\n *   if (!r.ok) report(r);\n * }\n * ```\n *\n * Usage — preview URL fetch (applies SSRF policy):\n * ```ts\n * const records = await observer.fetch_and_parse(new URL(preview_url));\n * ```\n */\n\nimport dns from 'node:dns/promises';\nimport { isIP, isIPv6 } from 'node:net';\n\nimport type {\n  AssertionOptions,\n  AssertionResult,\n  BindingMatch,\n  CatalogBinding,\n  PolicyResult,\n  SsrfPolicy,\n  TrackerUrlRecord,\n} from '../types';\nimport { extractTrackerUrls } from './html-parser';\nimport { matchBindings } from './alignment';\nimport {\n  DEFAULT_MACRO_PROHIBITED_PATTERN,\n  assertNoNestedExpansion,\n  assertRfc3986Safe,\n  assertSchemePreserved,\n  assertUnreservedOnly,\n} from './assertions';\nimport { DEFAULT_SSRF_POLICY, enforceSsrfPolicy, enforceSsrfPolicyResolved } from './ssrf';\n\n/**\n * Opaque dispatcher type — keeps `undici`'s type out of the public\n * surface. Callers constructing a dispatcher hand us the instance; we\n * pass it through to `undici.request` untouched.\n */\nexport type ObserverDispatcher = object;\n\n/**\n * Fetch knobs mirror the contract's `url_fetch.runner_config.fetch` block.\n * Callers SHOULD keep the defaults for AdCP Verified grading.\n */\nexport interface ObserverFetchOptions {\n  /** Max body bytes to read before aborting. Default 262144 (256 KiB). */\n  max_body_bytes?: number;\n  /** Connect-timeout in seconds. Default 3. */\n  max_connect_seconds?: number;\n  /** Overall request timeout in seconds. Default 10. */\n  timeout_seconds?: number;\n  /** Acceptable response content-types. Default: `text/html`, `application/xhtml+xml`. */\n  required_content_types?: readonly string[];\n  /** SSRF policy to enforce. Default: {@link DEFAULT_SSRF_POLICY}. */\n  ssrf_policy?: SsrfPolicy;\n  /**\n   * Custom undici dispatcher. Advanced callers inject here to plug in\n   * a mock or a pre-pinned Agent. When omitted, the observer\n   * constructs an `Agent` with `connect.lookup` pinned to the first\n   * policy-allowed DNS address — this is the defense the contract's\n   * `dns_revalidation: required` clause mandates.\n   */\n  dispatcher?: ObserverDispatcher;\n}\n\nexport class PreviewFetchError extends Error {\n  readonly sub_reason:\n    | 'http_status'\n    | 'content_type'\n    | 'size_exceeded'\n    | 'redirect_returned'\n    | 'ssrf_blocked'\n    | 'fetch_timeout';\n  readonly detail: string;\n  constructor(sub_reason: PreviewFetchError['sub_reason'], detail: string) {\n    super(`preview_url_unusable:${sub_reason} — ${detail}`);\n    this.name = 'PreviewFetchError';\n    this.sub_reason = sub_reason;\n    this.detail = detail;\n  }\n}\n\nexport class SubstitutionObserver {\n  /**\n   * Parse inline preview HTML and return tracker URLs from the\n   * contract's normative tag/attribute set. URLs that fail WHATWG URL\n   * parsing are skipped silently — a downstream binding that expected\n   * them surfaces as `substitution_binding_missing`.\n   */\n  parse_html(html: string): TrackerUrlRecord[] {\n    return extractTrackerUrls(html);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Fetch `preview_url` under the SSRF policy, validate response\n   * shape, and parse the body. Redirects are treated as failure\n   * (policy: `follow_redirects: false`). The body is capped at\n   * `max_body_bytes` bytes — exceeding the cap yields a\n   * `size_exceeded` failure rather than a truncated parse.\n   *\n   * Throws {@link PreviewFetchError} on any fetch-layer failure so the\n   * runner can map the sub-reason to the contract's\n   * `preview_url_unusable_sub_reasons` vocabulary.\n   */\n  async fetch_and_parse(url: URL, options: ObserverFetchOptions = {}): Promise<TrackerUrlRecord[]> {\n    const policy = options.ssrf_policy ?? DEFAULT_SSRF_POLICY;\n    const maxBodyBytes = options.max_body_bytes ?? 262_144;\n    const connectTimeoutMs = (options.max_connect_seconds ?? 3) * 1000;\n    const timeoutMs = (options.timeout_seconds ?? 10) * 1000;\n    const allowedContentTypes = options.required_content_types ?? ['text/html', 'application/xhtml+xml'];\n\n    const presync = enforceSsrfPolicy(url, policy);\n    if (!presync.allowed) {\n      throw new PreviewFetchError('ssrf_blocked', presync.rule ?? 'unknown_rule');\n    }\n\n    // Every non-IP host path requires DNS revalidation — never pass a\n    // hostname to the HTTP client without re-checking resolved addresses.\n    const bareHost = unwrapHost(url.hostname);\n    const isBareIp = isIP(bareHost) !== 0;\n    let pinnedAddress: string | null = isBareIp ? bareHost : null;\n\n    if (!isBareIp) {\n      let addresses: string[] = [];\n      try {\n        const lookup = await dns.lookup(url.hostname, { all: true, verbatim: true });\n        addresses = lookup.map(entry => entry.address);\n      } catch (e) {\n        throw new PreviewFetchError('fetch_timeout', `DNS lookup failed: ${(e as Error).message}`);\n      }\n      const resolvedCheck = enforceSsrfPolicyResolved(url, addresses, policy);\n      if (!resolvedCheck.allowed) {\n        throw new PreviewFetchError('ssrf_blocked', resolvedCheck.rule ?? 'unknown_rule');\n      }\n      pinnedAddress = addresses[0] ?? null;\n    }\n\n    const { request, Agent } = await loadUndici();\n\n    // Pin to the already-policy-checked address. Providing `connect.lookup`\n    // makes undici resolve through our callback instead of invoking the OS\n    // resolver a second time — closes the DNS-rebinding window between\n    // our `dns.lookup` above and the TCP connect below. If the caller\n    // injected a dispatcher, trust their pinning.\n    const ownsDispatcher = !options.dispatcher;\n    const dispatcher: ObserverDispatcher =\n      options.dispatcher ??\n      new Agent({\n        connect: {\n          timeout: connectTimeoutMs,\n          ...(pinnedAddress\n            ? {\n                lookup: (\n                  _host: string,\n                  _opts: unknown,\n                  cb: (err: Error | null, address: string, family: number) => void\n                ) => cb(null, pinnedAddress, isIPv6(pinnedAddress) ? 6 : 4),\n              }\n            : {}),\n        },\n        bodyTimeout: timeoutMs,\n        headersTimeout: timeoutMs,\n      });\n\n    const abortCtrl = new AbortController();\n    const timerHandle = setTimeout(() => {\n      abortCtrl.abort(new Error('preview fetch timeout'));\n    }, timeoutMs);\n    // Allow Node to exit even if the timer is still scheduled — a\n    // stranded observer shouldn't keep the process alive.\n    timerHandle.unref?.();\n\n    try {\n      const res = await request(url.href, {\n        method: 'GET',\n        dispatcher: dispatcher as import('undici').Dispatcher,\n        maxRedirections: 0,\n        signal: abortCtrl.signal,\n        headers: { accept: allowedContentTypes.join(', ') },\n      });\n\n      if (res.statusCode >= 300 && res.statusCode < 400) {\n        throw new PreviewFetchError('redirect_returned', `status=${res.statusCode}`);\n      }\n      if (res.statusCode < 200 || res.statusCode >= 300) {\n        throw new PreviewFetchError('http_status', `status=${res.statusCode}`);\n      }\n      const contentType = (String(res.headers['content-type'] ?? '').split(';')[0] ?? '').trim().toLowerCase();\n      if (!allowedContentTypes.includes(contentType)) {\n        throw new PreviewFetchError('content_type', `content-type=${contentType || 'missing'}`);\n      }\n\n      const body = await readCapped(res.body, maxBodyBytes);\n      return extractTrackerUrls(body);\n    } catch (e) {\n      if (e instanceof PreviewFetchError) throw e;\n      if ((e as Error).name === 'AbortError') {\n        throw new PreviewFetchError('fetch_timeout', `exceeded ${timeoutMs}ms`);\n      }\n      throw new PreviewFetchError('fetch_timeout', (e as Error).message);\n    } finally {\n      clearTimeout(timerHandle);\n      abortCtrl.abort();\n      if (ownsDispatcher) {\n        const closable = dispatcher as { close?: () => Promise<void> };\n        try {\n          await closable.close?.();\n        } catch {\n          // Ignore — best-effort cleanup.\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** See {@link matchBindings}. */\n  match_bindings(\n    records: readonly TrackerUrlRecord[],\n    template: URL | string,\n    bindings: readonly CatalogBinding[]\n  ): BindingMatch[] {\n    return matchBindings(records, template, bindings);\n  }\n\n  /** See {@link assertRfc3986Safe}. */\n  assert_rfc3986_safe(match: BindingMatch, options: AssertionOptions = {}): AssertionResult {\n    return assertRfc3986Safe(match, options);\n  }\n\n  /** See {@link assertUnreservedOnly}. */\n  assert_unreserved_only(match: BindingMatch, options: AssertionOptions = {}): AssertionResult {\n    return assertUnreservedOnly(match, options);\n  }\n\n  /** See {@link assertNoNestedExpansion}. */\n  assert_no_nested_expansion(\n    match: BindingMatch,\n    prohibited_pattern: RegExp = DEFAULT_MACRO_PROHIBITED_PATTERN,\n    options: AssertionOptions = {}\n  ): AssertionResult {\n    return assertNoNestedExpansion(match, prohibited_pattern, options);\n  }\n\n  /** See {@link assertSchemePreserved}. */\n  assert_scheme_preserved(match: BindingMatch, template_scheme: string): AssertionResult {\n    return assertSchemePreserved(match, template_scheme);\n  }\n\n  /** See {@link enforceSsrfPolicy}. */\n  enforce_ssrf_policy(url: URL, policy: SsrfPolicy = DEFAULT_SSRF_POLICY): PolicyResult {\n    return enforceSsrfPolicy(url, policy);\n  }\n}\n\nfunction unwrapHost(host: string): string {\n  return host.startsWith('[') && host.endsWith(']') ? host.slice(1, -1) : host;\n}\n\nasync function readCapped(body: NodeJS.ReadableStream, capBytes: number): Promise<string> {\n  const chunks: Buffer[] = [];\n  let total = 0;\n  for await (const chunk of body as AsyncIterable<Buffer | string>) {\n    const buf = typeof chunk === 'string' ? Buffer.from(chunk, 'utf8') : chunk;\n    total += buf.length;\n    if (total > capBytes) {\n      throw new PreviewFetchError('size_exceeded', `>${capBytes} bytes`);\n    }\n    chunks.push(buf);\n  }\n  return Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8');\n}\n\nlet undiciModule: typeof import('undici') | undefined;\nasync function loadUndici(): Promise<typeof import('undici')> {\n  if (!undiciModule) {\n    undiciModule = await import('undici');\n  }\n  return undiciModule;\n}\n"],"mappings":"AAsBA,OAAO,SAAS;AAChB,SAAS,MAAM,cAAc;AAW7B,SAAS,0BAA0B;AACnC,SAAS,qBAAqB;AAC9B;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OACK;AACP,SAAS,qBAAqB,mBAAmB,iCAAiC;AAkC3E,MAAM,0BAA0B,MAAM;AAAA,EAClC;AAAA,EAOA;AAAA,EACT,YAAY,YAA6C,QAAgB;AACvE,UAAM,wBAAwB,UAAU,WAAM,MAAM,EAAE;AACtD,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,aAAa;AAClB,SAAK,SAAS;AAAA,EAChB;AACF;AAEO,MAAM,qBAAqB;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAOhC,WAAW,MAAkC;AAC3C,WAAO,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAAA,EAChC;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAaA,MAAM,gBAAgB,KAAU,UAAgC,CAAC,GAAgC;AAC/F,UAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,eAAe;AACtC,UAAM,eAAe,QAAQ,kBAAkB;AAC/C,UAAM,oBAAoB,QAAQ,uBAAuB,KAAK;AAC9D,UAAM,aAAa,QAAQ,mBAAmB,MAAM;AACpD,UAAM,sBAAsB,QAAQ,0BAA0B,CAAC,aAAa,uBAAuB;AAEnG,UAAM,UAAU,kBAAkB,KAAK,MAAM;AAC7C,QAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS;AACpB,YAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,gBAAgB,QAAQ,QAAQ,cAAc;AAAA,IAC5E;AAIA,UAAM,WAAW,WAAW,IAAI,QAAQ;AACxC,UAAM,WAAW,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM;AACpC,QAAI,gBAA+B,WAAW,WAAW;AAEzD,QAAI,CAAC,UAAU;AACb,UAAI,YAAsB,CAAC;AAC3B,UAAI;AACF,cAAM,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,UAAU,KAAK,CAAC;AAC3E,oBAAY,OAAO,IAAI,WAAS,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MAC/C,SAAS,GAAG;AACV,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,iBAAiB,sBAAuB,EAAY,OAAO,EAAE;AAAA,MAC3F;AACA,YAAM,gBAAgB,0BAA0B,KAAK,WAAW,MAAM;AACtE,UAAI,CAAC,cAAc,SAAS;AAC1B,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,gBAAgB,cAAc,QAAQ,cAAc;AAAA,MAClF;AACA,sBAAgB,UAAU,CAAC,KAAK;AAAA,IAClC;AAEA,UAAM,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,WAAW;AAO5C,UAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC,QAAQ;AAChC,UAAM,aACJ,QAAQ,cACR,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,MACR,SAAS;AAAA,QACP,SAAS;AAAA,QACT,GAAI,gBACA;AAAA,UACE,QAAQ,CACN,OACA,OACA,OACG,GAAG,MAAM,eAAe,OAAO,aAAa,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,QAC5D,IACA,CAAC;AAAA,MACP;AAAA,MACA,aAAa;AAAA,MACb,gBAAgB;AAAA,IAClB,CAAC;AAEH,UAAM,YAAY,IAAI,gBAAgB;AACtC,UAAM,cAAc,WAAW,MAAM;AACnC,gBAAU,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAAA,IACpD,GAAG,SAAS;AAGZ,gBAAY,QAAQ;AAEpB,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,QAClC,QAAQ;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,QACA,iBAAiB;AAAA,QACjB,QAAQ,UAAU;AAAA,QAClB,SAAS,EAAE,QAAQ,oBAAoB,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,MACpD,CAAC;AAED,UAAI,IAAI,cAAc,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,KAAK;AACjD,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,qBAAqB,UAAU,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,MAC7E;AACA,UAAI,IAAI,aAAa,OAAO,IAAI,cAAc,KAAK;AACjD,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,eAAe,UAAU,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,MACvE;AACA,YAAM,eAAe,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,cAAc,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY;AACvG,UAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,SAAS,WAAW,GAAG;AAC9C,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,gBAAgB,gBAAgB,eAAe,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,MACxF;AAEA,YAAM,OAAO,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,YAAY;AACpD,aAAO,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAAA,IAChC,SAAS,GAAG;AACV,UAAI,aAAa,kBAAmB,OAAM;AAC1C,UAAK,EAAY,SAAS,cAAc;AACtC,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,iBAAiB,YAAY,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,MACxE;AACA,YAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,iBAAkB,EAAY,OAAO;AAAA,IACnE,UAAE;AACA,mBAAa,WAAW;AACxB,gBAAU,MAAM;AAChB,UAAI,gBAAgB;AAClB,cAAM,WAAW;AACjB,YAAI;AACF,gBAAM,SAAS,QAAQ;AAAA,QACzB,QAAQ;AAAA,QAER;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,eACE,SACA,UACA,UACgB;AAChB,WAAO,cAAc,SAAS,UAAU,QAAQ;AAAA,EAClD;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,oBAAoB,OAAqB,UAA4B,CAAC,GAAoB;AACxF,WAAO,kBAAkB,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,EACzC;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,uBAAuB,OAAqB,UAA4B,CAAC,GAAoB;AAC3F,WAAO,qBAAqB,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,EAC5C;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,2BACE,OACA,qBAA6B,kCAC7B,UAA4B,CAAC,GACZ;AACjB,WAAO,wBAAwB,OAAO,oBAAoB,OAAO;AAAA,EACnE;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,wBAAwB,OAAqB,iBAA0C;AACrF,WAAO,sBAAsB,OAAO,eAAe;AAAA,EACrD;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,oBAAoB,KAAU,SAAqB,qBAAmC;AACpF,WAAO,kBAAkB,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,EACtC;AACF;AAEA,SAAS,WAAW,MAAsB;AACxC,SAAO,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI;AAC1E;AAEA,eAAe,WAAW,MAA6B,UAAmC;AACxF,QAAM,SAAmB,CAAC;AAC1B,MAAI,QAAQ;AACZ,mBAAiB,SAAS,MAAwC;AAChE,UAAM,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,WAAW,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI;AACrE,aAAS,IAAI;AACb,QAAI,QAAQ,UAAU;AACpB,YAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,IACnE;AACA,WAAO,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,EACjB;AACA,SAAO,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM;AAC9C;AAEA,IAAI;AACJ,eAAe,aAA+C;AAC5D,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc;AACjB,mBAAe,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ;AAAA,EACtC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/lib/substitution/observer/alignment.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { encodeUnreserved } from "../rfc3986.mjs";
 import { getCatalogMacroVector } from "../vectors.mjs";
 const MACRO_SEGMENT_RE = /\{[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*\}/;