@adcp/sdk 12.0.0 → 12.0.1

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Zero-config OAuth discovery + actionable authorization errors.\n *\n * When a library consumer calls an OAuth-gated MCP agent without saved\n * credentials, they get a `NeedsAuthorizationError` containing everything\n * needed to either run an interactive flow or present a clear prompt — no\n * re-probing required.\n *\n * Design note: this module only *discovers* — it never opens a browser or\n * writes state. Interactive flow handling stays in the caller (CLI or a\n * bespoke `OAuthFlowHandler`) so library behavior is predictable.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from '../../net';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, type OAuthMetadataInfo } from '../../errors';\nimport { parseWWWAuthenticate, type WWWAuthenticateChallenge } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Maximum length of an individual server-supplied string we copy into the\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` payload. Anything longer is truncated with a\n * `…` suffix so hostile agents can't smuggle megabyte error-descriptions\n * into operator-facing prompts and logs.\n */\nconst MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of scope strings we copy into `scopesSupported`. RFC 8414\n * allows an unbounded array; hostile servers have sent thousands.\n */\nconst MAX_SCOPES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of auth-params we preserve under `challenge.params`. Bounds\n * memory pressure from hostile servers that pack the `WWW-Authenticate`\n * header with unknown auth-params.\n */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS = 32;\n\n/**\n * Strip ASCII control characters (excluding TAB) from a server-supplied\n * string that may be shown to a human. Defeats terminal-hijack tricks like\n * `\\x1b]0;pwned\\x07` (rewrites terminal title), `\\r` (overwrites prompt),\n * and `\\x1b[2J` (clears screen). Also truncates over-long values.\n */\nfunction sanitizeDisplay(value: string): string {\n  const stripped = value.replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0b-\\x1f\\x7f]/g, '');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_DISPLAY_STRING) return stripped;\n  return `${stripped.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_STRING - 1)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge before embedding it in a\n * `NeedsAuthorizationError`. Consumers that render `requirements.challenge`\n * to a terminal should never see control characters. Caps `params` count to\n * bound hostile servers.\n *\n * The `scheme` is already lowercased + token-constrained by the parser.\n * Param keys are also token-constrained so they're safe; only values need\n * sanitizing.\n */\nfunction sanitizeChallenge(c: WWWAuthenticateChallenge): WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(c.params)) {\n    if (Object.keys(params).length >= MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS) break;\n    params[k] = sanitizeDisplay(v);\n  }\n  return {\n    scheme: c.scheme,\n    ...(c.realm !== undefined ? { realm: sanitizeDisplay(c.realm) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error !== undefined ? { error: sanitizeDisplay(c.error) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error_description !== undefined ? { error_description: sanitizeDisplay(c.error_description) } : {}),\n    ...(c.scope !== undefined ? { scope: sanitizeDisplay(c.scope) } : {}),\n    ...(c.resource_metadata !== undefined ? { resource_metadata: sanitizeDisplay(c.resource_metadata) } : {}),\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Structured description of what an agent's authorization server requires\n * before it will accept a `tools/call`. Produced by\n * {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationRequirements {\n  /** The agent URL we probed. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Resource URL the agent advertises in its `WWW-Authenticate` / PRM (RFC 9728). */\n  resource?: string;\n  /** URL of the protected-resource-metadata document (from `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata=…`). */\n  resourceMetadataUrl?: string;\n  /** First `authorization_servers[0]` from the protected-resource metadata. */\n  authorizationServer?: string;\n  /**\n   * All `authorization_servers` advertised by the PRM, in declaration order.\n   * The walker only probes `[0]` (PRM preference order — see RFC 9728 §3.3);\n   * the full list is exposed so callers can surface multi-issuer deployments\n   * in diagnostics. A length > 1 is uncommon and worth flagging to the\n   * operator — typically a federation partner or a staged migration.\n   */\n  authorizationServers?: string[];\n  /** `authorization_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414). */\n  authorizationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `token_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata. */\n  tokenEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `registration_endpoint` if the AS supports RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. */\n  registrationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Scopes advertised by the AS (RFC 8414 `scopes_supported`). */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /**\n   * `grant_types_supported` advertised by the AS (RFC 8414). `undefined` when\n   * the AS didn't publish the field — per RFC 8414 that defaults to\n   * `[\"authorization_code\", \"implicit\"]`. Clients should treat absence as\n   * \"unknown, try your grant and see,\" not as proof the grant is unsupported.\n   */\n  grantTypesSupported?: string[];\n  /** True when the AS metadata came from the OIDC fallback URL rather than RFC 8414. */\n  metadataSource?: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration';\n  /** Scope hinted in the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge's `scope` auth-param. */\n  challengeScope?: string;\n  /** Raw parsed challenge the agent returned on the 401. */\n  challenge: WWWAuthenticateChallenge;\n}\n\n/**\n * Error raised when an agent returns a 401 and we do not have credentials\n * to satisfy it. Carries everything needed to run an interactive OAuth flow\n * or show the operator an actionable prompt.\n *\n * Extends {@link AuthenticationRequiredError} so existing callers that catch\n * `AuthenticationRequiredError` automatically receive the richer variant —\n * they can downcast with `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` when they\n * want walked discovery metadata.\n *\n * Note on `code` vs `subCode`:\n *   The parent class declares `readonly code = 'AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED'` as\n *   a class field that re-initializes on every construction, so a child-side\n *   override attempt is silently overwritten under `useDefineForClassFields`.\n *   The narrow discriminator is exposed as `subCode` — prefer\n *   `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` for type-narrowing and use `subCode`\n *   only for structured-log keying.\n *\n * Note on `hasOAuth`:\n *   The inherited getter returns `true` only when both `authorization_endpoint`\n *   and `token_endpoint` were walked successfully. A partially-walked\n *   requirements record (PRM reachable but AS metadata missing) still yields\n *   `hasOAuth === false` even though `requirements.authorizationServer` is set.\n *   Treat it as \"we have enough to start a flow,\" not \"server wants OAuth.\"\n */\nexport class NeedsAuthorizationError extends AuthenticationRequiredError {\n  /** Narrow discriminator for consumers that already know about this class. */\n  readonly subCode = 'needs_authorization' as const;\n  readonly requirements: AuthorizationRequirements;\n\n  constructor(requirements: AuthorizationRequirements, message?: string) {\n    super(requirements.agentUrl, synthesizeOAuthMetadata(requirements), message ?? defaultMessage(requirements));\n    this.name = 'NeedsAuthorizationError';\n    this.requirements = requirements;\n    // Extend the parent's `details` payload so structured-logging consumers\n    // that read `err.details` (via `extractErrorInfo` or equivalent) see the\n    // full walked chain, not just the synthesized one-hop oauthMetadata.\n    this.details = { ...(this.details as object | undefined), requirements };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link OAuthMetadataInfo} for the base-class constructor so that\n * legacy callers still see a non-empty `oauthMetadata` + working\n * `hasOAuth`/`authorizationUrl` getters on the error. When discovery didn't\n * yield enough info, return undefined and let the base class degrade\n * gracefully.\n */\nfunction synthesizeOAuthMetadata(req: AuthorizationRequirements): OAuthMetadataInfo | undefined {\n  if (!req.authorizationEndpoint || !req.tokenEndpoint) return undefined;\n  return {\n    authorization_endpoint: req.authorizationEndpoint,\n    token_endpoint: req.tokenEndpoint,\n    ...(req.registrationEndpoint ? { registration_endpoint: req.registrationEndpoint } : {}),\n    ...(req.authorizationServer ? { issuer: req.authorizationServer } : {}),\n  };\n}\n\nfunction defaultMessage(req: AuthorizationRequirements): string {\n  const parts = [`Agent ${sanitizeDisplay(req.agentUrl)} requires OAuth authorization.`];\n  if (req.authorizationServer) {\n    parts.push(`Authorization server: ${req.authorizationServer}.`);\n  }\n  if (req.challenge.error_description) {\n    parts.push(`Server said: ${sanitizeDisplay(req.challenge.error_description)}.`);\n  }\n  parts.push('Provide an OAuthFlowHandler or run an interactive flow to complete authorization.');\n  return parts.join(' ');\n}\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface DiscoverAuthorizationOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Override per-probe HTTP timeout (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of\n   * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in\n   * hand and want to avoid a second round-trip.\n   */\n  wwwAuthenticate?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk the OAuth discovery chain starting from an agent URL. Returns\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` when the agent demands OAuth, or `null` when a\n * `tools/list` call succeeds without credentials.\n *\n * Strategy:\n *   1. POST `tools/list` to the agent with no `Authorization` header.\n *   2. If 401 + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`: parse the challenge.\n *   3. If the challenge carries `resource_metadata=…`: GET it and read\n *      `resource` + `authorization_servers`.\n *   4. For the first `authorization_servers[0]`: GET `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`\n *      and read `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`,\n *      `scopes_supported`.\n *   5. Return a structured record.\n *\n * Anything missing from the chain surfaces as `undefined` on the result —\n * callers can still present a partial picture without re-probing.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoverAuthorizationOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthorizationRequirements | null> {\n  // `allowPrivateIp` authorizes the agent probe. Chain hops (PRM, AS\n  // metadata) inherit that trust ONLY when they share the agent's origin —\n  // a compromised agent that advertises a private-IP authorization server\n  // on a different origin would otherwise pivot a discovery walk into the\n  // host's internal network.\n  const allowPrivateIpOnAgent = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const agentOrigin = originOf(agentUrl);\n  const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url: string): boolean =>\n    allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== undefined && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;\n\n  let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;\n  if (!challengeHeader) {\n    const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIpOnAgent, options.timeoutMs);\n    if (probe.status !== 401) {\n      // 200, 403, 5xx, or network error — not an OAuth 401 we can act on.\n      return null;\n    }\n    challengeHeader = probe.wwwAuthenticate;\n  }\n\n  const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(challengeHeader ?? null);\n  if (!challenge || challenge.scheme !== 'bearer') {\n    // A 401 without a Bearer challenge isn't our kind of problem — let it propagate.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const requirements: AuthorizationRequirements = {\n    agentUrl,\n    resourceMetadataUrl: challenge.resource_metadata ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.resource_metadata) : undefined,\n    challengeScope: challenge.scope ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.scope) : undefined,\n    challenge: sanitizeChallenge(challenge),\n  };\n\n  // Walk protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728 §3). Private-IP targets are\n  // only allowed when the hop's origin matches the agent's.\n  if (challenge.resource_metadata && isSafeHttpUrl(challenge.resource_metadata)) {\n    const prm = await fetchJson(\n      challenge.resource_metadata,\n      allowPrivateIpForHop(challenge.resource_metadata),\n      options.timeoutMs\n    );\n    if (prm && typeof prm === 'object') {\n      const resource = (prm as { resource?: unknown }).resource;\n      const servers = (prm as { authorization_servers?: unknown }).authorization_servers;\n      if (typeof resource === 'string') requirements.resource = sanitizeDisplay(resource);\n      if (Array.isArray(servers)) {\n        const validServers = servers\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string' && isSafeHttpUrl(s))\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (validServers.length > 0) {\n          requirements.authorizationServers = validServers;\n          requirements.authorizationServer = validServers[0];\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Walk authorization-server metadata using the first issuer. RFC 8414 §3\n  // first, then OIDC Discovery 1.0 fallback for AS deployments (Keycloak in\n  // OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) that only publish at\n  // `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration`.\n  if (requirements.authorizationServer) {\n    const asUrl = buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n    let md: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n    let source: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration' | undefined;\n    if (asUrl) {\n      const res = await fetchJson(asUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(asUrl), options.timeoutMs);\n      if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n        md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n        source = 'rfc-8414';\n      }\n    }\n    if (!md) {\n      const oidcUrl = buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(requirements.authorizationServer);\n      if (oidcUrl) {\n        const res = await fetchJson(oidcUrl, allowPrivateIpForHop(oidcUrl), options.timeoutMs);\n        if (res && typeof res === 'object') {\n          md = res as Record<string, unknown>;\n          source = 'openid-configuration';\n        }\n      }\n    }\n    if (md) {\n      requirements.metadataSource = source;\n      if (typeof md.authorization_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.authorizationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.authorization_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.token_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.tokenEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.token_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (typeof md.registration_endpoint === 'string') {\n        requirements.registrationEndpoint = sanitizeDisplay(md.registration_endpoint);\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.scopes_supported)) {\n        const scopes = md.scopes_supported\n          .filter((s: unknown): s is string => typeof s === 'string')\n          .slice(0, MAX_SCOPES)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (scopes.length > 0) requirements.scopesSupported = scopes;\n      }\n      if (Array.isArray(md.grant_types_supported)) {\n        const grants = md.grant_types_supported\n          .filter((g: unknown): g is string => typeof g === 'string')\n          .slice(0, 32)\n          .map(sanitizeDisplay);\n        if (grants.length > 0) requirements.grantTypesSupported = grants;\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return requirements;\n}\n\n/**\n * Probe the agent for the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge on a 401.\n *\n * Where `discoverAuthorizationRequirements` walks the full RFC 9728 → 8414\n * chain for Bearer/OAuth challenges, this helper is the catch-all: it works\n * for ANY scheme (Basic, Digest, Bearer-without-PRM, …) and returns the\n * structured challenge so callers can surface scheme-specific remediation\n * (e.g. \"use `--auth-scheme basic`\" when the gateway speaks RFC 7617).\n *\n * Returns `null` when the agent isn't responding with a 401, or when the\n * response carries no parseable `WWW-Authenticate`. Reuses `probeAgent401`\n * so the SSRF gate and timeout policy stay consistent with the OAuth path.\n */\nexport async function probeAuthChallenge(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: { allowPrivateIp?: boolean; timeoutMs?: number } = {}\n): Promise<WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null> {\n  const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, options.allowPrivateIp ?? false, options.timeoutMs);\n  if (probe.status !== 401) return null;\n  return parseWWWAuthenticate(probe.wwwAuthenticate ?? null);\n}\n\n/**\n * Fire a single unauthenticated `tools/list` at the agent and return the\n * status + `WWW-Authenticate` header. Used when the caller hasn't provided\n * a cached 401 response.\n */\nasync function probeAgent401(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number\n): Promise<{ status: number; wwwAuthenticate?: string }> {\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/list' });\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(agentUrl, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        accept: 'application/json',\n      },\n      body,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n    });\n    return { status: res.status, wwwAuthenticate: res.headers['www-authenticate'] };\n  } catch {\n    return { status: 0 };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check a URL is an absolute `http:`/`https:` URL before we hand it to\n * `ssrfSafeFetch`. Defeats `javascript:`, `file:`, `data:`, etc. the agent\n * might echo back in PRM or AS metadata. `ssrfSafeFetch` refuses non-HTTP\n * schemes too, but failing fast here gives a cleaner discovery flow and\n * avoids surfacing scheme errors as mysterious discovery misses.\n */\nfunction originOf(value: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    return new URL(value).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction isSafeHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(value);\n    return u.protocol === 'https:' || u.protocol === 'http:';\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the authorization-server metadata URL for an issuer per RFC 8414 §3.\n *\n * For issuer `https://as.example.com/tenant1`, metadata lives at\n * `https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/tenant1`\n * (well-known prefix inserted BEFORE the issuer path, not after). This\n * matches how the MCP SDK and most authorization servers advertise metadata.\n */\nfunction buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const pathname = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? u.pathname.slice(0, -1) : u.pathname;\n  return `${u.origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathname}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 fallback URL. Some authorization servers\n * (Keycloak in OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) only publish metadata at\n * `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration` — path *suffixed*, not\n * prefixed. The OIDC discovery doc carries `token_endpoint`,\n * `authorization_endpoint`, and `grant_types_supported` with the same\n * semantics as RFC 8414, so it's a safe read-through when the RFC 8414\n * probe misses.\n */\nfunction buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const base = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;\n  return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchJson(url: string, allowPrivateIp: boolean, timeoutMs?: number): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers: { accept: 'application/json' },\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n    });\n    if (res.status !== 200) return undefined;\n    return decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']);\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/authorization-required.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Zero-config OAuth discovery + actionable authorization errors.\n *\n * When a library consumer calls an OAuth-gated MCP agent without saved\n * credentials, they get a `NeedsAuthorizationError` containing everything\n * needed to either run an interactive flow or present a clear prompt — no\n * re-probing required.\n *\n * Design note: this module only *discovers* — it never opens a browser or\n * writes state. Interactive flow handling stays in the caller (CLI or a\n * bespoke `OAuthFlowHandler`) so library behavior is predictable.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText } from '../../net';\nimport { AuthenticationRequiredError, type OAuthMetadataInfo } from '../../errors';\nimport { parseWWWAuthenticate, type WWWAuthenticateChallenge } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Maximum length of an individual server-supplied string we copy into the\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` payload. Anything longer is truncated with a\n * `…` suffix so hostile agents can't smuggle megabyte error-descriptions\n * into operator-facing prompts and logs.\n */\nconst MAX_DISPLAY_STRING = 256;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of scope strings we copy into `scopesSupported`. RFC 8414\n * allows an unbounded array; hostile servers have sent thousands.\n */\nconst MAX_SCOPES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Maximum number of auth-params we preserve under `challenge.params`. Bounds\n * memory pressure from hostile servers that pack the `WWW-Authenticate`\n * header with unknown auth-params.\n */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS = 32;\n\n/**\n * Strip ASCII control characters (excluding TAB) from a server-supplied\n * string that may be shown to a human. Defeats terminal-hijack tricks like\n * `\\x1b]0;pwned\\x07` (rewrites terminal title), `\\r` (overwrites prompt),\n * and `\\x1b[2J` (clears screen). Also truncates over-long values.\n */\nfunction sanitizeDisplay(value: string): string {\n  const stripped = value.replace(/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0b-\\x1f\\x7f]/g, '');\n  if (stripped.length <= MAX_DISPLAY_STRING) return stripped;\n  return `${stripped.slice(0, MAX_DISPLAY_STRING - 1)}…`;\n}\n\n/**\n * Sanitize the parsed `WWW-Authenticate` challenge before embedding it in a\n * `NeedsAuthorizationError`. Consumers that render `requirements.challenge`\n * to a terminal should never see control characters. Caps `params` count to\n * bound hostile servers.\n *\n * The `scheme` is already lowercased + token-constrained by the parser.\n * Param keys are also token-constrained so they're safe; only values need\n * sanitizing.\n */\nfunction sanitizeChallenge(c: WWWAuthenticateChallenge): WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(c.params)) {\n    if (Object.keys(params).length >= MAX_CHALLENGE_PARAMS) break;\n    params[k] = sanitizeDisplay(v);\n  }\n  return {\n    scheme: c.scheme,\n    ...(c.realm !== undefined ? { realm: sanitizeDisplay(c.realm) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error !== undefined ? { error: sanitizeDisplay(c.error) } : {}),\n    ...(c.error_description !== undefined ? { error_description: sanitizeDisplay(c.error_description) } : {}),\n    ...(c.scope !== undefined ? { scope: sanitizeDisplay(c.scope) } : {}),\n    ...(c.resource_metadata !== undefined ? { resource_metadata: sanitizeDisplay(c.resource_metadata) } : {}),\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Structured description of what an agent's authorization server requires\n * before it will accept a `tools/call`. Produced by\n * {@link discoverAuthorizationRequirements}.\n */\nexport interface AuthorizationRequirements {\n  /** The agent URL we probed. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Resource URL the agent advertises in its `WWW-Authenticate` / PRM (RFC 9728). */\n  resource?: string;\n  /** URL of the protected-resource-metadata document (from `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata=…`). */\n  resourceMetadataUrl?: string;\n  /** First `authorization_servers[0]` from the protected-resource metadata. */\n  authorizationServer?: string;\n  /**\n   * All `authorization_servers` advertised by the PRM, in declaration order.\n   * The walker only probes `[0]` (PRM preference order — see RFC 9728 §3.3);\n   * the full list is exposed so callers can surface multi-issuer deployments\n   * in diagnostics. A length > 1 is uncommon and worth flagging to the\n   * operator — typically a federation partner or a staged migration.\n   */\n  authorizationServers?: string[];\n  /** `authorization_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414). */\n  authorizationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `token_endpoint` from the authorization-server metadata. */\n  tokenEndpoint?: string;\n  /** `registration_endpoint` if the AS supports RFC 7591 dynamic client registration. */\n  registrationEndpoint?: string;\n  /** Scopes advertised by the AS (RFC 8414 `scopes_supported`). */\n  scopesSupported?: string[];\n  /**\n   * `grant_types_supported` advertised by the AS (RFC 8414). `undefined` when\n   * the AS didn't publish the field — per RFC 8414 that defaults to\n   * `[\"authorization_code\", \"implicit\"]`. Clients should treat absence as\n   * \"unknown, try your grant and see,\" not as proof the grant is unsupported.\n   */\n  grantTypesSupported?: string[];\n  /** True when the AS metadata came from the OIDC fallback URL rather than RFC 8414. */\n  metadataSource?: 'rfc-8414' | 'openid-configuration';\n  /** Scope hinted in the `WWW-Authenticate` challenge's `scope` auth-param. */\n  challengeScope?: string;\n  /** Raw parsed challenge the agent returned on the 401. */\n  challenge: WWWAuthenticateChallenge;\n}\n\n/**\n * Error raised when an agent returns a 401 and we do not have credentials\n * to satisfy it. Carries everything needed to run an interactive OAuth flow\n * or show the operator an actionable prompt.\n *\n * Extends {@link AuthenticationRequiredError} so existing callers that catch\n * `AuthenticationRequiredError` automatically receive the richer variant —\n * they can downcast with `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` when they\n * want walked discovery metadata.\n *\n * Note on `code` vs `subCode`:\n *   The parent class declares `readonly code = 'AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED'` as\n *   a class field that re-initializes on every construction, so a child-side\n *   override attempt is silently overwritten under `useDefineForClassFields`.\n *   The narrow discriminator is exposed as `subCode` — prefer\n *   `instanceof NeedsAuthorizationError` for type-narrowing and use `subCode`\n *   only for structured-log keying.\n *\n * Note on `hasOAuth`:\n *   The inherited getter returns `true` only when both `authorization_endpoint`\n *   and `token_endpoint` were walked successfully. A partially-walked\n *   requirements record (PRM reachable but AS metadata missing) still yields\n *   `hasOAuth === false` even though `requirements.authorizationServer` is set.\n *   Treat it as \"we have enough to start a flow,\" not \"server wants OAuth.\"\n */\nexport class NeedsAuthorizationError extends AuthenticationRequiredError {\n  /** Narrow discriminator for consumers that already know about this class. */\n  readonly subCode = 'needs_authorization' as const;\n  readonly requirements: AuthorizationRequirements;\n\n  constructor(requirements: AuthorizationRequirements, message?: string) {\n    super(requirements.agentUrl, synthesizeOAuthMetadata(requirements), message ?? defaultMessage(requirements));\n    this.name = 'NeedsAuthorizationError';\n    this.requirements = requirements;\n    // Extend the parent's `details` payload so structured-logging consumers\n    // that read `err.details` (via `extractErrorInfo` or equivalent) see the\n    // full walked chain, not just the synthesized one-hop oauthMetadata.\n    this.details = { ...(this.details as object | undefined), requirements };\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an {@link OAuthMetadataInfo} for the base-class constructor so that\n * legacy callers still see a non-empty `oauthMetadata` + working\n * `hasOAuth`/`authorizationUrl` getters on the error. 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Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Override per-probe HTTP timeout (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * If provided, use this `WWW-Authenticate` header verbatim instead of\n   * re-probing the agent. Use this when you already have a 401 response in\n   * hand and want to avoid a second round-trip.\n   */\n  wwwAuthenticate?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk the OAuth discovery chain starting from an agent URL. Returns\n * `AuthorizationRequirements` when the agent demands OAuth, or `null` when a\n * `tools/list` call succeeds without credentials.\n *\n * Strategy:\n *   1. POST `tools/list` to the agent with no `Authorization` header.\n *   2. If 401 + `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer`: parse the challenge.\n *   3. If the challenge carries `resource_metadata=…`: GET it and read\n *      `resource` + `authorization_servers`.\n *   4. For the first `authorization_servers[0]`: GET `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`\n *      and read `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `registration_endpoint`,\n *      `scopes_supported`.\n *   5. Return a structured record.\n *\n * Anything missing from the chain surfaces as `undefined` on the result —\n * callers can still present a partial picture without re-probing.\n */\nexport async function discoverAuthorizationRequirements(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  options: DiscoverAuthorizationOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthorizationRequirements | null> {\n  // `allowPrivateIp` authorizes the agent probe. Chain hops (PRM, AS\n  // metadata) inherit that trust ONLY when they share the agent's origin —\n  // a compromised agent that advertises a private-IP authorization server\n  // on a different origin would otherwise pivot a discovery walk into the\n  // host's internal network.\n  const allowPrivateIpOnAgent = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const agentOrigin = originOf(agentUrl);\n  const allowPrivateIpForHop = (url: string): boolean =>\n    allowPrivateIpOnAgent && agentOrigin !== undefined && originOf(url) === agentOrigin;\n\n  let challengeHeader = options.wwwAuthenticate;\n  if (!challengeHeader) {\n    const probe = await probeAgent401(agentUrl, allowPrivateIpOnAgent, options.timeoutMs);\n    if (probe.status !== 401) {\n      // 200, 403, 5xx, or network error — not an OAuth 401 we can act on.\n      return null;\n    }\n    challengeHeader = probe.wwwAuthenticate;\n  }\n\n  const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(challengeHeader ?? null);\n  if (!challenge || challenge.scheme !== 'bearer') {\n    // A 401 without a Bearer challenge isn't our kind of problem — let it propagate.\n    return null;\n  }\n\n  const requirements: AuthorizationRequirements = {\n    agentUrl,\n    resourceMetadataUrl: challenge.resource_metadata ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.resource_metadata) : undefined,\n    challengeScope: challenge.scope ? sanitizeDisplay(challenge.scope) : undefined,\n    challenge: sanitizeChallenge(challenge),\n  };\n\n  // Walk protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728 §3). 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Defeats `javascript:`, `file:`, `data:`, etc. the agent\n * might echo back in PRM or AS metadata. `ssrfSafeFetch` refuses non-HTTP\n * schemes too, but failing fast here gives a cleaner discovery flow and\n * avoids surfacing scheme errors as mysterious discovery misses.\n */\nfunction originOf(value: string): string | undefined {\n  try {\n    return new URL(value).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction isSafeHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {\n  try {\n    const u = new URL(value);\n    return u.protocol === 'https:' || u.protocol === 'http:';\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the authorization-server metadata URL for an issuer per RFC 8414 §3.\n *\n * For issuer `https://as.example.com/tenant1`, metadata lives at\n * `https://as.example.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/tenant1`\n * (well-known prefix inserted BEFORE the issuer path, not after). This\n * matches how the MCP SDK and most authorization servers advertise metadata.\n */\nfunction buildAuthorizationServerMetadataUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const pathname = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? u.pathname.slice(0, -1) : u.pathname;\n  return `${u.origin}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server${pathname}`;\n}\n\n/**\n * OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 fallback URL. Some authorization servers\n * (Keycloak in OIDC mode, Ping, ADFS) only publish metadata at\n * `{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration` — path *suffixed*, not\n * prefixed. The OIDC discovery doc carries `token_endpoint`,\n * `authorization_endpoint`, and `grant_types_supported` with the same\n * semantics as RFC 8414, so it's a safe read-through when the RFC 8414\n * probe misses.\n */\nfunction buildOidcDiscoveryUrl(issuer: string): string | undefined {\n  if (!isSafeHttpUrl(issuer)) return undefined;\n  const u = new URL(issuer);\n  const base = u.pathname.endsWith('/') ? `${u.origin}${u.pathname.slice(0, -1)}` : `${u.origin}${u.pathname}`;\n  return `${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;\n}\n\nasync function fetchJson(url: string, allowPrivateIp: boolean, timeoutMs?: number): Promise<unknown> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers: { accept: 'application/json' },\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n    });\n    if (res.status !== 200) return undefined;\n    return decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']);\n  } catch {\n    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package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/diagnose.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText, SsrfRefusedError } from "../../net/index.mjs";
 import { decodeAccessTokenClaims, parseWWWAuthenticate, validateTokenAudience } from "./diagnostics.mjs";
 const AUTH_DIAGNOSIS_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1;

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/diagnose.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/diagnose.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `adcp diagnose-auth` — structured OAuth handshake diagnostics.\n *\n * Performs an end-to-end trace of the OAuth flow for a single MCP agent and\n * emits a structured {@link AuthDiagnosisReport} with wire-level HTTP captures,\n * decoded token claims, and ranked hypotheses about what might be wrong.\n *\n * Designed for incident diagnosis, not continuous monitoring — each run does\n * a full round-trip including (optionally) a token refresh and a `tools/call`\n * attempt, so don't call this in a tight loop.\n *\n * The runner is decoupled from the CLI so library consumers can invoke it\n * programmatically (e.g. from a monitoring agent or a test-controller fixture)\n * and render their own output.\n */\nimport { ssrfSafeFetch, decodeBodyAsJsonOrText, SsrfRefusedError } from '../../net';\nimport type { AgentConfig } from './types';\nimport { decodeAccessTokenClaims, parseWWWAuthenticate, validateTokenAudience } from './diagnostics';\nimport type { DecodedAccessToken } from './diagnostics';\n\n/**\n * Options for {@link runAuthDiagnosis}. Most callers pass an `AgentConfig` and\n * accept the defaults.\n */\nexport interface DiagnoseOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Skip the `tools/call` probe (e.g. if the agent doesn't expose a no-op tool). */\n  skipToolCall?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Name of the tool to exercise in the `tools/call` probe. Default: `get_products`.\n   * This default is AdCP-specific; for non-AdCP MCP agents, pass a tool name that exists.\n   */\n  probeToolName?: string;\n  /** Arguments to send with the probe tool call. Default: `{ brief: 'diagnose-auth probe' }`. */\n  probeToolArgs?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Skip the token-refresh attempt even when a refresh_token is available. */\n  skipRefresh?: boolean;\n  /** Replace the default timeout for individual HTTP probes (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Include raw access_token / refresh_token / id_token values in the report.\n   * Default false — tokens are replaced with `<redacted length=N>` markers so\n   * that `--json` output is safe to paste into bug reports and log aggregators.\n   */\n  includeTokens?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Wire-level capture of a single HTTP probe. */\nexport interface HttpCapture {\n  url: string;\n  method: string;\n  /** 0 if the request never left the client (DNS failure, SSRF refusal, …). */\n  status: number;\n  /** Response headers with lowercased keys. */\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Parsed JSON body if `content-type` is JSON, raw text otherwise, or `null` on error. */\n  body: unknown;\n  /** Client-side error message, if any. */\n  error?: string;\n}\n\n/** One step of the diagnosis, in execution order. */\nexport interface DiagnosisStep {\n  name:\n    | 'probe_protected_resource_metadata'\n    | 'probe_authorization_server_metadata'\n    | 'decode_current_token'\n    | 'token_refresh_attempt'\n    | 'decode_refreshed_token'\n    | 'list_tools_probe'\n    | 'tool_call_probe';\n  /** Present for HTTP steps. */\n  http?: HttpCapture;\n  /** Present for decode steps. Claims are unverified. */\n  decodedToken?: DecodedAccessToken | null;\n  /** Free-form notes attached by the step for hypothesis ranking. */\n  notes?: string[];\n  /** Step-level error (distinct from `http.error` — set when the step was skipped or could not run). */\n  error?: string;\n}\n\n/** Rank verdict for a hypothesis. Ordered most-to-least actionable. */\nexport type HypothesisVerdict = 'likely' | 'possible' | 'ruled_out' | 'not_observed';\n\n/** One ranked hypothesis about what might be wrong. */\nexport interface Hypothesis {\n  /**\n   * Stable ID. Currently `H1`, `H2`, `H4`, `H5`, `H6` — `H3` (session ID handling)\n   * is reserved for a future addition. Downstream consumers should treat this as\n   * an opaque string rather than exhaustively switching on it.\n   */\n  id: string;\n  /** Short human-readable title. */\n  title: string;\n  /** One-line summary, tailored with evidence from this run. */\n  summary: string;\n  verdict: HypothesisVerdict;\n  /** Supporting evidence extracted from the steps above. */\n  evidence: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Report schema version. Bumped when breaking changes to the shape of\n * {@link AuthDiagnosisReport} land. Dashboards and downstream consumers should\n * check this before relying on specific fields.\n */\nexport const AUTH_DIAGNOSIS_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\n/** Full diagnosis report returned by {@link runAuthDiagnosis}. */\nexport interface AuthDiagnosisReport {\n  /** See {@link AUTH_DIAGNOSIS_SCHEMA_VERSION}. */\n  schemaVersion: typeof AUTH_DIAGNOSIS_SCHEMA_VERSION;\n  /** Agent URL under test. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Alias from saved config, if one was provided. */\n  aliasId?: string;\n  /** Per-step wire captures, in execution order. */\n  steps: DiagnosisStep[];\n  /** Ranked hypotheses — `likely` first, then `possible`, then `ruled_out`. */\n  hypotheses: Hypothesis[];\n  /** Report generation timestamp (ISO-8601, UTC). */\n  generatedAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Run the full diagnosis. Pass an agent config with (optionally) saved\n * `oauth_tokens` to exercise a realistic handshake. Returns a structured\n * report — rendering is the caller's job (CLI renders a text summary;\n * programmatic consumers typically serialize to JSON).\n */\nexport async function runAuthDiagnosis(\n  agent: AgentConfig,\n  options: DiagnoseOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthDiagnosisReport> {\n  const steps: DiagnosisStep[] = [];\n  const agentUrl = agent.agent_uri;\n  const allowPrivateIp = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const includeTokens = options.includeTokens ?? false;\n  // Per-invocation RPC id counter so concurrent `runAuthDiagnosis` calls don't share state.\n  let rpcId = 0;\n  const nextRpcId = () => ++rpcId;\n\n  // Step 1: protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728)\n  const prmCapture = await probeProtectedResourceMetadata(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, options.timeoutMs);\n  steps.push({ name: 'probe_protected_resource_metadata', http: prmCapture });\n\n  // Step 2: authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414) — derives issuer from PRM\n  const asCapture = await probeAuthorizationServerMetadata(prmCapture, allowPrivateIp, options.timeoutMs);\n  steps.push({ name: 'probe_authorization_server_metadata', http: asCapture });\n\n  // Step 3: decode the current access token (if saved)\n  const currentToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token;\n  const currentDecoded = currentToken ? decodeAccessTokenClaims(currentToken) : null;\n  steps.push({\n    name: 'decode_current_token',\n    decodedToken: currentDecoded,\n    notes: currentToken\n      ? currentDecoded\n        ? [`Decoded JWT with claims: ${Object.keys(currentDecoded.claims).join(', ')}`]\n        : ['Saved access_token is opaque (not a JWT) — `aud` inspection is not possible']\n      : ['No saved access_token'],\n  });\n\n  // Step 4: token refresh (only if we have a refresh_token AND the user didn't skip)\n  let refreshedAccessToken: string | undefined;\n  let refreshedDecoded: DecodedAccessToken | null = null;\n  if (!options.skipRefresh && agent.oauth_tokens?.refresh_token) {\n    const tokenEndpoint = extractTokenEndpoint(asCapture);\n    const clientId = agent.oauth_client?.client_id;\n    // Always request the agent URL as the resource indicator, even if PRM\n    // advertises something different — a well-behaved client sends what it\n    // actually wants to talk to, and using PRM.resource here would cause H2\n    // to fire spuriously when the real problem is H1.\n    const resource = agentUrl;\n    if (!tokenEndpoint) {\n      steps.push({\n        name: 'token_refresh_attempt',\n        error: 'No token_endpoint available from authorization-server metadata — cannot attempt refresh',\n      });\n    } else if (!clientId) {\n      steps.push({\n        name: 'token_refresh_attempt',\n        error: 'No saved oauth_client.client_id — cannot attempt refresh without it',\n      });\n    } else {\n      const refreshCapture = await attemptTokenRefresh({\n        tokenEndpoint,\n        clientId,\n        clientSecret: agent.oauth_client?.client_secret,\n        refreshToken: agent.oauth_tokens.refresh_token,\n        resource,\n        allowPrivateIp,\n        timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,\n      });\n      // Capture the raw access_token string BEFORE redaction so we can still\n      // decode claims for H2 analysis. The report body itself uses the\n      // redacted capture unless includeTokens is set.\n      if (refreshCapture.status === 200 && refreshCapture.body && typeof refreshCapture.body === 'object') {\n        const body = refreshCapture.body as Record<string, unknown>;\n        if (typeof body.access_token === 'string') {\n          refreshedAccessToken = body.access_token;\n          refreshedDecoded = decodeAccessTokenClaims(refreshedAccessToken);\n        }\n      }\n      steps.push({\n        name: 'token_refresh_attempt',\n        http: includeTokens ? refreshCapture : redactTokenMaterial(refreshCapture),\n      });\n      if (refreshedAccessToken) {\n        steps.push({\n          name: 'decode_refreshed_token',\n          decodedToken: refreshedDecoded,\n          notes: refreshedDecoded\n            ? [`Decoded refreshed JWT with claims: ${Object.keys(refreshedDecoded.claims).join(', ')}`]\n            : ['Refreshed access_token is opaque (not a JWT)'],\n        });\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Step 5: unauthenticated list_tools to surface 401 + WWW-Authenticate\n  const listToolsCapture = await probeListTools(agentUrl, undefined, allowPrivateIp, options.timeoutMs, nextRpcId);\n  steps.push({ name: 'list_tools_probe', http: listToolsCapture });\n\n  // Step 6: authenticated tool_call (skip if no token or if caller opts out)\n  const tokenForCall = refreshedAccessToken ?? currentToken;\n  if (!options.skipToolCall && tokenForCall) {\n    const toolName = options.probeToolName ?? 'get_products';\n    const args = options.probeToolArgs ?? { brief: 'diagnose-auth probe' };\n    const toolCapture = await probeToolCall(\n      agentUrl,\n      tokenForCall,\n      toolName,\n      args,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      nextRpcId\n    );\n    steps.push({ name: 'tool_call_probe', http: toolCapture });\n  } else if (!tokenForCall) {\n    steps.push({\n      name: 'tool_call_probe',\n      error: 'No access_token available — skipping authenticated tool call probe',\n    });\n  }\n\n  const hypotheses = rankHypotheses({\n    agentUrl,\n    steps,\n    currentDecoded,\n    refreshedDecoded,\n  });\n\n  return {\n    schemaVersion: AUTH_DIAGNOSIS_SCHEMA_VERSION,\n    agentUrl,\n    aliasId: agent.id,\n    steps,\n    hypotheses,\n    generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  };\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Probes\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nasync function probeProtectedResourceMetadata(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number\n): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  const u = new URL(agentUrl);\n  const url = `${u.origin}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource${u.pathname}`;\n  return httpGet(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs);\n}\n\nasync function probeAuthorizationServerMetadata(\n  prm: HttpCapture,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number\n): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  const issuer = extractIssuer(prm);\n  if (!issuer) {\n    return {\n      url: '',\n      method: 'GET',\n      status: 0,\n      headers: {},\n      body: null,\n      error: 'protected-resource metadata did not yield an authorization_servers[0] entry',\n    };\n  }\n  const url = `${issuer.replace(/\\/$/, '')}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`;\n  return httpGet(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs);\n}\n\nasync function probeListTools(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  bearerToken: string | undefined,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs: number | undefined,\n  nextRpcId: () => number\n): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  return httpJsonRpc(agentUrl, { method: 'tools/list' }, bearerToken, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, nextRpcId);\n}\n\nasync function probeToolCall(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  bearerToken: string,\n  toolName: string,\n  args: Record<string, unknown>,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs: number | undefined,\n  nextRpcId: () => number\n): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  return httpJsonRpc(\n    agentUrl,\n    { method: 'tools/call', params: { name: toolName, arguments: args } },\n    bearerToken,\n    allowPrivateIp,\n    timeoutMs,\n    nextRpcId\n  );\n}\n\nasync function attemptTokenRefresh(options: {\n  tokenEndpoint: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  refreshToken: string;\n  resource: string;\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n}): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  const body = new URLSearchParams({\n    grant_type: 'refresh_token',\n    refresh_token: options.refreshToken,\n    client_id: options.clientId,\n    // RFC 8707: explicitly request a token for this resource. If the AS\n    // ignores this (H2), the refreshed token's aud claim will still be wrong.\n    resource: options.resource,\n  });\n  if (options.clientSecret) body.set('client_secret', options.clientSecret);\n\n  return httpFormPost(options.tokenEndpoint, body, options.allowPrivateIp, options.timeoutMs);\n}\n\nasync function httpGet(url: string, allowPrivateIp: boolean, timeoutMs?: number): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers: { accept: 'application/json' },\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n    });\n    return {\n      url,\n      method: 'GET',\n      status: res.status,\n      headers: res.headers,\n      body: decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']),\n    };\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { url, method: 'GET', status: 0, headers: {}, body: null, error: formatError(err) };\n  }\n}\n\nasync function httpJsonRpc(\n  url: string,\n  rpc: { method: string; params?: unknown },\n  bearerToken: string | undefined,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs: number | undefined,\n  nextRpcId: () => number\n): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: nextRpcId(), ...rpc });\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'content-type': 'application/json',\n    accept: 'application/json',\n  };\n  if (bearerToken) headers.authorization = `Bearer ${bearerToken}`;\n\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n    });\n    return {\n      url,\n      method: 'POST',\n      status: res.status,\n      headers: res.headers,\n      body: decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']),\n    };\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { url, method: 'POST', status: 0, headers: {}, body: null, error: formatError(err) };\n  }\n}\n\nasync function httpFormPost(\n  url: string,\n  body: URLSearchParams,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number\n): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n        accept: 'application/json',\n      },\n      body: body.toString(),\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n    });\n    return {\n      url,\n      method: 'POST',\n      status: res.status,\n      headers: res.headers,\n      body: decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']),\n    };\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { url, method: 'POST', status: 0, headers: {}, body: null, error: formatError(err) };\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Hypothesis ranking\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\ninterface RankInput {\n  agentUrl: string;\n  steps: DiagnosisStep[];\n  currentDecoded: DecodedAccessToken | null;\n  refreshedDecoded: DecodedAccessToken | null;\n}\n\nfunction rankHypotheses(input: RankInput): Hypothesis[] {\n  const out: Hypothesis[] = [];\n  const prmStep = input.steps.find(s => s.name === 'probe_protected_resource_metadata');\n  const listStep = input.steps.find(s => s.name === 'list_tools_probe');\n  const toolStep = input.steps.find(s => s.name === 'tool_call_probe');\n  const refreshStep = input.steps.find(s => s.name === 'token_refresh_attempt');\n\n  // H1: Resource URL mismatch between well-known and agent host\n  out.push(rankH1(input.agentUrl, prmStep));\n\n  // H2: Refresh grant missing `resource` parameter (RFC 8707)\n  out.push(rankH2(input.agentUrl, refreshStep, input.refreshedDecoded));\n\n  // H4: Agent endpoint returns 401 with no WWW-Authenticate (RFC 6750 violation)\n  out.push(rankH4(listStep, toolStep));\n\n  // H5: Token `aud` claim missing or doesn't match agent URL\n  out.push(rankH5(input.agentUrl, input.currentDecoded, prmStep));\n\n  // H6: Agent endpoint doesn't validate audience (accepts token but ignores it)\n  out.push(rankH6(input.agentUrl, input.currentDecoded, toolStep));\n\n  // H7: Authorization server supports Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591)\n  // for client_credentials — informational, helps operators decide whether\n  // a throwaway M2M client is viable for compliance runs.\n  const asStep = input.steps.find(s => s.name === 'probe_authorization_server_metadata');\n  out.push(rankH7(asStep));\n\n  // Order: likely > possible > ruled_out > not_observed\n  const order: Record<HypothesisVerdict, number> = {\n    likely: 0,\n    possible: 1,\n    ruled_out: 2,\n    not_observed: 3,\n  };\n  return out.sort((a, b) => order[a.verdict] - order[b.verdict]);\n}\n\nfunction rankH1(agentUrl: string, prmStep?: DiagnosisStep): Hypothesis {\n  const base: Hypothesis = {\n    id: 'H1',\n    title: 'Resource URL mismatch between well-known and agent host',\n    summary: '',\n    verdict: 'not_observed',\n    evidence: [],\n  };\n  if (\n    !prmStep?.http ||\n    prmStep.http.status !== 200 ||\n    typeof prmStep.http.body !== 'object' ||\n    prmStep.http.body === null\n  ) {\n    base.verdict = 'not_observed';\n    base.summary = 'No protected-resource metadata was retrieved — cannot compare `resource` to agent URL';\n    return base;\n  }\n  const advertised = (prmStep.http.body as { resource?: unknown }).resource;\n  if (typeof advertised !== 'string') {\n    base.verdict = 'not_observed';\n    base.summary = 'protected-resource metadata has no `resource` field';\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  const normAdvertised = normalizeForCompare(advertised);\n  const normAgent = normalizeForCompare(agentUrl);\n  if (normAdvertised === normAgent) {\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = `Advertised resource matches agent URL (${advertised})`;\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  // RFC 9728 §2 + §3.2 — `resource` is the canonical resource identifier the\n  // AS binds tokens to (the `aud` claim target per RFC 9068 §3), not the\n  // request URI. RFC 8707 §2 requires only an absolute URI with optional path\n  // component, so a parent-path resource ID covering the agent's sub-path is\n  // spec-correct, not a mismatch.\n  const advertisedOrigin = originForCompare(advertised);\n  const agentOrigin = originForCompare(agentUrl);\n\n  // Unparseable resource (e.g. AS returned an opaque URN like `urn:foo`). We\n  // can't classify origin/path containment without parsing, and falling\n  // through would misleadingly evaluate `isPathPrefix` against raw strings.\n  // Surface as `possible` so the operator sees the actual advertisement\n  // without us inventing a fix hint we can't justify.\n  if (!advertisedOrigin) {\n    base.verdict = 'possible';\n    base.summary = `Advertised resource is not a parseable URL: \"${advertised}\"`;\n    base.evidence = [\n      `PRM resource: ${advertised}`,\n      `Agent URL: ${agentUrl}`,\n      'RFC 8707 §2 requires `resource` to be an absolute URI. Check the AS configuration if this should be a URL identifier.',\n    ];\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  if (agentOrigin && advertisedOrigin !== agentOrigin) {\n    base.verdict = 'likely';\n    base.summary = `Advertised resource origin \"${advertisedOrigin}\" does not match agent origin \"${agentOrigin}\"`;\n    base.evidence = [\n      `PRM resource: ${advertised}`,\n      `Agent URL: ${agentUrl}`,\n      \"Fix: point the agent at the same origin (scheme+host+port) the PRM advertises, or fix the PRM `resource` to advertise the agent's own origin.\",\n    ];\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  if (isUrlPrefix(normAdvertised, normAgent)) {\n    // Agent endpoint is a sub-path under the advertised resource identifier.\n    // RFC 9728 §3.2 leaves this open; RFC 9068 §3 + RFC 8707 §2 together\n    // make it the canonical pattern for a single resource server fronting\n    // multiple endpoints under a shared `aud` identifier.\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = `Agent URL is a sub-path under advertised resource identifier (spec-correct per RFC 9728 §2/§3.2)`;\n    base.evidence = [\n      `PRM resource: ${advertised}`,\n      `Agent URL: ${agentUrl}`,\n      `The AS will issue tokens with \\`aud=${advertised}\\`; the agent at \\`${agentUrl}\\` validates that aud against its own resource identifier, not the request URI. This is the intended pattern for a single resource server fronting multiple endpoints.`,\n    ];\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  // Same origin, agent is not a sub-path of advertised resource. The AS may\n  // legitimately host multiple resource identifiers on the same origin, each\n  // covering a disjoint set of endpoints; without inspecting AS aud-binding\n  // policy we can't tell whether this is intended or a misconfiguration.\n  base.verdict = 'possible';\n  base.summary = `Advertised resource \"${advertised}\" does not contain agent URL \"${agentUrl}\" as a sub-path (both on origin ${agentOrigin ?? '(unknown)'})`;\n  base.evidence = [\n    `PRM resource: ${advertised}`,\n    `Agent URL: ${agentUrl}`,\n    'If the AS binds tokens with `aud=<advertised resource>`, this agent endpoint may be outside that audience — confirm the AS aud-binding policy or that the operator advertised the correct resource identifier for this endpoint.',\n  ];\n  return base;\n}\n\nfunction rankH2(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  refreshStep: DiagnosisStep | undefined,\n  refreshedDecoded: DecodedAccessToken | null\n): Hypothesis {\n  const base: Hypothesis = {\n    id: 'H2',\n    title: 'Refresh grant missing `resource` parameter (RFC 8707)',\n    summary: '',\n    verdict: 'not_observed',\n    evidence: [],\n  };\n  if (!refreshStep) {\n    base.summary = 'No token refresh was attempted (skipped, missing refresh_token, or missing client registration)';\n    return base;\n  }\n  if (refreshStep.error) {\n    base.summary = `Token refresh could not run: ${refreshStep.error}`;\n    return base;\n  }\n  if (!refreshStep.http || refreshStep.http.status !== 200) {\n    base.summary = `Token refresh returned HTTP ${refreshStep.http?.status ?? 0}; cannot evaluate aud handling`;\n    base.evidence = refreshStep.http ? [`Body: ${safeStringify(refreshStep.http.body)}`] : [];\n    return base;\n  }\n  if (!refreshedDecoded) {\n    base.verdict = 'possible';\n    base.summary = 'Refreshed token is opaque — audience cannot be inspected from the wire';\n    base.evidence = [\n      'If this agent is a public resource server, an opaque token should still carry `aud` when inspected via introspection.',\n    ];\n    return base;\n  }\n  const result = validateTokenAudience(jwtFromDecoded(refreshedDecoded), agentUrl);\n  if (result.ok) {\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = 'Refreshed token `aud` claim matches the expected resource — AS honors RFC 8707 `resource`';\n    return base;\n  }\n  base.verdict = 'likely';\n  base.summary = 'We asked the AS to refresh with `resource=<agent-url>` but the new token `aud` still does not match';\n  base.evidence = [\n    `Expected aud: ${agentUrl}`,\n    `Actual aud: ${safeStringify(result.actualAudience)}`,\n    'Fix: update the AS to honor RFC 8707 `resource` and emit the corresponding `aud` claim on refresh_token grants.',\n  ];\n  return base;\n}\n\nfunction rankH4(listStep?: DiagnosisStep, toolStep?: DiagnosisStep): Hypothesis {\n  const base: Hypothesis = {\n    id: 'H4',\n    title: 'Agent endpoint returns 401 with no `WWW-Authenticate` (RFC 6750 violation)',\n    summary: '',\n    verdict: 'not_observed',\n    evidence: [],\n  };\n  const unauthed = listStep?.http;\n  const authed = toolStep?.http;\n  const rfc6750Offender = (cap: HttpCapture | undefined) =>\n    cap && cap.status === 401 && !cap.headers['www-authenticate'];\n\n  if (rfc6750Offender(unauthed) || rfc6750Offender(authed)) {\n    base.verdict = 'likely';\n    base.summary = 'Agent returned 401 without a `WWW-Authenticate` header — breaks RFC 6750 §3 and RFC 9728 discovery';\n    base.evidence = [];\n    if (rfc6750Offender(unauthed))\n      base.evidence.push(`unauthenticated tools/list: ${unauthed!.status} (no WWW-Authenticate)`);\n    if (rfc6750Offender(authed))\n      base.evidence.push(`authenticated tools/call: ${authed!.status} (no WWW-Authenticate)`);\n    base.evidence.push('Fix: emit `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error=\"…\", resource_metadata=\"…\"` on 401 responses.');\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  if (\n    (unauthed?.status === 401 && unauthed.headers['www-authenticate']) ||\n    (authed?.status === 401 && authed.headers['www-authenticate'])\n  ) {\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = 'Agent correctly emits a WWW-Authenticate challenge on 401';\n    const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(\n      unauthed?.headers['www-authenticate'] ?? authed?.headers['www-authenticate']\n    );\n    if (challenge) {\n      base.evidence = [\n        `Scheme: ${challenge.scheme}`,\n        ...(challenge.error ? [`error: ${challenge.error}`] : []),\n        ...(challenge.resource_metadata ? [`resource_metadata: ${challenge.resource_metadata}`] : []),\n      ];\n    }\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  base.summary = 'No 401 was observed on either probe — cannot evaluate challenge format';\n  return base;\n}\n\nfunction rankH5(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  currentDecoded: DecodedAccessToken | null,\n  prmStep: DiagnosisStep | undefined\n): Hypothesis {\n  const base: Hypothesis = {\n    id: 'H5',\n    title: 'Token `aud` claim missing or does not match agent URL',\n    summary: '',\n    verdict: 'not_observed',\n    evidence: [],\n  };\n  if (!currentDecoded) {\n    base.summary = 'No saved access token was decodable — cannot inspect `aud`';\n    return base;\n  }\n  // Prefer the advertised resource (PRM) when available, fall back to agent URL.\n  const prmResource =\n    prmStep?.http?.body && typeof (prmStep.http.body as { resource?: unknown }).resource === 'string'\n      ? (prmStep.http.body as { resource: string }).resource\n      : undefined;\n  const expected = prmResource ?? agentUrl;\n  const prmDiffersFromAgent =\n    prmResource !== undefined && normalizeForCompare(prmResource) !== normalizeForCompare(agentUrl);\n  const result = validateTokenAudience(jwtFromDecoded(currentDecoded), expected);\n  if (result.ok) {\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = `Saved token \\`aud\\` matches expected resource (${expected})`;\n    if (prmDiffersFromAgent) {\n      base.evidence = [\n        `Compared against advertised PRM resource; agent URL differs (see H1). Token is valid for the resource the AS thinks it's protecting, not for the agent URL you configured.`,\n      ];\n    }\n    return base;\n  }\n  base.verdict = 'likely';\n  base.summary = result.reason ?? 'Saved token audience does not match expected resource';\n  base.evidence = [\n    `Expected: ${expected}${prmDiffersFromAgent ? ' (from PRM; see H1 — agent URL differs)' : ''}`,\n    `Actual aud: ${safeStringify(result.actualAudience ?? 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Most callers pass an `AgentConfig` and\n * accept the defaults.\n */\nexport interface DiagnoseOptions {\n  /** Allow http:// and private-IP probe targets. Default false. */\n  allowPrivateIp?: boolean;\n  /** Skip the `tools/call` probe (e.g. if the agent doesn't expose a no-op tool). */\n  skipToolCall?: boolean;\n  /**\n   * Name of the tool to exercise in the `tools/call` probe. Default: `get_products`.\n   * This default is AdCP-specific; for non-AdCP MCP agents, pass a tool name that exists.\n   */\n  probeToolName?: string;\n  /** Arguments to send with the probe tool call. Default: `{ brief: 'diagnose-auth probe' }`. */\n  probeToolArgs?: Record<string, unknown>;\n  /** Skip the token-refresh attempt even when a refresh_token is available. */\n  skipRefresh?: boolean;\n  /** Replace the default timeout for individual HTTP probes (ms). Default inherits from ssrfSafeFetch (10s). */\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n  /**\n   * Include raw access_token / refresh_token / id_token values in the report.\n   * Default false — tokens are replaced with `<redacted length=N>` markers so\n   * that `--json` output is safe to paste into bug reports and log aggregators.\n   */\n  includeTokens?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Wire-level capture of a single HTTP probe. */\nexport interface HttpCapture {\n  url: string;\n  method: string;\n  /** 0 if the request never left the client (DNS failure, SSRF refusal, …). */\n  status: number;\n  /** Response headers with lowercased keys. */\n  headers: Record<string, string>;\n  /** Parsed JSON body if `content-type` is JSON, raw text otherwise, or `null` on error. */\n  body: unknown;\n  /** Client-side error message, if any. */\n  error?: string;\n}\n\n/** One step of the diagnosis, in execution order. */\nexport interface DiagnosisStep {\n  name:\n    | 'probe_protected_resource_metadata'\n    | 'probe_authorization_server_metadata'\n    | 'decode_current_token'\n    | 'token_refresh_attempt'\n    | 'decode_refreshed_token'\n    | 'list_tools_probe'\n    | 'tool_call_probe';\n  /** Present for HTTP steps. */\n  http?: HttpCapture;\n  /** Present for decode steps. Claims are unverified. */\n  decodedToken?: DecodedAccessToken | null;\n  /** Free-form notes attached by the step for hypothesis ranking. */\n  notes?: string[];\n  /** Step-level error (distinct from `http.error` — set when the step was skipped or could not run). */\n  error?: string;\n}\n\n/** Rank verdict for a hypothesis. Ordered most-to-least actionable. */\nexport type HypothesisVerdict = 'likely' | 'possible' | 'ruled_out' | 'not_observed';\n\n/** One ranked hypothesis about what might be wrong. */\nexport interface Hypothesis {\n  /**\n   * Stable ID. Currently `H1`, `H2`, `H4`, `H5`, `H6` — `H3` (session ID handling)\n   * is reserved for a future addition. Downstream consumers should treat this as\n   * an opaque string rather than exhaustively switching on it.\n   */\n  id: string;\n  /** Short human-readable title. */\n  title: string;\n  /** One-line summary, tailored with evidence from this run. */\n  summary: string;\n  verdict: HypothesisVerdict;\n  /** Supporting evidence extracted from the steps above. */\n  evidence: string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Report schema version. Bumped when breaking changes to the shape of\n * {@link AuthDiagnosisReport} land. Dashboards and downstream consumers should\n * check this before relying on specific fields.\n */\nexport const AUTH_DIAGNOSIS_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\n/** Full diagnosis report returned by {@link runAuthDiagnosis}. */\nexport interface AuthDiagnosisReport {\n  /** See {@link AUTH_DIAGNOSIS_SCHEMA_VERSION}. */\n  schemaVersion: typeof AUTH_DIAGNOSIS_SCHEMA_VERSION;\n  /** Agent URL under test. */\n  agentUrl: string;\n  /** Alias from saved config, if one was provided. */\n  aliasId?: string;\n  /** Per-step wire captures, in execution order. */\n  steps: DiagnosisStep[];\n  /** Ranked hypotheses — `likely` first, then `possible`, then `ruled_out`. */\n  hypotheses: Hypothesis[];\n  /** Report generation timestamp (ISO-8601, UTC). */\n  generatedAt: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Run the full diagnosis. Pass an agent config with (optionally) saved\n * `oauth_tokens` to exercise a realistic handshake. Returns a structured\n * report — rendering is the caller's job (CLI renders a text summary;\n * programmatic consumers typically serialize to JSON).\n */\nexport async function runAuthDiagnosis(\n  agent: AgentConfig,\n  options: DiagnoseOptions = {}\n): Promise<AuthDiagnosisReport> {\n  const steps: DiagnosisStep[] = [];\n  const agentUrl = agent.agent_uri;\n  const allowPrivateIp = options.allowPrivateIp ?? false;\n  const includeTokens = options.includeTokens ?? false;\n  // Per-invocation RPC id counter so concurrent `runAuthDiagnosis` calls don't share state.\n  let rpcId = 0;\n  const nextRpcId = () => ++rpcId;\n\n  // Step 1: protected-resource metadata (RFC 9728)\n  const prmCapture = await probeProtectedResourceMetadata(agentUrl, allowPrivateIp, options.timeoutMs);\n  steps.push({ name: 'probe_protected_resource_metadata', http: prmCapture });\n\n  // Step 2: authorization-server metadata (RFC 8414) — derives issuer from PRM\n  const asCapture = await probeAuthorizationServerMetadata(prmCapture, allowPrivateIp, options.timeoutMs);\n  steps.push({ name: 'probe_authorization_server_metadata', http: asCapture });\n\n  // Step 3: decode the current access token (if saved)\n  const currentToken = agent.oauth_tokens?.access_token;\n  const currentDecoded = currentToken ? decodeAccessTokenClaims(currentToken) : null;\n  steps.push({\n    name: 'decode_current_token',\n    decodedToken: currentDecoded,\n    notes: currentToken\n      ? currentDecoded\n        ? [`Decoded JWT with claims: ${Object.keys(currentDecoded.claims).join(', ')}`]\n        : ['Saved access_token is opaque (not a JWT) — `aud` inspection is not possible']\n      : ['No saved access_token'],\n  });\n\n  // Step 4: token refresh (only if we have a refresh_token AND the user didn't skip)\n  let refreshedAccessToken: string | undefined;\n  let refreshedDecoded: DecodedAccessToken | null = null;\n  if (!options.skipRefresh && agent.oauth_tokens?.refresh_token) {\n    const tokenEndpoint = extractTokenEndpoint(asCapture);\n    const clientId = agent.oauth_client?.client_id;\n    // Always request the agent URL as the resource indicator, even if PRM\n    // advertises something different — a well-behaved client sends what it\n    // actually wants to talk to, and using PRM.resource here would cause H2\n    // to fire spuriously when the real problem is H1.\n    const resource = agentUrl;\n    if (!tokenEndpoint) {\n      steps.push({\n        name: 'token_refresh_attempt',\n        error: 'No token_endpoint available from authorization-server metadata — cannot attempt refresh',\n      });\n    } else if (!clientId) {\n      steps.push({\n        name: 'token_refresh_attempt',\n        error: 'No saved oauth_client.client_id — cannot attempt refresh without it',\n      });\n    } else {\n      const refreshCapture = await attemptTokenRefresh({\n        tokenEndpoint,\n        clientId,\n        clientSecret: agent.oauth_client?.client_secret,\n        refreshToken: agent.oauth_tokens.refresh_token,\n        resource,\n        allowPrivateIp,\n        timeoutMs: options.timeoutMs,\n      });\n      // Capture the raw access_token string BEFORE redaction so we can still\n      // decode claims for H2 analysis. The report body itself uses the\n      // redacted capture unless includeTokens is set.\n      if (refreshCapture.status === 200 && refreshCapture.body && typeof refreshCapture.body === 'object') {\n        const body = refreshCapture.body as Record<string, unknown>;\n        if (typeof body.access_token === 'string') {\n          refreshedAccessToken = body.access_token;\n          refreshedDecoded = decodeAccessTokenClaims(refreshedAccessToken);\n        }\n      }\n      steps.push({\n        name: 'token_refresh_attempt',\n        http: includeTokens ? refreshCapture : redactTokenMaterial(refreshCapture),\n      });\n      if (refreshedAccessToken) {\n        steps.push({\n          name: 'decode_refreshed_token',\n          decodedToken: refreshedDecoded,\n          notes: refreshedDecoded\n            ? [`Decoded refreshed JWT with claims: ${Object.keys(refreshedDecoded.claims).join(', ')}`]\n            : ['Refreshed access_token is opaque (not a JWT)'],\n        });\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Step 5: unauthenticated list_tools to surface 401 + WWW-Authenticate\n  const listToolsCapture = await probeListTools(agentUrl, undefined, allowPrivateIp, options.timeoutMs, nextRpcId);\n  steps.push({ name: 'list_tools_probe', http: listToolsCapture });\n\n  // Step 6: authenticated tool_call (skip if no token or if caller opts out)\n  const tokenForCall = refreshedAccessToken ?? currentToken;\n  if (!options.skipToolCall && tokenForCall) {\n    const toolName = options.probeToolName ?? 'get_products';\n    const args = options.probeToolArgs ?? { brief: 'diagnose-auth probe' };\n    const toolCapture = await probeToolCall(\n      agentUrl,\n      tokenForCall,\n      toolName,\n      args,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      options.timeoutMs,\n      nextRpcId\n    );\n    steps.push({ name: 'tool_call_probe', http: toolCapture });\n  } else if (!tokenForCall) {\n    steps.push({\n      name: 'tool_call_probe',\n      error: 'No access_token available — skipping authenticated tool call probe',\n    });\n  }\n\n  const hypotheses = rankHypotheses({\n    agentUrl,\n    steps,\n    currentDecoded,\n    refreshedDecoded,\n  });\n\n  return {\n    schemaVersion: AUTH_DIAGNOSIS_SCHEMA_VERSION,\n    agentUrl,\n    aliasId: agent.id,\n    steps,\n    hypotheses,\n    generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  };\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Probes\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nasync function probeProtectedResourceMetadata(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number\n): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  const u = new URL(agentUrl);\n  const url = `${u.origin}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource${u.pathname}`;\n  return httpGet(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs);\n}\n\nasync function probeAuthorizationServerMetadata(\n  prm: HttpCapture,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number\n): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  const issuer = extractIssuer(prm);\n  if (!issuer) {\n    return {\n      url: '',\n      method: 'GET',\n      status: 0,\n      headers: {},\n      body: null,\n      error: 'protected-resource metadata did not yield an authorization_servers[0] entry',\n    };\n  }\n  const url = `${issuer.replace(/\\/$/, '')}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`;\n  return httpGet(url, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs);\n}\n\nasync function probeListTools(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  bearerToken: string | undefined,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs: number | undefined,\n  nextRpcId: () => number\n): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  return httpJsonRpc(agentUrl, { method: 'tools/list' }, bearerToken, allowPrivateIp, timeoutMs, nextRpcId);\n}\n\nasync function probeToolCall(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  bearerToken: string,\n  toolName: string,\n  args: Record<string, unknown>,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs: number | undefined,\n  nextRpcId: () => number\n): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  return httpJsonRpc(\n    agentUrl,\n    { method: 'tools/call', params: { name: toolName, arguments: args } },\n    bearerToken,\n    allowPrivateIp,\n    timeoutMs,\n    nextRpcId\n  );\n}\n\nasync function attemptTokenRefresh(options: {\n  tokenEndpoint: string;\n  clientId: string;\n  clientSecret?: string;\n  refreshToken: string;\n  resource: string;\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean;\n  timeoutMs?: number;\n}): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  const body = new URLSearchParams({\n    grant_type: 'refresh_token',\n    refresh_token: options.refreshToken,\n    client_id: options.clientId,\n    // RFC 8707: explicitly request a token for this resource. If the AS\n    // ignores this (H2), the refreshed token's aud claim will still be wrong.\n    resource: options.resource,\n  });\n  if (options.clientSecret) body.set('client_secret', options.clientSecret);\n\n  return httpFormPost(options.tokenEndpoint, body, options.allowPrivateIp, options.timeoutMs);\n}\n\nasync function httpGet(url: string, allowPrivateIp: boolean, timeoutMs?: number): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'GET',\n      headers: { accept: 'application/json' },\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n    });\n    return {\n      url,\n      method: 'GET',\n      status: res.status,\n      headers: res.headers,\n      body: decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']),\n    };\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { url, method: 'GET', status: 0, headers: {}, body: null, error: formatError(err) };\n  }\n}\n\nasync function httpJsonRpc(\n  url: string,\n  rpc: { method: string; params?: unknown },\n  bearerToken: string | undefined,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs: number | undefined,\n  nextRpcId: () => number\n): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: nextRpcId(), ...rpc });\n  const headers: Record<string, string> = {\n    'content-type': 'application/json',\n    accept: 'application/json',\n  };\n  if (bearerToken) headers.authorization = `Bearer ${bearerToken}`;\n\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers,\n      body,\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n    });\n    return {\n      url,\n      method: 'POST',\n      status: res.status,\n      headers: res.headers,\n      body: decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']),\n    };\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { url, method: 'POST', status: 0, headers: {}, body: null, error: formatError(err) };\n  }\n}\n\nasync function httpFormPost(\n  url: string,\n  body: URLSearchParams,\n  allowPrivateIp: boolean,\n  timeoutMs?: number\n): Promise<HttpCapture> {\n  try {\n    const res = await ssrfSafeFetch(url, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',\n        accept: 'application/json',\n      },\n      body: body.toString(),\n      allowPrivateIp,\n      ...(timeoutMs !== undefined ? { timeoutMs } : {}),\n    });\n    return {\n      url,\n      method: 'POST',\n      status: res.status,\n      headers: res.headers,\n      body: decodeBodyAsJsonOrText(res.body, res.headers['content-type']),\n    };\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { url, method: 'POST', status: 0, headers: {}, body: null, error: formatError(err) };\n  }\n}\n\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n// Hypothesis ranking\n// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\ninterface RankInput {\n  agentUrl: string;\n  steps: DiagnosisStep[];\n  currentDecoded: DecodedAccessToken | null;\n  refreshedDecoded: DecodedAccessToken | null;\n}\n\nfunction rankHypotheses(input: RankInput): Hypothesis[] {\n  const out: Hypothesis[] = [];\n  const prmStep = input.steps.find(s => s.name === 'probe_protected_resource_metadata');\n  const listStep = input.steps.find(s => s.name === 'list_tools_probe');\n  const toolStep = input.steps.find(s => s.name === 'tool_call_probe');\n  const refreshStep = input.steps.find(s => s.name === 'token_refresh_attempt');\n\n  // H1: Resource URL mismatch between well-known and agent host\n  out.push(rankH1(input.agentUrl, prmStep));\n\n  // H2: Refresh grant missing `resource` parameter (RFC 8707)\n  out.push(rankH2(input.agentUrl, refreshStep, input.refreshedDecoded));\n\n  // H4: Agent endpoint returns 401 with no WWW-Authenticate (RFC 6750 violation)\n  out.push(rankH4(listStep, toolStep));\n\n  // H5: Token `aud` claim missing or doesn't match agent URL\n  out.push(rankH5(input.agentUrl, input.currentDecoded, prmStep));\n\n  // H6: Agent endpoint doesn't validate audience (accepts token but ignores it)\n  out.push(rankH6(input.agentUrl, input.currentDecoded, toolStep));\n\n  // H7: Authorization server supports Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591)\n  // for client_credentials — informational, helps operators decide whether\n  // a throwaway M2M client is viable for compliance runs.\n  const asStep = input.steps.find(s => s.name === 'probe_authorization_server_metadata');\n  out.push(rankH7(asStep));\n\n  // Order: likely > possible > ruled_out > not_observed\n  const order: Record<HypothesisVerdict, number> = {\n    likely: 0,\n    possible: 1,\n    ruled_out: 2,\n    not_observed: 3,\n  };\n  return out.sort((a, b) => order[a.verdict] - order[b.verdict]);\n}\n\nfunction rankH1(agentUrl: string, prmStep?: DiagnosisStep): Hypothesis {\n  const base: Hypothesis = {\n    id: 'H1',\n    title: 'Resource URL mismatch between well-known and agent host',\n    summary: '',\n    verdict: 'not_observed',\n    evidence: [],\n  };\n  if (\n    !prmStep?.http ||\n    prmStep.http.status !== 200 ||\n    typeof prmStep.http.body !== 'object' ||\n    prmStep.http.body === null\n  ) {\n    base.verdict = 'not_observed';\n    base.summary = 'No protected-resource metadata was retrieved — cannot compare `resource` to agent URL';\n    return base;\n  }\n  const advertised = (prmStep.http.body as { resource?: unknown }).resource;\n  if (typeof advertised !== 'string') {\n    base.verdict = 'not_observed';\n    base.summary = 'protected-resource metadata has no `resource` field';\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  const normAdvertised = normalizeForCompare(advertised);\n  const normAgent = normalizeForCompare(agentUrl);\n  if (normAdvertised === normAgent) {\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = `Advertised resource matches agent URL (${advertised})`;\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  // RFC 9728 §2 + §3.2 — `resource` is the canonical resource identifier the\n  // AS binds tokens to (the `aud` claim target per RFC 9068 §3), not the\n  // request URI. RFC 8707 §2 requires only an absolute URI with optional path\n  // component, so a parent-path resource ID covering the agent's sub-path is\n  // spec-correct, not a mismatch.\n  const advertisedOrigin = originForCompare(advertised);\n  const agentOrigin = originForCompare(agentUrl);\n\n  // Unparseable resource (e.g. AS returned an opaque URN like `urn:foo`). We\n  // can't classify origin/path containment without parsing, and falling\n  // through would misleadingly evaluate `isPathPrefix` against raw strings.\n  // Surface as `possible` so the operator sees the actual advertisement\n  // without us inventing a fix hint we can't justify.\n  if (!advertisedOrigin) {\n    base.verdict = 'possible';\n    base.summary = `Advertised resource is not a parseable URL: \"${advertised}\"`;\n    base.evidence = [\n      `PRM resource: ${advertised}`,\n      `Agent URL: ${agentUrl}`,\n      'RFC 8707 §2 requires `resource` to be an absolute URI. Check the AS configuration if this should be a URL identifier.',\n    ];\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  if (agentOrigin && advertisedOrigin !== agentOrigin) {\n    base.verdict = 'likely';\n    base.summary = `Advertised resource origin \"${advertisedOrigin}\" does not match agent origin \"${agentOrigin}\"`;\n    base.evidence = [\n      `PRM resource: ${advertised}`,\n      `Agent URL: ${agentUrl}`,\n      \"Fix: point the agent at the same origin (scheme+host+port) the PRM advertises, or fix the PRM `resource` to advertise the agent's own origin.\",\n    ];\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  if (isUrlPrefix(normAdvertised, normAgent)) {\n    // Agent endpoint is a sub-path under the advertised resource identifier.\n    // RFC 9728 §3.2 leaves this open; RFC 9068 §3 + RFC 8707 §2 together\n    // make it the canonical pattern for a single resource server fronting\n    // multiple endpoints under a shared `aud` identifier.\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = `Agent URL is a sub-path under advertised resource identifier (spec-correct per RFC 9728 §2/§3.2)`;\n    base.evidence = [\n      `PRM resource: ${advertised}`,\n      `Agent URL: ${agentUrl}`,\n      `The AS will issue tokens with \\`aud=${advertised}\\`; the agent at \\`${agentUrl}\\` validates that aud against its own resource identifier, not the request URI. This is the intended pattern for a single resource server fronting multiple endpoints.`,\n    ];\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  // Same origin, agent is not a sub-path of advertised resource. The AS may\n  // legitimately host multiple resource identifiers on the same origin, each\n  // covering a disjoint set of endpoints; without inspecting AS aud-binding\n  // policy we can't tell whether this is intended or a misconfiguration.\n  base.verdict = 'possible';\n  base.summary = `Advertised resource \"${advertised}\" does not contain agent URL \"${agentUrl}\" as a sub-path (both on origin ${agentOrigin ?? '(unknown)'})`;\n  base.evidence = [\n    `PRM resource: ${advertised}`,\n    `Agent URL: ${agentUrl}`,\n    'If the AS binds tokens with `aud=<advertised resource>`, this agent endpoint may be outside that audience — confirm the AS aud-binding policy or that the operator advertised the correct resource identifier for this endpoint.',\n  ];\n  return base;\n}\n\nfunction rankH2(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  refreshStep: DiagnosisStep | undefined,\n  refreshedDecoded: DecodedAccessToken | null\n): Hypothesis {\n  const base: Hypothesis = {\n    id: 'H2',\n    title: 'Refresh grant missing `resource` parameter (RFC 8707)',\n    summary: '',\n    verdict: 'not_observed',\n    evidence: [],\n  };\n  if (!refreshStep) {\n    base.summary = 'No token refresh was attempted (skipped, missing refresh_token, or missing client registration)';\n    return base;\n  }\n  if (refreshStep.error) {\n    base.summary = `Token refresh could not run: ${refreshStep.error}`;\n    return base;\n  }\n  if (!refreshStep.http || refreshStep.http.status !== 200) {\n    base.summary = `Token refresh returned HTTP ${refreshStep.http?.status ?? 0}; cannot evaluate aud handling`;\n    base.evidence = refreshStep.http ? [`Body: ${safeStringify(refreshStep.http.body)}`] : [];\n    return base;\n  }\n  if (!refreshedDecoded) {\n    base.verdict = 'possible';\n    base.summary = 'Refreshed token is opaque — audience cannot be inspected from the wire';\n    base.evidence = [\n      'If this agent is a public resource server, an opaque token should still carry `aud` when inspected via introspection.',\n    ];\n    return base;\n  }\n  const result = validateTokenAudience(jwtFromDecoded(refreshedDecoded), agentUrl);\n  if (result.ok) {\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = 'Refreshed token `aud` claim matches the expected resource — AS honors RFC 8707 `resource`';\n    return base;\n  }\n  base.verdict = 'likely';\n  base.summary = 'We asked the AS to refresh with `resource=<agent-url>` but the new token `aud` still does not match';\n  base.evidence = [\n    `Expected aud: ${agentUrl}`,\n    `Actual aud: ${safeStringify(result.actualAudience)}`,\n    'Fix: update the AS to honor RFC 8707 `resource` and emit the corresponding `aud` claim on refresh_token grants.',\n  ];\n  return base;\n}\n\nfunction rankH4(listStep?: DiagnosisStep, toolStep?: DiagnosisStep): Hypothesis {\n  const base: Hypothesis = {\n    id: 'H4',\n    title: 'Agent endpoint returns 401 with no `WWW-Authenticate` (RFC 6750 violation)',\n    summary: '',\n    verdict: 'not_observed',\n    evidence: [],\n  };\n  const unauthed = listStep?.http;\n  const authed = toolStep?.http;\n  const rfc6750Offender = (cap: HttpCapture | undefined) =>\n    cap && cap.status === 401 && !cap.headers['www-authenticate'];\n\n  if (rfc6750Offender(unauthed) || rfc6750Offender(authed)) {\n    base.verdict = 'likely';\n    base.summary = 'Agent returned 401 without a `WWW-Authenticate` header — breaks RFC 6750 §3 and RFC 9728 discovery';\n    base.evidence = [];\n    if (rfc6750Offender(unauthed))\n      base.evidence.push(`unauthenticated tools/list: ${unauthed!.status} (no WWW-Authenticate)`);\n    if (rfc6750Offender(authed))\n      base.evidence.push(`authenticated tools/call: ${authed!.status} (no WWW-Authenticate)`);\n    base.evidence.push('Fix: emit `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error=\"…\", resource_metadata=\"…\"` on 401 responses.');\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  if (\n    (unauthed?.status === 401 && unauthed.headers['www-authenticate']) ||\n    (authed?.status === 401 && authed.headers['www-authenticate'])\n  ) {\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = 'Agent correctly emits a WWW-Authenticate challenge on 401';\n    const challenge = parseWWWAuthenticate(\n      unauthed?.headers['www-authenticate'] ?? authed?.headers['www-authenticate']\n    );\n    if (challenge) {\n      base.evidence = [\n        `Scheme: ${challenge.scheme}`,\n        ...(challenge.error ? [`error: ${challenge.error}`] : []),\n        ...(challenge.resource_metadata ? [`resource_metadata: ${challenge.resource_metadata}`] : []),\n      ];\n    }\n    return base;\n  }\n\n  base.summary = 'No 401 was observed on either probe — cannot evaluate challenge format';\n  return base;\n}\n\nfunction rankH5(\n  agentUrl: string,\n  currentDecoded: DecodedAccessToken | null,\n  prmStep: DiagnosisStep | undefined\n): Hypothesis {\n  const base: Hypothesis = {\n    id: 'H5',\n    title: 'Token `aud` claim missing or does not match agent URL',\n    summary: '',\n    verdict: 'not_observed',\n    evidence: [],\n  };\n  if (!currentDecoded) {\n    base.summary = 'No saved access token was decodable — cannot inspect `aud`';\n    return base;\n  }\n  // Prefer the advertised resource (PRM) when available, fall back to agent URL.\n  const prmResource =\n    prmStep?.http?.body && typeof (prmStep.http.body as { resource?: unknown }).resource === 'string'\n      ? (prmStep.http.body as { resource: string }).resource\n      : undefined;\n  const expected = prmResource ?? agentUrl;\n  const prmDiffersFromAgent =\n    prmResource !== undefined && normalizeForCompare(prmResource) !== normalizeForCompare(agentUrl);\n  const result = validateTokenAudience(jwtFromDecoded(currentDecoded), expected);\n  if (result.ok) {\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = `Saved token \\`aud\\` matches expected resource (${expected})`;\n    if (prmDiffersFromAgent) {\n      base.evidence = [\n        `Compared against advertised PRM resource; agent URL differs (see H1). Token is valid for the resource the AS thinks it's protecting, not for the agent URL you configured.`,\n      ];\n    }\n    return base;\n  }\n  base.verdict = 'likely';\n  base.summary = result.reason ?? 'Saved token audience does not match expected resource';\n  base.evidence = [\n    `Expected: ${expected}${prmDiffersFromAgent ? ' (from PRM; see H1 — agent URL differs)' : ''}`,\n    `Actual aud: ${safeStringify(result.actualAudience ?? '(missing)')}`,\n    'Fix: ensure the AS sets `aud` to the resource URL on token issuance (RFC 9068 §2.2 / RFC 8707).',\n  ];\n  return base;\n}\n\nfunction rankH6(agentUrl: string, currentDecoded: DecodedAccessToken | null, toolStep?: DiagnosisStep): Hypothesis {\n  const base: Hypothesis = {\n    id: 'H6',\n    title: 'Agent accepts token but does not validate audience',\n    summary: '',\n    verdict: 'not_observed',\n    evidence: [],\n  };\n  if (!toolStep?.http || !currentDecoded) {\n    base.summary = 'Need both a decoded token and a tool_call probe to evaluate';\n    return base;\n  }\n  if (toolStep.http.status !== 200) {\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = `tool_call returned HTTP ${toolStep.http.status} — agent did not accept the token blindly`;\n    return base;\n  }\n  const audResult = validateTokenAudience(jwtFromDecoded(currentDecoded), agentUrl);\n  if (audResult.ok) {\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = 'Token `aud` matches agent URL and tool_call succeeded — cannot distinguish from correct behavior';\n    return base;\n  }\n  base.verdict = 'likely';\n  base.summary =\n    'tool_call succeeded with a token whose `aud` does not match the agent URL — agent is not enforcing audience';\n  base.evidence = [\n    `tool_call status: ${toolStep.http.status}`,\n    `Token aud: ${safeStringify(audResult.actualAudience ?? '(missing)')}`,\n    `Agent URL: ${agentUrl}`,\n    'Fix: have the agent reject tokens whose `aud` does not include its own resource URL (RFC 9068).',\n  ];\n  return base;\n}\n\n/**\n * H7 — DCR readiness for client_credentials. Pure capability probe; no\n * attempt to actually register. Flagged `possible` when both a\n * `registration_endpoint` and `client_credentials` in `grant_types_supported`\n * are advertised, so an operator deciding whether to script a throwaway M2M\n * client has a signal. `ruled_out` when one or both are missing.\n */\nfunction rankH7(asStep?: DiagnosisStep): Hypothesis {\n  const base: Hypothesis = {\n    id: 'H7',\n    title: 'Authorization server supports Dynamic Client Registration for client_credentials',\n    summary: '',\n    verdict: 'not_observed',\n    evidence: [],\n  };\n  if (!asStep?.http || asStep.http.status !== 200 || !asStep.http.body || typeof asStep.http.body !== 'object') {\n    base.summary = 'Authorization server metadata not observed';\n    return base;\n  }\n  const md = asStep.http.body as { registration_endpoint?: unknown; grant_types_supported?: unknown };\n  const registrationEndpoint = typeof md.registration_endpoint === 'string' ? md.registration_endpoint : undefined;\n  const grants = Array.isArray(md.grant_types_supported)\n    ? md.grant_types_supported.filter((g: unknown): g is string => typeof g === 'string')\n    : undefined;\n  const supportsCc = grants ? grants.includes('client_credentials') : undefined;\n  if (!registrationEndpoint) {\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = 'No registration_endpoint advertised — DCR not available';\n    base.evidence = ['AS metadata has no registration_endpoint field'];\n    return base;\n  }\n  if (supportsCc === false) {\n    base.verdict = 'ruled_out';\n    base.summary = 'registration_endpoint present but client_credentials not in grant_types_supported';\n    base.evidence = [\n      `registration_endpoint: ${registrationEndpoint}`,\n      `grant_types_supported: [${(grants ?? 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package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/diagnostics.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 function parseWWWAuthenticate(header) {
   if (!header) return null;
   const trimmed = header.trim();

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/diagnostics.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/diagnostics.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * OAuth diagnostics utilities.\n *\n * Small, pure helpers used by `adcp diagnose-auth` and by consumers who want\n * to introspect OAuth wire-level state without rolling their own parsers.\n *\n * None of these helpers perform cryptographic validation. `decodeAccessTokenClaims`\n * reads a JWT without checking its signature, and `validateTokenAudience` only\n * compares the `aud` claim — it does not verify the token is authentic.\n */\n\n/**\n * Parsed WWW-Authenticate challenge (RFC 9110 §11.6.1, RFC 6750, RFC 9728).\n *\n * Only the fields most relevant to OAuth diagnostics are surfaced; unknown\n * auth-params are preserved under `params` so callers can inspect them.\n */\nexport interface WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  /** Auth-scheme token, e.g. \"Bearer\" or \"DPoP\". Always lowercased. */\n  scheme: string;\n  /** `realm` auth-param, if present. */\n  realm?: string;\n  /** `error` auth-param (RFC 6750 §3), e.g. \"invalid_token\". */\n  error?: string;\n  /** `error_description` auth-param (RFC 6750 §3). */\n  error_description?: string;\n  /** `scope` auth-param (RFC 6750 §3). */\n  scope?: string;\n  /** `resource_metadata` auth-param (RFC 9728 §5.3) — URL of the protected-resource metadata document. */\n  resource_metadata?: string;\n  /** All auth-params (lowercased keys), including unknown ones. */\n  params: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a `WWW-Authenticate` header into its auth-scheme and parameters.\n *\n * Handles the single-challenge case used by MCP servers in practice: one scheme\n * (typically `Bearer`) followed by comma-separated `key=value` or `key=\"value\"`\n * auth-params. Returns `null` for an empty or malformed header.\n *\n * Quoted-string values may contain escaped quotes (`\\\"`) and backslashes (`\\\\`),\n * per RFC 9110 §5.6.4; these are unescaped on the way out.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const c = parseWWWAuthenticate(\n *   'Bearer realm=\"api\", error=\"invalid_token\", resource_metadata=\"https://api.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\"'\n * );\n * // c.scheme === 'bearer'\n * // c.error === 'invalid_token'\n * // c.resource_metadata === 'https://api.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource'\n * ```\n */\nexport function parseWWWAuthenticate(header: string | null | undefined): WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null {\n  if (!header) return null;\n  const trimmed = header.trim();\n  if (!trimmed) return null;\n\n  // Scheme is the leading token, up to the first whitespace (or end of string for bare schemes).\n  const schemeMatch = /^([!#$%&'*+\\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z]+)(?:\\s+([\\s\\S]*))?$/.exec(trimmed);\n  if (!schemeMatch) return null;\n\n  const scheme = schemeMatch[1]!.toLowerCase();\n  const rest = schemeMatch[2] ?? 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Ignore and move on.\n      while (i < rest.length && rest[i] !== ',') i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    i++; // skip '='\n    while (i < rest.length && (rest[i] === ' ' || rest[i] === '\\t')) i++;\n\n    // read value: either quoted-string or token\n    let value = '';\n    if (rest[i] === '\"') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < rest.length && rest[i] !== '\"') {\n        if (rest[i] === '\\\\' && i + 1 < rest.length) {\n          value += rest[i + 1];\n          i += 2;\n        } else {\n          value += rest[i];\n          i++;\n        }\n      }\n      if (rest[i] === '\"') i++;\n    } else {\n      const valStart = i;\n      while (i < rest.length && rest[i] !== ',' && rest[i] !== ' ' && rest[i] !== '\\t') i++;\n      value = rest.slice(valStart, i);\n    }\n\n    params[key] = value;\n  }\n\n  return {\n    scheme,\n    realm: params.realm,\n    error: params.error,\n    error_description: params.error_description,\n    scope: params.scope,\n    resource_metadata: params.resource_metadata,\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * JWT header section (first segment), decoded but unverified.\n */\nexport interface DecodedJWTHeader {\n  alg?: string;\n  typ?: string;\n  kid?: string;\n  [key: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * JWT claims section (second segment), decoded but unverified.\n *\n * Standard registered claims (RFC 7519 §4.1) are typed; everything else\n * flows through as `unknown`.\n */\nexport interface DecodedJWTClaims {\n  iss?: string;\n  sub?: string;\n  /** Audience — string or array of strings per RFC 7519. */\n  aud?: string | string[];\n  exp?: number;\n  nbf?: number;\n  iat?: number;\n  jti?: string;\n  scope?: string;\n  [key: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of decoding an access token.\n */\nexport interface DecodedAccessToken {\n  header: DecodedJWTHeader;\n  claims: DecodedJWTClaims;\n  /** Raw signature segment (base64url, unverified). */\n  signature: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a JWT access token without verifying its signature.\n *\n * For diagnostics only — the returned claims MUST NOT be trusted for\n * authorization decisions. 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../../../src/lib/auth/oauth/diagnostics.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * OAuth diagnostics utilities.\n *\n * Small, pure helpers used by `adcp diagnose-auth` and by consumers who want\n * to introspect OAuth wire-level state without rolling their own parsers.\n *\n * None of these helpers perform cryptographic validation. `decodeAccessTokenClaims`\n * reads a JWT without checking its signature, and `validateTokenAudience` only\n * compares the `aud` claim — it does not verify the token is authentic.\n */\n\n/**\n * Parsed WWW-Authenticate challenge (RFC 9110 §11.6.1, RFC 6750, RFC 9728).\n *\n * Only the fields most relevant to OAuth diagnostics are surfaced; unknown\n * auth-params are preserved under `params` so callers can inspect them.\n */\nexport interface WWWAuthenticateChallenge {\n  /** Auth-scheme token, e.g. \"Bearer\" or \"DPoP\". Always lowercased. */\n  scheme: string;\n  /** `realm` auth-param, if present. */\n  realm?: string;\n  /** `error` auth-param (RFC 6750 §3), e.g. \"invalid_token\". */\n  error?: string;\n  /** `error_description` auth-param (RFC 6750 §3). */\n  error_description?: string;\n  /** `scope` auth-param (RFC 6750 §3). */\n  scope?: string;\n  /** `resource_metadata` auth-param (RFC 9728 §5.3) — URL of the protected-resource metadata document. */\n  resource_metadata?: string;\n  /** All auth-params (lowercased keys), including unknown ones. */\n  params: Record<string, string>;\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a `WWW-Authenticate` header into its auth-scheme and parameters.\n *\n * Handles the single-challenge case used by MCP servers in practice: one scheme\n * (typically `Bearer`) followed by comma-separated `key=value` or `key=\"value\"`\n * auth-params. Returns `null` for an empty or malformed header.\n *\n * Quoted-string values may contain escaped quotes (`\\\"`) and backslashes (`\\\\`),\n * per RFC 9110 §5.6.4; these are unescaped on the way out.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * const c = parseWWWAuthenticate(\n *   'Bearer realm=\"api\", error=\"invalid_token\", resource_metadata=\"https://api.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource\"'\n * );\n * // c.scheme === 'bearer'\n * // c.error === 'invalid_token'\n * // c.resource_metadata === 'https://api.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource'\n * ```\n */\nexport function parseWWWAuthenticate(header: string | null | undefined): WWWAuthenticateChallenge | null {\n  if (!header) return null;\n  const trimmed = header.trim();\n  if (!trimmed) return null;\n\n  // Scheme is the leading token, up to the first whitespace (or end of string for bare schemes).\n  const schemeMatch = /^([!#$%&'*+\\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z]+)(?:\\s+([\\s\\S]*))?$/.exec(trimmed);\n  if (!schemeMatch) return null;\n\n  const scheme = schemeMatch[1]!.toLowerCase();\n  const rest = schemeMatch[2] ?? '';\n  const params: Record<string, string> = {};\n\n  // Walk the param list, handling quoted values with backslash escapes.\n  let i = 0;\n  while (i < rest.length) {\n    // skip leading whitespace and commas\n    while (i < rest.length && (rest[i] === ' ' || rest[i] === '\\t' || rest[i] === ',')) i++;\n    if (i >= rest.length) break;\n\n    // read key\n    const keyStart = i;\n    while (i < rest.length && /[!#$%&'*+\\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z]/.test(rest[i]!)) i++;\n    const key = rest.slice(keyStart, i).toLowerCase();\n    if (!key) break;\n\n    // expect '='\n    while (i < rest.length && (rest[i] === ' ' || rest[i] === '\\t')) i++;\n    if (rest[i] !== '=') {\n      // Not a key=value pair — could be a token68. Ignore and move on.\n      while (i < rest.length && rest[i] !== ',') i++;\n      continue;\n    }\n    i++; // skip '='\n    while (i < rest.length && (rest[i] === ' ' || rest[i] === '\\t')) i++;\n\n    // read value: either quoted-string or token\n    let value = '';\n    if (rest[i] === '\"') {\n      i++;\n      while (i < rest.length && rest[i] !== '\"') {\n        if (rest[i] === '\\\\' && i + 1 < rest.length) {\n          value += rest[i + 1];\n          i += 2;\n        } else {\n          value += rest[i];\n          i++;\n        }\n      }\n      if (rest[i] === '\"') i++;\n    } else {\n      const valStart = i;\n      while (i < rest.length && rest[i] !== ',' && rest[i] !== ' ' && rest[i] !== '\\t') i++;\n      value = rest.slice(valStart, i);\n    }\n\n    params[key] = value;\n  }\n\n  return {\n    scheme,\n    realm: params.realm,\n    error: params.error,\n    error_description: params.error_description,\n    scope: params.scope,\n    resource_metadata: params.resource_metadata,\n    params,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * JWT header section (first segment), decoded but unverified.\n */\nexport interface DecodedJWTHeader {\n  alg?: string;\n  typ?: string;\n  kid?: string;\n  [key: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * JWT claims section (second segment), decoded but unverified.\n *\n * Standard registered claims (RFC 7519 §4.1) are typed; everything else\n * flows through as `unknown`.\n */\nexport interface DecodedJWTClaims {\n  iss?: string;\n  sub?: string;\n  /** Audience — string or array of strings per RFC 7519. */\n  aud?: string | string[];\n  exp?: number;\n  nbf?: number;\n  iat?: number;\n  jti?: string;\n  scope?: string;\n  [key: string]: unknown;\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of decoding an access token.\n */\nexport interface DecodedAccessToken {\n  header: DecodedJWTHeader;\n  claims: DecodedJWTClaims;\n  /** Raw signature segment (base64url, unverified). */\n  signature: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a JWT access token without verifying its signature.\n *\n * For diagnostics only — the returned claims MUST NOT be trusted for\n * authorization decisions. Returns `null` if the token is not a well-formed\n * three-part JWT, or if the header/claims segments are not valid JSON.\n *\n * Opaque (non-JWT) tokens always return `null`, which is the expected outcome\n * for servers that issue reference tokens rather than JWTs.\n */\nexport function decodeAccessTokenClaims(token: string | null | undefined): DecodedAccessToken | null {\n  if (!token || typeof token !== 'string') return null;\n\n  const parts = token.split('.');\n  if (parts.length !== 3) return null;\n\n  try {\n    const header = JSON.parse(base64UrlDecode(parts[0]!)) as DecodedJWTHeader;\n    const claims = JSON.parse(base64UrlDecode(parts[1]!)) as DecodedJWTClaims;\n    if (typeof header !== 'object' || header === null) return null;\n    if (typeof claims !== 'object' || claims === null) return null;\n    return { header, claims, signature: parts[2]! };\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of audience validation.\n */\nexport interface TokenAudienceResult {\n  ok: boolean;\n  /** Human-readable reason when `ok` is false. */\n  reason?: string;\n  /** The `aud` claim value actually found in the token (undefined if missing or token unparseable). */\n  actualAudience?: string | string[];\n}\n\n/**\n * Check whether an access token's `aud` claim matches an expected resource URL.\n *\n * Returns `{ ok: true }` when the `aud` claim is a string equal to\n * `expectedResource` (after URL normalization), or is an array containing\n * such a string. 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package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { wrapFetchWithSizeLimit } from "../../protocols/responseSizeLimit.mjs";
 async function discoverOAuthMetadata(agentUrl, options = {}) {
   const { timeout = 5e3, fetch: providedFetch = fetch } = options;

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/discovery.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/file-storage.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import { promises as fs } from "fs";
 import path from "path";
 import { randomBytes } from "crypto";

package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/file-storage.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/lib/auth/oauth/index.mjs

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-import { fileURLToPath as __adcpFileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { dirname as __adcpDirname } from 'node:path';
-import { createRequire as __adcpCreateRequire } from 'node:module';
-const __filename = __adcpFileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
-const __dirname = __adcpDirname(__filename);
-const require = __adcpCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
 import {
   DEFAULT_CLIENT_METADATA,
   OAuthError,