rubik 0.9.1 → 0.11.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (138) hide show
  1. checksums.yaml +4 -4
  2. data/ATTRIBUTION.md +1 -1
  3. data/CHANGELOG.md +203 -1
  4. data/lib/rubik/adapter/base.rb +2 -1
  5. data/lib/rubik/adapter/process.rb +28 -67
  6. data/lib/rubik/ast/extractor.rb +2 -1
  7. data/lib/rubik/ast/treesitter_extractor.rb +2 -1
  8. data/lib/rubik/benchmark/vakanuvis_adoption.rb +12 -4
  9. data/lib/rubik/buffer/apply_contract.rb +3 -3
  10. data/lib/rubik/buffer/apply_transaction.rb +165 -0
  11. data/lib/rubik/buffer/manager.rb +26 -120
  12. data/lib/rubik/config/deep_ops.rb +4 -1
  13. data/lib/rubik/config/defaults.rb +6 -3
  14. data/lib/rubik/config/schema.rb +8 -0
  15. data/lib/rubik/config/secret_policy.rb +198 -0
  16. data/lib/rubik/config/store.rb +2 -1
  17. data/lib/rubik/config.rb +13 -2
  18. data/lib/rubik/context/ignore_rules.rb +193 -0
  19. data/lib/rubik/context/scanner.rb +46 -161
  20. data/lib/rubik/diagnostics/collector.rb +0 -9
  21. data/lib/rubik/errors.rb +15 -0
  22. data/lib/rubik/event_bus.rb +2 -1
  23. data/lib/rubik/kernel/dispatcher.rb +12 -7
  24. data/lib/rubik/kernel/unit.rb +4 -1
  25. data/lib/rubik/llm/client.rb +6 -200
  26. data/lib/rubik/llm/connection_pool.rb +104 -0
  27. data/lib/rubik/llm/registry.rb +13 -9
  28. data/lib/rubik/llm/router.rb +2 -5
  29. data/lib/rubik/llm/sse_parser.rb +110 -0
  30. data/lib/rubik/log.rb +21 -0
  31. data/lib/rubik/lsp/circuit_breaker.rb +98 -0
  32. data/lib/rubik/lsp/client.rb +77 -273
  33. data/lib/rubik/lsp/client_provisioner.rb +49 -0
  34. data/lib/rubik/lsp/manager.rb +67 -96
  35. data/lib/rubik/lsp/transport.rb +365 -0
  36. data/lib/rubik/mcp/boot_lifecycle.rb +6 -2
  37. data/lib/rubik/mcp/boot_run.rb +190 -0
  38. data/lib/rubik/mcp/manager.rb +55 -166
  39. data/lib/rubik/mcp/transport/stdio.rb +4 -1
  40. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/auto_apply.rb +8 -6
  41. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/continuation_manager.rb +3 -22
  42. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/ledger.rb +12 -1
  43. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/schema_vocabulary.rb +38 -0
  44. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/xml_render.rb +6 -1
  45. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger.rb +1 -0
  46. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_session.rb +53 -39
  47. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/loop.rb +28 -47
  48. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/lsp_feedback.rb +1 -1
  49. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/maestro_gate.rb +5 -7
  50. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/provider_recovery.rb +4 -2
  51. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/provider_resolver.rb +4 -2
  52. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/resume_window.rb +96 -0
  53. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/shell_deps.rb +16 -0
  54. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/step_executor.rb +2 -1
  55. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/stream_manager.rb +2 -1
  56. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/deferred_spec.rb +4 -1
  57. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/instance.rb +7 -12
  58. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/lifecycle.rb +3 -1
  59. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/notices.rb +2 -2
  60. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/questioner.rb +3 -1
  61. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/reaper.rb +3 -5
  62. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/resilience.rb +4 -2
  63. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/result_archive.rb +0 -4
  64. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/run_cycle.rb +2 -7
  65. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/spawn_transaction.rb +11 -2
  66. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/step_runner.rb +10 -2
  67. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/transcript_formatter.rb +2 -1
  68. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/type_definition.rb +0 -4
  69. data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/tool_timeout.rb +121 -1
  70. data/lib/rubik/platform/io_drain.rb +5 -2
  71. data/lib/rubik/platform/process.rb +144 -54
  72. data/lib/rubik/platform.rb +2 -1
  73. data/lib/rubik/plugin/manager.rb +2 -1
  74. data/lib/rubik/plugin/storage.rb +8 -8
  75. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_context.rb +8 -7
  76. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_execution.rb +13 -32
  77. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_models.rb +4 -3
  78. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_providers.rb +43 -2
  79. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/base.rb +47 -2
  80. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/buffer.rb +5 -4
  81. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/lsp.rb +2 -1
  82. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/pruner.rb +2 -1
  83. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/secrets.rb +151 -0
  84. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/workspace.rb +60 -150
  85. data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/workspace_approval.rb +209 -0
  86. data/lib/rubik/repl/config_wiring.rb +8 -6
  87. data/lib/rubik/repl/hooks.rb +2 -1
  88. data/lib/rubik/repl/input_execution.rb +162 -79
  89. data/lib/rubik/repl/input_loop.rb +2 -1
  90. data/lib/rubik/repl/lifecycle.rb +60 -210
  91. data/lib/rubik/repl/notice_router.rb +319 -0
  92. data/lib/rubik/repl/paste_support.rb +3 -1
  93. data/lib/rubik/repl/presentation.rb +5 -3
  94. data/lib/rubik/repl/pruner/gate.rb +3 -1
  95. data/lib/rubik/repl/pruner/harness.rb +2 -1
  96. data/lib/rubik/repl/shell.rb +4 -3
  97. data/lib/rubik/repl/tee_io.rb +2 -1
  98. data/lib/rubik/repl/turn_recorder.rb +6 -5
  99. data/lib/rubik/runtime/ast_service.rb +2 -1
  100. data/lib/rubik/runtime/discovery.rb +3 -2
  101. data/lib/rubik/runtime/loop_service.rb +4 -3
  102. data/lib/rubik/runtime/manifest_store.rb +9 -1
  103. data/lib/rubik/runtime/overlay_guard.rb +127 -0
  104. data/lib/rubik/runtime/overlay_storage.rb +109 -163
  105. data/lib/rubik/runtime/task_manager.rb +64 -25
  106. data/lib/rubik/sandbox/driver/docker.rb +5 -1
  107. data/lib/rubik/sandbox/runner.rb +21 -19
  108. data/lib/rubik/security/audit_log.rb +2 -1
  109. data/lib/rubik/security/command_gate.rb +126 -243
  110. data/lib/rubik/security/guard.rb +7 -3
  111. data/lib/rubik/security/secret_store.rb +492 -0
  112. data/lib/rubik/security/segment_report.rb +161 -0
  113. data/lib/rubik/security/synthesis_gate.rb +8 -11
  114. data/lib/rubik/session/manager.rb +7 -1
  115. data/lib/rubik/session/recorder.rb +2 -1
  116. data/lib/rubik/skills/manager.rb +4 -4
  117. data/lib/rubik/storage/search.rb +49 -0
  118. data/lib/rubik/storage/store.rb +13 -20
  119. data/lib/rubik/storage/transcript_indexer.rb +3 -2
  120. data/lib/rubik/storage/vakanuvis/harness.rb +2 -3
  121. data/lib/rubik/storage/vakanuvis.rb +2 -1
  122. data/lib/rubik/tools/base.rb +22 -0
  123. data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/files.rb +3 -15
  124. data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/goal_ledger.rb +12 -1
  125. data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/grep.rb +1 -6
  126. data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/lifecycle.rb +6 -5
  127. data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/synthesis.rb +3 -3
  128. data/lib/rubik/tools/lifecycle_rollbacks.rb +14 -1
  129. data/lib/rubik/tools/preflight_runner.rb +2 -1
  130. data/lib/rubik/tools/truncator.rb +48 -36
  131. data/lib/rubik/tools/uri_resolver.rb +3 -2
  132. data/lib/rubik/ui/banner.rb +4 -3
  133. data/lib/rubik/ui/capability.rb +1 -0
  134. data/lib/rubik/ui/spinner.rb +3 -1
  135. data/lib/rubik/ui/statusline.rb +6 -5
  136. data/lib/rubik/version.rb +1 -1
  137. data/lib/rubik.rb +4 -5
  138. metadata +20 -1
@@ -0,0 +1,492 @@
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+ # frozen_string_literal: true
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+
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+ require "yaml"
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+ require "fileutils"
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+ require "open3"
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+ require "tempfile"
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+ require "tmpdir"
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+ require_relative "../platform"
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+
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+ module Rubik
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+ module Security
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+ # Keeps provider credentials out of plain config files.
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+ #
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+ # Interface (class-level, the only surface callers may use):
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+ # - reference?(value) -> true when value is a stored-secret pointer
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+ # - reference_for(name) -> the pointer string for a SecretStore.name
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+ # - resolve(value) -> pointer -> stored value; anything else as-is
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+ # - set(name, value) -> store secret, return its pointer
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+ # - fetch(name) -> stored value or nil (a miss never raises)
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+ # - delete(name) -> idempotent removal
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+ # - backend_name -> symbol for the active backend
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+ #
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+ # A "name" is the config dot-path that owns the secret, e.g.
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+ # "providers.openai.api_key". Config files never receive the secret
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+ # itself, only the pointer ("rubik-secret:<name>"), so a config file may
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+ # be committed, synced, or shared without leaking credentials.
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+ #
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+ # Backend chain (first available wins, file fallback always exists):
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+ # macOS - Keychain generic passwords via the security CLI; the
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+ # secret travels on stdin (flag-then-stdin mode), never argv
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+ # Windows - Credential Manager via PowerShell PasswordVault; payloads
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+ # travel as env vars into FIXED scripts (secret base64)
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+ # Linux - secret-service D-Bus via secret-tool; secret on stdin
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+ # always - a ruthlessly simple owner-only 0600 YAML store at
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+ # ~/.rubik/secrets.yml — plaintext on disk is the honest
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+ # last resort, surfaced via backend_name
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+ #
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+ # Test seam: SecretStore.backend= injects any object responding to
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+ # read/write/delete, so unit tests never touch a host keyring.
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+ class SecretStore
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+ REFERENCE_PREFIX = "rubik-secret:"
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+ SERVICE = "rubik"
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+ NAME_PATTERN = /\A\w[\w.-]*\z/
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+
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+ class Error < StandardError; end
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+
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+ @monitor = Monitor.new
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+ @backend = nil
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+
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+ class << self
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+ def backend_name
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+ monitor_sync { backend_class_name(backend) }
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+ end
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+
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+ def available?
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+ true
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+ end
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+
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+ def reference?(value)
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+ value.is_a?(String) && value.start_with?(REFERENCE_PREFIX)
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+ end
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+
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+ def reference_for(name)
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+ "#{REFERENCE_PREFIX}#{validate_name!(name)}"
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+ end
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+
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+ def resolve(value)
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+ return value unless reference?(value)
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+
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+ fetch(value.delete_prefix(REFERENCE_PREFIX))
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+ rescue Error
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+ # A hand-edited pointer (empty name, hostile characters) must not
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+ # crash provider builds or REPL boot — an unresolvable reference
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+ # resolves to nil, and Registry warns loudly instead.
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+ nil
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+ end
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+
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+ # Stores the secret and returns its reference. Raises Error when the
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+ # active OS backend refuses; Config decides the fallback policy.
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+ def set(name, value)
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+ validate_name!(name)
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+ value = value.to_s unless value.is_a?(String)
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+ raise Error, "secret value must be a non-empty string" unless value.is_a?(String) && !value.empty?
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+
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+ backend.write(name, value)
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+ reference_for(name)
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+ end
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+
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+ def fetch(name)
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+ validate_name!(name)
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+ backend.read(name)
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+ end
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+
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+ def delete(name)
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+ validate_name!(name)
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+ backend.delete(name)
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+ true
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+ end
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+
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+ # Test seam: inject a backend object responding to read/write/delete.
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+ def backend=(backend_obj)
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+ monitor_sync { @backend = backend_obj }
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+ end
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+
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+ def reset!
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+ monitor_sync { @backend = nil }
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+ end
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+
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+ private
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+
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+ def backend
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+ monitor_sync { @backend ||= select_backend }
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+ end
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+
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+ def monitor_sync(&)
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+ @monitor.synchronize(&)
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+ end
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+
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+ def validate_name!(name)
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+ name_str = name.to_s
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+ return name_str if name_str.match?(NAME_PATTERN)
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+
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+ raise Error, "invalid secret name: #{name_str.inspect} (expected a dot-path like providers.openai.api_key)"
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+ end
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+ end
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+
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+ # Shared command plumbing. Backends are the internal seam; tests may
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+ # subclass and override #run to avoid touching a host keyring.
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+ class CommandBackend
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+ # Deadline for the stdin payload write (see #run).
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+ STDIN_WRITE_TIMEOUT = 5.0
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+
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+ private
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+
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+ # Single spawn point for every backend: receives a fully-formed
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+ # argument vector (never a shell string) plus optional stdin payload.
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+ #
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+ # The stdin payload travels through Platform.write_until so a backend
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+ # that never reads its stdin (headless keychain denial, crashed
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+ # secret service) fails with a deadline instead of parking the
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+ # caller forever on a full OS pipe buffer. Every IO failure — a
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+ # backend that died before reading stdin raising EPIPE, a spawn
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+ # failure — is converted to Error, because every caller (resolve,
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+ # set, delete, SecretPolicy, the !secrets commands) rescues only
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+ # that class.
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+ def run(argv, input: nil, env: nil)
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+ env_hash = env.is_a?(Hash) ? env : {}
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+ merged = ENV.to_h.merge(env_hash)
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+ Open3.popen3(merged, *argv) do |pin, pout, perr, waiter|
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+ begin
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+ Rubik::Platform.write_until(pin, input.to_s, timeout: STDIN_WRITE_TIMEOUT)
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+ ensure
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+ begin
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+ pin.close
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+ rescue IOError, SystemCallError
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+ nil
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+ end
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+ end
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+ [pout.read, perr.read, waiter.value]
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+ end
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+ rescue IOError, SystemCallError => e
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+ raise Error, "secret backend command failed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}"
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+ end
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+ end
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+
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+ class MacosKeychainBackend < CommandBackend
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+ SECURITY = "/usr/bin/security"
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+
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+ def self.available?
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+ Rubik::Platform.macos? && File.executable?(SECURITY)
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+ end
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+
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+ def write(name, value)
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+ out, err, st = run(security_write_argv(name), input: value)
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+ return true if st.success?
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+
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+ raise Error, "keychain write failed (#{st.exitstatus}): #{err} #{out}"
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+ end
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+
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+ def read(name)
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+ out, _err, st = run(security_read_argv(name))
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+ # 44 = errSecItemNotFound (honest miss); any other nonzero exit is
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+ # a denied/failed lookup and must not surface as an empty key.
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+ return nil unless st.success? || st.exitstatus == 44
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+
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+ # The CLI appends exactly one newline; chomp (not strip) so
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+ # legitimate leading/trailing whitespace in the secret survives.
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+ val = out.chomp
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+ val.empty? ? nil : val
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+ end
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+
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+ def delete(name)
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+ _out, _err, _st = run(security_delete_argv(name))
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+ true
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+ end
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+
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+ private
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+
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+ # The security CLI owns this contract: "-w" with no value asks the
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+ # tool to read the password from its standard input, so the secret
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+ # never rides argv or `ps` output.
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+ def security_write_argv(name)
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+ [SECURITY, "add-generic-password", "-U", "-s", SERVICE, "-a", name, "-w"]
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+ end
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+
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+ def security_read_argv(name)
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+ [SECURITY, "find-generic-password", "-s", SERVICE, "-a", name, "-w"]
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+ end
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+
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+ def security_delete_argv(name)
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+ [SECURITY, "delete-generic-password", "-s", SERVICE, "-a", name]
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+ end
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+ end
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+
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+ class WindowsCredManBackend < CommandBackend
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+ PS = "powershell.exe"
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+
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+ def self.available?
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+ Rubik::Platform.windows? && WindowsCredManBackend.find_in_path(PS)
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+ end
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+
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+ def self.find_in_path(binary)
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+ ENV["PATH"].to_s.split(File::PATH_SEPARATOR).any? do |dir|
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+ File.executable?(File.join(dir, binary))
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+ end
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+ end
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+
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+ def write(name, value)
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+ # The secret travels base64-encoded through the environment into a
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+ # FIXED script: no caller-controlled text is interpolated into any
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+ # command string, and the base64 alphabet cannot carry metacharacters.
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+ payload = {
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+ "RUBIK_SECRET_NAME" => name,
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+ "RUBIK_SECRET_VALUE_B64" => [value].pack("m0")
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+ }
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+ _out, err, st = run(write_script_argv, env: payload)
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+ # $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop' makes the script exit nonzero on
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+ # any vault failure; ignoring the status would hand back a dangling
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+ # pointer while reporting success.
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+ return true if st.success?
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+
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+ raise Error, "PasswordVault write failed (#{st.exitstatus}): #{err.to_s.strip}"
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+ end
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+
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+ def read(name)
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+ out, = run(read_script_argv, env: name_payload(name))
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+ encoded = out.to_s.strip
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+ encoded.empty? ? nil : encoded.unpack1("m0").force_encoding(Encoding::UTF_8)
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+ end
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+
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+ def delete(name)
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+ run(delete_script_argv, env: name_payload(name))
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+ true
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+ end
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+
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+ # FIXED scripts (frozen at load, no interpolation): WinRT
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+ # PasswordVault via Windows PowerShell 5.1, present on every
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+ # supported Windows release. cmdkey cannot read secrets back, so the
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+ # vault API is the only stdlib-reachable read path.
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+ WRITE_PS = <<~PS
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+ $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
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+ [void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Foundation,ContentType=WindowsRuntime]
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+ $v = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault
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+ $p = [Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String($env:RUBIK_SECRET_VALUE_B64))
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+ $c = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordCredential('rubik', $env:RUBIK_SECRET_NAME, $p)
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+ $v.Add($c)
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+ Write-Output 'ok'
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+ PS
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+
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+ READ_PS = <<~PS
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+ $ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
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+ [void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Foundation,ContentType=WindowsRuntime]
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+ $v = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault
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+ $c = $v.Retrieve('rubik', $env:RUBIK_SECRET_NAME)
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+ $c.RetrievePassword()
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+ Write-Output ([Convert]::ToBase64String([Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes($c.Password)))
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+ PS
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+
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+ DELETE_PS = <<~PS
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+ [void][Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault,Windows.Foundation,ContentType=WindowsRuntime]
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+ $v = New-Object Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault
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+ try { $c = $v.Retrieve('rubik', $env:RUBIK_SECRET_NAME); $v.Remove($c) } catch { }
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+ Write-Output 'ok'
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+ PS
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+
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+ private
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+
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+ def name_payload(name)
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+ { "RUBIK_SECRET_NAME" => name }
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+ end
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+
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+ def write_script_argv
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+ [PS, "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", WRITE_PS]
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+ end
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+
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+ def read_script_argv
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+ [PS, "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", READ_PS]
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+ end
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+
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+ def delete_script_argv
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+ [PS, "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", DELETE_PS]
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+ end
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+ end
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+
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+ class LinuxSecretToolBackend < CommandBackend
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+ TOOL = "secret-tool"
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+
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+ def self.available?
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+ return false unless Rubik::Platform.linux? && LinuxSecretToolBackend.find_in_path(TOOL)
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+
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+ # Canary probe: headless boxes ship the binary without a running
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+ # secret service ("Cannot autolaunch D-Bus"), so binary presence
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+ # alone lies. A missed lookup (exit 1) is a working service; a
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+ # crashed lookup (other nonzero) is not.
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+ new.canary_ok?
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+ end
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+
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+ def self.find_in_path(binary)
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+ ENV["PATH"].to_s.split(File::PATH_SEPARATOR).any? do |dir|
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+ File.executable?(File.join(dir, binary))
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+ end
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+ end
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+
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+ def write(name, value)
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+ # secret-tool store ADDS a new item; it does not upsert, and
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+ # lookup concatenates the payloads of every matching item — a
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+ # re-set secret would silently resolve to "key1key2". Clear any
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+ # prior items first so set is idempotent (mirroring the -U flag
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+ # the macOS backend passes to add-generic-password).
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+ run(clear_argv(name))
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+ _out, err, st = run(store_argv(name), input: value)
332
+ return true if st.success?
333
+
334
+ raise Error, "secret-tool store failed (#{st.exitstatus}): #{err}"
335
+ end
336
+
337
+ def read(name)
338
+ out, = run(lookup_argv(name))
339
+ val = out.to_s.strip
340
+ val.empty? ? nil : val
341
+ end
342
+
343
+ def delete(name)
344
+ run(clear_argv(name))
345
+ true
346
+ end
347
+
348
+ def canary_ok?
349
+ _out, _err, st = run(lookup_argv("rubik-availability-probe"))
350
+ st.exitstatus == 1 || st.success?
351
+ end
352
+
353
+ private
354
+
355
+ # The secret travels on stdin — never argv — per secret-service
356
+ # convention; attrs (service, account) name the lookup key.
357
+ def store_argv(name)
358
+ [TOOL, "store", "--label=rubik", "service", SERVICE, "account", name]
359
+ end
360
+
361
+ def lookup_argv(name)
362
+ [TOOL, "lookup", "service", SERVICE, "account", name]
363
+ end
364
+
365
+ def clear_argv(name)
366
+ [TOOL, "clear", "service", SERVICE, "account", name]
367
+ end
368
+ end
369
+
370
+ # The always-present fallback: owner-only store next to the global
371
+ # config, created 0600 from the first byte (same discipline as
372
+ # Config::Store#ensure_owner_only!), atomic replace on every write.
373
+ class FileBackend
374
+ def initialize(path = default_path)
375
+ @path = path
376
+ end
377
+
378
+ attr_reader :path
379
+
380
+ def write(name, value)
381
+ ensure_owner_only!
382
+ data = read_all
383
+ data[name] = value
384
+ atomic_replace(data)
385
+ end
386
+
387
+ def read(name)
388
+ read_all[name]
389
+ end
390
+
391
+ def delete(name)
392
+ data = read_all
393
+ data.delete(name)
394
+ atomic_replace(data)
395
+ true
396
+ end
397
+
398
+ private
399
+
400
+ def read_all
401
+ return {} unless File.exist?(@path)
402
+
403
+ parsed = YAML.safe_load_file(@path, permitted_classes: [], aliases: false)
404
+ parsed.is_a?(Hash) ? parsed : {}
405
+ rescue Psych::Exception
406
+ {}
407
+ end
408
+
409
+ def atomic_replace(data)
410
+ dir = File.dirname(@path)
411
+ FileUtils.mkdir_p(dir)
412
+ # Tempfile.new (NOT the block form of Tempfile.create, which
413
+ # unlinks the file when the block exits): the temp file must
414
+ # SURVIVE until the rename, and must be CLOSED before it —
415
+ # Windows refuses to rename an open file.
416
+ tmp = Tempfile.new("rubik-secrets-", dir)
417
+ begin
418
+ tmp.write(YAML.dump(data))
419
+ tmp.flush
420
+ tmp.chmod(0o600)
421
+ tmp.close
422
+ File.rename(tmp.path, @path)
423
+ rescue SystemCallError
424
+ # Windows rename can still refuse an existing destination:
425
+ # fall back to a short delete-then-rename window.
426
+ tmp.close
427
+ FileUtils.rm_f(@path)
428
+ File.rename(tmp.path, @path)
429
+ ensure
430
+ tmp.close
431
+ tmp.unlink
432
+ end
433
+ rescue SystemCallError => e
434
+ raise Error, "secret file store write failed: #{e.message}"
435
+ end
436
+
437
+ def ensure_owner_only!
438
+ FileUtils.touch(@path) unless File.exist?(@path)
439
+ File.chmod(0o600, @path)
440
+ rescue SystemCallError
441
+ nil
442
+ end
443
+
444
+ def default_path
445
+ home = if defined?(Rubik::Platform) && Rubik::Platform.respond_to?(:home_dir)
446
+ begin
447
+ Rubik::Platform.home_dir
448
+ rescue StandardError
449
+ nil
450
+ end
451
+ else
452
+ ENV["USERPROFILE"] || ENV.fetch("HOME", nil)
453
+ end
454
+ # No "." fallback: an owner-only secret store must never land in
455
+ # the working tree just because HOME is unset.
456
+ raise Error, "no home directory available for the secret file store (set HOME/USERPROFILE)" if home.nil? || home.to_s.strip.empty?
457
+
458
+ File.join(home.to_s, ".rubik", "secrets.yml")
459
+ end
460
+ end
461
+
462
+ def self.select_backend
463
+ # Test armor (RUBIK_TEST=1, the repo-wide convention): a test run
464
+ # must NEVER touch the host keyring, even through an un-injected
465
+ # path — an interactive-authorization `security` spawn on a headless
466
+ # CI runner hangs forever. Un-injected tests get the owner-only
467
+ # file store in a temp location instead.
468
+ return FileBackend.new(test_file_backend_path) if ENV["RUBIK_TEST"] == "1"
469
+
470
+ [MacosKeychainBackend, WindowsCredManBackend, LinuxSecretToolBackend].each do |klass|
471
+ return klass.new if klass.available?
472
+ end
473
+ FileBackend.new
474
+ end
475
+
476
+ # Process-unique path so parallel test workers cannot observe each
477
+ # other's writes; stays under the OS tempdir, never the worktree.
478
+ def self.test_file_backend_path
479
+ File.join(Dir.tmpdir, "rubik-test-secrets-#{Process.pid}.yml")
480
+ end
481
+
482
+ def self.backend_class_name(backend_obj)
483
+ case backend_obj
484
+ when MacosKeychainBackend then :macos_keychain
485
+ when WindowsCredManBackend then :windows_credman
486
+ when LinuxSecretToolBackend then :linux_secret_service
487
+ else :file
488
+ end
489
+ end
490
+ end
491
+ end
492
+ end
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
1
+ # frozen_string_literal: true
2
+
3
+ module Rubik
4
+ module Security
5
+ # Structured guidance-evidence builder for blocked dangerous commands
6
+ # (#500): every innermost dangerous segment with its trigger, the sibling
7
+ # commands that passed, a one-line wrapper preview, and the allowlist
8
+ # entries that would actually open the gate. A pure function from the
9
+ # classified command tree to a frozen plain-data hash — deliberately
10
+ # loadable WITHOUT the classifier stack, so BlockedWriteError guidance
11
+ # never drags the classifier in. nil when no single command is dangerous
12
+ # (expression-level elevations keep the scalar rule_name guidance path).
13
+ module SegmentReport
14
+ # Display caps for the blocked-segment report (guidance rendering, not
15
+ # gate semantics): one segment's argv rendering and the one-line
16
+ # wrapper preview never exceed these.
17
+ SEGMENT_DISPLAY_CAP = 120
18
+ WRAPPER_PREVIEW_CAP = 60
19
+
20
+ # Build the report for the given classified command tree; see the
21
+ # module comment for shape and the nil contract.
22
+ def build(commands)
23
+ segments = []
24
+ safe = []
25
+ safe_top_argv = []
26
+ wrappers = []
27
+ collect_dangerous_units(commands, 0, segments, safe, safe_top_argv, wrappers)
28
+ return nil if segments.empty?
29
+
30
+ # The gate (command_allowlisted?) matches EVERY top-level command,
31
+ # safe ones included — the entry set must cover them all to be
32
+ # honest: wrapper prefix + top-level dangerous segments + top-level
33
+ # safe units.
34
+ entries = wrappers.map { |w| wrapper_allowlist_entry(w) }
35
+ entries += segments.select { |s| s[:depth].zero? }.map { |s| allowlist_entry_for_argv(s[:argv]) }
36
+ entries += safe_top_argv.map { |argv| allowlist_entry_for_argv(argv) }
37
+
38
+ {
39
+ segments: segments,
40
+ safe: safe.uniq,
41
+ wrapper_preview: wrappers.empty? ? nil : wrapper_preview(wrappers.first),
42
+ allowlist_entries: entries.uniq
43
+ }.freeze
44
+ end
45
+
46
+ # Depth-first walk over the classified command tree. A dangerous
47
+ # command whose danger comes from dangerous inners contributes those
48
+ # inner leaves instead of itself (bash -c "rm -rf /" reports the inner
49
+ # rm, not the wrapper); a dangerous leaf is a segment; non-dangerous
50
+ # leaves join the passed roll call. Top-level wrappers (dangerous only
51
+ # through their inners) are tracked separately for preview + hint;
52
+ # top-level safe units keep their argv for the gate-honest entry set.
53
+ def collect_dangerous_units(commands, depth, segments, safe, safe_top_argv, wrappers)
54
+ Array(commands).each do |c|
55
+ inners = Array(c.inner_commands)
56
+ before = segments.size
57
+ collect_dangerous_units(inners, depth + 1, segments, safe, safe_top_argv, wrappers)
58
+ added = segments.size - before
59
+
60
+ if c.classification == :dangerous
61
+ if added.positive?
62
+ wrappers << c if depth.zero?
63
+ else
64
+ segments << dangerous_segment_data(c, depth)
65
+ end
66
+ elsif inners.empty?
67
+ safe << safe_segment_name(c)
68
+ safe_top_argv << c.argv.dup if depth.zero?
69
+ end
70
+ end
71
+ end
72
+
73
+ def dangerous_segment_data(result, depth)
74
+ argv = Array(result.argv)
75
+ {
76
+ display: segment_display(display_tokens(argv, result)),
77
+ argv: argv.dup.freeze,
78
+ rule: result.matched_rule,
79
+ option: result.overriding_option,
80
+ reason: result.classification_reason,
81
+ depth: depth
82
+ }
83
+ end
84
+
85
+ # Redirect-bearing segments (delegated inners) render their effects,
86
+ # not just their argv: `echo pwned > /etc/shadow`, not `echo pwned`.
87
+ # Flat operator/target tokens keep segment_display's quoting correct;
88
+ # argv itself stays pure — allowlist entries derive from it.
89
+ def display_tokens(argv, result)
90
+ reds = result.respond_to?(:redirects) ? Array(result.redirects) : []
91
+ reds.empty? ? argv : argv + reds.flat_map { |r| [r.operator, r.target] }
92
+ end
93
+
94
+ # Subcommand-aware roll call of the units that passed ("git checkout",
95
+ # not just "git") — matches the operator's mental model of the script.
96
+ def safe_segment_name(result)
97
+ result.command.join(" ")
98
+ end
99
+
100
+ # One-line wrapper preview for the guidance first line. The delegated
101
+ # payload (the whole -c script) is the argv token that contains
102
+ # whitespace — elide it so the full script is never re-embedded in the
103
+ # message (the defect this report exists to fix).
104
+ def wrapper_preview(result)
105
+ argv = Array(result.argv)
106
+ tokens = argv.dup
107
+ tokens[-1] = "'...'" if tokens.size > 1 && tokens[-1].to_s.match?(/\s/)
108
+ preview = segment_display(tokens)
109
+ preview.length > WRAPPER_PREVIEW_CAP ? "#{preview[0, WRAPPER_PREVIEW_CAP - 1]}..." : preview
110
+ end
111
+
112
+ # Shortest top-level argv prefix that actually satisfies the gate's
113
+ # token-prefix match (command_allowlisted?): the wrapper binary up to
114
+ # and including its delegation flag for flag-value payloads
115
+ # ("bash -c", "bash -e -c"), the bare binary for rest-argv wrappers
116
+ # ("sudo", "xargs"). Deriving it from delegation_source keeps the hint
117
+ # gate-honest for flag permutations a naive first-two-tokens guess
118
+ # would miss.
119
+ def wrapper_allowlist_entry(wrapper)
120
+ argv = Array(wrapper.argv)
121
+ return argv.first.to_s if argv.size <= 1
122
+
123
+ first_inner = Array(wrapper.inner_commands).first
124
+ if first_inner&.delegation_mode.to_s == "flag_value_is_expression"
125
+ idx = argv.index(first_inner.delegation_source)
126
+ return argv[0..idx].join(" ") if idx&.positive?
127
+ end
128
+ argv.first.to_s
129
+ end
130
+
131
+ # An allowlist entry can only carry whitespace-free tokens:
132
+ # normalize_allowlist splits entries on whitespace, so an argv token
133
+ # containing spaces ("feature x") can never be matched by an entry.
134
+ # Prefix up to (excluding) the first such token.
135
+ def allowlist_entry_for_argv(argv)
136
+ prefix = []
137
+ Array(argv).each do |token|
138
+ break if token.to_s.match?(/\s/)
139
+
140
+ prefix << token
141
+ end
142
+ prefix.empty? ? Array(argv).first.to_s : prefix.join(" ")
143
+ end
144
+
145
+ # Display-only rendering: collapse newlines, single-quote tokens that
146
+ # contain whitespace, hard-cap length. Shellwords.escape would
147
+ # backslash-quote every token (noise on Windows paths) — quote
148
+ # conditionally instead.
149
+ def segment_display(argv)
150
+ text = argv.map { |t| t.to_s.tr("\r\n", " ") }
151
+ .map { |t| t.match?(/\s/) ? "'#{t}'" : t }
152
+ .join(" ")
153
+ text.length > SEGMENT_DISPLAY_CAP ? "#{text[0, SEGMENT_DISPLAY_CAP - 1]}..." : text
154
+ end
155
+
156
+ module_function :build, :collect_dangerous_units, :dangerous_segment_data, :display_tokens,
157
+ :safe_segment_name, :wrapper_preview, :wrapper_allowlist_entry,
158
+ :allowlist_entry_for_argv, :segment_display
159
+ end
160
+ end
161
+ end
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
1
1
  # frozen_string_literal: true
2
2
 
3
+ require_relative "../log"
3
4
  require_relative "errors"
4
5
 
5
6
  module Rubik
@@ -181,21 +182,17 @@ module Rubik
181
182
  # spawn-boundary re-check). A guard lacking verify_synthesis_safety!
182
183
  # is downgraded to the shell-only gate — the duck-typed fallback is a
183
184
  # test-double affordance, but skipping the entire AST deny surface is
184
- # security-observable, so the downgrade is loud. $stderr.puts, not
185
- # Kernel#warn: warn is silenced when $VERBOSE is nil (bundler/rake
186
- # -W0) — same ruling as Log.emit. A failing emit is fail-closed AND
187
- # honest: refusal with the real cause, never a misattributed
188
- # "dangerous operations".
185
+ # security-observable, so the downgrade is loud. Routed through
186
+ # Rubik::Log (:security, issue #452): Log.emit uses $stderr.puts, not
187
+ # Kernel#warn, so the line survives $VERBOSE=nil (bundler/rake -W0),
188
+ # and Log's error isolation absorbs a broken emit target — the gate
189
+ # then proceeds through verify_command_safety!, whose own failures
190
+ # still fail closed.
189
191
  def self.run_synthesis_gate(guard, code)
190
192
  if guard.respond_to?(:verify_synthesis_safety!)
191
193
  guard.verify_synthesis_safety!(code)
192
194
  else
193
- begin
194
- $stderr.puts "[Synthesize] guard lacks verify_synthesis_safety!; downgraded to shell-only gate" # rubocop:disable Style/StderrPuts
195
- rescue StandardError => e
196
- raise BlockedWriteError,
197
- "guard downgrade warn could not be written to stderr (#{e.class}: #{e.message}); refusing to eval"
198
- end
195
+ Rubik::Log.warn(:security, "[Synthesize] guard lacks verify_synthesis_safety!; downgraded to shell-only gate")
199
196
  guard.verify_command_safety!(code)
200
197
  end
201
198
  end