rubik 0.9.1 → 0.11.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- checksums.yaml +4 -4
- data/ATTRIBUTION.md +1 -1
- data/CHANGELOG.md +203 -1
- data/lib/rubik/adapter/base.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/adapter/process.rb +28 -67
- data/lib/rubik/ast/extractor.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/ast/treesitter_extractor.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/benchmark/vakanuvis_adoption.rb +12 -4
- data/lib/rubik/buffer/apply_contract.rb +3 -3
- data/lib/rubik/buffer/apply_transaction.rb +165 -0
- data/lib/rubik/buffer/manager.rb +26 -120
- data/lib/rubik/config/deep_ops.rb +4 -1
- data/lib/rubik/config/defaults.rb +6 -3
- data/lib/rubik/config/schema.rb +8 -0
- data/lib/rubik/config/secret_policy.rb +198 -0
- data/lib/rubik/config/store.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/config.rb +13 -2
- data/lib/rubik/context/ignore_rules.rb +193 -0
- data/lib/rubik/context/scanner.rb +46 -161
- data/lib/rubik/diagnostics/collector.rb +0 -9
- data/lib/rubik/errors.rb +15 -0
- data/lib/rubik/event_bus.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/kernel/dispatcher.rb +12 -7
- data/lib/rubik/kernel/unit.rb +4 -1
- data/lib/rubik/llm/client.rb +6 -200
- data/lib/rubik/llm/connection_pool.rb +104 -0
- data/lib/rubik/llm/registry.rb +13 -9
- data/lib/rubik/llm/router.rb +2 -5
- data/lib/rubik/llm/sse_parser.rb +110 -0
- data/lib/rubik/log.rb +21 -0
- data/lib/rubik/lsp/circuit_breaker.rb +98 -0
- data/lib/rubik/lsp/client.rb +77 -273
- data/lib/rubik/lsp/client_provisioner.rb +49 -0
- data/lib/rubik/lsp/manager.rb +67 -96
- data/lib/rubik/lsp/transport.rb +365 -0
- data/lib/rubik/mcp/boot_lifecycle.rb +6 -2
- data/lib/rubik/mcp/boot_run.rb +190 -0
- data/lib/rubik/mcp/manager.rb +55 -166
- data/lib/rubik/mcp/transport/stdio.rb +4 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/auto_apply.rb +8 -6
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/continuation_manager.rb +3 -22
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/ledger.rb +12 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/schema_vocabulary.rb +38 -0
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger/xml_render.rb +6 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_ledger.rb +1 -0
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/goal_session.rb +53 -39
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/loop.rb +28 -47
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/lsp_feedback.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/maestro_gate.rb +5 -7
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/provider_recovery.rb +4 -2
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/provider_resolver.rb +4 -2
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/resume_window.rb +96 -0
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/shell_deps.rb +16 -0
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/step_executor.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/stream_manager.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/deferred_spec.rb +4 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/instance.rb +7 -12
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/lifecycle.rb +3 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/notices.rb +2 -2
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/questioner.rb +3 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/reaper.rb +3 -5
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/resilience.rb +4 -2
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/result_archive.rb +0 -4
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/run_cycle.rb +2 -7
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/spawn_transaction.rb +11 -2
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/step_runner.rb +10 -2
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/transcript_formatter.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/subagent/type_definition.rb +0 -4
- data/lib/rubik/orchestrator/tool_timeout.rb +121 -1
- data/lib/rubik/platform/io_drain.rb +5 -2
- data/lib/rubik/platform/process.rb +144 -54
- data/lib/rubik/platform.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/plugin/manager.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/plugin/storage.rb +8 -8
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_context.rb +8 -7
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_execution.rb +13 -32
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_models.rb +4 -3
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/agent_providers.rb +43 -2
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/base.rb +47 -2
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/buffer.rb +5 -4
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/lsp.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/pruner.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/secrets.rb +151 -0
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/workspace.rb +60 -150
- data/lib/rubik/repl/commands/workspace_approval.rb +209 -0
- data/lib/rubik/repl/config_wiring.rb +8 -6
- data/lib/rubik/repl/hooks.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/input_execution.rb +162 -79
- data/lib/rubik/repl/input_loop.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/lifecycle.rb +60 -210
- data/lib/rubik/repl/notice_router.rb +319 -0
- data/lib/rubik/repl/paste_support.rb +3 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/presentation.rb +5 -3
- data/lib/rubik/repl/pruner/gate.rb +3 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/pruner/harness.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/shell.rb +4 -3
- data/lib/rubik/repl/tee_io.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/repl/turn_recorder.rb +6 -5
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/ast_service.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/discovery.rb +3 -2
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/loop_service.rb +4 -3
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/manifest_store.rb +9 -1
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/overlay_guard.rb +127 -0
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/overlay_storage.rb +109 -163
- data/lib/rubik/runtime/task_manager.rb +64 -25
- data/lib/rubik/sandbox/driver/docker.rb +5 -1
- data/lib/rubik/sandbox/runner.rb +21 -19
- data/lib/rubik/security/audit_log.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/security/command_gate.rb +126 -243
- data/lib/rubik/security/guard.rb +7 -3
- data/lib/rubik/security/secret_store.rb +492 -0
- data/lib/rubik/security/segment_report.rb +161 -0
- data/lib/rubik/security/synthesis_gate.rb +8 -11
- data/lib/rubik/session/manager.rb +7 -1
- data/lib/rubik/session/recorder.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/skills/manager.rb +4 -4
- data/lib/rubik/storage/search.rb +49 -0
- data/lib/rubik/storage/store.rb +13 -20
- data/lib/rubik/storage/transcript_indexer.rb +3 -2
- data/lib/rubik/storage/vakanuvis/harness.rb +2 -3
- data/lib/rubik/storage/vakanuvis.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/tools/base.rb +22 -0
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/files.rb +3 -15
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/goal_ledger.rb +12 -1
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/grep.rb +1 -6
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/lifecycle.rb +6 -5
- data/lib/rubik/tools/builtins/synthesis.rb +3 -3
- data/lib/rubik/tools/lifecycle_rollbacks.rb +14 -1
- data/lib/rubik/tools/preflight_runner.rb +2 -1
- data/lib/rubik/tools/truncator.rb +48 -36
- data/lib/rubik/tools/uri_resolver.rb +3 -2
- data/lib/rubik/ui/banner.rb +4 -3
- data/lib/rubik/ui/capability.rb +1 -0
- data/lib/rubik/ui/spinner.rb +3 -1
- data/lib/rubik/ui/statusline.rb +6 -5
- data/lib/rubik/version.rb +1 -1
- data/lib/rubik.rb +4 -5
- metadata +20 -1
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@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
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# frozen_string_literal: true
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require "shellwords"
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require_relative "../log"
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require_relative "allowlist"
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require_relative "classifier"
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require_relative "errors"
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require_relative "segment_report"
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module Rubik
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module Security
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@@ -57,12 +59,6 @@ module Rubik
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/%0\|%0/
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].freeze
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# Display caps for the blocked-segment report (guidance rendering, not
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# gate semantics): one segment's argv rendering and the one-line
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# wrapper preview never exceed these.
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SEGMENT_DISPLAY_CAP = 120
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WRAPPER_PREVIEW_CAP = 60
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# Salt version/help probe'ları (Plan: safe-probe muafiyeti): a command
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# whose ONLY arguments are these flags is read-only by construction.
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SAFE_PROBE_FLAGS = ["--version", "-v", "--help", "-h"].freeze
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# Safe-probe exemption (highest-priority friction fix): run the
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# catastrophic fallback regex first — it never loosens.
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# Strictly single, isolated command without inner commands or chains.
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ast.respond_to?(:parse_warnings) && ast.parse_warnings.to_a.empty? &&
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(!ast.commands.first.respond_to?(:inner_commands) || ast.commands.first.inner_commands.nil? || ast.commands.first.inner_commands.empty?)
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if single_cmd && safe_probe?(cmd_str)
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if isolated_single_command?(ast) && safe_probe?(cmd_str)
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verify_command_fallback_regex!(cmd_str)
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@audit.log_audit("safe_probe", command: cmd_str, reason: "safe_probe_exemption")
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return true
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# the per-command walk bottoms out at its sentinel while the
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# composed evidence travels on the ExpressionResult itself.
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expression_reason = walk_reason == "dangerous_ast" ? expression_level_reason(ast) : nil
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# regex still runs afterwards — allowlisting never bypasses it.
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# A bug in the gate itself must fail closed, not fall through to
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# the regex-only downgrade below.
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allowlisted = allowlisted_fail_closed(ast, cmd_str)
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if allowlisted
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verify_command_fallback_regex!(cmd_str)
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return true
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end
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# Enrichment must never be able to un-block: a bug in the report
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report = begin
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dangerous_segment_report(ast.commands)
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warn "[Guard] segment report failed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}"
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nil
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end
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@audit.log_audit("blocked_command", command: cmd_str, reason: reason,
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dangerous_segments: segment_count(report))
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# probe_shape? (not safe_probe?): probes only reach this raise when
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# the exemption is disabled, so safe_probe? would be constantly
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# false and the variant-(a) guidance dead code.
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raise BlockedWriteError.new(
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"Dangerous command execution blocked: #{cmd_str} (reason: #{reason})",
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kind: :dangerous_command,
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blocked_command: cmd_str,
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rule_name: dangerous_rule_name(ast.commands) || (expression_reason ? "expression_level" : "dangerous_pattern"),
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probe_like: probe_shape?(cmd_str),
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segment_report: report,
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classification_reason: expression_reason
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)
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return true if operator_allowlist_pass?(ast, cmd_str)
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block_dangerous_command!(ast, cmd_str, reason: expression_reason || walk_reason, expression_reason: expression_reason)
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end
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# UNKNOWN is fail-closed, not pass-through: the matcher rates every
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allowlisted = allowlisted_fail_closed(ast, cmd_str)
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if allowlisted
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return true
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end
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return true if operator_allowlist_pass?(ast, cmd_str)
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# Workspace Trust Discovery Recognition Gate:
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if workspace_trust_candidate_allowed?(cmd_str, ast)
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end
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# Interactive operator approval gate (Antigravity-style single keypress)
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if effective_shell.respond_to?(:interactive_input?) && effective_shell.interactive_input?
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verify_command_fallback_regex!(cmd_str)
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"n"
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end
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if ["y", "yes"].include?(answer.to_s.downcase)
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return true
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end
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end
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"Unknown command execution blocked (fail-closed): #{cmd_str}. The binary is not in the " \
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"command database, so its effects cannot be classified. If it is genuinely safe, the " \
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kind: :unknown_command,
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blocked_command: cmd_str,
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probe_like: probe_shape?(cmd_str),
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)
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block_unknown_command!(cmd_str)
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# Ambiguous parse (tree-sitter syntax errors) is a classification
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# against the operator entries.
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@audit.log_audit("blocked_command", command: cmd_str, reason: "parse_ambiguous",
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kind: :parse_ambiguous,
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return true if operator_allowlist_pass?(ast, cmd_str)
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block_ambiguous_parse!(ast, cmd_str)
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return true if [:readonly, :local_effects, :external_effects].include?(ast.classification) && ast.parse_warnings.empty?
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# today) keeps flowing into its own deny layers
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warn "[WARN] AST classification error on non-shell input, continuing to synthesis deny layers: #{e.message}"
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Rubik::Log.warn(:security, "[WARN] AST classification error on non-shell input, continuing to synthesis deny layers: #{e.message}")
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@audit.log_audit("classifier_error", command: cmd_str, reason: "#{e.class}: #{e.message}",
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decision: "synthesis_layers")
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warn "[WARN] AST classification error, failing closed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}"
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Rubik::Log.warn(:security, "[WARN] AST classification error, failing closed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}")
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block_on_classifier_failure!(cmd_str, e)
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@allowlist.command_allowlisted?(ast, cmd_str: cmd_str)
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rescue StandardError => e
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warn "[Guard] #{'raw ' if raw}allowlist evaluation failed, failing closed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}"
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Rubik::Log.warn(:security, "[Guard] #{'raw ' if raw}allowlist evaluation failed, failing closed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}")
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false
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351
264
|
end
|
|
352
265
|
|
|
266
|
+
# AST fast-path check for the safe-probe exemption: strictly single,
|
|
267
|
+
# isolated command without inner commands or chains.
|
|
268
|
+
def isolated_single_command?(ast)
|
|
269
|
+
ast.respond_to?(:commands) && ast.commands.to_a.size == 1 &&
|
|
270
|
+
ast.respond_to?(:parse_warnings) && ast.parse_warnings.to_a.empty? &&
|
|
271
|
+
(!ast.commands.first.respond_to?(:inner_commands) || ast.commands.first.inner_commands.nil? || ast.commands.first.inner_commands.empty?)
|
|
272
|
+
end
|
|
273
|
+
|
|
274
|
+
# Operator allowlist valve pass, shared by the dangerous / unknown /
|
|
275
|
+
# ambiguous-parse block paths. Fail-closed default: the entry must
|
|
276
|
+
# cover EVERY dangerous segment recursively; catastrophic fallback
|
|
277
|
+
# regex still runs afterwards — allowlisting never bypasses it.
|
|
278
|
+
# A bug in the gate itself must fail closed, not fall through to
|
|
279
|
+
# the regex-only downgrade below. Returns true only after the
|
|
280
|
+
# allowed_command audit and the fallback regex have run.
|
|
281
|
+
def operator_allowlist_pass?(ast, cmd_str)
|
|
282
|
+
return false unless allowlisted_fail_closed(ast, cmd_str)
|
|
283
|
+
|
|
284
|
+
@audit.log_audit("allowed_command", command: cmd_str, reason: "operator_allowlist")
|
|
285
|
+
verify_command_fallback_regex!(cmd_str)
|
|
286
|
+
true
|
|
287
|
+
end
|
|
288
|
+
|
|
289
|
+
# Report assembly for the dangerous-classification block path, fail-soft
|
|
290
|
+
# to nil: enrichment must never be able to un-block, so a bug in the
|
|
291
|
+
# report walk downgrades to nil here and the raise in
|
|
292
|
+
# block_dangerous_command! still fires.
|
|
293
|
+
# Report assembly delegates to Security::SegmentReport (#500), fail-soft
|
|
294
|
+
# to nil: enrichment must never be able to un-block, so a bug in the
|
|
295
|
+
# report walk downgrades to nil here and the raise in
|
|
296
|
+
# block_dangerous_command! still fires.
|
|
297
|
+
def dangerous_segment_report_or_nil(commands)
|
|
298
|
+
SegmentReport.build(commands)
|
|
299
|
+
rescue StandardError => e
|
|
300
|
+
Rubik::Log.warn(:security, "[Guard] segment report failed: #{e.class}: #{e.message}")
|
|
301
|
+
nil
|
|
302
|
+
end
|
|
303
|
+
|
|
304
|
+
# Dangerous-classification block path: audit the block, then raise with
|
|
305
|
+
# the blocked-segment guidance report attached.
|
|
306
|
+
def block_dangerous_command!(ast, cmd_str, reason:, expression_reason:)
|
|
307
|
+
report = dangerous_segment_report_or_nil(ast.commands)
|
|
308
|
+
@audit.log_audit("blocked_command", command: cmd_str, reason: reason,
|
|
309
|
+
dangerous_segments: segment_count(report))
|
|
310
|
+
# probe_shape? (not safe_probe?): probes only reach this raise when
|
|
311
|
+
# the exemption is disabled, so safe_probe? would be constantly
|
|
312
|
+
# false and the variant-(a) probe guidance would be dead code.
|
|
313
|
+
raise BlockedWriteError.new(
|
|
314
|
+
"Dangerous command execution blocked: #{cmd_str} (reason: #{reason})",
|
|
315
|
+
kind: :dangerous_command,
|
|
316
|
+
blocked_command: cmd_str,
|
|
317
|
+
rule_name: dangerous_rule_name(ast.commands) || (expression_reason ? "expression_level" : "dangerous_pattern"),
|
|
318
|
+
probe_like: probe_shape?(cmd_str),
|
|
319
|
+
segment_report: report,
|
|
320
|
+
classification_reason: expression_reason
|
|
321
|
+
)
|
|
322
|
+
end
|
|
323
|
+
|
|
324
|
+
# Interactive operator approval gate (Antigravity-style single keypress):
|
|
325
|
+
# true (audited) when the operator approves, false when there is no
|
|
326
|
+
# interactive input or the answer is not yes.
|
|
327
|
+
def operator_interactive_approval?(cmd_str, shell)
|
|
328
|
+
effective_shell = shell || @shell
|
|
329
|
+
return false unless effective_shell.respond_to?(:interactive_input?) && effective_shell.interactive_input?
|
|
330
|
+
|
|
331
|
+
# Defense-in-depth: Un-bypassable catastrophic fallback regex MUST pass before prompt
|
|
332
|
+
verify_command_fallback_regex!(cmd_str)
|
|
333
|
+
|
|
334
|
+
theme = (effective_shell.respond_to?(:ui_theme) && effective_shell.ui_theme) ||
|
|
335
|
+
(defined?(Rubik::UI::Theme) ? Rubik::UI::Theme.new : nil)
|
|
336
|
+
|
|
337
|
+
question = "Allow unclassified command execution: '#{cmd_str}'?"
|
|
338
|
+
answer = if defined?(Rubik::UI::Approvals)
|
|
339
|
+
Rubik::UI::Approvals.keypress_yes_no(effective_shell, question, theme: theme, default: "n")
|
|
340
|
+
else
|
|
341
|
+
"n"
|
|
342
|
+
end
|
|
343
|
+
|
|
344
|
+
return false unless ["y", "yes"].include?(answer.to_s.downcase)
|
|
345
|
+
|
|
346
|
+
@audit.log_audit("allowed_command", command: cmd_str, reason: "operator_interactive_approval")
|
|
347
|
+
true
|
|
348
|
+
end
|
|
349
|
+
|
|
350
|
+
def block_unknown_command!(cmd_str)
|
|
351
|
+
@audit.log_audit("blocked_command", command: cmd_str, reason: "unknown_command")
|
|
352
|
+
raise BlockedWriteError.new(
|
|
353
|
+
"Unknown command execution blocked (fail-closed): #{cmd_str}. The binary is not in the " \
|
|
354
|
+
"command database, so its effects cannot be classified. If it is genuinely safe, the " \
|
|
355
|
+
"operator can allowlist the exact prefix: !allow-cmd add \"<binary> [args]\"",
|
|
356
|
+
kind: :unknown_command,
|
|
357
|
+
blocked_command: cmd_str,
|
|
358
|
+
rule_name: "unknown_command",
|
|
359
|
+
probe_like: probe_shape?(cmd_str),
|
|
360
|
+
segment_report: nil
|
|
361
|
+
)
|
|
362
|
+
end
|
|
363
|
+
|
|
364
|
+
def block_ambiguous_parse!(ast, cmd_str)
|
|
365
|
+
@audit.log_audit("blocked_command", command: cmd_str, reason: "parse_ambiguous",
|
|
366
|
+
parse_warnings: ast.parse_warnings.to_a.size)
|
|
367
|
+
raise BlockedWriteError.new(
|
|
368
|
+
"Command AST could not be fully parsed (tree-sitter syntax error); execution blocked (fail-closed): #{cmd_str}",
|
|
369
|
+
kind: :parse_ambiguous,
|
|
370
|
+
blocked_command: cmd_str,
|
|
371
|
+
rule_name: "parse_ambiguous",
|
|
372
|
+
probe_like: probe_shape?(cmd_str),
|
|
373
|
+
segment_report: nil
|
|
374
|
+
)
|
|
375
|
+
end
|
|
376
|
+
|
|
353
377
|
def dangerous_reason(commands)
|
|
354
378
|
commands.each do |c|
|
|
355
379
|
next unless c.classification == :dangerous
|
|
@@ -389,147 +413,6 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
389
413
|
reason.empty? ? nil : reason
|
|
390
414
|
end
|
|
391
415
|
|
|
392
|
-
# Structured report for wrapper/multi-segment blocked-command guidance:
|
|
393
|
-
# every innermost dangerous segment with its trigger, the sibling
|
|
394
|
-
# commands that passed, a one-line wrapper preview, and the allowlist
|
|
395
|
-
# entries that would actually open the gate. Plain data only —
|
|
396
|
-
# BlockedWriteError must stay loadable without the classifier stack.
|
|
397
|
-
# nil when no single command is dangerous (expression-level elevations
|
|
398
|
-
# keep the scalar rule_name guidance path).
|
|
399
|
-
def dangerous_segment_report(commands)
|
|
400
|
-
segments = []
|
|
401
|
-
safe = []
|
|
402
|
-
safe_top_argv = []
|
|
403
|
-
wrappers = []
|
|
404
|
-
collect_dangerous_units(commands, 0, segments, safe, safe_top_argv, wrappers)
|
|
405
|
-
return nil if segments.empty?
|
|
406
|
-
|
|
407
|
-
# The gate (command_allowlisted?) matches EVERY top-level command,
|
|
408
|
-
# safe ones included — the entry set must cover them all to be
|
|
409
|
-
# honest: wrapper prefix + top-level dangerous segments + top-level
|
|
410
|
-
# safe units.
|
|
411
|
-
entries = wrappers.map { |w| wrapper_allowlist_entry(w) }
|
|
412
|
-
entries += segments.select { |s| s[:depth].zero? }.map { |s| allowlist_entry_for_argv(s[:argv]) }
|
|
413
|
-
entries += safe_top_argv.map { |argv| allowlist_entry_for_argv(argv) }
|
|
414
|
-
|
|
415
|
-
{
|
|
416
|
-
segments: segments,
|
|
417
|
-
safe: safe.uniq,
|
|
418
|
-
wrapper_preview: wrappers.empty? ? nil : wrapper_preview(wrappers.first),
|
|
419
|
-
allowlist_entries: entries.uniq
|
|
420
|
-
}.freeze
|
|
421
|
-
end
|
|
422
|
-
|
|
423
|
-
# Depth-first walk over the classified command tree. A dangerous
|
|
424
|
-
# command whose danger comes from dangerous inners contributes those
|
|
425
|
-
# inner leaves instead of itself (bash -c "rm -rf /" reports the inner
|
|
426
|
-
# rm, not the wrapper); a dangerous leaf is a segment; non-dangerous
|
|
427
|
-
# leaves join the passed roll call. Top-level wrappers (dangerous only
|
|
428
|
-
# through their inners) are tracked separately for preview + hint;
|
|
429
|
-
# top-level safe units keep their argv for the gate-honest entry set.
|
|
430
|
-
def collect_dangerous_units(commands, depth, segments, safe, safe_top_argv, wrappers)
|
|
431
|
-
Array(commands).each do |c|
|
|
432
|
-
inners = Array(c.inner_commands)
|
|
433
|
-
before = segments.size
|
|
434
|
-
collect_dangerous_units(inners, depth + 1, segments, safe, safe_top_argv, wrappers)
|
|
435
|
-
added = segments.size - before
|
|
436
|
-
|
|
437
|
-
if c.classification == :dangerous
|
|
438
|
-
if added.positive?
|
|
439
|
-
wrappers << c if depth.zero?
|
|
440
|
-
else
|
|
441
|
-
segments << dangerous_segment_data(c, depth)
|
|
442
|
-
end
|
|
443
|
-
elsif inners.empty?
|
|
444
|
-
safe << safe_segment_name(c)
|
|
445
|
-
safe_top_argv << c.argv.dup if depth.zero?
|
|
446
|
-
end
|
|
447
|
-
end
|
|
448
|
-
end
|
|
449
|
-
|
|
450
|
-
def dangerous_segment_data(result, depth)
|
|
451
|
-
argv = Array(result.argv)
|
|
452
|
-
{
|
|
453
|
-
display: segment_display(display_tokens(argv, result)),
|
|
454
|
-
argv: argv.dup.freeze,
|
|
455
|
-
rule: result.matched_rule,
|
|
456
|
-
option: result.overriding_option,
|
|
457
|
-
reason: result.classification_reason,
|
|
458
|
-
depth: depth
|
|
459
|
-
}
|
|
460
|
-
end
|
|
461
|
-
|
|
462
|
-
# Redirect-bearing segments (delegated inners) render their effects,
|
|
463
|
-
# not just their argv: `echo pwned > /etc/shadow`, not `echo pwned`.
|
|
464
|
-
# Flat operator/target tokens keep segment_display's quoting correct;
|
|
465
|
-
# argv itself stays pure — allowlist entries derive from it.
|
|
466
|
-
def display_tokens(argv, result)
|
|
467
|
-
reds = result.respond_to?(:redirects) ? Array(result.redirects) : []
|
|
468
|
-
reds.empty? ? argv : argv + reds.flat_map { |r| [r.operator, r.target] }
|
|
469
|
-
end
|
|
470
|
-
|
|
471
|
-
# Subcommand-aware roll call of the units that passed ("git checkout",
|
|
472
|
-
# not just "git") — matches the operator's mental model of the script.
|
|
473
|
-
def safe_segment_name(result)
|
|
474
|
-
result.command.join(" ")
|
|
475
|
-
end
|
|
476
|
-
|
|
477
|
-
# One-line wrapper preview for the guidance first line. The delegated
|
|
478
|
-
# payload (the whole -c script) is the argv token that contains
|
|
479
|
-
# whitespace — elide it so the full script is never re-embedded in the
|
|
480
|
-
# message (the defect this report exists to fix).
|
|
481
|
-
def wrapper_preview(result)
|
|
482
|
-
argv = Array(result.argv)
|
|
483
|
-
tokens = argv.dup
|
|
484
|
-
tokens[-1] = "'...'" if tokens.size > 1 && tokens[-1].to_s.match?(/\s/)
|
|
485
|
-
preview = segment_display(tokens)
|
|
486
|
-
preview.length > WRAPPER_PREVIEW_CAP ? "#{preview[0, WRAPPER_PREVIEW_CAP - 1]}..." : preview
|
|
487
|
-
end
|
|
488
|
-
|
|
489
|
-
# Shortest top-level argv prefix that actually satisfies the gate's
|
|
490
|
-
# token-prefix match (command_allowlisted?): the wrapper binary up to
|
|
491
|
-
# and including its delegation flag for flag-value payloads
|
|
492
|
-
# ("bash -c", "bash -e -c"), the bare binary for rest-argv wrappers
|
|
493
|
-
# ("sudo", "xargs"). Deriving it from delegation_source keeps the hint
|
|
494
|
-
# gate-honest for flag permutations a naive first-two-tokens guess
|
|
495
|
-
# would miss.
|
|
496
|
-
def wrapper_allowlist_entry(wrapper)
|
|
497
|
-
argv = Array(wrapper.argv)
|
|
498
|
-
return argv.first.to_s if argv.size <= 1
|
|
499
|
-
|
|
500
|
-
first_inner = Array(wrapper.inner_commands).first
|
|
501
|
-
if first_inner&.delegation_mode.to_s == "flag_value_is_expression"
|
|
502
|
-
idx = argv.index(first_inner.delegation_source)
|
|
503
|
-
return argv[0..idx].join(" ") if idx&.positive?
|
|
504
|
-
end
|
|
505
|
-
argv.first.to_s
|
|
506
|
-
end
|
|
507
|
-
|
|
508
|
-
# An allowlist entry can only carry whitespace-free tokens:
|
|
509
|
-
# normalize_allowlist splits entries on whitespace, so an argv token
|
|
510
|
-
# containing spaces ("feature x") can never be matched by an entry.
|
|
511
|
-
# Prefix up to (excluding) the first such token.
|
|
512
|
-
def allowlist_entry_for_argv(argv)
|
|
513
|
-
prefix = []
|
|
514
|
-
Array(argv).each do |token|
|
|
515
|
-
break if token.to_s.match?(/\s/)
|
|
516
|
-
|
|
517
|
-
prefix << token
|
|
518
|
-
end
|
|
519
|
-
prefix.empty? ? Array(argv).first.to_s : prefix.join(" ")
|
|
520
|
-
end
|
|
521
|
-
|
|
522
|
-
# Display-only rendering: collapse newlines, single-quote tokens that
|
|
523
|
-
# contain whitespace, hard-cap length. Shellwords.escape would
|
|
524
|
-
# backslash-quote every token (noise on Windows paths) — quote
|
|
525
|
-
# conditionally instead.
|
|
526
|
-
def segment_display(argv)
|
|
527
|
-
text = argv.map { |t| t.to_s.tr("\r\n", " ") }
|
|
528
|
-
.map { |t| t.match?(/\s/) ? "'#{t}'" : t }
|
|
529
|
-
.join(" ")
|
|
530
|
-
text.length > SEGMENT_DISPLAY_CAP ? "#{text[0, SEGMENT_DISPLAY_CAP - 1]}..." : text
|
|
531
|
-
end
|
|
532
|
-
|
|
533
416
|
def segment_count(report)
|
|
534
417
|
report ? report[:segments].size : 0
|
|
535
418
|
end
|
data/lib/rubik/security/guard.rb
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
# frozen_string_literal: true
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
3
|
require_relative "audit_log"
|
|
4
|
+
require_relative "../storage/layout"
|
|
4
5
|
require_relative "allowlist"
|
|
5
6
|
require_relative "command_gate"
|
|
6
7
|
require_relative "path_policy"
|
|
@@ -49,6 +50,9 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
49
50
|
def self.for_config(config, root_dir: nil, shell: nil)
|
|
50
51
|
return new if config.nil? || !config.respond_to?(:fetch)
|
|
51
52
|
|
|
53
|
+
# Deliberate bare fetch (not Layout.config_get): config_get folds an
|
|
54
|
+
# explicit nil into the default, but here an explicit nil DISABLES
|
|
55
|
+
# auditing — the absent/nil distinction is load-bearing.
|
|
52
56
|
raw_audit = config.fetch("security.audit_log_path", default_audit_log_path)
|
|
53
57
|
audit_path =
|
|
54
58
|
case raw_audit
|
|
@@ -59,7 +63,7 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
59
63
|
# turns "!config set security.audit_log_path false" into boolean
|
|
60
64
|
# false, which would otherwise reach log_audit and die in a
|
|
61
65
|
# swallowed TypeError — silently dropping every audit event.
|
|
62
|
-
warn "[Guard] security.audit_log_path has non-path value #{raw_audit.inspect}; auditing disabled"
|
|
66
|
+
Rubik::Log.warn(:security, "[Guard] security.audit_log_path has non-path value #{raw_audit.inspect}; auditing disabled")
|
|
63
67
|
nil
|
|
64
68
|
end
|
|
65
69
|
|
|
@@ -67,9 +71,9 @@ module Rubik
|
|
|
67
71
|
|
|
68
72
|
new(
|
|
69
73
|
audit_log_path: audit_path,
|
|
70
|
-
command_allowlist: Array(
|
|
74
|
+
command_allowlist: Array(Rubik::Storage::Layout.config_get(config, "security.command_allowlist", [])),
|
|
71
75
|
# Stringy "false" from persisted config must disable probes too.
|
|
72
|
-
allow_safe_probes:
|
|
76
|
+
allow_safe_probes: Rubik::Storage::Layout.config_get(config, "security.allow_safe_probes", true).to_s.downcase != "false",
|
|
73
77
|
root_dir: effective_root,
|
|
74
78
|
shell: shell
|
|
75
79
|
)
|