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data/books/sun_tzu-art_of_war.txt

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+Sun Tzŭ Wu was a native of the Ch’i State.
+His Art of War brought him to the notice of Ho Lu, [2] King of Wu.
+Ho Lu said to him: "I have carefully perused your 13 chapters. May I submit your theory of managing soldiers to a slight test?"
+Sun Tzŭ replied: "You may."
+Ho Lu asked: "May the test be applied to women?"
+The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements were made to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. 
+Sun Tzŭ divided them into two companies, and placed one of the King’s favourite concubines at the head of each.
+He then bade them all take spears in their hands, and addressed them thus: "I presume you know the difference between front and back, right hand and left hand?"
+The girls replied: Yes.
+Sun Tzŭ went on: "When I say 'Eyes front' you must look straight ahead. When I say 'Left turn' you must face towards your left hand. When I say 'Right turn' you must face towards your right hand. When I say 'About turn' you must face right round towards your back."
+Again the girls assented.
+The words of command having been thus explained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the drill.
+Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order 'Right turn' But the girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzŭ said: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then the general is to blame."
+So he started drilling them again, and this time gave the order "Left turn" whereupon the girls once more burst into fits of laughter.
+Sun Tzŭ: "If words of command are not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to blame. But if his orders are clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it is the fault of their officers."
+So saying, he ordered the leaders of the two companies to be beheaded.
+Now the king of Wu was watching the scene from the top of a raised pavilion; and when he saw that his favourite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly alarmed and hurriedly sent down the following message: "We are now quite satisfied as to our general’s ability to handle troops. If we are bereft of these two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their savor. It is our wish that they shall not be beheaded."
+Sun Tzŭ replied: "Having once received His Majesty’s commission to be the general of his forces, there are certain commands of His Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am unable to accept."
+Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and straightway installed the pair next in order as leaders in their place.
+When this had been done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more; and the girls went through all the evolutions, turning to the right or to the left, marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound.
+Then Sun Tzŭ sent a messenger to the King saying: "Your soldiers, Sire, are now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for your majesty’s inspection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may desire; bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey."
+But the King replied: "Let our general cease drilling and return to camp. As for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops."
+Thereupon Sun Tzŭ said: "The King is only fond of words, and cannot translate them into deeds."
+After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzŭ was one who knew how to handle an army, and finally appointed him general.
+
+Planning is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. 
+The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
+These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.
+Without constant practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand.
+Which sovereign is in harmony with his subjects?
+Which of the two generals has most ability?
+With whom lie the advantage?
+Which side is more disciplined?
+Which army is the stronger?
+Which side are officers and men more highly trained and more constantly rewarded and punished?
+All warfare is based on deception.
+When able to attack, seem unable; when active, seem inactive; when near, we must appear far away; when far away, we must appear near.
+Baits entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.
+If the opponent is secure in their position, prepare for their action. 
+If the opponent is in superior, evade him.
+Use your opponent's emotions against them and seek to irritate them.
+Pretend to be weak, that your opponents may grow arrogant.
+Relentlessly pursue your opponent when possible. Give no rest.
+Force your opponent to expend their resources with no gain.
+Seperate large strong opponents into smaller weaker opponents.
+Attack opponents where they are unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
+
+Small expenditures of resources scaled over many allies over a long time; appreciate the full cost of the conflict.
+Over time all resources become stale; Expect more wear and tear than anticipated.
+Conflict is fought with resources and equipment which must be able to be maintained; Without these things, waging a conflict is impossible for anyone.
+An inability to maintain the resources and equipment necessary to sustain a conflict invites vulnerability.
+There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
+It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
+The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-waggons loaded more than twice.
+Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
+Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.
+On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.
+When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
+With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be dissipated;
+Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a single _picul_ of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.
+Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
+Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first.
+Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours.
+The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
+This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.
+In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
+Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.
+
+Sun Tzŭ said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. 
+So, too, it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.
+Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.
+Thus the highest form of generalship is to anticipate the enemy’s plans and preempt them with our own; The next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; The next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
+The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.
+The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken; Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
+The skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege; he overthrows their kingdom without protracted conflicts.
+With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.
+It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
+If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
+Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.
+Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.
+There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army: By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army; By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier’s minds; By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
+But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. 
+This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
+Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: they will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight; they win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces; they win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks; they win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared; they win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
+If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
+If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
+
+1. Sun Tzŭ said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond
+the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of
+defeating the enemy.
+
+2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the
+opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
+
+3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
+
+4. Hence the saying: One may _know_ how to conquer without being able
+to _do_ it.
+
+5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat
+the enemy means taking the offensive.
+
+6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength;
+attacking, a superabundance of strength.
+
+7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret
+recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of
+heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the
+other, a victory that is complete.
+
+8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is
+not the acme of excellence.
+
+9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and
+the whole Empire says, "Well done!" 
+"the world’s coarse thumb
+And finger fail to plumb."
+
+
+10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of
+thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
+
+11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins,
+but excels in winning with ease.
+
+12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor
+credit for courage.
+
+13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it
+means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
+
+14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes
+defeat impossible and does not miss the moment for defeating the
+enemy.
+
+15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle
+after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat
+first fights and afterwards looks for victory.
+
+16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly
+adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control
+success.
+
+17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement;
+secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly,
+Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
+
+18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to
+Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of
+chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
+
+19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight
+placed in the scale against a single grain.
+
+20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up
+waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical
+dispositions.
+
+1. Sun Tzŭ said: The control of a large force is the same principle as
+the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their
+numbers.
+
+2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different
+from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting
+signs and signals.
+
+3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the
+enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvers direct
+and indirect.
+
+4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against
+an egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.
+
+5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle,
+but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
+
+6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven
+and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and
+moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away
+but to return once more.
+
+7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of
+these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
+
+8. There are not more than five primary colours (blue, yellow, red,
+white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can
+ever be seen.
+
+9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt,
+sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can
+ever be tasted.
+
+10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct
+and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless
+series of manœuvers.
+
+11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is
+like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the
+possibilities of their combination?
+
+12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even
+roll stones along in its course.
+
+13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon
+which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.
+
+14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and
+prompt in his decision.
+
+15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to
+the releasing of the trigger.
+
+16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming
+disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos,
+your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against
+defeat.
+
+17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear
+postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
+
+18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of
+subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of
+latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical
+dispositions.
+
+19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains
+deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.
+
+20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body
+of picked men he lies in wait for him.
+
+21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and
+does not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilise combined
+energy.
+
+22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it
+were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or
+stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a
+slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped,
+to go rolling down.
+
+23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum
+of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So
+much on the subject of energy.
+
+1. Sun Tzŭ said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of
+the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field
+and has to hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted.
+
+2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but
+does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.
+
+3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach
+of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible
+for the enemy to draw near.
+
+4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped,
+he can force him to move.
+
+5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march
+swiftly to places where you are not expected.
+
+6. An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches
+through country where the enemy is not.
+
+7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack
+places which are undefended. You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only hold positions
+that cannot be attacked.
+
+8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent does not
+know what to defend; and he is skilful in defence whose opponent does
+not know what to attack.
+
+9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be
+invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.
+
+10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the
+enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your
+movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
+
+11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even
+though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we
+need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
+
+12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging
+us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the
+ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in
+his way.
+
+13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible
+ourselves, we an keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must
+be divided.
+
+14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up
+into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate
+parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few.
+
+15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior
+one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
+
+16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then
+the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several
+different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers
+we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
+
+17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear;
+should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he
+strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his
+right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere,
+he will everywhere be weak.
+
+18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible
+attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make
+these preparations against us.
+
+19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may
+concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.
+
+20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be
+impotent to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the
+left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the
+van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything
+under a hundred _li_ apart, and even the nearest are separated by
+several _li_!
+
+21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own
+in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory.
+I say then that victory can be achieved.
+
+22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from
+fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of
+their success.
+
+23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
+
+24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may
+know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.
+
+25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain
+is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the
+subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.
+
+26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own
+tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
+
+27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can
+see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.
+
+28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but
+let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.
+
+29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural
+course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
+
+30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what
+s weak.
+
+31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over
+which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the
+foe whom he is facing.
+
+32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare
+there are no constant conditions.
+
+33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and
+thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.
+
+34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always
+equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and
+waxing.
+
+1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the
+sovereign.
+
+2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend
+and harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.
+
+3. After that, comes tactical manœuvering, than which there is nothing
+more difficult. The difficulty of tactical manœuvering consists in turning the devious
+into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
+
+4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy
+out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the
+goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of _deviation_.
+
+5. Manœuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined
+multitude, most dangerous.
+
+6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an
+advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other
+hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice
+of its baggage and stores.
+
+7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make
+forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual
+distance at a stretch, doing a hundred _li_ in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all
+your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.
+
+8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind,
+and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its
+destination.
+
+9. If you march fifty _li_ in order to outmanœuver the enemy, you will
+lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will
+reach the goal.
+
+10. If you march thirty _li_ with the same object, two-thirds of your
+army will arrive.
+
+11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost;
+without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
+
+12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the
+designs of our neighbours.
+
+13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar
+with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls
+and precipices, its marshes and swamps.
+
+14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we
+make use of local guides.
+
+15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed. Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained.
+
+16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by
+circumstances.
+
+17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest.
+
+18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, in immovability like a mountain.
+
+19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you
+move, fall like a thunderbolt.
+
+20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst
+your men; when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the
+benefit of the soldiery.
+
+21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
+
+22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation.
+
+23. The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of
+gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence
+the institution of banners and flags.
+
+24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and
+eyes of the host may be focussed on one particular point.
+
+25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either
+for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men.
+
+26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums,
+and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing
+the ears and eyes of your army.
+
+27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
+
+28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent
+only on returning to camp.
+
+29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is
+keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This
+is the art of studying moods.
+
+30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and
+hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.
+
+31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait
+at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while
+the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.
+
+32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect
+order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident
+array:—this is the art of studying circumstances.
+
+33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor
+to oppose him when he comes downhill.
+
+34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers
+whose temper is keen.
+
+35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
+
+36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
+
+37. Such is the art of warfare.
+
+1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the
+sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.
+
+2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high
+roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in
+dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate
+position, you must fight.
+
+3. There are roads which must not be followed,
+
+armies which must be not attacked, towns which must not be besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which
+must not be obeyed.
+
+4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany
+variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
+
+5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted
+with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn
+his knowledge to practical account.
+
+6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying
+his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will
+fail to make the best use of his men.
+
+7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of
+disadvantage will be blended together.
+
+8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may
+succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
+
+9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always
+ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from
+misfortune.
+
+10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
+
+11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the
+enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the
+chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made
+our position unassailable.
+
+12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: 
+(1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
+
+(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;
+
+(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
+
+(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame;
+
+(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and
+trouble.
+
+
+13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the
+conduct of war.
+
+14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will
+surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a
+subject of meditation.
+
+1. Sun Tzŭ said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and
+observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in
+the neighbourhood of valleys.
+
+2. Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.
+
+3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.
+
+4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not
+advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army
+get across, and then deliver your attack.
+
+5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader
+near a river which he has to cross.
+
+6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy. So much for river warfare.
+
+7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over
+them quickly, without any delay.
+
+8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass
+near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. So much for operations in salt-marshes.
+
+9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with
+rising ground to your right and on your rear, so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for
+campaigning in flat country.
+
+10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns.
+
+11. All armies prefer high ground to low, and sunny places to dark.
+
+12. If you are careful of your men, and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of every
+kind, and this will spell victory.
+
+13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the
+slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of
+your soldiers and utilise the natural advantages of the ground.
+
+14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you
+wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it
+subsides.
+
+15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running
+between, deep natural hollows, confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses, should be left with all possible speed and not approached.
+
+16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to
+approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on
+his rear.
+
+17. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there should be any hilly
+country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with
+reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed
+out and searched; for these are places where men in ambush or insidious
+spies are likely to be lurking.
+
+18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on
+the natural strength of his position.
+
+19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious
+for the other side to advance.
+
+20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a
+bait.
+
+21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is
+advancing. The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass means
+that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.
+
+22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.
+
+23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the sign of
+chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over a wide area,
+it betokens the approach of infantry. When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties
+have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and
+fro signify that the army is encamping.
+
+24. Humble words and increased preparations ae signs that the enemy is
+about to advance. Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that
+he will retreat.
+
+25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on
+the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle.
+
+26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.
+
+27. When there is much running about and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has
+come.
+
+28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure.
+
+29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint
+from want of food.
+
+30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves,
+the army is suffering from thirst.
+
+31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to
+secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.
+
+32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. Clamour by night betokens nervousness.
+
+33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general’s authority is
+weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If
+the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary.
+
+34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for
+food, and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-fires,
+showing that they will not return to their tents, you may know that
+they are determined to fight to the death.
+
+35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in
+subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file.
+
+36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his
+resources; too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.
+
+37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s
+numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.
+
+38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign
+that the enemy wishes for a truce.
+39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrilyand remain facing ours for a
+long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again,
+the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.
+
+40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply
+sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength,
+keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.
+
+41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is
+sure to be captured by them.
+
+42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you,
+they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be
+practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you,
+punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless.
+
+43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with
+humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline.This is a certain road to victory.
+
+44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army
+will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.
+
+45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his
+orders being obeyed,the gain will be mutual.
+
+1. Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1)
+Accessible ground; (2) entangling ground; (3) temporising ground (4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.
+
+
+2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called
+_accessible_.
+
+3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in
+occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of
+supplies.
+
+4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called
+_entangling_.
+
+5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may
+sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your
+coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible,
+disaster will ensue.
+
+6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the
+first move, it is called _temporising_ ground.
+
+7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an
+attractive bait,
+
+8. With regard to _narrow passes_, if you can occupy them first, let
+them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.
+
+9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after
+him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly
+garrisoned.
+
+10. With regard to _precipitous heights_, if you are beforehand with
+your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there
+wait for him to come up.
+
+11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but
+retreat and try to entice him away.
+
+12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the
+strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a
+battle,
+
+13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.
+
+14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from
+natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible.
+These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5)
+disorganisation; (6) rout.
+
+15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against
+another ten times its size, the result will be the _flight_ of the
+former.
+
+16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too
+weak, the result is _insubordination_.
+
+17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on
+meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of
+resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is
+in a position to fight, the result is _ruin_.
+
+18. When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are
+not clear and distinct;
+
+19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an
+inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment
+against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the
+front rank, the result must be a _rout_.
+
+20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully
+noted by the general who has attained a responsible post.
+
+21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally;
+
+22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into
+practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises
+them, will surely be defeated.
+
+23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even
+though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory,
+then you must not fight even at the ruler’s bidding.
+
+24. The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without
+fearing disgrace,
+
+25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you
+into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and
+they will stand by you even unto death.
+
+26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority
+felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable,
+moreover, of quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to
+spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose.
+
+27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are
+unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway
+towards victory.
+
+28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that
+our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway
+towards victory.
+
+29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our
+men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of
+the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only
+halfway towards victory.
+
+30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered;
+once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.
+
+31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your
+victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you
+may make your victory complte.
+
+1. Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground:
+(1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4)
+open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground;
+(7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.
+
+2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive
+ground.
+
+3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great
+distance, it is facile ground.
+
+4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either
+side, is contentious ground.
+
+5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.
+
+6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,
+
+7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country,
+leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.
+
+8. Mountain forests,
+
+9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can
+only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy
+would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed in
+ground.
+
+10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting
+without delay, is desperate ground.
+
+11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt
+not. On contentious ground, attack not.
+
+12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way.
+
+13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.
+
+14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.
+
+15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a
+wedge between the enemy’s front and rear;
+
+16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from
+concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep
+them in disorder.
+
+17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when
+otherwise, they stopped still.
+
+18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly
+array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: "Begin
+by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be
+amenable to your will."
+
+19. Rapidity is the essence of war:
+
+20. The following are the principls to be observed by an invading
+force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be
+the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail
+against you.
+
+21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with
+food.
+
+22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,
+
+23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and
+they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is
+nothing they may not achieve.
+
+24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there
+is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart
+of a hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no
+help for it, they will fight hard.
+
+25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be
+constantly on the _qui vive;_ without waiting to be asked, they will do
+your will;
+
+26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious
+doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.
+
+27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because
+they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it
+is not because they are disinclined to longevity.
+
+28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep,
+
+29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the _shuai-jan_. Now the
+_shuai-jan_ is a snake that is found in the Ch‘ang mountains.
+
+30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the _shuai-jan_,
+
+31. Hence it is not enough to put one’s trust in the tethering of
+horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground.
+
+32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up one standard
+of courage which all must reach.
+
+33. How to make the best of both strong and weak—that is a question
+involving the proper use of ground.
+
+34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as though he were
+leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.
+
+35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure
+secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.
+
+36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports
+and appearances,
+
+37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans,
+
+38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who has
+climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind him. He
+carries his men deep into hostile territory before he shows his hand.
+
+39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a shepherd
+driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and that, and
+none knows whither he is going.
+
+40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:—this may be termed the
+business of the general.
+
+41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of ground;
+
+42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle is, that
+penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a short way means
+dispersion.
+
+43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across
+neighbourhood territory, you find yourself on critical ground.
+
+44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground.
+When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile ground.
+
+45. When you have the enemy’s strongholds on your rear, and narrow
+passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no place of
+refuge at all, it is desperate ground.
+
+46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men with unity
+of purpose.
+
+47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.
+
+48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my defences. On
+ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate my alliances.
+
+49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of
+supplies.
+
+50. On hemmed-in round, I would block any way of retreat.
+
+51. For it is the soldier’s disposition to offer an obstinate
+resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he cannot help himself,
+and to obey promptly when he has fallen into danger.
+
+We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring princes until we are acquainted with their designs.
+We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps. 
+We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.
+
+To be ignorant of any one of the following four or five principles does not befit a warlike prince.
+
+When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the enemy’s forces. 
+He overawes his opponents, and their allies are prevented from joining against him.
+
+55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.
+
+56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,
+
+57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let them know
+your design.
+
+58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; plunge it
+into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety.
+
+59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm’s way that is
+capable of striking a blow for victory.
+
+60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating ourelves
+to the enemy’s purpose.
+
+61. By persistently hanging on the enemy’s flank,
+
+62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer cunning.
+
+63. On the day that you take up your command, block the frontier
+passes, destroy the official tallies,
+
+64. Be stern in the council-chamber,
+
+65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.
+
+66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,
+
+67. Walk in the path defined by rule,
+
+68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy
+gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running
+hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.
+
+Be bold, cautions, slow to anger and only attack when very necessary. Use small attack to build to bigger attacks.
+Plan the attack using good imformation using natural obsicles and resources from the best postion possible.
+Share information widely and train constantly and do not attack until ready. Time your attack for maximum effect and use confusion and deception.
+Plan for the unintended consequinces of the attack and for what happens after.
+