omnibus 3.0.0 → 3.1.0

data/lib/omnibus/version.rb

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 #
-# Copyright:: Copyright (c) 2012-2014 Chef Software, Inc.
-# License:: Apache License, Version 2.0
+# Copyright 2012-2014 Chef Software, Inc.
 #
 # Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 # you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -16,5 +15,5 @@
 #
 
 module Omnibus
-  VERSION = '3.0.0'
+  VERSION = '3.1.0'
 end

data/omnibus.gemspec

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Gem::Specification.new do |gem|
   gem.files = `git ls-files`.split($/)
   gem.bindir = 'bin'
   gem.executables = %w(omnibus)
-  gem.test_files = gem.files.grep(%r{^(test|spec|features)/})
+  gem.test_files = gem.files.grep(/^(test|spec|features)\//)
   gem.require_paths = ['lib']
 
   gem.add_dependency 'chef-sugar',      '~> 1.2'
@@ -27,10 +27,12 @@ Gem::Specification.new do |gem|
   gem.add_dependency 'ohai',            '~> 6.12'
   gem.add_dependency 'fpm',             '~> 1.0.0'
   gem.add_dependency 'uber-s3'
-  gem.add_dependency 'thor',            '>= 0.16.0'
+  gem.add_dependency 'thor',            '~> 0.18'
 
+  gem.add_development_dependency 'aruba',   '~> 0.5'
+  gem.add_development_dependency 'fauxhai', '~> 2.1'
   gem.add_development_dependency 'rspec',   '~> 2.14'
-  gem.add_development_dependency 'rubocop', '~> 0.18'
+  gem.add_development_dependency 'rubocop', '0.21.0'
   gem.add_development_dependency 'rake'
 
   gem.add_development_dependency 'bundler'

data/spec/data/complicated/config/patches/bzip2/makefile_take_env_vars.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+--- bzip2-1.0.6/Makefile-orig	2010-09-10 17:46:02.000000000 -0500
++++ bzip2-1.0.6/Makefile	2013-11-21 13:55:11.000000000 -0600
+@@ -18,10 +18,10 @@
+ CC=gcc
+ AR=ar
+ RANLIB=ranlib
+-LDFLAGS=
++LDFLAGS+=
+
+ BIGFILES=-D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
+-CFLAGS=-Wall -Winline -O2 -g $(BIGFILES)
++CFLAGS+=-Wall -Winline -O2 -g $(BIGFILES)
+
+ # Where you want it installed when you do 'make install'
+ PREFIX=/usr/local

data/spec/data/complicated/config/patches/couchdb/patch_for_couchjs_stack.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+diff -r -u apache-couchdb-1.0.3/src/couchdb/priv/couch_js/main.c apache-couchdb-1.0.3-couchjs-stack-patch/src/couchdb/priv/couch_js/main.c
+--- apache-couchdb-1.0.3/src/couchdb/priv/couch_js/main.c	2012-07-17 16:09:32.000000000 -0700
++++ apache-couchdb-1.0.3-couchjs-stack-patch/src/couchdb/priv/couch_js/main.c	2012-07-17 16:11:35.000000000 -0700
+@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@
+         return JS_FALSE;
+     }
+
++    JS_SetScriptStackQuota(subcx, 0x20000000);
++
+     SETUP_REQUEST(subcx);
+
+     src = JS_GetStringChars(str);
+@@ -286,6 +288,7 @@
+     cx = JS_NewContext(rt, 8L * 1024L);
+     if (!cx) return 1;
+
++    JS_SetScriptStackQuota(cx, 0x20000000);
+     JS_SetErrorReporter(cx, printerror);
+     JS_ToggleOptions(cx, JSOPTION_XML);

data/spec/data/complicated/config/patches/gd/gd-2.0.33-configure-libpng.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+diff -ur libgd-gd-libgd-5551f61978e3/src/configure libgd-gd-libgd-5551f61978e3.fixed/src/configure
+--- libgd-gd-libgd-5551f61978e3/src/configure	2006-04-05 08:56:57.000000000 -0700
++++ libgd-gd-libgd-5551f61978e3.fixed/src/configure	2012-04-06 16:38:27.000000000 -0700
+@@ -10953,95 +10953,8 @@
+ # authors decide to do this AGAIN. Which I really hope they won't. TBB
+
+ if test "$withval" != no; then
+-  # Extract the first word of "libpng12-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+-set dummy libpng12-config; ac_word=$2
+-echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+-echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6
+-if test "${ac_cv_path_LIBPNG12_CONFIG+set}" = set; then
+-  echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+-else
+-  case $LIBPNG12_CONFIG in
+-  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+-  ac_cv_path_LIBPNG12_CONFIG="$LIBPNG12_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+-  ;;
+-  *)
+-  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+-for as_dir in $PATH
+-do
+-  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+-  test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+-  for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+-  if $as_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+-    ac_cv_path_LIBPNG12_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+-    echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+-    break 2
+-  fi
+-done
+-done
+-
+-  ;;
+-esac
+-fi
+-LIBPNG12_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_LIBPNG12_CONFIG
+-
+-if test -n "$LIBPNG12_CONFIG"; then
+-  echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $LIBPNG12_CONFIG" >&5
+-echo "${ECHO_T}$LIBPNG12_CONFIG" >&6
+-else
+-  echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+-echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6
+-fi
+-
+-  # Extract the first word of "libpng-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+-set dummy libpng-config; ac_word=$2
+-echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+-echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_word... $ECHO_C" >&6
+-if test "${ac_cv_path_LIBPNG_CONFIG+set}" = set; then
+-  echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
+-else
+-  case $LIBPNG_CONFIG in
+-  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+-  ac_cv_path_LIBPNG_CONFIG="$LIBPNG_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+-  ;;
+-  *)
+-  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+-for as_dir in $PATH
+-do
+-  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+-  test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+-  for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+-  if $as_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+-    ac_cv_path_LIBPNG_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+-    echo "$as_me:$LINENO: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+-    break 2
+-  fi
+-done
+-done
+-
+-  ;;
+-esac
+-fi
+-LIBPNG_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_LIBPNG_CONFIG
+
+-if test -n "$LIBPNG_CONFIG"; then
+-  echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $LIBPNG_CONFIG" >&5
+-echo "${ECHO_T}$LIBPNG_CONFIG" >&6
+-else
+-  echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: no" >&5
+-echo "${ECHO_T}no" >&6
+-fi
+-
+-  if test -n "$LIBPNG12_CONFIG"; then
+-    libpng_CPPFLAGS=`libpng12-config --cflags`
+-    # should be --ldopts, but it's currently broken
+-    libpng_LDFLAGS=`libpng12-config --ldflags`
+-    libpng_LDFLAGS=`echo " $libpng_LDFLAGS" | sed 's/ -l[^ ][^ ]*//g'`
+-  elif test -n "$LIBPNG_CONFIG"; then
+-    libpng_CPPFLAGS=`libpng-config --cflags`
+-    # should be --ldopts, but it's currently broken
+-    libpng_LDFLAGS=`libpng-config --ldflags`
+-    libpng_LDFLAGS=`echo " $libpng_LDFLAGS" | sed 's/ -l[^ ][^ ]*//g'`
+-  elif test -d "$withval"; then
++  if test -d "$withval"; then
+     libpng_CPPFLAGS="-I$withval/include"
+     libpng_LDFLAGS="-L$withval/lib"
+   fi

data/spec/data/complicated/config/patches/keepalived/keepalived-1.2.9_opscode_centos_5.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+diff --git keepalived-1.2.9/vrrp/vrrp_ipaddress.c keepalived-1.2.9_centos5/vrrp/vrrp_ipaddress.c
+index 130014f..1900327 100644
+--- a/keepalived/vrrp/vrrp_ipaddress.c
++++ b/keepalived/vrrp/vrrp_ipaddress.c
+@@ -76,7 +76,9 @@ netlink_ipaddress(ip_address_t *ipaddress, int cmd)
+		 *     without service. HA/VRRP setups have their own "DAD"-like
+		 *     functionality, so it's not really needed from the IPv6 stack.
+		 */
+-		req.ifa.ifa_flags |= IFA_F_NODAD;
++		#ifdef IFA_F_NODAD
++			req.ifa.ifa_flags |= IFA_F_NODAD;
++		#endif
+
+		addattr_l(&req.n, sizeof(req), IFA_LOCAL,
+			  &ipaddress->u.sin6_addr, sizeof(ipaddress->u.sin6_addr));

data/spec/data/complicated/config/patches/libedit/freebsd-vi-fix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff -ruN libedit-20120601-3.0/src/vi.c libedit-20120601-3.0.fixed/src/vi.c
+--- libedit-20120601-3.0/src/vi.c	2012-03-11 09:54:58.000000000 +0000
++++ libedit-20120601-3.0.fixed/src/vi.c	2013-02-08 05:22:16.338954507 +0000
+@@ -918,17 +918,15 @@
+  * NB: posix implies that we should enter insert mode, however
+  * this is against historical precedent...
+  */
+-#ifdef __weak_reference
+-__weakref_visible char *my_get_alias_text(const char *)
+-    __weak_reference(get_alias_text);
+-#endif
+ protected el_action_t
+ /*ARGSUSED*/
+ vi_alias(EditLine *el, Int c __attribute__((__unused__)))
+ {
+-#ifdef __weak_reference
++#ifdef __weak_extern
+	char alias_name[3];
+	char *alias_text;
++	extern __weakref_visible char *my_get_alias_text(const char *);
++	__weak_extern(get_alias_text);
+
+	if (my_get_alias_text == 0) {
+		return CC_ERROR;

data/spec/data/complicated/config/patches/libiconv/libiconv-1.14_srclib_stdio.in.h-remove-gets-declarations.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+diff -r -u libiconv-1.14/srclib/stdio.in.h.orig libiconv-1.14/srclib/stdio.in.h
+--- libiconv-1.14/srclib/stdio.in.h.orig	2013-02-22 13:52:46.336327969 -0600
++++ libiconv-1.14/srclib/stdio.in.h	2013-02-22 13:54:27.948207059 -0600
+@@ -679,22 +679,11 @@
+ # endif
+ #endif
+
+-#if @GNULIB_GETS@
+-# if @REPLACE_STDIO_READ_FUNCS@ && @GNULIB_STDIO_H_NONBLOCKING@
+-#  if !(defined __cplusplus && defined GNULIB_NAMESPACE)
+-#   undef gets
+-#   define gets rpl_gets
+-#  endif
+-_GL_FUNCDECL_RPL (gets, char *, (char *s) _GL_ARG_NONNULL ((1)));
+-_GL_CXXALIAS_RPL (gets, char *, (char *s));
+-# else
+-_GL_CXXALIAS_SYS (gets, char *, (char *s));
+-#  undef gets
+-# endif
+-_GL_CXXALIASWARN (gets);
+ /* It is very rare that the developer ever has full control of stdin,
+-   so any use of gets warrants an unconditional warning.  Assume it is
+-   always declared, since it is required by C89.  */
++   so any use of gets warrants an unconditional warning; besides, C11
++   removed it.  */
++#undef gets
++#if HAVE_RAW_DECL_GETS
+ _GL_WARN_ON_USE (gets, "gets is a security hole - use fgets instead");
+ #endif

data/spec/data/complicated/config/patches/libwrap/tcp_wrappers-7.6-makefile-dest-fix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+diff -ur tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile tcp_wrappers_7.6.fixed/Makefile
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile	2012-04-10 11:45:38.000000000 -0700
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.fixed/Makefile	2012-04-10 14:11:58.000000000 -0700
+@@ -768,9 +768,9 @@
+ install: install-lib install-bin install-dev
+
+ install-lib:
+-	install -o root -g root -m 0755 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/
+-	ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ))
+-	ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO))
++	install -m 0755 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}/lib/
++	ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ))
++	ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO))
+
+ install-bin:
+	install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpd ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
+@@ -787,12 +787,12 @@
+	install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_options.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/
+
+ install-dev:
+-	install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/
+-	install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}/usr/include/
+-	install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/
+-	ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/hosts_ctl.3
+-	ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_init.3
+-	ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_set.3
++	install -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/share/man/man3/
++	install -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}/include/
++	install -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}/lib/
++	ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/share/man/man3/hosts_ctl.3
++	ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/share/man/man3/request_init.3
++	ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/share/man/man3/request_set.3
+
+ shar:	$(KIT)
+	@shar $(KIT)

data/spec/data/complicated/config/patches/libwrap/tcp_wrappers-7.6-malloc-fix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -ur tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.fixed/scaffold.c
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c	2012-04-10 11:45:38.000000000 -0700
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.fixed/scaffold.c	2012-04-10 12:48:14.000000000 -0700
+@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
+ #define	INADDR_NONE	(-1)		/* XXX should be 0xffffffff */
+ #endif
+
+-extern char *malloc();
++/* extern char *malloc(); */
+
+ /* Application-specific. */
+
+Only in tcp_wrappers_7.6.fixed: scaffold.c-e

data/spec/data/complicated/config/patches/libwrap/tcp_wrappers-7.6-shared_lib_plus_plus-1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,1035 @@
+Submitted By: Tushar Teredesai <tushar@linuxfromscratch.org>
+Date: 2003-10-04
+Initial Package Version: 7.6
+Origin: http://archives.linuxfromscratch.org/mail-archives/blfs-dev/2003-January/001960.html
+Description: The patch was created from the tcp_wrappers modified package by Mark Heerdink.
+This patch provides the following improvements:
+    * Install libwrap.so along with libwrap.a.
+    * Create an install target for tcp_wrappers.
+    * Compilation and security fixes.
+    * Documentation fixes.
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/Makefile	1997-03-21 12:27:21.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/Makefile	2002-07-15 16:07:21.000000000 -0500
+@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
++GLIBC=$(shell grep -s -c __GLIBC__ /usr/include/features.h)
++
+ # @(#) Makefile 1.23 97/03/21 19:27:20
+
++# unset the HOSTNAME environment variable
++HOSTNAME =
++
+ what:
+	@echo
+	@echo "Usage: edit the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition in the Makefile then:"
+@@ -19,7 +24,7 @@
+	@echo "	generic (most bsd-ish systems with sys5 compatibility)"
+	@echo "	386bsd aix alpha apollo bsdos convex-ultranet dell-gcc dgux dgux543"
+	@echo "	dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix"
+-	@echo "	linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211"
++	@echo "	linux gnu machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211"
+	@echo "	ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4"
+	@echo "	sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2"
+	@echo "	uts215 uxp"
+@@ -43,8 +48,8 @@
+ # Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix/ptx
+ #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/etc
+ #
+-# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX
+-#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin
++# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX Linux
++REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin
+ #
+ # BSD 4.4
+ #REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec
+@@ -141,10 +146,21 @@
+	LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \
+	EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all
+
++ifneq ($(GLIBC),0)
++MYLIB=-lnsl
++endif
++
+ linux:
+	@make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \
+-	LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \
+-	NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all
++	LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \
++	NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \
++	EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT"
++
++gnu:
++	@make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \
++	LIBS=$(MYLIB) RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=weak_symbols.o \
++	NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= VSYSLOG= BUGS= all \
++	EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DHAVE_STRERROR -DHAVE_WEAKSYMS -D_REENTRANT"
+
+ # This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x.
+ hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10:
+@@ -391,7 +407,7 @@
+ # the ones provided with this source distribution. The environ.c module
+ # implements setenv(), getenv(), and putenv().
+
+-AUX_OBJ= setenv.o
++#AUX_OBJ= setenv.o
+ #AUX_OBJ= environ.o
+ #AUX_OBJ= environ.o strcasecmp.o
+
+@@ -454,7 +470,8 @@
+ # host name aliases. Compile with -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG to work
+ # around this. The workaround does no harm on other Solaris versions.
+
+-BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK
++BUGS =
++#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK
+ #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DINET_ADDR_BUG
+ #BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG
+
+@@ -464,7 +481,7 @@
+ # If your system supports NIS or YP-style netgroups, enable the following
+ # macro definition. Netgroups are used only for host access control.
+ #
+-#NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP
++NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP
+
+ ###############################################################
+ # System dependencies: whether or not your system has vsyslog()
+@@ -491,7 +508,7 @@
+ # Uncomment the next definition to turn on the language extensions
+ # (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn).
+ #
+-#STYLE	= -DPROCESS_OPTIONS	# Enable language extensions.
++STYLE	= -DPROCESS_OPTIONS	# Enable language extensions.
+
+ ################################################################
+ # Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records
+@@ -514,7 +531,7 @@
+ #
+ # The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the /usr/include/syslog.h file.
+
+-FACILITY= LOG_MAIL	# LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use
++FACILITY= LOG_DAEMON	# LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use
+
+ # The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged.
+
+@@ -610,7 +627,7 @@
+ # Paranoid mode implies hostname lookup. In order to disable hostname
+ # lookups altogether, see the next section.
+
+-PARANOID= -DPARANOID
++#PARANOID= -DPARANOID
+
+ ########################################
+ # Optional: turning off hostname lookups
+@@ -623,7 +640,7 @@
+ # In order to perform selective hostname lookups, disable paranoid
+ # mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition.
+
+-HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME
++#HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME
+
+ #############################################
+ # Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking
+@@ -649,28 +666,46 @@
+ # source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples: 4.4BSD derivatives,
+ # Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details.
+ #
+-# KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS
++KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS
+
+ ## End configuration options
+ ############################
+
+ # Protection against weird shells or weird make programs.
+
++CC	= gcc
+ SHELL	= /bin/sh
+-.c.o:;	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c
++.c.o:;	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $*.o -c $*.c
++
++SOMAJOR = 0
++SOMINOR = 7.6
++
++LIB	= libwrap.a
++SHLIB	= shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR).$(SOMINOR)
++SHLIBSOMAJ= shared/libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR)
++SHLIBSO	= shared/libwrap.so
++SHLIBFLAGS = -Lshared -lwrap
+
+-CFLAGS	= -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \
++shared/%.o: %.c
++	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(SHCFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
++
++CFLAGS	= -O2 -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \
+	$(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \
+	-DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \
+	-DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \
+	$(UCHAR) $(TABLES) $(STRINGS) $(TLI) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(DOT) \
+	$(VSYSLOG) $(HOSTNAME)
+
++SHLINKFLAGS = -shared -Xlinker -soname -Xlinker libwrap.so.$(SOMAJOR) -lc $(LIBS)
++SHCFLAGS = -fPIC -shared -D_REENTRANT
++
+ LIB_OBJ= hosts_access.o options.o shell_cmd.o rfc931.o eval.o \
+	hosts_ctl.o refuse.o percent_x.o clean_exit.o $(AUX_OBJ) \
+	$(FROM_OBJ) fix_options.o socket.o tli.o workarounds.o \
+	update.o misc.o diag.o percent_m.o myvsyslog.o
+
++SHLIB_OBJ= $(addprefix shared/, $(LIB_OBJ));
++
+ FROM_OBJ= fromhost.o
+
+ KIT	= README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c hosts_access.c shell_cmd.c \
+@@ -684,46 +719,80 @@
+	refuse.c tcpdchk.8 setenv.c inetcf.c inetcf.h scaffold.c \
+	scaffold.h tcpdmatch.8 README.NIS
+
+-LIB	= libwrap.a
+-
+-all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk
++all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk $(LIB)
+
+ # Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed.
+
+ config-check:
+	@set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; }
+-	@set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >/tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
+-	if cmp cflags /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
+-	then rm /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \
+-	else mv /tmp/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \
++	@set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >cflags.new ; \
++	if cmp cflags cflags.new ; \
++	then rm cflags.new ; \
++	else mv cflags.new cflags ; \
+	fi >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
++	@if [ ! -d shared ]; then mkdir shared; fi
+
+ $(LIB):	$(LIB_OBJ)
+	rm -f $(LIB)
+	$(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ)
+	-$(RANLIB) $(LIB)
+
+-tcpd:	tcpd.o $(LIB)
+-	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
++$(SHLIB): $(SHLIB_OBJ)
++	rm -f $(SHLIB)
++	$(CC) -o $(SHLIB) $(SHLINKFLAGS) $(SHLIB_OBJ)
++	ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIB)) $(SHLIBSOMAJ)
++	ln -s $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) $(SHLIBSO)
++
++tcpd:	tcpd.o $(SHLIB)
++	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
+
+-miscd:	miscd.o $(LIB)
+-	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
++miscd:	miscd.o $(SHLIB)
++	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
+
+-safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB)
+-	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
++safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(SHLIB)
++	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
+
+ TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o
+
+-tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB)
+-	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS)
++tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIB)
++	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS)
+
+-try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB)
+-	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS)
++try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIB)
++	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(SHLIBFLAGS)
+
+ TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o
+
+-tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB)
+-	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS)
++tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIB)
++	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(SHLIBFLAGS)
++
++install: install-lib install-bin install-dev
++
++install-lib:
++	install -o root -g root -m 0755 $(SHLIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/
++	ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIB)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ))
++	ln -sf $(notdir $(SHLIBSOMAJ)) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/$(notdir $(SHLIBSO))
++
++install-bin:
++	install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpd ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdchk ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0755 tcpdmatch ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0755 try-from ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0755 safe_finger ${DESTDIR}/usr/sbin/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdchk.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0644 try-from.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpdmatch.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0644 safe_finger.8 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man8/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_options.5 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man5/
++
++install-dev:
++	install -o root -g root -m 0644 hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0644 tcpd.h ${DESTDIR}/usr/include/
++	install -o root -g root -m 0644 $(LIB) ${DESTDIR}/usr/lib/
++	ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/hosts_ctl.3
++	ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_init.3
++	ln -sf hosts_access.3 ${DESTDIR}/usr/share/man/man3/request_set.3
+
+ shar:	$(KIT)
+	@shar $(KIT)
+@@ -739,7 +808,8 @@
+
+ clean:
+	rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \
+-	cflags
++	cflags libwrap*.so*
++	rm -rf shared
+
+ tidy:	clean
+	chmod -R a+r .
+@@ -885,5 +955,6 @@
+ update.o: mystdarg.h
+ update.o: tcpd.h
+ vfprintf.o: cflags
++weak_symbols.o: tcpd.h
+ workarounds.o: cflags
+ workarounds.o: tcpd.h
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/fix_options.c	1997-04-07 19:29:19.000000000 -0500
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/fix_options.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -35,7 +35,12 @@
+ #ifdef IP_OPTIONS
+     unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp;
+     char    lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp;
++#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
+     int     optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto;
++#else /* __GLIBC__ */
++    size_t  optsize = sizeof(optbuf);
++    int     ipproto;
++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
+     struct protoent *ip;
+     int     fd = request->fd;
+     unsigned int opt;
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.3	1996-02-11 10:01:27.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.3	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
+ hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library
+ .SH SYNOPSIS
+ .nf
+-#include "tcpd.h"
++#include <tcpd.h>
+
+ extern int allow_severity;
+ extern int deny_severity;
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.5	1995-01-30 12:51:47.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.5	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
+ impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a
+ quick introduction.
+ .PP
+-An extended version of the access control language is described in the
+-\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at
+-program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS.
++The extended version of the access control language is described in the
++\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. \fBNote that this language supersedes
++the meaning of \fIshell_command\fB as documented below.\fR
+ .PP
+ In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a
+ network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of
+@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
+ character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are
+ easier to edit.
+ .IP \(bu
+-Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored.
++Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#' character are ignored.
+ This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables
+ are easier to read.
+ .IP \(bu
+@@ -69,26 +69,33 @@
+ .SH PATTERNS
+ The access control language implements the following patterns:
+ .IP \(bu
+-A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if
++A string that begins with a `.' character. A host name is matched if
+ the last components of its name match the specified pattern.  For
+-example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name
+-`wzv.win.tue.nl\'.
++example, the pattern `.tue.nl' matches the host name
++`wzv.win.tue.nl'.
+ .IP \(bu
+-A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if
++A string that ends with a `.' character. A host address is matched if
+ its first numeric fields match the given string.  For example, the
+-pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
++pattern `131.155.' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
+ Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x).
+ .IP \(bu
+-A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS
++A string that begins with an `@' character is treated as an NIS
+ (formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host
+ member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported
+ for daemon process names or for client user names.
+ .IP \(bu
+-An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a
+-`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the
+-bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask
+-pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the
+-range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'.
++An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m' is interpreted as a
++`net/mask' pair. A host address is matched if `net' is equal to the
++bitwise AND of the address and the `mask'. For example, the net/mask
++pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0' matches every address in the
++range `131.155.72.0' through `131.155.73.255'.
++.IP \(bu
++A string that begins with a `/' character is treated as a file
++name. A host name or address is matched if it matches any host name
++or address pattern listed in the named file. The file format is
++zero or more lines with zero or more host name or address patterns
++separated by whitespace.  A file name pattern can be used anywhere
++a host name or address pattern can be used.
+ .SH WILDCARDS
+ The access control language supports explicit wildcards:
+ .IP ALL
+@@ -115,19 +122,19 @@
+ .ne 6
+ .SH OPERATORS
+ .IP EXCEPT
+-Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct
++Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2'; this construct
+ matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches
+ \fIlist_2\fR.  The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in
+ client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control
+-language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\'
+-would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'.
++language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c'
++would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))'.
+ .br
+ .ne 6
+ .SH SHELL COMMANDS
+ If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that
+ command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next section).
+ The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard
+-input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR.  Specify an `&\'
++input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR.  Specify an `&'
+ at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has
+ completed.
+ .PP
+@@ -159,7 +166,7 @@
+ .IP %u
+ The client user name (or "unknown").
+ .IP %%
+-Expands to a single `%\' character.
++Expands to a single `%' character.
+ .PP
+ Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by
+ underscores.
+@@ -243,9 +250,9 @@
+ less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the
+ client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much
+ harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that
+-the client\'s IDENT server is lying.
++the client's IDENT server is lying.
+ .PP
+-Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services.
++Note: IDENT lookups don't work with UDP services.
+ .SH EXAMPLES
+ The language is flexible enough that different types of access control
+ policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language
+@@ -285,7 +292,7 @@
+ .br
+ ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu
+ .PP
+-The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\'
++The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.'
+ in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP
+ netgroup.  The second rule permits access from all hosts in the
+ \fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of
+@@ -322,8 +329,8 @@
+ /etc/hosts.deny:
+ .in +3
+ .nf
+-in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
+-	/usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) &
++in.tftpd: ALL: (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
++	/usr/bin/mail -s %d-%h root) &
+ .fi
+ .PP
+ The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be
+@@ -349,7 +356,7 @@
+ capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not
+ terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter>
+ expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails
+-that shouldn\'t.  All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
++that shouldn't.  All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
+ .SH FILES
+ .na
+ .nf
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_access.c	1997-02-11 19:13:23.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_access.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -240,6 +240,26 @@
+     }
+ }
+
++/* hostfile_match - look up host patterns from file */
++
++static int hostfile_match(path, host)
++char   *path;
++struct hosts_info *host;
++{
++    char    tok[BUFSIZ];
++    int     match = NO;
++    FILE   *fp;
++
++    if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) {
++        while (fscanf(fp, "%s", tok) == 1 && !(match = host_match(tok, host)))
++            /* void */ ;
++        fclose(fp);
++    } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
++        tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", path);
++    }
++    return (match);
++}
++
+ /* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */
+
+ static int host_match(tok, host)
+@@ -267,6 +287,8 @@
+	tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled");	/* not tcpd_jump() */
+	return (NO);
+ #endif
++    } else if (tok[0] == '/') {                         /* /file hack */
++        return (hostfile_match(tok, host));
+     } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) {		/* check address and name */
+	char   *name = eval_hostname(host);
+	return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name));
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/hosts_options.5	1994-12-28 10:42:29.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/hosts_options.5	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -58,12 +58,12 @@
+ Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after
+ performing the %<letter> expansions described in the hosts_access(5)
+ manual page.  The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr
+-connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the
++connected to the null device, so that it won't mess up the
+ conversation with the client host. Example:
+ .sp
+ .nf
+ .ti +3
+-spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) &
++spawn (/usr/sbin/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/bin/mail root) &
+ .fi
+ .sp
+ executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/options.c	1996-02-11 10:01:32.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/options.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -473,6 +473,9 @@
+ #ifdef LOG_CRON
+     "cron", LOG_CRON,
+ #endif
++#ifdef LOG_FTP
++    "ftp", LOG_FTP,
++#endif
+ #ifdef LOG_LOCAL0
+     "local0", LOG_LOCAL0,
+ #endif
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/percent_m.c	1994-12-28 10:42:37.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/percent_m.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+
+ extern int errno;
+-#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED
++#if !defined(SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED) && !defined(HAVE_STRERROR)
+ extern char *sys_errlist[];
+ extern int sys_nerr;
+ #endif
+@@ -29,11 +29,15 @@
+
+     while (*bp = *cp)
+	if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') {
++#ifdef HAVE_STRERROR
++            strcpy(bp, strerror(errno));
++#else
+	    if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) {
+		strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]);
+	    } else {
+		sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno);
+	    }
++#endif
+	    bp += strlen(bp);
+	    cp += 2;
+	} else {
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/rfc931.c	1995-01-02 09:11:34.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/rfc931.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
+
+ int     rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */
+
+-static jmp_buf timebuf;
++static sigjmp_buf timebuf;
+
+ /* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */
+
+@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
+ static void timeout(sig)
+ int     sig;
+ {
+-    longjmp(timebuf, sig);
++    siglongjmp(timebuf, sig);
+ }
+
+ /* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
+	 * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server.
+	 */
+
+-	if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) {
++	if (sigsetjmp(timebuf,1) == 0) {
+	    signal(SIGALRM, timeout);
+	    alarm(rfc931_timeout);
+
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.8	1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.8	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
++.TH SAFE_FINGER 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual"
++.SH NAME
++safe_finger \- finger client wrapper that protects against nasty stuff
++from finger servers
++.SH SYNOPSIS
++.B safe_finger [finger_options]
++.SH DESCRIPTION
++The
++.B safe_finger
++command protects against nasty stuff from finger servers. Use this
++program for automatic reverse finger probes from the
++.B tcp_wrapper
++.B (tcpd)
++, not the raw finger command. The
++.B safe_finger
++command makes sure that the finger client is not run with root
++privileges. It also runs the finger client with a defined PATH
++environment.
++.B safe_finger
++will also protect you from problems caused by the output of some
++finger servers. The problem: some programs may react to stuff in
++the first column. Other programs may get upset by thrash anywhere
++on a line. File systems may fill up as the finger server keeps
++sending data. Text editors may bomb out on extremely long lines.
++The finger server may take forever because it is somehow wedged.
++.B safe_finger
++takes care of all this badness.
++.SH SEE ALSO
++.BR hosts_access (5),
++.BR hosts_options (5),
++.BR tcpd (8)
++.SH AUTHOR
++Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
++
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/safe_finger.c	1994-12-28 10:42:42.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/safe_finger.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -26,21 +26,24 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <ctype.h>
+ #include <pwd.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
+
+ extern void exit();
+
+ /* Local stuff */
+
+-char    path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbin";
++char    path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin";
+
+ #define	TIME_LIMIT	60		/* Do not keep listinging forever */
+ #define	INPUT_LENGTH	100000		/* Do not keep listinging forever */
+ #define	LINE_LENGTH	128		/* Editors can choke on long lines */
+ #define	FINGER_PROGRAM	"finger"	/* Most, if not all, UNIX systems */
+ #define	UNPRIV_NAME	"nobody"	/* Preferred privilege level */
+-#define	UNPRIV_UGID	32767		/* Default uid and gid */
++#define	UNPRIV_UGID	65534		/* Default uid and gid */
+
+ int     finger_pid;
++int	allow_severity = SEVERITY;
++int	deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
+
+ void    cleanup(sig)
+ int     sig;
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/scaffold.c	1997-03-21 12:27:24.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/scaffold.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -180,10 +180,12 @@
+
+ /* ARGSUSED */
+
+-void    rfc931(request)
+-struct request_info *request;
++void    rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest)
++struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin;
++struct sockaddr_in *our_sin;
++char   *dest;
+ {
+-    strcpy(request->user, unknown);
++    strcpy(dest, unknown);
+ }
+
+ /* check_path - examine accessibility */
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/socket.c	1997-03-21 12:27:25.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/socket.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -76,7 +76,11 @@
+ {
+     static struct sockaddr_in client;
+     static struct sockaddr_in server;
++#if !defined (__GLIBC__)
+     int     len;
++#else /* __GLIBC__ */
++    size_t  len;
++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
+     char    buf[BUFSIZ];
+     int     fd = request->fd;
+
+@@ -224,7 +228,11 @@
+ {
+     char    buf[BUFSIZ];
+     struct sockaddr_in sin;
++#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
+     int     size = sizeof(sin);
++#else /* __GLIBC__ */
++    size_t  size = sizeof(sin);
++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
+
+     /*
+      * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.8	1996-02-21 09:39:16.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.8	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
+ .PP
+ The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some
+ systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have
+-no `in.\' prefix to their name.
++no `in.' prefix to their name.
+ .SH EXAMPLE 2
+ This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons
+ are left in their original place.
+@@ -110,26 +110,26 @@
+ becomes:
+ .sp
+ .ti +5
+-finger  stream  tcp  nowait  nobody  /some/where/tcpd     in.fingerd
++finger  stream  tcp  nowait  nobody  /usr/sbin/tcpd       in.fingerd
+ .sp
+ .fi
+ .PP
+ The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some
+ systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the
+-daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid
++daemons have no `in.' prefix to their name, or there is no userid
+ field in the inetd configuration file.
+ .PP
+ Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be
+-covered by \fItcpd\fR.  Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8)
++covered by \fItcpd\fR.  Send a `kill -HUP' to the \fIinetd\fR(8)
+ process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to
+-execute the `inetimp\' command.
++execute the `inetimp' command.
+ .SH EXAMPLE 3
+ In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret"
+ or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it
+ specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example:
+ .nf
+ .sp
+-    ntalk  dgram  udp  wait  root  /some/where/tcpd  /usr/local/lib/ntalkd
++    ntalk  dgram  udp  wait  root  /usr/sbin/tcpd  /usr/sbin/in.ntalkd
+ .sp
+ .fi
+ .PP
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpd.h	1996-03-19 09:22:25.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpd.h	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -4,6 +4,25 @@
+   * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
+   */
+
++#ifndef _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H
++#define _TCPWRAPPERS_TCPD_H
++
++/* someone else may have defined this */
++#undef  __P
++
++/* use prototypes if we have an ANSI C compiler or are using C++ */
++#if defined(__STDC__) || defined(__cplusplus)
++#define __P(args)       args
++#else
++#define __P(args)       ()
++#endif
++
++/* Need definitions of struct sockaddr_in and FILE. */
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++
++__BEGIN_DECLS
++
+ /* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */
+
+ #define STRING_LENGTH	128		/* hosts, users, processes */
+@@ -25,10 +44,10 @@
+     char    pid[10];			/* access via eval_pid(request) */
+     struct host_info client[1];		/* client endpoint info */
+     struct host_info server[1];		/* server endpoint info */
+-    void  (*sink) ();			/* datagram sink function or 0 */
+-    void  (*hostname) ();		/* address to printable hostname */
+-    void  (*hostaddr) ();		/* address to printable address */
+-    void  (*cleanup) ();		/* cleanup function or 0 */
++    void  (*sink) __P((int));		/* datagram sink function or 0 */
++    void  (*hostname) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable hostname */
++    void  (*hostaddr) __P((struct host_info *)); /* address to printable address */
++    void  (*cleanup) __P((struct request_info *)); /* cleanup function or 0 */
+     struct netconfig *config;		/* netdir handle */
+ };
+
+@@ -61,25 +80,30 @@
+ /* Global functions. */
+
+ #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT)
+-extern void fromhost();			/* get/validate client host info */
++extern void fromhost __P((struct request_info *));	/* get/validate client host info */
+ #else
+ #define fromhost sock_host		/* no TLI support needed */
+ #endif
+
+-extern int hosts_access();		/* access control */
+-extern void shell_cmd();		/* execute shell command */
+-extern char *percent_x();		/* do %<char> expansion */
+-extern void rfc931();			/* client name from RFC 931 daemon */
+-extern void clean_exit();		/* clean up and exit */
+-extern void refuse();			/* clean up and exit */
+-extern char *xgets();			/* fgets() on steroids */
+-extern char *split_at();		/* strchr() and split */
+-extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr();	/* restricted inet_addr() */
++extern void shell_cmd __P((char *));	/* execute shell command */
++extern char *percent_x __P((char *, int, char *, struct request_info *)); /* do %<char> expansion */
++extern void rfc931 __P((struct sockaddr_in *, struct sockaddr_in *, char *)); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */
++extern void clean_exit __P((struct request_info *)); /* clean up and exit */
++extern void refuse __P((struct request_info *));	/* clean up and exit */
++extern char *xgets __P((char *, int, FILE *));	/* fgets() on steroids */
++extern char *split_at __P((char *, int));	/* strchr() and split */
++extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr __P((char *)); /* restricted inet_addr() */
+
+ /* Global variables. */
+
++#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS
++extern int allow_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */
++extern int deny_severity __attribute__ ((weak)); /* for connection logging */
++#else
+ extern int allow_severity;		/* for connection logging */
+ extern int deny_severity;		/* for connection logging */
++#endif
++
+ extern char *hosts_allow_table;		/* for verification mode redirection */
+ extern char *hosts_deny_table;		/* for verification mode redirection */
+ extern int hosts_access_verbose;	/* for verbose matching mode */
+@@ -92,9 +116,14 @@
+   */
+
+ #ifdef __STDC__
++extern int hosts_access(struct request_info *request);
++extern int hosts_ctl(char *daemon, char *client_name, char *client_addr,
++                     char *client_user);
+ extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...);
+ extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...);
+ #else
++extern int hosts_access();
++extern int hosts_ctl();
+ extern struct request_info *request_init();	/* initialize request */
+ extern struct request_info *request_set();	/* update request structure */
+ #endif
+@@ -117,27 +146,31 @@
+   * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results.
+   */
+
+-extern char *eval_user();		/* client user */
+-extern char *eval_hostname();		/* printable hostname */
+-extern char *eval_hostaddr();		/* printable host address */
+-extern char *eval_hostinfo();		/* host name or address */
+-extern char *eval_client();		/* whatever is available */
+-extern char *eval_server();		/* whatever is available */
++extern char *eval_user __P((struct request_info *));	/* client user */
++extern char *eval_hostname __P((struct host_info *));	/* printable hostname */
++extern char *eval_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *));	/* printable host address */
++extern char *eval_hostinfo __P((struct host_info *));	/* host name or address */
++extern char *eval_client __P((struct request_info *));	/* whatever is available */
++extern char *eval_server __P((struct request_info *));	/* whatever is available */
+ #define eval_daemon(r)	((r)->daemon)	/* daemon process name */
+ #define eval_pid(r)	((r)->pid)	/* process id */
+
+ /* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */
+
+-extern void sock_host();		/* look up endpoint addresses */
+-extern void sock_hostname();		/* translate address to hostname */
+-extern void sock_hostaddr();		/* address to printable address */
++/* look up endpoint addresses */
++extern void sock_host __P((struct request_info *));
++/* translate address to hostname */
++extern void sock_hostname __P((struct host_info *));
++/* address to printable address */
++extern void sock_hostaddr __P((struct host_info *));
++
+ #define sock_methods(r) \
+	{ (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; }
+
+ /* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. */
+
+ #if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT)
+-extern void tli_host();			/* look up endpoint addresses etc. */
++extern void tli_host __P((struct request_info *));	/* look up endpoint addresses etc. */
+ #endif
+
+  /*
+@@ -178,7 +211,7 @@
+   * behavior.
+   */
+
+-extern void process_options();		/* execute options */
++extern void process_options __P((char *, struct request_info *)); /* execute options */
+ extern int dry_run;			/* verification flag */
+
+ /* Bug workarounds. */
+@@ -217,3 +250,7 @@
+ #define strtok	my_strtok
+ extern char *my_strtok();
+ #endif
++
++__END_DECLS
++
++#endif /* tcpd.h */
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/tcpdchk.c	1997-02-11 19:13:25.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/tcpdchk.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -350,6 +350,8 @@
+ {
+     if (pat[0] == '@') {
+	tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat);
++    } else if (pat[0] == '/') {
++        tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"/\"", pat);
+     } else if (pat[0] == '.') {
+	tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat);
+     } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') {
+@@ -382,6 +384,8 @@
+ {
+     if (pat[0] == '@') {			/* @netgroup */
+	tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat);
++    } else if (pat[0] == '/') {
++        tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"/\"", pat);
+     } else if (pat[0] == '.') {
+	tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat);
+     } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') {
+@@ -402,8 +406,13 @@
+ static int check_host(pat)
+ char   *pat;
+ {
++    char    buf[BUFSIZ];
+     char   *mask;
+     int     addr_count = 1;
++    FILE   *fp;
++    struct tcpd_context saved_context;
++    char   *cp;
++    char   *wsp = " \t\r\n";
+
+     if (pat[0] == '@') {			/* @netgroup */
+ #ifdef NO_NETGRENT
+@@ -422,6 +431,21 @@
+	tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled");
+ #endif
+ #endif
++    } else if (pat[0] == '/') {                 /* /path/name */
++        if ((fp = fopen(pat, "r")) != 0) {
++            saved_context = tcpd_context;
++            tcpd_context.file = pat;
++            tcpd_context.line = 0;
++            while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) {
++                tcpd_context.line++;
++                for (cp = strtok(buf, wsp); cp; cp = strtok((char *) 0, wsp))
++                    check_host(cp);
++            }
++            tcpd_context = saved_context;
++            fclose(fp);
++        } else if (errno != ENOENT) {
++            tcpd_warn("open %s: %m", pat);
++        }
+     } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) {	/* network/netmask */
+	if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE
+	    || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE)
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8 tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/try-from.8	1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/try-from.8	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
++.TH TRY-FROM 8 "21th June 1997" Linux "Linux Programmer's Manual"
++.SH NAME
++try-from \- test program for the tcp_wrapper
++.SH SYNOPSIS
++.B try-from
++.SH DESCRIPTION
++The
++.B try-from
++command can be called via a remote shell command to find out
++if the hostname and address are properly recognized
++by the
++.B tcp_wrapper
++library, if username lookup works, and (SysV only) if the TLI
++on top of IP heuristics work. Diagnostics are reported through
++.BR syslog (3)
++and redirected to stderr.
++
++Example:
++
++rsh host /some/where/try-from
++
++.SH SEE ALSO
++.BR hosts_access (5),
++.BR hosts_options (5),
++.BR tcpd (8)
++.SH AUTHOR
++Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
++
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/weak_symbols.c	1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/weak_symbols.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
++ /*
++  * @(#) weak_symbols.h 1.5 99/12/29 23:50
++  *
++  * Author: Anthony Towns <ajt@debian.org>
++  */
++
++#ifdef HAVE_WEAKSYMS
++#include <syslog.h>
++int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;
++int allow_severity = SEVERITY;
++#endif
+diff -Naur tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c
+--- tcp_wrappers_7.6/workarounds.c	1996-03-19 09:22:26.000000000 -0600
++++ tcp_wrappers_7.6.gimli/workarounds.c	2002-01-07 08:50:19.000000000 -0600
+@@ -163,7 +163,11 @@
+ int     fix_getpeername(sock, sa, len)
+ int     sock;
+ struct sockaddr *sa;
++#if !defined(__GLIBC__)
+ int    *len;
++#else /* __GLIBC__ */
++size_t *len;
++#endif /* __GLIBC__ */
+ {
+     int     ret;
+     struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa;