hybrid_platforms_conductor 32.3.6

data/lib/hybrid_platforms_conductor/hpc_plugins/test/ports.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+module HybridPlatformsConductor
+
+  module HpcPlugins
+
+    module Test
+
+      # Various tests on ports
+      class Ports < HybridPlatformsConductor::Test
+
+        # Config DSL extension for this test plugin
+        module ConfigDslExtension
+
+          # List of rules on ports. Each info has the following properties:
+          # * *nodes_selectors_stack* (Array<Object>): Stack of nodes selectors impacted by this rule.
+          # * *ports* (Array<Integer>): List of ports concerned by this rule.
+          # * *state* (Symbol): State those ports should be in. Possible states are:
+          #   * *opened*: The port should be opened
+          #   * *closed*: The port should be closed
+          # Array< Hash<Symbol, Object> >
+          attr_reader :ports_rules
+
+          # Initialize the DSL 
+          def init_ports_test
+            @ports_rules = []
+          end
+
+          # Give a list of ports that should be opened
+          #
+          # Parameters::
+          # * *ports* (Integer or Array<Integer>): List of ports
+          def check_opened_ports(*ports)
+            @ports_rules << {
+              ports: ports.flatten,
+              state: :opened,
+              nodes_selectors_stack: current_nodes_selectors_stack
+            }
+          end
+
+          # Give a list of ports that should be closed
+          #
+          # Parameters::
+          # * *ports* (Integer or Array<Integer>): List of ports
+          def check_closed_ports(*ports)
+            @ports_rules << {
+              ports: ports.flatten,
+              state: :closed,
+              nodes_selectors_stack: current_nodes_selectors_stack
+            }
+          end
+
+        end
+
+        self.extend_config_dsl_with ConfigDslExtension, :init_ports_test
+
+        # Check my_test_plugin.rb.sample documentation for signature details.
+        def test_for_node
+          @nodes_handler.select_confs_for_node(@node, @config.ports_rules).each do |ports_rule_info|
+            node_ip = @nodes_handler.get_host_ip_of(@node)
+            ports_rule_info[:ports].each do |port|
+              log_debug "Test port #{node_ip}:#{port}"
+              port_opened =
+                begin
+                  Socket.tcp(node_ip, port, connect_timeout: 5) { true }
+                rescue
+                  false
+                end
+              case ports_rule_info[:state]
+              when :opened
+                error "Port #{port} should be opened but it's not" unless port_opened
+              when :closed
+                error "Port #{port} should be closed but it's not" if port_opened
+              else
+                raise "Unknown desired state for port: #{ports_rule_info[:state]}. Please correct this test plugin."
+              end
+            end
+          end
+        end
+
+      end
+
+    end
+
+  end
+
+end

data/lib/hybrid_platforms_conductor/hpc_plugins/test/private_ips.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+module HybridPlatformsConductor
+
+  module HpcPlugins
+
+    module Test
+
+      # Test that Private IPs are assigned correctly
+      class PrivateIps < HybridPlatformsConductor::Test
+
+        # Check my_test_plugin.rb.sample documentation for signature details.
+        def test
+          # Get a map of private IPs per node
+          @nodes_handler.prefetch_metadata_of @nodes_handler.known_nodes, :private_ips
+          private_ips = Hash[@nodes_handler.
+            known_nodes.
+            map { |node| [node, @nodes_handler.get_private_ips_of(node) || []] }
+          ]
+
+          # Check there are no duplicates
+          nodes_per_private_ip = {}
+          private_ips.each do |node, private_ips|
+            private_ips.each do |private_ip|
+              nodes_per_private_ip[private_ip] = [] unless nodes_per_private_ip.key?(private_ip)
+              nodes_per_private_ip[private_ip] << node
+            end
+          end
+          nodes_per_private_ip.each do |private_ip, nodes|
+            error "Private IP #{private_ip} is used by the following nodes: #{nodes.join(', ')}" if nodes.size > 1
+          end
+        end
+
+      end
+
+    end
+
+  end
+
+end

data/lib/hybrid_platforms_conductor/hpc_plugins/test/public_ips.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+module HybridPlatformsConductor
+
+  module HpcPlugins
+
+    module Test
+
+      # Test that Public IPs are assigned correctly
+      class PublicIps < HybridPlatformsConductor::Test
+
+        # Check my_test_plugin.rb.sample documentation for signature details.
+        def test
+          # Get a map of public IPs per node
+          @nodes_handler.prefetch_metadata_of @nodes_handler.known_nodes, :public_ips
+          public_ips = Hash[@nodes_handler.
+            known_nodes.
+            map { |node| [node, @nodes_handler.get_public_ips_of(node) || []] }
+          ]
+
+          # Check there are no duplicates
+          nodes_per_public_ip = {}
+          public_ips.each do |node, public_ips|
+            public_ips.each do |public_ip|
+              nodes_per_public_ip[public_ip] = [] unless nodes_per_public_ip.key?(public_ip)
+              nodes_per_public_ip[public_ip] << node
+            end
+          end
+          nodes_per_public_ip.each do |public_ip, nodes|
+            error "Public IP #{public_ip} is used by the following nodes: #{nodes.join(', ')}" if nodes.size > 1
+          end
+        end
+
+      end
+
+    end
+
+  end
+
+end

data/lib/hybrid_platforms_conductor/hpc_plugins/test/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,1930 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# Spectre & Meltdown checker
+#
+# Check for the latest version at:
+# https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker
+# git clone https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git
+# or wget meltdown.xae -O spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+# or curl -L meltdown.xae -o spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
+#
+# Stephane Lesimple
+#
+VERSION='0.35'
+
+trap 'exit_cleanup' EXIT
+trap '_warn "interrupted, cleaning up..."; exit_cleanup; exit 1' INT
+exit_cleanup()
+{
+	# cleanup the temp decompressed config & kernel image
+	[ -n "$dumped_config" ] && [ -f "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config"
+	[ -n "$vmlinuxtmp"    ] && [ -f "$vmlinuxtmp"    ] && rm -f "$vmlinuxtmp"
+	[ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ] && umount /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null
+	[ "$insmod_cpuid"    = 1 ] && rmmod cpuid 2>/dev/null
+	[ "$insmod_msr"      = 1 ] && rmmod msr 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+show_usage()
+{
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+	cat <<EOFSPECTRE
+	Usage:
+		Live mode:    $(basename $0) [options] [--live]
+		Offline mode: $(basename $0) [options] [--kernel <vmlinux_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>]
+
+	Modes:
+		Two modes are available.
+
+		First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel.
+		To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitly)
+
+		Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel.
+		You'll need to specify the location of the vmlinux file, config and System.map files:
+
+		--kernel vmlinux_file		Specify a (possibly compressed) vmlinux file
+		--config kernel_config		Specify a kernel config file
+		--map	 kernel_map_file	Specify a kernel System.map file
+
+	Options:
+		--no-color			Don't use color codes
+		--verbose, -v			Increase verbosity level
+		--no-sysfs			Don't use the /sys interface even if present
+		--sysfs-only			Only use the /sys interface, don't run our own checks
+		--coreos			Special mode for CoreOS (use an ephemeral toolbox to inspect kernel)
+		--batch text			Produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone
+		--batch json			Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef...
+		--batch nrpe			Produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE
+		--batch prometheus              Produce output for consumption by prometheus-node-exporter
+		--variant [1,2,3]		Specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked
+						Can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3)
+
+	Return codes:
+		0 (not vulnerable), 2 (vulnerable), 3 (unknown), 255 (error)
+
+	IMPORTANT:
+	A false sense of security is worse than no security at all.
+	Please use the --disclaimer option to understand exactly what this script does.
+
+EOFSPECTRE
+}
+
+show_disclaimer()
+{
+	cat <<EOFSPECTRE
+Disclaimer:
+
+This tool does its best to determine whether your system is immune (or has proper mitigations in place) for the
+collectively named "speculative execution" vulnerabilities. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee
+that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying whether your system has the known correct mitigations in place.
+However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might
+falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels).
+
+Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these
+vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable,
+except some specific/old models, such as some early Atoms. Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information
+from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device in which it runs.
+
+The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the lanprdape of vulnerable processors can be expected
+to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer
+explicitly stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement.
+
+Please also note that for Spectre vulnerabilities, all software can possibly be exploited, this tool only verifies that the
+kernel (which is the core of the system) you're using has the proper protections in place. Verifying all the other software
+is out of the scope of this tool. As a general measure, ensure you always have the most up to date stable versions of all
+the softwares you use, especially for those who are exposed to the world, such as network daemons and browsers.
+
+This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security.
+
+EOFSPECTRE
+}
+
+# parse options
+opt_kernel=''
+opt_config=''
+opt_map=''
+opt_live_explicit=0
+opt_live=1
+opt_no_color=0
+opt_batch=0
+opt_batch_format="text"
+opt_verbose=1
+opt_variant1=0
+opt_variant2=0
+opt_variant3=0
+opt_allvariants=1
+opt_no_sysfs=0
+opt_sysfs_only=0
+opt_coreos=0
+
+global_critical=0
+global_unknown=0
+nrpe_vuln=""
+
+# find a sane `echo` command
+# we'll try to avoid using shell builtins that might not take options
+if which echo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	echo_cmd=$(which echo)
+else
+	[ -x /bin/echo        ] && echo_cmd=/bin/echo
+	[ -x /system/bin/echo ] && echo_cmd=/system/bin/echo
+fi
+# still empty ? fallback to builtin
+[ -z "$echo_cmd" ] && echo_cmd=echo
+__echo()
+{
+	opt="$1"
+	shift
+	_msg="$*"
+
+	if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then
+		# strip ANSI color codes
+		# some sed versions (i.e. toybox) can't seem to handle
+		# \033 aka \x1B correctly, so do it for them.
+		_ctrlchar=$($echo_cmd -e "\033")
+		_msg=$($echo_cmd -e "$_msg" | sed -r "s/$_ctrlchar\[([0-9][0-9]?(;[0-9][0-9]?)?)?m//g")
+	fi
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+	$echo_cmd $opt -e "$_msg"
+}
+
+_echo()
+{
+	if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge "$1" ]; then
+		shift
+		__echo '' "$*"
+	fi
+}
+
+_echo_nol()
+{
+	if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge "$1" ]; then
+		shift
+		__echo -n "$*"
+	fi
+}
+
+_warn()
+{
+	_echo 0 "\033[31m$*\033[0m" >&2
+}
+
+_info()
+{
+	_echo 1 "$*"
+}
+
+_info_nol()
+{
+	_echo_nol 1 "$*"
+}
+
+_verbose()
+{
+	_echo 2 "$*"
+}
+
+_verbose_nol()
+{
+	_echo_nol 2 "$*"
+}
+
+_debug()
+{
+	_echo 3 "\033[34m(debug) $*\033[0m"
+}
+
+is_cpu_vulnerable_cached=0
+_is_cpu_vulnerable_cached()
+{
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+	[ "$1" = 1 ] && return $variant1
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+	[ "$1" = 2 ] && return $variant2
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+	[ "$1" = 3 ] && return $variant3
+	echo "$0: error: invalid variant '$1' passed to is_cpu_vulnerable()" >&2
+	exit 255
+}
+
+is_cpu_vulnerable()
+{
+	# param: 1, 2 or 3 (variant)
+	# returns 0 if vulnerable, 1 if not vulnerable
+	# (note that in shell, a return of 0 is success)
+	# by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here.
+	# usage: is_cpu_vulnerable 2 && do something if vulnerable
+	if [ "$is_cpu_vulnerable_cached" = 1 ]; then
+		_is_cpu_vulnerable_cached "$1"
+		return $?
+	fi
+
+	variant1=''
+	variant2=''
+	variant3=''
+
+	if is_cpu_specex_free; then
+		variant1=immune
+		variant2=immune
+		variant3=immune
+	elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ]; then
+		# Intel
+		# https://github.com/crozone/SpectrePoC/issues/1 ^F E5200 => spectre 2 not vulnerable
+		# https://github.com/paboldin/meltdown-exploit/issues/19 ^F E5200 => meltdown vulnerable
+		# model name : Pentium(R) Dual-Core  CPU      E5200  @ 2.50GHz
+		if grep -qE '^model name.+ Pentium\(R\) Dual-Core[[:space:]]+CPU[[:space:]]+E[0-9]{4}K? ' /proc/cpuinfo; then
+			variant1=vuln
+			[ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune
+			variant3=vuln
+		fi
+		if [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = 1 ]; then
+			# capability bit for future Intel processor that will explicitly state
+			# that they're not vulnerable to Meltdown
+			# this var is set in check_cpu()
+			variant3=immune
+			_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: RDCL_NO is set so not vuln to meltdown"
+		fi
+	elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = AuthenticAMD ]; then
+		# AMD revised their statement about variant2 => vulnerable
+		# https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/speculative-execution
+		variant1=vuln
+		variant2=vuln
+		[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
+	elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = ARM ]; then
+		# ARM
+		# reference: https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update
+		# some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers,
+		# an example is "bigLITTLE". we shouldn't rely on the first CPU only, so we check the whole list
+		i=0
+		for cpupart in $cpu_part_list
+		do
+			i=$(( i + 1 ))
+			# do NOT quote $cpu_arch_list below
+			# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+			cpuarch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $'$i' }')
+			_debug "checking cpu$i: <$cpupart> <$cpuarch>"
+			# some kernels report AArch64 instead of 8
+			[ "$cpuarch" = "AArch64" ] && cpuarch=8
+			if [ -n "$cpupart" ] && [ -n "$cpuarch" ]; then
+				# Cortex-R7 and Cortex-R8 are real-time and only used in medical devices or such
+				# I can't find their CPU part number, but it's probably not that useful anyway
+				# model R7 R8 A9    A15   A17   A57   A72    A73    A75
+				# part   ?  ? 0xc09 0xc0f 0xc0e 0xd07 0xd08  0xd09  0xd0a
+				# arch  7? 7? 7     7     7     8     8      8      8
+				#
+				# variant 1 & variant 2
+				if [ "$cpuarch" = 7 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(c09|c0f|c0e)$'; then
+					# armv7 vulnerable chips
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: this armv7 vulnerable to spectre 1 & 2"
+					variant1=vuln
+					variant2=vuln
+				elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(d07|d08|d09|d0a)$'; then
+					# armv8 vulnerable chips
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: this armv8 vulnerable to spectre 1 & 2"
+					variant1=vuln
+					variant2=vuln
+				else
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: this arm non vulnerable to 1 & 2"
+					# others are not vulnerable
+					[ -z "$variant1" ] && variant1=immune
+					[ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune
+				fi
+
+				# for variant3, only A75 is vulnerable
+				if [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && [ "$cpupart" = 0xd0a ]; then
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: arm A75 vulnerable to meltdown"
+					variant3=vuln
+				else
+					_debug "checking cpu$i: this arm non vulnerable to meltdown"
+					[ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune
+				fi
+			fi
+			_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: for cpu$i and so far, we have <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3>"
+		done
+	fi
+	_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: temp results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3>"
+	# if at least one of the cpu is vulnerable, then the system is vulnerable
+	[ "$variant1" = "immune" ] && variant1=1 || variant1=0
+	[ "$variant2" = "immune" ] && variant2=1 || variant2=0
+	[ "$variant3" = "immune" ] && variant3=1 || variant3=0
+	_debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: final results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3>"
+	is_cpu_vulnerable_cached=1
+	_is_cpu_vulnerable_cached "$1"
+	return $?
+}
+
+is_cpu_specex_free()
+{
+	# return true (0) if the CPU doesn't do speculative execution, false (1) if it does.
+	# if it's not in the list we know, return false (1).
+	# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c#n882
+	# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW,   X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW,  X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT,    X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL,     X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW,    X86_FEATURE_ANY },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR,   5 },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     5 },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_NSC,       5 },
+	# { X86_VENDOR_ANY,       4 },
+	parse_cpu_details
+	if [ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ]; then
+		if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then
+			if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW"  ]      || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW" ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT"   ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL"    ] || \
+				[ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW"   ]; then
+				return 0
+			fi
+		elif [ "$cpu_family" = 5 ]; then
+			return 0
+		fi
+	fi
+	[ "$cpu_family" = 4 ] && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+show_header()
+{
+	_info "Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION"
+	_info
+}
+
+parse_opt_file()
+{
+	# parse_opt_file option_name option_value
+	option_name="$1"
+	option_value="$2"
+	if [ -z "$option_value" ]; then
+		show_header
+		show_usage
+		echo "$0: error: --$option_name expects one parameter (a file)" >&2
+		exit 1
+	elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then
+		show_header
+		echo "$0: error: couldn't find file $option_value" >&2
+		exit 1
+	elif [ ! -f "$option_value" ]; then
+		show_header
+		echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2
+		exit 1
+	elif [ ! -r "$option_value" ]; then
+		show_header
+		echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2
+		exit 1
+	fi
+	echo "$option_value"
+	exit 0
+}
+
+while [ -n "$1" ]; do
+	if [ "$1" = "--kernel" ]; then
+		opt_kernel=$(parse_opt_file kernel "$2"); ret=$?
+		[ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255
+		shift 2
+		opt_live=0
+	elif [ "$1" = "--config" ]; then
+		opt_config=$(parse_opt_file config "$2"); ret=$?
+		[ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255
+		shift 2
+		opt_live=0
+	elif [ "$1" = "--map" ]; then
+		opt_map=$(parse_opt_file map "$2"); ret=$?
+		[ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255
+		shift 2
+		opt_live=0
+	elif [ "$1" = "--live" ]; then
+		opt_live_explicit=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then
+		opt_no_color=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--no-sysfs" ]; then
+		opt_no_sysfs=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--sysfs-only" ]; then
+		opt_sysfs_only=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--coreos" ]; then
+		opt_coreos=1
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--coreos-within-toolbox" ]; then
+		# don't use directly: used internally by --coreos
+		opt_coreos=0
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--batch" ]; then
+		opt_batch=1
+		opt_verbose=0
+		shift
+		case "$1" in
+			text|nrpe|json|prometheus) opt_batch_format="$1"; shift;;
+			--*) ;;    # allow subsequent flags
+			'') ;;     # allow nothing at all
+			*)
+				echo "$0: error: unknown batch format '$1'" >&2
+				echo "$0: error: --batch expects a format from: text, nrpe, json" >&2
+				exit 255
+				;;
+		esac
+	elif [ "$1" = "-v" ] || [ "$1" = "--verbose" ]; then
+		opt_verbose=$(( opt_verbose + 1 ))
+		shift
+	elif [ "$1" = "--variant" ]; then
+		if [ -z "$2" ]; then
+			echo "$0: error: option --variant expects a parameter (1, 2 or 3)" >&2
+			exit 255
+		fi
+		case "$2" in
+			1) opt_variant1=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
+			2) opt_variant2=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
+			3) opt_variant3=1; opt_allvariants=0;;
+			*)
+				echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2 or 3" >&2;
+				exit 255
+				;;
+		esac
+		shift 2
+	elif [ "$1" = "-h" ] || [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then
+		show_header
+		show_usage
+		exit 0
+	elif [ "$1" = "--version" ]; then
+		opt_no_color=1
+		show_header
+		exit 0
+	elif [ "$1" = "--disclaimer" ]; then
+		show_header
+		show_disclaimer
+		exit 0
+	else
+		show_header
+		show_usage
+		echo "$0: error: unknown option '$1'"
+		exit 255
+	fi
+done
+
+show_header
+
+if [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
+	_warn "Incompatible options specified (--no-sysfs and --sysfs-only), aborting"
+	exit 255
+fi
+
+# print status function
+pstatus()
+{
+	if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ]; then
+		_info_nol "$2"
+	else
+		case "$1" in
+			red)    col="\033[41m\033[30m";;
+			green)  col="\033[42m\033[30m";;
+			yellow) col="\033[43m\033[30m";;
+			blue)   col="\033[44m\033[30m";;
+			*)      col="";;
+		esac
+		_info_nol "$col $2 \033[0m"
+	fi
+	[ -n "$3" ] && _info_nol " ($3)"
+	_info
+}
+
+# Print the final status of a vulnerability (incl. batch mode)
+# Arguments are: CVE UNK/OK/VULN description
+pvulnstatus()
+{
+	if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ]; then
+		case "$1" in
+			CVE-2017-5753) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 1";;
+			CVE-2017-5715) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 2";;
+			CVE-2017-5754) aka="MELTDOWN";;
+		esac
+
+		case "$opt_batch_format" in
+			text) _echo 0 "$1: $2 ($3)";;
+			json)
+				case "$2" in
+					UNK)  is_vuln="null";;
+					VULN) is_vuln="true";;
+					OK)   is_vuln="false";;
+				esac
+				json_output="${json_output:-[}{\"NAME\":\"$aka\",\"CVE\":\"$1\",\"VULNERABLE\":$is_vuln,\"INFOS\":\"$3\"},"
+				;;
+
+			nrpe)	[ "$2" = VULN ] && nrpe_vuln="$nrpe_vuln $1";;
+			prometheus)
+				prometheus_output="${prometheus_output:+$prometheus_output\n}specex_vuln_status{name=\"$aka\",cve=\"$1\",status=\"$2\",info=\"$3\"} 1"
+				;;
+		esac
+	fi
+
+	# always fill global_* vars because we use that do decide the program exit code
+	case "$2" in
+		UNK)  global_unknown="1";;
+		VULN) global_critical="1";;
+	esac
+
+	# display info if we're not in quiet/batch mode
+	vulnstatus="$2"
+	shift 2
+	_info_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m "
+	case "$vulnstatus" in
+		UNK)  pstatus yellow 'UNKNOWN'        "$@";;
+		VULN) pstatus red    'VULNERABLE'     "$@";;
+		OK)   pstatus green  'NOT VULNERABLE' "$@";;
+	esac
+}
+
+
+# The 3 below functions are taken from the extract-linux script, available here:
+# https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/scripts/extract-vmlinux
+# The functions have been modified for better integration to this script
+# The original header of the file has been retained below
+
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+# extract-vmlinux - Extract uncompressed vmlinux from a kernel image
+#
+# Inspired from extract-ikconfig
+# (c) 2009,2010 Dick Streefland <dick@streefland.net>
+#
+# (c) 2011      Corentin Chary <corentin.chary@gmail.com>
+#
+# Licensed under the GNU General Public License, version 2 (GPLv2).
+# ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+vmlinux=''
+vmlinux_err=''
+check_vmlinux()
+{
+	readelf -h "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+try_decompress()
+{
+	# The obscure use of the "tr" filter is to work around older versions of
+	# "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern.
+
+	# Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here
+	for     pos in $(tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$6" | grep -abo "^$2")
+	do
+		_debug "try_decompress: magic for $3 found at offset $pos"
+		if ! which "$3" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+			vmlinux_err="missing '$3' tool, please install it, usually it's in the '$5' package"
+			return 0
+		fi
+		pos=${pos%%:*}
+		# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+		tail -c+$pos "$6" 2>/dev/null | $3 $4 > "$vmlinuxtmp" 2>/dev/null
+		if check_vmlinux "$vmlinuxtmp"; then
+			vmlinux="$vmlinuxtmp"
+			_debug "try_decompress: decompressed with $3 successfully!"
+			return 0
+		else
+			_debug "try_decompress: decompression with $3 did not work"
+		fi
+	done
+	return 1
+}
+
+extract_vmlinux()
+{
+	[ -n "$1" ] || return 1
+	# Prepare temp files:
+	vmlinuxtmp="$(mktemp /tmp/vmlinux-XXXXXX)"
+
+	# Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects:
+	if check_vmlinux "$1"; then
+		cat "$1" > "$vmlinuxtmp"
+		vmlinux=$vmlinuxtmp
+		return 0
+	fi
+
+	# That didn't work, so retry after decompression.
+	try_decompress '\037\213\010'     xy    gunzip  ''      gunzip      "$1" && return 0
+	try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000'     abcde unxz    ''      xz-utils    "$1" && return 0
+	try_decompress 'BZh'              xy    bunzip2 ''      bzip2       "$1" && return 0
+	try_decompress '\135\0\0\0'       xxx   unlzma  ''      xz-utils    "$1" && return 0
+	try_decompress '\211\114\132'     xy    'lzop'  '-d'    lzop        "$1" && return 0
+	try_decompress '\002\041\114\030' xyy   'lz4'   '-d -l' liblz4-tool "$1" && return 0
+	try_decompress '\177ELF'          xxy   'cat'   ''      cat         "$1" && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+# end of extract-vmlinux functions
+
+mount_debugfs()
+{
+	if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then
+		# try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards
+		mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1
+	fi
+}
+
+load_msr()
+{
+	modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1
+	_debug "attempted to load module msr, insmod_msr=$insmod_msr"
+}
+
+load_cpuid()
+{
+	modprobe cpuid 2>/dev/null && insmod_cpuid=1
+	_debug "attempted to load module cpuid, insmod_cpuid=$insmod_cpuid"
+}
+
+read_cpuid()
+{
+	_leaf="$1"
+	_bytenum="$2"
+	_and_operand="$3"
+
+	if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ]; then
+		# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
+		load_cpuid
+	fi
+	if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ]; then
+		return 2
+	fi
+
+	if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 3 ]; then
+		dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+		_debug "cpuid: reading leaf$_leaf of cpuid on cpu0, ret=$?"
+		_debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf eax-ebx-ecx-edx: $(   dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 2>/dev/null | od -x -A n)"
+		_debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf edx higher byte is: $(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 2>/dev/null | dd bs=1 skip="$_bytenum" count=1 2>/dev/null | od -x -A n)"
+	fi
+	# getting proper byte of edx on leaf$_leaf of cpuinfo in decimal
+	_reg_byte=$(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 2>/dev/null | dd bs=1 skip="$_bytenum" count=1 2>/dev/null | od -t u1 -A n | awk '{print $1}')
+	_debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf byte $_bytenum: $_reg_byte (decimal)"
+	_reg_bit=$(( _reg_byte & _and_operand ))
+	_debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf byte $_bytenum & $_and_operand = $_reg_bit"
+	[ "$_reg_bit" -eq 0 ] && return 1
+	# $_reg_bit is > 0, so the bit was found: return true (aka 0)
+	return 0
+}
+
+dmesg_grep()
+{
+	# grep for something in dmesg, ensuring that the dmesg buffer
+	# has not been truncated
+	dmesg_grepped=''
+	if ! dmesg | grep -qE '(^|\] )Linux version [0-9]'; then
+		# dmesg truncated
+		return 2
+	fi
+	dmesg_grepped=$(dmesg | grep -E "$1" | head -1)
+	# not found:
+	[ -z "$dmesg_grepped" ] && return 1
+	# found, output is in $dmesg_grepped
+	return 0
+}
+
+is_coreos()
+{
+	which coreos-install >/dev/null 2>&1 && which toolbox >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
+	return 1
+}
+
+parse_cpu_details()
+{
+	[ "$parse_cpu_details_done" = 1 ] && return 0
+	cpu_vendor=$(  grep '^vendor_id'  /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | head -1)
+	cpu_friendly_name=$(grep '^model name' /proc/cpuinfo | cut -d: -f2- | head -1 | sed -e 's/^ *//')
+	# special case for ARM follows
+	if grep -qi 'CPU implementer[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*0x41' /proc/cpuinfo; then
+		cpu_vendor='ARM'
+		# some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers,
+		# an example is "bigLITTLE", so we need to store the whole list, this is needed for is_cpu_vulnerable
+		cpu_part_list=$(awk '/CPU part/         {print $4}' /proc/cpuinfo)
+		cpu_arch_list=$(awk '/CPU architecture/ {print $3}' /proc/cpuinfo)
+		# take the first one to fill the friendly name, do NOT quote the vars below
+		# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+		cpu_arch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $1 }')
+		# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+		cpu_part=$(echo $cpu_part_list | awk '{ print $1 }')
+		[ "$cpu_arch" = "AArch64" ] && cpu_arch=8
+		cpu_friendly_name="ARM"
+		[ -n "$cpu_arch" ] && cpu_friendly_name="$cpu_friendly_name v$cpu_arch"
+		[ -n "$cpu_part" ] && cpu_friendly_name="$cpu_friendly_name model $cpu_part"
+	fi
+
+	cpu_family=$(  grep '^cpu family' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $4}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1)
+	cpu_model=$(   grep '^model'      /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1)
+	cpu_stepping=$(grep '^stepping'   /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1)
+	cpu_ucode=$(  grep '^microcode'   /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | head -1)
+
+	# also define those that we will need in other funcs
+	# taken from ttps://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+	# shellcheck disable=SC2034
+	{
+	INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH=$(( 0x0E ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM=$(( 0x0F ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L=$(( 0x16 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN=$(( 0x17 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_DUNNINGTON=$(( 0x1D ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM=$(( 0x1E ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G=$(( 0x1F ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP=$(( 0x1A ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX=$(( 0x2E ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE=$(( 0x25 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP=$(( 0x2C ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX=$(( 0x2F ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE=$(( 0x2A ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X=$(( 0x2D ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE=$(( 0x3A ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X=$(( 0x3E ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE=$(( 0x3C ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X=$(( 0x3F ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT=$(( 0x45 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E=$(( 0x46 ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE=$(( 0x3D ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E=$(( 0x47 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X=$(( 0x4F ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D=$(( 0x56 ))
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE=$(( 0x4E ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP=$(( 0x5E ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X=$(( 0x55 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE=$(( 0x8E ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP=$(( 0x9E ))
+
+	# /* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW=$(( 0x1C ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT=$(( 0x26 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL=$(( 0x27 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW=$(( 0x35 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW=$(( 0x36 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1=$(( 0x37 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2=$(( 0x4D ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT=$(( 0x4C ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD=$(( 0x4A ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD=$(( 0x5A ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT=$(( 0x5C ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON=$(( 0x5F ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE=$(( 0x7A ))
+
+	# /* Xeon Phi */
+
+	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL=$(( 0x57 ))
+	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM=$(( 0x85 ))
+	}
+	parse_cpu_details_done=1
+}
+
+is_ucode_blacklisted()
+{
+	parse_cpu_details
+	# if it's not an Intel, don't bother: it's not blacklisted
+	[ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ] || return 1
+	# it also needs to be family=6
+	[ "$cpu_family" = 6 ] || return 1
+	# now, check each known bad microcode
+	# source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c#n105
+	# 2018-02-08 update: https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/02/microcode-update-guidance.pdf
+	# model,stepping,microcode
+	ucode_found="model $cpu_model stepping $cpu_stepping ucode $cpu_ucode"
+	for tuple in \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x0B,0x80 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x0A,0x80 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x09,0x80 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE,0x0A,0x80  \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE,0x09,0x80  \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x03,0x0100013e  \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x02000036  \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x0200003a  \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x0200003c  \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE,0x04,0x28   \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E,0x01,0x1b   \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D,0x02,0x14 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D,0x03,0x07000011 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,0x01,0x0b000023 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,0x01,0x0b000025 \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT,0x01,0x21      \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E,0x01,0x18     \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE,0x03,0x23     \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,0x02,0x3b        \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,0x04,0x10        \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X,0x04,0x42a     \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,0x06,0x61b   \
+		$INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,0x07,0x712
+	do
+		model=$(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f1)
+		stepping=$(( $(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f2) ))
+		ucode=$(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f3)
+		if [ "$cpu_model" = "$model" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" = "$stepping" ] && echo "$cpu_ucode" | grep -qi "^$ucode$"; then
+			_debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: we have a match! ($cpu_model/$cpu_stepping/$cpu_ucode)"
+			return 0
+		fi
+	done
+	_debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: no ($cpu_model/$cpu_stepping/$cpu_ucode)"
+	return 1
+}
+
+is_skylake_cpu()
+{
+	# is this a skylake cpu?
+	# return 0 if yes, 1 otherwise
+	#if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+	#	    boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
+	#		switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+	#		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
+	#		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+	#		case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
+	#		case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
+	#		case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+	#			return true;
+	parse_cpu_details
+	[ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ] || return 1
+	[ "$cpu_family" = 6 ] || return 1
+	if [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE        ] || \
+		[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP  ] || \
+		[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X        ] || \
+		[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE  ] || \
+		[ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP ]; then
+		return 0
+	fi
+	return 1
+}
+
+# check for mode selection inconsistency
+if [ "$opt_live_explicit" = 1 ]; then
+	if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ] || [ -n "$opt_config" ] || [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+		show_usage
+		echo "$0: error: incompatible modes specified, use either --live or --kernel/--config/--map" >&2
+		exit 255
+	fi
+fi
+
+# coreos mode
+if [ "$opt_coreos" = 1 ]; then
+	if ! is_coreos; then
+		_warn "CoreOS mode asked, but we're not under CoreOS!"
+		exit 255
+	fi
+	_warn "CoreOS mode, starting an ephemeral toolbox to launch the script"
+	load_msr
+	load_cpuid
+	mount_debugfs
+	toolbox --ephemeral --bind-ro /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu -- sh -c "dnf install -y binutils which && /media/root$PWD/$0 $* --coreos-within-toolbox"
+	exitcode=$?
+	exit $exitcode
+else
+	if is_coreos; then
+		_warn "You seem to be running CoreOS, you might want to use the --coreos option for better results"
+		_warn
+	fi
+fi
+
+parse_cpu_details
+if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+	# root check (only for live mode, for offline mode, we already checked if we could read the files)
+	if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
+		_warn "Note that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information."
+		_warn "We'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors."
+		_warn "To run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0"
+		_warn
+	fi
+	_info "Checking for vulnerabilities on current system"
+	_info "Kernel is \033[35m$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)\033[0m"
+	_info "CPU is \033[35m$cpu_friendly_name\033[0m"
+
+	# try to find the image of the current running kernel
+	# first, look for the BOOT_IMAGE hint in the kernel cmdline
+	if [ -r /proc/cmdline ] && grep -q 'BOOT_IMAGE=' /proc/cmdline; then
+		opt_kernel=$(grep -Eo 'BOOT_IMAGE=[^ ]+' /proc/cmdline | cut -d= -f2)
+		_debug "found opt_kernel=$opt_kernel in /proc/cmdline"
+		# if we have a dedicated /boot partition, our bootloader might have just called it /
+		# so try to prepend /boot and see if we find anything
+		[ -e "/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$opt_kernel"
+		# special case for CoreOS if we're inside the toolbox
+		[ -e "/media/root/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/media/root/boot/$opt_kernel"
+		_debug "opt_kernel is now $opt_kernel"
+		# else, the full path is already there (most probably /boot/something)
+	fi
+	# if we didn't find a kernel, default to guessing
+	if [ ! -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
+		# Fedora:
+		[ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz" ] && opt_kernel="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz"
+		# Slackare:
+		[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz"             ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz"
+		# Arch:
+		[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-linux"       ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-linux"
+		# Linux-Libre:
+		[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre"
+		# pine64
+		[ -e "/boot/pine64/Image"        ] && opt_kernel="/boot/pine64/Image"
+		# generic:
+		[ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)"
+		[ -e "/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)"
+		[ -e "/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)"
+		# Gentoo:
+		[ -e "/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)"
+		# NixOS:
+		[ -e "/run/booted-system/kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/run/booted-system/kernel"
+		# systemd kernel-install:
+		[ -e "/etc/machine-id" ] && [ -e "/boot/$(cat /etc/machine-id)/$(uname -r)/linux" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$(cat /etc/machine-id)/$(uname -r)/linux"
+	fi
+
+	# system.map
+	if [ -e /proc/kallsyms ] ; then
+		opt_map=/proc/kallsyms
+	elif [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/System.map" ] ; then
+		opt_map="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/System.map"
+	elif [ -e "/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)" ] ; then
+		opt_map="/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)"
+	fi
+
+	# config
+	if [ -e /proc/config.gz ] ; then
+		dumped_config="$(mktemp /tmp/config-XXXXXX)"
+		gunzip -c /proc/config.gz > "$dumped_config"
+		# dumped_config will be deleted at the end of the script
+		opt_config="$dumped_config"
+	elif [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config" ]; then
+		opt_config="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config"
+	elif [ -e "/boot/config-$(uname -r)" ]; then
+		opt_config="/boot/config-$(uname -r)"
+	fi
+else
+	_info "Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel"
+	_info "CPU is \033[35m$cpu_friendly_name\033[0m"
+fi
+
+if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ]; then
+	_verbose "Will use vmlinux image \033[35m$opt_kernel\033[0m"
+else
+	_verbose "Will use no vmlinux image (accuracy might be reduced)"
+	bad_accuracy=1
+fi
+
+if [ -n "$opt_config" ] && ! grep -q '^CONFIG_' "$opt_config"; then
+	# given file is invalid!
+	_warn "The kernel config file seems invalid, was expecting a plain-text file, ignoring it!"
+	opt_config=''
+fi
+
+if [ -n "$dumped_config" ] && [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
+	_verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m/proc/config.gz (decompressed)\033[0m"
+elif [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
+	_verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m$opt_config\033[0m"
+else
+	_verbose "Will use no kconfig (accuracy might be reduced)"
+	bad_accuracy=1
+fi
+
+if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+	_verbose "Will use System.map file \033[35m$opt_map\033[0m"
+else
+	_verbose "Will use no System.map file (accuracy might be reduced)"
+	bad_accuracy=1
+fi
+
+if [ "$bad_accuracy" = 1 ]; then
+	_info "We're missing some kernel info (see -v), accuracy might be reduced"
+fi
+
+if [ -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then
+	if ! which readelf >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		_debug "readelf not found"
+		vmlinux_err="missing 'readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the 'binutils' package"
+	elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then
+		vmlinux_err='kernel image decompression skipped'
+	else
+		extract_vmlinux "$opt_kernel"
+	fi
+else
+	_debug "no opt_kernel defined"
+	vmlinux_err="couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used netboot, this is normal"
+fi
+if [ -z "$vmlinux" ] || [ ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then
+	[ -z "$vmlinux_err" ] && vmlinux_err="couldn't extract your kernel from $opt_kernel"
+else
+	vmlinux_version=$(strings "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep '^Linux version ' | head -1)
+	if [ -z "$vmlinux_version" ]; then
+		# try harder with some kernels (such as Red Hat) that don't have ^Linux version before their version string
+		vmlinux_version=$(strings "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -E '^[[:alnum:]][^[:space:]]+ \([^[:space:]]+\) #[0-9]+ .+ (19|20)[0-9][0-9]$' | head -1)
+	fi
+	if [ -n "$vmlinux_version" ]; then
+		# in live mode, check if the img we found is the correct one
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			_verbose "Kernel image is \033[35m$vmlinux_version"
+			if ! echo "$vmlinux_version" | grep -qF "$(uname -r)" || \
+				! echo "$vmlinux_version" | grep -qF "$(uname -v)"; then
+				_warn "Possible disrepancy between your running kernel and the image we found ($opt_kernel), results might be incorrect"
+			fi
+		else
+			_info "Kernel image is \033[35m$vmlinux_version"
+		fi
+	else
+		_verbose "Kernel image version is unknown"
+	fi
+fi
+
+_info
+
+# end of header stuff
+
+# now we define some util functions and the check_*() funcs, as
+# the user can choose to execute only some of those
+
+sys_interface_check()
+{
+	[ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 0 ] && [ -r "$1" ] || return 1
+	_info_nol "* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: "
+	if grep -qi '^not affected' "$1"; then
+		# Not affected
+		status=OK
+		pstatus green YES "kernel confirms that your CPU is unaffected"
+	elif grep -qi '^mitigation' "$1"; then
+		# Mitigation: PTI
+		status=OK
+		pstatus green YES "kernel confirms that the mitigation is active"
+	elif grep -qi '^vulnerable' "$1"; then
+		# Vulnerable
+		status=VULN
+		pstatus red NO "kernel confirms your system is vulnerable"
+	else
+		status=UNK
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unknown value reported by kernel"
+	fi
+	msg=$(cat "$1")
+	_debug "sys_interface_check: $1=$msg"
+	return 0
+}
+
+check_cpu()
+{
+	_info "\033[1;34mHardware check\033[0m"
+
+	_info     "* Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques"
+	_info     "  * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)"
+	_info_nol "    * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: "
+	if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
+		# try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards)
+		load_msr
+	fi
+	if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
+		spec_ctrl_msr=-1
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
+	else
+		# the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48
+		# here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool
+		# if we get a read error, the MSR is not there. bs has to be 8 for msr
+		# skip=9 because 8*9=72=0x48
+		dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			spec_ctrl_msr=1
+			pstatus green YES
+		else
+			spec_ctrl_msr=0
+			pstatus red NO
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "    * CPU indicates IBRS capability: "
+	# from kernel src: { X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL,        CPUID_EDX,26, 0x00000007, 0 },
+	read_cpuid 7 15 4; ret=$?
+	if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES "SPEC_CTRL feature bit"
+		cpuid_spec_ctrl=1
+	elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?"
+	else
+		pstatus red NO
+	fi
+
+	# hardware support according to kernel
+	if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
+		# the spec_ctrl flag in cpuinfo is set if and only if the kernel sees
+		# that the spec_ctrl cpuinfo bit set. we already check that ourselves above
+		# but let's check it anyway (in verbose mode only)
+		_verbose_nol "    * Kernel has set the spec_ctrl flag in cpuinfo: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw spec_ctrl; then
+				pstatus green YES
+			else
+				pstatus blue NO
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	# IBPB
+	_info     "  * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)"
+	_info_nol "    * PRED_CMD MSR is available: "
+	if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
+	else
+		# the new MSR 'PRED_CTRL' is at offset 0x49, write-only
+		# here we use dd, it's the same as using 'wrmsr 0x49 0' but without needing the wrmsr tool
+		# if we get a write error, the MSR is not there
+		$echo_cmd -ne "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0" | dd of=/dev/cpu/0/msr bs=8 count=1 seek=73 oflag=seek_bytes 2>/dev/null; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES
+		else
+			pstatus red NO
+		fi
+	fi
+
+
+	_info_nol "    * CPU indicates IBPB capability: "
+	# CPUID EAX=0x80000008, ECX=0x00 return EBX[12] indicates support for just IBPB.
+	read_cpuid 2147483656 5 16; ret=$?
+	if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES "IBPB_SUPPORT feature bit"
+	elif [ "$cpuid_spec_ctrl" = 1 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES "SPEC_CTRL feature bit"
+	elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?"
+	else
+		pstatus red NO
+	fi
+
+	# STIBP
+	_info     "  * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)"
+	_info_nol "    * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: "
+	if [ "$spec_ctrl_msr" = 1 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES
+	elif [ "$spec_ctrl_msr" = 0 ]; then
+		pstatus red NO
+	else
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "    * CPU indicates STIBP capability: "
+	# A processor supports STIBP if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[27] as 1
+	read_cpuid 7 15 8; ret=$?
+	if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES
+	elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?"
+	else
+		pstatus red NO
+	fi
+
+	_info     "  * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)"
+	_info_nol "    * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: "
+	cpuid_arch_capabilities=-1
+	# A processor supports STIBP if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[27] as 1
+	read_cpuid 7 15 32; ret=$?
+	if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES
+		cpuid_arch_capabilities=1
+	elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?"
+	else
+		pstatus red NO
+		cpuid_arch_capabilities=0
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "    * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: "
+	capabilities_rdcl_no=-1
+	capabilities_ibrs_all=-1
+	if [ "$cpuid_arch_capabilities" = -1 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+	elif [ "$cpuid_arch_capabilities" != 1 ]; then
+		capabilities_rdcl_no=0
+		capabilities_ibrs_all=0
+		pstatus red NO
+	elif [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then
+		spec_ctrl_msr=-1
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?"
+	else
+		# the new MSR 'ARCH_CAPABILITIES' is at offset 0x10a
+		# here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x10a' but without needing the rdmsr tool
+		# if we get a read error, the MSR is not there. bs has to be 8 for msr
+		capabilities=$(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr bs=8 count=1 skip=266 iflag=skip_bytes 2>/dev/null | od -t u1 -A n | awk '{print $8}'); ret=$?
+		capabilities_rdcl_no=0
+		capabilities_ibrs_all=0
+		if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			_debug "capabilities MSR lower byte is $capabilities (decimal)"
+			[ $(( capabilities & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_rdcl_no=1
+			[ $(( capabilities & 2 )) -eq 2 ] && capabilities_ibrs_all=1
+			_debug "capabilities says rdcl_no=$capabilities_rdcl_no ibrs_all=$capabilities_ibrs_all"
+			if [ "$capabilities_ibrs_all" = 1 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES
+			else
+				pstatus red NO
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "  * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown (RDCL_NO): "
+	if [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = -1 ]; then
+		pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+	elif [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = 1 ]; then
+		pstatus green YES
+	else
+		pstatus blue NO
+	fi
+
+	_info_nol "  * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: "
+	if is_ucode_blacklisted; then
+		pstatus red YES "$ucode_found"
+		_warn
+		_warn "The microcode your CPU is running on is known to cause instability problems,"
+		_warn "such as intempestive reboots or random crashes."
+		_warn "You are advised to either revert to a previous microcode version (that might not have"
+		_warn "the mitigations for Spectre), or upgrade to a newer one if available."
+		_warn
+	else
+		pstatus blue NO "$ucode_found"
+	fi
+
+	_info     "* CPU vulnerability to the three speculative execution attacks variants"
+	for v in 1 2 3; do
+		_info_nol "  * Vulnerable to Variant $v: "
+		if is_cpu_vulnerable $v; then
+			pstatus red YES
+		else
+			pstatus green NO
+		fi
+	done
+
+	_info
+}
+
+check_redhat_canonical_spectre()
+{
+	# if we were already called, don't do it again
+	[ -n "$redhat_canonical_spectre" ] && return
+
+	if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		redhat_canonical_spectre=-1
+	elif [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
+		redhat_canonical_spectre=-2
+	else
+		# Red Hat / Ubuntu specific variant1 patch is difficult to detect,
+		# let's use the same way than the official Red Hat detection script,
+		# and detect their specific variant2 patch. If it's present, it means
+		# that the variant1 patch is also present (both were merged at the same time)
+		if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw noibrs && strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw noibpb; then
+			_debug "found redhat/canonical version of the variant2 patch (implies variant1)"
+			redhat_canonical_spectre=1
+		else
+			redhat_canonical_spectre=0
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+
+###################
+# SPECTRE VARIANT 1
+check_variant1()
+{
+	_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m"
+
+	status=UNK
+	sys_interface_available=0
+	msg=''
+	if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1"; then
+		# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+		# v0.33+: don't. some kernels have backported the array_index_mask_nospec() workaround without
+		# modifying the vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 file. that's bad. we can't trust it when it says Vulnerable :(
+		# see "silent backport" detection at the bottom of this func
+		sys_interface_available=1
+	fi
+	if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+		# no /sys interface (or offline mode), fallback to our own ways
+		_info_nol "* Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: "
+		# vanilla: look for the Linus' mask aka array_index_mask_nospec()
+		# that is inlined at least in raw_copy_from_user (__get_user_X symbols)
+		#mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX
+		#cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX
+		#jae bad_get_user
+		# /* array_index_mask_nospec() are the 2 opcodes that follow */
+		#+sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX
+		#+and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX
+		#ASM_STAC
+		# x86 64bits: jae(0x0f 0x83 0x?? 0x?? 0x?? 0x??) sbb(0x48 0x19 0xd2) and(0x48 0x21 0xd0)
+		# x86 32bits: cmp(0x3b 0x82 0x?? 0x?? 0x00 0x00) jae(0x73 0x??) sbb(0x19 0xd2) and(0x21 0xd0)
+		if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)"
+		elif ! which perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it"
+		else
+			perl -ne '/\x0f\x83....\x48\x19\xd2\x48\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$vmlinux"; ret=$?
+			if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES "$ret occurence(s) found of 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
+				v1_mask_nospec=1
+			else
+				perl -ne '/\x3b\x82..\x00\x00\x73.\x19\xd2\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$vmlinux"; ret=$?
+				if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then
+					pstatus green YES "$ret occurence(s) found of 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()"
+					v1_mask_nospec=1
+				else
+					pstatus red NO
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "* Kernel has the Red Hat/Ubuntu patch: "
+		check_redhat_canonical_spectre
+		if [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = -1 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+		elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = -2 ]; then
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)"
+		elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES
+		else
+			pstatus red NO
+		fi
+
+		if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ] || ( [ "$v1_mask_nospec" != 1 ] && [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" != 1 ] ); then
+			# this is a slow heuristic and we don't need it if we already know the kernel is patched
+			# but still show it in verbose mode
+			_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE instructions following a jump in kernel... "
+			if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)"
+			else
+				if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+					pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+				else
+					# here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurrences of the LFENCE opcode
+					# in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50
+					# in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+)
+					# v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches,
+					# so let's push the threshold to 70.
+					# v0.33+: now only count lfence opcodes after a jump, way less error-prone
+					# non patched kernel have between 0 and 20 matches, patched ones have at least 40-45
+					nb_lfence=$(objdump -d "$vmlinux" | grep -w -B1 lfence | grep -Ewc 'jmp|jne|je')
+					if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 30 ]; then
+						pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence jump-then-lfence instructions found, should be >= 30 (heuristic)"
+					else
+						v1_lfence=1
+						pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence jump-then-lfence instructions found, which is >= 30 (heuristic)"
+					fi
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+
+	else
+		# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
+		msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
+		status=UNK
+	fi
+
+	# report status
+	cve='CVE-2017-5753'
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
+		# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
+		if [ "$v1_mask_nospec" = 1 ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (array_index_mask_nospec)"
+		elif [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 1 ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (Red Hat/Ubuntu patch)"
+		elif [ "$v1_lfence" = 1 ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has PROBABLY been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (jump-then-lfence instructions heuristic)"
+		elif [ "$vmlinux_err" ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve UNK "Couldn't find kernel image or tools missing to execute the checks"
+		else
+			pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability"
+		fi
+	else
+		if [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && [ "$v1_mask_nospec" = 1 ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (silent backport of array_index_mask_nospec)"
+		else
+			[ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && msg="Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+###################
+# SPECTRE VARIANT 2
+check_variant2()
+{
+	_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m"
+
+	status=UNK
+	sys_interface_available=0
+	msg=''
+	if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2"; then
+		# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+		sys_interface_available=1
+	fi
+	if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+		_info     "* Mitigation 1"
+		_info_nol "  * Kernel is compiled with IBRS/IBPB support: "
+		ibrs_can_tell=0
+
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			ibrs_can_tell=1
+			mount_debugfs
+			for dir in \
+				/sys/kernel/debug \
+				/sys/kernel/debug/x86 \
+				/proc/sys/kernel; do
+				if [ -e "$dir/ibrs_enabled" ]; then
+					# if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in
+					# /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled: vanilla
+					# /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled: Red Hat (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301)
+					# /proc/sys/kernel/ibrs_enabled: OpenSUSE tumbleweed
+					pstatus green YES
+					ibrs_knob_dir=$dir
+					ibrs_supported=1
+					ibrs_enabled=$(cat "$dir/ibrs_enabled" 2>/dev/null)
+					_debug "ibrs: found $dir/ibrs_enabled=$ibrs_enabled"
+					if [ -e "$dir/ibpb_enabled" ]; then
+						ibpb_enabled=$(cat "$dir/ibpb_enabled" 2>/dev/null)
+						_debug "ibpb: found $dir/ibpb_enabled=$ibpb_enabled"
+					else
+						ibpb_enabled=-1
+						_debug "ibpb: no ibpb_enabled file in $dir"
+					fi
+					break
+				else
+					_debug "ibrs: $dir/ibrs_enabled file doesn't exist"
+				fi
+			done
+			# on some newer kernels, the spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in /proc/cpuinfo
+			# is set when ibrs has been administratively enabled (usually from cmdline)
+			# which in that case means ibrs is supported *and* enabled for kernel & user
+			# as per the ibrs patch series v3
+			if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 0 ]; then
+				if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw spec_ctrl_ibrs; then
+					_debug "ibrs: found spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in /proc/cpuinfo"
+					ibrs_supported=1
+					# enabled=2 -> kernel & user
+					ibrs_enabled=2
+					# XXX and what about ibpb ?
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+			ibrs_can_tell=1
+			if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then
+				pstatus green YES
+				ibrs_supported=1
+				_debug "ibrs: found '*spec_ctrl*' symbol in $opt_map"
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
+			check_redhat_canonical_spectre
+			if [ "$redhat_canonical_spectre" = 1 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES "Red Hat/Ubuntu patch"
+				ibrs_supported=1
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then
+			if [ "$ibrs_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+				pstatus red NO
+			else
+				# if we're in offline mode without System.map, we can't really know
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "in offline mode, we need System.map to be able to tell"
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		_info     "  * Currently enabled features"
+		_info_nol "    * IBRS enabled for Kernel space: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then
+				# if ibpb=2, ibrs is forcefully=0
+				pstatus blue NO "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints"
+			else
+				# 0 means disabled
+				# 1 is enabled only for kernel space
+				# 2 is enabled for kernel and user space
+				case "$ibrs_enabled" in
+					"")
+						if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
+							pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+						else
+							pstatus red NO
+						fi
+						;;
+					0)
+						pstatus red NO
+						_verbose "    - To enable, \`echo 1 > $ibrs_knob_dir/ibrs_enabled' as root. If you don't have hardware support, you'll get an error."
+						;;
+					1 | 2) pstatus green YES;;
+					*)     pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
+				esac
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "    * IBRS enabled for User space: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then
+				# if ibpb=2, ibrs is forcefully=0
+				pstatus blue NO "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints"
+			else
+				case "$ibrs_enabled" in
+					"")
+						if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
+							pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+						else
+							pstatus red NO
+						fi
+						;;
+					0 | 1)
+						pstatus red NO
+						_verbose "    - To enable, \`echo 2 > $ibrs_knob_dir/ibrs_enabled' as root. If you don't have hardware support, you'll get an error."
+						;;
+					2) pstatus green YES;;
+					*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
+				esac
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "    * IBPB enabled: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			case "$ibpb_enabled" in
+				"")
+					if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
+						pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+					else
+						pstatus red NO
+					fi
+					;;
+				0)
+					pstatus red NO
+					_verbose "    - To enable, \`echo 1 > $ibrs_knob_dir/ibpb_enabled' as root. If you don't have hardware support, you'll get an error."
+					;;
+				1) pstatus green YES;;
+				2) pstatus green YES "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints";;
+				*) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;;
+			esac
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode"
+		fi
+
+		_info "* Mitigation 2"
+		_info_nol "  * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: "
+		# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options
+		if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then
+			if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then
+				pstatus green YES
+				retpoline=1
+				# shellcheck disable=SC2046
+				_debug 'retpoline: found '$(grep '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE' "$opt_config")" in $opt_config"
+			else
+				pstatus red NO
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration"
+		fi
+
+		_info_nol "  * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: "
+		# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm
+		# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles)
+		# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79
+		# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set
+		# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol
+		if [ -e "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2" ]; then
+			if grep -qw Minimal /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2; then
+				pstatus red NO "kernel reports minimal retpoline compilation"
+			elif grep -qw Full /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2; then
+				retpoline_compiler=1
+				pstatus green YES "kernel reports full retpoline compilation"
+			else
+				if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
+					pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+				else
+					pstatus red NO
+				fi
+			fi
+		elif [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+			# look for the symbol
+			if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then
+				retpoline_compiler=1
+				pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map"
+			else
+				if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
+					pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+				else
+					pstatus red NO
+				fi
+			fi
+		elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
+			# look for the symbol
+			if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+				# the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol
+				if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then
+					retpoline_compiler=1
+					pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols"
+				else
+					if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
+						pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+					else
+						pstatus red NO
+					fi
+				fi
+			elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then
+				# if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have
+				# any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary
+				retpoline_compiler=1
+				pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux"
+			else
+				if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
+					pstatus yellow UNKNOWN
+				else
+					pstatus red NO
+				fi
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map"
+			else
+				pstatus red NO
+			fi
+		fi
+	elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
+		# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
+		msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
+		status=UNK
+	fi
+
+	cve='CVE-2017-5715'
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
+		# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
+		if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then
+			pvulnstatus $cve OK "retpoline mitigates the vulnerability"
+		elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if ( [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 ] || [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ] ) && [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS/IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability"
+			elif ( [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 ] || [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ] ) && [ "$ibpb_enabled" = -1 ]; then
+				# IBPB doesn't seem here on this kernel
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS is mitigating the vulnerability"
+			elif [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "Full IBPB is mitigating the vulnerability"
+			elif [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && [ "$cpuid_spec_ctrl" != 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Your kernel is compiled with IBRS but your CPU microcode is lacking support to successfully mitigate the vulnerability"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: IBRS/IBPB will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
+			elif [ "$ibrs_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
+			fi
+		fi
+	else
+		[ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && msg="IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+		pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
+	fi
+}
+
+########################
+# MELTDOWN aka VARIANT 3
+check_variant3()
+{
+	_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m"
+
+	status=UNK
+	sys_interface_available=0
+	msg=''
+	if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown"; then
+		# this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything
+		sys_interface_available=1
+	fi
+	if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then
+		_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): "
+		kpti_support=0
+		kpti_can_tell=0
+		if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then
+			kpti_can_tell=1
+			if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then
+				# shellcheck disable=SC2046
+				_debug 'kpti_support: found option '$(grep -E '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config")" in $opt_config"
+				kpti_support=1
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then
+			# it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch
+			# so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map
+			kpti_can_tell=1
+			if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then
+				_debug "kpti_support: found kpti_force_enabled in $opt_map"
+				kpti_support=1
+			fi
+		fi
+		if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 ] && [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then
+			# same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the
+			# nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option)
+			kpti_can_tell=1
+			if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package"
+			else
+				if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then
+					_debug "kpti_support: found nopti string in $vmlinux"
+					kpti_support=1
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+
+		if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus green YES
+		elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus red NO
+		else
+			pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file"
+		fi
+
+		mount_debugfs
+		_info_nol "* PTI enabled and active: "
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			dmesg_grep="Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled"
+			dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|Kernel page table isolation enabled"
+			dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|x86/pti: Unmapping kernel while in userspace"
+			if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then
+				# vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo
+				_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'pti' flag in /proc/cpuinfo"
+				kpti_enabled=1
+			elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then
+				# kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo
+				_debug "kpti_enabled: found 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo"
+				kpti_enabled=1
+			elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then
+				# Red Hat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
+				kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null)
+				_debug "kpti_enabled: file /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled exists and says: $kpti_enabled"
+			fi
+			if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
+				dmesg_grep "$dmesg_grep"; ret=$?
+				if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+					_debug "kpti_enabled: found hint in dmesg: $dmesg_grepped"
+					kpti_enabled=1
+				elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+					_debug "kpti_enabled: dmesg truncated"
+					kpti_enabled=-1
+				fi
+			fi
+			if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then
+				_debug "kpti_enabled: couldn't find any hint that PTI is enabled"
+				kpti_enabled=0
+			fi
+			if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+				pstatus green YES
+			elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = -1 ]; then
+				pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "dmesg truncated, please reboot and relaunch this script"
+			else
+				pstatus red NO
+			fi
+		else
+			pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode"
+		fi
+
+		# no security impact but give a hint to the user in verbose mode
+		# about PCID/INVPCID cpuid features that must be present to avoid
+		# too big a performance impact with PTI
+		# refs:
+		# https://marc.info/?t=151532047900001&r=1&w=2
+		# https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/mechanical-sympathy/L9mHTbeQLNU
+		if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then
+			_info "* Performance impact if PTI is enabled"
+			_info_nol "  * CPU supports PCID: "
+			if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pcid; then
+				pstatus green YES 'performance degradation with PTI will be limited'
+			else
+				pstatus blue NO 'no security impact but performance will be degraded with PTI'
+			fi
+			_info_nol "  * CPU supports INVPCID: "
+			if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw invpcid; then
+				pstatus green YES 'performance degradation with PTI will be limited'
+			else
+				pstatus blue NO 'no security impact but performance will be degraded with PTI'
+			fi
+		fi
+	elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then
+		# we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only!
+		msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!"
+		status=UNK
+	fi
+
+
+	# Test if the current host is a Xen PV Dom0 / DomU
+	if [ -d "/proc/xen" ]; then
+		# XXX do we have a better way that relying on dmesg?
+		dmesg_grep 'Booting paravirtualized kernel on Xen$'; ret=$?
+		if [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then
+			_warn "dmesg truncated, Xen detection will be unreliable. Please reboot and relaunch this script"
+		elif [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then
+			if [ -e /proc/xen/capabilities ] && grep -q "control_d" /proc/xen/capabilities; then
+				xen_pv_domo=1
+			else
+				xen_pv_domu=1
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+		# checking whether we're running under Xen PV 64 bits. If yes, we are affected by variant3
+		# (unless we are a Dom0)
+		_info_nol "* Running as a Xen PV DomU: "
+		if [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
+			pstatus red YES
+		else
+			pstatus green NO
+		fi
+	fi
+
+	cve='CVE-2017-5754'
+	if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then
+		# override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all
+		pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable"
+	elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then
+		# if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test
+		if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then
+			if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability"
+			elif [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI"
+			elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM, PVH mode, or the Xen hypervisor must have the Xen's own PTI patch"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime"
+			elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then
+				pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+			else
+				pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information"
+			fi
+		fi
+	else
+		if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
+			msg="Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI"
+			status="OK"
+		elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then
+			msg="Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode"
+			status="VULN"
+		elif [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ]; then
+			msg="PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability"
+		fi
+		pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg"
+	fi
+
+	# Warn the user about XSA-254 recommended mitigations
+	if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then
+		_warn
+		_warn "This host is a Xen Dom0. Please make sure that you are running your DomUs"
+		_warn "in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode to prevent any guest-to-host / host-to-guest attacks."
+		_warn
+		_warn "See https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ and XSA-254 for details."
+	fi
+}
+
+check_cpu
+# now run the checks the user asked for
+if [ "$opt_variant1" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
+	check_variant1
+	_info
+fi
+if [ "$opt_variant2" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
+	check_variant2
+	_info
+fi
+if [ "$opt_variant3" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then
+	check_variant3
+	_info
+fi
+
+_info "A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer"
+
+if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "nrpe" ]; then
+	if [ ! -z "$nrpe_vuln" ]; then
+		echo "Vulnerable:$nrpe_vuln"
+	else
+		echo "OK"
+	fi
+fi
+
+if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "json" ]; then
+	_echo 0 "${json_output%?}]"
+fi
+
+if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "prometheus" ]; then
+	echo "# TYPE specex_vuln_status untyped"
+	echo "# HELP specex_vuln_status Exposure of system to speculative execution vulnerabilities"
+	echo "$prometheus_output"
+fi
+
+# exit with the proper exit code
+# [ "$global_critical" = 1 ] && exit 2  # critical
+# [ "$global_unknown"  = 1 ] && exit 3  # unknown
+# exit 0  # ok