hecks 3.10.0 → 3.12.0

data/rust/host/src/platform_signin/verify.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,604 @@
+//! The ordered checks that decide whether a platform sign-in token may be used.
+//!
+//! ## The order is the contract
+//!
+//! The checks run in a fixed order and the first failure is the verdict: the site's cookie, then
+//! the
+//! state, the size, the structure, the header, the key and signature, the claims, the nonce, the
+//! single-use identifier, and last the identity. Three consequences matter:
+//!
+//! - A request that fails early learns nothing about later checks (a forged request with a bad
+//! state
+//!   is not told whether its token was expired).
+//! - The `jti` is spent only after every check before it passed, so an attacker who replays a
+//!   victim's token with the wrong nonce cannot burn it.
+//! - Every refusal is one of the stable [`Reason`] codes, the same ones, in the same order, as the
+//!   issuer's reference verifier.
+//!
+//! ## What the caller supplies
+//!
+//! The query `token` and `state`, the pair of values from the site's own sign-in cookie, and the
+//! time. State and nonce are compared through an injected comparison so a test can see that it is
+//! the one in use; the default hashes both sides and compares fixed-length digests.
+
+use jsonwebtoken::{Algorithm, DecodingKey};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+
+use super::config::PlatformSigninConfig;
+use super::jti::JtiStore;
+use super::jwks::{KeySource, VerifyingKey};
+use super::jws::{CompactJws, JwsFault};
+use super::strict_json::{Json, JsonObject};
+
+/// The only signature algorithm accepted, compared exactly.
+const ALGORITHM: &str = "EdDSA";
+/// The only token type accepted, compared exactly.
+const TOKEN_TYPE: &str = "JWT";
+/// The claims every token must carry, present and not `null`.
+const REQUIRED_CLAIMS: [&str; 11] = [
+    "iss",
+    "aud",
+    "env",
+    "sub",
+    "email",
+    "email_verified",
+    "nonce",
+    "iat",
+    "nbf",
+    "exp",
+    "jti",
+];
+
+/// Why a token was refused; the stable code is the contract with the issuer's reference verifier.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+pub enum Reason {
+    MissingCookie,
+    StateMismatch,
+    TooLarge,
+    Malformed,
+    BadAlg,
+    UnknownKid,
+    BadSignature,
+    BadIss,
+    BadAud,
+    BadEnv,
+    MissingClaim,
+    NotYetValid,
+    Expired,
+    Lifetime,
+    NonceMismatch,
+    Replay,
+    EmailUnverified,
+    SubjectMismatch,
+}
+
+impl Reason {
+    /// Every reason, in the order the checks run.
+    pub const ALL: [Reason; 18] = [
+        Reason::MissingCookie,
+        Reason::StateMismatch,
+        Reason::TooLarge,
+        Reason::Malformed,
+        Reason::BadAlg,
+        Reason::UnknownKid,
+        Reason::BadSignature,
+        Reason::BadIss,
+        Reason::BadAud,
+        Reason::BadEnv,
+        Reason::MissingClaim,
+        Reason::NotYetValid,
+        Reason::Expired,
+        Reason::Lifetime,
+        Reason::NonceMismatch,
+        Reason::Replay,
+        Reason::EmailUnverified,
+        Reason::SubjectMismatch,
+    ];
+
+    /// Returns the stable lowercase code, such as `"bad_aud"`.
+    pub fn code(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Reason::MissingCookie => "missing_cookie",
+            Reason::StateMismatch => "state_mismatch",
+            Reason::TooLarge => "too_large",
+            Reason::Malformed => "malformed",
+            Reason::BadAlg => "bad_alg",
+            Reason::UnknownKid => "unknown_kid",
+            Reason::BadSignature => "bad_signature",
+            Reason::BadIss => "bad_iss",
+            Reason::BadAud => "bad_aud",
+            Reason::BadEnv => "bad_env",
+            Reason::MissingClaim => "missing_claim",
+            Reason::NotYetValid => "not_yet_valid",
+            Reason::Expired => "expired",
+            Reason::Lifetime => "lifetime",
+            Reason::NonceMismatch => "nonce_mismatch",
+            Reason::Replay => "replay",
+            Reason::EmailUnverified => "email_unverified",
+            Reason::SubjectMismatch => "subject_mismatch",
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Finds the reason that has this code.
+    pub fn from_code(code: &str) -> Option<Reason> {
+        Self::ALL.into_iter().find(|reason| reason.code() == code)
+    }
+}
+
+/// A refused token, carrying the stable reason and nothing of the token.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct Refusal {
+    pub reason: Reason,
+}
+
+impl Refusal {
+    /// Returns the stable reason code.
+    pub fn code(&self) -> &'static str {
+        self.reason.code()
+    }
+}
+
+/// The two values the site stored in the browser when it started the sign-in.
+///
+/// An empty value counts as absent: a cookie missing either one is a cookie that was never set.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct SigninCookie {
+    pub nonce: String,
+    pub state: String,
+}
+
+/// What arrived on the callback and what the browser's cookie held.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+pub struct SigninRequest<'a> {
+    /// The `token` query parameter, `None` when absent.
+    pub token: Option<&'a str>,
+    /// The `state` query parameter, `None` when absent.
+    pub state: Option<&'a str>,
+    /// The parsed sign-in cookie, `None` when the browser sent none.
+    pub cookie: Option<&'a SigninCookie>,
+}
+
+/// The claims of a token that passed every check.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub struct VerifiedClaims {
+    pub issuer: String,
+    pub audience: String,
+    pub environment: String,
+    pub subject: String,
+    /// The email, lowercased.
+    pub email: String,
+    pub idp_issuer: Option<String>,
+    pub idp_subject: Option<String>,
+    /// The `roles` claim when it is an array; its string members only.
+    pub roles: Vec<String>,
+    pub nonce: String,
+    pub jti: String,
+    pub issued_at: i64,
+    pub not_before: i64,
+    pub expires_at: i64,
+    /// Every claim as signed.
+    pub all: JsonObject,
+}
+
+/// A comparison of two secrets for equality, injected so tests can observe its use.
+pub type SecureCompare = Box<dyn Fn(&str, &str) -> bool + Send + Sync>;
+
+/// Compares two strings without the timing depending on where they first differ or on their
+/// lengths.
+///
+/// Both sides are hashed first so the comparison runs over equal-length digests.
+pub fn secure_compare(a: &str, b: &str) -> bool {
+    let (left, right) = (Sha256::digest(a.as_bytes()), Sha256::digest(b.as_bytes()));
+    left.iter()
+        .zip(right.iter())
+        .fold(0u8, |difference, (x, y)| difference | (x ^ y))
+        == 0
+}
+
+/// Runs the ordered checks against one issuer, site and environment.
+pub struct Verifier<K: KeySource> {
+    config: PlatformSigninConfig,
+    keys: K,
+    jti_store: JtiStore,
+    compare: SecureCompare,
+}
+
+impl<K: KeySource> Verifier<K> {
+    /// Builds a verifier that uses [`secure_compare`] for state and nonce.
+    pub fn new(config: PlatformSigninConfig, keys: K, jti_store: JtiStore) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            config,
+            keys,
+            jti_store,
+            compare: Box::new(secure_compare),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Replaces the comparison used for state and nonce.
+    pub fn with_compare(mut self, compare: SecureCompare) -> Self {
+        self.compare = compare;
+        self
+    }
+
+    /// Exposes the single-use record, so a caller can share or inspect it.
+    pub fn jti_store(&self) -> &JtiStore {
+        &self.jti_store
+    }
+
+    /// Decides whether a token may be used at `now` (Unix seconds).
+    ///
+    /// # Errors
+    ///
+    /// Returns the [`Refusal`] of the first check that fails, in the order the module documents.
+    /// Never panics on hostile input.
+    pub fn verify(&self, request: &SigninRequest<'_>, now: i64) -> Result<VerifiedClaims, Refusal> {
+        self.run_checks(request, now)
+            .map_err(|reason| Refusal { reason })
+    }
+
+    fn run_checks(&self, request: &SigninRequest<'_>, now: i64) -> Result<VerifiedClaims, Reason> {
+        let cookie = self.check_cookie_and_state(request)?;
+        let jws = parse_token(request.token, self.config.max_token_bytes)?;
+        self.check_signature(&jws, now)?;
+        let claims = &jws.claims;
+        self.check_pinned_claims(claims)?;
+        self.check_times(claims, now)?;
+        self.check_nonce(claims, cookie)?;
+        self.spend_jti(claims, now)?;
+        check_identity(claims)?;
+        Ok(accepted(jws.claims))
+    }
+
+    /// The site's own cookie must be present, and its state must equal the query's.
+    fn check_cookie_and_state<'r>(
+        &self,
+        request: &SigninRequest<'r>,
+    ) -> Result<&'r SigninCookie, Reason> {
+        let cookie = request
+            .cookie
+            .filter(|c| !c.nonce.is_empty() && !c.state.is_empty())
+            .ok_or(Reason::MissingCookie)?;
+        let state = request
+            .state
+            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+            .ok_or(Reason::StateMismatch)?;
+        if (self.compare)(state, &cookie.state) {
+            Ok(cookie)
+        } else {
+            Err(Reason::StateMismatch)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The algorithm is pinned before any key is looked up, so a header can never choose its own
+    /// check.
+    fn check_signature(&self, jws: &CompactJws, now: i64) -> Result<(), Reason> {
+        if jws.header.get_str("alg") != Some(ALGORITHM) {
+            return Err(Reason::BadAlg);
+        }
+        if jws.header.get_str("typ") != Some(TOKEN_TYPE) {
+            return Err(Reason::Malformed);
+        }
+        jws.signature_bytes().ok_or(Reason::Malformed)?;
+        let key = jws
+            .header
+            .get_str("kid")
+            .and_then(|kid| self.keys.key_for(kid, now))
+            .ok_or(Reason::UnknownKid)?;
+        if signature_verifies(&key, jws) {
+            Ok(())
+        } else {
+            Err(Reason::BadSignature)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Presence, then the exact issuer, site and environment, in that order.
+    fn check_pinned_claims(&self, claims: &JsonObject) -> Result<(), Reason> {
+        if REQUIRED_CLAIMS.iter().any(|name| !claims.is_present(name)) {
+            return Err(Reason::MissingClaim);
+        }
+        if claims.get_str("iss") != Some(self.config.issuer_url.as_str()) {
+            return Err(Reason::BadIss);
+        }
+        if claims.get_str("aud") != Some(self.config.site_id.as_str()) {
+            return Err(Reason::BadAud);
+        }
+        if claims.get_str("env") != Some(self.config.environment.as_str()) {
+            return Err(Reason::BadEnv);
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Integer times only, then not-yet-valid, expired and lifetime, in that order.
+    fn check_times(&self, claims: &JsonObject, now: i64) -> Result<(), Reason> {
+        let (iat, nbf, exp) = (
+            integer(claims, "iat"),
+            integer(claims, "nbf"),
+            integer(claims, "exp"),
+        );
+        let (Some(iat), Some(nbf), Some(exp)) = (iat, nbf, exp) else {
+            return Err(Reason::Malformed);
+        };
+        let (now, skew) = (i128::from(now), i128::from(self.config.skew_seconds));
+        if nbf > now.saturating_add(skew) {
+            return Err(Reason::NotYetValid);
+        }
+        if exp <= now.saturating_sub(skew) {
+            return Err(Reason::Expired);
+        }
+        let lifetime = exp.saturating_sub(iat);
+        if (1..=i128::from(self.config.max_lifetime_seconds)).contains(&lifetime) {
+            Ok(())
+        } else {
+            Err(Reason::Lifetime)
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn check_nonce(&self, claims: &JsonObject, cookie: &SigninCookie) -> Result<(), Reason> {
+        match claims.get_str("nonce") {
+            Some(nonce) if (self.compare)(nonce, &cookie.nonce) => Ok(()),
+            _ => Err(Reason::NonceMismatch),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Spends the `jti`. Called only after every check before it passed, so a request that fails
+    /// earlier can never burn a token that belongs to someone else.
+    fn spend_jti(&self, claims: &JsonObject, now: i64) -> Result<(), Reason> {
+        let jti = claims
+            .get_str("jti")
+            .filter(|jti| !jti.is_empty())
+            .ok_or(Reason::Replay)?;
+        let remembered_until = clamp(
+            integer(claims, "exp")
+                .unwrap_or(0)
+                .saturating_add(i128::from(self.config.skew_seconds)),
+        );
+        if self.jti_store.claim(jti, remembered_until, now) {
+            Ok(())
+        } else {
+            Err(Reason::Replay)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn parse_token(token: Option<&str>, max_bytes: usize) -> Result<CompactJws, Reason> {
+    let token = token.ok_or(Reason::Malformed)?;
+    CompactJws::parse(token, max_bytes).map_err(|fault| match fault {
+        JwsFault::TooLarge => Reason::TooLarge,
+        JwsFault::Malformed => Reason::Malformed,
+    })
+}
+
+fn signature_verifies(key: &VerifyingKey, jws: &CompactJws) -> bool {
+    let Ok(decoding_key) = DecodingKey::from_ed_components(key.x()) else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    jsonwebtoken::crypto::verify(
+        &jws.signature_segment,
+        jws.signing_input.as_bytes(),
+        &decoding_key,
+        Algorithm::EdDSA,
+    )
+    .unwrap_or(false)
+}
+
+fn integer(claims: &JsonObject, name: &str) -> Option<i128> {
+    match claims.get(name) {
+        Some(Json::Int(value)) => Some(*value),
+        _ => None,
+    }
+}
+
+fn clamp(value: i128) -> i64 {
+    i64::try_from(value).unwrap_or(if value < 0 { i64::MIN } else { i64::MAX })
+}
+
+/// A verified token must say the provider verified the email, and `sub` must be that email
+/// lowercased.
+fn check_identity(claims: &JsonObject) -> Result<(), Reason> {
+    if claims.get("email_verified") != Some(&Json::Bool(true)) {
+        return Err(Reason::EmailUnverified);
+    }
+    let (Some(email), Some(subject)) = (claims.get_str("email"), claims.get_str("sub")) else {
+        return Err(Reason::Malformed);
+    };
+    if subject == email.to_lowercase() {
+        Ok(())
+    } else {
+        Err(Reason::SubjectMismatch)
+    }
+}
+
+fn accepted(all: JsonObject) -> VerifiedClaims {
+    let text = |name: &str| all.get_str(name).unwrap_or_default().to_string();
+    let optional = |name: &str| all.get_str(name).map(str::to_string);
+    let time = |name: &str| clamp(integer(&all, name).unwrap_or(0));
+    VerifiedClaims {
+        issuer: text("iss"),
+        audience: text("aud"),
+        environment: text("env"),
+        subject: text("sub"),
+        email: text("email").to_lowercase(),
+        idp_issuer: optional("idp_iss"),
+        idp_subject: optional("idp_sub"),
+        roles: role_names(&all),
+        nonce: text("nonce"),
+        jti: text("jti"),
+        issued_at: time("iat"),
+        not_before: time("nbf"),
+        expires_at: time("exp"),
+        all,
+    }
+}
+
+fn role_names(claims: &JsonObject) -> Vec<String> {
+    match claims.get("roles") {
+        Some(Json::Array(items)) => items
+            .iter()
+            .filter_map(|item| {
+                if let Json::Str(role) = item {
+                    Some(role.clone())
+                } else {
+                    None
+                }
+            })
+            .collect(),
+        _ => Vec::new(),
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::platform_signin::test_support::*;
+    use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+
+    const DOCUMENTED_ORDER: &str = "missing_cookie, state_mismatch, too_large, malformed, bad_alg, unknown_kid, bad_signature, \
+         bad_iss, bad_aud, bad_env, missing_claim, not_yet_valid, expired, lifetime, nonce_mismatch, replay, \
+         email_unverified, subject_mismatch";
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_reason_codes_are_the_issuers_codes_in_the_issuers_order() {
+        let codes: Vec<&str> = Reason::ALL.iter().map(|r| r.code()).collect();
+        assert_eq!(codes.join(", "), DOCUMENTED_ORDER);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_code_maps_back_to_its_reason_and_nothing_else_does() {
+        for reason in Reason::ALL {
+            assert_eq!(Reason::from_code(reason.code()), Some(reason));
+        }
+        for text in ["", "BadAud", "bad_aud ", "accept", "refuse", "unknown"] {
+            assert_eq!(Reason::from_code(text), None, "{text:?}");
+        }
+        assert_eq!(
+            Refusal {
+                reason: Reason::Replay
+            }
+            .code(),
+            "replay"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn secure_compare_is_plain_equality_for_equal_different_and_different_length_input() {
+        assert!(secure_compare("", ""));
+        assert!(secure_compare("abc", "abc"));
+        assert!(!secure_compare("abc", "abd"));
+        assert!(!secure_compare("abc", "ab"));
+        assert!(!secure_compare("ab", "abc"));
+        assert!(!secure_compare("", "a"));
+        assert!(!secure_compare("\u{e9}", "e"));
+    }
+
+    type Calls = Arc<Mutex<Vec<(String, String)>>>;
+
+    fn spy() -> (SecureCompare, Calls) {
+        let calls = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
+        let seen = calls.clone();
+        let compare: SecureCompare = Box::new(move |a, b| {
+            seen.lock().unwrap().push((a.to_string(), b.to_string()));
+            a == b
+        });
+        (compare, calls)
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn state_and_nonce_are_compared_through_the_injected_seam() {
+        let (compare, calls) = spy();
+        let verifier = verifier_for(&[&KEY_A]).with_compare(compare);
+        let scenario = Scenario::good();
+        assert!(scenario.run(&verifier).is_ok());
+        let calls = calls.lock().unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            calls.contains(&(STATE.to_string(), STATE.to_string())),
+            "state goes through the seam: {calls:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            calls.contains(&(NONCE.to_string(), NONCE.to_string())),
+            "nonce goes through the seam: {calls:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_seam_that_says_no_refuses_even_equal_state_and_equal_nonce() {
+        let state_refused = verifier_for(&[&KEY_A]).with_compare(Box::new(|a, _| a != STATE));
+        assert_eq!(
+            Scenario::good().run(&state_refused).unwrap_err().reason,
+            Reason::StateMismatch
+        );
+        let nonce_refused = verifier_for(&[&KEY_A]).with_compare(Box::new(|a, _| a != NONCE));
+        assert_eq!(
+            Scenario::good().run(&nonce_refused).unwrap_err().reason,
+            Reason::NonceMismatch
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_seam_that_says_yes_accepts_a_different_state_and_a_different_nonce() {
+        let verifier = verifier_for(&[&KEY_A]).with_compare(Box::new(|_, _| true));
+        let mut scenario = Scenario::good();
+        scenario.state = Some("not-the-cookies-state".into());
+        scenario
+            .claims
+            .insert("nonce".into(), "not-the-cookies-nonce".into());
+        assert!(
+            scenario.run(&verifier).is_ok(),
+            "the verdict is the seam's, nothing else compares them"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_seam_is_not_consulted_for_a_nonce_before_the_earlier_checks_pass() {
+        let (compare, calls) = spy();
+        let verifier = verifier_for(&[&KEY_A]).with_compare(compare);
+        let mut scenario = Scenario::good();
+        scenario.flip_signature = true;
+        assert_eq!(
+            scenario.run(&verifier).unwrap_err().reason,
+            Reason::BadSignature
+        );
+        assert!(
+            calls.lock().unwrap().iter().all(|(a, _)| a == STATE),
+            "only the state was compared"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_good_token_yields_typed_claims_with_the_email_lowercased() {
+        let verifier = verifier_for(&[&KEY_A]);
+        let mut scenario = Scenario::good();
+        scenario
+            .claims
+            .insert("email".into(), "Person@Example.Test".into());
+        let claims = scenario.run(&verifier).expect("accepted");
+        assert_eq!(claims.email, "person@example.test");
+        assert_eq!(claims.subject, "person@example.test");
+        assert_eq!(
+            (
+                claims.issuer.as_str(),
+                claims.audience.as_str(),
+                claims.environment.as_str()
+            ),
+            (ISSUER, SITE, ENVIRONMENT)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(claims.roles, vec!["Admin".to_string()]);
+        assert_eq!(claims.idp_issuer.as_deref(), Some("https://idp.example"));
+        assert_eq!(claims.idp_subject.as_deref(), Some("idp-subject-0001"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            (claims.issued_at, claims.not_before, claims.expires_at),
+            (NOW, NOW, NOW + 60)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(claims.nonce, NONCE);
+        assert_eq!(claims.all.get_str("email"), Some("Person@Example.Test"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_refusal_and_its_debug_text_never_hold_the_token() {
+        let verifier = verifier_for(&[&KEY_A]);
+        let mut scenario = Scenario::good();
+        scenario.flip_signature = true;
+        let token = scenario.token();
+        let refusal = scenario.run(&verifier).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(!format!("{refusal:?} {refusal:#?}").contains(&token[..20]));
+    }
+}