grpc 1.84.1 → 1.85.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/crypto/fipsmodule/rsa/rsa.cc.inc

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+#include <iterator>
+
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/digest.h>
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
@@ -26,40 +28,41 @@
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 #include <openssl/nid.h>
-#include <openssl/thread.h>
 
 #include "../../internal.h"
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
 #include "../bcm_interface.h"
 #include "../bn/internal.h"
 #include "../delocate.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
 
+using namespace bssl;
+
 // RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02 is part of the legacy SSLv23 padding scheme.
 // Cryptography.io depends on this error code.
 OPENSSL_DECLARE_ERROR_REASON(RSA, BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02)
 
 DEFINE_STATIC_EX_DATA_CLASS(g_rsa_ex_data_class)
 
-static int bn_dup_into(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src) {
-  if (src == NULL) {
+static int bn_dup_into(UniquePtr<BIGNUM> *dst, const BIGNUM *src) {
+  if (src == nullptr) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  BN_free(*dst);
-  *dst = BN_dup(src);
-  return *dst != NULL;
+  dst->reset(BN_dup(src));
+  return *dst != nullptr;
 }
 
 RSA *RSA_new_public_key(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e) {
-  RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
-  if (rsa == NULL ||               //
+  RSAImpl *rsa = FromOpaque(RSA_new());
+  if (rsa == nullptr ||            //
       !bn_dup_into(&rsa->n, n) ||  //
       !bn_dup_into(&rsa->e, e) ||  //
       !RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
     RSA_free(rsa);
-    return NULL;
+    return nullptr;
   }
 
   return rsa;
@@ -68,8 +71,8 @@ RSA *RSA_new_public_key(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e) {
 RSA *RSA_new_private_key(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e, const BIGNUM *d,
                          const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *dmp1,
                          const BIGNUM *dmq1, const BIGNUM *iqmp) {
-  RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
-  if (rsa == NULL ||                     //
+  RSAImpl *rsa = FromOpaque(RSA_new());
+  if (rsa == nullptr ||                  //
       !bn_dup_into(&rsa->n, n) ||        //
       !bn_dup_into(&rsa->e, e) ||        //
       !bn_dup_into(&rsa->d, d) ||        //
@@ -80,7 +83,7 @@ RSA *RSA_new_private_key(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e, const BIGNUM *d,
       !bn_dup_into(&rsa->iqmp, iqmp) ||  //
       !RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
     RSA_free(rsa);
-    return NULL;
+    return nullptr;
   }
 
   return rsa;
@@ -88,23 +91,23 @@ RSA *RSA_new_private_key(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e, const BIGNUM *d,
 
 RSA *RSA_new_private_key_no_crt(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e,
                                 const BIGNUM *d) {
-  RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
-  if (rsa == NULL ||               //
+  RSAImpl *rsa = FromOpaque(RSA_new());
+  if (rsa == nullptr ||            //
       !bn_dup_into(&rsa->n, n) ||  //
       !bn_dup_into(&rsa->e, e) ||  //
       !bn_dup_into(&rsa->d, d) ||  //
       !RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
     RSA_free(rsa);
-    return NULL;
+    return nullptr;
   }
 
   return rsa;
 }
 
 RSA *RSA_new_private_key_no_e(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *d) {
-  RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
-  if (rsa == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
+  RSAImpl *rsa = FromOpaque(RSA_new());
+  if (rsa == nullptr) {
+    return nullptr;
   }
 
   rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
@@ -112,16 +115,16 @@ RSA *RSA_new_private_key_no_e(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *d) {
       !bn_dup_into(&rsa->d, d) ||  //
       !RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
     RSA_free(rsa);
-    return NULL;
+    return nullptr;
   }
 
   return rsa;
 }
 
 RSA *RSA_new_public_key_large_e(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e) {
-  RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
-  if (rsa == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
+  RSAImpl *rsa = FromOpaque(RSA_new());
+  if (rsa == nullptr) {
+    return nullptr;
   }
 
   rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_LARGE_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
@@ -129,7 +132,7 @@ RSA *RSA_new_public_key_large_e(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e) {
       !bn_dup_into(&rsa->e, e) ||  //
       !RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
     RSA_free(rsa);
-    return NULL;
+    return nullptr;
   }
 
   return rsa;
@@ -139,9 +142,9 @@ RSA *RSA_new_private_key_large_e(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e,
                                  const BIGNUM *d, const BIGNUM *p,
                                  const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *dmp1,
                                  const BIGNUM *dmq1, const BIGNUM *iqmp) {
-  RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
-  if (rsa == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
+  RSAImpl *rsa = FromOpaque(RSA_new());
+  if (rsa == nullptr) {
+    return nullptr;
   }
 
   rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_LARGE_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
@@ -155,165 +158,151 @@ RSA *RSA_new_private_key_large_e(const BIGNUM *n, const BIGNUM *e,
       !bn_dup_into(&rsa->iqmp, iqmp) ||  //
       !RSA_check_key(rsa)) {
     RSA_free(rsa);
-    return NULL;
+    return nullptr;
   }
 
   return rsa;
 }
 
-RSA *RSA_new(void) { return RSA_new_method(NULL); }
-
-RSA *RSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
-  RSA *rsa = reinterpret_cast<RSA *>(OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(RSA)));
-  if (rsa == NULL) {
-    return NULL;
+RSAImpl::RSAImpl(const ENGINE *engine)
+    : RefCounted(CheckSubClass()),
+      meth(engine ? ENGINE_get_RSA_method(engine) : nullptr) {
+  if (meth == nullptr) {
+    meth = const_cast<RSA_METHOD *>(RSA_default_method());
   }
+  METHOD_ref(meth);
+  flags = meth->flags;
+  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ex_data);
+}
 
-  if (engine) {
-    rsa->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA_method(engine);
-  }
+RSA *RSA_new() { return RSA_new_method(nullptr); }
 
-  if (rsa->meth == NULL) {
-    rsa->meth = (RSA_METHOD *)RSA_default_method();
+RSA *RSA_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
+  UniquePtr<RSAImpl> rsa(New<RSAImpl>(engine));
+  if (rsa == nullptr) {
+    return nullptr;
   }
-  METHOD_ref(rsa->meth);
 
-  rsa->references = 1;
-  rsa->flags = rsa->meth->flags;
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&rsa->lock);
-  CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data);
-
-  if (rsa->meth->init && !rsa->meth->init(rsa)) {
-    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_rsa_ex_data_class_bss_get(), rsa, &rsa->ex_data);
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&rsa->lock);
+  if (rsa->meth->init && !rsa->meth->init(rsa.get())) {
     METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
-    OPENSSL_free(rsa);
-    return NULL;
+    rsa->meth = nullptr;
+    return nullptr;
   }
 
-  return rsa;
+  return rsa.release();
 }
 
 RSA *RSA_new_method_no_e(const ENGINE *engine, const BIGNUM *n) {
-  RSA *rsa = RSA_new_method(engine);
-  if (rsa == NULL || !bn_dup_into(&rsa->n, n)) {
+  RSAImpl *rsa = FromOpaque(RSA_new_method(engine));
+  if (rsa == nullptr || !bn_dup_into(&rsa->n, n)) {
     RSA_free(rsa);
-    return NULL;
+    return nullptr;
   }
   rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
   return rsa;
 }
 
-void RSA_free(RSA *rsa) {
-  if (rsa == NULL) {
-    return;
+RSAImpl::~RSAImpl() {
+  if (meth != nullptr && meth->finish != nullptr) {
+    meth->finish(this);
   }
+  METHOD_unref(meth);
 
-  if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&rsa->references)) {
-    return;
-  }
+  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_rsa_ex_data_class_bss_get(), &ex_data);
+}
 
-  if (rsa->meth->finish) {
-    rsa->meth->finish(rsa);
+void RSA_free(RSA *rsa) {
+  if (rsa != nullptr) {
+    FromOpaque(rsa)->DecRefInternal();
   }
-  METHOD_unref(rsa->meth);
-
-  CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_rsa_ex_data_class_bss_get(), rsa, &rsa->ex_data);
-
-  BN_free(rsa->n);
-  BN_free(rsa->e);
-  BN_free(rsa->d);
-  BN_free(rsa->p);
-  BN_free(rsa->q);
-  BN_free(rsa->dmp1);
-  BN_free(rsa->dmq1);
-  BN_free(rsa->iqmp);
-  rsa_invalidate_key(rsa);
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_cleanup(&rsa->lock);
-  OPENSSL_free(rsa);
 }
 
 int RSA_up_ref(RSA *rsa) {
-  CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&rsa->references);
+  FromOpaque(rsa)->UpRefInternal();
   return 1;
 }
 
-unsigned RSA_bits(const RSA *rsa) { return BN_num_bits(rsa->n); }
+unsigned RSA_bits(const RSA *rsa) {
+  return BN_num_bits(FromOpaque(rsa)->n.get());
+}
 
-const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->n; }
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *rsa) { return FromOpaque(rsa)->n.get(); }
 
-const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->e; }
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *rsa) { return FromOpaque(rsa)->e.get(); }
 
-const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->d; }
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *rsa) { return FromOpaque(rsa)->d.get(); }
 
-const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->p; }
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *rsa) { return FromOpaque(rsa)->p.get(); }
 
-const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->q; }
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *rsa) { return FromOpaque(rsa)->q.get(); }
 
-const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->dmp1; }
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *rsa) {
+  return FromOpaque(rsa)->dmp1.get();
+}
 
-const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->dmq1; }
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *rsa) {
+  return FromOpaque(rsa)->dmq1.get();
+}
 
-const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->iqmp; }
+const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *rsa) {
+  return FromOpaque(rsa)->iqmp.get();
+}
 
 void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_n, const BIGNUM **out_e,
                   const BIGNUM **out_d) {
-  if (out_n != NULL) {
-    *out_n = rsa->n;
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+  if (out_n != nullptr) {
+    *out_n = impl->n.get();
   }
-  if (out_e != NULL) {
-    *out_e = rsa->e;
+  if (out_e != nullptr) {
+    *out_e = impl->e.get();
   }
-  if (out_d != NULL) {
-    *out_d = rsa->d;
+  if (out_d != nullptr) {
+    *out_d = impl->d.get();
   }
 }
 
 void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_p,
                       const BIGNUM **out_q) {
-  if (out_p != NULL) {
-    *out_p = rsa->p;
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+  if (out_p != nullptr) {
+    *out_p = impl->p.get();
   }
-  if (out_q != NULL) {
-    *out_q = rsa->q;
+  if (out_q != nullptr) {
+    *out_q = impl->q.get();
   }
 }
 
-const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *rsa) {
-  // We do not support the id-RSASSA-PSS key encoding. If we add support later,
-  // the |maskHash| field should be filled in for OpenSSL compatibility.
-  return NULL;
-}
-
 void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *rsa, const BIGNUM **out_dmp1,
                          const BIGNUM **out_dmq1, const BIGNUM **out_iqmp) {
-  if (out_dmp1 != NULL) {
-    *out_dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+  if (out_dmp1 != nullptr) {
+    *out_dmp1 = impl->dmp1.get();
   }
-  if (out_dmq1 != NULL) {
-    *out_dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
+  if (out_dmq1 != nullptr) {
+    *out_dmq1 = impl->dmq1.get();
   }
-  if (out_iqmp != NULL) {
-    *out_iqmp = rsa->iqmp;
+  if (out_iqmp != nullptr) {
+    *out_iqmp = impl->iqmp.get();
   }
 }
 
 int RSA_set0_key(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) {
-  if ((rsa->n == NULL && n == NULL) || (rsa->e == NULL && e == NULL)) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+
+  if ((impl->n == nullptr && n == nullptr) ||
+      (impl->e == nullptr && e == nullptr)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (n != NULL) {
-    BN_free(rsa->n);
-    rsa->n = n;
+  if (n != nullptr) {
+    impl->n.reset(n);
   }
-  if (e != NULL) {
-    BN_free(rsa->e);
-    rsa->e = e;
+  if (e != nullptr) {
+    impl->e.reset(e);
   }
-  if (d != NULL) {
-    BN_free(rsa->d);
-    rsa->d = d;
+  if (d != nullptr) {
+    impl->d.reset(d);
   }
 
   rsa_invalidate_key(rsa);
@@ -321,17 +310,18 @@ int RSA_set0_key(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) {
 }
 
 int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) {
-  if ((rsa->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (rsa->q == NULL && q == NULL)) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+
+  if ((impl->p == nullptr && p == nullptr) ||
+      (impl->q == nullptr && q == nullptr)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (p != NULL) {
-    BN_free(rsa->p);
-    rsa->p = p;
+  if (p != nullptr) {
+    impl->p.reset(p);
   }
-  if (q != NULL) {
-    BN_free(rsa->q);
-    rsa->q = q;
+  if (q != nullptr) {
+    impl->q.reset(q);
   }
 
   rsa_invalidate_key(rsa);
@@ -339,23 +329,22 @@ int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) {
 }
 
 int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) {
-  if ((rsa->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) ||
-      (rsa->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) ||
-      (rsa->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+
+  if ((impl->dmp1 == nullptr && dmp1 == nullptr) ||
+      (impl->dmq1 == nullptr && dmq1 == nullptr) ||
+      (impl->iqmp == nullptr && iqmp == nullptr)) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (dmp1 != NULL) {
-    BN_free(rsa->dmp1);
-    rsa->dmp1 = dmp1;
+  if (dmp1 != nullptr) {
+    impl->dmp1.reset(dmp1);
   }
-  if (dmq1 != NULL) {
-    BN_free(rsa->dmq1);
-    rsa->dmq1 = dmq1;
+  if (dmq1 != nullptr) {
+    impl->dmq1.reset(dmq1);
   }
-  if (iqmp != NULL) {
-    BN_free(rsa->iqmp);
-    rsa->iqmp = iqmp;
+  if (iqmp != nullptr) {
+    impl->iqmp.reset(iqmp);
   }
 
   rsa_invalidate_key(rsa);
@@ -365,8 +354,11 @@ int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) {
 static int rsa_sign_raw_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
                                      size_t max_out, const uint8_t *in,
                                      size_t in_len, int padding) {
-  if (rsa->meth->sign_raw) {
-    return rsa->meth->sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+
+  if (impl->meth->sign_raw) {
+    return impl->meth->sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len,
+                                padding);
   }
 
   return rsa_default_sign_raw(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len, padding);
@@ -374,15 +366,18 @@ static int rsa_sign_raw_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out,
 
 int RSA_sign_raw(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
                  const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, int padding) {
-  boringssl_ensure_rsa_self_test();
+  boringssl_ensure_rsa_sign_self_test();
   return rsa_sign_raw_no_self_test(rsa, out_len, out, max_out, in, in_len,
                                    padding);
 }
 
-unsigned RSA_size(const RSA *rsa) { return BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); }
+unsigned RSA_size(const RSA *rsa) {
+  return BN_num_bytes(FromOpaque(rsa)->n.get());
+}
 
 int RSA_is_opaque(const RSA *rsa) {
-  return rsa->meth && (rsa->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_OPAQUE);
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+  return impl->meth && (impl->meth->flags & RSA_FLAG_OPAQUE);
 }
 
 int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
@@ -392,11 +387,13 @@ int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
 }
 
 int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *rsa, int idx, void *arg) {
-  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data, idx, arg);
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+  return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&impl->ex_data, idx, arg);
 }
 
 void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *rsa, int idx) {
-  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&rsa->ex_data, idx);
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+  return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&impl->ex_data, idx);
 }
 
 // SSL_SIG_LENGTH is the size of an SSL/TLS (prior to TLS 1.2) signature: it's
@@ -410,7 +407,7 @@ struct pkcs1_sig_prefix {
   int nid;
   // hash_len is the expected length of the hash function.
   uint8_t hash_len;
-  // len is the number of bytes of |bytes| which are valid.
+  // len is the number of bytes of `bytes` which are valid.
   uint8_t len;
   // bytes contains the DER bytes.
   uint8_t bytes[19];
@@ -428,35 +425,35 @@ static const struct pkcs1_sig_prefix kPKCS1SigPrefixes[] = {
     },
     {
         NID_sha1,
-        BCM_SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+        SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
         15,
         {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05,
          0x00, 0x04, 0x14},
     },
     {
         NID_sha224,
-        BCM_SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+        SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
         19,
         {0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
          0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c},
     },
     {
         NID_sha256,
-        BCM_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+        SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
         19,
         {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
          0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},
     },
     {
         NID_sha384,
-        BCM_SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+        SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
         19,
         {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
          0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},
     },
     {
         NID_sha512,
-        BCM_SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+        SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
         19,
         {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
          0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},
@@ -545,23 +542,25 @@ int RSA_add_pkcs1_prefix(uint8_t **out_msg, size_t *out_msg_len,
   return 0;
 }
 
-int rsa_sign_no_self_test(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest,
-                          size_t digest_len, uint8_t *out, unsigned *out_len,
-                          RSA *rsa) {
-  if (rsa->meth->sign) {
+int bssl::rsa_sign_no_self_test(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest,
+                                size_t digest_len, uint8_t *out,
+                                unsigned *out_len, RSA *rsa) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+
+  if (impl->meth->sign) {
     if (!rsa_check_digest_size(hash_nid, digest_len)) {
       return 0;
     }
-    // All supported digest lengths fit in |unsigned|.
+    // All supported digest lengths fit in `unsigned`.
     assert(digest_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
     static_assert(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE <= UINT_MAX, "digest too long");
-    return rsa->meth->sign(hash_nid, digest, (unsigned)digest_len, out, out_len,
-                           rsa);
+    return impl->meth->sign(hash_nid, digest, (unsigned)digest_len, out,
+                            out_len, rsa);
   }
 
   const unsigned rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
   int ret = 0;
-  uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL;
+  uint8_t *signed_msg = nullptr;
   size_t signed_msg_len = 0;
   int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;
   size_t size_t_out_len;
@@ -591,7 +590,7 @@ err:
 
 int RSA_sign(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
              uint8_t *out, unsigned *out_len, RSA *rsa) {
-  boringssl_ensure_rsa_self_test();
+  boringssl_ensure_rsa_sign_self_test();
 
   return rsa_sign_no_self_test(hash_nid, digest, digest_len, out, out_len, rsa);
 }
@@ -606,7 +605,7 @@ int RSA_sign_pss_mgf1(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
 
   size_t padded_len = RSA_size(rsa);
   uint8_t *padded = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_malloc(padded_len));
-  if (padded == NULL) {
+  if (padded == nullptr) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -618,18 +617,19 @@ int RSA_sign_pss_mgf1(RSA *rsa, size_t *out_len, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out,
   return ret;
 }
 
-int rsa_verify_no_self_test(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest,
-                            size_t digest_len, const uint8_t *sig,
-                            size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa) {
-  if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
+int bssl::rsa_verify_no_self_test(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest,
+                                  size_t digest_len, const uint8_t *sig,
+                                  size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+  if (impl->n == nullptr || impl->e == nullptr) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
     return 0;
   }
 
   const size_t rsa_size = RSA_size(rsa);
-  uint8_t *buf = NULL;
+  uint8_t *buf = nullptr;
   int ret = 0;
-  uint8_t *signed_msg = NULL;
+  uint8_t *signed_msg = nullptr;
   size_t signed_msg_len = 0, len;
   int signed_msg_is_alloced = 0;
 
@@ -651,8 +651,8 @@ int rsa_verify_no_self_test(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest,
     goto out;
   }
 
-  // Check that no other information follows the hash value (FIPS 186-4 Section
-  // 5.5) and it matches the expected hash.
+  // Check that no other information follows the hash value (FIPS 186-5 Section
+  // 5.4) and it matches the expected hash.
   if (len != signed_msg_len || OPENSSL_memcmp(buf, signed_msg, len) != 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
     goto out;
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ out:
 
 int RSA_verify(int hash_nid, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
                const uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_len, RSA *rsa) {
-  boringssl_ensure_rsa_self_test();
+  boringssl_ensure_rsa_verify_self_test();
   return rsa_verify_no_self_test(hash_nid, digest, digest_len, sig, sig_len,
                                  rsa);
 }
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ int RSA_verify_pss_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const uint8_t *digest, size_t digest_len,
 
   size_t em_len = RSA_size(rsa);
   uint8_t *em = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_malloc(em_len));
-  if (em == NULL) {
+  if (em == nullptr) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -715,24 +715,24 @@ static int check_mod_inverse(int *out_ok, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *ainv,
     return 1;
   }
 
-  // Note |bn_mul_consttime| and |bn_div_consttime| do not scale linearly, but
-  // checking |ainv| is in range bounds the running time, assuming |m|'s bounds
+  // Note `bn_mul_consttime` and `bn_div_consttime` do not scale linearly, but
+  // checking `ainv` is in range bounds the running time, assuming `m`'s bounds
   // were checked by the caller.
-  BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+  BN_CTXScope scope(ctx);
   BIGNUM *tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-  int ret = tmp != NULL && bn_mul_consttime(tmp, a, ainv, ctx) &&
-            bn_div_consttime(NULL, tmp, tmp, m, m_min_bits, ctx);
-  if (ret) {
-    *out_ok = constant_time_declassify_int(BN_is_one(tmp));
+  if (tmp == nullptr ||  //
+      !bn_mul_consttime(tmp, a, ainv, ctx) ||
+      !bn_div_consttime(nullptr, tmp, tmp, m, m_min_bits, ctx)) {
+    return 0;
   }
-  BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-  return ret;
+  *out_ok = constant_time_declassify_int(BN_is_one(tmp));
+  return 1;
 }
 
 int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
   // TODO(davidben): RSA key initialization is spread across
-  // |rsa_check_public_key|, |RSA_check_key|, |freeze_private_key|, and
-  // |BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked| as a result of API issues. See
+  // `rsa_check_public_key`, `RSA_check_key`, `freeze_private_key`, and
+  // `BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked` as a result of API issues. See
   // https://crbug.com/boringssl/316. As a result, we inconsistently check RSA
   // invariants. We should fix this and integrate that logic.
 
@@ -740,32 +740,34 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if ((key->p != NULL) != (key->q != NULL)) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(key);
+  if ((impl->p != nullptr) != (impl->q != nullptr)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_ONLY_ONE_OF_P_Q_GIVEN);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  // |key->d| must be bounded by |key->n|. This ensures bounds on |RSA_bits|
+  // `impl->d` must be bounded by `impl->n`. This ensures bounds on `RSA_bits`
   // translate to bounds on the running time of private key operations.
-  if (key->d != NULL &&
-      (BN_is_negative(key->d) || BN_cmp(key->d, key->n) >= 0)) {
+  if (impl->d != nullptr && (BN_is_negative(impl->d.get()) ||
+                             BN_cmp(impl->d.get(), impl->n.get()) >= 0)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_D_OUT_OF_RANGE);
     return 0;
   }
 
-  if (key->d == NULL || key->p == NULL) {
+  if (impl->d == nullptr || impl->p == nullptr) {
     // For a public key, or without p and q, there's nothing that can be
     // checked.
     return 1;
   }
 
   BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
     return 0;
   }
 
   BIGNUM tmp, de, pm1, qm1, dmp1, dmq1;
-  int ok = 0, has_crt_values;
+  int ok = 0;
+  bool has_crt_values;
   unsigned pm1_bits, qm1_bits;
   BN_init(&tmp);
   BN_init(&de);
@@ -775,21 +777,21 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
   BN_init(&dmq1);
 
   // Check that p * q == n. Before we multiply, we check that p and q are in
-  // bounds, to avoid a DoS vector in |bn_mul_consttime| below. Note that
-  // n was bound by |rsa_check_public_key|. This also implicitly checks p and q
+  // bounds, to avoid a DoS vector in `bn_mul_consttime` below. Note that
+  // n was bound by `rsa_check_public_key`. This also implicitly checks p and q
   // are odd, which is a necessary condition for Montgomery reduction.
-  if (BN_is_negative(key->p) ||
-      constant_time_declassify_int(BN_cmp(key->p, key->n) >= 0) ||
-      BN_is_negative(key->q) ||
-      constant_time_declassify_int(BN_cmp(key->q, key->n) >= 0)) {
+  if (BN_is_negative(impl->p.get()) ||
+      constant_time_declassify_int(BN_cmp(impl->p.get(), impl->n.get()) >= 0) ||
+      BN_is_negative(impl->q.get()) ||
+      constant_time_declassify_int(BN_cmp(impl->q.get(), impl->n.get()) >= 0)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
     goto out;
   }
-  if (!bn_mul_consttime(&tmp, key->p, key->q, ctx)) {
+  if (!bn_mul_consttime(&tmp, impl->p.get(), impl->q.get(), ctx)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
     goto out;
   }
-  if (BN_cmp(&tmp, key->n) != 0) {
+  if (BN_cmp(&tmp, impl->n.get()) != 0) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_N_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
     goto out;
   }
@@ -798,16 +800,16 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
   // may be unreduced because other implementations use the Euler totient. We
   // simply check that d * e is one mod p-1 and mod q-1. Note d and e were bound
   // by earlier checks in this function.
-  if (!bn_usub_consttime(&pm1, key->p, BN_value_one()) ||
-      !bn_usub_consttime(&qm1, key->q, BN_value_one())) {
+  if (!bn_usub_consttime(&pm1, impl->p.get(), BN_value_one()) ||
+      !bn_usub_consttime(&qm1, impl->q.get(), BN_value_one())) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
     goto out;
   }
   pm1_bits = BN_num_bits(&pm1);
   qm1_bits = BN_num_bits(&qm1);
-  if (!bn_mul_consttime(&de, key->d, key->e, ctx) ||
-      !bn_div_consttime(NULL, &tmp, &de, &pm1, pm1_bits, ctx) ||
-      !bn_div_consttime(NULL, &de, &de, &qm1, qm1_bits, ctx)) {
+  if (!bn_mul_consttime(&de, impl->d.get(), impl->e.get(), ctx) ||
+      !bn_div_consttime(nullptr, &tmp, &de, &pm1, pm1_bits, ctx) ||
+      !bn_div_consttime(nullptr, &de, &de, &qm1, qm1_bits, ctx)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
     goto out;
   }
@@ -818,21 +820,23 @@ int RSA_check_key(const RSA *key) {
     goto out;
   }
 
-  has_crt_values = key->dmp1 != NULL;
-  if (has_crt_values != (key->dmq1 != NULL) ||
-      has_crt_values != (key->iqmp != NULL)) {
+  has_crt_values = impl->dmp1 != nullptr;
+  if (has_crt_values != (impl->dmq1 != nullptr) ||
+      has_crt_values != (impl->iqmp != nullptr)) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_INCONSISTENT_SET_OF_CRT_VALUES);
     goto out;
   }
 
   if (has_crt_values) {
     int dmp1_ok, dmq1_ok, iqmp_ok;
-    if (!check_mod_inverse(&dmp1_ok, key->e, key->dmp1, &pm1, pm1_bits, ctx) ||
-        !check_mod_inverse(&dmq1_ok, key->e, key->dmq1, &qm1, qm1_bits, ctx) ||
-        // |p| is odd, so |pm1| and |p| have the same bit width. If they didn't,
+    if (!check_mod_inverse(&dmp1_ok, impl->e.get(), impl->dmp1.get(), &pm1,
+                           pm1_bits, ctx) ||
+        !check_mod_inverse(&dmq1_ok, impl->e.get(), impl->dmq1.get(), &qm1,
+                           qm1_bits, ctx) ||
+        // `p` is odd, so `pm1` and `p` have the same bit width. If they didn't,
         // we only need a lower bound anyway.
-        !check_mod_inverse(&iqmp_ok, key->q, key->iqmp, key->p, pm1_bits,
-                           ctx)) {
+        !check_mod_inverse(&iqmp_ok, impl->q.get(), impl->iqmp.get(),
+                           impl->p.get(), pm1_bits, ctx)) {
       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, ERR_LIB_BN);
       goto out;
     }
@@ -878,8 +882,8 @@ static const BN_ULONG kSmallFactorsLimbs[] = {TOBN(0xc4309333, 0x3ef4e3e1),
                                               0x000017b1};
 
 DEFINE_LOCAL_DATA(BIGNUM, g_small_factors) {
-  out->d = (BN_ULONG *)kSmallFactorsLimbs;
-  out->width = OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kSmallFactorsLimbs);
+  out->d = const_cast<BN_ULONG *>(kSmallFactorsLimbs);
+  out->width = std::size(kSmallFactorsLimbs);
   out->dmax = out->width;
   out->neg = 0;
   out->flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
@@ -891,7 +895,7 @@ int RSA_check_fips(RSA *key) {
   }
 
   BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-  if (ctx == NULL) {
+  if (ctx == nullptr) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -902,23 +906,24 @@ int RSA_check_fips(RSA *key) {
 
   // Perform partial public key validation of RSA keys (SP 800-89 5.3.3).
   // Although this is not for primality testing, SP 800-89 cites an RSA
-  // primality testing algorithm, so we use |BN_prime_checks_for_generation| to
+  // primality testing algorithm, so we use `BN_prime_checks_for_generation` to
   // match. This is only a plausibility test and we expect the value to be
   // composite, so too few iterations will cause us to reject the key, not use
   // an implausible one.
   //
-  // |key->e| may be nullptr if created with |RSA_new_private_key_no_e|.
+  // `key->e` may be nullptr if created with `RSA_new_private_key_no_e`.
   enum bn_primality_result_t primality_result;
-  if (key->e == nullptr ||          //
-      BN_num_bits(key->e) <= 16 ||  //
-      BN_num_bits(key->e) > 256 ||  //
-      !BN_is_odd(key->n) ||         //
-      !BN_is_odd(key->e) ||
-      !BN_gcd(&small_gcd, key->n, g_small_factors(), ctx) ||
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(key);
+  if (impl->e.get() == nullptr ||          //
+      BN_num_bits(impl->e.get()) <= 16 ||  //
+      BN_num_bits(impl->e.get()) > 256 ||  //
+      !BN_is_odd(impl->n.get()) ||         //
+      !BN_is_odd(impl->e.get()) ||
+      !BN_gcd(&small_gcd, impl->n.get(), g_small_factors(), ctx) ||
       !BN_is_one(&small_gcd) ||
-      !BN_enhanced_miller_rabin_primality_test(&primality_result, key->n,
+      !BN_enhanced_miller_rabin_primality_test(&primality_result, impl->n.get(),
                                                BN_prime_checks_for_generation,
-                                               ctx, NULL) ||
+                                               ctx, nullptr) ||
       primality_result != bn_non_prime_power_composite) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, RSA_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED);
     ret = 0;
@@ -927,20 +932,20 @@ int RSA_check_fips(RSA *key) {
   BN_free(&small_gcd);
   BN_CTX_free(ctx);
 
-  if (!ret || key->d == NULL || key->p == NULL) {
+  if (!ret || impl->d == nullptr || impl->p == nullptr) {
     // On a failure or on only a public key, there's nothing else can be
     // checked.
     return ret;
   }
 
   // FIPS pairwise consistency test (FIPS 140-2 4.9.2). Per FIPS 140-2 IG,
-  // section 9.9, it is not known whether |rsa| will be used for signing or
+  // section 9.9, it is not known whether `rsa` will be used for signing or
   // encryption, so either pair-wise consistency self-test is acceptable. We
   // perform a signing test.
   uint8_t data[32] = {0};
   unsigned sig_len = RSA_size(key);
   uint8_t *sig = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len));
-  if (sig == NULL) {
+  if (sig == nullptr) {
     return 0;
   }
 
@@ -963,21 +968,29 @@ cleanup:
   return ret;
 }
 
-int rsa_private_transform_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out,
-                                       const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
-  if (rsa->meth->private_transform) {
-    return rsa->meth->private_transform(rsa, out, in, len);
+int bssl::rsa_private_transform_no_self_test(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out,
+                                             const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+
+  if (impl->meth->private_transform) {
+    return impl->meth->private_transform(rsa, out, in, len);
   }
 
   return rsa_default_private_transform(rsa, out, in, len);
 }
 
-int rsa_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
-                          size_t len) {
-  boringssl_ensure_rsa_self_test();
+int bssl::rsa_private_transform(RSA *rsa, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *in,
+                                size_t len) {
+  boringssl_ensure_rsa_sign_self_test();
   return rsa_private_transform_no_self_test(rsa, out, in, len);
 }
 
-int RSA_flags(const RSA *rsa) { return rsa->flags; }
+int RSA_flags(const RSA *rsa) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+  return impl->flags;
+}
 
-int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *rsa, int flags) { return rsa->flags & flags; }
+int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *rsa, int flags) {
+  auto *impl = FromOpaque(rsa);
+  return impl->flags & flags;
+}