grpc 1.84.1 → 1.85.0.pre1

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/rand.cc.inc

@@ -23,125 +23,257 @@
 #include <openssl/chacha.h>
 #include <openssl/ctrdrbg.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
 
 #include "../../bcm_support.h"
+#include "../../mem_internal.h"
 #include "../bcm_interface.h"
 #include "../delocate.h"
 #include "internal.h"
 
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+#include "../entropy/internal.h"
+#endif
+
 
-// It's assumed that the operating system always has an unfailing source of
-// entropy which is accessed via |CRYPTO_sysrand[_for_seed]|. (If the operating
-// system entropy source fails, it's up to |CRYPTO_sysrand| to abort the
-// process—we don't try to handle it.)
+using namespace bssl;
+
+// # Entropy design
+//
+// Each thread gets its own, thread-local DRBG. These are `rand_thread_state`
+// objects. In non-FIPS mode these are seeded from the operating system. It's
+// assumed that the operating system always has an unfailing source of entropy
+// which is accessed via `CRYPTO_sysrand`. (If the operating system entropy
+// source fails, it's up to `CRYPTO_sysrand` to abort the process—we don't try
+// to handle it.)
+//
+// If running in FIPS mode, a compliant entropy source must be used to seed the
+// thread-local DRBGs instead. That is either the BoringCrypto jitter source or,
+// on Android, a source provided by the OS which is accessed via a UNIX domain
+// socket. When seeding from these sources, OS entropy is still used via the
+// "additional data" input to the DRBG. But, from a compliance perspective,
+// this input is irrelevent.
 //
-// In addition, the hardware may provide a low-latency RNG. Intel's rdrand
-// instruction is the canonical example of this. When a hardware RNG is
-// available we don't need to worry about an RNG failure arising from fork()ing
-// the process or moving a VM, so we can keep thread-local RNG state and use it
-// as an additional-data input to CTR-DRBG.
+// Since the jitter source takes some time to run, there is a single jitter
+// source per address space. It's used to seed a DRBG (`core_drbg`) which, in
+// turn, seeds the thread-local DRBGs. Android also uses this core DRBG design
+// in order to keep things more uniform across platforms.
+//
+// The core DRBG will be reseeded in accordance with NIST's reseeding
+// requirements. However, since our DRBG configuration allows for 2**48
+// generate calls before reseeding, it's unlikely that any process would
+// observe a reseed of that DRBG.
+//
+// The thread-local DRBGs mean that we have to worry about the process fork()ing
+// or the underlying VM getting cloned. Thus we try to mix entropy into each
+// generation from the thread-local DRBGs. The hardware may provide a
+// low-latency RNG. (Intel's rdrand instruction is the canonical example of
+// this.) If available, that'll be used for this additional data. Otherwise
+// we'll draw from the OS if it doesn't provide other fork-detection APIs.
 //
 // (We assume that the OS entropy is safe from fork()ing and VM duplication.
 // This might be a bit of a leap of faith, esp on Windows, but there's nothing
 // that we can do about it.)
 
-// kReseedInterval is the number of generate calls made to CTR-DRBG before
-// reseeding.
-static const unsigned kReseedInterval = 4096;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+// This #if-block needs to be outside of the anonymous namespace:
+
+struct core_drbg {
+  CTR_DRBG_STATE drbg;
+  // calls is the number of generate calls made on `drbg` since it was last
+  // (re)seeded. This is bound by `kCoreReseedInterval`.
+  uint64_t calls = 0;
+};
 
-// CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE is the number of bytes in a “block” for the purposes of the
-// continuous random number generator test in FIPS 140-2, section 4.9.2.
-#define CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+DEFINE_BSS_GET(struct core_drbg *, g_core_drbg, = nullptr)
+DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(g_core_drbg_lock)
+#endif  // FIPS
 
 namespace {
+
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
+
+// The number of times we'll generate from the core DRBG before reseeding.
+// This is within the permitted bounds but so high that this effectively means
+// that we'll never reseed it. See SP 800-90Ar1 table 3.
+constexpr uint64_t kCoreReseedInterval = (UINT64_C(1) << 48) - 1;
+constexpr size_t kCoreDRBGEntropySize = 48;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID)
+// Android seeds from a system daemon which is responsible for getting
+// entropy from a validated source.
+void core_drbg_get_entropy(uint8_t entropy[kCoreDRBGEntropySize]) {
+  uint8_t daemon_buffer[BSSL_ENTROPY_DAEMON_RESPONSE_LEN];
+  size_t daemon_buffer_len = sizeof(daemon_buffer);
+  if (!bssl_get_seed_from_daemon(daemon_buffer, &daemon_buffer_len)) {
+    // If the daemon isn't running then fallback to system entropy.
+    CRYPTO_sysrand(entropy, kCoreDRBGEntropySize);
+    return;
+  }
+  SHA384(daemon_buffer, daemon_buffer_len, entropy);
+}
+#else
+// Non-Android platforms use the jitter source.
+void core_drbg_get_entropy(uint8_t entropy[kCoreDRBGEntropySize]) {
+  // This runs the jitter source and takes some milliseconds.
+  for (unsigned i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
+    // The internal health checks of the jitter source may cause spurious
+    // failures, therefore we retry a number of times because failure
+    // to get entropy is fatal.
+    if (entropy::GetSeed(entropy)) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+  fprintf(stderr, "Persistent jitter source failure.\n");
+  BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+}
+#endif
+
+struct core_drbg *core_drbg_get_locked() {
+  struct core_drbg **core = g_core_drbg_bss_get();
+  if (*core != nullptr) {
+    return *core;
+  }
+
+  uint8_t entropy[kCoreDRBGEntropySize];
+  core_drbg_get_entropy(entropy);
+
+  *core = New<core_drbg>();
+  if (!*core) {
+    BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+  }
+
+  uint8_t nonce[CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN] = {0};
+  static constexpr char kPersonalization[] = "BoringSSL";
+  if (!CTR_DRBG_init(&(*core)->drbg, /*df=*/1, entropy, sizeof(entropy), nonce,
+                     reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(kPersonalization),
+                     sizeof(kPersonalization))) {
+    BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+  }
+
+  return *core;
+}
+
+// Draw a seed for a thread-local DRBG from the core DRBG.
+void core_drbg_draw_seed(uint8_t *out_seed, size_t len) {
+  MutexWriteLock lock(g_core_drbg_lock_bss_get());
+
+  struct core_drbg *const core = core_drbg_get_locked();
+  if (core->calls > kCoreReseedInterval) {
+    uint8_t reseed_entropy[kCoreDRBGEntropySize];
+    core_drbg_get_entropy(reseed_entropy);
+    if (!CTR_DRBG_reseed(&core->drbg, reseed_entropy,
+                         /*additional_data=*/nullptr, 0)) {
+      BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+    }
+    core->calls = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (!CTR_DRBG_generate(&core->drbg, out_seed, len,
+                         /*additional_data=*/nullptr, 0)) {
+    BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
+  }
+  core->calls++;
+}
+
+#endif  // BORINGSSL_FIPS
+
+// kReseedInterval is the number of generate calls made to a thread-local
+// CTR-DRBG before reseeding.
+static const unsigned kReseedInterval = 4096;
+
 // rand_thread_state contains the per-thread state for the RNG.
 struct rand_thread_state {
   CTR_DRBG_STATE drbg;
   uint64_t fork_generation;
-  // calls is the number of generate calls made on |drbg| since it was last
-  // (re)seeded. This is bound by |kReseedInterval|.
+  // calls is the number of generate calls made on `drbg` since it was last
+  // (re)seeded. This is bound by `kReseedInterval`.
   unsigned calls;
-  // last_block_valid is non-zero iff |last_block| contains data from
-  // |get_seed_entropy|.
-  int last_block_valid;
-  // fork_unsafe_buffering is non-zero iff, when |drbg| was last (re)seeded,
+  // fork_unsafe_buffering is non-zero iff, when `drbg` was last (re)seeded,
   // fork-unsafe buffering was enabled.
   int fork_unsafe_buffering;
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-  // last_block contains the previous block from |get_seed_entropy|.
-  uint8_t last_block[CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE];
-  // next and prev form a NULL-terminated, double-linked list of all states in
-  // a process.
+  // next and prev form a nullptr-terminated, double-linked list of all states
+  // in a process.
   struct rand_thread_state *next, *prev;
-  // clear_drbg_lock synchronizes between uses of |drbg| and
-  // |rand_thread_state_clear_all| clearing it. This lock should be uncontended
+  // clear_drbg_lock synchronizes between uses of `drbg` and
+  // `rand_thread_state_clear_all` clearing it. This lock should be uncontended
   // in the common case, except on shutdown.
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX clear_drbg_lock;
+  Mutex clear_drbg_lock;
 #endif
 };
+
 }  // namespace
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-// thread_states_list is the head of a linked-list of all |rand_thread_state|
+// thread_states_list is the head of a linked-list of all `rand_thread_state`
 // objects in the process, one per thread. This is needed because FIPS requires
-// that they be zeroed on process exit, but thread-local destructors aren't
-// called when the whole process is exiting.
-DEFINE_BSS_GET(struct rand_thread_state *, thread_states_list, nullptr)
+// the ability to zero them on demand (AS09.28). BoringSSL triggers this with a
+// destructor function.
+DEFINE_BSS_GET(struct rand_thread_state *, thread_states_list, = nullptr)
 DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(thread_states_list_lock)
 
-static void rand_thread_state_clear_all(void) __attribute__((destructor));
-static void rand_thread_state_clear_all(void) {
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+static void rand_thread_state_clear_all() __attribute__((destructor));
+static void rand_thread_state_clear_all() {
+  thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()->LockWrite();
   for (struct rand_thread_state *cur = *thread_states_list_bss_get();
-       cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&cur->clear_drbg_lock);
+       cur != nullptr; cur = cur->next) {
+    cur->clear_drbg_lock.LockWrite();
     CTR_DRBG_clear(&cur->drbg);
   }
+
+  g_core_drbg_lock_bss_get()->LockWrite();
+  struct core_drbg **core = g_core_drbg_bss_get();
+  if (*core) {
+    CTR_DRBG_clear(&(*core)->drbg);
+  }
+
   // The locks are deliberately left locked so that any threads that are still
-  // running will hang if they try to call |BCM_rand_bytes|. It also ensures
-  // |rand_thread_state_free| cannot free any thread state while we've taken the
+  // running will hang if they try to call `BCM_rand_bytes`. It also ensures
+  // `rand_thread_state_free` cannot free any thread state while we've taken the
   // lock.
 }
 #endif
 
-// rand_thread_state_free frees a |rand_thread_state|. This is called when a
+// rand_thread_state_free frees a `rand_thread_state`. This is called when a
 // thread exits.
 static void rand_thread_state_free(void *state_in) {
   struct rand_thread_state *state =
       reinterpret_cast<rand_thread_state *>(state_in);
 
-  if (state_in == NULL) {
+  if (state_in == nullptr) {
     return;
   }
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+  thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()->LockWrite();
 
-  if (state->prev != NULL) {
+  if (state->prev != nullptr) {
     state->prev->next = state->next;
   } else if (*thread_states_list_bss_get() == state) {
-    // |state->prev| may be NULL either if it is the head of the list,
-    // or if |state| is freed before it was added to the list at all.
+    // `state->prev` may be nullptr either if it is the head of the list,
+    // or if `state` is freed before it was added to the list at all.
     // Compare against the head of the list to distinguish these cases.
     *thread_states_list_bss_get() = state->next;
   }
 
-  if (state->next != NULL) {
+  if (state->next != nullptr) {
     state->next->prev = state->prev;
   }
 
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+  thread_states_list_lock_bss_get()->UnlockWrite();
 
   CTR_DRBG_clear(&state->drbg);
 #endif
 
-  OPENSSL_free(state);
+  Delete(state);
 }
 
 #if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && \
     !defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
-// rdrand should only be called if either |have_rdrand| or |have_fast_rdrand|
+// rdrand should only be called if either `have_rdrand` or `have_fast_rdrand`
 // returned true.
 static int rdrand(uint8_t *buf, const size_t len) {
   const size_t len_multiple8 = len & ~7;
@@ -169,7 +301,7 @@ static int rdrand(uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { return 0; }
 
 #endif
 
-bcm_status BCM_rand_bytes_hwrng(uint8_t *buf, const size_t len) {
+bcm_status bssl::BCM_rand_bytes_hwrng(uint8_t *buf, const size_t len) {
   if (!have_rdrand()) {
     return bcm_status::failure;
   }
@@ -181,155 +313,32 @@ bcm_status BCM_rand_bytes_hwrng(uint8_t *buf, const size_t len) {
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
 
-// In passive entropy mode, entropy is supplied from outside of the module via
-// |BCM_rand_load_entropy| and is stored in global instance of the following
-// structure.
-
-struct entropy_buffer {
-  // bytes contains entropy suitable for seeding a DRBG.
-  uint8_t
-      bytes[CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE + CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD];
-  // bytes_valid indicates the number of bytes of |bytes| that contain valid
-  // data.
-  size_t bytes_valid;
-  // want_additional_input is true if any of the contents of |bytes| were
-  // obtained via a method other than from the kernel. In these cases entropy
-  // from the kernel is also provided via an additional input to the DRBG.
-  int want_additional_input;
-};
-
-DEFINE_BSS_GET(struct entropy_buffer, entropy_buffer, {})
-DEFINE_STATIC_MUTEX(entropy_buffer_lock)
-
-bcm_infallible BCM_rand_load_entropy(const uint8_t *entropy, size_t entropy_len,
-                                     int want_additional_input) {
-  struct entropy_buffer *const buffer = entropy_buffer_bss_get();
-
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
-  const size_t space = sizeof(buffer->bytes) - buffer->bytes_valid;
-  if (entropy_len > space) {
-    entropy_len = space;
-  }
-
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(&buffer->bytes[buffer->bytes_valid], entropy, entropy_len);
-  buffer->bytes_valid += entropy_len;
-  buffer->want_additional_input |= want_additional_input && (entropy_len != 0);
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
-  return bcm_infallible::not_approved;
-}
-
-// get_seed_entropy fills |out_entropy_len| bytes of |out_entropy| from the
-// global |entropy_buffer|.
-static void get_seed_entropy(uint8_t *out_entropy, size_t out_entropy_len,
-                             int *out_want_additional_input) {
-  struct entropy_buffer *const buffer = entropy_buffer_bss_get();
-  if (out_entropy_len > sizeof(buffer->bytes)) {
-    abort();
-  }
-
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
-  while (buffer->bytes_valid < out_entropy_len) {
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
-    RAND_need_entropy(out_entropy_len - buffer->bytes_valid);
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
-  }
-
-  *out_want_additional_input = buffer->want_additional_input;
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(out_entropy, buffer->bytes, out_entropy_len);
-  OPENSSL_memmove(buffer->bytes, &buffer->bytes[out_entropy_len],
-                  buffer->bytes_valid - out_entropy_len);
-  buffer->bytes_valid -= out_entropy_len;
-  if (buffer->bytes_valid == 0) {
-    buffer->want_additional_input = 0;
-  }
-
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(entropy_buffer_lock_bss_get());
-}
-
-// rand_get_seed fills |seed| with entropy. In some cases, it will additionally
-// fill |additional_input| with entropy to supplement |seed|. It sets
-// |*out_additional_input_len| to the number of extra bytes.
+// rand_get_seed fills `seed` with entropy. Since, in FIPS mode, this entropy
+// comes from the jitter source / system daemon, `additional_input` will also be
+// filled with system entropy.
 static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state,
                           uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
-                          uint8_t additional_input[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
+                          uint8_t additional_input[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN],
                           size_t *out_additional_input_len) {
-  uint8_t entropy_bytes[sizeof(state->last_block) +
-                        CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD];
-  uint8_t *entropy = entropy_bytes;
-  size_t entropy_len = sizeof(entropy_bytes);
-
-  if (state->last_block_valid) {
-    // No need to fill |state->last_block| with entropy from the read.
-    entropy += sizeof(state->last_block);
-    entropy_len -= sizeof(state->last_block);
-  }
-
-  int want_additional_input;
-  get_seed_entropy(entropy, entropy_len, &want_additional_input);
-
-  if (!state->last_block_valid) {
-    OPENSSL_memcpy(state->last_block, entropy, sizeof(state->last_block));
-    entropy += sizeof(state->last_block);
-    entropy_len -= sizeof(state->last_block);
-  }
-
-  // See FIPS 140-2, section 4.9.2. This is the “continuous random number
-  // generator test” which causes the program to randomly abort. Hopefully the
-  // rate of failure is small enough not to be a problem in practice.
-  if (CRYPTO_memcmp(state->last_block, entropy, sizeof(state->last_block)) ==
-      0) {
-    fprintf(CRYPTO_get_stderr(), "CRNGT failed.\n");
-    BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
-  }
-
-  assert(entropy_len % CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE == 0);
-  for (size_t i = CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE; i < entropy_len; i += CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-    if (CRYPTO_memcmp(entropy + i - CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE, entropy + i,
-                      CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
-      fprintf(CRYPTO_get_stderr(), "CRNGT failed.\n");
-      BORINGSSL_FIPS_abort();
-    }
-  }
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(state->last_block, entropy + entropy_len - CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE,
-                 CRNGT_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
-  assert(entropy_len == BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD * CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
-  OPENSSL_memcpy(seed, entropy, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
-
-  for (size_t i = 1; i < BORINGSSL_FIPS_OVERREAD; i++) {
-    for (size_t j = 0; j < CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN; j++) {
-      seed[j] ^= entropy[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * i + j];
-    }
-  }
-
-  // If we used something other than system entropy then also
-  // opportunistically read from the system. This avoids solely relying on the
-  // hardware once the entropy pool has been initialized.
-  *out_additional_input_len = 0;
-  if (want_additional_input &&
-      CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(additional_input, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN)) {
-    *out_additional_input_len = CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN;
-  }
+  core_drbg_draw_seed(seed, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
+  CRYPTO_sysrand(additional_input, CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN);
+  *out_additional_input_len = CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN;
 }
 
 #else
 
-// rand_get_seed fills |seed| with entropy. In some cases, it will additionally
-// fill |additional_input| with entropy to supplement |seed|. It sets
-// |*out_additional_input_len| to the number of extra bytes.
+// rand_get_seed fills `seed` with system entropy in a non-FIPS build.
 static void rand_get_seed(struct rand_thread_state *state,
                           uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
-                          uint8_t additional_input[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN],
+                          uint8_t additional_input[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN],
                           size_t *out_additional_input_len) {
-  // If not in FIPS mode, we don't overread from the system entropy source and
-  // we don't depend only on the hardware RDRAND.
-  CRYPTO_sysrand_for_seed(seed, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
+  CRYPTO_sysrand(seed, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN);
   *out_additional_input_len = 0;
 }
 
 #endif
 
-bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(
     uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const uint8_t user_additional_data[32]) {
   if (out_len == 0) {
     return bcm_infallible::approved;
@@ -348,18 +357,12 @@ bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(
   if (!have_fast_rdrand() ||
       !rdrand(additional_data, sizeof(additional_data))) {
     // Without a hardware RNG to save us from address-space duplication, the OS
-    // entropy is used. This can be expensive (one read per |RAND_bytes| call)
+    // entropy is used. This can be expensive (one read per `RAND_bytes` call)
     // and so is disabled when we have fork detection, or if the application has
     // promised not to fork.
     if (fork_generation != 0 || fork_unsafe_buffering) {
       OPENSSL_memset(additional_data, 0, sizeof(additional_data));
-    } else if (!have_rdrand()) {
-      // No alternative so block for OS entropy.
-      CRYPTO_sysrand(additional_data, sizeof(additional_data));
-    } else if (!CRYPTO_sysrand_if_available(additional_data,
-                                            sizeof(additional_data)) &&
-               !rdrand(additional_data, sizeof(additional_data))) {
-      // RDRAND failed: block for OS entropy.
+    } else {
       CRYPTO_sysrand(additional_data, sizeof(additional_data));
     }
   }
@@ -372,25 +375,26 @@ bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(
   struct rand_thread_state *state = reinterpret_cast<rand_thread_state *>(
       CRYPTO_get_thread_local(OPENSSL_THREAD_LOCAL_RAND));
 
-  if (state == NULL) {
-    state = reinterpret_cast<rand_thread_state *>(
-        OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(struct rand_thread_state)));
-    if (state == NULL ||
+  if (state == nullptr) {
+    state = New<rand_thread_state>();
+    if (state == nullptr ||
         !CRYPTO_set_thread_local(OPENSSL_THREAD_LOCAL_RAND, state,
                                  rand_thread_state_free)) {
       // If the system is out of memory, use an ephemeral state on the
       // stack.
+      Delete(state);
       state = &stack_state;
     }
 
-    state->last_block_valid = 0;
     uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
-    uint8_t personalization[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN] = {0};
+    uint8_t personalization[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN] = {0};
     size_t personalization_len = 0;
     rand_get_seed(state, seed, personalization, &personalization_len);
 
-    if (!CTR_DRBG_init(&state->drbg, seed, personalization,
-                       personalization_len)) {
+    if (!CTR_DRBG_init(&state->drbg, /*df=*/true, seed,
+                       sizeof(seed) - CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN,
+                       seed + sizeof(seed) - CTR_DRBG_NONCE_LEN,
+                       personalization, personalization_len)) {
       abort();
     }
     state->calls = 0;
@@ -398,43 +402,42 @@ bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(
     state->fork_unsafe_buffering = fork_unsafe_buffering;
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_init(&state->clear_drbg_lock);
     if (state != &stack_state) {
-      CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
+      MutexWriteLock lock(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
       struct rand_thread_state **states_list = thread_states_list_bss_get();
       state->next = *states_list;
-      if (state->next != NULL) {
+      if (state->next != nullptr) {
         state->next->prev = state;
       }
-      state->prev = NULL;
+      state->prev = nullptr;
       *states_list = state;
-      CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(thread_states_list_lock_bss_get());
     }
 #endif
   }
 
   if (state->calls >= kReseedInterval ||
-      // If we've forked since |state| was last seeded, reseed.
+      // If we've forked since `state` was last seeded, reseed.
       state->fork_generation != fork_generation ||
-      // If |state| was seeded from a state with different fork-safety
-      // preferences, reseed. Suppose |state| was fork-safe, then forked into
+      // If `state` was seeded from a state with different fork-safety
+      // preferences, reseed. Suppose `state` was fork-safe, then forked into
       // two children, but each of the children never fork and disable fork
       // safety. The children must reseed to avoid working from the same PRNG
       // state.
       state->fork_unsafe_buffering != fork_unsafe_buffering) {
     uint8_t seed[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN];
-    uint8_t reseed_additional_data[CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN] = {0};
+    uint8_t reseed_additional_data[CTR_DRBG_SEED_LEN] = {0};
     size_t reseed_additional_data_len = 0;
     rand_get_seed(state, seed, reseed_additional_data,
                   &reseed_additional_data_len);
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-    // Take a read lock around accesses to |state->drbg|. This is needed to
+    // Take a read lock around accesses to `state->drbg`. This is needed to
     // avoid returning bad entropy if we race with
-    // |rand_thread_state_clear_all|.
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&state->clear_drbg_lock);
+    // `rand_thread_state_clear_all`.
+    state->clear_drbg_lock.LockRead();
 #endif
-    if (!CTR_DRBG_reseed(&state->drbg, seed, reseed_additional_data,
-                         reseed_additional_data_len)) {
+    if (!CTR_DRBG_reseed_ex(&state->drbg, seed, sizeof(seed),
+                            reseed_additional_data,
+                            reseed_additional_data_len)) {
       abort();
     }
     state->calls = 0;
@@ -442,7 +445,7 @@ bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(
     state->fork_unsafe_buffering = fork_unsafe_buffering;
   } else {
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&state->clear_drbg_lock);
+    state->clear_drbg_lock.LockRead();
 #endif
   }
 
@@ -461,7 +464,7 @@ bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(
     out += todo;
     out_len -= todo;
     // Though we only check before entering the loop, this cannot add enough to
-    // overflow a |size_t|.
+    // overflow a `size_t`.
     state->calls++;
     first_call = 0;
   }
@@ -471,12 +474,12 @@ bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(
   }
 
 #if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&state->clear_drbg_lock);
+  state->clear_drbg_lock.UnlockRead();
 #endif
   return bcm_infallible::approved;
 }
 
-bcm_infallible BCM_rand_bytes(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
+bcm_infallible bssl::BCM_rand_bytes(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len) {
   static const uint8_t kZeroAdditionalData[32] = {0};
   BCM_rand_bytes_with_additional_data(out, out_len, kZeroAdditionalData);
   return bcm_infallible::approved;