grpc 1.59.2 → 1.62.0

data/third_party/boringssl-with-bazel/src/crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c

@@ -1,888 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
- * 2001.
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/digest.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/obj.h>
-#include <openssl/thread.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-#include "../internal.h"
-#include "../x509/internal.h"
-#include "internal.h"
-
-#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1 | EXFLAG_SS)
-#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
-  (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
-#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
-  (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
-#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
-  (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
-
-static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca);
-static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca);
-static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                       int ca);
-static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca);
-static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                       int ca);
-static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                  int ca);
-static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                        int ca);
-static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
-
-static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b);
-static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
-
-static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
-    {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0,
-     check_purpose_ssl_client, (char *)"SSL client", (char *)"sslclient", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
-     check_purpose_ssl_server, (char *)"SSL server", (char *)"sslserver", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0,
-     check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, (char *)"Netscape SSL server",
-     (char *)"nssslserver", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign,
-     (char *)"S/MIME signing", (char *)"smimesign", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0,
-     check_purpose_smime_encrypt, (char *)"S/MIME encryption",
-     (char *)"smimeencrypt", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign,
-     (char *)"CRL signing", (char *)"crlsign", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, (char *)"Any Purpose",
-     (char *)"any", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper,
-     (char *)"OCSP helper", (char *)"ocsphelper", NULL},
-    {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0,
-     check_purpose_timestamp_sign, (char *)"Time Stamp signing",
-     (char *)"timestampsign", NULL},
-};
-
-#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard) / sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
-
-static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
-
-static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE *const *a, const X509_PURPOSE *const *b) {
-  return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
-}
-
-// As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* I
-// really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
-// things.
-int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) {
-  int idx;
-  const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
-  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (id == -1) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-  idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
-  if (idx == -1) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-  pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-  return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) {
-  if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
-    OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509V3, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  *p = purpose;
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) {
-  if (!xptable) {
-    return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
-  }
-  return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
-}
-
-X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) {
-  if (idx < 0) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) {
-    return xstandard + idx;
-  }
-  return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname) {
-  X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
-  for (int i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
-    xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
-    if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) {
-      return i;
-    }
-  }
-  return -1;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) {
-  X509_PURPOSE tmp;
-  size_t idx;
-
-  if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) {
-    return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
-  }
-  tmp.purpose = purpose;
-  if (!xptable) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &idx, &tmp)) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-  return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
-                     int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
-                     const char *name, const char *sname, void *arg) {
-  X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
-  char *name_dup, *sname_dup;
-
-  // This is set according to what we change: application can't set it
-  flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
-  // This will always be set for application modified trust entries
-  flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
-  // Get existing entry if any
-  int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
-  // Need a new entry
-  if (idx == -1) {
-    if (!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-    ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
-  } else {
-    ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
-  }
-
-  // Duplicate the supplied names.
-  name_dup = OPENSSL_strdup(name);
-  sname_dup = OPENSSL_strdup(sname);
-  if (name_dup == NULL || sname_dup == NULL) {
-    if (name_dup != NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_free(name_dup);
-    }
-    if (sname_dup != NULL) {
-      OPENSSL_free(sname_dup);
-    }
-    if (idx == -1) {
-      OPENSSL_free(ptmp);
-    }
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic
-  if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
-    OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
-    OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
-  }
-  // dup supplied name
-  ptmp->name = name_dup;
-  ptmp->sname = sname_dup;
-  // Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry
-  ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
-  // Set all other flags
-  ptmp->flags |= flags;
-
-  ptmp->purpose = id;
-  ptmp->trust = trust;
-  ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
-  ptmp->usr_data = arg;
-
-  // If its a new entry manage the dynamic table
-  if (idx == -1) {
-    // TODO(davidben): This should be locked. Alternatively, remove the dynamic
-    // registration mechanism entirely. The trouble is there no way to pass in
-    // the various parameters into an |X509_VERIFY_PARAM| directly. You can only
-    // register it in the global table and get an ID.
-    if (!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
-      xptable_free(ptmp);
-      return 0;
-    }
-    if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
-      xptable_free(ptmp);
-      return 0;
-    }
-    sk_X509_PURPOSE_sort(xptable);
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) {
-  if (!p) {
-    return;
-  }
-  if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
-    if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
-      OPENSSL_free(p->name);
-      OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
-    }
-    OPENSSL_free(p);
-  }
-}
-
-void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) {
-  unsigned int i;
-  sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
-  for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) {
-    xptable_free(xstandard + i);
-  }
-  xptable = NULL;
-}
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->purpose; }
-
-char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->name; }
-
-char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->sname; }
-
-int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->trust; }
-
-static int nid_cmp(const void *void_a, const void *void_b) {
-  const int *a = void_a, *b = void_b;
-
-  return *a - *b;
-}
-
-int X509_supported_extension(const X509_EXTENSION *ex) {
-  // This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: that is
-  // those which are used by the verify process. If an extension is
-  // critical and doesn't appear in this list then the verify process will
-  // normally reject the certificate. The list must be kept in numerical
-  // order because it will be searched using bsearch.
-
-  static const int supported_nids[] = {
-      NID_netscape_cert_type,    // 71
-      NID_key_usage,             // 83
-      NID_subject_alt_name,      // 85
-      NID_basic_constraints,     // 87
-      NID_certificate_policies,  // 89
-      NID_ext_key_usage,         // 126
-      NID_policy_constraints,    // 401
-      NID_name_constraints,      // 666
-      NID_policy_mappings,       // 747
-      NID_inhibit_any_policy     // 748
-  };
-
-  int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
-
-  if (ex_nid == NID_undef) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (bsearch(&ex_nid, supported_nids, sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int),
-              sizeof(int), nid_cmp) != NULL) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-  return 0;
-}
-
-static int setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) {
-  X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
-  size_t i;
-  if (dp->reasons) {
-    if (dp->reasons->length > 0) {
-      dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
-    }
-    if (dp->reasons->length > 1) {
-      dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
-    }
-    dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
-  } else {
-    dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
-  }
-  if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-  for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
-    GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
-    if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
-      iname = gen->d.directoryName;
-      break;
-    }
-  }
-  if (!iname) {
-    iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
-  }
-
-  return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
-}
-
-static int setup_crldp(X509 *x) {
-  int j;
-  x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &j, NULL);
-  if (x->crldp == NULL && j != -1) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
-    if (!setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i))) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) {
-  BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
-  ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
-  ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
-  EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
-  size_t i;
-  int j;
-
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&x->lock);
-  const int is_set = x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET;
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&x->lock);
-
-  if (is_set) {
-    return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
-  }
-
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&x->lock);
-  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) {
-    CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
-    return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
-  }
-
-  if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha256(), x->cert_hash, NULL)) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-  }
-  // V1 should mean no extensions ...
-  if (X509_get_version(x) == X509_VERSION_1) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
-  }
-  // Handle basic constraints
-  if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &j, NULL))) {
-    if (bs->ca) {
-      x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
-    }
-    if (bs->pathlen) {
-      if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || !bs->ca) {
-        x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-        x->ex_pathlen = 0;
-      } else {
-        // TODO(davidben): |ASN1_INTEGER_get| returns -1 on overflow,
-        // which currently acts as if the constraint isn't present. This
-        // works (an overflowing path length constraint may as well be
-        // infinity), but Chromium's verifier simply treats values above
-        // 255 as an error.
-        x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
-      }
-    } else {
-      x->ex_pathlen = -1;
-    }
-    BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
-  } else if (j != -1) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-  }
-  // Handle key usage
-  if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, &j, NULL))) {
-    if (usage->length > 0) {
-      x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
-      if (usage->length > 1) {
-        x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
-      }
-    } else {
-      x->ex_kusage = 0;
-    }
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
-    ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
-  } else if (j != -1) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-  }
-  x->ex_xkusage = 0;
-  if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &j, NULL))) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
-      switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
-        case NID_server_auth:
-          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
-          break;
-
-        case NID_client_auth:
-          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
-          break;
-
-        case NID_email_protect:
-          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
-          break;
-
-        case NID_code_sign:
-          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
-          break;
-
-        case NID_ms_sgc:
-        case NID_ns_sgc:
-          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
-          break;
-
-        case NID_OCSP_sign:
-          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
-          break;
-
-        case NID_time_stamp:
-          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
-          break;
-
-        case NID_dvcs:
-          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
-          break;
-
-        case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage:
-          x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU;
-          break;
-      }
-    }
-    sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
-  } else if (j != -1) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, &j, NULL))) {
-    if (ns->length > 0) {
-      x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
-    } else {
-      x->ex_nscert = 0;
-    }
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
-    ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
-  } else if (j != -1) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-  }
-  x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, &j, NULL);
-  if (x->skid == NULL && j != -1) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-  }
-  x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, &j, NULL);
-  if (x->akid == NULL && j != -1) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-  }
-  // Does subject name match issuer ?
-  if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
-    // If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed
-    if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK &&
-        !ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) {
-      x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS;
-    }
-  }
-  x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &j, NULL);
-  if (x->altname == NULL && j != -1) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-  }
-  x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL);
-  if (x->nc == NULL && j != -1) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-  }
-  if (!setup_crldp(x)) {
-    x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
-  }
-
-  for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++) {
-    const X509_EXTENSION *ex = X509_get_ext(x, j);
-    if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) == NID_freshest_crl) {
-      x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
-    }
-    if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) {
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
-      x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
-      break;
-    }
-  }
-  x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
-
-  CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock);
-  return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0;
-}
-
-// check_ca returns one if |x| should be considered a CA certificate and zero
-// otherwise.
-static int check_ca(const X509 *x) {
-  // keyUsage if present should allow cert signing
-  if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  // Version 1 certificates are considered CAs and don't have extensions.
-  if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) {
-    return 1;
-  }
-  // Otherwise, it's only a CA if basicConstraints says so.
-  return ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA));
-}
-
-int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) {
-  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  return check_ca(x);
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca) {
-  if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (ca) {
-    return check_ca(x);
-  }
-  // We need to do digital signatures or key agreement
-  if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  // nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use
-  if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-// Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or
-// key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual
-// key types.
-#define KU_TLS (KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)
-
-static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca) {
-  if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (ca) {
-    return check_ca(x);
-  }
-
-  if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (ku_reject(x, KU_TLS)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                       int ca) {
-  int ret;
-  ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
-  if (!ret || ca) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-  // We need to encipher or Netscape complains
-  if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  return ret;
-}
-
-// purpose_smime returns one if |x| is a valid S/MIME leaf (|ca| is zero) or CA
-// (|ca| is one) certificate, and zero otherwise.
-static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) {
-  if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (ca) {
-    // check nsCertType if present
-    if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) == 0) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-
-    return check_ca(x);
-  }
-  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
-    return (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) == NS_SMIME;
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                    int ca) {
-  int ret;
-  ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
-  if (!ret || ca) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-  if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  return ret;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                       int ca) {
-  int ret;
-  ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
-  if (!ret || ca) {
-    return ret;
-  }
-  if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  return ret;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                  int ca) {
-  if (ca) {
-    return check_ca(x);
-  }
-  if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-// OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that each CA
-// is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
-
-static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) {
-  if (ca) {
-    return check_ca(x);
-  }
-  // leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify()
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
-                                        int ca) {
-  int i_ext;
-
-  // If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate.
-  if (ca) {
-    return check_ca(x);
-  }
-
-  // Check the optional key usage field:
-  // if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
-  // and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
-  // be rejected).
-  if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
-      ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
-       !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required.
-  if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // Extended Key Usage MUST be critical
-  i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *)x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
-  if (i_ext >= 0) {
-    const X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *)x, i_ext);
-    if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) {
-      return 0;
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { return 1; }
-
-// Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. This can be
-// used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates which have been looked
-// up using some simple method such as by subject name. These are: 1. Check
-// issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) 2. If akid(subject) exists
-// check it matches issuer 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports
-// certificate signing returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch,
-// reasons match codes for X509_verify_cert()
-
-int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) {
-  if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
-                    X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) {
-    return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
-  }
-  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer) || !x509v3_cache_extensions(subject)) {
-    return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
-  }
-
-  if (subject->akid) {
-    int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
-    if (ret != X509_V_OK) {
-      return ret;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) {
-    return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
-  }
-  return X509_V_OK;
-}
-
-int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) {
-  if (!akid) {
-    return X509_V_OK;
-  }
-
-  // Check key ids (if present)
-  if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
-      ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) {
-    return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
-  }
-  // Check serial number
-  if (akid->serial &&
-      ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) {
-    return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
-  }
-  // Check issuer name
-  if (akid->issuer) {
-    // Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF
-    // GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but
-    // we only take any notice of the first.
-    GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
-    GENERAL_NAME *gen;
-    X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
-    size_t i;
-    gens = akid->issuer;
-    for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
-      gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
-      if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
-        nm = gen->d.dirn;
-        break;
-      }
-    }
-    if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) {
-      return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
-    }
-  }
-  return X509_V_OK;
-}
-
-uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x) {
-  // Ignore the return value. On failure, |x->ex_flags| will include
-  // |EXFLAG_INVALID|.
-  x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
-  return x->ex_flags;
-}
-
-uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x) {
-  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) {
-    return x->ex_kusage;
-  }
-  return UINT32_MAX;
-}
-
-uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x) {
-  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) {
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) {
-    return x->ex_xkusage;
-  }
-  return UINT32_MAX;
-}
-
-const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x509) {
-  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  return x509->skid;
-}
-
-const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x509) {
-  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->keyid : NULL;
-}
-
-const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x509) {
-  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->issuer : NULL;
-}
-
-const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x509) {
-  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) {
-    return NULL;
-  }
-  return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->serial : NULL;
-}
-
-long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x509) {
-  if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509) || (x509->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0) {
-    return -1;
-  }
-  return x509->ex_pathlen;
-}